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Problems of Communism

JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1986

Book Reviews

Robert Sharlet
Melvin Croan
Vladimir Tismaneanu
Barry M. Schutz

MOSCOW'S AFGHAN WAR

Zalmay Khalilzad

From Mao to Market

Jan S. Prybyla

Gorbachëv and Eastern Europe

Vladimir V. Kusin

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Moscow's Afghan War

Zalmay Khalilzad

In the seventh year of its war in Afghanistan, the USSR is applying increasingly sophisticated military tactics to subdue the country. Moscow is pairing its military efforts with a domestic pacification program and an international campaign to gain legitimacy for a pro-Soviet communist government in Kabul. For their part, the Afghan Mujahedin are contesting Kabul's legitimacy in international forums and holding their own against Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

China's Economic Experiment: From Mao to Market

Jan S. Prybyla

Following a four-year period of adjustment that saw marked improvement in the quantitative performance of China's industry and agriculture, Chinese leaders in 1981 embarked on a new course of economic reform to help cure the economy's qualitative ills. Initially, experiments with free markets and privatization of labor and property were begun in the countryside. In 1985, these experiments were extended to the urban industrial economy. Beijing still faces the problem of reconciling the incompatibility between the market mechanism and central plan institutions.

Gorbachëv and Eastern Europe

Vladimir V. Kusin

Moscow's dealings with Eastern Europe since Mikhail Gorbachëv's accession have been generally characterized by continuity. Policies of bloc integration and military cooperation have been pursued with little significant change beyond a modest increase in Soviet vigor. Gorbachëv's steps to date have offered little prospect of improving economic performance, the Achilles' heel of the region.

Essay-reviews

Politics of Soviet Law

Robert Sharlet

Although "socialist legality" is no longer 99 percent political, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union continues to interfere in the everyday administration of justice—a point well illustrated by recent émigré Soviet jurists. The interplay between politics and law in the USSR raises the question as to what, if any, positive role Soviet jurists can play in shaping the system's future.

(Abstracts continued on reverse side)

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Last Stages of Leninism

Melvin Croan

The survival of the Soviet system depends on its ability to meet the challenge of change. To meet this challenge, the Soviet leadership needs to abandon crucial tenets of Leninist ideology; but such a step would undermine the Soviet party-state's claim to legitimacy.

Limits of Critical Marxism

Vladimir Tismaneanu

The potential contribution of Eastern Europe's critical Marxists is severely limited by their unwillingness or inability to discard the fundamental Marxist categories that buttress the dictatorial Soviet-type regimes they so cogently criticize in their writings. This contradiction is revealed in several books by or about the Budapest School and the philosophers that coalesced around the Yugoslav journal *Praxis*.

Soviet Designs on Africa

Barry M. Schutz

The Soviet Union stepped up its involvement in Africa between 1975 and 1979. The hallmarks of this period were the USSR's use of military surrogates and its enhanced ability to provide quick and massive military assistance. Despite mixed success, the Soviets continue to strive for their ultimate objective in Africa—political advantage over the West.

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Moscow's Afghan War

Zalmay Khalilzad

On December 27, 1985, Moscow's war in Afghanistan entered its seventh year. It has yet to progress according to Soviet expectations. The Soviet-installed regime of Babrak Karmal remains ineffective. The factionalism in the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) remains fierce. But most important, despite a commitment of some 120,000 Soviet troops, the Soviet and Karmal forces have been unable to rout the anti-Soviet, anticommunist forces, the Mujahedin. And so the war goes on.

But this is not the story of a stalemate. Rather, it is a tale of changing Soviet tactics against continued partisan resistance, and of increasing competition between them for the support of the Afghan people at home and for public sentiment abroad. For its part, Moscow is escalating its military efforts and applying political pressure in the hope of undermining the Afghans' will to resist. The greater military effort is accompanied by a large-scale program of "Sovietization" designed to transform Afghan society along socialist lines. Moscow is also renewing its efforts to lessen support for the Mujahedin in states friendly to them, especially Pakistan and Iran. It has allowed the Kabul regime to engage in UN-sponsored indirect talks with Pakistan, in the hope that diplomacy will supplement its military efforts against the Mujahedin. The leaders of the Afghan resistance, for their part, are trying to strengthen a recently formed alliance among seven major factions, bring about greater coordination of military operations in Afghanistan, and adopt new political strategies in international forums. The war in Afghanistan is thus as much a test of will and resolve as it is a clash of opposing forces.

The war has been immensely costly for the Afghan people. Some 4 million, or nearly one in every four of the pre-invasion population, have become refugees in Iran or Pakistan. According to *The New York Times* some 500,000 Afghans have lost their lives since the Soviet invasion.[1] It is also estimated that up to four million Afghans have become displaced within their own country since they have been moving to the cities or to the mountains from the countryside to escape from the fighting.[2] In some parts of Afghanistan famine and malnutrition are common.[3]

Yet, the Soviet Union has also had to pay a higher price for its involvement than Soviet leaders had probably anticipated. Although exact figures are difficult to come by, the estimates are that between 10,000 and 40,000 Soviet soldiers already have lost their lives in Afghanistan.[4] Hundreds of planes, helicopters, tanks, and armored vehicles have been destroyed.[5] Large facilities for accommodating Soviet forces in Afghanistan had to be constructed and some of them have had to be rebuilt or repaired after being attacked by the resistance groups. The direct costs of the six years of war have been estimated at 18 to 36 billion

Zalmay Khalilzad is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science, and a member of the Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University (New York). He is author of Security of Southwest Asia *(1984), and coauthor of* "The Government of God": Iran's Islamic Republic *(1984). The author wishes to thank professors Zbigniew Brzezinski and Robert Jervis for comments on an earlier draft, and the Ford Foundation for a grant to study security issues in the Asian rimland.*

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[1] *The New York Times*, Dec. 10, 1985.

[2] See Statement of G. Hekmatyar to the UN, New York, October 1985.

[3] For a discussion of humanitarian needs, see the statement by Gerald B. Helmand and Richard Schifter submitted to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, US Congress, Dec. 4, 1985.

[4] Estimates of the number of Soviet fatalities vary a great deal. The Mujahedin estimate Soviet losses at 50,000 dead by the end of 1985. The US government estimates that some 10,000 Soviets have died in Afghanistan over the past six years. See *The Washington Post*, Dec. 2, 1985.

[5] According to US government estimates, the Soviets have lost 700 aircraft in Afghanistan. Ibid.

US dollars, not an insignificant amount for an economy that already suffers from serious shortcomings.[6] The Soviets also have had to assume some of the burden of the Afghan economy which has been severely disrupted by the war. Moscow even has had to pay some of Afghanistan's foreign debt.

Afghanistan continues to be a political vulnerability for the Kremlin. To the Soviets' dismay, they are widely seen as being colonialists. The UN General Assembly has called for the departure of "foreign troops" from Afghanistan since 1980 with larger majorities each year. The image of the Red Army has been tarnished by reports of the Soviet soldiers' drug abuse and defections. Soviet human rights abuses, detailed for example in the 1985 UN-sponsored report by Felix Ermacora,[7] the activities around the world of groups supportive of the Mujahedin, and the continuing effectiveness of the principal resistance groups in Afghanistan continue to embarrass Moscow.

In spite of these costs, neither side appears willing to give up the fight or to accept a "political settlement" that does not meet its chief goals. The basic Soviet goal is to assure the continued existence of a friendly communist regime in Afghanistan. The Mujahedin refuse to accept such a regime. Thus, both sides are preparing for a protracted struggle, and each is hoping that time will be on its side.

This article will review the Soviet conduct of the war, as well as Moscow's pacification strategy. It will also look at the resistance forces and their efforts to oppose the Soviet Union both militarily and politically. To gain a better understanding of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, it is instructive to look at Soviet military tactics as they have evolved since the invasion.

Soviet Military Tactics

The Soviets have yet to devise a military strategy which would let them exercise real control over Afghanistan in short order. Their inability to do so has made them change their military tactics repeatedly and increase the number of their troops.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan began in earnest on December 24, 1979 when Soviet airborne troops began to land at Kabul. Within three days, some 5,000 troops had been airlifted to the Afghan capital. With these forces the Soviets overthrew the communist government headed by Hafizullah Amin, disarmed Afghan soldiers in Kabul, and seized important facilities, such as the radio station.[8] As the airborne troops were taking over the Afghan capital, two Soviet motorized rifle divisions crossed the Amu Darya (Oxus River) from Central Asia. More forces followed. By early January 1980, the number of Soviet soldiers had reached 85,000.

The Soviets divided the country into seven military regions. The 201st Motorized Rifle Division, located at Konduz and Fayzabad, had primary responsibility for the security of the northeast. The 16th Motorized Rifle Division, based in Mazar-e-Sharif, was responsible for the security of Balkh province and surrounding areas. The 275th Division, operating out of Jalalabad, was assigned the East-Central region. The 105th Airborne Division and the 360th Motorized Rifle Division were made responsible for the security of Kabul and the surrounding areas. The 54th Division and the 68th Division were responsible for Herat and western Afghanistan. The 357th Motorized Rifle Division was stationed in Qandahar in the southeast. The Soviets also have air assault brigades in various locations. Some 30,000 soldiers based in Soviet Central Asia are held in reserve along the Afghan border for possible use in Afghanistan, especially northern Afghanistan.[9]

The number of Soviet troops stationed in Afghanistan was increased by about 10,000 soldiers annually in 1981, 1982, and 1984. There are indications that in 1985 the increase was between 5,000 and 10,000. Thus, the total number of Soviet troops committed to Afghanistan is approximately 155,000—125,000 inside Afghanistan and some 30,000 on the Afghan border.[10]

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[6] For economic costs of the war, see Joseph J. Collins, "The Soviet Afghan War," in Robert E. Harkavy and Stephanie G. Neuman, Eds., *The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World, Vol. 1*, Lexington, MA, DC Heath, 1985, p. 197; also Nake Kamrany and Leon Poullada, *The Potential of Afghanistan's Society and Institutions to Resist Soviet Penetration and Domination*, Los Angeles, Modelling Research Group, 1985. The authors assert the economic costs could be US$12 billion annually.

[7] The Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, *Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan* (New York), A140-843, Nov. 5, 1985.

[8] As a KGB defector reported, the Soviets deployed in the vicinity of Kabul moved to eliminate Amin with speed and efficiency:

"Along the road, the column was stopped at an Afghan checkpoint. Afghan troops gathered around to find out what was happening. Suddenly the flaps of the front vehicle went up and the Afghans were machine-gunned to the ground. The column rolled on. When it reached the palace, the special troops attacked from three sides, while Colonel Bayerenov led the attack on the palace. The attack got off to a good start. It would have been even better had the leading armored vehicle not got caught up in the palace gates. Moscow wanted no Afghans left to tell the tale of what had happened in the palace. No prisoners were to be taken. Anybody leaving the building was to be shot on sight. Amin was found drinking in a bar on the top floor of the palace. He was shot without question." *Time* (New York), Nov. 22, 1982.

[9] *The New York Times*, Oct. 9, 1980; David Isby, "Afghanistan, 1982: The War Continues," *International Defense Review* (Geneva), No. 11, 1982, and The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1984-1985*, London, IISS, 1985.

[10] US Government sources estimate that the total number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan was 120,000 in the fall of 1985. *The Washington Post*, Dec. 2, 1985.


AFGHANISTAN
Airport
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National Capital
International Boundary
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SOURCE: Prepared for *Problems of Communism* by the Cartographic Services Lab of the Department of Geography of the University of Maryland, College Park, MD, (from US Department of State base maps 504958 and 504959, August 1982).

The Soviets have also upgraded their weapons. MiG-21 aircraft have been replaced by MiG-23 fighters and MiG-27 strike planes. Two squadrons of the sophisticated Su-25's fighters have been deployed in Afghanistan. The Soviets have also dramatically increased the number of Mi-24 helicopter gunships and have introduced a large number of heavy-lift helicopters. The Soviet ground troops are also using much more sophisticated equipment.[11]

Soviet military tactics have changed over the years, indicating a trial-and-error search for approaches that might work. During 1980, believing that the Mujahedin could easily be defeated, the Soviets employed large formations in an offensive strategy against the resistance forces, pursuing them to their strongholds. Intense fighting took place in the eastern and northeastern parts of the country, especially in Konar and Badakhshan provinces. But the Mujahedin —not surprisingly—used different tactics than Moscow expected them to use. Rather than standing in place and fighting a conventional war, they adopted hit-and-run tactics.[12]

Lack of success led Moscow to change its approach. Rather than pursuing the resistance and seeking quick victory, the Soviet forces went on the defensive. They sought to maintain control over the cities and towns, key communication points, military facilities, and main transportation arteries, thus leaving the countryside to the resistance. The shift, which occurred late in 1980, was influenced by two other factors. First, major uprisings occurred in several Afghan cities including Kabul, Herat, Jalalabad, Sorubi, and Aybak.[13] Second, the resistance groups were complicating Soviet logistical problems and the normal economic functioning of the country by attacking the country's lines of communication. The Soviets were, as they continue to be, particularly concerned with threats against the Salang Tunnel on the road linking Kabul to the Soviet border in the north. The Panjshir partisans, led by Ahmed Shah Massud, who is by now the best-known of the Mujahedin commanders, were a continuous threat to the Salang Pass.

The Soviets left the responsibility for pursuing the Mujahedin in the outlying areas largely to the Afghan regular forces under the control of the Karmal government. These forces, however, were much weakened after the Soviet invasion by the defections of between 30,000 and 40,000 soldiers to the Mujahedin.[14] Moscow also began to rely more on small and mobile forces conducting search-and-destroy operations. According to many reports, including a number of documents released by the US government, the Soviets also began to use chemical weapons on a significant scale against the Mujahedin.[15]

Soviet operations in 1981 reflected the new approach. The biggest operations were carried out in Panjshir, because of concern over the security of Salang road, and in the Paghman area which is 16 miles northwest of Kabul. Between June and September both regions were subjected to major attacks by the Soviets. The Soviets responded to an uprising in the city of Qandahar with artillery bombardments.

The disappointing results of the 1981 operations prompted the Soviets to send a high-level delegation headed by First Deputy Defense Minister (now Defense Minister) Sergey Sokolov to Afghanistan at the end of the year. Apparently, Sokolov concluded that the number of Soviet forces was inadequate even for a defensive strategy and recommended that more forces be sent to Afghanistan. While their forces focused on holding the cities and keeping the lines of communication open, the Soviets encouraged Karmal to go on the offensive against the Mujahedin in the rural areas. Karmal exhorted his forces to take "the revolutionary struggle" to the provinces, districts, and villages.

Soviet efforts in 1982 again failed to bring major victories. Soviet forces bombed the Shomali region near Kabul because the Mujahedin had attacked the Bagram Air Base from that area. Moscow also applied substantial force against Herat in July after part of that city fell to the Mujahedin. The Soviets also carried out two offensives in the Panjshir valley to reduce the pressure against the Salang road (May and August). The May offensive was one of the biggest military operations since the invasion, involving some 12,000 to 15,000 soldiers. The Panjshir offensive was followed by a similar move once again against Paghman in June-July.[16] By the end of July, the Kabul regime had

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[11] Joseph J. Collins, "The Soviet-Afghan War," loc. cit., passim.

[12] For a discussion of Soviet military efforts during 1980, see Zalmay Khalilzad, "Soviet Occupied Afghanistan," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November-December 1980; James Hansen, "Afghanistan: the Soviet Experience," *National Defense* (Arlington, VA), Vol. 66, 1982, pp. 20-22; Nearby Observer, "The Afghan-Soviet War: Stalemate or Evolution?" *Middle East Journal* (Washington, DC), Spring 1982.

[13] Henry Bradsher, *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union*, Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1983, p. 208.

[14] Ibid., p. 206.

[15] US Department of State, *Special Report* (Washington, DC), Nos. 98 and 104, 1982

[16] Edward Girardet, "How Stubborn Tribesmen Nibble Russians to Death," *U.S. News and World Report* (Washington, DC), July 12, 1982; and US Department of State, "Afghanistan: Three Years of Occupation," *Special Report*, No. 106, December 1982.

Vying for the Panjshir Valley: at left, a Soviet camp on the perimeter of the strategically important valley in August 1983; at right, resistance leader Ahmad Shah Massud (center), the "Lion of the Panjshir," leads a patrol.

—Nagakura/GAMMA—LIAISON.

declared the area free of Mujahedin. However, in October and November the Soviets carried out yet another offensive against the area. In both Paghman and Panjshir, the Soviet dilemma in 1982 was that when they moved into the area the Mujahedin retreated from the valley to the mountains and then carried out attacks against the Soviets and the Karmal troops at times of their choosing. In order to flush out the Mujahedin from caves where they had hidden, the Soviets continued to use chemical weapons—incapacitants, lethal chemicals, and perhaps even mycotoxin biological weapons. According to US government estimates, some 3,000 deaths resulted from Soviet use of these agents in 1981 and 1982.[17]

It was probably not until 1983 that the Soviet leaders realized that, short of a massive increase in the number of their forces, a quick military victory in Afghanistan was unlikely. Yet, the Soviets did not augment their forces in 1983. Moscow might have begun considering at that point the possibility that the negotiations on a settlement, initiated in 1982 under UN sponsorship, might bring about international acceptance of the Soviet-installed regime. Moscow may also have been reacting to growing international criticism of its conduct of the war, especially the use of chemical agents (which became considerably less frequent during 1983).[18]

From a military viewpoint, 1983 was a mixed year for the Soviets. Having failed to defeat the Mujahedin in Panjshir, the Soviets sought to divide the resistance parties by offering Massud a ceasefire to which he agreed. The ceasefire lasted until spring 1984, and caused some resentment against Massud both within his own group as well as among other resistance leaders. However, in several other areas the Soviets faced increased military pressure. During the summer, Kabul itself, its Bala Hissar barracks, and the Soviet military headquarters and embassy came under attack on a number of occasions. For several months, the Soviets lost control in parts of Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, and Qandahar. To deal with these Mujahedin attacks, the Soviets bombed the western suburbs of Herat in April, causing heavy casualties.[19]

Soviet frustrations led to more modifications in tactics in 1984, including increased attacks on civilians, a greater reliance on Soviet troops, and the establishment of security outposts manned by Soviet troops. The Soviets apparently made a conscious decision to go after civilian targets directly in areas of strong resistance. Crops were burned, animals killed, and houses destroyed. At times, hundreds of civilians were killed. This led to the depopulation of some resistance strongholds—for example, Paghman, and parts of Panjshir, Logar, and Paktia. In some areas, the resistance units now have to bring along their own food supplies since the local population is no longer there to provide it. The object of this policy was to complicate the logistics of the resistance as well as to undermine support for the resistance among the noncombatant population. Moscow might also have intended to increase the number of refugees in Iran and Pakistan in the hope of turning around the positive attitude toward the Mujahedin in both countries.[20]

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[17] US Department of State, *Special Report*, Nos. 98 and 104, 1982; also *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), Sept. 16, 1982.

[18] William Branigan, "Afghanistan: Inside a Soviet War Zone," *The Washington Post*, six-part series, October 1983.

[19] Louis Dupree, "Afghanistan in 1983: And *Still* No Solution," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley, CA), February 1984; Sayed B. Majrooh, "Afghanistan 1983," Afghan Information Center, *Monthly Bulletin* (Peshawar), No. 32-33, November-December 1983; *U.S. News and World Report*, Aug. 1, 1983, p. 22.

The Soviets also began to employ a mix of large conventional forces and small special forces units in their operations. The special forces increasingly engaged in guerrilla-type operations against the Mujahedin. Another innovation was the use of helicopter units for night-time attacks. The use of Soviet forces in challenging resistance control in the countryside increased, thus modifying an earlier tendency to leave that job to Karmal's forces. A large Soviet force was sent to Paktia province during April and May to relieve the besieged Khost military outpost, but failed to achieve this objective.

To make Kabul secure, most villages located within a five-mile radius (extended to 10 miles in 1985) were destroyed. Moscow also increased the number of military posts around the ring. This made large-scale infiltration of the city difficult. As a result, the resistance had to acquire rockets with a greater range so as to hit the Afghan capital. Moscow also increased the number of fixed military posts along important highways, for example, on the roads between Kabul and Konduz, and Kabul and Jalalabad.

The Soviets used a large number of their own forces to attack Panjshir in April. Heavy bombers based in the Soviet Union were used for high-altitude saturation bombing. The Soviets built five garrisons running the length of the Panjshir river valley.[21] Most of the 40,000 civilians still there left the area and have not returned. However, the areas in the mountains remained in Massud's hands. Soviet efforts to kill or capture him also failed. This time, the operation against Panjshir was a bigger success than on previous occasions as it decreased the pressure on the Salang Pass and significantly increased Massud's difficulties. However, Soviet forces in the area were subjected to sustained attacks and also suffered many casualties.

The Panjshir operation was followed by similar attacks in Herat, Takhar, and Qandahar provinces. Again hundreds of civilians were killed because of indiscriminate bombing of residential areas in the cities of Herat and Qandahar. The resistance in turn increased its pressure against Soviet strongholds including the military base Khair Khana (near Kabul), and shelled the city of Kabul itself, causing frequent and serious disruptions in the supply of electricity and other services.[22]

The attacks in 1984 began a new phase in Soviet military policy in Afghanistan which can be characterized as an incremental escalation aimed at breaking the stalemate in the war. In 1985, the Soviets accelerated this trend. They carried out several major offensives against resistance strongholds—Herat was attacked twice, in April and October, Konar in June, Panjshir in July, and Paktia in September.[23]

Soviet military actions in 1985 also had two additional goals. First, the Soviets strengthened their efforts to cut off or limit the supply routes of the Mujahedin. Increased Soviet military activity near the Iranian and Pakistani borders was intended in part to serve this purpose. Lacking the manpower in Afghanistan to seal off the more than 1,500 miles of Pakistani border and the more than 400 mile-long border shared by Afghanistan with Iran, the Soviets have also relied on land mines and occasional special forces operations in the border areas. They are supplementing these efforts by seeking support among the Pashtun tribesmen in the Pakistani border area in the hope that these tribesmen would prevent the Mujahedin from crossing into Afghanistan.[24] According to the Mujahedin, however, Soviet efforts to close the supply routes have made access more difficult but by no means impossible.

By bringing the war closer to the Pakistani and Iranian borders, the Soviets are pursuing their second goal, namely, to induce Pakistan and Iran to cease supporting the Mujahedin.[25] In late 1985 the Soviets carried out two major military offensives close to Pakistani territory in Konar and Paktia. As noted, they are also seeking friends among the tribes living along the Afghan border. Air and ground incursions into Iranian and Pakistani territory have increased. During 1985, there were over 200 such incursions against Pakistan. The Soviet press has been carrying increasingly strident criticisms of Iran's and Pakistan's support for the Mujahedin.

The Sovietization Program

The Soviets are pairing greater military efforts with a substantial political and economic program to mold

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[20] John Keegan, "The Ordeal of Afghanistan," *The Atlantic Monthly* (Boston), November 1985. Kamrany and Poullada, op. cit., p. 121.

[21] "Panjshir—the Seventh Offensive," *Central Asian Survey* (Oxford), Incidental Papers Series, No. 1, 1985.

[22] US Department of State, "Afghanistan: Five Years of Occupation," *Special Report*, No. 120, December 1984.

[23] For reports on these attacks see the fortnightly bulletin, *Afghan Realities*, published by the Afghan Information and Documentation Center, Peshawar, Pakistan. Also see *Monthly Bulletin* and the reports in *Afghanistan Forum* (Washington, DC).

[24] Author's interviews in Pakistan and New York, fall of 1985.

[25] *The Muslim* (Islamabad), Oct. 11, 1985.

Afghan society in the Soviet image.[26] This has produced a crippling dilemma. While the Sovietization program seeks to convert Afghans into loyal supporters of the communist regime, the massive use of force only increases the Afghans' hostility toward the Soviets and the communist regime that they support. Yet, to transform Afghanistan into a pacified Soviet satellite, the Soviets must first subdue the Afghan resistance militarily. Soviet cooptation efforts are unlikely to work as long as Moscow conducts what amounts to a genocidal war against the Afghans. Nevertheless, in the long term, Moscow's program might have some effect, especially if the war goes badly for the Mujahedin.

Moscow's program has many elements, including the expansion of existing Afghan coercive institutions and the creation of new ones under Soviet control. Moscow has sought to increase the size and competence of Kabul's armed forces in hopes of turning the war into a purely Afghan struggle and so gradually ending direct Soviet participation. (Here the Soviets have failed as Soviet direct involvement in the fighting against the Mujahedin has increased.) To augment the regime's forces, draft laws have been changed several times. Each change extended the length of service and lowered the draft age. At times, conscripts were made to remain in service even though they had completed their term. The regime also resorted to press gangs and street roundups of young men for military service. But these measures—accompanied as they are by attacks against civilians and the misuse of Afghan soldiers and officers—have resulted in widespread defections and evasion of military service. Prior to the Soviet invasion the Afghan armed forces had numbered close to 100,000; at present they number between 40,000 and 50,000 men, many of whom are of questionable loyalty and some of whom directly or indirectly aid the Mujahedin. Afghan pilots have been known to drop their bombs in the desert rather than on the target area. On several occasions Afghan regular forces have sabotaged Soviet-controlled military facilities. One dramatic example of this occurred in May 1985 when some 20 aircraft were destroyed by Afghan officers at the Shindand military base. In another instance, officers with ties to the resistance flew two Mi-24 helicopters to Pakistan.[27] In November 1985, four army generals were arrested and reportedly executed for collaborating with the Mujahedin.[28]

Struggles between adherents of the two factions of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA)—the Parcham and Khalq—have particularly affected the armed forces. Although both factions were pro-Soviet, a split occurred in 1967 because of differences over organizational tactics (Khalqis wanted a Leninist-type party based on the working class, while Parchamis preferred a broad national democratic front) and personal rivalries that were compounded by social and ethnic differences (Khalqis are mainly rural Pashtuns while the Parchamis are mostly urbanized and Dari-speaking).

Prior to the Soviet takeover, Khalqi officers dominated the armed forces. However, since 1979 the number of Parchamis, whose leader Karmal was installed in power, has been increasing so fast in the armed forces that they might be now predominant. This is clearly resented by the Khalqis. Khalqi officers have been reluctant to follow the orders of Parchami officers. At times actual battles between the factions have taken place. For example, in June of 1983 fighting in the 25th Division between the two groups raged for three days. Parchamis often accuse Khalqi officers of cooperating with the Mujahedin.[29] For the present, the Soviets appear to have little confidence in these Afghan forces and frequently behave as though they were expendable. Casualties among Kabul regime soldiers have been very high, perhaps three to five times higher than for Soviet soldiers.[30]

The state secret police, KHAD, has grown considerably since the invasion. This KGB-run organization is spreading its influence over the state and party apparatuses. Its status was enhanced officially in 1986 when it became the Ministry of Internal Security. It carries out surveillance over the government and the military, employing a mixture of brutal tactics and economic rewards to undermine popular support for the Mujahedin. It also seeks to infiltrate the resistance and probably has been responsible for the assassinations of several of its commanders. There are reports that KHAD may have more than 20,000 operatives among whom are a number of common thugs. The Soviets run a large training program for KHAD personnel.[31] Although KHAD appears to be considerably more effective than the armed forces, it is embroiled in conflicts with other institutions, notably the military.[32]

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[26] See Khalilzad, "The Soviet Dilemma in Afghanistan," *Current History* (Philadelphia), October 1985, p. 334.

[27] *Afghan Realities*, July 16, 1985 provides details on these acts.

[28] See *Special Report*, No. 135, December 1985, p. 7.

[29] *Monthly Bulletin*, April 1983. On the historical reasons for Parchami-Khalqi rivalry, see Anthony Arnold, *Afghanistan's Two-Party Communism: Parcham and Khalq*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1983.

[30] *The Washington Times*, Jan. 13, 1986.

[31] Henry Bradsher, "Afghanistan," *The Washington Quarterly* (Washington, DC), Summer 1984, p. 51.

The Soviets have also had some successes with the militias whose formation they have promoted. The purpose of the militias is to decrease the military burden on the Soviet and Afghan armed forces and to win over critical local leaders. Local leaders are encouraged to form militias to keep the Mujahedin out of their areas. In return, they are allowed to keep their weapons and receive financial support and weapons from Kabul. The formation of militias has been fostered especially in the border areas to limit the infiltration and resupply of Mujahedin from neighboring states. However, militias in urban institutions, in factories and schools for example, have been created as well. The militias have at times been a significant problem for the resistance, even though some local leaders have sided with the Mujahedin after getting money and weapons from Kabul.

Another form of the Sovietization effort has been the expansion of the Afghan Communist party, the PDPA. Since the original communist coup of 1978, when party membership stood at 5,000, the PDPA has expanded to more than 140,000 members according to Soviet and Kabul sources.[33] Actual membership is probably half that number. Nevertheless, the party and its affiliated organizations have become a means for expanding the base of support for the regime. Under Soviet prodding, the Kabul regime has pressured government personnel, especially Afghan military officers, to join the party. A refusal to do so can bring loss of position and benefits. Many of those who have joined the party have done so for practical reasons—to obtain government jobs and contracts, admission to university, scholarships to study abroad, or merely to avoid problems with the occupying power.

These members would no doubt abandon the PDPA in large numbers if the collapse of the pro-Soviet regime became imminent or if the Soviet forces were about to leave. However, should the Soviets win the war or be perceived as doing so, the party would find many more recruits. Yet, the influx of new party members has done little to dilute the factional conflicts. The Khalqis, who lost much of their power to the Parchamis after the Soviet invasion, appear unreconciled to the present arrangements. Their hostility has been a serious obstacle to Soviet military efforts because the Mujahedin are frequently informed of Soviet military plans when Afghan military forces are also involved in an operation.

Dealing with factionalism has absorbed a lot of energy on the part of the Soviets. A series of changes in party and state office-holders have been announced in 1985 by Kabul, in a probably futile effort to stop the factionalism.[34] The Parchami Najibullah, former head of KHAD, has been named secretary of the PDPA Central Committee. He holds substantial responsibilities for several areas. It is possible that he is being positioned to replace Karmal—if and when the Soviets decide to do so. Najibullah's secretaryship is another indication of the growing influence of KHAD. The promotion of Ghulam Faruq Yaqubi, Najibullah's successor at KHAD, to full membership on the Central Committee points in the same direction.

Two Parchamis, Dastiqir Panjsheri and former Defense Minister Abdul Qader, have been dropped from the Politburo. Suleiman Laeq, also a Parchami, who is minister of tribes and nationalities, became a candidate member of the Politburo. Ismail Danesh, minister of mines and industries, who belongs to the Khalq faction, was dropped from the Politburo and sent into honorable political exile as Afghanistan's ambassador to Libya. Another Khalqi, Defense Minister Lt.-General Nazar Mohammad, has been promoted to candidate member of the Politburo. A Khalqi from the security apparatus to be promoted to full member of the Central Committee is Saifullah, commander of the Kabul police.

The Kabul regime has tried to build a facade of legitimacy for itself in 1985 through a series of public initiatives. On April 12, Kabul announced it would call a *Loyah Jirga*, the traditional grand assembly of Afghan tribal leaders. Historically, such assemblages were used by Afghan kings and by the republican government to gain acquiescence in a transfer of power or approval of a major new policy. In the 1980 Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, which serves as an interim constitution, the *Loyah Jirga* is defined as the "highest organ of state power." Yet, neither the Karmal regime nor the Amin government had convoked a *Loyah Jirga*, although regional *jirgas* were held. Reports of the event suggest that a high percentage of the 2,000 participants were regime functionaries, from the military or KHAD, or members of the PDPA or its front organizations.[35]

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[32] Edward Girardet, "Russia's War in Afghanistan," *Central Asian Survey*, July 1983, pp. 94-95.

[33] See report on Babrak Karmal's speech to the High Jirgah of Frontier Tribes, Sept. 14, 1985, in *Afghanistan Forum*, November 1985, p. 5.

[34] On the personnel changes in late 1985, see *Special Report*, No. 135, December 1985.

In August, local council elections were announced—the day before they were to begin. In Kabul, the "election" process was simple: a smattering of district residents were assembled at a meeting hall. Candidates were introduced only moments before the vote. Voting meant raising hands under the watchful eyes of KHAD agents; secret ballots were not used. The regime announced that 450,000 residents had participated, about 90 percent of eligible voters.[36]

In September, a High Tribal *Jirga* was convened for the Pathan and Baluch tribes whose territories span the borders with Pakistan and, in the case of the Baluch, also with Iran. This time, a somewhat higher proportion of the roughly 3,700 delegates actually were tribal representatives.[37] Delegates reportedly received cash payments supplemented by arms for attending. The weapons were said to be for use in defending the frontier but were presumably also for use in tribal lands across the border, which would complicate the situation there for Pakistan.

A number of PDPA-dominated institutions have been established under the communist government. They are intended not only to make Afghanistan structurally similar to the USSR but also to facilitate the political indoctrination and mobilization of the population. This is especially true of institutions such as the Democratic Youth Organization, similar to the Soviet Komsomol, and its affiliate, the Pioneer organization, for children between ages 10 and 15. The Kabul regime and the Soviets are sparing no efforts to influence Afghan youths. Since the Soviet invasion, 25,000 to 40,000 Afghans have been sent to the Soviet Union to be educated. There are presently more students in the Soviet Union from Afghanistan than from any other country, with the possible exception of Vietnam. The adults who are educated in the Soviet Union are rewarded upon their return, generally with government positions.[38]

Increasingly, the Afghan students being selected for training in the Soviet Union are orphaned and quite young. They currently number between 5,000 and 10,000. Most are expected to spend as many as 10 years in the USSR. The emphasis on children and orphans is a newly visible element in Moscow's Sovietization program.[39] Afghan resistance commanders have reported capturing "child soldiers" between ages 8 and 15 who, they claim, have been trained in the Soviet Union to perform espionage work and carry out assassinations.

Yet the Soviet experience with Afghan students so far has not been entirely positive. The ongoing war obviously generates hostility toward Moscow even among them. Moreover, some face discrimination when in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, even if only half of the students currently in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe return to work in collusion with the Soviets, it undoubtedly could have a substantial impact on the future of Afghanistan. Moscow probably believes that Afghanistan will not be pacified until its Sovietization program succeeds in transforming traditional Afghan social patterns. No doubt, the Soviet investment in Afghanistan's young is intended to bring about such a transformation.

In Afghanistan itself, although a large number of the country's educational institutions have been disrupted or destroyed (50 percent according to Kabul government figures), those that remain under regime control are being restructured along Soviet lines. Russian is being made a required subject beginning with the fourth grade, while English, French, and German classes are being phased out.[40] Many of the administrators and teachers in Afghan schools come from the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe. All cultural and educational cooperation agreements with Western nations have been terminated. The curriculum now includes courses on "sociology," which in fact teach communist ideology. The version of Afghanistan's history now being taught has been tailored to inculcate pro-Soviet and pro-regime attitudes.

Sovietization extends also to the economic sphere. The Soviet Union has not only increased its economic ties with Afghanistan since the invasion but has encouraged the Kabul regime to sever its ties to the West. Some 70 percent of Afghan trade is now with Soviet-bloc countries.[41] The Soviets have encouraged the exploitation of Afghan natural resources. They have tripled their gas imports from Afghanistan, but pay less than the international price. Payments for gas are deducted from the growing "Afghan debt" to the Soviet Union. Afghan officials cannot tell how much gas is being exported to the USSR, since the meters are situated inside the Soviet Union and the Afghans do not have access to them.[42] Infrastructural ties to the Soviet Union have been multiplied. Moscow

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[35] Ibid.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid.

[38] *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), Nov. 4, 1985.

[39] Ibid.

[40] *The Christian Science Monitor*, Dec. 30, 1985, pp. 7-8, and Jan. 6, 1986, pp. 11-12; and Professor Batinshah Safi, "Russification of Education in Afghanistan," Peshawar, Afghanistan Education Committee, mimeo., nd.

[41] *IMF Directions of Trade 1985*, Washington, DC, International Monetary Fund, 1985.

[42] Edward Girardet, *Afghanistan: The Soviet War*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1985, p. 155.

At left, Borak Abdulkadir, a graduate of Moscow's Highway Construction College, uses Russian to conduct a class in 1985 at the Polytechnical College in Kabul (built with Soviet technical assistance); at right, a school run by Afghan resistance forces in Konar province.

—TASS from SOVFOTO; Afghanistan Education Committee.

has even replaced the Afghan airline's planes acquired in the West with planes made in the Soviet Union. As in the political and military sphere, the Soviets are basically drafting the economic plans and programs to be followed by the Kabul regime.[43]

It is clearly Moscow's expectation that a combination of escalating military pressure and the ambitious Sovietization program will wear down the Afghan resistance over time. Although the results so far are mixed, it is still too early to expect the Soviets to decide on the failure or success of their current strategy. According to Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Kapitsa, Moscow expects its problem in Afghanistan to "be over" in five years.[44] It is possible that if the Soviets fail to put down the resistance by 1990, they might conclude that their strategy has not worked. Soviet failure or success will be determined not only by the programs and actions of the Soviets and the Kabul regime but also by the performance of the Mujahedin and the policies of states concerned with the conflict in Afghanistan. Let us first review the efforts of the resistance movement.

The Resistance

The groups involved in the Afghan resistance are numerous, and their orientations and aspirations vary. They differ in ideology, in base of support, and in relative capability. All want the Soviet forces to leave, but each group has different additional goals. None wants the pre-invasion situation restored. All reject the communist regime that ruled for some 18 months before the Soviet invasion. Some want to bring about basic changes in the institutions under which they have lived, if need be by force. Others essentially want to restore the institutions overthrown by the communists. Thus, the war by the resistance against Soviet occupation is crossed by internal conflicts.

Those who want basic changes can be broadly described as Islamic "fundamentalists," even though there are significant differences within this category.[45] As a rule, they advocate the establishment of a "new" political system, namely an Islamic Republic, which has not existed in Afghanistan before, and which does not exist in any Sunni Muslim country. The largest Afghan "fundamentalist" groups are Burhanuddin Rabbani's Jamiat-i-Islami; Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-e-Islami; Yunus Khalis's Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan; and Abdul Rasool Sayyaf's Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan.

Sayyaf is an eloquent orator in Arabic and won a prize for service to Islam in Saudi Arabia in 1984. He was born in about 1940, and received a bachelor's degree in religious studies from Kabul University and a master's degree from Al-Azhar in Cairo, where he probably joined the Muslim Brotherhood. He returned to Afghanistan in the late 1960's, and joined Hekmatyar's and Rabbani's Jawanani-Musulman, the Muslim Youth Organization, then active at Kabul University. In 1972, the leaders of this organization formed a political party, the Jamiat-i-Islami. Rabbani was elected president, Sayyaf, vice-president, and Hekmatyar became a member of the party's Council.

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[43] Ibid.

[44] *The Muslim*, Oct. 11, 1985, p. 1.

[45] Khalilzad, "Soviet Occupied Afghanistan," loc. cit., p. 38.

Sayyaf was jailed by President Mohammad Daud in 1975 but was released in 1980 by Babrak Karmal's regime. Upon his release he went to Peshawar and joined the Mujahedin forces. He has often acted as spokesman for the fundamentalist parties. In domestic politics he favors a strict application of the Islamic law, the Sharia. In foreign policy, he advocates equidistance from the Soviet Union and the United States.[46] Presently, he has close ties with Saudi Arabia.

Hekmatyar and Rabbani have also been influenced by Muslim Brotherhood beliefs. Hekmatyar, whose group is strong among the Pashtuns, was thought to be the best-organized political leader. In 1982, everyone agreed that his group was the largest. Today there is no such consensus. Hekmatyar's forces have been involved in most of the fights among the partisan groups. This factor perhaps has contributed to decreased support.[47] Hezb-e-Islami has its origins in the late 1960's, when Hekmatyar and Rabbani were among the organizers of the Muslim Youth Organization before becoming involved in the Jamiat. At that time, Hekmatyar was studying engineering at Kabul University. In the mid-1970's, he fled to Pakistan, where he broke with Jamiat and established his own group. Allegedly, he received Pakistani support to work against President Daud. Like Sayyaf, Hekmatyar favors strict application of Islamic laws and has close ties with the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East. On international politics, his public position is that "both America and Russia are enemies of Islam."[48]

Rabbani and Khalis comprise the moderate wing of the Afghan fundamentalist group. Khalis broke away from Hekmatyar in 1979. He is the oldest (born in 1919) of the Peshawar-based leaders. Both Khalis and Rabbani have moderated their views on domestic and foreign policy issues over time. They appear inclined to allow some political diversity in Afghanistan. At the international level, they were originally equally critical of the United States and the Soviet Union. Since 1983, however, they have been expressing more favorable views about the United States.[49] Rabbani's base of support is largely among non-Pashtuns.

Another set of parties active against the Soviet forces and currently based in Pakistan can be classified as "traditionalist." They, too, declare that they want an Islamic government in Afghanistan. However, they would be satisfied if pre-1978 Afghan political institutions are restored. One such "traditionalist" party is Mahez-e Milli-ye Islami, headed by Ahmad Gailani; a second is Jabh-e Najat-e Milli, led by Siabghatullah Mojadeddi; a third is Mohammad Nabi's Haraket-e-Inqelab-ye-Islami.

The "traditionalists" represent the old elite. Gailani, for example, was a friend and adviser of former King Mohammad Zahir Khan. They desire a role for the former King (who is in Italy) and probably would be satisfied with a government headed by him. They have openly called for support from the West. At the domestic level, they have declared themselves in favor of a multi-party system but opposed to permitting the communists to form a legal party. On the whole, the traditionalists have not been as well organized as the fundamentalists. Allegations about the misuse of funds have been directed more frequently against these groups than against the fundamentalists.

While the Pakistan-based groups are the largest resistance organizations, there are other important groups. These include the Shiites in Central Afghanistan, who can be subdivided into those supported by Iran (NASR and Sepah) and those independent of Iran (Shura-ye Ettefaq, Harakat-i-Islami, and Mustazafin).[50] There are also a number of groups independent of both the Shiite organizations and the Pakistan-based Sunni groups. In the Nooristan region of eastern Afghanistan, for example, there are the Free Resistance Front and the Free Government group.

Although these groups have had substantial success individually in opposing the Soviets, a lack of unity has prevented them from realizing fully their political and military potential. In fact, they have spent a significant part of their resources fighting each other. This has enabled the Soviets to avoid paying a higher price for their occupation and has prevented the Mujahedin from receiving greater international recognition and support. Lack of unity has prevented the Mujahedin from challenging the legitimacy of the Karmal regime in many international forums and drawing greater attention to Soviet atrocities in Afghanistan.

If it holds and consolidates, the alliance of the principal resistance groups formed in May 1985 in Peshawar has the potential to change this situation dramatically. The alliance, called the Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahedin,[51] has a supreme Council composed of the leaders of the seven constituent groups.

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[46] *Nawa-i-Waqt* (Lahore) July 25, 1980.

[47] *Le Monde* (Paris), Nov. 15-17, 1983, trans. in Joint Publications Research Service (hereafter JPRS), *Near East/South Asia* (Washington, DC), Jan. 11, 1984, p. 100.

[48] *Al-Hawadith* (London), April 18, 1980, in JPRS, *Near East/North Africa*, June 13, 1980, p. 15.

[49] Jere Van Dyk, *In Afghanistan: An American Odyssey*, New York, Coward-McCann, Inc., 1983; Van Dyk quotes Rabbani as saying that Russia is "the first enemy; the West is the second," p. 63.

[50] On the Shiites, see Oliver Roy, "Rise of Khomeynism among Shiite Minority," *Le Monde Diplomatique*, April 1983, quoted in JPRS, *Near East/South Asia*, June 8, 1983, pp. 56-60.

[51] *Monthly Bulletin*, May 1985.

The position of spokesman for the alliance rotates among the seven leaders at three month intervals. The first spokesman was Khalis, followed by Hekmatyar.[52] Currently, Gailani is spokesman. The alliance has a 49-member *shora* (assembly) composed of seven delegates from each group, a joint military committee, and six nonmilitary bodies (committees on cultural, political, refugee, education, information, and health affairs). A principal purpose of the alliance is to increase the political profile of the resistance. Perhaps the Mujahedin have finally recognized that a united front is a necessary precondition for their greater international presence.

In October 1985, the alliance sent a delegation of representatives from all seven groups headed by its spokesman—Gulbuddin Hekmatyar—to New York for the 40th anniversary of the United Nations. The delegation requested that the resistance forces rather than the Karmal government be given Afghanistan's seat at the UN.[53] The Mujahedin also intend to seek to represent Afghanistan in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), where Afghanistan has remained unrepresented ever since the Karmal government was in effect expelled.[54] In January 1986, the alliance's spokesman Gailani headed a delegation to an OIC foreign ministers' meeting. The delegation was given high visibility at the meeting, but the issue of formal membership for the Mujahedin was deferred until the scheduled January 1987 meeting of OIC heads of state. OIC membership could be the first hurdle in the challenge of the Karmal government's right to represent Afghanistan in other organizations, including the UN.

The alliance is also intended to foster military coordination among the resistance groups. Relations among the partisan groups have at times been characterized by conflict, including actual fighting, during which hundreds of partisans have lost their lives. Although influenced by ideological differences, the discord has been fundamentally the result of the competition for domination and power among the seven leaders in Peshawar. Lack of a coalition had prevented the emergence of a single overall military command and joint planning in the war against the Soviets. It had often led to misunderstandings and fights for the spoils of victory, as well as premature claims of victory.

Lack of alliance among the seven major parties had also hindered the organizational development of each of the individual parties. Commanders in the field felt no need to follow the orders of party leaders, since they could always go to other parties if they were unhappy with their own leader. To change the relative power in favor of his group, an individual leader often sought to subvert the other parties and to "buy" the others' commanders. In order not to lose commanders to rivals, leaders tended to tolerate incompetence and even corruption. In turn, commanders faced similar problems in relation to their fighters. The lack of cooperation among the parties, and actual fighting among them, had lead to a considerable loss of popularity for the seven leaders among the Afghan population.

Even with the current alliance, many sources of conflict remain among the Mujahedin. Thus, a major task of the new joint military committee of the alliance is the prevention or at least the containment of these conflicts. Its additional purposes are to: (1) coordinate a military strategy and a weapons distribution system congruent with the strategy; (2) develop a program to protect supply routes; (3) improve the capacity to prevent infiltration by Kabul's agents; (4) establish joint training for Mujahedin and improve the quality of training; (5) develop common strategies to counter major Soviet military moves.

A number of resistance organizations and commands inside Afghanistan are already well organized and cooperate with one another despite political differences. Among the internal regional commands, the most effective appear to be those led by young and educated commanders, such as Panjshir's Massud, Herat's Ismail Khan, Jalaluddin in Paktia, and Abdul Haq in Kabul.[55] If the alliance functions effectively and broadens to encompass military coordination, the less well-organized groups might emulate the methods of these younger commanders and become more effective in their own areas.

In order to prevent the Soviets and the Karmal regime from succeeding in emptying the Afghan countryside, the Mujahedin—besides increasing their capabilities in important regions—need also to develop basic social institutions. In many parts of Afghanistan, the Mujahedin are the only authority. Yet the resistance is not in a position to provide the population of those areas with emergency relief services. Assisting the local population in developing social programs could intensify ties between the local population and the resistance organizations. It might even enable some refugees to return home. Should the Mujahedin develop a joint social service program in liberated areas, it would further strengthen the alliance and undermine the prospects for Moscow's Sovietization program.

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[52] *Afghan Realities*, Oct. 16, 1985.

[53] *The Wall Street Journal* (New York), Nov. 1, 1985.

[54] *Afghan Realities*, Oct. 16, 1985, p. 2.

[55] *The Washington Post*, a six-part series in October 1983; *Monthly Bulletin*, June 1983, pp. 6–8.

The International Dimension

Soviet attempts to eradicate the resistance in Afghanistan have been coupled with efforts to bring about the abandonment of the Mujahedin by their friends in the international community. The Soviets have striven to isolate the issue of Afghanistan and thus to prevent events there from affecting the Soviet Union's relations with other countries. Moreover, Moscow is using various propaganda tools to try to convince the world that the Karmal government is "legitimate" and that the war in Afghanistan was precipitated by and goes on because of "foreign interference," meaning support for the Afghan resistance.[56]

Soviet efforts have been partially successful. Although the sanctions imposed on the Soviet Union after the invasion were in force longer than was the case with sanctions for any other post-World War II transgression, most of them have long since been lifted. Few significant international agreements with the Soviet Union have been delayed over Afghanistan. The Soviet-imposed regime of Babrak Karmal occupies Afghanistan's seat in all international forums except for the Islamic Conference. In the UN-sponsored negotiations on Afghanistan, it is the Karmal government that is party to the indirect talks with Pakistan. The mass media in many countries use Soviet terminology in discussing Afghan developments. Thus, the resistance is almost invariably referred to as "the rebels," implying that the Mujahedin are fighting against the legitimate government.

Recently, however, support in some key countries for the resistance in Afghanistan has increased. This includes greater support in the United States Congress, which recently authorized overt humanitarian assistance for the first time.[57] Since American support for the Mujahedin's military operations remains covert for the most part, one cannot be certain about the overall magnitude of US assistance to the Mujahedin. The Soviets themselves have claimed that Washington has spent US$300 million in support of the Afghan partisans during the first four years of the Soviet-Afghan war and intended to spend $130 million in 1984.[58] *The Washington Post* reported that for the 1985 fiscal year Congress allocated $250 million for the Afghan program.[59]

But the countries that have the most influence on developments in Afghanistan are its immediate neighbors. Fully aware of this, the Soviet Union has increased pressure on both Iran and Pakistan in the hopes of changing their policies with regard to the war



Leaders of Afghanistan resistance parties at a 1985 meeting in Peshawar, Pakistan: from left to right, Abddur Rasoul Sayyaf (partly hidden), Burhanudin Rabbani, unidentified (hidden, at rear), Sebghatullah Mojadeddi, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Nabi Muhammadi, Yunus Khalis, and Ahmad Gailani.

—Photo furnished by Hezb-e Islami.

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[56] *International Herald Tribune*, (Paris), Dec. 4, 1984, p. 1.

[57] *Policy Forum* (Washington, DC), Vol. 2, No. 18, October 1985.

[58] Bradsher, "Afghanistan," loc. cit., p. 46.

[59] *The Washington Post*, Jan. 13, 1985.

in Afghanistan. Pakistan has experienced a marked deterioration in its relations with Moscow. President Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq was given a stern lecture by the new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachëv about Pakistan's Afghanistan policies when the two met at Konstantin Chernenko's funeral. To increase the pressure on Islamabad, Moscow has also sought—unsuccessfully—to prevent an improvement in Indo-Pakistan relations by making repeated suggestions that Islamabad masterminded the Sikh opposition to New Delhi; sought a nuclear capability against India; was becoming an American military base, and thus was tipping the regional balance of power against India.[60]

Up to now, these pressures on Islamabad have failed to bring about any fundamental change in Pakistani policy, although there are voices in Pakistan calling for a change. Moscow is counting on Pakistan's domestic divisions to influence the government to come to terms with the situation in Afghanistan. As noted earlier, it is also active among the tribesmen in Pakistan's North-West Frontier and Baluchistan provinces.

For Iran, the war in Afghanistan has been a significant factor in negatively affecting relations with the Soviet Union. Iranian support for the Afghan resistance has focused largely on the Shiites, who constitute some 20 percent of the Afghan population. The Soviets and the Kabul regime have at times shown their displeasure at Iranian support by carrying out cross-border military operations. Such operations against Iran first took place in 1982. Rather than intimidating Iran, they heightened the Iranian perception of the Soviet threat and led to increased support for the Afghan Mujahedin.[61]

Recently, the Soviets have sensed an opportunity to improve relations with Iran. Tehran's international isolation and need for arms for the Iran-Iraq war has led Moscow to expect less hostility from Iran. Yet, so far Iran has not changed its policies in return for a significant betterment of relations with the USSR. The future of Iran's Afghanistan policy remains uncertain, but it need not necessarily change to Moscow's advantage. As one indicator of the uncertainty, Hekmatyar recently closed his offices in Iran.[62] However, Rabbani continues to have a mission in Iran, and his group has a working relationship with some of the Iranian-backed resistance groups. The Mujahedin are looking for partners among the Shiite resistance.

The People's Republic of China is another neighboring state affecting the war in Afghanistan. Although it is improving its relations with Moscow, Beijing has not given up supplying arms to the Afghan resistance. Also, although the Chinese during 1985 had softened their position with regard to the need to resolve the Afghan conflict as one of the three preconditions for any improvement in Sino-Soviet relations, the most recent Chinese statements seem to imply that meeting all three preconditions is again their requirement of the Soviets.[63]

Islamic states, whether neighbors or not, have generally been supportive of the Mujahedin. The role of Saudi Arabia has been especially substantial. One resistance group, Sayyaf's Islamic Alliance, has close ideological and financial ties to the Saudis. Both the government and semi-private groups in Saudi Arabia, such as the Mecca-based World Muslim League, provide significant financial support to the Mujahedin. However, two Saudi allies, Oman and the United Arab Emirates, recently established diplomatic relations with Moscow. Pressure on the Saudis to follow suit is increasing. It is conceivable that Riyadh could make Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan a condition for the establishment of these ties with Moscow.

But Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are also crucial for helping the Mujahedin gain greater international legitimacy. For example, if the new alliance of the Afghan Mujahedin consolidates, Saudi Arabia might support the demand by the Afghan fighters for membership in the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Should the Mujahedin receive such formal support from the Muslim world, they could then press for greater attention to the Afghan cause at the UN. For example, no UN Security Council meetings have been called to deal with military offensives against the Mujahedin even when these involved major attacks on civilian targets. The Mujahedin could encourage sympathetic UN members to call for such meetings in the future. Other UN organs, such as its public affairs program and the 4th Committee (which deals with colonial issues) might also begin to give greater attention to Afghan-related matters. The alliance also enables sympathetic countries to deal at a high political level with the Mujahedin without fear of favoring one resistance group over another. Ultimately, an effective alliance could give the Mujahedin a voice in negotiations dealing with Afghanistan.

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[60] Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter FBIS-SOV), Feb. 22, 1984.

[61] Zalmay Khalilzad, "Islamic Iran: Soviet Dilemma," *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1984, pp. 1-20.

[62] Interviews by author, autumn 1985.

[63] For a recent statement, see Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian's report before the National People's Congress Standing Committee, Jan. 16, 1986, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC), Jan. 17, 1985, pp. K/1-15.

UN Proximity Talks

Presently, the formal negotiations on Afghanistan are the "proximity" (indirect) talks between the Kabul government and Pakistan. These talks, which have been held periodically since 1982, are sponsored by the United Nations. The talks have gone through several phases, during which conflicting proposals were made both on the format and substance of a settlement. In December 1985, reports were issued that the two sides had agreed that a settlement should consist of four instruments.[64] Reportedly, Kabul and Islamabad have already reached agreement on three of the four documents comprising the settlement. The first document deals with what is called "non-interference and non-intervention," and is to be ratified by Islamabad and Kabul. This instrument will require the end of outside assistance to the Mujahedin, especially by Pakistan. Presumably, Kabul will undertake not to interfere in Pakistani affairs, by ceasing to support Pashtun and Baluch separatists and tribal opponents of Islamabad, and thus implicitly recognize the disputed border between the two countries—the Durand line.

The second document deals with international guarantees of the settlement. The two sides have agreed that Washington and Moscow should be the guarantors of an Afghan settlement. The United States has announced its willingness "to play an appropriate guarantor's role in the context of a comprehensive and balanced settlement," and has informed the UN that it finds this document acceptable.[65] The American declaration reversed an earlier posture by which Washington would not support any one component of the settlement until the entire agreement was completed.

The third document focuses on the return of Afghan refugees to Afghanistan. According to the Pakistanis, before the refugees return to Afghanistan they will be consulted regarding the "conditions" acceptable for their return, which will be "voluntary."[66] An agreement on the fourth instrument—which is to set out the interrelationship between the first three documents as well as deal with the withdrawal of foreign troops—is yet to be reached. This document is expected to have specific dates as to when the withdrawal will begin and when it will be completed. The Kabul regime has refused to provide these dates so far.[67] It reportedly has made the provision of these dates conditional on Pakistani acceptance of face-to-face negotiations in future talks. To Kabul, direct talks would mean that Pakistan, and therefore other states, accepts the Karmal regime as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. To date, Pakistan has not agreed.[68]

The insistence by Kabul on direct talks raises questions regarding Moscow's real attitude toward a "political settlement" in Afghanistan. That attitude could be one of several:

- Moscow might see the UN-talks as simply a means of lowering the political costs of its involvement while it continues to try to defeat the resistance militarily. Thus, to keep the talks going, Kabul will continue at Moscow's behest to make demands that are unacceptable to the other side.

- Moscow might be ambivalent about the negotiations. As it continues to intensify its military efforts, Moscow might view the talks as conceivably giving some legitimacy to the Kabul regime. If direct talks come about, Moscow might believe that a Soviet-oriented regime could survive without the presence of Soviet troops.

- Moscow might be uncertain whether the Kabul regime would survive even if the Mujahedin stopped receiving outside assistance. Nevertheless, Moscow might feel that recognition by Pakistan would improve the chances of the Kabul government because such recognition could lead to tensions between Pakistan and the Mujahedin as well as induce some Mujahedin commanders to join the government.

- Moscow might be calculating that if the Kabul regime becomes "legitimated," it could call in Soviet troops to help against persisting Mujahedin opposition. Moscow could do so at a considerably smaller political cost because the Mujahedin would be much less formidable without Pakistani support and the world outcry would be considerably smaller since the number of Soviet troops needed would not have to be as large as it is now.

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[64] Unpublished paper by Abdul Waheed, Pakistan Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany, "Afghanistan—A Forgotten War," presented at a conference on Afghanistan sponsored by the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung, Munich, Dec. 16-17, 1985; and *The New York Times*, Jan. 1, 1986.

[65] Waheed, loc. cit.

[66] Ibid.

[67] *The New York Times*, Jan. 1, 1986; and *The Christian Science Monitor*, Jan. 2, 1986.

[68] *The New York Times*, Jan. 1, 1986.

It is highly probable that Moscow believes that Pakistan's acceptance of the Kabul regime would significantly increase its chances of survival. Therefore, in order induce Pakistan to talk directly with the Kabul regime, the Soviets have been bringing about changes—largely cosmetic—in the Kabul government. Their purpose is to convince the Afghan population, Pakistan, and world opinion generally that the Kabul government is broadening the bases of its support. The Soviets have urged the Kabul government to "create an atmosphere of positive dialogue between the public and political forces, including those who so far stick to positions hostile to the revolution."[69]

Karmal has implemented these desiderata by appointing a few Afghans who do not have formal PDPA affiliation to prestigious positions in the government. For example, two persons without party affiliation were appointed to ministerial positions: Abdul Basir Ranjbir was named head of the central bank, and Mohammad Daoud Kauian was appointed head of the Bakhtar News Agency. There are rumors that more noncommunists will be appointed. In January 1986, the Revolutionary Council was broadened to include some non-party members.[70]

However, both the Soviets and Karmal's government continue to maintain that the 1978 coup, which brought the communists to power, is irreversible. They have not demonstrated any serious desire to negotiate directly with the partisans or to agree to a mechanism through which the Afghan people could express their preferences regarding the kind of government they might want. Even though a few noncommunists have honorific positions, Moscow and Kabul appear determined to keep control over the ministries of defense and interior, KHAD, and similarly crucial institutions.

Even if Kabul were to provide the dates for a Soviet troop withdrawal without direct talks with Pakistan, there remain potentially serious problems with the present negotiations. First, since they do not directly include the Mujahedin, the partisans have opposed these talks for fear that Islamabad might agree to something unacceptable to them.[71] The danger of a split between Pakistan and the resistance on the terms of a political settlement is serious. Islamabad might implicitly (or explicitly) agree to accept a communist-dominated government in Afghanistan and stop supporting the Mujahedin in exchange for a promise of Soviet withdrawal and the willingness of the Kabul government to take back the Afghan refugees. The Mujahedin are likely to reject such a formula since the removal of the communist-dominated government is one of their principal demands. To achieve it, at least some of the Mujahedin are likely to continue their resistance even without Pakistani support. Yet without Islamabad's support, the Mujahedin would be dramatically less effective, and thus make it possible for Moscow and its local surrogates to overcome an increasingly weak opposition. Moreover, if continued opposition became threatening, Moscow might "delay" the withdrawal of some of its troops or even bring in more troops at the "invitation" of a "legitimate" government. Such a move might be perceived by many as entirely proper.

Second, Iran is not a party to the UN talks and might oppose an agreement concluded by Pakistan. Iran has refused to participate because the Mujahedin are not represented. Pakistan and UN negotiator Diego Cordovez have kept the Iranians "informed," but Tehran's attitude to the negotiations is not known. Should Tehran oppose the agreement, it might continue support for the Mujahedin resistance, which in turn might move closer to Iran. Even if Iran were not to supply major weapons to the Mujahedin, the Soviet Union might take a negative Iranian official position to be a reason for delaying or stopping its troop withdrawal. Given Iran's unpopularity in the international community, the Soviets' move would probably elicit only a muted world reaction.

But the basic problem with the talks is that Moscow's fundamental position on Afghanistan remains unchanged. It does not accept the Afghan population's right to self-determination. So far at least, the talks serve Moscow to reduce its costs of establishing a communist-dominated, pro-Soviet government in Kabul. Should Moscow accept the Afghans' right to self-government, it could easily find a "face-saving" way out of Afghanistan. Its refusal to do so is undoubtedly conditioned by what Moscow perceives to be its strategic stakes in Afghanistan.

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[69] *Pravda* (Moscow), Nov. 10, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Nov. 18, 1985, p. D/1.

[70] Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: South Asia* (Washington, DC), Jan. 22, 1986, p. C/1.

[71] The Soviets, also, are not represented at the talks. They have at times sent an official to Geneva to give on-the-spot instructions to the Kabul delegation, and the Mujahedin, on occasion, have been briefed by Pakistan.

Soviet Stakes in Afghanistan

Apparently, the Soviet leadership remains convinced that a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the establishment of a noncommunist regime there would damage Soviet prestige and have adverse repercussions elsewhere. It also must expect that a victory in Afghanistan would bring very significant advantages to the Soviet Union. Although Moscow's perception of damage to its interests from a failure in Afghanistan is probably exaggerated, it nevertheless plays a role in Soviet persistence. Accepting defeat in a country where, because of territorial contiguity and past and present investments, substantial interests are involved, could undermine the legitimacy of Soviet domination elsewhere and lead to the questioning of Soviet capability and resolve. Undoubtedly Moscow has its own domino theory, making a retreat very difficult. Western support of the resistance might be taken by Moscow as an indication that Western powers would insist on gaining influence on security issues in Afghanistan if the communist regime fell. The Soviets have repeatedly made the argument that—had they not invaded Afghanistan—the United States would have turned Afghanistan into an American military base.[72] Given the Soviet perspective on world politics, this notion probably finds some credence in Moscow.

Soviet domestic factional politics reinforce external considerations for not withdrawing from Afghanistan. The reluctance of any single leader during a succession period to consider withdrawal from Afghanistan reflects a desire to avoid personal responsibility for a setback there. Being associated with failure could encourage challenges by rivals. Soviet activities in Afghanistan since Gorbachev's coming to power are characterized by continued application of force.

Another factor deterring Moscow from leaving Afghanistan is the Soviet expectation of significant gains from a victory there. Soviet credibility would be strengthened by a demonstration that it supports its friends and stands firm in the face of pressure. Not only would the Soviets add a country the size of France to their satellite empire, they could also use Afghanistan as a base for subverting neighboring countries, such as Iran or Pakistan. A Soviet victory would also have important geostrategic implications for the Persian Gulf by improving Moscow's ability to project power there.

The question of potential Soviet gains from secure access to Afghan military facilities has been a controversial one. Immediately after the Soviet occupation many analysts, including several senior officials in the Carter administration, argued that the Soviets had made significant gains in their ability to massively

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[72] For Soviet and Kabul regime statements, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *White Book: Pakistan Subversive Activities Against the Afghan Revolution*, Moscow, Novosti Press Agency, 1980.

Table 1: Potential Soviet Force Projection
Great Circle Distances from Soviet and Afghan Bases to Key Persian Gulf Cities

(in kilometers)

	From USSR				From Afghanistan			
Gulf city	Izyl Atrek	Nabit Dag	Yerevan	Kalai Mor[a]	Qandahar	Shindand	Farah[b]	Herat
Bandar Abbas	1,181	1,374	1,807	1,113	1,004	861	794	965
Chah Bahar	1,491	2,178	2,232	1,165	841	900	798	1,002
Muscat	1,720	2,306	2,359	1,498	1,204	1,237	1,137	1,335

Estimated Combat Radii for Selected Soviet-bloc Aircraft[c]

(in kilometers)

MIG-21	635	MIG-23	1,150	MIG 25 (A and E)	1,260	MIG 27 (D and J)	795
Su-15	862	Su-17	530	Su-24	1,061	Yak-28	925

[a] Possible Soviet airfield inside the Soviet Union.

[b] A helicopter airfield here could be expanded to accommodate other aircraft.

[c] Estimates of combat radii vary. The highest and lowest estimates have been averaged here.

SOURCES: Albert Wohlstetter, et al., *Interest and Power in the Persian Gulf*, Los Angeles, CA, Pan Heuristics, 1980; and US Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1985.

Wreckage of a Soviet convoy destroyed on the highway from Gardez to Kabul in 1983.

– Kouwenberg & Versteeg/SYGMA.

threaten Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf. Some argued that this consideration was probably a major motivating factor for the Soviet action. Over time, this interpretation has been replaced by another extreme analysis that attributes no significant effect on Soviet ability for power projection to the Gulf.[73]

The perception that Afghanistan was a first step in a general Soviet expansion in the region was clearly exaggerated. However, so is the belief that the occupation of Afghanistan does not change the Soviet capability to project power. It is unlikely that the invasion was primarily motivated by the Soviet Union's desire to better its power projection capabilities, but it is equally unlikely that Moscow was unaware of this possibility. The confusion in the West about the regional implications of relative Soviet capability is largely due to the fact that the Soviet presence in Afghanistan has different implications for different parts of the Gulf. The invasion has not changed Soviet power projection capability as far as the upper Gulf (Iraq, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia) is concerned. Bases in the Soviet Transcaucasus region are closer to this area than are existing or potential bases in Afghanistan. However, bases in Afghanistan have improved Moscow's ability for projecting power to the lower Gulf and the Arabian Sea, including the Strait of Hormuz, parts of Iran and Oman, and the whole of Pakistan. (See the data in Table I on page 17.)

Given their perceptions of gains and losses from victory or failure in Afghanistan, it is not clear whether the Soviets will leave this unfortunate country under any circumstances. The first precondition for Soviet departure would be a much stronger Afghan resistance capable of dramatically increasing the costs of Soviet occupation. Only if Soviet leaders are persuaded that time is not on their side in the long run, might they begin to consider seriously a settlement that would allow self-determination to the Afghans.

Soviet Options

The Soviets could respond to more effective resistance efforts either by continuing the present level of involvement, escalating, or deciding on some form of disengagement. In the short run, they are likely to continue the 1984-85 strategy, although there is a chance of escalation.

Escalation would certainly make life more difficult for the Afghan resistance. However, a substantial increase in the number of Soviet troops (perhaps another 100,000) would also greatly increase the costs of occupation. Furthermore, almost doubling the number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan would draw more attention to the situation as a whole and could negatively affect Soviet ties with key countries, including the United States, at a time when Moscow is seeking expanded economic ties and new arms control negotiations.

An escalation of the war, including the use of more brutal tactics, would also be likely to lead to intensified military activities by the resistance against Soviet strongholds. International friends of the Mujahedin might respond by increasing their support, as they have done in the past. Clearly the Soviets would be able to hurt the Afghans more than vice versa, but the result could be greater Afghan hatred for the Soviets. If the alliance among the Mujahedin holds, the Afghans might also be able to exact a much higher political price for the Soviet occupation than has been the case in the past.

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[73] For a detailed discussion of potential Soviet gains from bases in Afghanistan, see Zalmay Khalilzad, "The United States and the War in Afghanistan,'" in Leo Rose and Noor Hussein, Eds., *United States Pakistan Relations*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1985.

In another possible scenario of escalation, the Soviet Union might increase pressure on Iran, but especially on Pakistan, to abandon the Afghan resistance. As already mentioned, Soviet relations with Pakistan remain tense and Soviet propaganda against Pakistan is increasingly hostile. Greater Soviet pressure on Pakistan could take several forms. First, Moscow might increase its efforts to destabilize Pakistan politically.[74] Such efforts have not had much success so far however, and an active Soviet policy of destabilization runs the risk of undermining the very tribes and parties in Pakistan that are more receptive to Moscow than the current regime. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan actually strengthened President Zia's position. Evidence of significant efforts at destabilization might be seen by many Pakistanis as an indication of a Soviet plan to use Afghanistan as a base for expanding in the region. Nevertheless, Moscow is likely to pursue the destabilization option before fundamentally changing its policies on Afghanistan.

Second, Soviet escalation might take the form of direct military pressure through air strikes against major Pakistani targets. Successful attacks could increase opposition pressure on President Zia to come to terms with the Soviets. However, it could also increase pressure on the government to respond decisively. The Pakistani air force recently brought down an intruding aircraft.[75]

Soviet military pressure could also force Pakistan to seek closer security relations with the United States, something Moscow does not want. It could dispose Washington, at the very least, to increase its military supplies for Islamabad. Already, in response to a Soviet cross-border attack against purely Pakistani targets in 1985, the Reagan administration expedited the shipment of sensitive air defense equipment to Pakistan.[76] Washington has also indicated to the Soviets that direct military pressure on Pakistan can have significant repercussions on the state of Soviet-American relations.

Third, major military incursions into Pakistan are a possibility, including, perhaps, the takeover of Pakistani territory for a period of time. The Soviets might justify such action as being directed against Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan. For Moscow to carry out such operations against Pakistan, however, major logistical preparations and the formation of supply lines would be necessary. These would be visible and could be vulnerable to attack. In sum, a substantial investment of resources would be required for Moscow to mount a significant territorial incursion into Pakistan. Should this occur, Pakistan, which has a 500,000 man army and some very modern equipment, including F-16's, would be likely to resist—as did the Iranians in 1982.

A Soviet attempt to hold Pakistani territory would probably lead to a major crisis in American-Soviet relations. The Reagan administration takes pride in having restored a strategic relationship with Islamabad. Thus a Soviet attack against Pakistan would be viewed as a major challenge by the United States and could lead to a major confrontation. International censure would also increase dramatically. A Soviet attack would damage Moscow's tenuously better ties with China, which has a long-standing security relationship with Pakistan. Clearly then, this is a very risky option for the Soviet Union.

Prospects

In the aftermath of the Geneva summit between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachëv, there has been much speculation that peace might be at hand in Afghanistan. Unfortunately this does not appear likely. Moscow still insists that Afghanistan should be dominated by pro-Soviet communists. The Mujahedin still reject this Soviet goal. Even an agreement between Pakistan and the Kabul government need not spell an end to the war.

It is possible that when Moscow realizes that neither escalation against the Mujahedin and neighboring countries nor the current negotiations will result in a communist-dominated Afghanistan, it might begin to consider other alternatives. It is not self-evident that the Soviets would never accept anything short of total military victory. In the past, the Soviets have changed their minds, and they may do so again.

Several compromises appear feasible. Some observers have suggested that the post-World War II settlements on Finland and Austria provide useful examples of what might be achieved. However, given the many unique features of the Afghan case, if the

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[74] This section draws on my "The Soviet Dilemma in Afghanistan," loc. cit.

[75] *The Washington Times*, Jan. 16, 1986.

[76] *The New York Times*, May 12, 1985.

Soviets ever do accept a political settlement and withdraw, a new and different precedent will thereby be set.

Former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski has proposed a formula of compromise—namely, the external neutralization of Afghanistan combined with a Soviet military withdrawal, the introduction of Islamic peace-keeping forces for an interim period, and self-determination for the Afghans.[77] An arrangement that guarantees Afghanistan's neutrality would ensure that Afghanistan would not become a security threat to the Soviet Union. The neutralization formula deals with Soviet fears of American strategic designs on Afghanistan. Moscow could even claim victory, were such an agreement reached, by asserting that it has achieved one goal for which it invaded Afghanistan in the first place. A settlement of this type might be achieved through current or modified UN-sponsored negotiations that allowed the Mujahedin to have some representation.

The Soviets and their friends—and even some independent analysts—have occasionally charged that Washington prefers the continuation of the war to a political settlement. Such charges are based on the recognition that Soviet involvement in Afghanistan offers propaganda advantages to the United States and keeps the Soviet Union entangled in a protracted and bloody conflict. Until recently, even some responsible governments, including India's, had voiced such opinions. Recent Indian press reports, however, show that New Delhi now accepts that Washington is seriously interested in a political settlement.[78]

In bilateral talks on Afghanistan in 1982 and 1985, and on other occasions, the United States has indicated to the Soviet Union that Washington will not create obstacles to a Soviet withdrawal and a political settlement in Afghanistan. Yet Moscow has expressed distrust of American assurances, probably not least because its countercharges against the United States served its own propaganda purposes. It is important that available channels be used to signal periodically to Moscow that the United States is ready and willing to play a constructive role—should Moscow decide to consider seriously a settlement that includes self-determination for the Afghan people.

Ultimately, however, two factors will have crucial influence on the Soviet decision. One is the military strength and the popular support of the Mujahedin in Afghanistan. The other is the level of international support (especially Pakistani) extended to the Mujahedin. The latter is partly contingent upon the maintenance and strengthening of the alliance among the resistance groups. Only when Moscow is convinced that it cannot get its way by military force, will it pursue solutions that encompass self-determination. Moscow has yet to reach that point.

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[77] *The New York Times*, Oct. 6, 1985.

[78] See, e.g., the articles by A. G. Noorani, "India's Policy on Afghanistan," *Indian Express* (New Delhi), June 14 and 15, 1985.

China's Economic Experiment: From Mao to Market

Jan S. Prybyla

After a brief, turbulent period of a market-plan economy with mixed private/socialized property in the early 1950's (the political equivalent of which was Mao's "New Democracy"),[1] the Chinese adopted Stalin's model of a centrally planned command economy with comprehensive state/collective property. The installation of this model was completed in 1956, toward the end of China's First Five-Year Plan (1953-57). Almost as soon as it was in place, however, the model was found to be ill-suited to China's conditions. The Stalinist emphasis on capital-intensive heavy industrialization at the expense of agriculture produced many problems: sluggish agricultural output and labor productivity; sectoral disproportions; consumer-goods shortages and low consumption levels; bottlenecks in the supply of key inputs; retarded services; urban unemployment (25 percent of the urban labor force, or 8 million people, in 1957); and rigid, overcentralized bureaucratic structures and procedures. As a result, between 1957 and 1976 the model was subjected to "right" (1957, 1961-65) and "left" (1958-60, 1966-76) adjustments that caused violent swings in the economy, as well as in the political and social lives of the Chinese people.

By 1976, the Chinese economy was in a bad state. While the poor quality of the country's economic performance was not new and had many dimensions, it was summed up in low and, for some time declining, factor productivity.[2] Indeed, the 10 years of profound political upheaval during the Cultural Revolution merely added to the already long-term negative trend of productivity, which had averaged −1.5 percent annually since 1957.[3] The growth in the net domestic product that had been obtained since the introduction of the planned economy in the mid-1950's (4.4 percent annually)[4] was due primarily to the addition of factors, especially labor, rather than to improvement in the efficiency of factor use. In fact, great damage was inflicted on land (through ecological abuse), labor (through educational obscurantism), and capital (through technological retardation), particularly in periods of leftward adjustment, such as the Great Leap Forward (1958-60) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-76).[5] The result was poverty verging on destitution in large areas of China's countryside.

Jan S. Prybyla is Professor of Economics at The Pennsylvania State University (University Park). He is author of The Chinese Economy: Problems and Policies *(1978, 1981),* Issues in Socialist Economic Modernization *(1970), and* Market and Plan Under Socialism: The Bird in the Cage *(forthcoming). He is a contributing editor of* Current History, *and a member of the editorial advisory board of* Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, *published by the School of Law, University of Maryland (Baltimore).*

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[1] Mao's New Democracy was an attempt to combine communist dictatorial political forms with emasculated and restricted manifestations of political pluralism in a united front of communists and noncommunist "patriotic personnages." New Democracy was envisaged by Mao as a transitional phenomenon, the main function of which was to prepare the ground for proletarian dictatorship by the communist party. Like the transitional arrangements in the economy before 1953, it was a mix of incompatible elements. See Mao Tse-tung, "On New Democracy" (January 1940), in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Bejing, Foreign Languages Press, 1965, Vol. II, PP. 339-84.

[2] Total factor productivity is defined as the output per unit of labor and capital combined. For a discussion of factor productivity, see K. C. Yeh, "Macroeconomic Changes in the Chinese Economy During the Readjustment," *The China Quarterly* (London), December 1984, pp. 705-13.

[3] See Table 6 "Annual Rates of Growth of Domestic Product, Factor Inputs and Productivity, Selected Periods," in ibid., p. 711.

[4] Ibid.

[5] The following is just one of many examples of ecological abuse. In Inner Mongolia (Nei Monggol), the plowing up of grasslands during the Cultural Revolution's "take grain as the key link" campaign turned 967,000 acres of good pastureland into desert and resulted in 1.9 million acres' being invaded by sand. Between 1966 and 1978, the

(continued on p. 22)

The search for the causes of China's economic problems proceeded in two stages. The first, from 1976 through 1980, was characterized by political housecleaning, ideological reinterpretations, and piecemeal economic adjustments. The formal beginning of the end of the first stage came in December 1978 with the holding of the landmark 3rd Plenum of the Party's 11th Central Committee at which Deng Xiaoping consolidated his hold on the party leadership. The consensus that emerged from the Plenum was that China's economic problems lay in the party and government's erroneous "style of work," which, it was said, had produced leftist distortions of the system of central administrative command planning. Thus, it followed that if this work style were rectified—through replacement of personnel plus some "education"—things would fall into place. In other words, what was needed was a simple adjustment. With time, the simplicity of the remedies and their lack of effectiveness became apparent. The second stage began in 1981 and is still going on. The consensus, apparently fragile, now seems to be that China's economic troubles are rooted in the system of central planning and that what is needed is reform.

An important conceptual distinction between "adjustment" and "reform" must be made at this time. Adjustment means policy changes *within* the framework of the given system. Adjustment-type changes do not alter in any fundamental respect the basic operational principles and institutional structure of the system. The opposite is true of reform. Reform changes the principles governing the system and the system's institutional arrangements for the generation, conveyance, processing, and coordination of information about cost and utility, motivation, and distribution of property rights. Reform alters in a qualitative way the locus of decision-making in the system and the criteria for making the decisions. Thus, it marks the system's transformation into something qualitatively different. For reform of a centrally planned economy to deserve its name, the market and private property must become the dominant determinants of production, investment, and the distribution of income shares in the system.[6]

Policies of Adjustment

Between 1976 and 1980, four major adjustment policies were implemented. First, the administrative structure of the plan, flattened by the leftist hurricanes of the Cultural Revolution, was rebuilt and righted. Among other things, administration of the economy was simplified and decision-making was devolved to local authorities and industrial managers.[7] Second, the system's goal priorities were reordered primarily to benefit agriculture and consumer-goods industries, as well as to create a more open economy (in particular vis-à-vis the West). Third, emphasis was put on the importation of modern engineering technology from capitalist countries, in order to help modernize the technologically retarded Chinese plants and equipment. Fourth, and potentially most significant, selected elements of capitalist social techniques[8] were imported and used as supplements to the command plan ("using capitalism to build socialism").

The fourth adjustment policy raises the interesting question of whether social techniques are systemical-

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number of livestock in this autonomous region declined by half. *Renmin Ribao* (Beijing), Jan. 23, 1979; and Nei Monggol Regional Radio Station (Hohhot), Jan. 26, 1979, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-CHI*), Feb. 2, 1979. For an overview of the ecological disaster in China wrought by leftward adjustments, see Vaclav Smil, *The Bad Earth: Environmental Degradation in China*, Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 1984.

The educational damage inflicted by the Cultural Revolution was both quantitative and qualitative. "Educational work suffered great setbacks during the 'cultural revolution' in the years 1966-76, and has not to this day fully recovered from the evil consequences" (*Beijing Review*, Jan. 1, 1981, p. 8). According to Hu Yaobang, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 160 million youths who were between the ages of 8 and 18 in 1966 (at the outset of the Cultural Revolution) received substandard, indeed "poisonous," education during the years of turmoil. Another 210 million teenagers in primary and secondary schools around 1980 were being given deficient education as a result of the destruction wrought by the Cultural Revolution. Ibid., Apr. 14, 1980, p. 15. In 1978, in a population exceeding 960 million, China had a total of 4.3 million scientific and technical personnel in engineering, scientific research, agriculture, public health, and teaching. The only relatively reliable ones were those whose skills were acquired before 1966. State Statistical Bureau, *Statistical Yearbook of China 1983*, Hong Kong, Economic Information and Agency, 1983, pp. 103, 525. For an update on the educational situation, see Marianne Bastid, "Chinese Educational Policies in the 1980s and Economic Development," *The China Quarterly*, June 1984, pp. 189-219.

[6] The transformation thesis explicitly rejects the convergence notion of market socialism in which market and plan harmoniously fuse in roughly equal proportions, the one aiding and rounding off the other. I find the convergence notion to be theoretically unsound and operationally unattainable.

[7] See Robert Michael Field, "Changes in Chinese Industry Since 1978," *The China Quarterly*, December 1984, p. 742.

[8] As explained more fully in the text below, by resort to capitalist social techniques is meant the use of prices (including wages and interest rates), profits that depend on prices, and taxes to motivate workers and managers and to influence the spending patterns of consumers and investors, and the use of exchange rates in transactions with foreign countries. It also means that broad property rights with regard to assets are vested in the actual users of those assets. In a capitalist (market) economy, these techniques arise from competitive, lateral, buying and selling transactions concluded by freely choosing economic units. In a command economy, only the form of these techniques is used, without the substance. Thus, prices in a command economy setting are not the mathematical expression of costs and utilities in the system and do not even remotely indicate allocative rationality. Rather, they are accounting devices denoting—very roughly and imperfectly—production costs plus an arbitrary margin of profit. Property rights in assets vested in enterprise managers are subject to administrative restrictions regarding their value, size, use, and so on.

ly and culturally neutral. Is it possible to graft markets and de facto private property rights onto the central administrative command plan so as to improve the plan's efficiency, without reforming the planned system *as a whole?* Indeed, can capitalist social techniques be used to build a more efficient state socialism? Or, is it necessary to truncate such techniques, emasculate them, and restrict them in order to prevent them from fundamentally changing the state socialist system? More broadly, does the importation of capitalist social techniques produce behavioral ripples that transcend the economy and cause "spiritual pollution," for example, or "unhealthy tendencies"?[9]

The answer, of course, is that social techniques cannot be completely separated from the system from which they have evolved. Nor, in my opinion, can they be used disjointedly. They must be applied as a system, their organic interconnections unbroken. Capitalist social techniques, it can be argued, are the products of a pluralistic culture and as such need a pluralistic, competitive, free-wheeling, free-choice environment to do their job of efficient resource allocation. If such an environment is denied them, or if their essential interconnections are broken, they either atrophy or work in a perverse way. Indeed, ever since Nikita Khrushchev came to power in 1957, the Soviet and East European economies have borrowed capitalist social techniques, only to devitalize them and hem them in by the bureaucratic plan. Consequently, the efficiency results have been very small, nonexistent, or even negative.[10]

In China, like elsewhere in the world of the plan, the use of capitalist social techniques during the period of adjustment was intended to maximize reliance on "economic levers" rather than on "administrative levers." Unlike administrative levers, which are arbitrarily imposed from above, economic levers are indirect, general inducements to economic agents expressed in financial terms. Economic leverage means using prices (including wages and interest rates), profits that depend on prices, and taxes to motivate workers and managers and to influence the spending patterns of consumers. The economic agents adapt to those inducements at will; within the parameters set up by the levers, the agents have free choice. But to do the job of raising the efficiency of resource use, prices must be market prices, and markets must be workably (not necessarily perfectly, in a textbook sense) competitive. If prices are administered by government and/or party authorities—whether central or local—and thus do not originate in reasonably competitive buyer-seller transactions, then they are merely administrative levers masquerading as economic levers: arbitrary prices arbitrarily imposed.[11] Administrative levers, whether in the form of physical commands or administered prices, cannot convey the multidimensional opportunity-cost information needed for efficiency of operations. In fact, they produce troublesome motivational effects.

The use of capitalist social techniques during the period of adjustment in China had two major characteristics: the various measures adopted were not organically linked into a logical, internally consistent system; and many of the measures were confined to certain geographical areas or to selected experimental enterprises.[12] In other words, the capitalist social techniques were fenced off from one another and thus did not constitute an organic entity.

Nonetheless, the adjustments were quite comprehensive and affected urban as well as rural policies. State agricultural procurement prices (and above-quota prices) were raised, as were industrial tariff wages and salaries.[13] Later, the salaries of teachers and other "intellectuals" were also raised. Overtime and piecework pay and bonuses to enterprise managers, workers, and employees were reintroduced for the first time since the mid-1960's, and strict administrative restrictions on labor mobility were relaxed

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[9] The ethical principles of a socialist economy are listed by the Hungarian economist János Kornai as: (1) socialist wage setting (to each according to his work and equal pay for equal work); (2) solidarity (help the weak to rise rather than punish them through capitalist-like competition); (3) security (full employment guaranteed by society); and (4) priority of general interest over partial (individual) interest. See János Kornai, "The Dilemmas of a Socialist Economy: The Hungarian Experience," *Cambridge Journal of Economics* (Cambridge, UK), June 1980, p. 149. Kornai rightly concludes that conflicts are inevitable between these four ethical principles and the five conditions for economic efficiency, which are: (1) an incentive system to stimulate better performance from all individuals participating in production; (2) careful calculation of costs and benefits and termination of nonefficient production activities; (3) fast and flexible adjustment to the current situation and external conditions; (4) entrepreneurship; and (5) personal responsibility.

[10] On the Soviet and East European borrowing of capitalist social techniques and its efficiency results, see Jan S. Prybyla, *Market and Plan Under Socialism: The Bird in the Cage*, Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1986.

[11] "The Retreat from Marx," *The Economist* (London), Oct. 27, 1984, p. 18. In China, "the assigned profit margin for making hot rolled steel is now ten times as high as for cold rolled steel. So the hot sort is naturally in surplus while the cold has to be imported at great cost. Yet rolled steel is one of the products [that] will stay subject to administrative decree" (ibid.).

[12] For example, it has been reported that since August 1984, 1,000 customs and security officials have manned around the clock the perimeter of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (near Hong Kong). *South China Post* (Hong Kong), May 29, 1985.

[13] Tariff or basic wages and salaries are laid down—on the Soviet model—by the central authorities in schedules that are mandatory on state-sector enterprises. There are several such schedules. Industrial workers in China are generally subject to an eight-grade schedule, the skill and basic wage rate being spelled out for each job grade. State employees are under a different schedule containing roughly 30 salary grades. There are separate schedules for engineering and technical personnel, teachers, etc. See Jan S. Prybyla, *The Chinese Economy: Problems and Policies*, 2nd ed., Columbia, University of South Carolina Press, 1981, pp. 150–63.

Manufacture of "Camel" brand cigarettes at the Xiamen Cigarette Factory in Fujian Province in 1981.

—EASTFOTO.

through a de facto termination of the rustication (*xiafang*) program, the gradual removal of rightist labels, and the encouragement of unemployable youths "awaiting work" to find work for themselves in the newly revived urban private sector or in cooperative industry and services.[14]

There were important structural changes in industry as well. Instead of the state appropriating 100 percent of state enterprise profits, experiments with profits taxation, partial profit retention by enterprises, and enterprise incentive funds were initiated in selected places and firms. Special Economic Zones equipped with various legal forms of joint-venture or capitalist coproduction were also begun, and similar arrangements were made in the case of individual projects outside the zones. In the countryside, rural fairs (where near-market prices prevail) and household subsidiary plots were resurrected and expanded somewhat, and a production responsibility system subject to contract between the rural collectivity (production team) and small groups of households was initiated in 1979.

Results of Adjustment

Although the use of selected capitalist techniques has generally proven unsuccessful in the long run, such adjustments of the plan are not invariably a waste of time. They can, and sometimes do, improve certain dimensions of the planned economy's performance. They did that in China. Indeed, by 1980, quantitative performance of industry and agriculture had shown marked improvement from the levels of 1975.[15] However, the economy's qualitative ills remained by and large unaffected. In fact, the ad hoc use of emasculated and disjointed capitalist social techniques side by side with administrative orders of all kinds made the qualitative deficiences if not worse, at least more visible and less tolerable. Thus, hitherto suppressed inflation came more into the open; hidden unemployment came out of hiding; subsidies continued to rise at fast rates; budgetary deficits appeared, as did balance of payments disequilibria; investment (especially outside the state budget) continued on its runaway course despite the central authorities' efforts to curb it; the production process was disrupted by persistent energy and transportation bottlenecks; a significant portion of state firms operated in the red; quality of output was deficient; and factor productivity showed little or no gain. Additionally, social indiscipline was on the rise, some people demanded more freedom of cultural expression and political democracy, and many people, especially the young, began to question the relevance of Marxism-Leninism.[16] In these respects, China by 1980 had begun to encounter many of the same problems advanced socialist economies had experienced during their numerous experiments with adjustment of their highly centralized plans.

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[14] The *xiafang* movement, which peaked in the late 1960's and early 1970's, involved the compulsory transfer of educated urban youths (mainly middle-school graduates) to the countryside. Between 1968 and 1978, about 20 million urban youths were so relocated. The policy of rustication was quietly phased out in 1978-79, following the National Conference on Rusticated Youth Settling in the Countryside held in Beijing, Oct. 31-Dec. 10, 1978. Although most of the "sent down" youths returned to their home towns after this time, many apparently still remain stranded in the countryside, caught in inextricable red tape. See Charles Hoffmann, "Urban Unemployment in China," *Asian Thought and Society* (Oneonta, NY), March 1964, pp. 32-37.

Rightist labels were attached to many people, mainly intellectuals, during the Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1957 that followed the aborted Hundred Flowers Campaign. The consequences for an individual of being branded a rightist were terrifying. See, for example, Ruth Earnshaw Lo and Katherine Kindermann, *In the Eye of the Typhoon*, New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980. Removal of rightist labels was ordered in 1975, but the order was countermanded by the left faction within the leadership. The removal process was resumed shortly after the arrest of the so-called Gang of Four in late 1976. See "Last Rightists have Their Designation Removed," *Beijing Review*, Nov. 24, 1978, p. 3.

Urban unemployment, according to Hoffmann, loc. cit. (note 14, Table 2, p. 33), probably peaked at 13 percent of the urban labor force in 1979. The precise youth component of the 15 million urban unemployed in that year cannot be known with certainty, but it could be as high as three-fifths. According to Li Xiannian (report to a working conference of the Party's Central Committee, Apr. 25, 1979), the urban unemployment at that time stood at 20 million. *Ming Pao* (Hong Kong), June 14, 1979, p. 4. See also, John Philip Emerson, "Urban School-leavers and Unemployment in China," *The China Quarterly*, March 1983, pp. 1-16.

[15] For example, gross agricultural output rose from 128.5 billion *renminbi* in 1976 to 164.6 *renminbi* in 1980. Over the same period, gross industrial output rose from 321.9 billion *renminbi* to 499.2 billion. See *Statistical Yearbook of China 1983*, op. cit., pp. 149 and 215.

[16] For a discussion of this view among youth, see Stanley Rosen, "Prosperity, Privatization, and China's Youth," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March-April 1985, pp. 1-28.

Beyond Adjustment, Toward Reform

The year 1981 marks a turning point in China's post-Mao economic history, although the turning had been some two years in coming. The period 1981-85 can be divided into two subperiods. From 1981 until the end of 1984, the agricultural economy underwent important changes in market relations and privatization of labor and property that skirted, and perhaps even crossed, systemic frontiers. While this was going on, the nonagricultural, or urban, economy (industry, commerce, services, transport, communications) was primarily still functioning under a policy adjustment, with experiments of a reformist temper being tried only in a selected but growing number of enterprises and geographical locations. Beginning in 1985, however, while the reform-like changes in agriculture were consolidated, the movement toward reform in the nonagricultural sector was stepped up, though not without stops and retreats. In 1985, therefore, experiments with free markets and privatization of labor and property began to be extended throughout the other sectors of the economy.

The decision taken by the party Central Committee in October 1984 to move beyond adjustment in the urban sector is official recognition of the need to bring the two major sectors of the economy into institutional harmony.[17] It also is an implicit admission that qualitative improvement of economic performance must be sought through the use of market and privatization measures of reform, rather than through a return to the Stalinist plan in either its original (First Five-year Plan) version or in its modified 1961-65 form. A return to the no-market, no-plan solution of Maoism is not even under consideration.

Agriculture

The keystone of the institutional changes in agriculture, the element of change that constitutes a transition from adjustment-like tinkering with the parts to a reform-like replacement of the economic mechanism, is the contractual system of net-output delivery by households, or *baogan daohu*.[18] It is the culmination of an evolutionary process initiated in 1979 (but present in a somewhat different form in China during 1961-65)[19] whereby the rural collective's operational unit, the production team (of some 30 to 40 households), signs contracts with its smaller component units for the delivery of given quantities and assortments of output at stated prices. These smaller units may be groups (*zu*) of up to half a dozen households or individual peasant families (*hu*). The production responsibility contract (*zeren zhi*) may be either an output contract (*baochan zhi*) or a net-output delivery contract (*baogan zhi*).

Under the terms of the output contract, the noncollective producing unit (the group or household) delivers the contracted-for output to the collective and receives workpoints for it. The value of a workpoint is determined by the collective effort of all production-team households in the context of the state's pricing policy, and the income distribution function rests, as before, with the production team (the collective). Under the net-output delivery contract, no workpoints are involved. The contracted-for output is delivered to the collective and paid for at prices specified in the contract. The balance remaining after the delivery obligation is fulfilled, the agricultural tax is paid, and a number of collective deductions are made remains the property of the household and can be consumed by the family, sold on the free market, or sold to the state at "negotiated" (near-market) prices. From the standpoint of the noncollective contracting unit, the evolution since 1979 has been from group to household. From the standpoint of the nature of the contract, the movement has been from output contract to net-output delivery contract. In other words, between 1979 and 1981, the progression was clearly in the direction of free market and the privatization of labor and use of land.[20]

The details and precise modalities of operation of the *baogan daohu* have been publicized and widely discussed and analyzed.[21] Our interest here is in the systemic implications of this arrangement, that is, in its reform potential.

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[17] "Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Reform of the Economic Structure, Adopted by the 12th Central Committee of the CPC at Its Third Plenary Session on October 21, 1984," *Beijing Review*, Oct. 29, 1984, pp. i-xvi. See also *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 22, 1984, pp. K/1-17. For a discussion, see *The New York Times*, Oct. 21, 1984.

[18] A literal translation of *Baogan daohu* is "full responsibility to household."

[19] Two major differences between *baogan daohu* (1985) and the household contract system of 1961-65 should be noted. First, the 1961-65 system was less prevalent than the present one. Second, in a significant proportion of cases, the 1961-65 system involved payment in workpoints to the household by the contracting team or brigade (*baochan daohu*), whereas no workpoints are involved in the present system (*baogan daohu*). In other words, the present arrangement represents a more widespread and profound decollectivization than did its 1961-65 predecessor (denounced during the Cultural Revolution as an evil creature of Liu Shaoqi).

[20] Yak-Yeow Kueh, "China's New Agricultural Policy Program: Major Consequences, 1979-1983," *Journal of Comparative Economics* (New Haven, CN), December 1984, pp. 354-61, esp. Table 1, p. 356, and Table 2, p. 357.

The arrangement amounts to family tenant farming, the landlord being the state (via the collectivity). Although no actual rent payment is involved, there is a quasi-rent element implicit in the net-output delivery obligation at state-set prices, which in the past were typically below—sometimes appreciably below—equivalent market prices. Legally, the land remains the property of the collective, and it cannot be bought or sold by the noncollective units. Such units, however, can obtain extensive (and exclusive) rights of use to the land, typically for a 15-year period (longer in the case of pastures and woodlands). Draft animals, farm machinery, and means of transportation can be owned privately by the families. Limited numbers of helpers (three) can be hired, but this restriction seems not to be closely enforced. The contract can be transferred to another family with the collective's permission, and compensation must be paid to the transferor by the transferee for any capital improvements made to the land. Consolidation of land parcels is also possible, again with the collective's consent. Under the contract, households may specialize in particular tasks, regardless of whether such tasks are agricultural or not (for example, transportation, machinery repair, merchandising).

From the standpoint of the system, the importance of *baogan daohu* resides in the de facto (not de jure) privatization of landed property (both de facto and de jure in the case of draft animals, machines, carts, trucks, and so on); the devolution of extensive (though far from unlimited) decisión-making power, including decisions about income distribution and the voluntary establishment of cooperatives, to the level of a private production unit (the family); and the significant resort to market prices and near-market prices (negotiated prices) by both parties to the contract in deciding on the volume, assortment, and disposition of output. The last is to become even more important with the proposed phasing out of the state's monopoly of purchases of key farm products (for example, grain, oilseeds, cotton) and the concurrent removal of state-set procurement prices and the contractual delivery quota. This decision has been taken in consequence of the upsurge in farm production and the resultant decline, in some cases, of market prices below state procurement prices.[22]

There can be no doubt that in agriculture there has taken place (since 1981) a considerable marketization of information and coordination through reasonably competitive market prices and direct lateral buyer-seller transactions, and an equally impressive de facto privatization of property rights (involving greater flexibility of cropping patterns, work schedules, specialization, and marketing), both of which have affected motivation in a positive way.

Results in Agriculture

Proponents of going beyond adjustment naturally attribute the favorable situation in agriculture over the last several years to the contractual household net-output delivery arrangement (*baogan daohu*). The results in agriculture are impressive (despite recent estimates of a fairly sizable reduction in grain output for 1985).[23] Production of grain, cotton, and other commodities has risen spectacularly, albeit from low levels.[24] Yields have increased, and labor productivity has risen to the point where from 15 to 30 percent of the labor force has been released from land-related work. Per capita rural incomes have risen sharply.[25]

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[21] A useful source is Frederick W. Crook, "The *Baogan Daohu* Incentive System: Translation and Analysis of a Model Contract," *The China Quarterly*, June 1985, pp. 291-303.

[22] Du Runsheng, "Second Stage Rural Reform," *Beijing Review*, June 24, 1985, pp. 15–17, 22; Zhao Ziyang, "Why Relax Agricultural Price Controls," ibid., Feb. 18, 1985, pp. 16–18, 29. "Starting this year [1985], Chinese farmers will no longer be obliged to sell a portion of their harvest to the state. Instead, they will depend primarily on contracts and the market demand to determine which crops they will grow. . . . Through contracts with farmers, the government will purchase large amounts of grain and cotton at preferential prices and leave the rest of the crop to be regulated by the market. When the market price goes low, the state will purchase the grain or cotton from the farmers at a protective price higher than market price. On the other hand, when the market price goes high, the state may sell its reserves in big quantities to bring the price back down. By buying and selling the government can control the wide fluctuations in the market." See also "Market to Replace the Quota System," ibid., Jan. 14, 1985, p. 8. As part of the "second stage" (1985) agricultural changes, and reflecting the growing monetization and commercialization-specialization of the rural economy, the agricultural tax, formerly paid in grain, will henceforth be settled in cash in the "reverse ratio" of 3:7, i.e., 30 percent of the tax grain will be valued at the former state monopoly (quota) price, and 70 percent at the former (higher) above quota price. Xinhua (Beijing), May 24, 1985, in *FBIS—CHI*, May 29, 1985, pp. K/4-6.

[23] Estimates of grain production in 1985 put grain output at about 27 million tons below the 1984 record of 407 million tons. See John F. Burns, "Facing a Decline in Its Grain Fields, China Retreats on Policy," *The New York Times*, Jan. 1, 1986.

[24] For example, grain production in China increased from 284.5 million metric tons in 1975 to 407.1 million metric tons in 1984. *Statistical Yearbook of China 1983*, op. cit., p. 158; and State Statistical Bureau, "Communiqué on Fulfillment of China's 1984 Economic and Social Development Plan," *Beijing Review*, Mar. 25, 1985, p. II.

[25] According to Fei Xiaotong, "more than one-third of the total rural labor force in southern Jiangsu [Province] has given up farming" ("Surplus Rural Labor Put to Work," *Beijing Review*, May 27, 1985, p. 20). According to a *New York Times* report, "apart from peasants who have switched to growing cotton and other crops [rather than grain], about 50 million have cut back or abandoned farming to go into the fastest growing sector of the economy, rural industry." Such a comparatively low figure would constitute roughly 15 percent of the total agricultural labor force. See John F. Burns, "China Grain Crop Dips: Setback Seen for Policy," *The New York Times*, Dec. 23,

(continued on p. 27)

Jia Chunyan, a peasant of the once highly publicized model brigade of Dazhai, keeps her surplus from the 1984 corn crop in her living room together with her bicycle and TV.

—Sven-Erik Sjoberg, Pressens Bild from Photoreporters.

and household expenditure patterns have shown qualitative improvement. The marketed portion of agricultural output has been expanded, and town and village industries (cooperative as well as private) have mushroomed, absorbing some of the farm labor that has been displaced.

There have also been a few troublesome results connected, it would seem, with *baogan daohu* (see discussion below). Nonetheless, there is no doubt that, so far at least, the positive developments in agriculture outweigh the negative ones. Most important, the problem of the deficient quality of economic performance in the agricultural sector has been addressed with remarkable success.

Two questions arise in this connection. The first concerns the source of the agricultural success story. Is it the partial decollectivization and movement away from central command planning represented by the *baogan daohu?* Or is it the contribution of other, less-reformist, more-technical factors? The latter include a succession of good weather years; increased use of chemical fertilizers; reversion to traditional cropping patterns (that is, the abandonment of the Maoist policy of commune and provincial self-sufficiency and of

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1985. The Beijing *China Daily* (New York ed.) of Oct. 9, 1985, p. 4, puts the number of "surplus laborers" in China's countryside at 120 million, which is expected to reach some 230 million by the turn of the century. Sixty million surplus farm workers were employed in rural industries in 1985. There are indications that the rural industries are being developed too fast. There is also talk of "wasted funds, raw materials, and energy [which] greatly dampen the enthusiasm of the masses." Commentator's article, *Renmin Ribao*, June 3, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, June 7, 1985, p. K/9. See also Robert Delfs, "The Rural Uprising," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), July 11, 1985, pp. 56-57.

Per capita income in 1984, according to a sample survey of peasant households, came to 355 yuan, an increase of 160 percent over 1978, or 100 percent when price increases are taken into account. *Beijing Review*, Apr. 22, 1985, p. 16. A note of caution. Knotty statistical problems are involved in the sample surveys of peasant incomes. These include the questionable reliability of the price deflator in the countryside; the representativeness of the samples drawn on an unspecified but nonrandom basis; the question of collectively supplied consumption goods (not taken into account by the income data); and the propensity of local officials to "overfulfill" the statistical plan, i.e., the tendency to inflate statistics so as to show that what the leadership wants (that the peasants should grow rich) is, in fact, happening instantaneously. On the technical problems involved in rural income sampling, see Nicholas R. Lardy, "Consumption and Living Standards in China, 1978-83," *The China Quarterly*, Dec. 1984, pp. 851-52.

the policy of "grain first") and a consequent rise in interprovincial trade in farm produce; and the hike in procurement prices, which falls under the rubric of adjustment. It should be noted, however, that it is not easy to draw a line between institutional changes and technical ones. For example, the increased use of chemical fertilizers by household producers is due in large part to an improvement in the system's motivational structure; it is simply now worth the peasants' while to use more chemicals whereas it was not under the old workpoints system.

This leads to the second question: Is *baogan daohu* a reform or an adjustment? The answer is that it is an almost-reform. The degree of individual choice involved is far from minor. That choice is exercised to a large extent on the basis of market-price information; it is coordinated in large part by the market; and it is motivated by the lure of market gain. Property rights to assets—including land—are clearly and significantly privatized.

But the liberation of individual choice under the regime of *baogan daohu* is not nearly complete. Limitations on that choice are pervasive and significant as regards both state intervention in the market process and state restrictions on private rights of use of assets. The coexistence of market prices, "preferential" (quota and above-quota) prices, and negotiated prices—a multi-tier price system—encourages market manipulations and distortions, of which quality of produce is the first victim. But there is a more fundamental problem. Even though the Chinese peasant understands instinctively and fairly accurately the principles of the market mechanism and the rights inherent in private property use, such understanding seems to have eluded the officials put in charge of markets and property supervision. The attitude of these officials toward fluctuating prices (especially upward fluctuation, which is seen as "profiteering") and market equilibrium prices in the context of commodity shortages ranges from unsympathetic to hostile. In this view, what is not controlled is seen as "arbitrary" and "blind."[26] Such attitudes have had real consequences. The sharp rises in the retail prices of deregulated farm goods on China's city markets in 1985, for example, led to a flurry of administrative price controls, rollbacks, and subsidies.[27] Even more dangerous, the theoretical grasp of how a market-price system operates is still quite elementary on the part of many financial cadres.[28]

But it is not just a question of deficiency in theoretical comprehension of how market prices allocate resources. In practice, even for those who understand basic market principles, it is not easy to distinguish between price changes that are a result of granting greater freedom to buyers and sellers to bargain competitively and arrive at equilibrium prices in the market and price changes that stem from "wrong" sources such as speculation, cost-push, or demand inflation. Given the magnitude of this practical difficulty, the financial bureaucrats will most likely do what comes most naturally: they will administratively control prices.

Reform of the plan requires the mobility of factors of production. This is still not the case in China under *baogan daohu*. Even though factor mobility has increased compared with the post-1957 past, land and labor remain largely tied, and capital equipment (as well as crucial current inputs) must be purchased from the state monopolist. Although peasants are now permitted to leave the land in response to market signals, they are not permitted to leave the countryside

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[26] See, e.g., Chen Yun's speech to the National Party Conference (Sept. 23, 1985), in *Beijing Review*, Sept. 30, 1985, p. 19; and Tian Jiyun, vice-premier of the State Council, "Price System Due for Reform," ibid., Jan. 28, 1985, p. 19.

[27] In early May 1985, the prices of 1,800 food items were partially deregulated in Beijing. Although the average price increase was said to have been 50 percent, beef prices went up 130 percent, and many vegetable prices doubled. Concerned about possible adverse reactions by urban workers to the price hikes, the government awarded every Beijing resident a subsidy equivalent (at present) to US$2.19 a month. The total cost of this subsidy (about US$140 million a year) is roughly equal to the subsidy formerly paid by the government on food purchased from peasants and resold to urban consumers at lower prices. In December 1985, Deputy Prime Minister Li Peng announced that this subsidy would be raised in order to "stabilize" the situation in Beijing, and that there would be no major price changes in 1986. *The New York Times*, Dec. 23, and May 10, 1985; *Ta Kung Pao* (Hong Kong), May 31, 1985, in *FBIS-CHI*, May 31, 1985, p. W/1. A contingent of 11,000 government price inspectors was deployed in Beijing to prevent price gouging (some would say, to prevent prices from finding their market equilibrium level). In 1984, a decision was made to partially deregulate the prices of certain raw materials and energy. This resulted in a sharp increase in factory production costs. The factories affected by the rise were not, however, permitted to pass on their increased costs in the form of increased prices of their products. Very few went out of business. The great majority were kept afloat by new government subsidies. *The Wall Street Journal* (New York), Apr. 1, 1985.

[28] Following are two examples of the cadres' deficient theoretical grasp of how a market price system operates. In Urumqi, a meeting of cadres concluded that "commodity price departments must straighten out prices so as to conform to the law of prices. Prices which should be changed must be resolutely changed. Those which should be controlled must be strictly controlled. Prices which are not allowed to be raised, resolutely must not be allowed to be raised" (Xinjiang Regional Radio [Urumqi], May 30, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, June 4, 1985, p. T/1). Consider also the statements of a *Renmin Ribao* commentator: "At present a small number of state commercial units in some cities and rural areas still show no interest in market conditions. Some of them are merely hankering after profits. When ore products are supplied, they force down the prices at the expense of the producers; and when products are in short supply or in great demand they raise prices willfully at the expense of the consumers. . . . The authorities concerned should strengthen effective management and supervision over the market and should strictly ban willfull price hikes in violation of state regulations" ("State Commerce Should Learn to Participate in Market Regulation," *Renmin Ribao*, May 28, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, May 28, 1985, pp. K/15-16). Commentator would have flunked Economics 101.

Privately raised pigs are carted to market by peasants near Chengdu in Sichuan Province.

—Laffont/SYGMA.

(though many do).[29] Thus, *baogan daohu*, despite its thrust toward free markets and privatization of property use and labor, is still only a half-reform, perhaps a little better than half. However, even the reformist half has so far operated in the broader context of the administrative command plan that still dominates the nonagricultural sectors of the economy.

Industry: Some Problems

Beginning in 1985, and lasting until 1990, this administrative command dominance over the nonagricultural economy (over "industry," or the "urban" sector for short) is to be relaxed and reduced in scope. The aim is to create a "planned commodity economy" in the urban sector, a code name for marketization and privatization. Reform-minded changes in industry are thus designed to bring the urban economy in harmony with the already accomplished reformist changes in agriculture.

Movement from adjustment toward reform in industry, however, is likely to prove more difficult than it did in agriculture. For one thing, whereas agriculture was a collective-sector economy, the industrial economy is primarily a state-sector economy. The state sector is characterized by a comparatively greater rigidity of administrative (ministerial-type) structures. Unlike the collective sector, it is the preserve of the bureaucrats who inhabit it in great numbers and benefit greatly from the privileges flowing from its administration. There is bound to be resistance to the expanded use of the market mechanism because it takes the bread out of the bureaucrats' mouths. Ironically, there is also likely to be considerable opposition to privatization of property rights from those who would seem to benefit most from such privatization—the enterprise managers, since most of them are neither professionally nor intellectually equipped to make the kind of property-related decisions and take the entrepreneurial risks required by market rules. Like their cousins in the countryside (the commune, brigade, and team officials), but on a more grandiose scale, these urban bureaucrats and enterprise managers are prone to react to the step-by-step relaxation of direct administrative controls in a highly "feudalistic" and corrupt way that distorts and ultimately undermines the intent of the reform. Indeed, according to numerous reports in the Chinese press, a number of urban officials have taken advantage of commodity shortages, privileged administrative position and access to information, and the incompatible mix of administrative commands and emerging markets to line their own pockets.[30]

This has happened in China on a very impressive scale. Instead of market competition and useful output and innovation, what emerges is the old-fashioned bureaucratic squeeze, mutual back-scratching, parasitic payoffs, and bribes. One of the earliest reactions to the October 1984 decision and the consequent relaxation of central controls was the emergence of countless so-called briefcase companies set up by individual officials, groups of officials, and work units to take advantage of the fluid situation and to do business in the cracks between plan and market. It is important to point out that these "unhealthy tendencies," as they are officially called, are not manifestations of competitive market ethics that demand adherence to contractual law freely arrived at. Such tendencies are rather the expression of bureaucratic privilege let loose in a setting characterized by supply shortages, demand inflation, and a combination of highly imperfect markets and administrative commands—the "commoditization" of long-standing malpractices. Instead of a market economy, what mushrooms in such a situation is "feudal socialism," that is, bureaucratic baronies operating in markets of various shades not only of impropriety and illegality, but of textbook market imperfection.[31]

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[29] On the unauthorized and uncontrolled movement of rural labor to the cities, see Christine Wong, "The Second Phase of Economic Reform in China," *Current History* (Philadelphia), September 1985, p. 262. In the Chinese conception of the market, labor and natural resources (e.g., land) are not "commodities," hence they are not subject to market transactions that are concerned only with commodities. Capital goods produced by state firms are presently in a theoretical twilight zone. Some, like trucks and tractors, have been reclassified from noncommodities to commodities. See Robert C. Hsu, "Conceptions of the Market in Post-Mao China: An Interpretive Essay," *Modern China* (Beverly Hills), October 1985, pp. 438-40.

[30] "When Party and government organs and cadres use their influence to set up enterprises . . . all the profits are syphoned off into the pockets of individuals or small groups. . . . These malpractices mar the reputation of the reform. . . . They contaminate the organism of the Party. The new malpractices are all associated with money. Some cadres and Party members are . . . blinded by lust for gain. . . . They have become slaves to money" (*Zhibu Shenghuo* [Beijing], No. 5, 1985, trans. in *Inside China Mainland* [Taipei], August 1985, pp. 15-17). See also *Beijing Review*, Apr. 1, 1985, p. 7. To date the biggest scandal, on Hainan Island, involved 690 parties who pocketed 2.1 million yuan (US$720,000). Between January and March 1985, 872 more-or-less phoney companies were set up by 88 government departments and others (even schools and kindergartens). Contraband vehicles and 16 other luxury goods imported from Hong Kong and other capitalist places were resold at hefty profits on the domestic market. See *The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly* (Hong Kong), Aug. 19, 1985, p. 6.

The second reason why the movement toward reform in the urban sector will be more difficult than reform in agriculture is an extension of the first. In agriculture, the devolution of decision-making powers has been to the level of the private firm (the family). In the urban sector, this devolution will be made to the level of the lowest bureaucratic unit: the state enterprise, with all that this implies in bureaucratic bad habits and modes of behavior just discussed.

Then there is the practical matter of experience. Agriculture in China has during most periods operated partially in a framework of market prices (in village fairs) and de facto private property (household subsidiary plots). The private (family) property mentality promoted briefly by the agrarian reforms of the late 1940's and early 1950's has never been quite extinguished. Such has not been the experience of industry. Except for black-market prices, industry after the mid-1950's operated exclusively in a setting of state-set prices. All institutional manifestations of private property were eventually obliterated, first by the Great Leap Forward and then, more thoroughly, by the Cultural Revolution.

An important philosophical principle that has to be kept in mind when discussing adjustment and reform of the plan is that those in charge of the plan, the top leaders of the communist party, do not intend to relinquish control over the economy, but to make that control more efficient. Their goal in doing so is to facilitate maintaining political control. Direct control of the economy through administrative commands and highly centralized property rights has proved increasingly counterproductive. The only apparent alternative, therefore, is decentralization with the help of markets and privatized rights of property. The big question thus is how to combine efficient central control with such decentralization—in short, how to create a decentralized monopoly.

It cannot be done, but most state socialist regimes in the last 30 years have given this impossibility their best shot. What is involved in this quest is the reconciliation of private and social interests. The market accomplishes such reconciliation by enabling the dominant influence of consumer demand to determine the volume and assortment of output and the basic configuration of income shares. This the philosophy of decentralized monopoly cannot allow. Reform of the plan, therefore, is caught from the start in a Catch-22 economic philosophy conundrum. Be this as it may, the Chinese leadership's decision to initiate changes in the urban economic structure clearly tries to address this problem by concentrating on two fundamental issues: macro-control and micro-autonomy.

Macro-Control

Macro-control concerns the relationship between the state (at whatever level) and firms or enterprises. Under the Stalinist model, practically all enterprises are socialized—nationalized or collectivized—and are directly controlled by the administrative command plan, which is also highly centralized. Under modified versions of this model, the role of administrative commands expressed in physical-technical norms (for example, output targets set in tons) is somewhat reduced, and the role of indicators expressed in financial terms (for example, output performance judged by profit and profitability rates, or by sales volume) is increased. At the same time, the financial indicators are less directive and more indicative than the physical-technical norms. There is thus a double transition: from physical to "value"[32] instruments of control, and from mandatory to more "guidance" planning (plus some free production and exchange on the periphery). However, the financial indicators ("economic levers") continue for the most part to be based on state-set, cost-plus, allocatively irrational industrial prices. This double switch, therefore, does not advance the cause of economic efficiency by much, if at all, as can be demonstrated by examining the 30-year-old Soviet and East European experience with economic levers. From the standpoint of efficient resource use (which is the crux of the planned economy's problem), economic levers are only as good as the price system from which they stem. The Chinese are beginning to understand this, but their understanding is as yet imperfect.

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[31] Barry Kramer, "Oriental Tradition—Chinese Officials Still Give Preference to Kin, Despite Peking Policies: Favoritism Stirs Resentment But Curb Isn't Enforced; A Job for a Son of Deng," *The Wall Street Journal*, Oct. 29, 1985.

[32] As noted earlier, "value" instruments of control in a centrally planned economy are norms expressed in financial terms (e.g., profit, sales targets), the "values" being based on allocatively irrational, planner-determined prices.

In China, changes in the macro-control mechanism involve not only the double transition from physical to "value" instruments of control and from mandatory to guidance planning (which is in essence an adjustment), but also, since 1984, proposals for and some attempts at altering the industrial-price system vis-à-vis the market mechanism. In the remainder of this section, I shall examine the key components of the Chinese planners' efforts to carry out this transition.

Planning. The idea is not to abolish mandatory planning but to reduce it, while at the same time increasing guidance planning. Reduction of mandatory planning in the Chinese case involves cutting from 120 to 30 the number of products regulated by the plan, and streamlining the number of administrative echelons involved in economic decision-making.[33] A potentially important development is the distribution of some producer goods outside the state material-technical supply network, that is, outside the centralized system of producer-goods rationing. A primary mechanism for accomplishing this task is the holding of producer-goods fairs, which have been reported from various places, most notably Shanghai. At these fairs, capital goods can be purchased and sold at prices negotiated by the buyer and seller within certain limits. This is a "Hungarian" development.

TUB WASHER
National
TC-217D

Rural Chinese wait at the Beijing railroad station on their way home with two of the "three bigs"—a television set and a washing machine.

—UPI/BETTMANN.

In Hungary, under the New Economic Mechanism, the Soviet-type material-technical supply system has been replaced by multiple-channel wholesale trade in the means of production. Increasing guidance planning, that is, the use of financially expressed incentives and disincentives, appears to involve primarily augmenting the economic role of lower level authorities (provinces, municipalities, economic zones) compared with that of central authorities. Goods of minor or purely local importance are to be subject to the interplay of supply and demand forces in the market. The markets, however, are not to be completely free, but subject to various forms of supervision by local authorities.

There are two major problems with this arrangement as it has been adopted in China. First, mandatory planning, although reduced in terms of the number of commodities regulated, continues to apply to strategic products (for example, raw materials, steel) that enter into the manufacture of most other products. So long as mandatory planning is not completely abolished, it will, by its presence, however small, significantly limit and inhibit any and all reformist movements outside the area in which its writ runs. Second, there is reason to believe that shifting the responsibility for guidance planning from central to lower level bureaucrats will result in merely making guidance planning mandatory at the lower levels. There is evidence that mandating guidance at lower levels has, in fact, already happened.[34] The short-term result of this propensity to dictate guidance has been an overheated economy with runaway investment and a further lowering of the quality of output. The situation is also unsatisfactory with respect to the local authorities' attitude toward the "free" market sphere. Indeed, according to reports in the Chinese press, it seems that local authorities have been wont either to turn the market into an underground operation benefiting relatives and associates in the bureaucratic power edifice or to restrict it in various ways.[35]

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[33] *Beijing Review*, Oct. 29, 1984, p. 7, puts the reduction at from 120 to 60. Some aggregation in the remaining balances of items that were listed separately before may be involved.

[34] Abram Bergson, "A Visit to China's Economic Reforms," *Comparative Economic Studies* (Tempe, AZ), Summer 1985, p. 76. A secretary of the Lingui County (Guanxi Province) Party Committee told bankers who were reluctant to lend money for building some questionable town and township enterprises: "We are not in charge of personnel administration, but your 'party tickets' are in our hands. . . . You don't have to follow the leadership of the county government. . . . You refuse to give help. In the future don't call on us when you have problems." The bankers got the message and gave the loan. *Renmin Ribao*, June 5, 1985, trans.in *FBIS-CHI*, June 7, 1985, p. K/8. In the first six months of 1985, the Agricultural Bank lent 2 billion yuan to rural industries run by local authorities under guidance planning, a figure originally targeted for the whole year. Vigor Fung, "China Seeks to Slow Economy Without Reversing Reforms," *The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly*, Aug. 19, 1985, p. 21.

Price System. A largely unnoticed and unsung epic feat of bureaucratic futility occurred in the Soviet Union in 1967 when several million industrial wholesale prices were recalculated by hand and published in massive volumes as part of the USSR's proposed transition from mandatory-physical to guidance-"value" planning.[36] Although the new prices were updated and a little better calculated (in an accounting sense), they took little if any account of use values (demand). Thus, they were instantly obsolete. Like the old prices, they gave the wrong signals, and the waste went on.

Chinese policymakers today, unlike their Soviet counterparts in 1967, are aware of the need not merely to readjust the industrial price system, but to reform it, that is, to make such a price system a mathematical expression of competitive business transactions in a market in which the parties involved maintain wide rights of choice. Without such reform, guidance planning, even if carried out in the spirit of guidance rather than mandate, is a trivial pursuit from the point of view of allocative optimality. Intellectual understanding extends to the formidable difficulties—economic, political, psychological—inherent in freeing industrial prices. Caution and gradualness characterize the leadership's approach to the task of price reform ("We must grope for stones while crossing the river"). Unfortunately, by stretching out the price distortions over time, this pragmatic, step-by-step handling of change may itself undo the intent of reform. At the back of the policymakers' minds seems to be lodged the idea that a comprehensive freeing of industrial prices should await a significant increase in the supply of goods, that is, the advent of a buyers' market (as has happened with grain and some other farm products). However, the arrival of such a happy state may be obstructed by the present continued irrationalities of the shackled industrial price system.

So far, relative prices of some products have been readjusted and others will be readjusted later. Still, a lot of prices (e.g., for coal, steel, short-distance railway rates, housing rents, and public utilities) are "too low," while other prices are "too high." These readjustments of relative prices have several important constraints imposed on them. One is that the prices of products produced and distributed by the mandatory state plan should be left basically unchanged. What is meant by "basically" is not altogether clear, but it would appear that the prices of such products when "marketed by enterprises through their own channels according to specific regulations" are to be determined by market forces.[37]

An initial result has been the emergence of a dual price system for a number of key commodities (for example, coal, steel), which does nothing to make the price system allocatively more rational. The existence of the dual price system compromises economic calculation in monetary terms. Another constraint on price reform is the regime's commitment not to affect urban living standards adversely, not even temporarily. Thus, relative price adjustments and price deregulation (as with some farm products) have been typically accompanied by cash subsidies to urban wage-earners or by the introduction of new price controls.

And so the present situation is marked by the not very compatible and distorting coexistence of state-set cost-plus prices, floating prices, white-market prices, and black-market prices. These various prices are supposed to be restricted to their respective spheres of mandatory planning (state prices), guidance planning (floating prices), and market sector (market prices), but they are not. They overlap and conflict. Not only is there a badly insulated three- (or four-) tier price system, but there is a multi-currency system as well: one for local people and one for foreigners (foreign-exchange certificates or foreign—nonsocialist—currencies). Here, too, there are leakages from one sphere to the other. Chinese *renminbis* mingle with foreign-exchange certificates, Hong Kong dollars, and US dollars, and there is a rampant black market in foreign currencies.

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[35] Since deregulation, some local governments have refused to decontrol and have used their power to monopolize the timber trade and exploit forest farmers. *Renmin Ribao*, May 26, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, June 3, 1985, pp. K/15-16. Local leaders have reportedly been restricting the marketizing changes promoted by the center by, for example, limiting the availability of open spaces and enclosed areas where market transactions are authorized, collecting unwarranted fees and fines (''squeeze''); suspending or confiscating business licenses, and capriciously occupying private business premises. Shandong Provincial Radio Service (Jonan), June 9, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, June 11, 1985, pp. O/1-2. On the frequent verticality (''commandism'') of what are supposed to be lateral, mutually arrived-at *baogan daohu* contracts, and the great number of levies and surtaxes imposed locally by cadres hostile to the *baogan daohu* system, see Ts'ai Ming-ch'in, ''The Burden on the Peasantry: An Analysis of Mainland China's Rural Economy,'' *Issues & Studies* (Taipei), April 1984, pp. 30-47.

[36] Gertrude E. Schroeder, ''The 1966-67 Soviet Industrial Price Reform: A Study in Complications,'' *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), April 1969, pp. 462-77; and Jan S. Prybyla, ''Soviet Economic Reforms in Industry,'' *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv* (Kiel), Vol. 107, No. 2, 1971, pp. 272-316.

[37] ''Tian Jiyun On Commodity Prices,'' *Banyue Tan* (Beijing), No. 9, May 10, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, June 5, 1985, p. K/12.

The debate continues. A question that has not been unequivocally answered is whether those who advocate fundamental changes in the industrial price system realize that price flexibility is not a one-time operation, that prices must be continuously flexible, that they must move spontaneously over time. But, as noted above, economic spontaneity is equated with arbitrariness and blindness, and political pluralism is seen as unhealthy bourgeois factionalism.

At present, worker mobility in industry, particularly in the state sector, is insignificant. With the exception of private-sector employment (which has risen substantially since 1978 but still constitutes a very small percentage—2.5 percent in 1984—of total urban employment) and freer movement of labor among jobs in the cooperative sector, urban workers continue to be assigned to their *danwei* (work units) by labor bureaus, and both inter- and intra-enterprise labor mobility is subject to mandatory administrative planning. Although there have been some successful experiments in loosening up the mobility of scarce skilled labor,[38] in general such efforts have met with theoretical incomprehension and bureaucratic opposition: there is need, it is said, to distinguish between "rational flow and anarchic free flow [that is, market allocation] of talented people."[39] There have been numerous official announcements heralding future change: the Soviet-type eight-grade tariff wage system will soon be abolished in enterprises;[40] enterprises will have more control over wage determination;[41] wage rates will be determined more by individual workers' productivity-related criteria than by seniority;[42] and total payrolls will be allowed to fluctuate according to individual enterprise performance.[43]

But such practices require the freeing of industrial labor so that it can move spontaneously in response to wage differentials; otherwise the changes are meaningless. The latter appears to be the case at this juncture, for the central authorities have made it patently clear that they will not abandon their control over wages altogether. (Even the "liberal" Hungarians have not done this.) The central government's interest in retaining a measure of wage control no doubt stems from its concern with the possibility of runaway consumption funds and inflation, as well as a concern about the skewing of the pattern of income distribution.[44] Despite talk about the need, from an efficiency standpoint, to increase income differentials, in China such differentials cannot exceed certain rather narrowly defined limits without giving rise to serious political difficulties. Redistributive mechanisms (such as progressive income taxes linked to transfer payments) are not yet in place, so wage control has to be more direct. In other words, part of the problem with the price of labor, as with other prices, is the transitional incompatibility of the plan-market institutional arrangements of motivation, that is, the coexistence of administrative controls over labor mobility with not fully marketized incentive levers, with the two sets of instruments frequently working at crosspurposes.

Because the 1985 floating of wages by enterprises was to proceed from the payroll base figures for 1984, enterprises hurried to raise wages (especially through the less easily controllable bonuses) before January 1, 1985.[45] In December 1984, wages jumped an unprecedented 46 percent, most of the increase having been paid for by borrowing from state banks. That month, bank loans rose 48.4 percent, and government expenditures on payrolls went 70 percent over the budget. To foot the bill, the treasury printed 8 billion extra yuan in 1984.[46]

Interest rates, one of the economic levers on which the government has increasingly relied to guide the nonmandatory spheres of the economy, are not market-determined and have not proved effective so far in allocating capital funds rationally or in cooling down the overheated economy. Differentiated and floating interest rates are being tried, but any resemblance to market rates is coincidental.

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[38] For a discussion of some of the experiments, including the use of job markets for nation-wide placement, see *Asiaweek* (Hong Kong), Sept. 6, 1985, pp. 37–43.

[39] Hunan Provincial Radio Service (Changsha), May 18, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, May 21, 1985, p. P/3.

[40] New Year's speech by Zhao Ziyang, premier of the State Council, to the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in Beijing, Jan. 1, 1985, in *Beijing Review*, Jan. 7, 1985, p. 15.

[41] Zhao Ziyang, "Report on the Work of the Government," delivered at the 2nd Session of the 6th National People's Congress on May 15, 1984, in *Beijing Review*, June 11, 1984, p. iv.

[42] "Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Reform of the Economic Structure," Adopted by the 12th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China at its Third Plenary Session on Oct. 20, 1984, in *Beijing Review*, Oct. 29, 1984, p. xii.

[43] See notes 40 and 41.

[44] Zhao Ziyang, "Report on the Work of the Government," loc. cit. On the problem of runaway consumption and investment in late 1984 to mid-1985, see An Zhiwen, "A Year in which Marked Progress Was Made in the Reform of the Economic Structure of the Cities," *Renmin Ribao*, May 13, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, May 22, 1985, pp. K/6–11, esp. p. K/10. Western economists estimate the 1985 inflation rate in the urban areas of China at 10 to 15 percent, with the Shanghai rate put at 17 percent. Leonard Silk, "China Hits Its Stride," *The New York Times*, Oct. 27, 1985.

[45] Wong, loc. cit., p. 279.

[46] *Hong Kong Evening Standard*, June 4, 1985, p. 8. In 1984, gross wages in Beijing rose 500 yuan. Of this, more than 80 million yuan was paid out in in-kind and money bonuses, including bonuses for worn-out shoes. *Ming Pao* (Hong Kong), May 17, 1985, p. 5, in *FBIS-CHI*, May 22, 1985, p. W/3.

Micro-Autonomy

Micro-autonomy means three things: experimentation with mixed public-private forms of property enfranchisement at the enterprise level; resort to partial or total foreign ownership of firms; and enlargement of the decision-making powers of state enterprises with regard to some or all of the following: production, supply, marketing, pricing, labor, and investment. To constitute meaningful reform (that is, to raise the quality of economic performance), micro-autonomy must occur within a setting of marketized macrocontrol. Otherwise micro-autonomy becomes merely an exercise in administrative decentralization—a tinkering with the bureaucratic apparatus. This has been the fate of micro-autonomy in the Soviet Union and most East European state socialist countries.

Mixed Property Forms. The coexistence of public and private forms of enfranchisement at the enterprise level is not new in the People's Republic of China. Mixed public-private enterprises existed in China before the mid-1950's, some of them even surviving until the Cultural Revolution in 1966. What is new is the direction and magnitude of change outlined in recent proposals. For example, under the proposed industrial changes, in the years 1985-87, *all* enterprises with fixed assets of less than 1.5 million yuan and annual profits of under 200,000 yuan are to be contracted out or leased to individuals or groups (cooperatives) for periods of up to five years. As in Hungary, such enterprises tend to be concentrated in the service trades, catering, maintenance, repair, construction, and local transportation. The arrangement is broadly similar to the *baogan daohu* system in agriculture, where, as will be recalled, legal social ownership is combined with broad privatization of the rights of use. The leased enterprises are required to pay rent and taxes to the state. They are granted relatively broad rights of business decision-making, including decisions about the distribution of the firms' net income. As an added benefit, public firms operating under the leasing arrangement will be allowed to avoid restrictions on the hiring of labor applicable to private-sector enterprises.[47]

It appears that most enterprises so far denationalized have been turned over to cooperative groups. The kind of small enterprises involved in this change currently account for a little more than half the total value of gross industrial output (a count that includes enterprises in rural towns and townships). It is expected that by 1987 most of that output value will be produced under the leasing cooperative arrangement.

It remains to be seen how this will work out in practice. As has been noted, the movement involves the de facto privatization of industrial property rights primarily to groups. The question is whether these groups will be *bona fide* cooperatives or neo-Stalinist collectives—which are simply a lowlier species of state enterprises. Much will depend on the taxing and rent-collecting attitudes and policies of local authorities and on whether there will be enough capital and current inputs outside the plan for the "autonomous" firms to do something with their newly acquired money. Will the leased firms compete with state firms for scarce materials, maybe even for customers? If so, what will be the state's reaction? Will the new arrangement further encourage an already active underground economy and contribute to the well-established propensity of officials to be corrupted?

In addition to the establishment of various forms of contracting and leasing arrangements, the legal private sector in urban areas has been significantly expanded. This trend, however, must be kept in perspective. Although the number of people employed in this sector (mostly in services, retail trade, and catering) has increased more than 15-fold since 1978, such workers still constitute only a very small proportion of total urban employment (2.5 percent at the end of 1984, compared with 3.2 percent in 1957 at the end of the Stalinist First Five-Year Plan).[46] Even if one assumes considerable undercounting of this essentially amorphous backpack sector, legal private activities in urban areas are quite marginal and are likely to remain that way.

Foreign Ownership. There has been foreign equity participation in socialist development of communist states in the past—in the pre-Stalin Soviet Union during the 1920's, and since then in some other countries (for example, Hungary); the practice has the doctrinal sanction of no less an authority than Lenin himself. In China, since 1978 various forms of foreign participation have been encouraged. Two remarks have to be made in this regard. First, foreign industrial participation—whatever the precise form, and there are many—has as a rule been isolated from the rest of the economy either through special regulations or outright zoning. Second, the high hopes that such an arrangement would attract advanced technology and generate hard-currency exports (especially with respect to the Special Economic Zones) have not yet been realized. Actual (as distinct from contemplated) foreign investment in joint ventures of all kinds has been relatively modest, made largely by "Hong Kong compatriots" for tourism-related projects, industrial assembly work (e.g., assembly of television sets), and real-estate speculation (and perhaps for political insurance as well).

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[47] Wong, loc. cit., p. 262, and Christine Wong, "Ownership and Control in Chinese Industry: The Maoist Legacy and Prospects for the 1980s," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *China in the 1980s*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1985.

[46] *Statistical Yearbook of China 1983*, op. cit., p. 120; and *Beijing Review*, Mar. 25, 1985, p. viii.

State Enterprises. The enlargement of the hitherto minimal decision-making prerogatives of state-owned enterprises is also a form, albeit more limited, of denationalization and privatization of collective property rights (including, prominently, greater rights by an enterprise to its profits). Collective firms, while disadvantaged in many respects, have typically enjoyed greater independence from planning indices and ministerial intervention than state firms have. Such an increase in state enterprise "autonomy" is the micro end of the macro use of economic levers.

At the heart of the enterprise autonomy scheme is the question of profit retention.[49] In the past, state enterprises remitted almost all their profits to the state treasury. The state then allocated nonreturnable grants for the enterprises' capital needs out of the state budget, and sent detailed instructions for the use of these funds. Under the new policy, however, instead of remitting all profits, enterprises will pay a tax on profits. This and other taxes will be used by the state as an economic lever to induce the desired enterprise behavior with respect to the after-tax profits retained by the enterprises. The self-interest of the

A peasant entrepreneur in Xiwei manufactures ceramic mosaics.

—Laffont/SYGMA.

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[49] Barry Naughton, "False Starts and Second Wind: Financial Reform in China's Industrial System," in Elizabeth J. Perry and Christine Wong, Eds., *The Political Economy of Reform in Post-Mao China*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1985.

enterprise, it is now believed, can be reconciled with the country's "social" interest (as perceived by the state) through the state's taxation policy. But such a view may be overly optimistic. The Soviet experience with profit retention shows that this assumption is correct only if the price system within which profit arises and taxes are deployed is market rational.[50] Without a revolutionary marketization, that is, a freeing and debureaucratization of the industrial price system, the partial privatization of property rights in the form of profits to the level of the state firm remains an adjustment that will, in my opinion, keep generating allocatively wrong signals. Indeed, Soviet experimentation with tax-for-profit formulas (and the associated "enterprise funds")[51] has now been going on for 30 years, and there are no indications that it has been at all helpful. In fact, there has probably even been some net regression.

Knowing this, the Chinese have introduced an array of corrective taxes to compensate for profit distortions due to the continued presence of an irrational price system. Among these taxes is a product tax, which is applied uniformly throughout the country but differentiated among products. The purpose of the tax is to confiscate that part of (windfall) profits on certain goods that arises from "wrong" pricing, as, for example, the profits on some consumer durables and cigarettes.[52] There is also a resource tax designed to eliminate rent differentials among extractive industries and mining, and an adjustment tax whose purpose is to remove differences among enterprises in the same industrial branch, whenever such differences arise from "undeserved" causes.[53] Moreover, to remind enterprise managements that capital is not free and to correct for profit distortions due to capital intensity, a capital charge is now levied on fixed and working capital. And a bonus tax is in force to help curb the "blind" and "wanton" disbursement of premiums. The use of taxes, including the most important, the eight-grade progressive income tax,[54] shows that Chinese planners have a far better theoretical grasp of the issues involved in using economic levers with noneconomic prices than the Soviets have ever been able to manage.

But there still are many unresolved questions. The most important of these is who will do the determining of what is "reasonable" profit and what is not, and what criteria will be used to make that determination. When prices are allocatively distorted, it is not easy, even with the purest of intentions, to pinpoint what part of profits or profitability rates is due to erroneous economic calculation and what is due to other factors. In such conditions, there is bound to be considerable administrative fiat in the decision to tax, which may compound rather than lessen the problem. The Hungarians are familiar with this dilemma.

In addition to the right to a portion of profit and greater latitude in the use of retained profit, enterprises are to gain new rights with respect to their labor force. This includes, notably, the right to hire and to dismiss workers for cause, and the right to determine wages in relation to performance.[55] These rights, too, especially the latter, will almost certainly be circumscribed by the state's taxing policy and bureaucratic suasion. Other important rights granted to enterprises include the right to enter into lateral transactions with other firms, not as a general rule, but supplementary to the (guidance) plan, and on a larger scale and with less administrative fuss than was possible under the mandatory plan; the right to increase the scope of production outside the plan and of "self-disposal" goods; and the right to purchase certain producer goods and materials on a more or less open market.[56]

It is interesting but not surprising to note that the introduction of the tax-for-profits scheme has right away given rise to complaints in the Chinese press about large-scale tax avoidance and evasion.[57]

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[50] Alec Nove, *The Soviet Economic System*, 2nd ed., Boston and London, George Allen & Unwin, 1980; Marshall I. Goldman, *USSR in Crisis: The Failure of an Economic System*, New York, W.W. Norton, 1983; and Prybyla, *Market and Plan Under Socialism*.

[51] See William G. Rosenberg, "Observations on the Soviet Incentive System," *The ACES Bulletin* (Bloomington, IN), Fall-Winter 1977, pp. 27–43; and Prybyla, "Soviet Economic Reforms in Industry." After-tax profits of Soviet state enterprises are allocated, in accordance with centrally determined formulas, among three major enterprise funds (also known as "economic stimulation funds"): the material incentive fund; fund for social-cultural measures; and production development fund. Monies from these funds may be disbursed by enterprises (with the approval of their supervisory ministries) for various enterprise-related purposes.

[52] On the various types of new taxes, see Wong, "The Second Phase of Economic Reform in China"; and Naughton, loc. cit. On broader issues involved in the change, see Nina P. Halpern, "China's Industrial Economic Reforms: The Question of Strategy," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley), October 1985, pp. 998–1012.

[53] What is "undeserved" is sometimes difficult to define in the much-plan, some-market context. For example, many local firms have jumped in on the booming market in herbal medicines and cigarettes, allegedly reaping windfall profits from these addictions, while supplying inferior products.

[54] This is a graduated progressive tax that had long been imposed on collective enterprises and is now extended to state enterprises.

[55] See notes 40 and 41. Under the former system, enterprise managers—who were appointed by superior administrative-party authorities—had very limited rights with respect to the hiring and dismissal of workers in their enterprises. In conformity with the socialist ethical principle of job security (see note 9 above), it became almost impossible to fire incompetent (much less, superfluous) state-sector workers. The phenomenon goes by the name of the unbreakable "iron rice bowl." In Kaifeng, Henan Province, for example, of 400 large factories, 110 were at one point operating below capacity or had ceased operations altogether, while keeping everyone on the payroll. *Beijing Review*, May 25, 1979, p. 8.

[56] These various rights are listed in *Beijing Review*, June 18, 1984, pp. 10–11, in a report on the May 10, 1984, "State Council Provisional Regulations on Greater Decision-Making Powers of State-Owned Industrial Enterprises." For some recently aired innovative proposals on micro-autonomy, see Mary Lee, "Prescription for Health: Reform Highlights Management Problems in China," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Sept. 12, 1985, p. 103.

Prospects

Instead of speculating on the future course of economic changes in China, I shall list some dangers that lurk along the reformist path. I assume that the current leadership, or an important and influential part of it, is committed to the improvement of the qualitative performance of the economy. I further assume that such improvement requires reform of the economic system rather than adjustment. In the Chinese context, as noted throughout this essay, this means that markets and privatized property rights would have to become dominant in the system. This would require the marketization of the plan's institutions of information, coordination, and motivation (in short, the establishment of competitive market relations among buyers and sellers), and the de facto privatization of property rights in the means of production, exchange, and distribution.

There are, I think, three interacting and interrelated groups of dangers in the way of the reformist movement in China. The components of these three groups have been active elsewhere in the world of the plan. They have succeeded in all instances in bringing the reform movement to a halt either early on (as in the Soviet Union) or a bit later (Hungary). The three groups are economic, political, and ideological.

The economic dangers come from three sources. First, from the nature of the market mechanism itself; second, from the basic incompatibility of market and administrative command institutions where these coexist because the reform is introduced incrementally rather than all at once; and third, from the behavior of those unacquainted with the operational rules and ethical requisites of the market and privatized property rights.

The market mechanism is very good at equilibrating supply and demand in individual product markets (and, incidentally, at resolving conflicts at a fairly "low" systemic level), but it is less good in achieving equilibrium on the macro level. This means that the introduction of markets and privatized property rights might bring with it bouts of open unemployment, open inflation, booms and recessions, balance of payments disequilibria, and wide differentials in the distribution of income and wealth. This has happened in China. These problems are also present in the system of central administrative command planning, but most of the time they manifest themselves there in a suppressed or disguised form. Their openness in a market setting provides opponents of reform with excellent issues around which to mobilize resistance to the marketization and privatization process. This has been the case in Hungary.

The incompatibility of market and plan institutions during the "transitional" period has been discussed here and elsewhere.[58] The effects of the cure of a little bit of market and more than a bit of planning, with partly privatized and mostly socialized property rights, have in general proved worse than the disease. A good instance of this unhappy mix in China is the attempted extension of urban micro-autonomy in a system still dominated by an irrational industrial price system. This institutional working-at-odds has been instrumental in subverting the reformist movement (never very strong) in the USSR and most East European countries.

Operating within the market environment brings rewards to many. However, it is not an easy or restful task; nor is it one with which all are familiar or toward which everyone is temperamentally and professionally predisposed. Moreover, the market is governed by stringent rules of the game. Observance of contract terms and abstinence from all action in restraint of trade, for example, are among the rules of market conduct, and a predisposition for risk-taking (not gambling) is among the chief qualities of the market entrepreneur. But the qualities required of government bureaucrats and state enterprise managers in a plan setting are quite different from those of the market entrepreneur. Where the entrepreneur is bold and adventuresome, the bureaucrat is obedient and staid. Where the former seeks to maximize gain, the latter tries to minimize loss.

Thrust into a market environment, bureaucrats tend to behave not like capitalists, but like black marketeers, lining their pockets, stealing, and generally acting not according to the rules of the market, but according to the street-smart, corrupt codes of the underground economy. Their behavior is partly connected with the high degree of imperfection found in markets created by something that is neither adjustment nor reform. Mostly, however, it is due to the incompatibility of (even modest) pluralism in the economic marketplace and continued monopoly of political power.

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[57] In Hebei Province, between 1980 and 1984, some enterprises paid only 30 percent of the taxes due by them. Officials at various levels have been accused of "lowering tax rates at random, widening the range of tax exemptions, even regarding taxation as an obstacle to reform." *Renmin Ribao*, May 24, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, May 28, 1985, p. K/10; Xinhua (Beijing), May 27, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, May 31, 1985, p. K/2. See also, Marlowe Hood, "China Learns a Capitalist Lesson: Tax Evasion Goes With the Game," *The Wall Street Journal*, Nov. 16, 1985.

[58] E.g., Gertrude Schroeder, "The Soviet Economy on a Treadmill of 'Reforms,' " in US Congress Joint Economic Committee, *Soviet Economy in a Time of Change*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1979, pp. 312-40; idem, "Soviet Economic 'Reform': More Steps on the Treadmill," in US Congress Joint Economic Committee, *Soviet Economy in the 1980's: Problems and Prospects*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1982, Part I, pp. 65-88.

It should be added that bureaucrats and managers are not the only ones who experience difficulty operating in a market environment. There are other groups as well; the nonentrepreneurial peasants, for example. The market, after all, is not responsive to nonpecuniary considerations. Those unable to operate in it according to the rules, or those excluded from it, may add up to a sizable political constituency.

The political danger stems not only from this ill-fit of market and centralized planning, but also from other sources. The market is a labor-saving device in the sense that it generates, transmits, and analyzes information about what needs to be done in the system; coordinates the disparate pieces of information; and provides the requisite motivation to get the job done. The market does all this at a comparatively low transaction cost; there is no need for bureaucrats to do this work deliberately and manually. In other words, the market threatens the bureaucrats in their capacity as "producers"—planners, supervisors, enforcers, double-checkers, and so on. The market also endangers the consumer privileges of the bureaucratic elite. Under the regime of the market, what matters is money, not political privilege. Reform thus threatens the bureaucracy on both counts.

Ideological dangers to reform come from two doctrinal sources: Marxism and Leninism. From the standpoint of Marxism, there are two issues connected with economic reform. Clinging to Marxism are socialist ethical codes (developed mostly after Stalin's death) that include the right to employment (regarded as more important than the right of free speech), interpreted in the state sector as the right to a lifetime job (in China, the right has traditionally extended even to children of many state-sector employees). Other rights associated with the Marxist ethos are access to basic necessities of life at low (subsidized) prices, "equality," stability, and others.[59]

The quest for market efficiency inevitably comes in conflict with these ethical desiderata and suscitates resistance in the adversely affected quarters. The codes are part of an implicit social contract between the monoparty state and the citizenry. The citizens receive these economic guarantees but at a sacrifice: they lack locational mobility, experience chronic shortages of desired goods and services, put up with low quality of products and other consumer frustrations, and accept a slow increase in their standard of living. Economic reform, with its competition, high-risk quotient, and short response time to rapidly changing market conditions, breaks that contract. Some firms have to close, some people have to be dismissed from their jobs, rents rise, and so on.

The second issue connected with Marxism and affected by economic reform is that of social classes. Marketization and de facto privatization of the economic system benefit not one class but many, and these are not the ones chosen as "progressive" by Marx's Laws of History. Although in the long run, reform benefits the urban proletariat—in fact, transforms it into a middle class—the short- and medium-term benefits, and some of the longer term ones as well, accrue primarily to the entrepreneurial and independent segments of urban and rural society: the "rich" peasant, the shopkeeper, the enterprising businessman, the broker, and the venture capitalist. Reform changes not only the output structure of the economy but its class structure as well, and in the process redefines class in a non-Marxist sense.

If Marxism is associated with the socialist ethical code, Leninism is identified—much more accurately—with party control over all spheres of life. Marketization and privatization reforms diffuse economic power among many centers; production, exchange, and distribution relations tend to function best when horizontally integrated rather than vertically, and tend to diversify and be made more indicative and indirect—all of which goes against the Leninist imperative of absolute power absolutely concentrated. On this Leninist issue of control, economics, politics, and ideology converge. Marketization and privatization, the opponents of reform argue, cause not only macroeconomic woes and aberrant behavior ("spiritual pollution"). They threaten the planning, supervisory, and managerial elites both as "producers" and consumers; they are ethically repugnant on a Marxist interpretation; and, above all, they are a menace to unified monopolistic control by the Leninist party.

These are serious counts that have to be carefully considered in arriving at a perception of the odds for and against the reformist movement in China.

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[59] See footnote 9.

Gorbachëv and Eastern Europe

Vladimir V. Kusin

When Mikhail Gorbachëv became Soviet party leader in March 1985, most Western observers anticipated that he would provide a more imaginative and dynamic guidance for Eastern Europe than his immediate predecessors had exercised. At the same time, observers were divided as to whether this imagination and dynamism would translate into greater uniformity in Eastern Europe or whether Gorbachëv would allow the individual states greater latitude. The official proclamation of Gorbachëv's accession was cast in a continuity mold, promising that Moscow would go on "doing everything possible and necessary to strengthen the socialist community."[1] By contrast, Gorbachëv's maiden speech as leader (at a Central Committee meeting) and a *Pravda* editorial two days later contained turns of phrase that raised the expectations of those desiring reformist change. Instead of advocating "strengthening the might of the socialist community," the General Secretary pledged "fraternal friendship" with it. Missing also were such ritual catchwords as "socialist internationalism," "cohesion," and even "Marxism-Leninism," not to mention the once obligatory commitment to increasing the bloc's "defensive capacity."[2] Yet, in his March 13 funeral oration for Konstantin Chernenko delivered from atop the Lenin mausoleum, Gorbachëv revived some of the old stereotypes:

> *Faithful to the principles of socialist internationalism, our party will continue to do everything for broader interaction between the fraternal countries and for the enhancement of their position in international affairs.*[3]

On the same day, the new Soviet leader met briefly with bloc leaders in Moscow for the Chernenko funeral. According to private East European sources, a cool and detached Gorbachëv simply told his lesser comrades to get on with the business at hand with greater application and consistency. Henceforth, he indicated, the emphasis would be on economic efficiency and tighter coordination of the bloc's external actions. All should strive for a lessening of tensions vis-à-vis the West, but only on the basis of bloc unity directed by Moscow. A Warsaw Pact summit would be held in due time to extend the treaty. Hungary's János Kádár reportedly sought to pose as the bloc's elder statesman paternally accepting Gorbachëv into the family, but the General Secretary remained aloof, gently referring the Hungarian to his proper station by indicating that he would not attend the Hungarian party congress, then only two weeks away.[4]

Vladimir V. Kusin is Deputy Director of Research and Analysis, Radio Free Europe (Munich). Formerly associated with the universities of Lancaster, Glasgow, and Hokkaido, he is the author of The Intellectual Origins of the Prague Spring *(1971),* Political Grouping in the Czechoslovak Reform Movement *(1972), and* From Dubček to Charter 77 *(1978), and numerous articles on Eastern Europe.*

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[1] TASS in English, Mar. 11, 1985, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-SOV*), Mar. 11, 1985, pp. R/2–4.

[2] For Gorbachëv's March 11 speech, see *Pravda* (Moscow), Mar. 12, 1985; for the editorial, ibid., Mar. 13, 1985.

[3] TASS in English, Mar. 13, 1985, in *FBIS-SOV*, Mar. 13, 1985, pp. R/2–3.

[4] The communiqué from this encounter appeared in *Pravda*, Mar. 14, 1985. Western observers generally interpreted this meeting as an "informal" one. See, e.g., *Le Monde* (Paris), Mar. 14, 1985.

The only specific point apparently mentioned was the possibility (later dropped) that the 27th CPSU Congress might be brought forward in time—a sign that Gorbachëv may have overestimated his own capacity to break the back of opposition to him within

(continued on p. 40)

Although the Budapest event might have offered an opportunity for a more extensive summit, time was too short. Moreover, Gorbachëv had to be doubly careful with regard to Hungary. As the new leader of an empire in trouble, it would be imprudent to be seen either endorsing or condemning the somewhat unorthodox ways of comrades in one of the constituent countries so early in his tenure. Even if he himself had wanted to give his blessing to market-based reformism, which—despite considerable conjecture—is by no means certain, his own party's Politburo, given its composition at Gorbachëv's accession, would most likely not have allowed him to do so. Also, once he took a stand, lesser bloc leaders would have felt obliged either to follow suit or raise objections. The caucus could have degenerated into a squabble. Rather than show himself too friendly with Kádár, Gorbachëv needed to demonstrate that East Europeans were a priority with the new Soviet chief, but only as a collective entity.

By and large, the Western press saw Gorbachëv's accession as a blessing for the Soviet Union's European allies. The *Los Angeles Times* ran the headline "Gorbachëv May Be Eastern Europe's Best Hope for Evolution."[5] The *London Times* correspondent in Warsaw, in a piece entitled "Time Ripe for a Strong Hand," reported that "in Poland one senses the desire for the emergence of a strong, reform-orientated, non-interventionist leader in the Kremlin."[6] *The Washington Post* stressed the economic angle: "Soviet Allies Optimistic on Modernization."[7] The *International Herald Tribune* proclaimed that "East Europe Sees Gorbachev as Sign Uncertainty Is Over,"[8] and an overview in *Le Soir* bore the title "In the East, a Breath of Fresh Air."[9]

Many observers further believed that some bloc countries might fare better under Gorbachëv than would others. The Hungarians might have their departure from orthodoxy sanctioned. The East Germans might recover the leeway in dealing with Bonn they had lost in the late summer of 1984. Poland's Wojciech Jaruzelski might be given a go-ahead for conciliation with his discontented populace. On the other hand, the Romanians might be brought to heel. The Bulgarians might be chastised for economic failures and for botching up their involvement in the papal assassination attempt and for the handling of their Turkish minority. The Czechoslovaks, too, might be unceremoniously impelled to mend their efficiency record and to start a reform. Leadership changes in Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria, some believed, might be speeded up. In general, languishing in economic and political doldrums would no longer be allowed.

What really came to pass did not quite match expectations, but neither did it depart drastically from the predictions. Let us review the record nearly a year later, looking first at issues of bloc-wide significance and then at the specifics of Moscow's bilateral dealings with the East European states.

Renewing the Pact

There was never any doubt that the Warsaw Pact would be renewed after its first 30 years, but the precise form of renewal and the nature of Pact obligations did evoke some debate among the member states. It is known that Romania—and possibly others—wanted the Pact extended by only five or 10 years rather than by 20 years with an automatic 10-year further extension. Ceauşescu later said that he had favored setting a shorter treaty duration as an act of goodwill toward the West, "to give a new perspective to the peoples, to the struggle for the abolition of military blocs and for peace." In the end, he signed the 20-plus-10 extension "to consolidate collaboration and friendship with the socialist countries," but the Romanian leader added that he hoped the treaty would not have to run its full course and that it would be terminated earlier, "concomitantly with NATO."[10] Judging from the perfunctory nature of the April 26 renewal ceremonies in Warsaw and other indirect evidence,[11] the issue had been resolved earlier in the month.

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the Soviet party. Gorbachëv reportedly asked East European party leaders how preparations were going for their party congresses and whether the gatherings might be held earlier (this only related to the Bulgarian, Czechoslovakian, East German, and Polish comrades, since the Hungarian congress was imminent and the Romanian congress had been held in November 1984).

[5] Robert Gillette, Mar. 12, 1985. Attribution of headlines to correspondents can, of course, be misleading, but in the cases cited, the home-base editors did read their man in the field fairly accurately.

[6] Roger Boyse, Mar. 12, 1985.

[7] Bradley Graham, Mar. 13, 1985.

[8] Henry Tanner, Mar. 13, 1985.

[9] Pol Mathil, Mar. 14, 1985.

[10] See excerpts from his speech before the Romanian State Council, as reported by Agerpres in English at 1732 GMT, May 22, 1985, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Eastern Europe* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-EEU*), May 23, 1985, p.p. H/1–2.

Actually, the Romanian proposal was probably not a major bone of contention. *The Washington Post* of Apr. 2, 1985, quotes an unnamed Western diplomat in Bucharest to the effect that the Romanians had "glamorized and promoted their own part in the renewal . . . to reinforce their image with the West as the Warsaw Pact's difficult member." The diplomat thought that "there never was any real intention [by Ceauşescu] not to renew or not to go along with Soviet terms."

At the October 1985 meeting of Warsaw Pact leaders in Sofia: from left to right, Gustav Husák, János Kádár, Erich Honecker, Mikhail Gorbachëv, and host Todor Zhivkov.

—INTERFOTO MTI from EASTFOTO.

Defense funding has been another sore point. A commentator speaking on Budapest Radio on the day of the Pact's renewal argued against relying on linear growth in armaments as the linchpin of military modernization. He called for more "rational" ways of improving combat capabilities.[12] Three weeks later, two Hungarian military leaders went on record in separate releases with an assurance that their country would meet its obligations under the Pact, but only "in proportion to the capabilities of our national economy and our realistic possibilities." One of them added that "the principle of a proportionate distribution of the burden" had been expressly laid down during the renewal negotiations.[13] In May, Ceauşescu declared publicly that Romania had not been increasing its military appropriations for the past two years and that the Warsaw Pact countries should now unilaterally reduce their defense budgets by 10 to 15 percent annually "to make the NATO governments as well as others follow suit."[14]

East Germany also had some reservations about its Pact obligations, if we are to judge from an unusual sentence in a communiqué issued in mid-May, at the end of CPSU Politburo member Viktor Grishin's visit to East Berlin. It read: "In the future, too, the GDR will do justice to its responsibility within the defense alliance of the Warsaw Treaty as a cornerstone of peace and socialism in Europe."[15]

It would be wrong to see the pre-renewal tussle as simply a one-way street, with the allies hurling amendment requests at the USSR. On its part, the Soviet Union may have wished to make the Pact more political and more specific where the original text had been quite general.[16] In the end, nothing was changed in the document, not even its preamble, with its open references to the situation as perceived by the Pact's

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[11] In addition to signing the renewal document and an accompanying communiqué, the Pact leaders laid wreaths at three places and held a joint dinner before concluding the one-day affair. British newspaperman Ian Mather, interviewing Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry official Richard Dvořak in mid-April, was told regarding renewal of the Pact that there had been "some reservations, particularly from Romania, but they are now settled." See *The Observer* (London), Apr. 14, 1985.

[12] Colonel Péter Deák, Radio Budapest, 6:30 p.m., Apr. 26, 1985, trans. by Radio Free Europe monitoring service (Munich).

[13] Deputy Prime Minister and then Defense Minister General Lájos Czinege, and Secretary of State in the Ministry of Defense General Lájos Morocz, in two separate releases by MTI (Hungarian Telegraph Agency, Budapest), in English, May 14, 1985. See also Vladimir Socor, "Warsaw Pact Summit Renews the Warsaw Treaty," Radio Free Europe (hereafter, RFE), *Background Report* (Munich), No. 53, June 19, 1985.

[14] See Agerpres, May 17, 1985, for Ceauşescu's interview on Spanish television; and *FBIS-EEU*, May 30, 1985, pp. H/1–5, for a translation of the text of his address to the Socialist Democracy and Unity Front on May 23, as published in *Scînteia* (Bucharest), May 24, 1985.

[15] ADN International Service in German, 1149 GMT, May 14, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-EEU*, May 15, 1985, p. E/1.

[16] This possibility is discussed in an excellent article by Regensburg University Professor Jens Hacker in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Dec. 7, 1984.

creators in the mid-1950's. The absence of amendments, in the direction of either reduced or increased central control in the Pact, may be seen as a compromise, the simplest option.

This compromise probably reflected the reality that, as a military organization, the Warsaw Pact per se does not play a major role in East-West strategic relations. The Czech ex-communist exile Zdeněk Mlynář had even suggested that the Soviet Union could perfectly well allow the Pact to expire in 1985, which would be applauded by members of peace movements and various statesmen in the West to Moscow's advantage. With or without the Pact, he argued, Eastern Europe would still remain a military bloc under Soviet command.[17] But, as Mlynář predicted, there was no dissolution. This is because the Pact's function as a legally defined political bond between the East European regimes and the USSR retains a definite value. By having to sign the joint political platforms promulgated periodically through the Pact's Political Consultative Committee, the Soviet Union's "allies" commit themselves to postures from which later deviation can be easily censured.[18]

The reality of Soviet domination in Pact affairs was highlighted at a December 4 meeting of bloc defense ministers in East Berlin, where Soviet Defense Minister Sergey Sokolov vowed that the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) would match any US arms buildup. The fact that East Germany had the previous week pledged to increase its 1986 defense budget by 7.7 percent suggested that it was the WTO's East European members who would bear the brunt of expanded military outlays.[19]

The Pact summits are useful to Moscow not only for enforcing defense policies; they also can serve as platforms from which to launch political offensives. An example is the declaration "For the Elimination of the Nuclear Threat and a Turn for the Better in European and World Affairs" signed at the WTO summit in Sofia on October 23, 1985. The document endorses various Soviet proposals purportedly aimed at preventing an arms race in space, terminating the arms race on earth, and freezing Soviet and US military forces at current levels.[20]

Economic Linkages in the Bloc

As in the case of the WTO, so with the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) the USSR under Gorbachëv seems to be pursuing long-standing policies, but with increased vigor. In a speech delivered in Dnipropetrovsk on June 26, at a time when the prime ministers of the member states were assembled in Warsaw at the 40th session of the CEMA Council, Gorbachëv stated:

> *The matter at issue is that of deepening the economic cooperation and economic integration of the member countries of the CEMA. Well-adjusted specialization and production cooperation, active interaction in advancing science and technology make both our community as a whole and each of its members more robust and still stronger in defense, and nullify the policy of economic pressure that is actively pursued by the West toward the socialist countries.*[21]

These goals, confirmed by the CEMA Council at the conclusion of its June 25–27 session,[22] have five interlinking components: close coordination of national five-year plans so as to dovetail production programs; conclusion of special long-term cooperative agreements, such as in extracting and transporting Soviet natural gas or conserving on energy consumption; elaboration of a joint plan of action for scientific and technical work; a continued high concentration of trading within the bloc, with special emphasis on the delivery of quality goods and consumer durables from Eastern Europe to the USSR; and limitation on trade and other economic links with the West. Although Hungary's economic experiment is apparently going to be allowed to proceed, the requirement to partake fully of CEMA's non-market-based integration limits the possibility for that country or other East European states to move further away from centrally determined economic parameters.

The June CEMA session also made a public gesture toward greater cooperation with the European Communities. However, Western officials generally concluded that the effort contained a high degree of propaganda and that bloc-to-bloc dealings would reinforce Moscow's central power over decisions on East-West trade that ought to remain the preserve of individual East European countries.[23]

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[17] Interview in *Die Weltwoche* (Zurich), Apr. 11, 1985.

[18] The Political Consultative Committee (PCC) was defined in the original (and renewed) treaty as consisting of "members of government or some other specially appointed representatives." By 1960, the practice of holding PCC meetings as summits for party chiefs had become established. As of the end of 1985, there have been 23 PCC meetings, including the constituent session. Seven were held under Nikita Khrushchev, 11 under Leonid Brezhnev, one under Yuriy Andropov, and four so far under Gorbachëv.

[19] *The Washington Times*, Dec. 5, 1985. For the East German announcement, see *Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), Nov. 30, 1985. Poland astonishingly reported spending 31.7 percent more on defense in 1985 than in 1984. See *Zolnierz Wolnosci* (Warsaw), Nov. 27, 1985.

[20] *Pravda*, Oct. 24, 1985, trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, OH—hereafter, *CDSP*), Nov. 20, 1985, pp. 4–5.

[21] *Pravda*, June 27, 1985.

[22] See the communiqué in *Pravda*, June 29, 1985.

The prime ministers of the CEMA states (which include, in addition to the USSR and its East European allies, Cuba, Mongolia, and Vietnam) convened in Moscow in December to launch a 15-year cooperative program to upgrade their respective economies technologically. Five key areas were targeted for joint efforts: electronics, production automation, atomic energy, new industrial materials, and biotechnology (especially as applied to agriculture).[24]

Under Gorbachëv, the Soviet party is evidently seeking to increase the role of the bloc's communist parties in overseeing fulfillment of CEMA commitments by their respective states. On May 20–21 in Moscow, secretaries of the respective national parties in charge of economic matters held the first of what are slated to be annual meetings.[25] In the words of Czechoslovak delegate Miloš Jakeš,

> *the main purpose was . . . to make use of CEMA experience in party work in order to mobilize the toiling masses for the fulfillment of all CEMA-set objectives.*[26]

The key question is: Can CEMA integration work better under Gorbachëv than it did under his predecessors? It is now nearly 15 years since CEMA, meeting in Bucharest in July 1971, adopted a "comprehensive" program for bloc economic integration, and the organization still remains largely a vehicle whereby Soviet raw materials are exchanged for East European manufactures and investments. The price structure within the trading bloc is in a shambles,[27] and growth rates of the member states' economies are generally declining. The Gorbachëv approach to CEMA seems to be the same as his approach to the domestic Soviet economy: tighten discipline now and perhaps institute reform later. One wonders whether the sheer weight of the predicament and the resistance of established institutions and processes will not force him to keep postponing reform in both settings.

Internationalism vs. Nationalism

Although Moscow doubtless would prefer unquestioning, unvarying obedience on the part of its East European partners, reality—as the discussion of WTO and CEMA developments has already suggested—is something different. The response of alliance partners to Moscow's lead has varied considerably, and the Soviet Union itself has shown some flexibility in dealing with its allies.

A June 15, 1985, *Pravda* item entitled "Internationalism in Practice" sternly asserted that the national interests of CEMA member countries must be "correctly conjoined" with the international interests of the bloc as a whole. Communists, it was maintained, must "always and in everything" remain loyal to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. This was followed by an equally stern and far more specific article in the June 21 *Pravda* over the pseudonymous byline of O. Vladimirov.[28] Vladimirov condemned a number of sins, without attributing them to any one country: overestimation of the role of private property in a socialist economy; undue emphasis both on national attributes and on the imitation of foreign models; disrespect for the basic common principles of socialism; "revisionism" regarding the national issue, and exacerbation of minority problems; spreading of "national communism"; unprincipled compromises with antisocialist forces; the claim that small countries can mediate between the great powers; Russophobia and anti-Sovietism; advocacy of "a new unity" instead of proletarian internationalism; and "various revisionist, nationalist, and clerical concepts." Many of the issues on this bill of particulars had been overworked already and awakened little new attention.[29] However, some of the issues served as the focus for a lively new debate engaging both Soviet and East European authors. Would or would not Moscow allow room for East European governments to undertake foreign political action that they deemed to be consonant with their own national economic and political interests? How much input would they be allowed to have into Soviet strategic interaction with the West? Would Soviet coordination be loose and cooperative or tight and disciplinarian?

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[23] On relations between CEMA and the Communities and on other CEMA issues of the 1980's, see Vladimir Sobell, RFE, *Background Report*, Nos. 8, 63, and 67, of Feb. 4, July 2, and July 17, 1985.

[24] The bloc also formed a six-nation organization, Interrobot, to coordinate production of industrial robots. See account in *The Washington Post*, Dec. 19, 1985.

[25] *Pravda*, May 22, 1985.

[26] *Rudé Právo* (Prague), May 22, 1985. The new measure was also discussed in an article "Internationalism in Practice" appearing in *Pravda*, June 15, 1985, obviously designed as a guideline for the upcoming CEMA summit.

[27] *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, of June 29, 1985, reported that Soviet Premier Nikolay Tikhonov abruptly closed a price debate at the Warsaw CEMA meeting when some East Europeans began to talk about the unevenness of the price levels in raw materials, machinery, and food.

The Soviets even launched a counter-offensive on the price issue. In September in an article specially written for the Czechoslovak party daily, then USSR Gosplan Chairman Nikolay Baybakov stated: "The price level is of considerable importance for the intensification of trade in engineering goods. In our opinion, there is a certain discrepancy between the quality of various items delivered to the USSR and their prices." See *Rudé Právo*, Sept. 6, 1985.

[28] The June 21 article appeared to have lifted certain passages from an article in the April 1984 issue of *Voprosy Istorii KPSS*, by O. V. Borisov (the pseudonym for Oleg Rakhmanin, first deputy head of the Central Committee's Department for Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries and a noted China specialist).

[29] The June 22 editions of *Rudé Právo* and *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia) reprinted the full text of the Vladimirov article. The Poles carried a bland summary, and the Romanians, Hungarians, and East Germans barely mentioned it.

Barely had the Vladimirov article seen the light of day, when the CPSU journal *Kommunist* published an article by Oleg Bogomolov, director of the Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System, arguing that national interests among socialist countries need not be identical, and that to ignore such interests would do more harm than good. The same issue also included a spirited defense of Hungary's reforms, written by Károly Németh, János Kádár's deputy.[30] Romania's Nicolae Ceauşescu quickly sprang to the defense of national interests, as did the Romanian press.[31] By contrast, Czechoslovakia's Ivan Hlivka staunchly opposed "any kind of relaxation" in efforts to increase bloc unity, and stressed the view that Soviet foreign policy was conducted "not from positions of toothless pacifism, barren objectivism, and unprincipled compromise with the class enemy, but from clear-cut class positions."[32]

In August, a well-known Soviet political commentator, Nikolay Shishlin, tried to square the circle, arguing that while each socialist country "has its own specific national interests [which] do not disappear overnight merely with the establishment of socialism . . . it is equally obvious that the fundamental interests of the socialist states coincide; they are identical."[33] In an interview with Radio Budapest that was broadcast on August 31, *Izvestiya* commentator Aleksandr Bovin praised small and medium-sized states for their ability to "find zones of agreement" and "play a balancing role" in international affairs.[34] While Bovin's comments were ostensibly about small *non-socialist* countries, the Hungarian radio audience could hardly have missed the difference between his views and those of Vladimirov, who had stated:

> *What kind of mediation by this or that socialist country can help solve conflicts between the USSR and the USA, when the foreign policy of the USSR and the Marxist-Leninist core of world socialism [i.e., the bloc] is identical on all basic international issues?*

The more relaxed Soviet posture was also evident at the October Pact summit in Sofia. The final communiqué appealed not to "socialist internationalism," but to "common fundamental interests and goals . . . [and a] Marxist-Leninist world outlook." Cooperation and integration were to be pursued "on the basis of a harmonious combining of national and international interests."[35] Although one would have to judge that Hungary, East Germany, and Romania had scored a point, Czechoslovakia's Hlivka still averred that the Sofia document "reaffirmed the loyalty of the fraternal parties and countries to revolutionary principles, to proletarian and socialist internationalism . . . ."[36]

The draft of the revised Soviet Communist Party Program, published on October 26 in *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*,[37] came out strongly for economic integration—not only as a source of renewed growth, but also as a means of shielding the community against "hostile actions of imperialism" as well as the "economic crises and negative processes inherent in capitalism." On the role of small states in world politics, the document was less adamant:

> *All states, large and small, regardless of their capabilities, geographic situation, and social systems, can and must participate in the search for solutions to acute problems, the resolution of conflicts, the reduction of tensions, and the curbing of the arms race.*

Despite such language, Michal Štefaňák, head of the International Affairs Department of the Czechoslovak Communist Party's Central Committee, interpreted Soviet foreign policy, as shown in the Program, to be "profoundly internationalist and class-based."[38]

In Hungary, various officials weighed in with statements that collectively amounted to a comprehensive policy pronouncement defending their country's independent course, albeit within the parameters of continued membership in the Soviet bloc. Party secretary Matyas Szürös suggested that "there are no permanently valid solutions that yield successful results regardless of the specific conditions," and he entered a plea for "proper adaptation" of the basic principles of communism to specific national circumstances, an appeal that he related not only to Hungary's foreign policies, but to its domestic policies as well.[39] First Secretary Kádár, writing on the eve of the Reagan-Gorbachëv summit, saw the upcoming meeting of the superpowers as vindicating the comportment of Hungary and East Germany in 1984.[40] Ferenc Havasi, a member of Hungary's Politburo and the party secretary in charge of economic affairs, soon thereafter defended the "modernization" (i.e., the continuation and extension) of the country's economic reforms,[41] and Németh opened a national conference on inner-party democracy with the argument that "history cannot serve as a collection of examples that appear to justify the circumstances of today, nor can one build the future from the past alone."[42]

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[30] *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 10, signed to press on July 3, 1985. Németh had been designated Kádár's "deputy" at the March congress of the Hungarian party. See *Népszabadság* (Budapest), Mar. 29, 1985.

[31] For Ceauşescu's speeches, see *Scînteia*, July 12, 1985; and Agerpres, July 24, 1985; for articles, see *Era Socialista* (Bucharest), Nos. 13, 18, and 19, July 10, Sept. 25, and Oct. 10, 1985.

[32] *Rudé Právo*, July 9, 1985.

[33] *Novoye Vremya* (Moscow), Aug. 23, 1985. The next day, the Hungarian party newspaper *Népszabadság* excerpted the Shishlin article at length.

[34] Radio Budapest, Aug. 31, 1985, 4 p.m., trans. by RFE monitoring service.

[35] *Pravda*, Oct. 24, 1985.

[36] *Pravda* (Bratislava), Oct. 29, 1985.

[37] For a translation, see *CDSP*, Nov. 27, 1985, Special Supplement.

[38] *Rudé Právo*, Nov. 12, 1985.

At the Kremlin's November 7 reception commemorating the Bolshevik revolution, Gorbachëv noted the "exceptional importance" of the October meeting of Warsaw Pact leaders in Sofia and acknowledged that the Soviets have "immense respect" for the experience of their partners and "value the fraternal aid and friendly advice of comrades in the struggle [for socialist transformation]." He added that the USSR was "always ready to share [its] knowledge and experience with them."[43] As if to highlight this cooperative spirit, Gorbachëv stopped off in Prague on November 21 on his way home from the Geneva summit meeting in order to brief Pact leaders (a move that may also have been designed to diminish the possibility of a backlash at home from some of his more diehard Kremlin colleagues). In the face of the "complicated" contemporary international situation, the allies pledged "unity and togetherness" and "class-based solidarity."[44]

Hungary and East Germany were swift to pick up the ball in the aftermath of Geneva. Gyula Horn, a secretary in the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, observed that the two East European states had been correct in pressing for damage limitation and a resumption of détente.[45] In Germany, the Socialist Unity Party's Central Committee convened to hear Politburo member Werner Jarowinsky defend the efforts of East Germany and West Germany to help consolidate the Geneva results by using their specific weight in the two alignments. The meeting also removed from the Politburo Konrad Naumann, a hard-liner known for his reservations concerning inner-German rapprochement.[46] And even Czechoslovakia seemed to want to be part of the new trend: Gustav Husák hastened to East Germany to sign a communiqué with Erich Honecker that stated:

> *Both parties . . . noted the willingness of their governments to keep identifying new forms of cooperation with the countries of Western Europe, based on equality and mutual advantage, as stipulated in the Helsinki Final Act. . . .*[47]

Time will tell, of course, whether all these statements will actually afford the East Europeans much room for maneuver. In this context, it is useful to go over the salient events of the year in bilateral relations between Moscow and the East European states.

Hungary: Circumscribed Acceptance

Why Grigory Romanov, a reputed hard-liner and Gorbachëv's rival (already destined for ouster?), was chosen to deliver the CPSU's message at the 13th National Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP) at the end of March, we do not know. It could have been an indirect warning to the Hungarians that they should not take Gorbachëv's approval for granted, or it may have been a ploy to humble Romanov by making him deliver a more moderate and balanced message than he might have been inclined to make. In any case, Romanov's speech clearly conveyed the wish of Gorbachëv and the CPSU not to commit Moscow either to full support or to straight rejection of Hungary's reformist course. Romanov said that "there is no way of reliably safeguarding the national interests of each socialist state except by strengthening our community as a whole and by augmenting our traditions of proletarian and socialist internationalism." On the other hand, he defined the bloc as a community in which "there is no place for relations of domination and subordination, the foisting of some people's will on others, or for mechanical standardization." In other words, reformist particularism in Hungary could go on, provided due respect was paid to bloc-wide tenets as set by Moscow. Romanov noted "the high level of trust and mutual understanding" between the CPSU and the HSWP leaderships, and spoke approvingly of the exchange of experience in "improving the methods of management in the national economy and in developing democracy."[48]

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[39] *Népszabadság*, Nov., 2, 1985. A translation appears in *FBIS-EEU*, Nov. 27, 1985, pp. F/8–11. *Neues Deutschland* was quick to reprint salient passages of the Szürös article in its Nov. 6, 1985, issue. Steven Koppany analyzes the Szürös article in Radio Free Europe, *Hungarian Situation Report* (Munich), No. 13, Dec. 6, 1985.

[40] See *New Hungarian Quarterly* (Budapest), No. 45, Winter 1984; in Hungarian, *Magyarország* (Budapest), Nov. 3, 1985.

[41] *Népszabadság*, Nov. 7, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-EEU*, Nov. 29, 1985, pp. F/3–6.

[42] Radio Budapest, Nov. 21 and 22, 1985, 12 noon and 10 p.m., respectively (trans. by RFE monitoring service). See also *Népszabadság*, Nov. 22, 1985.

[43] *Pravda*, Nov. 8, 1985.

[44] Pravda, Nov. 22, 1985. The CPSU Politburo's statement on the Geneva summit alluded to the Prague pourparler's commitment to "joint peaceful positions" but also spoke of unity based on "class solidarity." Ibid., Nov. 28, 1985. The Prague stopover marked an unprecedented fourth Warsaw Pact summit for the year.

[45] Budapest Television, Nov. 21, 1985, trans. by RFE monitoring service.

[46] *Neues Deutschland*, Nov. 23, 1985. For a translation of a broadcast of Jarowinsky's speech by ADN's International Service in German at 1626 GMT, Nov. 22, 1985, see *FBIS-EEU*, Nov. 26, 1985, pp. E/1–7.

[47] *Rudé Právo*, Nov. 27, 1985.

Romanov also highlighted the need to consolidate "our states' economic independence from the West":

> *Of course we are in favor of developing business relations with the capitalist countries alongside the consolidation of socialist economic integration. However, we build these relations in such a way as to prevent the imperialist forces from exploiting economic levers as a means of political pressure and interference in the affairs of the sovereign socialist states.*

The CPSU Politburo report reviewing Romanov's visit said that the HSWP congress had demonstrated "a further consolidation of socialism's positions in Hungary" and had contributed to "enhanced cohesion of the countries of the socialist community."[49] It was not clear in Budapest how such a somber assessment gibed with the reaffirmation of reformist lines at the congress itself.[50]

Things looked up when Prime Minister György Lázár was dispatched to Moscow to open a Hungarian exhibition on April 1. Gorbachëv apparently avoided the usual internationalist and integrationist exhortations and wished the Hungarians success in fulfilling their congress decisions.[51] He must have known that the main resolution of the congress postulated further reforms.

Moscow continued to signal positive attitudes, if not explicit approbation toward Hungarian reforms. At a Soviet-Hungarian symposium on reform concepts held in Moscow at the end of May and the beginning of June, István Huszár, Béla Csikós-Nagy, and other Hungarian specialists met Pëtr Fedoseyev, Dzherman Gvishiani, Abel Aganbegyan, and Oleg Bogomolov. Upon their return to Hungary, Huszár acknowledged that some questions concerning "commodity and price relations" were not viewed "in quite the same way" by the two sides, but on balance he assessed the conference as a positive development "based on complete mutual confidence."[52]

As noted above, in July the Soviet party journal *Kommunist* published an article by HSWP Politburo member Károly Németh that reiterated in unusually candid fashion the Hungarian leadership's intention to go ahead with innovation, including expansion of worker influence on management and "an increase in inner-party democracy." The HSWP's policy, he wrote, "is in need of constant renewal. . . . The party is guided by principles, but not by dogma . . . , and the anwers that were being given decades ago, or even 10 or 20 years ago . . . no longer meet the needs of today.[53] Bogomolov's article in the same issue of *Kommunist* implicity provided a theoretical justification for Németh's defense of his country's unorthodox approaches.[54]

In a September interview, CPSU Central Committee member and Director of Moscow's Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada Georgiy Arbatov described Moscow's view of the Hungarian experience with market forces:

> *It is accepted as being successful, although it has some complications, which the Hungarians speak about. At the same time, nobody can automatically take a model from another country and implement it. I think the Hungarian comrades—and I talk with them about it—would be the first to be appalled if we just took their model and implemented it in our country.*[55]

Kádár went to Moscow in September for talks with Gorbachëv. The resulting communiqué emphasized "common experiences and the general laws of the building of socialism," but also acknowledged "national characteristics." It did not, however, mention Hungary's reforms or the Soviet attitude toward them. In an atmosphere of reported "complete unanimity of views," Gorbachëv accepted an invitation to visit Hungary.[56]

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[48] The full text appeared in *Pravda*, Mar. 27, 1985.

[49] Ibid., Apr. 5, 1985.

[50] HSWP Central Committee member and *Népszabadság* commentator Péter Rényi, when asked by the Second German TV Channel whether the pace of reforms would be maintained, said, "I believe so. Insofar as one can measure reforms on a speedometer, I would even venture to say that they will now move faster." ZDF, 9:45 p.m., Mar. 29, 1985, trans. by RFE monitoring service.

[51] See the communiqué in *Pravda*, Apr. 2, 1985. Kádár doubtless would have liked to have gone himself, but did not—whether for health reasons (exhaustion after the HSWP congress) or because Gorbachëv did not yet consider it opportune. As it was, Lázár's reception by the Soviet General Secretary contrasted with the failure of Romanian and Bulgarian counterparts—also in Moscow at about the same time—to be granted audiences with the new CPSU chief.

[52] MTI, May 28, 1985; also *Népszabadság*, June 1, 1985.

[53] Loc. cit.

[54] The HSWP held a national conference on "inner-party democracy" on November 21–23, 1985, at which both the themes discussed and the conclusions drawn were evocative of the Prague Spring of 1968. HSWP Deputy General Secretary Károly Németh delivered the main address. See *Népszabadság*, Nov. 22 and 23, 1985.

[55] *The Los Angeles Times*, Sept. 27, 1985.

[56] *Népszabadság*, Sept. 26, 1985.

This limited evidence suggests that Gorbachëv's acceptance of Hungary's reformist course is qualified. First, although the reforms are being accepted, the Soviet leaders avoid giving them full and unequivocal public endorsement. Second, the Hungarians are being reminded that they must observe "the general laws of socialism," both by keeping domestic developments under party control and by exercising caution in their dealings with the West. Third, although a limited application of some Hungarian experiences has been hinted at, a replication of Hungarian reforms in the USSR is being ruled out, and the reformist course is not being prescribed for other East European allies individually or collectively. Fourth, the Hungarians are required to continue their participation in economic integration and to support the foreign policy initiatives of the bloc, particularly those affecting Soviet strategic interests. The limits have thus been established quite clearly.[57]

Handling Honecker

In 1984, Moscow and East Berlin fell out over the kind of East-West policy to be pursued by Moscow's allies in the wake of the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in Western Europe and the USSR's confrontational posture in response. More particularly, how close inner-German relations should be within the global East-West climate became a bone of contention. Moscow eventually prevailed on Honecker to cancel an announced visit to West Germany.[58] Would Gorbachëv now loosen the grip?

The East Germans were openly hopeful that Gorbachëv would "restore energetic leadership . . . and end the confusion that overshadowed relations between Moscow and its key ally [read East Berlin] last year."[59] On the day of Chernenko's death, Honecker praised West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl's State of the Nation speech, an address that Moscow had criticized not long before.[60] Shortly after arriving in Moscow for the Chernenko funeral, Honecker met with Kohl for more than two hours in a guest house in Lenin Hills. In a joint statement, the two declared their hope for a new era in East-West relations and pledged to develop "normal and good relations" between their countries.[61]

Honecker's pace was too fast for Gorbachëv. Less than 10 days later, Andrey Gromyko summoned East German Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer to Moscow and enforced the adoption of a tough and unbending joint communiqué that indicated Moscow would determine the rules of the game.[62] The Soviets clearly wanted to be seen as determining when and how confrontation was to be shifted to accommodation and not as being compelled to act under pressure from an eager client.

The Bonn government was perceived in Moscow as the most likely supporter (next to Britain) of US President Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the prime target of the latest Soviet peace offensive. Driving a wedge between SDI supporters and the opponents would be more valuable than continued efforts at decoupling Bonn from Washington, at least in the short run. Honecker's "commonality of interests" with West Germany would stand in the way. It would be inappropriate for East Berlin to behave as if SDI were not an issue, or as if it concerned only the US-Soviet "grand" relationship and not ties between the lesser powers.

Finally, Moscow had decided that the "correct" ideological way of celebrating the forthcoming anniversary of the end of World War II was to keep West Germany dangling on the "revanchist" hook. Unseemly haste in restoring friendliness between Kohl and Honecker would run counter to this carefully orchestrated anniversary program. It is possible, too, that the Soviets had already anticipated an upsurge in the political fortunes of West Germany's Social Democrats (the SPD) and wanted to steer Honecker clear of excessively close relations with the governing coalition of Christian Democrats, Christian Socialists, and Free Democrats.

Whatever the reasons, the Soviets offered the East German leader an alternative strategy (or so it seems in hindsight). He was apparently asked to redirect his *Westpolitik* toward countries other than West Germany and to downplay relations with Bonn to sub-governmental and trade levels while in the meantime cultivating the SPD. Only after the Soviets decided to change their own stand vis-à-vis the West in general and, perhaps, Bonn in particular, would Honecker be allowed to deal with Kohl again. He would then, in fact, be able to do so from a position of strength, having in the interim proven himself to be an important European statesman.[63]

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[57] The results of Kádár's talks with Gorbachëv were similar to those he had held with Andropov during his previous visit to Moscow in July 1983. Indeed, the Gorbachëv-Kádár communiqué specifically referred to this earlier visit and to satisfactory implementation by both sides of agreements reached then. On the earlier meeting, see Alfred Reisch, "Kadar Policies Get Seal of Approval from the Soviet Leadership?" RFE, *Background Report*, No. 195, Aug. 11, 1983.

[58] For analysis of the 1984 tribulations, see Ronald D. Asmus, *East Berlin and Moscow: the Documentation of a Dispute*, Munich, Radio Free Europe, Occasional Paper Number One, 1985.

[59] From a Reuter despatch from East Berlin, Mar. 12, 1985, reporting comments of East German officials to Western diplomats. West German Economics Minister Martin Bangemann reportedly had a talk with Honecker in which the East German leader "seemed to be encouraged by Gorbachëv's appointment."

[60] *Neues Deutschland* and *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* of Mar. 11, 1985; cf. TASS of Feb. 28, 1985.

[61] ADN International Service in German, 2058 GMT, Mar. 12, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-EEU*, Mar. 13, 1985, p. E/1.

[62] For the text of the communiqué, see *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Mar. 21, 1985.

Honecker appears to have accepted this scenario without demur. Yet the communiqué signed after a May meeting with Gorbachëv in Moscow showed some signs of unresolved issues. Despite a stated mood of "cordiality and complete unanimity," there was no declaration that relations between the two countries were satisfactory, and "mutual resolve was expressed to further perfect relations along party, state, and public lines."[64] Viktor Grishin's subsequent mid-May visit to East Berlin yielded yet additional evidence that Honecker was being reminded to behave as told. In the words of the communiqué,

> *Erich Honecker pointed to the complete agreement in views about current issues of world politics, the struggle for the preservation of peace, and further strengthening of the unity and united nature of the socialist community, which had been emphasized so strongly during his meeting with Mikhail Gorbachëv.*[65]

The document also included the already-cited GDR pledge to honor Warsaw Pact obligations "in the future, too."

A curious incident in mid-April may explain this last development. In two consecutive issues—April 15 and 16—the otherwise protocol-conscious East German party newspaper *Neues Deutschland* referred to the Soviet troops stationed in East Germany as "Group of Soviet Forces in the German Democratic Republic," and not (as was official and customary) as "Group of Soviet Forces in Germany," a formula designating Soviet rights in *all* Germany, East and West. The then commander of these troops, Soviet Army General Mikhail Zaytsev, went out of his way to correct the mistake, using the old designation no fewer than four times in a speech delivered on April 16; *Neues Deutschland* dutifully reprinted the general's speech the next day with the correct formula, and has not erred since.[66] A West German journalist noted in this context:

> *As regards the rights and responsibilities of the Soviet Union within the Four-Power agreements on Germany and Berlin, West German and West Berlin negotiators have precisely in recent months frequently learned from their GDR interlocutors that this or that is at the moment "impracticable" because "our friends"—that is, the Soviets—have said so.*[67]

Nonetheless, East Germany was champing at the bit. Beginning late in the summer of 1985, East Berlin started a series of leaks that when combined conveyed a common theme. Honecker, it was implied, wanted to go to Bonn at long last, but had to wait for Soviet approval, which Gorbachëv had promised to give only after the summit meeting with Reagan in Geneva.[68] More important still, the East Germans once again joined forces with the Hungarians, this time to postulate three tenets that they believed to be instrumental for their own conduct of policy toward the West, as well as their demeanor inside the bloc. First, both apparently asked Gorbachëv to show flexibility and readiness to compromise when dealing with the United States.[69] Second, they successfully induced Moscow to accept the notion that small and medium-sized states on both sides of the ideological divide have a role of their own to play in influencing the behavior of the superpowers. And third, they argued in favor of an undogmatic interpretation of internationalism that would allow for the acceptance of national peculiarities and interests.

Yet, one must be careful in assessing prospects for East German freedom of action. On the one hand, the Honecker regime has undoubtedly come of age and, as an economically important partner of the USSR, the GDR rightly claims more room for itself than its role as a mere Soviet military instrument allowed it to have in the past. On the other hand, however innovative and versatile Gorbachëv may turn out to be, he is not likely to surrender suzerainty where it matters most. Dovetailing of interests rather than accenting of differences will constitute the center of gravity of future Soviet–East German relations. Moreover, Honecker has not been a reformer at home. East German policies of economic intensification have already met with Soviet approbation and possibly even emulation. Hence, Soviet chastisement for GDR foreign policy transgressions is likely to be carefully balanced with good marks for East Berlin's useful domestic economic policies.

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[63] This interpretation is offered in Barbara V. Flow, "Honecker Woos NATO Countries" and "Mixed Signals in Inter-German Relations," RFE, *Background Report*, Nos. 42 and 76, May 9, and Aug. 8, 1985.

[64] *Pravda*, May 6, 1985.

[65] See fn. 15.

[66] See *Tagesspiegel* (West Berlin), Apr. 17, 1985, for a more detailed account.

[67] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Apr. 18, 1985.

[68] Honecker conveyed this message himself in an interview in *Saarbrücker Zeitung*, Nov. 13, 1985. For a good summary of East German positions at that pre-summit juncture, see "Honecker's Policy of Wait and See," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Nov. 13, 1985.

[69] See Louis Wiznitzer's article filed from Paris to *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), Nov. 6, 1985, which references unnamed East European sources.

Poland the Insoluble

The plan for Poland which has been crystallizing over the past year appears essentially identical to the concept of "normalization" formulated in basic contours four years ago, under Brezhnev. It seems to have the following features:

- General Wojciech Jaruzelski will stay at the helm as the best strong man available.
- His priority task will now be to revivify the Polish United Workers' Party so that it, rather than the army and the government, once again becomes the undisputed ruler of the country.[70]
- The Polish government will concentrate on straightening out the economy, at first not along the lines of the reformist concept of 1981 (which contained a number of "Hungarian" features) but rather in the Gorbachëv manner.[71]
- Soviet-Polish relations will form the core of Poland's economic recovery program.[72] A renewed attempt to spur modernization through capitalist assistance, such as the one undertaken by Gierek with Brezhnev's blessing in the early 1970's, will not be tolerated. Neither will Poland become too friendly with the West in the political and cultural fields, lest this afford the West an opportunity to link up with the opposition inside the country.
- The state will maintain a non-confrontational but distant relationship with the Church; the two are not to be seen as acting in unison on any of the essential problems facing Poland.
- The state will alternate between toughness toward dissenters and apparent accommodation designed to condition the public to accept the regime's monopoly in domestic politics as irreversible.
- The regime will not enter into dialogue with underground Solidarity, but will not be averse to simulated consultations with the new official trade unions and possibly even the self-management organs in factories. The objective will be to weaken residual sympathy among industrial workers for the defeated union and to persuade the public of the futility of reliance on clandestine organizations for matters affecting everyday life.

In April, Gorbachëv remained for a day in Poland for bilateral talks after the Warsaw Pact renewal ceremonies. The talks produced a communiqué that spoke of "a spirit of unity and cordial friendship," but it lacked the usual references to confidence, mutual understanding, and identity of views. Gorbachëv was said to have confirmed the Soviet Union's constant,

Toasts are exchanged at the April 26, 1985, banquet in Warsaw marking renewal of the Warsaw Pact: at left, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachëv; at center, East Germany's Erich Honecker; at right, Poland's Wojciech Jaruzelski.

—REUTERS/BETTMANN.

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[70] The Central Committee of the PUWP met on May 12–13 to discuss "the effectiveness of party work and ways of improving its quality." The leadership said it was "increasing the scope of participation of party bodies and party members in the process of policy- and decision-making." *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), May 12–15, 1985, carried reports on the session. When personnel changes were made in the wake of the Sejm elections of October 13, Jaruzelski gave up the premiership for the more ceremonial chairmanship of the Council of State, while retaining his position as party leader. Polish official sources and Western observers alike interpreted this as an indication of a decision to focus on party matters. See Polish government spokesman Jerzy Urban's remarks to foreign press correspondents as reported by the Associated Press and Deutsche Press Agentur on Nov. 12, 1985, as well as Jaruzelski's speech at a PUWP ideological conference on Nov. 27, 1985 (*Trybuna Ludu*, Nov. 29, 1985); also *The Washington Times*, Nov. 12, 1985; and *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), Nov. 13, 1985.

[71] This emphasis is clear from the proceedings of the PUWP's economic conference in Poznan on May 31–June 1, and from the speech of the new Prime Minister Zbigniew Messner to the Sejm on November 12. On the Poznan meeting, see *FBIS-EEU*, June 3, 1985, pp. G/1–17; on Messner's speech, see Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish, 1445 GMT, Nov. 12, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-EEU*, Nov. 18, 1985, pp. G/3–28.

[72] The states signed two economic agreements on October 7: one on cooperation in the period 1986–90, including provisions for Soviet use of Polish industrial capacity; the other on the rescheduling until after 1990 of Poland's debt to the USSR—amounting to more than 5 billion rubles—and toleration of Poland's negative balance of payments with the Soviet Union until the end of 1987. See *Trybuna Ludu*, Oct. 8, 1985; and Roman Stefanowski's article in RFE, *Polish Situation Report* (Munich), No. 17, Oct. 20, 1985.

East Germany's Erich Honecker, left, and Romania's Nicolae Ceauşescu raise their hands in a gesture of friendship at the conclusion of the Romanian leader's May 29, 1985, visit to the German Democratic Republic.

—ADN Zentralbild from EASTFOTO.

unwavering solidarity with the Polish party and the Polish people and to have expressed Moscow's interest in fully overcoming the crisis, achieving stabilization, and strengthening the positions of socialism. Jaruzelski was not mentioned by name, an unmistakable sign that Moscow was not putting all its eggs into his basket.[73]

Waiting Out Ceauşescu

Gorbachëv has not acted overtly with respect to Romania; he has not even met individually with the ailing Ceauşescu.[74] In the meantime, economic necessity and Soviet pressures have forced Romania to increase its trade and other cooperative undertakings with CEMA countries, and even agree to participate in projects on Soviet territory.[75] Simultaneously, the importance of Romanian economic connections with the West has diminished perceptibly. The bulk of export earnings has been earmarked for rapid payoff of earlier loans and related interest expenses, thereby further reducing the room for purchases of modern equipment, spare parts, and raw materials on Western markets. Bucharest's economic crisis and the resulting accommodation with the USSR has tended to devalue Ceauşescu's international standing.

At the same time, Romania continues to be a nuisance within the bloc. Gorbachëv could not possibly have welcomed Ceauşescu's May call for reductions in WTO defense outlays.[76] Moreover, in a reprise of the political alignments of 1984 (which had seen Honecker, Kádár, and Ceauşescu striking a somewhat independent posture vis-à-vis the Soviet Union), Honecker received Ceauşescu in East Berlin in late May. Although the resulting communiqué adhered more closely to the measured position of the GDR than to the tenets usually verbalized by the Romanians, it made no mention of "socialist internationalism."[77] On the day of Ceauşescu's arrival, the East Germans praised him for relying on "principles of independence and national sovereignty," and Romania was said to "occupy a respected place in the family of the fraternal socialist countries."[78]

Nicolae Ceauşescu's persistent pursuit of the theme of independence, however futile the end result may turn out to be in Romania's own case, cannot be totally written off. Twenty years of rhetoric and shadow-boxing with the Soviets over this issue have given it a life of its own. Not even Gorbachëv can ignore the impact it has had on attitudes in the empire over which he now presides. Moreover, all was not empty talk and sham argumentation. Romania engineered the departure of Soviet troops from its land and refused to allow their return. It rejected Khrushchev's concept of hierarchic economic integration in the bloc at a time when all the others were willing to accept it. Without Romania, the economic landscape of the empire could have changed then, making subsequent economic reforms more difficult. Ceauşescu repudiated the invasion of reformist Czechoslovakia and the ensuing Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty, giving heart to others. He denied full cooperation to Warsaw Pact military programs, including maneuvers on his territory and—possibly, although we do not know it for certain—training exercises outside the European theater.[79] Romania opposed the Soviet policies that culminated in the rifts with China, the Eurocommunists, and Israel. It created, albeit clumsily, a body politic and body theoretic that continue to balk Soviet desires for the homogeneity of the bloc and unbridled Muscovite hegemony over it.

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[73] *Trybuna Ludu*, Apr. 28, 1985.

[74] Most recently, Ceauşescu's appearance during his mid-December visit to Yugoslavia was said to be worn and haggard. See *Die Presse* (Vienna), Dec. 19, 1985; and *Chicago Tribune*, Dec. 24, 1985.

[75] Radio Moscow broadcasts in Romanian assert that the USSR is stepping up oil deliveries to Romania to keep her refining capacities functioning. Statistical services in both countries show an increase in deliveries in 1984 and the first half of 1985, but these unreliable sources do not make it clear how much of the increased Romanian oil bill reflects expanded physical deliveries and how much it reflects rising prices, or how much is paid for in hard currency or "hard-currency goods." Progfams planned for the 1986–90 period apparently entail fairly substantial Romanian participation in gas extraction on Soviet teritory and in the builidng of pipelines, alongside other CEMA states. See Paul Gafton's articles in RFE, *Romanian Situation Report* (Munich), Nos. 7 and 8, Apr. 9 and May 14, 1985.

[76] See fn. 14. For a round-up of recent developments in the Romanian-Soviet dispute, see Anneli Maier's article in RFE, *Romanian Situation Report*, No. 12, Aug. 13, 1985.

[77] See *Scînteia*, May 31, 1985; a translation of the communiqué as released by ADN International Service in German, 1701 GMT, May 30, 1985, can be found in *FBIS-EEU*, May 31, 1985, pp. E/6–11.

[78] *Neues Deutschland*, May 28, 1985; and ADN International Service in German, May 28, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-EEU*, May 29, 1985, p. E/1.

The Bulgarian Connection

Bulgaria's Todor Zhivkov, like Czechoslovakia's Gustav Husák, had the distinction of having two individual meetings with Gorbachëv in 1985: one during a visit to Moscow on June 5–7, the other when the Soviet leader stayed behind in Sofia on October 24–25, after the Warsaw Pact summit. The first visit produced the usual citations of brotherly cohesion and consensual opinion, as well as a fourth Order of Lenin for Zhivkov.[80] After the second meeting, however, Gorbachëv told workers in a Sofia factory (which exports most of its machine tools output to the USSR): "We briefed each other . . . in a comradely fashion, not evading a few prickly issues."[81]

Observers had noted a few "prickly issues" even in pre-Gorbachëv times, relating in particular to the Bulgarian nationalism of Zhivkov's late daughter, Lyudmila.[82] But other matters were probably on Gorbachëv's mind when he took Zhivkov to task: the botching of Bulgaria's terrorist and underworld connections, with special reference to the papal assassination plot; the unnecessary haste and brutality of the campaign to Bulgarize ethnic Turks; and Bulgaria's lackadaisical economic behavior. All three issues antedate Gorbachëv's accession, but he chose to administer the censure.

The extent of Bulgarian involvement in the attempted murder of the Pope and the connection of the then KGB chairman and Gorbachëv's mentor Yuriy Andropov with the event is not yet clear. What is certain is a rather intimate and unsavory association of the Bulgarian secret services with syndicated crime in the European underworld, especially its drug and arms smuggling branch, in which Turkish nationals play a significant role.[83] Even if the hand that guided Mehmet Ali Ağca in St. Peter's Square was not Bulgarian, the drawn-out tumult and revelations to which the act led, would justify displeasure.

Sofia's campaign to coerce ethnic Turks into adopting Bulgarian names, which began in the autumn of 1984, had essentialy been completed by February 1985, just before Gorbachëv's succession. There is no evidence of any Soviet opposition to this campaign, or to Bulgaria's long-term goal of "one Slavic nation." A Turkish reporter accompanying the speaker of the Ankara parliament, Necmettin Karaduman, on a six-day visit to Moscow in late May 1985 said that Karaduman asked Vasiliy Kuznetsov, first deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, to intercede with Sofia. Kuznetsov purportedly refused "to intervene in another country's internal affairs."[84] If Gorbachëv criticized Zhivkov regarding the actions vis-à-vis Bulgaria's Turks, one can only surmise that it was not the act itself but rather the handling of the campaign that provoked Soviet dissatisfaction.

Bulgaria's economic performance is probably the most important issue in what observers see as Gorbachëv's stern behavior toward this Balkan ally. Four factors seem salient. The first is Bulgaria's wasteful domestic energy sector and dependence on Soviet coal and oil deliveries. (An acute shortage of power made the winters of 1984 and 1985 critical periods, with extensive power cuts and equipment breakdowns that rivaled those of neighboring Romania.) More broadly, Moscow apparently did not like the way Bulgaria approached coordination of the two countries' five-year plans, for 1986–90.[85]

Second, the USSR has long criticized the poor quality of deliveries from Bulgaria, especially of engineering goods.[86] When visiting the USSR in August

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[79] For a history of Romania's comportment in the Warsaw Pact, see Robert L. Hutchings, *Soviet-East European Relations: Consolidation and Conflict, 1968–1980*, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1983; and David Holloway and Jane Sharp, Eds., *The Warsaw Pact: Alliance in Transition*, London, Macmillan, 1984. A recent journalistic summary appeared in *Der Tagesspiegel* (West Berlin), Dec. 21, 1985.

[80] The occasion for the award remains a mystery. The citation refers to a "jubilee," but there was no obvious birthday or other anniversary being celebrated. See TASS in English, 1033 GMT, June 7, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-EEU*, June 7, 1985, pp. F/3–4.

[81] *Pravda*, Oct. 25, 1985. The Russian words for "prickly issues" were "*ostryye ugly*."

[82] On Lyudmila Zhivkova's "mystical reworking of Marxism-Leninism, her endorsement of traditional nationalism, her vigorous assertion of claims on Macedonia, her lavish celebration of Bulgaria's non-Slavic Thracian past, and her sponsorship of independent cultural and peace initiatives," see Stephen Ashley in RFE, *Bulgarian Situation Report* (Munich), No. 12, Nov. 7, 1985.

[83] Reports on Bulgarian involvements in the "sensitive issues" relating to drugs, arms and other murky affairs have been plentiful. See, e.g., a report by the US Drug Enforcement Agency as released by USIA, July 26, 1984; *The New York Times*, Feb. 6, 1985; and *Libération* (Paris), Oct. 16, 1985.

[84] *Hurriyet* (Ankara), May 31, 1985, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Western Europe* (Washington, DC), June 4, 1985, p. T/1.

[85] See Rada Nikolaev' articles in RFE, *Bulgarian Situation Report*, Nos. 10 and 12, Sept. 2 and Nov. 7, 1985. The first of these discusses Bulgaria's energy crisis; the second, a number of personnel changes, which included the dismissal of Stanish Bonev, chairman of Bulgaria's State Planning Commission, on October 18—an event that occurred one week before, and appeared connected with, Gorbachëv's visit.

[86] See, e.g., an interview with the Soviet Ambassador to Sofia, Leonid Grekov, in *Pogled* (Sofia), No. 26, July, 1985.

1985, Bulgarian Communist Party Politburo member Stanko Todorov said:

> *We assured our Soviet comrades that Bulgarian workers were making great efforts to improve the quality and reliability of the products we export to the USSR.*[87]

Third, the Soviets appeared displeased over lagging productivity levels, lax discipline, and excessive worker preoccupation with private pastimes and private enterprise. Soviet Ambassador Leonid Grekov said:

> *The attachment of (Bulgarian) workers to the land is not a simple problem. Many of your workers have houses in the countryside, gardens, vineyards, or they breed livestock. When they return to their jobs, it is only natural that they rest after having attended to these activities.*[88]

The Bulgarians responded by tightening control over cadre work and by launching a campaign against corruption, incompetence, and indiscipline.[89]

Fourth, there must have been some displeasure over the "embourgeoisement" and generally lax ideological manners of Bulgarian youth. A rather harsh decree was issued in October 1985 to tighten supervision and indoctrination of the 16-to-19 age group.[90]

Economic decline would have become the concern of Bulgarians even without Soviet criticism. It appears that neither the "new economic approach," first formulated in 1977, nor the "new economic mechanism," first introduced in 1982 and then amended in 1984, has brought the expected results. Reform Bulgarian style, hailed (together with the East German experience) as potentially capable of steering a communist economy between the Scylla of the command system and the Charybdis of marketization, seems to be foundering. Bulgarian economists have already begun to argue the case for a reform that would rest on market principles, as practiced in Hungary.[91]

It is difficult to link Gorbachëv's ascent to power with a wave of terrorist acts that has plagued Bulgaria of late—an explosion on a train, a parcel bomb, destruction of ski lifts, and fires on Sofia streetcars. But one thing is certain, the oft-ignored Balkan state has emerged from the doldrums with a bang, and will doubtless engage a goodly measure of the new Soviet leader's attention.

Czechoslovakia's Non-Reform

A Czechoslovak newspaper greeted Gorbachëv's ascent with the headline "Continuation of the Great Work" and pointedly emphasized the legacy of the hapless Konstantin Chernenko,[92] an indication of Prague's unfailing loyalty to hard-line orthodoxy. Presumably, Czechoslovakia will continue—as it did during the Andropov period—to emulate Soviet campaigns to intensify and modernize production, uproot corruption, and tighten work discipline. At the same time, it will also likely pursue an "active foreign policy" of endless exchanges of official and semi-official visits with other nations as a means of softening its image as an oppressive regime; and to the same end, it may continue to treat dissidents with some moderation and afford some leeway to religious believers (even while blocking vitally required agreements with the Vatican).

But the current Czechoslovak leadership has no stomach for reforms, even economic ones, at this time. Party leader Gustav Husák told a June session of the Czechoslovak party Central Committee:

> *We will not take the road of any of the market-oriented concepts that would weaken the system of socialist collective property and the party's leading role in the economy. We have had bad experience with that kind of thing.*[93]

Resources for the next five-year plan are being allocated on the assumption that the command system remains essentially unchanged. The country's proportion of trade with the USSR is nearing 50 percent, and more than 80 per cent of overall trade turnover is with the socialist world.[94]

In its orthodoxy, Czechoslovakia sometimes even outdoes Big Brother. Barely a week before the May meeting of Gorbachëv and Husák in Moscow, the Soviet leader had told visiting Italian Communist official Gianni Cervetti that the idea of holding a world communist conference was simply not topical.[95] Yet in mid-June, Husák said he was convinced that "the unity and togetherness of the movement would be enhanced" if such a meeting took place.[96]

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[87] *Rabotnichesko Delo*, Aug. 20, 1985.

[88] Interview in *Pogled*, loc. cit.

[89] See two lengthy lead articles in *Rabotnichesko Delo*, Sept 9 and 15, 1985, and a series of critical articles in *Trud* (Sofia) running from August through November 1985.

[90] On the decree and reasons for it, see interviews with the chief secretary in the Ministry of Education, in *Vechernji Noviny* (Sofia), Oct. 30, 1985, and with Minister of Education Aleksandar Fol, in *Rabotnichesko Delo*, Nov. 1, 1985.

[91] For example, economist Ivan Angelov argued in *Trud* of Sept. 20, 1985, that Bulgaria's New Economic Mechanism had failed and that full reliance on the market was preferable.

[92] *Pravda* (Bratislava), Mar. 13, 1985.

[93] *Rudé Právo*, June 19, 1985.

[94] According to the semi-annual (1985) plan fulfillment report, 46.2% of all Czechoslovak foreign trade was with the USSR and 80.3% with "socialist countries." *Rudé Právo*, July 26, 1985. For the increasingly awesome Czechoslovak economic entanglement with the Soviet Union, see also *Hospodářské Noviny* (Prague), May 31, 1985.

Writing in *Rudé Právo* of July 9, 1985, Ivan Hlivka called for full recognition of the primacy of Soviet experience for bloc members, for total coordination of economic and political measures, for intensification of the influence of communist party organizations on intrabloc processes, and for rejection of those hoping to rely on the West in their modernization drives. Another Czechoslovak official interpreted the new version of the Soviet party program as demanding "improvement of political coordination in the Warsaw Pact" and as postulating faithfulness to Marxism-Leninism by the ruling parties as the most important factor in a successful march forward.[97]

Husák presents Gorbachëv with a choice between what the former likes to call a politically stable and loyal Czechoslovakia under the present leadership and the dark threatening future that reformism would bring if it were allowed once again to raise its ugly head. Even if Gorbachëv were aware that Husák is exaggerating both the virtues of his own government and the perils inherent in reform, he could not remain indifferent to the argument. Gorbachëv has no shortage of problems and potential crises around him, and a placid, if inefficient, Czechoslovakia is better than another Prague Spring. Things may start happening when Czechoslovak economic inadequacy becomes more pronounced, but not a shadow of disagreement was allowed to seep into the communiqué issued after Gorbachëv stopped over in Prague on his way from the summit in Geneva in November and held bilateral talks with Husák before briefing the Warsaw Pact leaders collectively.[98]

Conclusion

In all, Mikhail Gorbachëv has set the signposts for Eastern Europe in a way that combines firmness with a good amount of understanding. He seems to have recognized that there are limits that he himself cannot overstep, as well as problems that his lesser allies have to cope with in their own way. He did not relax the Soviet grip on the area to the point where disintegration might, or almost certainly would, ensue. He has eschewed endorsing market-based reform for individual countries or as an underpinning of CEMA. He prodded all of the client states into domestic action designed to increase efficiency, discipline, and thrift, and he asked them to cut corruption and abuse of power. He affirmed Soviet primacy in coordinating the way the East-West relationship was to be shaped and conducted.

Nevertheless, Gorbachëv has fine-tuned rather than bulldozed. No East European leader has been toppled, and no established governmental mode has been changed. The Hungarians continue their reforms, and so far the Czechoslovaks go ahead with their non-reforms. He has conceded that national peculiarities and interests do not have to be trampled underfoot but could be amicably dovetailed in order to produce internationalist ideological satisfaction. He has given his client states the right to deal with the West as long as they eschew countering Soviet strategic objectives, comply with CEMA's integration plans, and avoid becoming dependent on Western economic mercies.

In other words, in not acting rashly either in tightening or in relaxing Soviet control over the area, Gorbachëv has acted optimally. By the same token, neither the centrifugalists nor the centripetalists can be fully content with what has come to pass.

In at least one respect Gorbachëv has so far failed to provide an adequate answer to the East European challenge. He has not charted a credible path toward making the region economically healthy. The East Germans and the Hungarians may yet achieve their own economic revitalization, but for the other countries, the post-industrial era of hi-tech modernization keeps receding into the more distant future. From any perspective, Marxist or not, this shakiness of the economic base should be cause for considerable concern.

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[95] *L'Unità* (Rome), May 22, 1985.

[96] *Rudé Právo*, June 19, 1985. On the world communist conference the Czechoslovaks had to backpedal. Vasil Bilak told the CC meeting on Nov 28, 1985 in one terse sentence: "Today we see that conditions for it are not yet ripe." *Rudé Právo*, Nov. 30, 1985.

[97] See Michal Štefaňák in ibid., Nov. 12, 1985.

[98] Ibid., Nov. 22, 1985.

Books

Politics of Soviet Law

Robert Sharlet

OLIMPIAD S. IOFFE. *Soviet Law and Soviet Reality.* Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1985.

FRIDRIKH NEZNANSKY. *The Prosecution of Economic Crimes in the USSR, 1954-1984.* Falls Church, VA, Delphic Associates, 1985.

LOUISE I. SHELLEY. *Lawyers in Soviet Work Life.* New Brunswick, NJ, Rutgers University Press, 1984.

JOHN N. HAZARD. *Managing Change in the USSR: The Politico-Legal Role of the Soviet Jurist.* Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, 1983.

JOHN N. HAZARD, WILLIAM E. BUTLER and PETER B. MAGGS. *The Soviet Legal System: The Law in the 1980's.* New York, Oceana, 1984.

Robert Sharlet is Professor of Political Science, Union College (Schenectady, NY). His books on Soviet law and politics include The New Soviet Constitution of 1977 *(1980) and* Pashukanis: Selected Writings on Marxism and Law *(1980)—co-edited with Piers Beirne & trans. by Peter B. Maggs.*

OVER HALF A CENTURY ago, Yevgeniy Pashukanis, the preeminent Soviet legal philosopher of his day, declared that "for us revolutionary legality is a problem that is 99 percent political."[1] Since that time, and especially since Stalin's death in 1953, substantial changes have occurred in the way the Soviet leadership governs Soviet society. Overt and systematic terror as a principal means of control passed from the scene some decades ago as the party-state shifted its emphasis from prerogative or administrative methods of governance to normative or legal ones. After Stalin, reliance on legal processes has been the general rule—except for "political cases" which continue to be dealt with administratively, albeit under a cloak of legality. The treatment of "political cases," relatively small in number but significant for their calculated violation of Soviet-style due process, is by now well-documented in Western literature.[2]

Less well known, however, is the day-to-day admixture of politics and law in the legislative and policy implementation process and in the more mundane spheres of civil law and criminal procedure. Although "socialist legality" is no longer 99 percent political, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, as the political sovereign, continues to interfere in the ordinary administration of justice in myriad subtle ways. However, the increasing availability in the West of authoritative accounts by émigré Soviet jurists is now beginning to shed some light on these heretofore hidden aspects of the Soviet legal system. The most recently published accounts, among them Olimpiad Ioffe's[3] *Soviet Law and Soviet Reality,* Fridrikh Neznansky's[4] *The Prosecution of Economic Crimes in the USSR, 1954-1984,* and those included in Louise Shelley's[5] study

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[1] Yevgeniy B. Pashukanis, "The Soviet State and the Revolution in Law," trans. by Hugh W. Babb, in John N. Hazard, Ed., *Soviet Legal Philosophy,* Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1951, p. 280.

[2] See Peter Reddaway, Ed., *Uncensored Russia: Protest and Dissent in the Soviet Union,* New York, American Heritage Press, 1972; and Ludmilla Alexeyeva, *Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious, and Human Rights,* Middletown, CT, Wesleyan University Press, 1985.

[3] Before emigrating from the USSR, Olimpiad Ioffe was chairman of the Department of Civil Law of Leningrad University Law School. He also played a major role in the post-Stalin drafting and recodification of Soviet civil law.

[4] During his long career in the USSR Procuracy, Fridrikh Neznansky worked as a senior criminal investigator and served as a prosecutor in hundreds of cases handled by the Moscow City Procuracy. After leaving the Procuracy, he worked for several years as a defense attorney until his emigration in the late 1970's.

[5] Louise Shelley is an American criminologist

(continued on p. 55)

Lawyers in Soviet Work Life, reveal much about the preemptive role of politics in the ordinary legal process in the USSR. These insider accounts are beginning to enrich the analyses of Western scholars.

FEW WESTERN SPECIALISTS on Soviet law and politics have doubted that the party controls the formal legislative process, but they were not familiar with the exact modus operandi of this control. Émigré scholarship is now helping to fill this gap. It reveals that the Politburo, acting on the advice of the Central Committee Secretariat, determines the long-term lawmaking agenda and assigns the various legislative drafting tasks to appropriate state institutions and organizations. The substance of every new law is predetermined in advance by the party leadership by means of "political directives" that are binding on the drafting and enactment agencies.[6] Of course, for a legal act as complex as the new USSR Constitution of 1977, a mere political directive was not sufficient; the Administrative Organs Department of the party Secretariat closely supervised the Constitutional Commission and its drafting committees in order to ensure an outcome consistent with the will of the party as ultimate legislator. This department of the Secretariat paid special attention to novel or unusual proposals that arose in response to the leadership's political directives on the Constitution. Thus, for example, the head of the Administrative Organs Department vetoed a constitutional clause that would have created a tier of tribunals to exercise judicial review over administrative decisions.[7]

To be sure, not all legislative initiative inevitably comes from the top. Nonetheless, a legislative proposal "remains a mere idea until it has been taken over by the appropriate party agency" (Ioffe, p. 36). Only after such an agency approves a legislative draft is it possible to proceed to formal enactment.

Even in the implementation of new legislation, or of laws already on the books, a state agency may turn to its party supervisor for guidance. For example, when a technical dispute arose within an important state commission during the mid-1970's, the chairman deferred taking a decision on the matter—even though the majority on the commission supported him—by saying: "Let's hold off on the decision and find out what our [party] curator thinks."[8] Conversely, in 1978, when scholars of the Institute of State and Law of the Academy of Sciences initiated a purely theoretical discussion of legislation to implement Article 58 of the new Constitution, which presumably guarantees a citizen the right to judicial redress for unlawful violation of his rights by an official, they were told to cease and desist. To date, Article 58 remains a dead letter (Ioffe, pp. 37, 52).

Party leaders not only control the flow and implementation of legislation, they also frequently adopt a cavalier attitude toward their own laws. The Politburo, which has historically defined itself as a meta-juridical institution above and outside the law it creates, routinely bypasses budget law, for example, in order to procure funding for unforeseen exigencies, and it regularly orders or permits ad hoc amendments to planning law in order to overcome unexpected difficulties. In neither case does the party bother to use the established legislative process to carry out such changes in an orderly way. In effect, "the annual planning laws remain intact, while the real plans are changed again and again in a tightly closed administrative sphere without any needless publicity" (Ioffe, p. 218). Typical of this approach to planning law is the example of Aleksey Kosygin, who when informed in the late 1970's that oil output had declined because of, among other things, new, general restructuring legislation that stripped the industry's enterprises of their status as juridical persons, exclaimed: "Well, then, to hell with the restructuring. Consider them juridical persons!"[9] In brief, Soviet politics of law are characterized by "strict legality" in the texts and "striking arbitrariness" in practice (Ioffe, p. 182).

THE PARTY MAINTAINS its control over the administration of criminal and civil justice, and the policy-implementation process in general, by means of a steady flow of directives to the operational agencies involved. These party directives, described variously as "instructive law" (Neznansky, p. 30) or "secret instructions," (Ioffe, pp. 38, 57, 164), constitute a considerable body of classified, unpublished rules. Formal legal norms—constitutional, code, and statutory law—

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specializing in Soviet law. Her study is based on in-depth interviews with 25 former Soviet jurists now living in the West, the majority of whom had served as legal advisors to economic enterprises, local governments, and social organizations, or worked as state arbitrators. Some of her respondents were also defense attorneys.

[6] See Olimpiad S. Ioffe and Peter B. Maggs, *Soviet Law in Theory and Practice*, New York, Oceana, 1983, pp. 99-101.

[7] See Konstantin M. Simis, "The Making of the New Soviet Constitution: Conflict over Administrative Justice," in Robert Sharlet, Ed., "Studies in Soviet Legal Policymaking and Implementation," a special issue of *Soviet Union*, (Tempe, AZ) Vol. 6, No. 2, 1979, pp. 203-07. Simis, a former Soviet jurist, was involved in the drafting of the 1977 Constitution before his emigration from the USSR.

[8] Olimpiad S. Ioffe, "Law and Economy in the USSR," *Harvard Law Review* (Cambridge, MA) May 1982, p. 1605.

[9] Ioffe, "Law and Economy . . . ," pp. 1623-24.

are constantly subject to interpretation through the prism of party instructions. In effect, "instructive law is a hidden reef that underlies the Soviet system of justice" (and administration), which an official can ignore only at his own peril (Neznansky, p. 32).

In the sphere of criminal justice, instructive law affords party officials and appointees—in a word, the ruling class—"the protection of the law denied to the ordinary citizen" (Neznansky, p. 39).[10] In practice, a protected individual suspected of a crime cannot be arrested without party sanction, and often investigations are impeded, criminal proceedings terminated, or punishment limited to disciplinary action by the party. The higher the rank of the individual, the less likely it is that he will face any formal juridical action, and the more likely it becomes that he will be dealt with on a purely intra-party basis. A recent example was the case of Nikolay A. Shchëlokov, long-time USSR Minister of Internal Affairs under Brezhnev. Reportedly involved in a bribery scandal, Shchëlokov was dismissed from office shortly after Andropov's rise to power and the initiation of an anti-corruption campaign. The errant minister was subsequently subjected to party sanctions, but no legal action was initiated against him (Ioffe, p. 199).[11]

Lesser party officials and *nomenklatura* appointees accused of economic crimes also frequently escape prison as a result of party intervention. In the early 1960's, for example, Ivan Satin, a local party official, was caught operating a large-scale fruit and vegetable scam in the Moscow region. His illegal organization included several dozen well-placed individuals in the political, legal, and economic apparatus. The scam involved diverting produce from state warehouses for under-the-counter sale in retail outlets. The annual take was over 500,000 rubles. Although the Procuracy had a solid case, the party would not permit the arrest of several ringleaders, including the first secretary of a district party committee and the chairman of the executive committee of the local soviet. Satin himself received only a light sentence, while 30 of his lower ranking accomplices were sentenced to terms of 10 to 15 years (Neznansky, pp. 104-07).[12]

In another case, in the mid-1960's, the jilted mistress of a senior gas-industry official anonymously denounced her former lover for running an extensive extortion and kickback racket among his employees. The operation included discreet payoffs in the form of valuable presents to two ministers and, through them, to Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Kosygin, who was, apparently unaware of the scheme.

Generally, Soviet criminal investigators approach a case involving highly placed individuals with considerable trepidation (Neznansky, p. 99). In this particular instance, the Moscow City procurator warned his subordinate that the ministers would probably invoke their party connections. It did not matter that an airtight case could be made. The Central Committee refused to condone the arrest of the ringleader, and the Administrative Organs Department instructed the Procuracy to terminate criminal proceedings against all those involved for "lack of evidence." In the end, the chief investigator in the case was dismissed on the grounds that he had brought charges against the notables prematurely (Neznansky, pp. 107-11).[13]

Another example of party interference in a criminal case involved the editor of the magazine *Ogonek*, A. Sofronov, who was reported by his employees for embezzling large sums of money in the mid-1970's. The evidence was irrefutable, but because Sofronov was involved in disseminating the party's ideological line, Mikhail Suslov intervened on his behalf, and the "case took another course." In the subsequent cover-up, not only did the editor avoid punishment, but those who had turned him in were brought to trial (Ioffe, p. 199).

Party instructions also orchestrate all political cases. As one regional party official noted candidly to a roomful of judges: "Yes, you judges are independent and subordinate only to law. But you are dependent on me, are you not?" (Ioffe, p. 220). Further indication of party involvement in political trials can be found in the *samizdat* literature that reaches the West. It is replete with accounts of political cases decided according to party directives, which emanate more often than not from an anonymous *apparatchik*.[14] Investigator Neznansky cites a more unusual example—a classified case of internal dissent assigned to him in the late 1960's. It concerned two Greek Communists who had emigrated to the Soviet Union several years earlier, but had since become disillusioned and were seeking to leave the USSR. In the case file, Neznansky found General Secretary Brezhnev's "personal instructions" to press charges against the men for contacting the Chinese ambassador about re-emigrating to the People's Republic of China (p. 35).

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[10] See also Ioffe, *Soviet Law and Soviet Reality*, p. 143, especially the "Romanov case," in which party permission to arrest a prominent person suspected of a crime was denied.

[11] On the anti-corruption campaign, see Robert Sharlet, "Soviet Legal Policy under Andropov: Law and Discipline," in Joseph L. Nogee, Ed., *Soviet Politics: Russia After Brezhnev*, New York, Praeger, 1985, pp. 85-108; and on corruption in general, see Konstantin M. Simis, *USSR: The Corrupt Society*, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1982.

[12] On this type of case in general, see Gregory Grossman, "The 'Second Economy' of the USSR," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September-October 1977, pp. 25-40.

[13] For a similar case, the so-called Uzbek fur case, see Ioffe, *Soviet Law and Soviet Reality*, pp. 105-06.

[14] For an analysis of such cases, see Robert Sharlet, "The Communist Party and the Administration of Justice in the USSR," in Donald D. Barry, F.J.M. Feldbrugge, George Ginsburgs, and Peter B. Maggs, Eds., *Soviet Law After Stalin*, Vol. III: *Soviet Institutions and the Administration of Law*, Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands, Sijthoff and Noordhof, 1979, pp. 321-92.

The party also intervenes in routine criminal cases, but on a more selective basis, and in less dramatic ways. One such instance was a 1978 case of attempted rape cited by Ioffe. The victim, a young Leningrad woman, was rescued by fellow citizens, who turned her attacker over to the police. The assailant did not deny his crime, and it looked like an open-and-shut case. His father, however, was a prominent law professor at Leningrad University—to be precise, the chairman of the Criminal Law Department. The professor used his professional connections to have the case terminated on a technicality, no doubt with prior approval from the appropriate party organ (p. 200).[15]

Party influence can serve not only as a mitigating factor for those who fall under its protection, but also as an aggravating circumstance for the less fortunate. Such was the experience of a Moscow factory worker in a case described by Neznansky. The man committed a minor offense (petty theft), but was given a harsh sentence out of all proportion to the crime. It seems that it was his bad luck to have had his case adjudicated during a special party-sponsored law-and-order campaign designed to clean up Moscow before the 1980 Summer Olympic Games. Moscow City Party Committee First Secretary and Politburo member Viktor Grishin had warned prosecutors and judges that "he would personally look into any cases" in which lenient sentences were handed down (p. 36).[16]

As in any legal system, the vast majority of cases that arise in the Soviet Union involve civil litigation of one kind or another. In this area, too, the influence of the party is often felt, as indicated by the following:

- In a series of civil suits, bus drivers in Leningrad sought compensation from management for carbon monoxide poisoning due to faulty maintenance of vehicles and hazardous working conditions. Before the local authorities realized how many drivers had been poisoned, the first few cases sailed through the courts in favor of the plaintiffs. Faced, however, with hundreds of similar compensation claims, the party stepped in with a secret directive forbidding any further decisions against the management. Defense arguments thereafter fell on deaf ears, and all subsequent appeals failed as party instructions overrode civil equity.[17]
- An enterprise counsel in Ukraine believed that the local arbitration board had acted illegally in rejecting his claim against a rail freight carrier. He later learned that "all arbitrators are under a firm party order not to penalize the railroads" in economic disputes (Shelley, pp. 63-64).
- A regional party committee secretly sanctioned an illegal decision on housing legislation by a city soviet. A group of law professors asked the city prosecutor to appeal the decision in the manner provided for by Soviet law. Knowing that the party had a hand in the matter, the wary prosecutor declined to act (Ioffe, p. 42).
- An arbitration board imposed a very heavy fine on an enterprise for failing to fulfill its planned contractual obligation to a trading partner. The director of the organization "appealed" to the regional party committee, arguing that his preoccupation with fulfilling a military order had overridden the obligation in question. The party, in keeping with its standing policy of bailing out priority industries (such as the railroads and the defense sector) when management problems arise, interceded and directed the chief arbitrator to set the case aside (Shelley, p. 72).
- In a clearcut probate case, the party issued "secret instructions" to a lower court to resolve a dispute between the heirs of a famous physician in a manner that contravened the laws of inheritance. On appeal, the higher courts implicitly deferred to the instructive law and upheld the illegal decision (Ioffe, p. 191).

POLITICAL LICENSE and "legalized arbitrariness" are most blatant in Soviet administrative law. As Ioffe points out, "most administrative regulations are not only unpublished but even secret [i.e., classified]. Therefore, citizens who have been ordered administratively to do or not to do something cannot check the legality of the orders received" (p. 205). Given the sub rosa character of administrative rules, the opportunities for covert party manipulation are legion. In effect, party instructive law can virtually reshape administrative regulations at will. Two examples involving university admissions policies will suffice to illustrate this point.

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[15] For a rape-murder case involving party pressure in the opposite direction—to get a conviction at any cost—see the "Case of the Two Boys," in Dina Kaminskaya, *Final Judgment: My Life as a Soviet Defense Attorney*, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1982, Part Two.

[16] Similarly, see also the "Uzbek black marketeer case," pp. 88-89. In spite of blatant procedural error, all appeals failed in face of an ongoing party campaign. As a senior procurator bluntly put it: "The party won't understand our overturning verdicts just because some procedural rule was broken."

[17] See Yuri Luryi, "Soviet Labor Law: New Concepts or Relationships?" *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* (New York), Vol. 23, No. 2, 1985, pp. 423-24. The author was formerly a defense attorney at the Leningrad bar.

In the mid-1960's, the Kirghiz Party Central Committee directed the republic's university to implement a kind of affirmative-action program to increase the enrollment of native women. Contrary to formal Soviet university procedure, female Kirghiz students were to be admitted without having to take the entrance examinations required of all other applicants, including young women of other nationalities resident in the republic. In fact, however, examinations were a mere formality, notes Ioffe, since all the vacancies had been allocated beforehand to the children of the ruling elite "according to various secret instructions" (pp. 42-43, 214-15). A decade later, in the mid-1970's, the Leningrad regional party organization issued secret instructions mandating a discriminatory admissions policy at Leningrad University, by ordering certain faculties, including law, not to admit "Jews, half-Jews, or persons who looked Jewish" (Ioffe, p. 39).[18]

THE INSIDE VIEW of the Soviet legal system offered by former Soviet jurists clearly illustrates the strong impact of politics on Soviet law and supports the generally accepted Western scholarly perception of the interrelationship between the party and law in the USSR.[19] It demonstrates that in its penchant for intervening directly in the legal process on behalf of its cadres and *apparatchiki* or in defense of significant regime interests, the party actually practices the "jurisprudence of political expedience."[20]

Yet, despite this evidence of actions to the contrary, the party continues to preach a doctrine of strict legality, and Soviet juridical literature describes the relationship between the legal system and the party in a rather sanitized form. Witness, for instance, the commentary by Central Committee official Boris Ponomarëv concerning the Constitution's assertion that "all party organizations operate within the framework of the USSR Constitution":

> *The proposition set forth in paragraph 3 of Article 6 means that the party organizations in the first place shall not replace state organs, and secondly shall not violate the Constitution and legislative acts enacted in accordance with it. The central party organs may, of course, find it necessary to introduce changes and additional provisions into legislation and issue corresponding statements to this effect addressed to deputies of the Supreme Soviets—to communists, and to communists who work in the highest state organs, but until the law has been altered or abrogated, all party organizations must conform to it. The principles of socialist legality, consequently, extend fully to the Communist Party.*[21]

Similarly, with regard to the implementation of law, the party modestly acknowledges its mandated general supervisory role without ever hinting at its actual ad hoc interference in individual cases. For instance, as noted in the mid-1970's by one party official in the USSR Ministry of Justice, "the Party Bureau of the Ministry and the party organizations of the administrations and of departments direct the work of communists, of all collaborators in further perfection of the organization of work of the [legal] apparatus, strengthening work discipline, improving auditing and verification of the execution of policy, and raising the personal responsibility of every worker for the work assigned" (*The Soviet Legal System*, pp. 39-42).[22]

To be sure, the party *usually* does confine itself to a supervisory role over legal institutions. To do otherwise would be impractical and would leave its "leading role" in the Soviet system in shambles, since direct intervention in specific cases can be very time-consuming for party officials and organizations already burdened with manifold other responsibilities. Thus, line party organizations generally seek to exercise control by setting the broad policy parameters within which legal institutions operate, while staff party committees in those institutions strive to ensure general compliance.

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[18] On the method of rigging entrance exams for the purpose of discriminating against Jewish applicants to Soviet universities, see Grigori Freiman, *It Seems I Am a Jew: A Samizdat Essay*, trans. by M. B. Nathanson, Carbondale, IL, Southern Illinois University Press, 1980, esp. Ch. 3. The author writes about his experiences as a Soviet mathematics professor.

[19] John Hazard probably speaks for most specialists on Soviet law when he writes: "Politics run like a red thread through the institutions of Soviet law . . . ." *Managing Change*, p. 12.

[20] Robert Sharlet, "Varieties of Dissent and Regularities of Repression in the European Communist States," in Jane L. Curry, Ed., *Dissent in Eastern Europe*, New York, Praeger, 1983, esp. pp. 12-14.

[21] Hazard, Butler, and Maggs, *The Soviet Legal System*, p. 38; the volume provides a compilation and translation of useful selections of laws and commentaries on all aspects of the Soviet legal process. For some additional discussion of Art. 6, see also Ioffe, *Soviet Law and Soviet Reality*, p. 202.

[22] For an analysis of supervision as opposed to interference in the party relationship to the Soviet legal system, see R. Sharlet, "The Communist Party and the Administration of Justice in the USSR," loc. cit., esp. pp. 338-50.

As a result, in the great majority of instances involving neither a protected person nor a pressing political priority, Neznansky observes, "justice for the ordinary citizen in the USSR has lost much of the arbitrariness of the Stalin era and is most closely determined by the objective standards of formal law" (p. 39). Soviet legal literature abounds in cases in which the post-Stalin rules of due process for both criminal and civil cases have been maintained and/or enforced through higher court review (*The Soviet Legal System*, Chs. 7 and 8).

Moreover, in most of the disputes that parties choose to bring to state arbitration, Louise Shelley's respondents report, state arbitrators carry out their duties with a high degree of legal professionalism (pp. 49-52, 69-71).[23] However, while the state arbitrator's decisions are usually based on objective legal criteria, they are frequently difficult to execute due to, among other things, the rigidities of the centrally planned Soviet economy. Thus, in practice—as a means of coping with the structural defects in the economic system—enterprise directors often avoid the legal process by resorting to "informal rules," a "set of mores [or] unwritten laws" that have evolved in the interstices between the party's instructive law and the formal law of the state (Neznansky, p. 37).

IN THE BOOKS reviewed here, some broader perspectives on the interplay between politics and law in the Soviet Union are presented by John Hazard, long the *doyen* of Soviet legal studies in the West, and by Olimpiad Ioffe, for many years the preeminent civil law specialist in the USSR. Although their vantage points are different—Hazard writing as an informed and experienced Western observer and Ioffe as a former practitioner of Soviet law—their views coincide on three fundamental issues.

First, both are in agreement on the dominant role of the party in the Soviet system in general, and in the legal system in particular. As Hazard has noted: "The conclusion cannot be avoided that, if there is any principle that communists hold sacred and which they will defend at all costs, it is the Communist Party's monopoly rule" (*Managing Change*, p. 11). Second, both agree that the party has come increasingly to rely on law as a means of control and governance, steadily bringing more and more relationships and activities within the purview of the country's legal codes. In Ioffe's words: "Year after year legal regulations are becoming more and more widespread in the country" (p. 16).[24]

Third, Hazard and Ioffe are in accord on the existence of significant gaps between reality and law in the USSR. Hazard notes a major disjunction in looking back over the span of Soviet legal history:

> *The communists of 1917 promised much: abundance; social tranquility; a society that would require no coercion; international proletarian brotherhood; a legal system that would favor the working man and eventually wither away, to be replaced by a non-coercive set of administrative regulations and a thoroughly absorbed sense of social obligation that would stimulate citizens to perform duties because they understood their importance to community well-being. None of this has been achieved in the sixty-odd years of Soviet history. Production has lagged; productivity has been low; conflict exists in society; deviance is punished severely; the legal system has been developed along conventional Romanist lines; administrative regulations have multiplied, to be enforced with coercive measures; and laws have had to punish "parasites" for refusing to work and nonconformists for departing from the principles established by the Communist Party in its Code of Morals. (Managing Change, p. 169)*

For his part, Ioffe has in view primarily the period since Stalin, in which he sees a series of profound contradictions between the theory and the practice of Soviet law.

ment over the function of law and the role of the jurist in the Soviet system. These differences are further magnified by the fact that Ioffe is drawing on past experience while Hazard is looking to the future.

For Ioffe, Soviet law is essentially a relatively static order-maintenance system aimed at maximizing the party's power over society and protecting the "state's position of economic monopolist" (p. 13). He repeatedly uses the metaphor of the mask, describing Soviet law as "legislative camouflage" or "a disguising mask" that serves as a "practical cover for arbitrariness" (pp. 85, 177, 218). The pervasive image is one of law as a shroud stifling political and economic initiative that does not conform to prescribed party norms.

For Hazard, Soviet law is primarily a dynamic instrument in the party's hands for shaping the socioeconomic environment and moulding the Soviet citizen in the desired image. The dominant theme of Hazard's past work has been the linkage between law and social change in the USSR and in Soviet-type systems.[25] As he contemplates the future development of the Soviet system, the prevailing image is one of jurisprudence as a policy science for "managing change" through "the orderly procedures of law" (*Managing Change*, p. 47).

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[23] See also Hazard, Butler and Maggs, *The Soviet Legal System*, Ch. 14.

[24] See also Robert Sharlet, "Constitutional Implementation and the Juridicization of the Soviet System," in Donald R. Kelley, Ed., *Soviet Politics in the Brezhnev Era*, New York, Praeger, 1980, pp. 200-234.

As one might expect, Ioffe's and Hazard's divergent conceptions of Soviet law rest on very different perceptions of political and economic reality in the USSR. To Ioffe, the "appropriate criterion" for economic efficiency is the degree to which the present economic structure sustains the political dominance of the state, and *not* the degree to which it ensures the material well-being of society. From this point of view, he argues, the party "leadership has made the economy work splendidly as the source of its dictatorship." Ioffe concludes that, given the nature of the Soviet political system, there is *no* hope that law could serve as a regulatory agent for reforming the economy without weakening state power.[26]

For Hazard, the situation in the contemporary USSR presents a very different picture. In his view, the hegemonic role of the party in the Soviet system is being eroded as a consequence of the modernization of Soviet society. The party is no longer firmly in control of the course of events as the USSR approaches the slippery downslope to the "post-industrial era" with its unforeseeable problems. The Polish crisis, triggered by a failure to meet consumer needs, is recognized by Soviet leaders as a possible harbinger of a general crisis of state socialism, and they are haunted by the "spectre of unmanageable change" (*Managing Change*, p. 1).

In Hazard's opinion, the road to salvation for the USSR lies in the ongoing "scientific and technological revolution," which in turn must be accompanied by managerial innovation, beginning with "rethinking the unthinkable"—the role and methods "of the Communist Party itself." He suggests that the Soviet leadership may be on the threshold of enhancing the "politico-legal" role of the legally educated party member working alongside the economist and the engineer in managing the inevitable process of change (*Managing Change*, p. 43).[27]

Ultimately, of course, Gorbachëv (himself a lawyer-politician, as was Lenin) will determine which vision of Soviet law will prevail—Ioffe's pessimistic forecast, or Hazard's optimistic scenario. Over 20 years ago, a prominent Soviet law professor suggested that lawyers could be of help in the legislative process, but only if they were "brave enough to say 'no' when necessary." The proposal had little impact then on the party's legal policy, and it cost the professor his position (Ioffe, p. 171). Will it be any different now under Gorbachëv? Will jurists play a significant role in shaping the Soviet future, or will they continue to simply carry out party instructions? The safe bet would be to await the implementation of the resolutions adopted at the 27th CPSU Congress (to be held in February 1986) before venturing any answers to such questions. Yet, if past experience is any guide, odds are that many years will pass before legality overcomes political expediency in the Soviet Union.

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[25] See John N. Hazard, *Law and Social Change in the USSR*, London, Stevens, 1953; and Hazard, *Communists and Their Law*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1969.

[26] See Ioffe, "Law and Economy in the USSR," loc. cit., pp. 1624-25.

[27] See also Ch. 4 in passing. The Soviet legal press has been relatively silent since Gorbachëv's accession about what future role the jurist might play. Supportive of Hazard's projection is a recent lead article "Juridical Science: Planning, Multi-faceted Approaches, and Integration," *Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo* (Moscow), August 1985, pp. 3-12. On the parts to be played by Soviet law and jurists in the scientific-technical revolution, see Robert Sharlet "STR, Party Policy, and Socialist Law," in Gordon B. Smith, Peter B. Maggs, and George Ginsburgs, Eds., *Soviet and East European Law and the Scientific-Technical Revolution*, New York, Pergamon, 1981, pp. 47-77.

Last Stages of Leninism

Melvin Croan

ALAIN BESANÇON. *The Rise of the Gulag: Intellectual Origins of Leninism.* New York, The Continuum Publishing Corporation, 1981.

GUY HERMET, Ed. *Totalitarismes.* Paris, Economica, 1984.

CARL A. LINDEN. *The Soviet Party-State: The Politics of Ideocratic Despotism.* New York, Praeger Publishers, 1983.

ERIK P. HOFFMANN and ROBBIN F. LAIRD. *Technocratic Socialism: The Soviet Union in the Advanced Industrial Era.* Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1985.

STEPHEN F. COHEN. *Sovieticus: American Perceptions and Soviet Realities.* New York and London, Norton, 1985.

STEPHEN F. COHEN. *Rethinking the Soviet Experience: Politics and History Since 1917.* New York, Oxford University Press, 1985.

TIMOTHY J. COLTON. *The Dilemma of Reform in the Soviet Union.* New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1984.

AN OLD SAYING has it that whoever is incapable of change lacks the means of self-preservation. This adage applies not only to individuals, but to countries as well. The Soviet Union today stands at a crossroads where the very survival of its system may be at stake because recent leaders have failed to deal with the most basic problem facing the Soviet Union—the challenge of change. Will Mikhail Gorbachëv put the USSR on the road to change? How far will it be able to move forward in the face of formidable institutional and ideological obstacles?

The volumes under review here deal with many different aspects of the Soviet experience Yet all of them can be read with an eye to the conundrum of change. Furthermore, in one way or another, each study broaches the crucial question of the future of Marxism-Leninism—the system's ideological lodestar—or, to put the accent where it rightly belongs, the future of Leninism.

ALAIN BESANÇON, a French specialist on Russian history, sees Leninism as virtually synonymous with the Soviet system, and as an amalgam of corrupt philosophy and debased religion, now permanently wed to the colossus of power it called forth. Although he devotes many chapters in his *The Rise of the Gulag* to unearthing the Russian roots of Leninism, Besançon is insistent that Leninism has to be understood as a chiliastic ideology, whose origins can be traced back to Gnosticism and Manichaeism and whose pretensions remain truly universalistic. Comparing the development of ideology to the different stages of the growth of parasites, he treats Leninism as the outgrowth of an inchoate French cycle and a more developed German cycle, the latter involving successive mutations of Hegelianism by Marx and Engels. Leninism for him is the final mutation of all of its antecedents and constitutes a complete ideology unto itself. The clear implication is that Leninism as an ideology has little in common with Russian national traditions. Yet, it took root because "civil society in Russia suffered, with regard to the state, from a congenital weakness," writes Besançon, and because the cultural environment was not sufficiently varied, vigorous, and diverse "to combat and eliminate" this ideology, as occurred in France and Germany. For Besançon, this explains why "neither in France nor in Germany could an

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Melvin Croan is Professor of Political Science, University of Wisconsin (Madison) and author of numerous works on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, with a particular emphasis on East Germany. He is currently working on a study of bureaucratic socialism and its critics.

ideology have been established as simple, as complete, as fortified and as organized as the Russian ideology" (pp. 105 and 104). Besançon's view of Leninism as alien to Russian national traditions is similar to that of Alexander Solzhenitsyn, whom Besançon admires as an exemplar of the virtue of pure truth which, he firmly believes, must eventually prevail over ideological falsehood.

According to Besançon, Leninism presently holds sway not because it conveys conviction, but because it manifests power. As he puts it, "All the reality of ideology is concentrated in the exercise of power" (p. 289). Yet, precisely because this is true of Leninism, the Soviet system is incapable of change and, Besançon concludes, is doomed to immobilism and destined to be swept away by an evolving reality that Leninism cannot even begin to comprehend.

In many respects, Besançon's treatment of Leninism as an ideology intermeshed with power is bound to call to mind Hannah Arendt's classic study, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, a veritable tour de force that related the pursuit and exercise of unlimited power to considerations of intellectual history, social decay, economic dislocation, and, above all else, abnormal political psychology. Arendt held the "essence" of totalitarianism to be terror, prefigured by the relentless compulsion to impose the fictitious world of ideology upon a recalcitrant reality. Her work—indeed, the notion of totalitarianism itself—received much criticism from various quarters. Many political scientists, and some historians, contended that theories of totalitarianism could not be "operationalized," and that they served to obfuscate, rather than to clarify the actual experiences of the regimes that they were supposed to explain. What the critics overlooked was that the concept of totalitarianism constituted less a tool for empirical micro-analysis than an expression of moral concern in the grand tradition of political philosophy.

This and many other important points are cogently argued by Pierre Hassner in his insightful contribution ("Totalitarianism Viewed From the West") to the volume on "totalitarianisms" (note the plural]), edited by Guy Hermet. The publication of this book in Paris at a time when controversies about the concept of totalitarianism have all but subsided in the Anglo-Saxon world[1] is itself noteworthy as a manifestation of the dramatic shift of Left Bank intellectual attitudes away from an earlier enchantment with Soviet-style socialism. The greater the pity, therefore, that the chapter on the Soviet Union, written by Aleksander Smolar, should have largely failed to answer the question, "transformation or degeneration?" posed by its title.[2] However, in general, the volume sustains a fairly high standard of analysis; in addition to Hassner's excellent presentation, and two brief but thoughtful epilogues authored by Juan Linz and Richard Lowenthal (two non-French students of the subject), special mention should be made of Pierre Manent's contribution, "Totalitarianism and the Problem of Political Representation." Exploring the political theory of representation in terms of the relationship between civil society and the state, Manent's rich, dialectical discussion adds true philosophical depth to the subject of the state's absorption of civil society, considered by most contributors to this volume to be the hallmark of totalitarianism.

IN HIS BOOK, *The Soviet Party-State*, Carl Linden, who previously proposed a "conflict model" of Soviet politics in lieu of the totalitarian approach,[3] returns to the fray with the concept of "ideocratic despotism." Borrowed—with due acknowledgement—from Nicholas Berdayev, the term "ideocratic" is meant to convey the primacy of ideology, "a secular analogue to theocracy with its close tying of ideas as dogma and power" (p. xii) In the ensuing discussion, Linden stresses the Leninist input, but he also feels that original Marxism must be regarded as "an active, not inert, ingredient in the political chemistry that produced the first ideocratic party state" (p. x and Ch. 1). This Soviet party-state, according to Linden, claims to be monolithic, but it actually suffers from the factional politics that Linden deems to be inherent in ideocratic rule.

Soviet "crypto-politics," to use T.H. Rigby's apt designation,[4] has produced few real heroes, yet Linden comes close to treating Nikita Khrushchëv as one. Despite the many contradictions in the policies of this former Soviet leader, Linden gives him relatively high marks for at least attempting to ameliorate despotism, and for shifting "the party's focus from ideocratic to mundane economic managerial functions" (p. xi and Ch. 5). By contrast, he judges Leonid Brezhnev to have strengthened the coercive and repressive features of the Soviet system, with the objective of reimposing a purely despotic relationship between the rulers and the ruled. Yet, as Linden makes clear in his tantalizing—if rather disjointed—discussion of "repressed political potentials" (Ch. 4), he believes that the regime's ideocratic foundations will be subject to an ever-increasing challenge from below, especially from various Russian nationalist currents. "In the not distant future," Linden writes, the Soviet leadership will have to confront a stark choice between instituting "a basic change in its manner of rule" or else risking "an upheaval" (p. 158).

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[1] For a recent discussion of these controversies, see Walter Laqueur, "Is There Now, or Has There Ever Been, Such a Thing as Totalitarianism?" *Commentary* (New York), October 1985, pp. 29-35.

[2] Long-time readers of this journal will recognize the title as having been borrowed from Zbigniew Brzezinski's article, "The Soviet Political System: Transformation or Degeneration?" *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January-February 1966. Brzezinski's essay was reprinted along with the commentaries that it engendered in Zbigniew Brzezinski, Ed., *Dilemmas of Change in Soviet Politics*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1969.

[3] Carl A. Linden, *Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership, 1957-1964*, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966, pp. 1-9.

[4] T.H. Rigby, "Crypto-Politics," in Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., Ed., *Communist Studies and the Social Sciences*, Chicago, Rand McNally, 1969, pp. 116-28.

HOW THE KREMLIN has sought to obviate such unpalatable alternatives is the subject of *Technocratic Socialism,* coauthored by Erik Hoffmann and Robbin Laird. This study, the final volume in a trilogy,[5] presents a comprehensive summation of recent Soviet thinking on policy-making, politics, and progress under conditions of advanced industrialism. The authors argue that the concept of "developed" or "mature" socialism, unveiled under Brezhnev, together with various corollary constructs involving "the scientific-technological revolution" and "the scientific management of society," comprise a distinct, Soviet ideology of advanced modernization and, therefore, signify a pragmatic adaptation of official Marxism-Leninism. At the same time, they emphasize that the new, authoritarian order, which they designate as "technocratic socialism," constitutes an orientation of the top elite that has yet to become "an integral part of bureaucratic behavior or mass political culture" (p. 198). This elite, according to the evidence so assiduously marshalled by Hoffmann and Laird, has always harbored deep-seated reservations about opening up decision-making processes to anything resembling real participation by the lower echelons. Therefore, the authors' attempt to sift through official pronouncements so as to pinpoint conservative, reformist, and centrist positions within the elite seems contrived. Moreover, it also tends to deflect attention away from one of their more basic points, namely, that the primary objective of Soviet theorizing thus far has been to devise more effective means for formulating and implementing policy from the top down, and for fashioning more streamlined methods of political control over society.

TO TURN FROM Hoffmann and Laird's highly informative—but ultimately inconclusive—study to Stephen Cohen's two recent books is to experience initial delight that quickly turns to distress. Both *Sovieticus,* a collection of topical commentaries that appeared in *The Nation* magazine, and *Rethinking the Soviet Experience,* a more substantial academic disquisition, are written with sustained verve. Each is predicated upon the commendable supposition that politics and history comprise a single subject of study. Unfortunately, both the historical interpretations Cohen ventures and the political arguments he advances turn out to be seriously flawed.

Introducing himself as a revisionist among Sovietologists, Cohen proceeds to attack most of the "conventional wisdom" of preeminent scholars in the field. He indicts the Western—and, particularly, the American—scholarly perception of the Soviet system. This does not mean that he holds any brief for the Soviet system, at least not for the form that it has taken since Stalin's rise to power. Yet, while Cohen sees the evident defects of the system, he seems to believe that just about everything objectionable about the Soviet experience can be blamed on the West. What he fails to acknowledge is that absolving the Soviet regime of virtually all responsibility for its conduct at home and abroad is, as Richard Pipes has suggested, tantamount to holding Russia itself in deep contempt.[6]

What is the course Soviet history might have taken had the West shown the Soviet Union a full measure of "understanding"? Cohen, who is also the author of a highly sympathetic biography of Nikolay Bukharin,[7] consistently argues the possibility of a non-Stalinist alternative. His might-have-been scenario centers on the blossoming of the New Economic Policy (NEP, 1921-28) which allegedly Bukharin would have championed and nurtured until it had developed into something approximating full-scale market socialism with a human face. This historical fantasy has to be predicated either on the view that Leninism is substantially more open-ended and open-minded than the burden of the available evidence allows us to believe, or else on the contention that "Bolshevism was larger and more diverse than Lenin and Leninism" (*Rethinking the Soviet Experience*, p. 49).

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[5] The two earlier volumes were *The Politics of Economic Modernization in the Soviet Union,* Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1982; and *The Scientific-Technological Revolution and Soviet Foreign Policy,* Elmsford, NY, Pergamon Press, 1982.

[6] Richard Pipes, "U.S. and Them," *The New Republic* (Washington, DC), Oct. 14, 1985, p. 34. For Cohen's rejoinder to Pipes, which seems to sidestep Pipes's point about holding Russia "in deep contempt," see his letter, "Cohen on Pipes," ibid., Feb. 3, 1986, p. 42.

[7] Stephen F. Cohen, *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Political Biography, 1888-1938,* New York, Alfred Knopf, 1973.

But what would a non-Leninist type of Bolshevism really amount to, if not a blatant contradiction in terms? And even if one were, for argument's sake, to deem such a concoction feasible, would it have been politically viable? Furthermore, would Bukharin necessarily have been the right person to lead the experiment? Finally, would a Bukharinite Soviet Russia have inexorably progressed toward the democratic, yet developmental, socialism of Cohen's imagination? These are all questions that the author has studiously avoided because, given the nature of the case, they are unanswerable.

Cohen is deliberately equivocal with regard to the prospects for change in the contemporary Soviet system. On the one hand, he envisions the emergence of a "coalition for change" composed of both reformers and conservatives within the ruling elite. In his view, this coalition would draw strength from many sources, including the official ideology's promise of a better future, and its commitment to "the very idea, desirability, and inexorability of change" (*Rethinking the Soviet Experience*, p. 152). Lest anyone suppose that such an ostensibly significant asset could assure the triumph of reformism, Cohen—consistent to the very end—protests that reform will be a lost cause unless the West adopts conciliatory policies toward the Soviet Union. This, of course, is neither self-evident nor demonstrable. In fact, competitive East-West relations, including perhaps the tensions and crises Cohen so decries, could well prove to be a much greater incentive to Soviet domestic reform than the détente he advocates. In any event, it would be foolhearty for the West to sacrifice its own legitimate interests for a chimerical pursuit of domestic change in the Soviet Union over which, *pace* Professor Cohen, it can never hope to exert decisive influence.

A MUCH MORE SOPHISTICATED approach to the basic issues of change in the Soviet system is provided by Timothy Colton in *The Dilemma of Reform in the Soviet Union*. This thought-provoking, short book, conceived as an "essay" for a "general audience," manages to review the legacy of the Brezhnev period, diagnose the ailments of the Soviet system, examine the emergent ruling elite, explore various options for change, and consider the relationship between foreign affairs and domestic policy—all in a scant 100 pages. Though admirably concise, Colton's study is full of insights, and is so tightly argued throughout, that no brief summary can substitute for the actual reading of the text itself. Suffice it to note only that Colton foresees the Kremlin opting for a course of "moderate reform," which he defines as:

> *a strategy of controlled change somewhere between radical and minimal reform. Its focus would be on public policy and the machinery needed to fulfill change, not on basic institutions and beliefs. Hence it falls well short of radical reform. But, unlike minimal reform, the change involved will pose a challenge to some established groups and thereby generate controversy and conflict.* (p. 63)

His prediction appears to be remarkably accurate. Having come to power after these words were written, the new Kremlin leadership headed by Gorbachëv seems bent on precisely the course charted by Colton. It remains to be seen whether the limited initiatives undertaken thus far by this leadership will lead to any wider ranging measures, and whether they will produce the desired results. Colton forecasts potentially dire consequences, should resurgent conservative forces obstruct change or, in his words, if "bungled reforms come to naught" (p. 79).

IS THE SOVIET UNION, then, on the verge of an existential crisis? Clearly Besançon and Linden, as well as other observers, feel that this may well be the case.[8] Colton, for his part, alludes to the possibility of a "crisis of legitimacy" in the 1990's in the event of a miscarriage of "moderate reform," but rejects the thesis that the survival of the Soviet system is presently at stake, and cautions against an underestimation of the rulers' resources and an exaggeration of their problems. From his extensive, although by no means exhaustive, list of Soviet ailments, Colton singles out economic stagnation as the most likely source of serious trouble in the longer term. On the opposite side of the ledger, he notes such features as societal inertness, patriotic pride, and the like, calling special attention to the entrenched power of the ruling elite and the elaborate network of controls that it commands. "Although some controls can be modified," he asserts, "no present or foreseeable Soviet leader will tamper with the basic authoritarian credo of Leninism" (p. 59).*

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[8] See, for example, Ernst Kux, "Contradictions in Soviet Socialism," *Problems of Communism*, November-December 1984, pp. 1-27; and R.V. Burks, "The Coming Crisis in the Soviet Union," in Morton A. Kaplan and Alexander Shtromas, Eds., *The Prospects for Transformation in the Soviet Union*, New York, Professors World Peace Academy, forthcoming. Burks argues that "the chances of system breakdown in the Soviet Union within the next five to ten years are probably better than even."

This is, in fact, precisely the rub. Viewed in retrospect, Leninism must surely be ranked as one of the most powerful and durable ideological/political forces of the 20th century. As a technique for the seizure of power and the maintenance of control in backward areas of the world, it knows no rival. It is also unsurpassed in its proven ability to foster social mobilization and political institutionalization simultaneously, thereby escaping the kind of premature decay of power experienced by other revolutionary regimes.[10] All told, it has proved remarkably successful in carrying through its own highly distinctive strategy of "politically forced development."[11] But can this very same Leninism also adjust to the unintended consequences of what it has wrought? Can it cope effectively with the fundamental political challenges posed by novel developments that fall beyond the conceptual grasp of its parochial *Weltanschauung?* The odds against the requisite transmogrification of Leninist theory and practice appear well-nigh overwhelming.

Consider, in the first instance, Leninism's elitist conception of "democratic centralism" and the politics of administrative command to which it has given rise. The latter has spawned the *nomenklatura,* a monstrous labyrinth of preferment, patronage, and privilege. Its beneficiaries, now numbering close to several million persons, constitute something of a class unto themselves that manifests a highly developed sense of vested interest in self-preservation.[12] It is one thing for Gorbachëv to replace top-ranking Brezhnev-era gerontocrats, or to remove incompetent individuals along the line; it would be an entirely different matter for any Soviet leader to excise the entire bureaucratic excrescence. After all, the *nomenklatura* is a key factor contributing to the regime's stability, even though it is also a major component of systemic stasis.

Reforms that may eventually lead to a relaxation of controls in order to introduce some measure of genuine popular participation—to say nothing of any broadly gauged marketization of the Soviet economy—pose a somewhat different, though related problem. As Linden reminds us, Leninism provides no "practical wisdom" about how to delimit, devolve, or distribute power. Indeed, all of its ingrained, antidemocratic reflexes, rooted in Lenin's profound distrust of the masses and reinforced by the Soviet party-state's jealous monopolization of the many perquisites of power, militate against the very possibility of such change. As if that were not enough, there remains the factor of the cultural milieu of Leninism. Contrary to Besançon's opinion, the psychology of Leninism is deeply embedded in the millennial Russian historical experience and unfailingly conjures up the specter of anarchy at the mere suggestion of any dimunition of centralized authority.

Last but by no means least, there is the matter of the "scientific-technological revolution." It is difficult to agree with Hoffmann and Laird that the Soviet system is successfully mastering its imperatives. To be sure, the Soviet leaders would like to borrow selectively from advanced technology for their own special purposes, namely, finding better methods of planning, administration, and political control. In other words, the Kremlin would like nothing more than to modernize Leninism. But its aspirations in this regard seem doomed to disappointment. Despite the Orwellian nightmare of a technologized totalitarianism, the "third industrial revolution" may actually enhance the realm of freedom. Whichever way this may turn out, advanced technology, particularly the computer revolution and the concomitant information explosion, threatens to burst the constraints of Leninism. The Soviet leaders appear only too cognizant of this fact; the resultant quandary constitutes a significant factor contributing to the Soviet Union's growing technological lag vis-à-vis the West.

In the final analysis, the relationship between Leninism and legitimacy is what lies at the very heart of the dilemma of change in the Soviet Union. On the one hand, the changes that seem essential for the survival of the Soviet system in the long run remain improbable if crucial Leninist tenets are not abandoned. On the other hand, the discarding of the doctrinal foundations of Leninism would obviously undermine the Soviet party-state's claim to legitimacy. Either way, the last stage of Leninism appears to be at hand. Its historical role on the Soviet scene all but played out, Leninism may well be no longer around in the 21st century in any presently recognizable guise. Considering the human toll that has been exacted in its name during the course of the present century, Leninism's impending demise, whenever it occurs, should occasion no lament.

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* Warning against wishful thinking in the West concerning Gorbachëv, the astute columnist, George F. Will, recently remarked that "any Soviet leader has been thoroughly marinated in the ideology that legitimates him." "Abolishing the 20th Century," *Newsweek* (New York), Dec. 9, 1985, p. 104.

[10] A seminal analysis of these issues was first offered by Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics* (Princeton, NJ), April, 1965, pp. 386–430.

[11] See Richard Lowenthal, "Development vs. Utopia in Communist Policy," in Chalmers Johnson, Ed., *Change in Communist Systems,* Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1970.

[12] For an ex-insider's firsthand experience of the *nomenklatura* system, see Mikhail Voslensky, *Nomenklatura: Gospodstvyyushchiy klass Sovetskogo Soyuza,* London, Overseas Publications, 1984. The recent translation into English of Voslensky's informative and insightful book, published by Doubleday as *Nomenklatura: The Soviet Ruling Class,* is from the German edition and contains numerous misrenderings of Soviet political terminology. See the discussion of Voslensky's book by Peter Reddaway, "More Equal Than Others," *The New Republic,* Dec. 2, 1985, pp. 28–31.

Limits of Critical Marxism

Vladimir Tismaneanu

FERENC FEHÉR, AGNES HELLER, and GYÖRGY MÁRKUS. *Dictatorship over Needs.* New York, St. Martin's Press, 1983.

FERENC FEHÉR and AGNES HELLER. *Hungary 1956 Revisited. The Message of a Revolution—A Quarter of a Century After.* London, George Allen & Unwin, 1983.

GEORGE KONRÁD. *Antipolitics.* San Diego, New York, London, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1984.

OSKAR GRUENWALD. *The Yugoslav Search for Man: Marxist Humanism in Contemporary Yugoslavia.* South Hadley, MA, Bergin & Garvey, 1983.

"MARXISM has been the greatest fantasy of our century."[1] Thus Leszek Kolakowski characterized the mythical ambivalence of historical materialism, its intrinsic utopian dimension and longing for a new foundation of reality. Unlike other theologies, Marxism was able to deter for many decades the emergence of a sense of critical questioning, and to nourish passionate, even fanatical, emotional attachments on the part of normally skeptical Western intellectuals. From Georg Lukács to Lucien Goldmann, from Max Horkheimer to Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, historical materialism functioned as a metaphysical source, a shield against the liberal temptation and an invitation to that mystical drama that Hegelians called "the advent of the realm of freedom." The promise of total subjective emancipation—the generous Messianic dream, rooted in German idealism and French Jacobinism—represented the precondition for the conversion of Marxism into an intolerant pedagogy, a dogmatic attempt to transcend the limits of the human condition and to challenge the ethical prescriptions that had guaranteed the continuity of European intellectual and political history.

Although Marxism has never been a monolithic entity, exponents of its diverse "orthodox" and "heretic" directions have all shared a certain rebellious instinct, an unacknowledged irrational vocation. In this sense at least, Leninism was a legitimate offspring of the original doctrine, and Antonio Gramsci was perfectly right in attributing to Lenin St. Paul's role in the expansion and institutionalization of an otherwise esoteric creed. Lenin and Trotsky were the initiators of a new practice of philosophy, and their commitment to the use of terror against the "enemies of the Revolution" was a prelude to Stalin's ultimate bastardization of historical materialism. In the words of Milovan Djilas:

> *the dominant streak in Lenin's character and political practice was a ruthless will to coerce, dictate, and subjugate. Stalin's terror and Stalin's tyranny are unmistakably foreshadowed by Leninism.*[2]

Contemporary Marxism presents a bewildering proliferation of neo-Marxist, "critical," or even "post-critical" schools, many of them unequivocally opposed to authoritarian regimes of the Soviet type. Praxis—the process by

Vladimir Tismaneanu, who received his Ph.D. from the University of Bucharest, is Hooper Fellow in International Security Affairs at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (Philadelphia). His articles on revolutionary ideologies have appeared in Orbis, Praxis International, Survey, *and* Telos. *He has completed a study on the Latin American radical left and is working on a book on the ideological crisis of Soviet-type regimes.*

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[1] Leszek Kolakowski, "Marxism—A Summing Up," *Survey* (London), Summer 1977-78, p. 165; and Sidney Hook, *Marxism and Beyond*, Totowa, NJ, Rowman and Littlefield, 1983, pp. 54-72 (an excellent assessment of Kolakowski's contribution to the demystification of Marxism).

[2] George Urban, "A Conversation with Milovan Djilas," *Encounter* (London), December 1979, p. 11.

which, according to Hegelian-Marxist dialectics, the subject and object of history are supposed to become one—has regained its abstract and speculative content. This is particularly true of the East European critical philosophy of resistance, an intellectual current that emerged as "humanist revisionism" in the wake of Nikita Khrushchev's secret de-Stalinization speech at the 20th Congress of the CPSU.[3] Georg Lukács and Ernst Bloch were the towering figures who inspired the theoretical awakening of East-Central Europe's critical Marxist intelligentsia. For a generation of disenchanted social philosophers, there were new illusions, new metaphysical dreams, brought into being during the painstaking operation of restoring intellectual sovereignty. The early Marx was invoked as an ally against the positivist doctrinaire late Marx; the young Lukács, with his eschatological pathos, was rehabilitated, together with other exponents of the critical tradition (e.g., Karl Korsch, Henri Lefebvre, Walter Benjamin, and Theodor Adorno).

IN THIS SETTING, the Budapest School audaciously defied the hypocrisy of Hungary party chief János Kádár's "repressive tolerance" and inaugurated a far-reaching démarche whose basic aim has been to demythologize the ideology of "really existing socialism" and to dispel illusions about its nature. In *Dictatorship over Needs,* leading members of the Budapest School—Ferenc Fehér, Agnes Heller, and György Márkus—bear witness to the possibility of developing an uninhibited outlook capable of breaking through the veil of Marxist "false consciousness." Nevertheless, these onetime "pupils" of Lukács continue to insist on the relevance of the Marxian paradigm for the comprehension of authoritarian-bureaucratic systems. They persevere in investing their emotional capital in the humanist potential of the Marxist dialectic, although they are perfectly well aware that Stalinist and neo-Stalinist appropriation of historical materialism cannot but frustrate and severely compromise their own endeavor. The political-philosophical discourse of their book remains rooted in a certain type of "existential" Marxism. In other words, the authors base themselves on a Fichtean revolt against "reality" and claim, in good Hegelian tradition, that they would attain some "truer" reality beyond the present, spurious one.

The members of the Budapest School reject any pose of neutrality and raise their voices on behalf of the beleaguered "unhappy consciousness." Early Marxian categories, such as subjectivity and alienation, are central to their political-philosophical discourse. Abiding by a Blochian rather than a Lukácsian tradition, this school rebukes what Hegel called "reconciliation with reality" (*Versöhnung mit der Wirklichkeit*) and is deeply suspicious of the propensity of the radical-utopian Left in the West to dismiss the long-term implications that the failure of Marxism in Eastern Europe has for the nature of revolutionary thought itself.

The authors seem caught between their awareness of the ethical impasse inherent in Marxism and an unwillingness (or powerlessness) to go beyond Marxism itself. They continue to practice a sui generis variety of Marxism, something that one could call "anti-totalitarian Marxism," but which is nonetheless anchored in the same intellectual matrix they wish to overcome. They prove incapable of scrutinizing the immanent pathology of historical materialism, of questioning its humanist pretentions, of introducing the criterion of praxis into their assessment of its contemporary hypostases. Yet, genuine post-Marxist critical philosophy—of which the Budapest School is in some sense a harbinger—must elaborate theses directly refuting the frozen axioms of historical materialism. In an ironic twist, these disciples of Max Weber's once most promising disciple—Lukács—need to rediscover the tension between reason and unreason and embark on a thoroughgoing critique of political *ratio* itself.

NO MORALISTIC indictment of Soviet-type regimes will succeed in undermining the pyramid of privilege erected in the name of Marxism-Leninism. Although an ethical-axiological scrutiny is certainly an indispensable component of any critique, the latter must be expanded to a general sociological interpretation of the subjective and objective background of collectivist-authoritarian regimes. One cannot sublimely ignore or discard Hannah Arendt's and Raymond Aron's penetrating dissections of totalitarian Leviathans.

The Budapest School views "dictatorship over needs" as a consistent Stalinist sociopolitical system that is central to Eastern Europe's Soviet-type regimes. It begins with the assumption "that the subjection of the 'rebellious' and 'individualistic' private person to a 'superior wisdom' has to be started at the level of his need system" (p. 227-28). "Dictatorship over needs" is thus a key concept that grasps the inner logic of the East-Central European regimes—

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[3] Vladimir Tismaneanu, "Critical Marxism and Eastern Europe," *Praxis International* (Oxford), October 1983, pp. 248-61.

the persistence of latent Stalinism in them. It suggests the process of dissolution of the autonomous subject within the overwhelming framework of totalitarian controls. Furthermore, this concept indicates the disastrous politicization of the psyche, the cynical manipulation of the subjective field, the attempt to do away with the sphere of privacy as an ultimate sanctuary of the ego.

Despite certain "liberalizing" measures, the totalitarian order remains basically unchanged, characterized by oppression *in actu* and *in potentia*, exercised in varying degrees according to the prevailing interests of the bureaucratic elite. On this issue, there is no significant difference between the Hungarian philosophers, who state that "East Europeans still live under Stalin's shadow" (p. xi), and Kolakowski, for whom

> *the so-called de-Stalinization, forced upon Communist states by various economic and political necessities, has not suspended the totalitarian principle. In Communist countries at the moment we are not dealing with "liberalized" or "democratized" variants of communism but essentially with an ailing Stalinism.*[4]

In evaluating Eastern Europe's Soviet-type regimes, the Hungarians see no principle of moderation, no democratic rationality, underlying the functioning of the social organization. On the contrary, the recourse to violence is always possible, should the *nomenklatura* (the self-perpetuating political elite) feel its hegemony jeopardized. One is tempted to make use here of the concept of "structural violence," the basic political strategy developed by a frightened "elite" whose incorrigible debility originates in the never-solved complex of legitimacy issues. For communist bureaucracies there is no basis of legitimacy other than sheer power, no authentic meritocratic competition, no reasonable hierarchy of values. This is particularly conspicuous in the case of self-contained hyper-personalized—one might say "pharaonic"—regimes, such as the late Enver Hoxha's in Albania, Kim Il-song's in North Korea, and Nicolae Ceauşescu's in Romania.

Yet the communist regimes are not actually as "solid" and immobile as they appear to be. The example of the Hungarian authors reviewed here refutes the image of these regimes' total manipulation of and control over their societies. Kádár's ideological watchdogs had to put up with these intellectual troublemakers for many years before hitting upon the optimal bureaucratic solution of banishment. (The emergence of Solidarity in Poland is, of course, another powerful argument against those who grant these systems an aura of immunity and infallibility.)

There is a negative principle working at the core of these regimes, despite the apparently smooth functioning of their repressive institutions. The logic of domination cannot ultimately prevail over the counter-logic of emancipation. The problem is whether a culture of resistance should include Marxism among its main components or should jettison it as a key feature of the execrated autocracy that is being resisted. To be sure, Marxism, as a Weltanschauung, cannot be reduced to the verbal ritual practiced by the servants of the "dictatorship over needs." But this political metaphysics cannot escape responsibility for the ruin of so many altruistic promises and the triumph of the worst species of tyrants in this century.

To go beyond myth and utopia, it is essential to discard the obsolete tenets and archaic symbols of Marxism, to transcend the "previous philosophical consciousness." Yet, the Budapest School is loath to commit intellectual parricide and remains sentimentally attached to the cultural-political horizon of historical materialism. These philosophers are obviously oriented toward a desirable, but according to them nonexistent, order of democracy and social justice. (Once again the real alternatives seem subordinated to ultimate metaphysical archetypes.) And if, as they argue, "the world needs more, not less, socialism than it has today" (p. xiii), one should perhaps question Marx's ghost regarding the tragic fate of political idealism and historical romanticism when converted into revolutionary praxis.

Unlike the historical school of Isaac Deutscher, the Hungarian critical Marxists refuse to subscribe to the Stalinist theory of "objective necessity." It is thus all the more urgent that they unify the theory of "dictatorship over needs" with a comprehensive interpretation of Marxism as an instrument of intellectual and political subjugation.

A particularly interesting chapter in *Dictatorship over Needs* focuses on relations between East European societies and the Western Left. The Hungarian authors, despite their disaffection with Soviet-type societies, seem still convinced that a dialogue is possible with certain West European communist parties. It is for these writers a matter of intellectual honor to persuade Western Marxists that "dictatorship over needs" is actually the opposite of any kind of humanist philosophy, including historical materialism. They therefore attempt to offer "an elementary model of the functioning of the Soviet social systems" (p. 40). Those systems, artificial as they were at the outset, invented their own mechanisms of "internalization" and succeeded in becoming a reference point, a "second nature" for various strata of the population. The main achievement of the system would be, eventually, to cauterize any sense of historical transcendence, to preclude the genesis of independent nuclei of thought and action—i.e., to effect a complete intellectual *Gleichschaltung*. Totalitarian systems aim to destroy the notion of individual autonomy. These authors correctly excoriate the immoral escapism of the Western Left in its attempt surreptitiously to dissociate the "innocent" theory from the abominable praxis, and they remind the reader that

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[4] Leszek Kolakowski, "The Euro-Communist Schism," *Encounter*, August 1977, p. 14. See also idem, "A General Theory of Sovietism," *Encounter*, May 1983, as well as his masterful *Main Currents of Marxism, Volume 3: The Breakdown*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978.

> *these societies, however tragic this may be, do belong to the international history of that social and intellectual movement that bears the name of socialism.* (p. 43)

The authors take on the eternal question about the origins and dynamics of social conflicts in Eastern Europe. Students of East European societies will certainly benefit from the stimulating discussion of bureaucratic planning as a social process, as an operation touched off and controlled by the apparatus as a "single corporate entity" (p. 77). In this view, planning is a euphemism employed to conceal the despotic style of these economies, their command character.

The Hungarian philosophers' expectation (inspired by the experience of Solidarity in Poland) of the emergence of "self-created organs of a counter power" (p. 297) seems an abstract and overly optimistic appraisal of the window of tolerance currently granted by the system. Is this anything more than another utopian blueprint, rooted in sublimated despair and embarrassed feelings of defeat? As the authors themselves have to admit, such pluralistic forms of self-organization of various social groups can exist and survive only through violence, and, unfortunately, spontaneous oppositional violence in a police state is more often than not doomed to failure. Totalitarianism is totalitarianism precisely because it succeeds in combatting and eradicating areas of spontaneity and informal centers of communication. The matter is then how to outmaneuver bureaucratic manipulation and reinvent politics beyond the frontiers dictated by the system.

"Dictatorship over needs" represents a modernized version of Stalinist totalitarianism. Yet, although overt terrorism was replaced after Stalin's death with a more "moderate" dictatorial formula, the system has undergone no fundamental transformations that would warrant a different assessment of its "essence." Stalin's successors generally get by without using his atrocious methods, but they have preserved intact the entire infrastructure, perpetuating the risk or even the likelihood of a tragic return to terrorism. One shares the pessimistic conclusions of Albert Camus, for whom the pestilent rats, despite a temporary retreat, never totally surrender.[5]

A principal function of communist bureaucracy is to exert dictatorship over ideas as well as over needs, to inculcate in its subjects its own image of the future, and to tame any form of resistance. The bureaucratic ethos involves a redoubtable esprit de corps, a solidarity developed through continued paternalistic behavior and jealously guarded monopoly of power.[6]

The dissolution of the civil society and the maintenance of an atomized political space, the sine qua non of the "dictatorship over needs," have provoked widespread moral paralysis and intellectual corruption in Soviet-type regimes. Mistrusted and despised even by many of its own promoters, Marxism-Leninism remains a guarantor, a means of ideological self-reproduction of the system. What is involved is a deliberate fabrication of self-images, ritualistically inculcated in the population. The ideologues fail to persuade the "propagandized" subjects but at least partially succumb to the fallacies they have themselves concocted. This is a strange interplay of illusion, cynicism, and self-deception, in which it is almost impossible to discern who really believes in and who only pretends to share the values of the system. Duplicity is the rule of the game.

The supreme irony is that the "ideologues" still hope to revive the mesmerizing function of the original doctrine and to that purpose obsessively reiterate the same hollow platitudes. A theory that was once able to inspire collective dreams and exalted sacrifices is reduced to a senile, unexciting, unappealing, and infinitely redundant succession of outworn stereotypes, a debased materialism altogether devoid of metaphysical sensitivity and humanist authenticity.

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[5] Rats being the metaphor for totalitarianism in Camus's novel *The Plague*.

[6] See Ferenc Fehér, "Paternalism as a Mode of Legitimation in Soviet-type Societies," in T. H. Rigby and Ferenc Fehér, Eds., *Political Legitimation in Communist States*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1982, pp. 64–81.

The "magic" principle of *partiynost'* (party-mindedness, or partisanship) replaces the obligation to search for truth, which, according to one of the few Gramscian theses actually accepted and quoted by Marxist-Leninist missionaries, is supposed to be "revolutionary." The Budapest philosophers describe this enthrallment:

> *The ways of the Party are enigmatic, indeed it is Kierkegaard's God that is embodied in it; no one can ever be in the right against it.* (p. 191)

These authors expose the hidden rationale for the soporific, wooden jargon of official sermons and simulated faith: the exercise of domination by the bureaucrats. This topic merits further elaboration, since the language of Bolshevism has been the movement's most "effective" contribution to the desecration of humanist culture in the 20th century, and the source of its victory over competing totalitarian doctrines. This smothering rhetoric has imbued millions of books, booklets, and journals, and even a new species of human being, allergic to any sign of linguistic, let alone intellectual, spontaneity. The effects of this "semantic purge" were impressively described by Ludvik Vaculik:

> *The languages people speak today are seen as embodying the evolution of human knowledge. . . . The men I talk to, by contrast, act and speak as if they had been excluded from this evolution, as if nothing had existed before them, as if we had been waiting for them to come to offer us everything that exists, and above all to keep it under surveillance. Modern physics talks of "antimatter"; here is "antithought."*[7]

Turned into a state religion, Marxism-Leninism became, as Cornelius Castoriadis and Claude Lefort demonstrated, the perfect language of domination.[8]

The Hungarian philosophers illumine the resulting moral dereliction. In the building of the "new human being," the ethics of responsibility—the basis of Western moral philosophy—was abrogated and replaced by a new moral code, the ethics of heteronomy. The individual was absolved of personal implication in his deeds, and the party became the absolute arbiter of good and truth. George Konrád perceptively expressed the result in his historical-metaphysical novel *The Loser:*

> *It still didn't occur to me that my jokes could cost me my life. Communism for me was a metaphysical future, a second creation, the work of man replacing God, the axis of all known human values—the thing we would accomplish together, correcting our errors as we went along, an open alternative to familiar oppression. I felt that if this experiment turned out to be a mistake, the human race would have lost its reason for being. What's more, the world of Communism for me was not merely living proof of its dialectics, but the pledge of my own survival, a unified force battling fascism which must, lest it be crushed, suspend its inherent benevolence from time to time, and, adhering to the rules of war, become as ruthless as its foes.*

In the process the individual found himself victimized in the name of his ultimate freedom:

> *For the spectators the blood was tomato juice; for us the blood was our own.*[9]

The tormenting question for the Budapest School—an issue that Kolakowski and Castoriadis unambiguously and trenchantly solved—is the relevance of the Marxian message for contemporary subjectivity, particularly in this age of "postmodernity," to use Alain Touraine's apt concept. They seem unable to confront the entire Jacobin tradition, including the mystique of the Enlightenment, that inspired the vicious experiment of "dictatorship over needs" that they so keenly criticize. These writers are further confronted with the contemporary obsolescence of the Left-Right paradigm and the obligation to reconsider fundamental topics in the light of the real and decisive conflict between democratic and totalitarian principles.

For those who have long been subjected to the "virtuous" pedagogy of socialism, a scholastic definition of the real substance of those regimes is actually irrelevant, particularly if the commentators retain their problematic commitment to radical socialism. As a basis for a critique of the "dictatorship over needs," some reference to existing, if imperfect, social-democratic experiments would be more effective than indulgence in hazy dialectical constructs and skeptical historical relativism.

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[7] Ludvik Vaculik, "Thus Spake Schweik," *The New York Review of Books*, July 21, 1983.

[8] Cornelius Castoriadis, "The Hungarian Source," *Telos* (St. Louis, MO), No. 29, 1979, pp. 4-6; Claude Lefort, *Éléments d'une critique de la bureaucratie* (Elements for a Critique of Bureaucracy), Paris, Gallimard, 1979.

[9] George Konrád, *The Loser*, New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1982, pp. 136, 206.

Even the Budapest philosophers discussed here seem to sense the inanity of their plaintive and solitary *cri de coeur*. One is reminded of Bloch's pathetic, and hardly consoling, words: "We have no confidence, we have only hope."[10]

IT IS NATURAL that these philosophers are preoccupied with the Hungarian revolution of 1956 and seek to retrieve the spirit of that magnificent experience and to find in it political symbols that can nourish contemporary anti-totalitarian praxis. Hence Fehér and Heller's book *Hungary 1956 Revisited*, dedicated to the memory of the victims. This work is an invaluable introduction to one of the few world-historical events to occur in East-Central Europe in the aftermath of World War II and the Soviet occupation of that area. The Hungarian revolution marked the first time that Stalinist autocracy was challenged uncompromisingly, not only at the level of foreign policy, but at the fundamental one: the political organization of society. It engendered a new substantive principle, a new order of rationality that was the opposite of the mummified Stalinist technology of power—namely, the emergence of the individual as the center of political discourse.

One of the most interesting chapters in this book consists of a rehabilitation of Imre Nagy, not only with regard to the scurrilous slanders proffered by the scribblers of the Kádár regime, but also with respect to those who, like Castoriadis, ignore the simple but fundamental fact that Nagy inaugurated a new type of radical practice. As Fehér and Heller so tellingly put it, Nagy "was one of the most remarkable specimens of a novel type in political activity: the post-Machiavellian politician." (p. 126)

This phenomenon is all the more remarkable because of the inexorable tendency of Stalinist parties to beget whole cohorts of super-Machiavellians, from the Bolshevik Politburo to the inflexible champions of the Comintern (Georgi Dimitrov, Josip Broz Tito, Palmiro Togliatti, to name but a few).

Although I totally agree with Fehér and Heller that Nagy incarnated "the type of personality the *anti-authoritarian revolution needed and will always need*" (p. 128, emphasis in original), I still wonder how such a non-Stalinist activist (and he was a true militant) could have put up for more than 30 years with the Bolshevik "Inquisition." Was he aware, during the Moscow show-trials of that tortuous psychological mechanism Gramsci so aptly called "the hypocrisy of self-criticism"? During his Moscow exile, did he experience—like Lukács—the pseudo-moral obligation to endorse, even if only by silence, the infamous sentences against the Old Bolsheviks?

No one can question the sincerity of Nagy's commitment to the cause of the 1956 revolution, but it is still debatable whether he actually anticipated many of the crucial consequences of his historical decision to join the masses instead of massacring them. It is certainly true, for example—as Fehér and Heller argue—that Nagy and the revolution he served personified certain libertarian values that were to be "adopted," or rather *usurped*, by the "Eurocommunist" parties. But he was by all means more than a "Eurocommunist" *avant la lettre*, more than an astute *Realpolitiker*, at least during the last days of the revolution and later on, during his deportation to Romania and the ignominious trial staged by Kádár and the Soviet KGB General Ivan Serov.

Nagy's last words suggest more than nausea and contempt for his former comrades, and the Hungarian writers are not mistaken in their conviction that these words uttered in intimate closeness to a posterity already awaiting him, expressed more than a communist *querelle de famille*:

> *"In this trial, in this tissue of hate and lies, I have to sacrifice my life for my ideas. I willingly sacrifice it. After what you have done to these ideas, my life has no value any longer. I am certain that history will condemn my murderers. One thing alone would repulse me: to be rehabilitated by those who will murder me."* (p. 136)

Fehér and Heller are doubtless familiar with Jorge Semprun's writings about the Spanish communist movement and Santiago Carrillo's dubious career in it,[11] and it is therefore surprising that they would tend to associate Nagy's figure with a movement personified by the Spanish "Eurocommunist" professional manipulator. If it is true, as they claim, that Nagy rejected Khrushchevism as "a paternalistic consolidation of Stalin's decaying work" (p. 118), then he would certainly have resented the chameleonic posturing of such "Eurocommunist" luminaries as Carrillo, Jean Kanapa, or Giancarlo Pajetta. To accept the authors' portrayal of Nagy as "the first Eurocommunist" (ibid.) would diminish his historical stature and trivialize the meaning of his final divorce from the *whole* legacy of Leninism.

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[10] See Jürgen Rühle, "The Philosopher of Hope: Ernst Bloch," in Leopold Labedz, Ed., *Revisionism: Essays on the History of Marxist Ideas*, New York, Praeger, 1962; and Ernst Bloch, *Héritage de ce temps* (Heritage of Our Time), Paris, Payot, 1978.

As for the Hungarian break with Marxism, György Márkus wrote in a letter to this reviewer: "While I actually doubt the survival of a 'critical' Marxism as part of the counterculture in Eastern European circumstances (at least in the more quasi-liberal environments and for the time being—and essentially not for intellectual reasons), I further think that—despite its most real crisis—this heritage represents in its totality the intellectually deepest and most synthetic attempt to deal with the crisis-phenomena of modernity and as such both the theory and its crisis will stay with us for a long time." Personal correspondence by Márkus from The University of Sydney, Australia, March 29, 1983. See also Agnes Heller and Ferenc Fehér, *Marxisme et démocratie. Au-delà du socialisme réel* (Marxism and Democracy: Beyond Really Existing Socialism), Paris, Maspero, 1981.

[11] *Jorge Semprun, The Autobiography of Federico Sanchez and the Communist Underground in Spain*, trans. by Helen Lane, New York, Karz Publishers, 1979. For Semprun's more recent views concerning the destiny of Marxism, see his introduction to Leszek Kolakowski, *L'esprit révolutionnaire* (The Revolutionary Mind), Paris, Denoël, 1985.

Nevertheless, benefiting from their friendship with Lukács and the opportunity to read some of the unpublished memoirs of Hungarian communist leaders, Fehér and Heller accomplish a praiseworthy task of historical and political restitution. In the process, they demolish the fellow-traveler-style literature concerning Kádár's "liberal" despotism, and put forward a new reading of Eastern Europe's communist drama in this century, with all its internecine struggles, Freudian complexes, and Macbethian plots. Witness the assassination in Kádár's jail of Geza Losonczy, whose daughter, according to George Konrád, is still imploring her father's murderers to tell her where his grave is.[12] Losonczy, that irresistible intellectual who had been a hero of the anti-fascist underground and then, together with Kádár, a victim of Rakosist terror,[13] was Imre Nagy's most enthusiastic supporter. During his last year, he fell victim to paranoia and confessed to numerous imaginary crimes:

> *"I confess to being a spy on the payroll of Josip Broz Tito and Eisenhower; I admit that I incited a fascist counter-revolution against my nation and against the army of the glorious Soviet Union, the fatherland of all workers."* (p. 165)

Losonczy, Nagy, Miklos Gimes, Istvan Bibo, Lukács, Tamas Aczel, Tibor Déry, Gyula Hay, Pal Maléter—these people and their comrades epitomized the regained honor of Hungarian culture, its irrepressible vitality. Of more global significance, they strove to establish a new body politic inspired by those values and principles to which Hannah Arendt alluded in her brilliant essay "The Revolutionary Tradition and Its Lost Treasure."[14] The logic of heresy culminated in liberating apostasy. The dialectical celebration of wickedness, the unrestrained cult of sacrifice, and the self-flagellation of the intellect through the identification of truth with party, all those stifling rationalizations were finally exposed by these individuals. They succeeded thereby in breaking through the enthralling force of *History and Class Consciousness*, as young Lukacs had entitled his noted contribution on the "inevitable" victory of universal categories over frail particularity.[15]

DISSIDENT East-Central European intellectuals, with their outspoken discourse and refusal to acquiesce in the pragmatic imperatives of superpower politics, perceive Yalta as the starting point of a calamitous evolution, of a pattern of cynical treatment of nations and countries, and as the climax of short-sighted *Realpolitik* guided by ill-conceived Machiavellian assumptions. George Konrád's *Antipolitics* voices the growing malaise of those immediately subject to the long-term effects of the "Yalta logic," a revolt against the iniquitous international order imposed, in his view, by a collusion of contemporary empires.

It is one of the characteristics of Eastern Europe's post-World War II culture that literature and political sociology are inextricably linked, with literature being the main vehicle for conveying actual or potential dissenting views. As in prerevolutionary Russia, so in Soviet-type regimes in Eastern Europe, literature is charged with a subversive content, with that dimension of dissaffection with reality that is not permitted expression in political-philosophical works. This is, of course, true only for certain areas of the literary field, where censorship has somewhat subsided; it does not apply to pseudo-artistic celebrations of the communist status quo. This commitment of literature to fundamental human values was best expressed by Jaroslav Seifert, the Czech Nobel Prize-winning poet, when he declared in 1956:

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[12] Reconfirmed in a conversation with George Konrád in New York on January 19, 1986.

[13] On Geza Losonczy's biography, see *The Truth about the Nagy Affair: Facts, Documents, Comments* (with a Preface by Albert Camus), London, Secker & Warburg and New York, Praeger, published for the Congress for Cultural Freedom, 1959, pp. 122-23.

[14] In Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution*, New York, Viking, 1963.

For the historical-political background of the Hungarian revolution, see the indispensable study by Ferenc A. Vali, *Rift and Revolt in Hungary*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1961, as well as the important volume edited by Tamas Aczel, *Ten Years After: The Hungarian Revolution in the Perspective of History*, New York, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1966, esp. the essays by Raymond Aron and Michael Polanyi.

[15] Franz Borkenau insisted on Lukács's role in the crystallization of the "secret doctrine of wickedness" as an esoteric counterpart to the official theory which postulated identity between truth and the class consciousness of the proletariat. See Franz Borkenau, *World Communism: A History of the Communist International*, Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 1971, pp. 172-73. On the same issue, see the superb chapter "The Revolutionary Commitment," in Melvin J. Lasky, *Utopia and Revolution*, Chicago, London, The University of Chicago Press, 1976.

An important recent addition to the Lukács controversy is Hungarian philosopher and human rights activist Gaspar Miklos Tamas's "Lukács's Ontology: A Metacritical Letter," in Agnes Heller, Ed., *Lukács Reappraised*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1983, pp. 154-77. Tamas provides significant criticism of the Budapest School's tendency to idealize both Lukács's personality and his ethical stances.

For the impact of the young Lukács on contemporary critical Marxism, see the comprehensive study by Andrew Arato and Paul Breines, *The Young Lukács and the Origins of Western Marxism*, New York, The Seabury Press, 1979.

> *If an ordinary person is silent about the truth, it may be a tactical maneuver. If a writer is silent, he is lying.*[16]

In the 1970's, Konrád coauthored (with Ivan Szelenyi) a highly polemical interpretation of the status of the intelligentsia in the societies of "really existing socialism."[17] In certain points, that study anticipated many of the audacious hypotheses more recently advanced by the Hungarian author in his unorthodox introduction to *Antipolitics*, including the "emancipatory" mission assigned to a transnational intellectual elite. For Konrad, it is the calling of the *freischwebende Intelligenz*, as Karl Mannheim designated the free-floating stratum of uncommitted intellectuals,[18] to suggest the guidelines for an alternative to the present political boundaries in Europe.

Unlike the East German Rudolf Bahro, Konrád nourishes no illusions with respect to the nature of the system functioning in East-Central Europe. Far from considering it the result of a "revolution betrayed," he, like the Budapest School, seems to view the prevailing system as an autonomous social formation, intrinsically hostile to a free development of the human personality. Yet he suggests that "the nations of Eastern Europe have chosen a road that leads toward gradual and peaceful recovery of independence" (p. 26). Although Konrád concedes that "what *Realpolitik* seems to be telling us, from both East and West, is that we can loosen our bonds only to the extent that the Soviet Union can accept some gentle relaxation without suffering injury to its prestige" (p. 27), his hypothesis of marginal autonomy contains a good deal of wishful thinking. He overlooks possible Soviet reactions to any of the practical initiatives he is calling for, particularly the suggestion of a neutral Eastern Europe, which runs diametrically counter to Leninist-Stalinist expansionist logic. It is, of course, little wonder that utopian proposals appeal to East European intellectuals, who desire to escape the tragic quandary of having to choose between the Scylla of resigned compliance with the Prince—i.e., more or less honorable capitulation—and the Charybdis of quixotic rebellion.

However noble Konrád's aspiration for the creation of an autonomous and neutral Europe, his proposal smacks of the suicidal self-delusive conciliatory tendencies found in the West, that state of voluntary blindness Norman Podhoretz described as "the spirit of appeasement."[19] Like the pacifists and isolationists in the West, Konrád seeks to escape from neo-cold war rhetoric and find new paths toward dialogue and mutual comprehension. Specifically, he calls for the abrogation of the Yalta agreements and the withdrawal of all foreign military force, Soviet and American, from Europe. "The key to peace," he argues, "is not disarmament but the mutual withdrawal of military forces" (p. 30). However, it is highly doubtful that any such Soviet "withdrawal," unlikely in any event, would automatically result in the kind of East-Central European neutrality that the Hungarian writer is aiming at. On the contrary, the most probable consequence of such an occurrence would be a mood of perpetual anxiety on the part of the Soviet leaders, manifested in strengthened censorship and ruthless suppression of dissent. There are no Soviet military forces in Romania or Yugoslavia, but the "dictatorship over needs" keeps going there. As Irving Kristol correctly emphasized,

> *It is a fact, not to be forgotten, that the Soviet Union has never reconciled itself to the dissolution of a Communist regime, anywhere, anytime.*[20]

I would further argue with Konrád's self-styled East European Gaullism, evident in the suggestion that Europe become "an independent agent in the debate between America and the Soviet Union" (p. 33). Europe cannot be a neutral partner to superpower dialogue; Western Europe, in particular, remains a natural ally of the United States in the struggle for the preservation of those very values that are imperiled by Soviet expansionism.

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[16] See Michael Kaufman, "Czech Government Eulogizes Maverick Poet," *The New York Times*, Jan. 22, 1986.

[17] George Konrád and Ivan Szelenyi, *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1979.

[18] Mannheim elaborated the theory of the epistemological privilege of the intelligentsia in his book *Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge*, New York, Harcourt, 1947.

[19] See Norman Podhoretz, "Appeasement by Any Other Name," *Commentary* (New York), July 1983; also Walter Laqueur, "The Psychology of Appeasement," ibid., October 1978.

[20] Irving Kristol, "Let Europe Be Europe," *The New York Times Book Review*, June 10, 1984, p. 15. The same point was poignantly made by Cornelius Castoriadis in "Defending the West," *Partisan Review* (Boston), No. 3, 1984, pp. 375-79.

Getting rid of Yalta amounts to eliminating the causes of the cold war, and Konrád cannot be so gullible as to think, together with the American revisionist school, that the United States "provoked" the "peace-loving" Soviets into this confrontation. American forces in Western Europe maintain a status quo directly and consistently menaced by the Soviet Union, and it is naïve to expect Soviet leaders to permit a peaceful transformation of East-Central Europe into a pluralist, politically neutral region.

Konrád knows too well that communists—committed to the principle of totalitarian conditioning and domination—cannot accept democracy. Even that most intelligent of Western Marxists, Antonio Gramsci, was committed to the same ideal and praxis—the seizure and preservation of power, even if he talked of *hegemony* rather than *monopoly* with regard to political-cultural power. The Soviets are in Eastern Europe not for reasons of security, but primarily because they have to safeguard a myth, to prevent internal anarchy and the final collapse of the system. Prisoners of such insoluble dilemmas, swinging between utopia and despair, East European dissident intellectuals have acquired a sense of surreal political sociology unknown to their peers in the West, if one is to judge from the following quote from Konrád: "Our great dream: what would it be like if the Russian politburo were like the English queen?" (p.75).

Antipolitics is a manifesto for "the serpentine strategy of East European liberation" (p. 123). For Konrád, to foster "antipolitics" is to avoid millenarian temptations, to assuage visceral outbursts, and to encourage "a healthy pagan cynicism toward dedicated fanatics" (p. 172). Antipolitics would eventually amount to rediscovering the heuristic value of memory, enjoying the "dialogic rationality," and turning down the specious determinism of Soviet ideology. According to Konrád, a "second culture" would establish the authority of intellectual creativity over matters of spirit by annulling, through cathartic irony and a new sense of objectivity, the hypnotizing impact of ritualized clichés. In a word, the "power of the spirit" would undermine "the power of the state." For Konrád, antipolitics becomes another way of rejecting the absurdity of contemporary "ideological wars" and asserting the supremacy of permanent transpolitical values.

THE LAST of the volumes reviewed here, Oskar Gruenwald's *The Yugoslav Search for Man*, belongs as well to the philosophical literature of humanist Marxism. It is an honest and well-documented inquiry into the tribulations of Yugoslav "dialectical Marxism," an attempt to dissipate illusions concerning the Titoist social experiment. Together with Aleksa Djilas and Mihajlo Mihajlov, Gruenwald represents a political orientation whose basic objective is to "democratize" the system,[21] to uphold any effort aimed at weakening that system's repressive institutions.

Gruenwald characterizes the regime created by Tito and his party as an "enlightened despotism," whose faked tolerance vanishes as soon as it is confronted with a real political opposition. The imperatives of his struggle for survival with Soviet imperialism forced Tito to permit the emergence in Yugoslavia of avant-garde currents of intellectual resistance doomed to underground existence in other East European states. Yet, he did not welcome the critique of the metaphysical foundations of socialism that this openness engendered.

Such a critique was mounted by the philosophical school that coalesced around the journal *Praxis*. The Gruenwald book offers a fascinating exegesis of this school and suggests the reasons leading to the decision to put a brutal end to humanist Marxist free research in Yugoslavia. The *Praxis* group detected the aberrations of pseudo-socialist ethics, the intrinsic perversions of the system, and responded by founding a Marxist personalism. This philosophy was immediately denounced by ideological orthodoxy (in both Yugoslavia and other communist countries) as an assault against the very essence of "socialist systems."

Yugoslav humanist Marxist philosophers like Mihajlo Markovič, Svetozar Stojanovič, Gajo Petrovič, Rudi Supek, Ljubomir Tadič, and Predrag Vranicki dwelled upon the fundamental ethical issue of Marxist philosophy and praxis, the tension between means and ends, the relationship between revolutionary praxiology and teleology. They were aware that something was rotten in the Leninist-Stalinist, i.e., Bolshevik, approach to this topic, and attempted to develop an all-embracing critique of bureaucratic socialism.

These Yugoslav Marxists, subjected to harassment by the outraged communist apparatus, gradually realized the impossibility of avoiding a political collision with the exponents of the established power. Like the Budapest School, as well as Leszek Kolakowski and

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[21] Pedro Ramet, "Yugoslavia and the Threat of Internal and External Discontents," *Orbis* (Philadelphia), Spring 1984, p. 120; and Pedro Ramet, Ed., *Yugoslavia in the 1980's*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1985. Among the best-known works by Yugoslav humanist Marxists are Svetozar Stojanovič, *Between Ideals and Reality*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1973; and Mihailo Markovič, *From Affluence to Praxis*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1974.

Karel Kosik, the Yugoslav critical Marxists had to give up many radical-humanist illusions with regard to the "reformability" of the system from within. The required commitment to the existing order—by antiphrasis called "socialism"—was replaced by an uninhibited examination of the factors that had brought about the Stalinist concentration-camp universe. After a long and excruciatingly painful journey, these critical Marxists finally succeeded in abandoning the "lyrical illusion," as Malraux once called Marxist moral idealism. They discovered the truth of the observation by Albert Camus that "none of the evils that totalitarianism claims to remedy . . . is worse than totalitarianism itself."[22]

IN ARRIVING at this conclusion, the *Praxis* group took a long step beyond the thrall of utopia and revolution. Yet they suffered from the same failing that plagued the efforts of the Budapest School—the ultimate inability to renounce the central and contaminating commitment to Marxism.

East European critical Marxism, in its most outspoken phase, has debunked the sclerotic logic and apocryphal legitimation of the existing regimes. Its moral-political message, which seems now almost extinguished, functioned until the late 1970's as a ferment of radical opposition to the ruling bureaucracies, contributing to the genesis and development of the dissident counterculture. This process was accompanied, primarily in Poland, Hungary, and Yugoslavia, by a progressive disenchantment with the merely humanist (ethical) critique of the communist regimes. This awareness pointed to the necessity to turn dissidence into opposition and, as a logical inference, to abandon Marxism as an inaccurate and even misleading historical perspective.

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[22] Quoted in Robert Conquest, "The Role of the Intellectual in International Misunderstanding," *Encounter*, August 1978, p. 38.

On the issue of relations between totalitarian power and cultural resistance, see Albert Camus, "Kádár Had His Own Day of Fear," an introduction to Tibor Meray, *Ce-jour là: Budapest (23 octobre 1956)* (That Day: Budapest, October 23, 1956), Paris, Robert Laffont, 1966.

Soviet Designs on Africa

Barry M. Schutz

R. CRAIG NATION and MARK V. KAUPPI, Eds. *The Soviet Impact in Africa.* Lexington, MA, Lexington Press, 1984.

THOMAS H. HENRIKSEN, Ed. *Communist Powers and Sub-Saharan Africa.* Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1981.

PAUL B. HENZE. *Russians and The Horn: Opportunism and the Long View.* Marina del Rey, CA, European American Institute for Security Research, EAI Paper No. 5, 1983.

DAN C. HELDMAN. *The USSR and Africa: Foreign Policy Under Khrushchev.* New York, Praeger Publishers, 1981.

MILENE CHARLES. *The Soviet Union and Africa: The History of the Involvement.* Lanham, MD, University Press of America, 1980.

AT THE START of the last quarter of the 20th century, the Soviet Union jettisoned its policy of limited engagement in sub-Saharan Africa and the Horn and became a more active power in the region. Under the banner of countering imperialism, the Soviet Union intensified its efforts to establish close ties with African governments and radical political movements, undermine Western influence throughout the continent, furnish arms and training to revolutionary movements, and obtain military facilities wherever and whenever possible.

Why did Soviet leaders choose 1975 to intervene in African affairs? In addressing this question in *The Soviet Impact in Africa,* which he coedited with R. Craig Nation, Mark Kauppi identifies several congruent factors that influenced the Soviets' decision. In the region, in 1974-75, there occurred the collapse of the Portuguese empire and the overthrow of Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie by a radical military coup that required external support. On the global level, there was increasing Soviet awareness of a loss of resolve by US leaders after Vietnam and Watergate, as well as the concomitant implementation of Soviet bloc cooperative intervention in the Third World on the Soviets' behalf. This led Soviet leaders to believe that the global correlation of forces had shifted in their favor and that they therefore could project Soviet power well beyond their borders. While the novelty of this development receded somewhat in the time between the publication of Thomas Henriksen's edited collection, *Communist Powers and Sub-Saharan Africa,* in 1981 and the Nation and Kauppi volume in 1984, the Soviet Union maintains an active presence in Ethiopia and Angola, and, to a lessening extent, in Mozambique.

Following the main thrust of the Soviet allied interventions in Africa during 1975-79, the Soviets embarked upon an extended period of consolidation, a process that has produced something of a controversy among Western observers. Some have expressed fears concerning a further expansion of Soviet influence; others have predicted the reversal of Soviet/communist fortunes in the region.[1] Neither view, however, has been supported by events. There have been some Soviet gains, to be sure, but there have been notable setbacks as well. In his essay, "The Soviet Union and Zimbabwe: The Liberation Struggle and After" (in Nation and Kauppi), Keith Somerville cites Soviet miscalculation in backing the losing movement as the reason for the Soviets' failure to add black, revolutionary Zimbabwe to its constellation of states in southern Africa after 1980. And in his "From Intervention to Consolidation: The Soviet Union and Southern Africa," also in Nation and Kauppi, Seth Singleton identifies the Soviets' failure to rebuild and develop Mozambique's war-ravaged economy as a major factor in the Soviets' declining influence in that country, despite the latter's continuing adherence to Marxist-Leninist political principles.

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[1] For a discussion of the debate on recent Soviet fortunes in Africa, see Steven R. David, "Third World Interventions," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), May-June 1984, pp. 65-71.

Barry M. Schutz is Professor of Third World/African Studies at the Defense Intelligence College (Washington, DC) and Adjunct Professor, National Security Studies Program, Georgetown University (Washington, DC). He has written widely on political change in Southern Africa and the Horn.

By contrast, Thomas Henriksen and Richard Bissell's sober assessments of the continuing Soviet presence in Africa, both in Henriksen's volume, point to the emergence of a qualitatively new Soviet threat based on the Soviets' enhanced ability to provide quick and massive military assistance over considerable distance, as well as on the great complementarity in political and military roles of the Soviet Union, Cuba, and the East European states. The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) still runs Angola with Soviet and Cuban arms and personnel, and Mengistu Haile-Mariam still rules Ethiopia—since 1984, with the support of a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party (the Ethiopian Workers' Party). Thus, a curious stasis of Soviet influence and African resistance exists. While the Soviet/Cuban juggernaut of the late 1970's has been halted, the very presence of the two countries remains a dynamic factor in the politics of the region.

WHAT HAS BEEN the genesis of Soviet involvement in Africa, and does it have antecedents in Imperial Russia? Richard Bissell (in Henriksen) and Paul Henze (in *Russians and the Horn*) each elaborate pre-Bolshevik traditions of Russian "designs" on an Ethiopia that, like Russia, had an orthodox Christian state religion and an imperial dynastic rulership. More generally, traditional tsarist interest in Africa, according to both Bissell and Henze, focused on the Russian desire to compete for influence with the established colonial powers (Britain, France, Italy, the Ottomans) and the need to secure certain geopolitical objectives in the region. But the Russians were never able to match the success of the European colonial powers. This exclusion from the European colonial "club" in Africa in late 19th century, notes Bissell, seems to have whetted Soviet interest in Haile Selassie's Ethiopia, even to the extent that from 1953 to 1974 the Soviet Union was willing to provide aid to a feudal regime that was closely linked to the United States.

The persistence of this link, of course, was rooted in more than common tradition between the Soviet Union and Ethiopia. Russian geopolitical alignment with Ethiopia and the African Horn enabled Imperial Russia to gain access to the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, and (later) the Suez Canal via the Mediterranean and Black Seas. Bissell distinguishes this "Russian" perception of the utility of involvement in Africa from the "communist" one which accentuates the spread of Marxist-Leninist ideology rather than the pursuit of geostrategic national interest (though the latter of course remains a Soviet concern). Dan Heldman's analysis of Soviet African policy during the Khrushchev era (1957-64), *The USSR and Africa*, also distinguishes these historical/geopolitical pressures from ideological motives of Soviet policy in Africa. Although Heldman generally concurs with Bissell's interpretation, he offers a more fully developed theoretical perspective of the pragmatic foundations of Soviet foreign policy—examined during Khrushchev's tenure—with emphasis on the legitimizing function of Marxist-Leninist ideology.

Ironically, geostrategic considerations, while generally mentioned only in passing in Soviet writings, are actually easier to grasp than are the more frequent and loudly proclaimed ideological justifications. Indeed, Soviet views toward revolution and the Third World have struggled to keep pace with a rapidly and pervasively changing global environment and a sometimes fluctuating line caused by political leadership changes. Milene Charles, in her *The Soviet Union and Africa: The History of the Involvement*, assiduously follows the circuitous path of CPSU policy toward, and the party's concomitant Africanist research concerning, sub-Saharan Africa since the Bolsheviks came to power. It is essentially a tale of missed opportunity, policy failure, and poor communication. From Lenin's advocacy of support for progressive national democratic (national bourgeois) forces in the colonized territories to Stalin's rigid "we-they" rejection of all but loyal Communists in such territories, Moscow failed to win true converts in Africa. Perhaps most poignant in this regard is Charles's portrait of George Padmore, the West Indian Communist who toiled to extend Moscow's line to the African colonies, only later to reject Moscow for Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah and Pan-Africanism in the 1950's and early 1960's.

Moscow's research on Africa, in the meantime, developed steadily. Soviet Africanist research in the 1920's anticipated the destructive potential of latent anti-colonialism among Third World elites. In the 1930's, D.A. Ol'derogge laid the foundation for the celebrated linguistic capability of Soviet Africanist research by establishing programs in Swahili, Hausa, Amharic, and Zulu. During the 1950's and the early 1960's, I. Potekhin headed research efforts into African ethnography, while in the late 1960's and early 1970's, A. Solodovnikov developed and refined methods for conducting specialized economic analyses. Finally, by the late 1970's, Soviet Africanists even moved into the heretofore forbidden "bourgeois" fields of psychology and sociology.

In spite of this continuous line of research, the Soviets have a poor record on communicating effectively with African regimes receiving their support. Among Moscow's most notable failures were Ghana (1966), Mali (1968), the Sudan (1969), Nigeria (1972), and its recurring unpopularity in Sekou Toure's Guinea (with its most recent departure in 1978). It was not until 1975, when, ironically, Cuba took the initiative in developing the MPLA linkage with Moscow, that this poor performance was finally reversed. The "Cuban connection" not only ensured the Soviets' continuous influence and presence in Angola, it also provided Moscow with the essential surrogate military personnel to stymie the Somali drive into the Horn in 1977.

It was only when policymakers incorporated findings of research with actual political experience, however, that Soviet research on Africa yielded some concrete results. It helped Soviet decisionmakers correct a persistent tendency of the 1950's and 1960's to back the leader or movement with whom they were ideologically most comfortable. This propensity had inclined them to support such lost causes as those led by Patrice Lumumba in the Congo (Zaire) conflict (1961-65) and by Oginga Odinga in Kenya in the late 1960's. Thus, in 1969, having learned the hard way, the Soviets threw military support to the winning Federal forces in Nigeria (against secessionist Biafra) and sided with Siad Barre, who had just come to power via a military coup in Somalia.

But the Soviets were to learn yet another valuable lesson in Zimbabwe in the late 1970's. Moscow's propensity to play zero-sum games with competing movements—smugly adhering to Joshua Nkomo and his Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) at the expense of Robert Mugabe and his Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)—ultimately proved detrimental to Soviet interests there. As a result, Moscow now seems intent on avoiding the same mistake in South Africa by carefully touching all bases, keeping in contact with the weaker Pan-African Congress and the compromising Zulu leader, Gatsha Buthelezi, while directing fundamental support to the more popular, radical, and established African National Congress (ANC). Taking note of this recent Soviet proclivity, Bissell urges readers to understand that "the lessons the Russians have learned in their African experiences to date are likely to condition their intentions in the 1980's" (p. 1).

HOW MIGHT such lessons influence Soviet use of other Bloc states to help achieve specific goals in the region? Is there in fact a confluence of interests among members of the Bloc, or have some actions of certain Bloc members actually worked at crosspurposes with Soviet interests? The East European states' involvement in southern Africa is of course partially political for the Soviet Bloc. But it also holds considerable economic self-interest in the acquisition of many of the same mineral resources that the West requires. For this reason, argues Christopher Coker in his challenging essay "The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: Patterns of Competition and Collaboration in Southern Africa" (in Nation and Kauppi), these states—in particular, Romania, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia—are not likely to support or encourage policies that would cut off the Cape Route for the West, since they too might suffer should such policies backfire. In fact, the Bloc states depend as much as Western states on the shipping route around the Cape for importing their own supplies, most notably to bring Middle East oil to East European ports in Soviet tankers. Of course, such dependency on open sea lanes generates considerable concern among Bloc states over what they perceive as increasing Western entrenchment in southern Africa. Thus, an anti-Soviet (though pro-East European) Zimbabwe, an increasingly Western-leaning Mozambique, and a formidable anticommunist insurgency in Angola tend to heighten Bloc states' fears of restricted access to valuable resources in the region.

Coker also sees the East European states hedging their commitments in Angola and Mozambique, since the successful implementation of Soviet-style five-year plans in the two Lusophone states might actually stabilize their economies and engender steadier and more efficient Western investment. The potential impact of such investment increases in significance with the Bloc's 1984 rejection of Angola's, Mozambique's, and Ethiopia's bid for membership in the Council of Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA),[2] an action that surely casts a pall on long-term prospects for economic cooperation between the CEMA states and the Afro-Marxist regimes. Combined with inefficient Bloc economic management in Africa, exclusion from CEMA weakens "socialist orientation," especially in Angola and Mozambique. The latter's continuing drift to the West since 1982 may be a harbinger of Angola's subsequent fate.

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[2] See Coker, p. 67. Fortunately for these three Afro-Marxist regimes, the European Economic Community and the Lome Conference have accepted them as recipients of developmental assistance.

Much has been written about the critical Cuban role in the Soviet intervention in Africa. The Cuban commitment to buttress the MPLA in Angola in 1975 has perhaps been the most important development in African politics since Ghana's independence in 1957. Cuba's entry into Angola with massive Soviet backing altered some basic conceptions regarding Soviet capability throughout the Third World, let alone that inherent to Africa. Cuba's military commitment, its effective coordination as a vehicle for Soviet African ambitions, and its remarkable ability to sustain its commitments have helped to further polarize politics in southern Africa by intensifying the arms buildup in South Africa and ultimately by driving Washington closer to Pretoria. As George Volsky argues in his perceptive though thinly documented essay, "Cuba" (in Henriksen), Cuba's operations in Africa show how a single leader of a small country working as a surrogate for one of the superpowers can decisively alter trends in the international system.

However, Cuba's entry into Africa has not been an unmixed blessing for the small Caribbean power. While most African states understand and accept Cuba's involvement in Angola, they do not necessarily view Havana's involvement in the Horn in the same light. Cuba's Angolan operation appears somewhat heroic because (a) it is perceived to have preceded and stimulated Soviet assistance; and (b) it was directed against the South African attack on Angola. Cuba's involvement in the Horn, on the other hand, is objectionable in African eyes because it is seen as tactical, that is, as subordinate to Soviet strategic aims in the region; and as inconsistent with Cuba's professed policy of nonalignment, an inconsistency that surfaces primarily in Cuba's abdication of material support for the Eritrean struggle.

But Cuba is not the only communist country whose activities have advanced Soviet interests in Africa. Yugoslavia in particular, notes Henriksen, has abetted the "spread of communism, if not the influence of the Soviet Union" (p. 118). Henriksen makes a good case, but he infers more negative consequences for the West than seems warranted. (Indeed, it can be argued that Yugoslavia's modest support for ZANU in its struggle to achieve power in Zimbabwe has actually provided Robert Mugabe with an anti-Soviet Marxist-Leninist model for development.)

Romania, too, seems to have enhanced Soviet standing in southern Africa. Bucharest's interest in the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA—once aligned with the MPLA but now its main opponent) before the joint Cuban-Soviet intervention in Angola in late September-early October 1975[3] may yet facilitate a continuing East Bloc role there should the MPLA and UNITA ever form a coalition government.[4]

Ironically, the activities of East-West "bridge" states such as Yugoslavia, Romania, and even North Korea help retain a Western presence in the region as much if not more than they maintain and extend Soviet influence. This is so because the absence of direct Soviet involvement enables the newly independent African states to forge positions of nonalignment without sacrificing their revolutionary credentials. The existence of active Marxist model states with no particular subservience to Soviet aims has already proven to be a powerful force in Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Angola and may exercise an even greater influence on a South Africa ruled by blacks, should this ever occur.

HOW DOES CHINA fit into all this? As is well known, in the mid-1960's, the People's Republic of China (PRC) competed aggressively with the Soviet Union in Africa, offering emerging African states an especially vital alternative revolutionary model of development. A decade later, Chinese activism in support of the FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola) and UNITA in Angola posed a severe problem to both Moscow and Havana which, during the transitional period in 1974-75, backed the besieged MPLA in Luanda.

Both William Ratliff, in his essay on "The People's Republic of China" (in Henriksen), and Colin Legum, in his "The Soviet Union's Encounter with Africa" (in Nation and Kauppi), stress the significant impact China had on the Havana-

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[3] For example, in April 1975, UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi was received in Bucharest by Romanian party leader Nicolae Ceaușescu. See, e.g., John A. Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution: Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare (1962-1976)*, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1978, pp. 265-66.

[4] It is interesting to note that the Reagan administration recently announced that it would seek a joint congressional resolution proclaiming moral support for Jonas Savimbi and UNITA. This statement was made in anticipation of Savimbi's late January-early February 1986 visit to Washington. The administration made it clear, however, that it opposes giving military or economic aid to UNITA. See Bernard Gwertzman, "Reagan To Offer Angolan Rebels Moral Backing," *The New York Times*, Jan. 26, 1986.

Moscow decision to intervene in Angola.[5] In fact, Soviet competition with Beijing for primary influence throughout southern Africa was truly a zero-sum game. For example, the Soviet Union refused to supply needed arms to Mugabe and his ZANU movement unless ZANU renounced its Maoist inclinations. (Mugabe refused to bow to Soviet pressure, and he later paid the Soviets back for their intransigence by denying the USSR any role in independent Zimbabwe.) Furthermore, one can argue that Mozambique's star has fallen, in Soviet eyes at least, partially because of the Mozambique Liberation Front's (FRELIMO) enduring relationship with Beijing before and after independence.

But Soviet competition with the PRC is not nearly so intense at present. Seth Singleton's chapter in Nation and Kauppi indicates that Moscow may even see Beijing's support for liberation in southern Africa as a potential source of tension between the United States and China. This is so, he suggests, because traditionally the aim of Soviet policy during periods of retrenchment is "to divide China and the United States rather than attempt new gains at the expense of both" (p. 119).

INDIGENOUS REGIONAL conflict has also had a decisive impact on developments in the Horn, and, according to some scholars, in spite of superpower competition in the area. The conflicts between Ethiopia and Somalia and between Eritrea and Ethiopia would exist even without superpower, and especially Soviet, involvement, says Marina Ottaway in her "Superpower Competition and Regional Conflicts in the Horn of Africa," yet another excellent contribution in Nation and Kauppi. Superpower competition may have fueled the flames of conflict, she concedes, but the source of the hostility can be found elsewhere, most notably in the policies and proposals of European colonial powers before and after World War II. For example, Great Britain exacerbated regional conflict in the Horn by proposing toward the end of the war the creation of a Greater Somalia that would comprise British Somaliland, former Italian Somalia, the Northern Frontier District of Kenya, and the Ogaden and Haud, internationally recognized territories within Ethiopia. Britain also proposed that Eritrea be divided between the Sudan and Ethiopia rather than be annexed by the latter. These proposals infuriated Haile Selassie in Ethiopia, incited emerging African elites in Kenya, and whetted the appetite of the Somalis inhabiting these diverse regions. In addition, the apparent irredentist impact of colonial, fascist Italy's policies on Somali nationalism contributed greatly to existing Somali claims and the subsequent conflict.

Eritrean expectations for a distinct political and cultural status were fed by 10 years of federation status within Imperial Ethiopia (1952-1962). Haile Selassie's termination of this arrangement sparked the formation of the Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM) in 1961, a nationalist coalition that soon fragmented into the leftwing Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and the more moderate Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). Whereas from its inception, the ELF attracted Arab support, the EPLF turned to the Soviet Union and eventually obtained support from the Soviet bloc. Such support was acceptable to EPLF members because these countries represented a revolutionary alternative to the US-backed Haile Selassie regime.

Not all analysts, however, accept this interpretation. Some writers, such as Paul Henze, argue that "Eritrea" never existed and was only "created" by Soviet and other outside support. The Soviets were able to orchestrate the emergence of Eritrea, according to Henze, because of a coincidence of events: the development of a specious Eritrean nationalism stimulated by the rush to African independence in the early 1960's, and the enjoinment of Soviet and Arab interests after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war when the Eritrean cause became the object of Arab interest. Marina Ottaway, among other specialists on the Horn, finds no evidence to support Henze's assertion. Furthermore, there seems little basis for Henze's claim in *Russians and the Horn*, devoid as it is of any footnotes or bibliographical references, that it is an improvement on the "remarkable paucity of informed and balanced books on developments in the Horn of Africa during the past ten years" (p. 2).[6]

No doubt exists about longstanding Soviet interest in the Horn or about Moscow's historical fascination with Ethiopia. But irony touches the Soviets' finally reaching the Horn through a military buildup that enabled Somalia to invade Ethiopia in pursuit of its goal of "greater" Somalia. Paradox enters the Horn with the Soviet military and political swing to Mengistu's emerging revolutionary regime in Ethiopia. After Fidel Castro's fruitless attempt in early 1977 to reconcile Mengistu and Siad Barre in a Pax Sovietica of the Horn (which was to include South Yemen as well), Moscow realized that it had been euchred by Siad Barre who, in late 1977, expelled his Soviet advisers and abrogated Somalia's treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union. (Perhaps even more ironic, the Soviets may have had some awareness of, if not influence on, Somalia's impending attack on Ethiopia.)[7]

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[5] See also Jiri Valenta, "The Soviet-Cuban Intervention in Angola," *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Los Angeles), Spring-Summer, 1978, pp. 14-15.

[6] Information and balance, of course, are in the eye of the beholder. Informative books on the Horn during the period in question include, in my opinion, Tom Farer, *War Clouds on the Horn of Africa: The Widening Storm*, 2nd ed., Washington, DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1979; Marina Ottaway, *Soviet and American Influence in the Horn of Africa*, New York, Praeger, 1982; Marina and David Ottaway, *Ethiopia: Empire in Revolution*, New York, Holmes and Meier, 1978; Fred Halliday and Maxine Molyneux, *The Ethiopian Revolution*, New York, Schocken, 1982; and Richard Sherman, *Eritrea: The Unfinished Revolution*, New York, Praeger, 1980.

The Soviet Union gambled, and lost, on its commitment to Somalia, sacrificing its investment in the port of Berbera in the process. But it did manage to recoup much of its losses by establishing a firm relationship with the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia. Determined to avoid a repetition of their vanishing acts in Ghana (1966) and Egypt (1973), the Soviets are exercising every stratagem derived from their 30 years of trial-and-error operations in Africa. Moscow's insistence on a vanguard party in Addis Ababa strikes a Leninist chord that the Soviets somehow seem to have forgotten in most of their African adventures heretofore.

EVEN IF IT IS TRUE that the Soviets have been disinclined to get involved in regional conflicts in the Horn, as Ottaway suggests, there is little doubt that they have a favorable disposition toward local disputes in southern Africa. Singleton argues that, in essence, the Soviet Union shares a propensity toward regional polarization with its putative nemesis, white-ruled South Africa. To the extent that Moscow succeeds in associating the United States with Pretoria's apartheid policy in South Africa, it gains the support of blacks in South Africa as well as of the Front-Line States (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe), Nigeria, and many other Third World countries. Moscow knows that South Africa is more important to the United States than it is to the Soviet Union and that the United States is trapped between disapproval of South Africa's internal policies and Washington's satisfaction with economic/strategic benefits accruing from its association with Pretoria.

South Africa likewise benefits from a certain level of regional instability that keeps the Soviet and Cuban pots boiling in Angola and Mozambique. The de-Sovietization of Angola might induce Washington to put even greater pressure on Pretoria to redistribute power inside South Africa. In order to help avoid such a development, Pretoria continually searches for real and imagined ANC training or staging bases throughout the region. Internally, the repression of moderate black oppositionists (such as Steve Biko, Desmond Tutu, and African trade union leaders, among others) polarizes black opposition to white rule by creating more hard-line enemies and leading to a Moscow-dependent African National Congress revolutionary movement as the only alternative to Afrikaner rule. This development—in full swing in late 1985—places the Soviets in the dominant position as political organizers and military suppliers of the black opposition which also just happens to confirm Pretoria's worst fears and provide the latter with the rationale for further repression.

Stalemate over independence for Namibia follows the same script. So long as SWAPO (South West African People's Organization) is not in power, it needs Moscow's military support and Angola's territorial protection. But once in power, SWAPO would likely prefer to emulate nonaligned Zimbabwe, adhering to a pragmatic economic policy while inhibiting the ANC from staging attacks from its territory. Singleton astutely observes that such an outcome would greatly satisfy Washington but neither Moscow nor Pretoria.

WHAT THEN IS Moscow's ultimate objective in Africa? According to many of the contributors to the books under review here, the answer is straightforward: political leverage throughout Africa. As Richard Remnek and Joachim Krause argue in their two essays on Soviet military policy in Nation and Kauppi, as Milene Charles infers from the history of the Soviet involvement with Africa, and as Heldman implies in his case study of Khrushchev's Africa policy, the Soviet Union seeks political advantage over the West through essentially military means. The often conflicting goals of other Bloc actors, the alternative revolutionary model of China, and the constraints imposed by specific African states in African regional contexts limit Soviet prospects for the achievement of this objective.

But the Soviets have plied their interest in Africa for a very long time and through undulating phases. They have suffered setbacks in Ghana, Egypt, Somalia, and the Sudan only to reemerge in

---

[7] At the very least, the Soviets surely played an important role in the buildup of the Somali military. For example, Henze notes that "without Soviet support, the Somalis could not have developed the military strength to threaten Ethiopia" (p. 32).

Angola and Ethiopia, among others, with renewed determination and new tactics for survival. They will no doubt continue to pursue their interests in Africa, perhaps content in the ideological certainty that, over the long run, history is on their side. Maybe in future, Soviet leaders will pay greater attention to economic rather than military assistance, or enlist additional Third World countries (for example, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Nicaragua) to serve as military surrogates for pressing Soviet interests in Africa. Certainly, the edited volumes by Henriksen and by Nation and Kauppi contain perspectives essential for assessing the past Soviet role in Africa, and perhaps even for anticipating Soviet intentions and operations in the future.

Correspondence

NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to The Editors, Problems of Communism, *US Information Agency, 301 4th Street, SW, Washington, DC 20547, USA.*

PHILIPPINES

TO THE EDITORS: In his correspondence in the July-August 1985 issue of *Problems of Communism* concerning David Rosenberg's earlier article "Communism in the Philippines" (*Problems of Communism*, September-October 1984), Leif Rosenberger raises a rather crucial point that needs further clarification.

Mr. Rosenberger states that in 1983 "Carlos Gaspar, an East German, was discovered to be the CPP's link in a complex international funding support system" (p. 85). "Carlos" Gaspar is Karl Gaspar. But, in fact, he is very much a Filipino, not an East German, and served as Executive Secretary of the Mindanao-Sulu Pastoral Secretariat. Recently released from detention, he continues to be active in the Church. Nowhere in the source cited by Rosenberger (an Apr. 27, 1983, AFP transmission from Hong Kong translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Asia and Pacific*, Apr. 28, 1983), is Gaspar called an East German, although his first name is given there as "Carlito." Mr. Gaspar's writings are available in *How Long?*, Quezon City, Claretians Publications, 1985.

The issue concerning outside funding of the CPP is an important one and deserves careful research.

RICHARD J. KESSLER
Senior Associate
Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace
Washington, DC

CORRECTION

The title of the novel of William Faulkner that John and Carol Garrard reported had been excerpted in the Soviet literary journal *Inostrannaya literatura* (see "Soviet Book Hunger," *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1985, p. 80) should have been *The Sound and the Fury*.

SOVIETS AT SEA

TO THE EDITORS: In my review of four novels about the Soviet professional and military classes ("Novel Views of the Soviet Cadres," *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1985), I erroneously cited the preface to *The Hunt for Red October* as a source for the story of the attempted defection of a Soviet naval vessel to the West (p. 74). Memory deceived me. There is no preface; the passage cited is from page 88 of the novel itself.

There is, however, public evidence of the incident involving the Soviet frigate *Storozhevoy*, which left the port of Riga on November 8, 1975, manned by a crew who, together with the political officer, were attempting to seek asylum in Sweden. The vessel was intercepted by Soviet fighter aircraft and surface vessels and returned to Soviet custody. The best reference seems to be an article by Lt. Gregory Young, USN in the February 1985 issue of *Sea Power*, published by the US Navy. This article is summarized in *The New York Times* of February 10, 1985; *Facts on File* of April 5, 1985, also carries the item. According to *Facts on File* for June 12, 1976, the Stockholm newspaper *Expressen* on May 4, 1976, reported the barratry by the *Storozhevoy's* crew.

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MARCH-APRIL 1986

COMMUNISM IN SPAIN

Eusebio Mujal-León

Chinese on SDI

Bonnie S. Glaser
&
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Castro and Gorbachëv

W. Raymond Duncan

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Cover: Followers of the Communist Party of Spain at a 1977 election rally in Bilbao. Photo from Katherine Young.

Paul A. Smith, Jr., is on a one-year sabbatical from his duties as Chief Editor to conduct research on the theory and practice of international political communication. Wayne Hall, Managing Editor of *Problems of Communism* since 1978, will be Acting Chief Editor during Mr. Smith's absence.

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Articles

Decline and Fall of Spanish Communism

Eusebio Mujal-León

The Communist Party of Spain entered the post-Franco era confident that it would become the dominant force on the political Left. Instead, the party has become a minor actor in the politics of democratic Spain. The PCE's decline precipitated factionalism, and then fragmentation. Communist hopes to regain political influence by joining the opposition to Spain's membership in NATO were shattered when Felipe González's Socialist government won the vote to stay in NATO in the March 12, 1986, referendum.

Chinese Perspectives on the Strategic Defense Initiative

Bonnie S. Glaser and Banning N. Garrett

The Chinese leadership began to focus on the Strategic Defense Initiative of the United States sometime in late 1984 or early 1985. Beijing instructed various ministries and research organizations to examine SDI and its implications for China. Leading analysts at foreign policy institutes and defense, science, and technology organizations held conferences and wrote position papers on this important topic. What has emerged from these efforts is a picture of informed and diverse opinion with as wide a range of views on SDI as is found in the West.

Castro and Gorbachëv: Politics of Accommodation

W. Raymond Duncan

A warming trend in Cuban-Soviet ties was evident at the party congresses held this year in Havana and Moscow. While the expressions of warmth may be more dramatic than usual, fluctuations between accommodation and discord are not new to Cuban-Soviet relations. Economic considerations and a growing awareness of the fiscal contraints attendant to supporting Third World revolutionary movements underlie the most recent upturn in relations.

Notes

Checklist of Communist Parties in 1985

Richard F. Staar

The "world communist movement" as seen or defined by Moscow remained largely unchanged in 1985 according to the latest version of the checklist published by *Problems of Communism* in conjunction with the Hoover Institution (Stanford, CA). The Soviet Communist Party remains unable to convene a new worldwide gathering of this "movement" (the last such meeting was in 1969). While most parties of communist-ruled states continue to increase their memberships (the Polish United Workers' Party being an exception), the communist parties in democratic societies are experiencing a drop in electoral support and related intraparty factional strife.

(Abstracts continued on reverse side)

Communist Fronts in 1985

Wallace Spaulding

A survey of the activities of the major communist international front organizations in 1985 reveals continued strong Soviet guidance despite a facade of leadership "independence." The major theme of front initiatives has been the perennial "peace struggle," whose new emphasis has been on blocking the US Strategic Defense Initiative. Not all front events were successful in Soviet eyes, the 12th World Youth Festival revealing weaknesses in the ideological staunchness of Soviet youth and considerable inclination on the part of foreign delegates to denounce Soviet aggression in Afghanistan.

Essay-reviews

East German Quest for Legitimacy

Angela E. Stent

Since its founding in 1945, the GDR has had to struggle for recognition at home and abroad. The 1972 Basic Treaty between the two Germanies increased the international stature of the GDR, but it did not provide the one form of legitimacy the GDR most wanted: de jure recognition as a separate state by West Germany. Although the treaty has led to substantial economic interaction between the two German governments, intra-German contacts potentially raise doubts among GDR citizens about the regime's legitimacy.

Rethinking the Iranian Revolution

Muriel Atkin

The course of Iran's Islamic Revolution caused Soviet analysts to revise their earlier interpretation of developments there. Although they now argue that the revolution was a promising opportunity that went wrong, there are significant variations in their assessments of the nature and role of Islamic fundamentalism in the Revolution. Western scholars of Soviet-Iranian relations would benefit by consulting these and similar Soviet sources.

Soviet Military Politics

Dale R. Herspring

The Soviet military by and large appears satisfied with its share of the nation's economic resources and disinclined to mount an institutional challenge to party dominance of the society. However, this quiescence may in part reflect the nature of the current high command. Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov, removed from duties as chief of the General Staff in 1984, was a much more vocal advocate of a distinctly "military" perspective at a high political level.

Decline and Fall of Spanish Communism

Eusebio Mujal-León

Spanish communism is today struggling for its very survival. Once the premier force in the anti-Franco opposition and confident of becoming the hegemonic force on the Spanish Left, the *Partido Comunista de España* (PCE) has seen its dreams shattered and itself rendered marginal in the politics of a democratic Spain. In the national elections of October 1982, the Spanish Communists received only 3.8 percent of the vote (and 4 out of 350 seats in the Congress of Deputies) and, what was worse, found themselves overwhelmed by their rivals (the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party or PSOE), who won 48 percent of the vote and an absolute majority of the seats in the *Cortes*, the Spanish parliament.

Since then, the situation has worsened for the Communists. Their party's electoral defeat aggravated existing tensions in its leadership. During the last four years, two splinter groups (one led by former Secretary General Santiago Carrillo, the other by former Executive Committee member Ignacio Gallego) have emerged, each disputing the PCE's claim to represent Spanish communism.

This article seeks to analyze the causes for the decline and fall of the Communist Party of Spain. The first section places the PCE in historical perspective and assesses the Communists' efforts to balance the competing demands of maintaining organizational and ideological cohesion while pursuing broad alliances both during the Franco era and in the first years of democracy. The second section analyzes the conflicts and debates which developed within the PCE in the wake of the October 1982 debacle, devoting particular attention to the struggle among supporters of the present and former secretaries general (Gerardo Iglesias and Santiago Carrillo, respectively) for control of the party's organization. The conclusion speculates on the PCE's future, and on the party's chances in the next parliamentary elections that are to be held in June 1986.

Eusebio Mujal-León is Associate Professor of Government at Georgetown University (Washington, DC). He is author of Communism and Political Change in Spain *(1983) and co-editor of* Spain at the Polls *(1985), and has just completed* Looking Beyond the Pyrenees: Spanish Foreign Policy Since Franco. *During 1984–86, Professor Mujal-León was a Visiting Fellow at the Center of International Studies, Princeton University, where he was working on Soviet–Latin American relations. The author wishes to thank Ann-Sofie Nilsson of the University of Lund for her helpful comments on the draft of this article.*

Preparing for the Post-Franco Era

The Communists were a major reference point on the Left and in the opposition during the Franco era. Although the PCE had been an insignificant force prior to the outbreak of the Civil War (1936–39), its influence grew markedly during that conflict. Yet, because the party subordinated its policies to the exigencies of Soviet foreign policy during the Civil War and aborted whatever chances may have existed for a social revolution (and—others on the Left believed—victory in the war), it became an outcast among the anti-Franco opposition in the aftermath of the Civil War.

Paradoxically, it was the Franco regime that helped the Communist party regain credibility and influence. For the regime, the PCE represented the ideological and political quintessence of what was wrong with modernity and the 20th century. By attacking the Communists as a "foreign" force, as the principal source of dissent in Spanish society, the Franco regime legitimated itself as a defender of genuine Spanish national interests. By so doing, however, the Franco regime helped make the Communists a reference point for the student and worker elites coming to political maturity during the 1950's and 1960's, who adopted anti-Franco positions. To them, the PCE was one of the few real opponents to the regime, and membership in or collaboration with the Communist party became almost a required rite of passage for this new generation of politicized Spaniards.

However, the Communists' role in Spanish politics was defined not only by their historic relationship to rivals on the Left or by the Manichean arguments of the Franco regime. A further source of Communist strength during the Franco years lay in the adaptive and innovative policies pursued by the PCE. Beginning with a call for National Reconciliation made by the PCE in 1956 on the 20th anniversary of the Civil War, the Communists spared no effort in trying to overcome their decades-long *exilio dentro del exilio*.[1] These efforts involved the modification and adaptation of party policies on political and social alliance strategies, on organization and ideology, as well as on international relations. Two objectives animated these efforts: (1) to galvanize a broad coalition of parties and social forces to overthrow the Franco regime (with the PCE playing a major, and preferably a determinant, role in the process); and (2) to insure a broad base of electoral and political support in the post-Franco era for the PCE.

Pursuit of such coalition-building efforts made it incumbent on Communist leaders to convince ordinary PCE members that such policies would ultimately redound to the advantage of their party. To justify these policies, the Communist leadership argued that the triumph of the "financial oligarchy and latifundist aristocracy" in the Civil War could be reversed if a coalition of the working class, the peasantry, and the "non-monopolist" sectors of the middle class could bring about the overthrow of the Franco regime. In its wake would come an "anti-monopolist" phase during which the feudal remnants in agriculture would be eliminated, autocratic and centralistic political structures modernized, and banking and credit facilities as well as major industrial concerns nationalized. By phrasing the argument in this way, the Communist leadership could insist on the necessity for a broad coalition of political and social forces, as well as on the peaceful nature of the forthcoming changes.[2]

The PCE's emphasis on moderation and broad alliance was appropriate insofar as the party hoped to reassure the middle classes and to broaden its acceptance among Spaniards in general, but it was hardly adequate for the task of organizational maintenance and mobilization of the PCE itself. In order to inspire party militants and to increase the party's strength as an organization, Communist leaders emphasized the imminence of the Franco regime's demise. Insisting on this as well as on the profundity of the forthcoming changes was important because veteran party cadres were often none too happy about the changes in party ideology introduced in the late 1960's and 1970's, accepting many of them not so much out of genuine conviction as out of organizational loyalty or "party spirit." Such loyalty, as well as internal party discipline, could best be maintained by painting a catastrophic picture, by insisting that the explosive nature of the political and social situation in Spain would lead to the rapid (albeit peaceful) overthrow of the regime and to the emergence of a Communist party strong enough to be the hegemonic force on the Left and the pivotal actor in Spanish politics.[3]

Keeping a balance between these two aspects of Communist strategy—catholicity in the search for allies and insistence on imminent political change—was a major challenge for the PCE as it prepared for the transition to the post-Franco era. Maintaining this equilibrium required more than political dexterity. It could be accomplished only if the Communists were successful in imposing their version of the *ruptura* (break) with the Franco regime during the transition to democracy in Spain. When the party failed to prevent the adoption of a "reformist" solution (promoted by King Juan Carlos and Premier Adolfo Suárez), and when it then had to watch its Socialist competitors take advantage of the time and opportunity provided by the "reformist" victory to catch up on the Communists' 20-year organizational head start, the contradictions in the Communist strategy became much harder to handle and ultimately provoked the PCE's fragmentation.

Having emphasized so much the need and even inevitability of a *ruptura* with the Franco regime, the Communists eventually found it very difficult to recognize that it was not going to happen. In fact, as late as

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[1] The phrase "exile within exile" is from Ignacio Fernández de Castro's *De las Cortes de Cádiz al Plan de Desarrollo* (From the Parliament of Cadiz to the Development Plan), Paris, Ediciones de Ruedo Ibérico, 1968, p. 286.

[2] See the *Programa Manifesto del PCE* (Program Manifesto of the PCE) approved at the second National Conference in September 1975.

[3] Although the Communists were rarely explicit in this regard, in 1971 Carrillo compared the Spanish Communist position to that of the PSOE in 1930. The thrust of his message was clear to those who knew something about Spanish history: 1930 was the year before the instauration of the Second Spanish Republic; in the June 1931 Constituent Assembly elections the PSOE emerged as the dominant party on the Left with 105 out of 470 seats. See Carrillo's interview with *La Nouvelle Critique* (Paris), October-November 1971, p. 24.

1978, Communist leaders insisted that the process of "democratic change . . . coincided with the analyses made by the PCE."[4] Even after Adolfo Suárez and the Union of the Democratic Center (UCD) emerged victorious from the June 1977 election, and the PSOE received three times as many votes as the PCE, the Communist leadership still claimed that Spain was "immersed in a political revolution."[5] The persistence with which Communist leaders held to these notions suggests how integral to Communist identity was the belief that the Franco institutions had to be dismantled before a democratic Spain could be built. Ultimately, it might be said, the PCE fell prey to its old nemesis, Francisco Franco. Although the party made great efforts to show how much it had changed since the Civil War and how well it understood the social and economic transformations Spain had undergone, its frame of reference remained the 1930's, and its guiding light opposition to the ancien regime.

The Communists' failure to accomplish the *ruptura* was at the root of subsequent discontent with Carrillo's leadership and his policies, but there were few Communists at the dawn of the post-Franco era who explicitly blamed him for that failure. What is more, regardless of what his critics subsequently said, at the time Carrillo had little choice but to pursue the course he did. The Communists did their best to galvanize a broad-front coalition against the regime and pursued a mass-mobilization strategy on selected occasions,[6] but the PCE had to maneuver in a context that was largely unfavorable to it. The Communists were constrained by the distrust that other political groups as well as many Spaniards felt toward the PCE.

These limits might have been overcome if the situation in Spain during 1973–1977 had in fact been "prerevolutionary." This was not the case. First of all, the memory of the Civil War had inoculated the political elites and the population against violent upheavals as well as against those groups (like the Communists or the neo-Francoist Popular Alliance) whose identities were inextricably tied to the past. Second, social and economic changes (especially since the late 1950's) had created a sizable middle class and a consumer society. Whatever the injustices and the unequal distribution of wealth in society, by the 1970's Spaniards had more of virtually everything than ever before. Third, the political opposition was also split. Some wanted a clear break with Francoism, others a negotiated *ruptura*, and still others wanted simply a democratic government, caring neither how nor under whose auspices this was brought about. In this context, the reformist faction associated with King Juan Carlos and Premier Adolfo Suárez successfully wrested control of regime institutions from more conservative elements. The King played an especially important role in this process. As the institutional symbol of continuity, he maintained the cohesion of the military but prevented its radicalization; and he gained the acquiescence of senior military officers to a reform program about which they were most certainly not enthusiastic.

Given these contraints, the accomplishments of the Communists were not insignificant. By organizing demonstrations and strikes in late 1975 and early 1976, they played a major role in mobilizing popular opinion against those who favored *continuismo*. This pressure from below showed the extent and intensity of popular support for democratization. It was crucial in tilting the balance in favor of the reformists and in reducing the chances for polarization and direct confrontation between Right and Left.

By late 1976, the party's legalization rather than the *ruptura* had become the Communists' most important objective. This shift was never formally acknowledged. Instead, many Communists chose to view the legalization of the party as a necessary element of the *ruptura*. But the myth of the *ruptura*, which had originated in harsh clandestine experience and was perpetuated by Communist leaders for organizational and mobilizational reasons, was no longer functional by early 1977.[7] Moreover, by the mid-1970's the Bolshevik Revolution had lost much of the propelling force it had had for European leftists in the 1940's. Of course, the PCE had contributed to this process by its own doctrinal evolution, but the dissipation of the October 1917 myth itself also eroded the foundations of the Communist subculture and, therefore, the PCE's social and political base.

A final dimension of the Communist weakness related to the PCE's search for a new role in the politics of a democratic Spain. Until the transition to democracy, the PCE had had an easy time defining itself. The party was the most determined opponent and the antithesis of the Franco regime. This role was at once difficult and comfortable—the latter because it assured the

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[4] This formulation was contained in Thesis 1 as presented by the Central Committee to the 9th PCE Congress. See *Mundo Obrero* (Madrid), Mar. 23–29, 1978.

[5] See the retrospective analysis in ibid., Jan. 16–22, 1981.

[6] For example, the Communists encouraged strikes and demonstrations in early 1976 in Madrid and Barcelona.

[7] With respect to engendering a total break, the Spanish Communist capability in 1977 compared unfavorably with that of the Italian and French Communists in 1945. Although both faced major hurdles, they were mass parties and drew substantial sustenance from their (occasionally self-inflated) role in the wartime resistance and in the victory over fascism.

Communists of constant reinforcement for their identity. With the end of the Franco era, the certainties of the past dissolved, and the Communists confronted the challenge of relating to a new and democratic system. This was not an easy task for them, because operating clandestinely for so long had prevented the PCE from fully understanding the magnitude of the changes in Spanish society since the 1950's. Clandestinity had also reinforced the PCE leadership's autocratic style, which in turn cast a shadow over the party's ability to adjust to an open society.

The June 1977 parliamentary election transformed the role of the PCE in Spanish politics. Despite the influence the Communists had exerted in the opposition to the Franco regime during much of the preceding two decades, they garnered only 9.4 percent of the vote in that election whereas the PSOE received 29 percent.[8] Although PCE leaders reassured their supporters that this was only a temporary setback and tried with some success in the next two years to play the UCD and PSOE off against each other in an effort to further their proposal for a Spanish version of the "historic compromise,"[9] their party did not improve perceptibly on its performance in the next parliamentary elections held in March 1979. On that occasion, the PCE received only 10.8 percent of the vote. Thereafter, the dwindling prospects for the party combined to produce the most serious crisis the PCE has faced since the de-Stalinization campaign in the 1950's.

Communism in a Democracy

The PCE entered the post-Franco era confronted by several urgent tasks. It needed to consolidate the identity and structures of the party as well as to redefine its relationship vis-à-vis the Spanish domestic environment as well the international communist environment. The Communists would have faced these tasks in any case, but their failure to bring about a clear-cut break with the institutions and heritage of the Franco regime visibly complicated the situation.

To insist on the centrality of Communist identity—in ideological and organizational terms—as the principal theme around which to discuss the crisis of the PCE may appear at first glance to be somewhat extravagant. The PCE, after all, had a very definite past, a history, and a tradition. As a quasi-religious, countercultural society, the Communist party has had its own rituals and language as well as a pantheon of heroes dating back to the Popular Front and Civil War period. But even as the Communists stressed the constancy of their struggle, to the degree that their leaders had reacted to the changes affecting the international communist movement and Spanish society by adjusting their policies and strategies, they had compromised their party's identity.

Spurred by the weakening of Soviet control over West European communist parties after 1956 and confident that by distancing themselves from Moscow their party would break out of its isolation in Spain, the PCE redefined its relationship to the international communist movement and in the process came out in favor of a specifically West European, pluralistic, and parliamentary model of communism. Espousal of "Eurocommunism" led the PCE away from the Bolshevik model for the seizure and exercise of power and toward strengthening of ties with other Eurocommunist as well as socialist and social democratic parties. Paradoxically, while the shift away from Moscow ("It is no longer our Rome," Carrillo declared in June 1976) could be undertaken rather easily in clandestine conditions when the leaders exercised unquestioned control over party organizations, these conditions in turn made a real *aggiornamento* virtually impossible. Moreover, the progressive abandonment of the Bolshevik model did not by itself create a new and distinct paradigm. Insofar as the Spanish Communists adopted positions already staked out by democratic socialist parties, they were implicitly abandoning their claim to a unique role and character. As long as the PCE appeared to be an ascendant force in Spain and "Eurocommunism" was on the rise, the crisis over the Communists' identity remained latent. When the bubble burst—the French Left's defeat in the March 1978 legislative elections as well as the Aldo Moro kidnapping in Rome provide useful international benchmarks; the weak Communist showing in the March 1979 elections, a Spanish one—the ensuing frustration and uncertainty aggravated other problems faced by the PCE.

With the dawn of the post-Franco era, the Communists could no longer maintain the role of irreducible and systemic opposition. The PCE's commitment to consensus politics did not change, but under a democratic regime the justification for such policies had to change. Indeed, its policies became primarily defensive in orientation: to pursue consensus politics as a means of preventing a return to dictatorship and precluding the consolidation of a bipolar system in which the Union of the Democratic Center and the Socialists would be dominant. As before, Communist calls for consensus politics and coalition-building may have served to reassure the Spanish middle class, but support for the status quo made mobilization of PCE members and sympathizers increasingly difficult. The difficulty was not insurmountable, as long as a desirable objective—for example, PCE entry into the government—was within reach. However, moderate policies that neither brought the Communists into the government nor made them as popular as the PSOE went against the grain of many members. Complicating the situation was the make-up of the Spanish polity. Alongside quite politicized worker, student, and professional elites stood a public with a largely moderate orientation.[10] For this public, the Communists were not an attractive electoral choice, especially in comparison to the Socialists, who were perceived as youthful, dynamic, and cosmopolitan.

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[8] For a detailed analysis of democratic Spain's electoral map, see Howard R. Penniman and Eusebio Mujal-León, Eds., *Spain at the Polls: The General Elections of 1977, 1979 and 1982*, Raleigh, NC, Duke University Press, 1985.

[9] The PCE called this a "government of national concentration." The "historic compromise" refers to the efforts in the 1970's by the Italian Communist Party to work with the ruling Christian Democratic government.

The consequences of the Communist failure to impose a *ruptura* were not immediately apparent either to the Communists or to other Spanish political forces. The political situation in Spain in late 1977 and early 1978 was still quite fluid. Indeed, as the subsequent disintegration of the UCD attested, the parties and party system had not yet crystallized. The surprisingly strong Socialist performance (29 percent of the vote and 118 out of 350 seats in the Chamber of Deputies) in June 1977 only masked the PSOE's still unconsolidated organizational structures. Thus, the Communist situation did not appear overly grave. The PCE still retained the aura of strength it had developed during clandestinity as well as a very real influence exerted through the trade union known as the *Comisiones Obreras*.

Moreover, the PCE made an almost ideal alliance partner for Suárez and the UCD, which sought to contain the Socialist competition, draft a new Constitution, and get working-class acquiescence to the economic austerity package known as the *Pactos de la Moncloa*. Although the PCE had not done nearly as well as it had expected in the 1977 elections, there appeared to be room for its influence to grow. Electorally speaking, the PCE was perceived as "democratic" by a larger proportion of Socialist and Centrist voters (60 and 38 percent respectively) than was the Italian Communist Party in 1975 by the voters affiliated with other Italian parties. A dramatic increase in membership—from approximately 15,000 in 1975 to nearly 200,000 in April 1978—suggested that the PCE was developing a mass base, which would allow implementation of the Gramscian strategy of "presence" at all levels of society.[11]

From this perspective, the problems provoked by the PCE's organizational restructuring in 1977 and 1978 did not appear insurmountable. The Communist leaders viewed the problems that surfaced after the PCE was legalized in April 1977 as being quite normal after 40 years underground. Communications between the different party organizations operating within Spain had often been difficult and had created a center-periphery cleavage. The resurgence of regional nationalisms at the end of the Franco era and the demands made by left-wing nationalists on the new political system also complicated the Communists' situation. The forging of a cohesive, unified national party was complicated by the inevitable conflicts that arose in this period between the older, exiled leaders of the party (who returned to Spain in 1976 and early 1977) and the younger militants who had had a good deal of latitude in formulating party policy under Franco. Carrillo had deliberately advanced some of these younger cadres to high positions in the party. Thus, the frictions were not due to generational conflict as such between the Secretary General, as representative of the exiled leadership, and the leaders from within Spain. Rather, they developed when "historic" figures returned to important positions either in provincial party organizations or in the national headquarters. This conflict was intensified on occasion by the obvious unsuitability of some cadres—both from among the exiles and from those who had been in Spain—for work in legal, mass organizations.

A further source of friction was the displacement of many intellectuals and professionals from prominent positions in the PCE. The entry of these "forces of culture" into Communist ranks during the 1960's and early 1970's had been greeted with enthusiasm by party leaders because it seemed to confirm not only the decline of the Franco regime but also the correctness and viability of the adaptive strategy pursued by the PCE since 1956. Active in dissident university movements, many of these young professionals helped the PCE to turn these movements into centers of anti-Franco activity. The professionals and intellectuals also played a major role in delegitimating Francoism through their participation in various united fronts calling for amnesty and democratic liberties.[12]

After the failure of these efforts and the disappointing outcome of the June 1977 elections, the PCE

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[10] See Ch. 4 by Jose Ignacio Wert in *Spain at the Polls*.

[11] The figures are from an analysis of the Communist voter and his attitudes by Juan Linz, "A Sociological Look at Spanish Communism," unpubl ms., 1979. See especially the section on "The Image of the PCE-PSUC."

[12] See the discussion in Eusebio Mujal-León, *Communism and Political Change in Spain*, Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1983, esp. Ch. 8

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leadership began to rely more on the Communist presence in the labor movement as it struggled against the Centrists and the Socialists. This displacement of the "forces of culture" at an organizational and political level combined with several other factors—the most important of which were the persistence of an anti-intellectual or *ouvriériste* bias within the PCE and the intellectuals' unwillingness to suspend their critical faculties for the sake of "party"—to create serious strains after June 1977.

These problems were by no means unique to the PCE, nor were they sufficient by themselves to provoke the political crisis of the PCE. What activated the crisis and deepened latent and real fissures was the PCE's failure to join the government. For the Communists, this would have been the most expeditious way of legitimating themselves to the Spanish public and of shortening the distance that separated them from the Socialists. Carrillo and others in the leadership believed that a Spanish version of the "historic compromise" was not only possible but, given Spanish conditions, probable and necessary. To realize this end, during 1977 and 1978 the Communists pursued a number of initiatives in alliance policy, international relations, and internal redefinition and reform whose riskiness the Communist leadership appeared to underestimate.

Communist strategy had a dual aim. On the one hand, it tried to retain the loyalty of traditional party members; on the other, to attract new members and voters. The contradictions inherent in this strategy became visible in a number of specific policy initiatives pursued by the PCE. Thus, the policy of consensus in national politics that the Communists followed (its formal appellation was *concentración democrática*) drew on and fostered contradictory pulls.[13] The moderation of the Communists, their efforts to calm partisan tempers, and their collaboration with the UCD were designed to attract Center-Left voters. But if they urged collaboration across class lines, the Communists also directed especially biting attacks against their ostensible partners on the Left, the Socialists, precisely because the latter's commitment to "real" change was weak.

The contradictory pulls were also visible in the ideological sphere, particularly in the proposal Carrillo made in late 1977 to delete the self-description "Leninist" from the PCE program. This initiative, as might be expected, provoked a storm of controversy. As with the policy of consensus, its objective was the legitimization of the PCE, the breaking down of barriers to Communist participation in the government. In order to have this otherwise bold initiative approved at the 9th Congress in April 1978, however, party leaders relied on support from trade union activists and the party apparatus, who went along not because of enthusiasm for "Eurocommunism," but because Carrillo put the issue in organizational terms. Party discipline and cohesion demanded approval of the proposal; as Executive Committee member Simon Sánchez Montero aptly and simply put it during the Congress debate: "It is Leninist to drop Leninism."

Marcelino Camacho, secretary general of the Workers' Commissions (CC.OO.), at a press conference on October 9, 1980, in connection with trade union elections.

—Pictorial Parade

Opposition to the proposal that the party no longer term itself "Leninist" came from two, rather different, sources. The "traditionalists" objected to the proposal on the ground that it meant abandoning a core part of Communist identity. The more "liberal" elements within the party objected because they believed that in order to sustain a viable "Eurocommunist" strategy, the PCE needed to overhaul its policies drastically and engage in profound criticism of its internal organization and principles. To these individuals, the Carrillo proposal smacked of a public relations gambit resembling the "unanimous" French Communist party decision in early 1976 to drop the phrase "dictatorship of the proletariat" from its program. For this group of Spanish Communists, there had not been nearly enough time for debate on an issue that went to the very core of the Communist identity. What was more, the change could hardly signify much if the same people remained in control throughout the Spanish Communist organization and the autocratic style of leadership personified by Carrillo was perpetuated.

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[13] It crystallized in the *Pactos de la Moncloa* (1977), the new Constitution (1978), and in the *Acuerdo Nacional sobre el Empleo* (1982).

As long as the possibility remained that the Communists might recover influence, the contradictions in these policy initiatives as well as between the competing needs of organizational maintenance and electoral expansion did not become too great. Rank-and-file Communists remained optimistic (or at least amenable to being convinced) about the future prospects of the PCE well into the summer of 1979. Although the PCE had not done particularly well in the March 1979 parliamentary elections, the party had improved on its performance in the municipal contests a month later—sufficiently so as to compel the Socialists into alliances at the local level.

The 1979 municipal elections were also the backdrop against which the PSOE debated whether to drop the term "Marxist" from its self-description. First Secretary Felipe González made a proposal to that effect, and it became a source of conflict at the 29th PSOE Congress in May 1979. There the proposal lost, and the PSOE was thrown into a crisis when González subsequently refused renomination to his post of First Secretary. Behind the dispute over the inclusion of the word "Marxist" lay not just personal and organizational conflicts within the PSOE. Also involved were competing perspectives on alliance strategies.[14] Those who wanted retention of the term sought closer collaboration with the Communists and a leftist identity for the PSOE. When, four months later, González returned triumphant as First Secretary at an extraordinary congress held in September 1979, the chances for a strategy based on unity of the Left virtually disappeared.[15]

The González victory and the growing unwillingness of the UCD to join forces with the Communists after the March 1979 elections isolated the PCE politically. This, combined with a worsening international climate after the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and a declining domestic economy (there was virtually no growth in the gross domestic product, and unemployment began to rise sharply), brought the Spanish Communist crisis into the open.

Carrillo Is Challenged

Earlier in this article, I noted the existence of several competing groups within the PCE in the months after its legalization. Alongside the party apparatus and its labor activists, there were hard-line (sometimes described as pro-Soviet) components and a small group of "liberal Eurocommunists." By late 1979 and early 1980, competition between these groups increased. Party labor activists, who had been among Carrillo's most loyal supporters at the April 1978 Congress, grew disenchanted with the policy of consensus and urged a turn to "mobilization"—a euphemism for more strikes and demonstrations in response to the worsening domestic economic situation. Speaking for hard-line labor activists, Fidel Alonso wrote in the party newspaper *Mundo Obrero*:

> *Over a long period of time, the party has appeared not as the most dynamic and combative opposition party, leading the working class and the popular strata . . . but rather as a party of collaboration and restraint of mobilization . . . .*[16]

Just how realistic these demands were in the Spanish context or how serious labor activists were about going through with them is questionable. Unquestionable, however, was the significance of this breaking of ranks with the leadership. It reflected frustration at the dwindling prospects for the PCE, and it showed the Carrillo leadership's growing inability to maintain a balance between the organizational and electoral needs of the PCE.

Another manifestation of the crisis was a decline in the PCE's membership. It had risen dramatically after Franco's death, reaching an official total of 201,757 by late 1977.[17] Thereafter, membership began a slow but inexorable decline, down to 171,332 by the end of 1978, and then to 140,000 by late 1979. In the same period, the party organizations in Madrid and Catalonia lost nearly 50 percent of their membership.[18]

The growing boldness of hard-line sectors in labor (and in the party apparatus) divided the heretofore dominant "Eurocommunist" faction, whose unquestioned leader and animator had been Santiago Carrillo. The response of Carrillo and his supporters was to emphasize continued adherence to "Eurocommunist" tenets, such as the commitment to political pluralism and consensus politics while at the same time affirming party discipline and the value of traditional communist organizational doctrine.

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[14] In an interview with *Zona Abierta* (Madrid), September 1979, p. 12, González clearly expressed his opinion: "The Socialist party's capacity to attract [voters] diminishes in inverse proportion to links through stable agreements with other parties and, especially, the PCE."

[15] As far as González was concerned, in order to win national power the PSOE had to unload its 19th century Marxist baggage and rhetoric. Modernization of Spanish society, not nationalization and class conflict, was the driving force of his program.

[16] *Mundo Obrero*, Feb. 13–19, 1981.

[17] For membership figures, see the articles in *La Calle* (Madrid), Jan. 15–21 and 22–28, 1980.

[18] *El País* (Madrid), Dec. 24, 1980 and also Victor Díaz Cardiel, then regional secretary for Madrid, in *Mundo Obrero*, Sept. 25–Oct. 1, 1981.

His "liberal" critics saw in this approach the inevitable emasculation of "Eurocommunism." Unless party leaders pushed forward with the internal democratization of the PCE, the "hard-liners" would not be really defeated, nor would the Spanish public be convinced about the democratic transformation of the party. Such arguments had already been heard prior to the 9th congress in 1978; the small "liberal" minority associated with some intellectuals and professionals had made them.[19] Their reoccurrence in 1980 was noteworthy because members of the apparatus were now voicing these arguments. Individuals like Pilar Brabo, Carlos Alonso Zaldívar, Ernest García—all under 40 years old, members of the Executive Committee, and, most important, members of the inner circle around Carrillo—pressed in this direction and came to be dubbed the "renovators."[20]

As these factions crystallized and the struggle between them grew more heated, each strove to articulate a general strategic line. Nuanced differences were apparent in their respective conceptions of alliances (both political and social), ideology, and international policies. Appropriately enough, however, it was over principles of internal organization and Communist identity that the cleavages within the "Eurocommunist" group became most explicit.

Organizational questions have always had a privileged place in communist debates. Since the classic formulation of such questions by Lenin in *What is to be Done?* communists have debated what appeared to be obscure organizational issues and drawn broad political conclusions from them. The historic importance of organizational questions stems from several theses propounded by Lenin (and subsequently accepted by the Third International) including the one that "class political consciousness could be brought to the workers *only from without*."[21] In order to develop class consciousness among the proletariat and to overthrow the existing capitalist order, the working class needed to have a tightly knit organization of revolutionaries at its disposal. Although there were subsequent elaborations of Leninist party doctrine (among them PCI Secretary General Palmiro Togliatti's post–World War II argument in favor of a mass-based party), communist parties retained their commitment to a distinct organizational tradition whose centerpiece was the doctrine of democratic centralism. This was true as well of the Spanish Communists who, even as they changed other components of their ideology during the 1960's and 1970's, remained firm in their adherence to this doctrine. Other than promising to return to "Leninist" interpretations of doctrine and to promote greater internal democracy once the PCE was legalized, party leaders had made no major concessions on organizational matters.[22]

Despite the contradictions implicit in coupling a commitment to political and social pluralism with an autocratic form of internal organization, the PCE experienced only scattered debate on these questions until Carrillo proposed that "Leninism" be dropped from the party program. Approval of his proposal at the 9th Congress in April 1978 (by a vote of 968 in favor, 240 against, with 40 abstentions) marked the beginning of what was to become a tortuous and still uncompleted debate within the Spanish party.

By the early 1980's, there had emerged within the PCE three competing interpretations as to the nature of the party, its relations to mass organizations, and its organizational response to peripheral nationalist movements. The majority position, articulated by Carrillo, argued for continued innovation and adaptation at the level of general policy. It emphasized, however, the continuing relevance of traditional communist organizational precepts and the need for loyalty to the party line as articulated by its leadership. For these *oficialistas*, the legalization of the party and the decision to expand its membership so as to make it a mass-based party entailed an adjustment but not a dramatic transformation in the flow of authority within the party. The three-tiered system of the PCE—leaders, activists, and members—did not require the elimination of democratic centralism. True, as an organizational rule, it might not be altogether enforceable in relations between activists and members, but democratic centralism remained very much in force for the *real* members, the leaders and the activists. For this group, democratic centralism was not only an organizational mechanism to insure unity despite the heterogeneity of the Communists' social base but also a distinguishing feature of Communists and their party organization.[23]

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[19] An example was the speech of PCE lawyer José Maria Mohedano given in March 1978, prior to the Madrid provincial conference.

[20] The term caught on after 250 critics published a document in *El Pais* (June 3, 1981) entitled "Eurocomunismo y Renovación."

[21] This is a much quoted sentence from V.I. Lenin's *What is to be Done?* See in James E. Connor, Ed., *Lenin on Politics and Revolution*, Indianapolis, Pegasus, 1968, p. 53.

[22] For the evolution of the PCE's organizational doctrine, see Mujal-León, *Communism and Political Change in Spain*, Ch. 5.

The Communists were the vanguard party in Spanish society (even if—in a concession to the sensitivities of other groups on the Left—the PCE agreed it would have to earn that leading role), and their primary constituency remained the working class. Although the extension of communist influence among all sectors of society was vital to the fulfillment of the vanguard role, the party had to direct and not merely respond to the needs of social sectors. This was true not only with respect to "new" social movements but even with respect to the working class. *Comisiones Obreras* might be "independent," but Communists were under an obligation to work within the *Comisiones* to insure that those groups' policies were consistent with those of the PCE. Although the party could not expect *Comisiones* to fall into line automatically, the *oficialistas* saw democratic centralism as the means by which party policies were made effective in relation to other organizations and movements.

As the intensity of the party battles increased, the rhetoric of the *oficialistas* became more strident, their positions tougher. This could be seen in party statute changes. Whereas the emphasis at the April 1978 9th PCE Congress had been on unlimited discussion and renewal, at the 10th Congress in 1981 the focus was on discipline. Thus, the articles that established the guidelines for expulsion and other sanctions—Articles 63 and 64—were four times as long as the corresponding articles in the 1978 statutes. In the section of the 1981 statutes dedicated to the "rights" of party members, there was a newly-incorporated reference to "the acceptance of directives and decisions made according to the principles of subordination of the minority to the majority, of inferior organizations to superior ones" (Article 10). Amendments calling for acceptance of different currents of opinion within the PCE, the "federalization" of the party, the elaboration of alternative lists, and the use of proportional criteria in the selection of representatives to leading party bodies were turned down. Paralleling these developments was the stress Carrillo now put on "party patriotism," on "the roots and sources that are ours."[24] His emphasis on "party-mindedness" further narrowed the communist base in Spanish society but aimed at drawing a favorable response from the party faithful.

The opponents of the *oficialista* position included the "hard-liners" as well as the "renovators." The former were the traditionalists within the party who wanted a return to conventional Leninist/Stalinist formulations. They placed greater emphasis on mobilizing the proletariat than on working within "institutions" (read the parliament), and advocated a supportive position toward the Soviet Union. These "hard-line" critics had viewed Carrillo's "Eurocommunist" innovations with ill-disguised contempt.

In Catalonia, the "hard-liners" won a startling victory at the 5th Congress of the Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia (PSUC) in early 1981, when they eliminated the word "Eurocommunism" from the party program.[25] Then, as other groups in the PSUC leadership and in the central party organization moved to isolate them, they responded by setting up a parallel, quasi-clandestine leadership structure in the Catalan party. This flagrant violation of democratic centralism led to the expulsion of the pro-Soviet elements in December 1981. A similar pattern emerged in Madrid.[26] There, after joining forces with the "renovators" to gain approval at a June 1981 provincial conference of an amendment permitting factions (it was defeated at the 1981 PCE Congress), Fidel Alonso and his supporters distributed a letter decrying "the scandalous situation" within the party, a situation that, in their view, "threatened to dilapidate the political capital obtained with so much sacrifice during the struggle against the dictatorship."[27] The "hard-liners" favored the re-Leninization of the PCE, but paradoxically, they joined forces with the "renovators" in most party organizations after 1979 in trying to bend, if not emasculate, democratic centralism.

While the "hard-liner" challenge to the *oficialistas* was vehement, it was not as significant as that emanating from the "renovators." The latter represented the "liberal" wing of the PCE and included several persons, like Pilar Brabo and Carlos Alonso Zaldívar, who had once been close to Carrillo and owed their careers in the party to him. The "renovators" did not question the PCE's general political strategy, attributing the recent failures of the party instead to the "lack of fit between the PCE's organizational strategy and its political project."[28] These organizational failures, in their view, had made it impossible for the Communists to recapture political initiative after the party's legalization. The core elements of the organizational proposals made by "renovators" were: (1) to overhaul radically the party structures; (2) to eliminate "Stalinist political culture"; and, (3) to create "democratic centralism of a new type." For Brabo, the model to be followed was that of the early Bolshevik party where "there existed debate, internal as well as public confrontation, and the broadest possible democratic discussion, [with allowances even for] the formation of organized tendencies."[29] This model of internal pluralism would complement the social and political pluralism to which the PCE was committed in Spanish society, and also insure the party's openness to the needs and impulses of mass movements, be they labor-based or devoted to ecological or feminist issues.

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[23] See Ignacio Latierro, "Thoughts on Eurocommunism and the Party," *Nuestra Bandera*, (Madrid), No. 108, no date, pp. 13–17.

[24] See Carrillo's interview in the weekly organ of the PSUC, *Treball* (Barcelona), June 1–7, 1982, and his July 1981 Central Committee report in *Mundo Obrero*, July 28–Aug. 5, 1981. See also his speech at the PCE Fiesta, *Mundo Obrero*, Oct. 2–8, 1981.

[25] For an extended discussion, see my article "Cataluña, Carrillo, and Eurocommunism," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March-April 1981, pp. 25–47.

[26] As noted in *La Calle*, July 14–20, 1981.

[27] *Mundo Obrero* (Special Madrid Edition), November 1981, carried the text of the letter.

[28] Pilar Brabo, "Eurcommunism and the Party," *Nuestra Bandera*, No. 106, March 1981, pp. 21–23.

Aligned with the "renovators" were several prominent intellectuals, professionals, and academics who—although they were party members and even, in the case of Ramón Tamames, belonged in the Executive Committee—could not be classified as members of the apparatus. The "renovators" also had a Basque component, led by Basque Communist Party (EPK) Secretary General Roberto Lertxundi, which supported the "federalization" of the PCE. Translated, this meant favoring party decentralization through the creation of autonomous regional units. Despite the defeat of his "federalist" thesis at the 10th Congress, Lertxundi had pressed ahead with this proposal—which infuriated Carrillo not only because it meant tampering with the "historic" structure of the party but also because it threatened to undo Carrillo's decades-long effort to reassure moderate and conservative Spaniards and the military that the PCE did not favor separatist movements. In response to Lertxundi's decision to fuse the EPK with the Basque nationalist coalition known as *Euskadiko Eskerra*,[30] the *oficialistas* dissolved the regional EPK Central Committee and then expelled Lertxundi and five other PCE Central Committee members who supported him.[31]

The Basque affair triggered a general crisis with the "renovators." Several members of this group became sponsors of a public meeting in Madrid at which Lertxundi and other Basque leaders could present their views.[32] They too were expelled—by a vote of 67 in favor, 24 against, with 8 abstentions. Their ouster more or less completed the "normalization" of the highest policymaking bodies of the PCE.

But the price for this "normalization" was high. Not only had the leadership been decimated, but the party had also badly damaged its public credibility. Worse, all of this occurred as the process of political realignment gained impetus. By late 1981, the UCD, suffering from bitter internal strife and under challenge from Manuel Fraga Iriborne's conservative Popular Alliance, was in an advanced state of decomposition. For its part, the Spanish public had lost confidence in the UCD (in the wake of the failed February 1981 coup attempt, the Centrist government had given every sign of drift), and it was now ready to put its support and hopes for the consolidation of democracy in the hands of the PSOE. After the May 1982 regional elections in Andalusia, where they received over 60 percent of the vote, the Socialists stood ready to assume the mantle of government.



Santiago Carrillo in fall 1982 after the poor electoral showing of the Communist Party of Spain raised questions about the efficacy of his leadership as secretary general.

—Katherine Young.

Rampant Factionalism

The Spanish Communist crisis reached a new high in the wake of the October 1982 parliamentary elections in which the PSOE won 48 percent of the vote (and 202 seats in the Congress of Deputies) while the

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[29] Ibid., p. 21.

[30] One of EE's components, EIA, was the political arm of the less radical Basque terrorist group, ETA (Politico-Militar).

[31] For the relevant texts, see *Mundo Obrero*, Nov. 6–12, 1981, special appendix.

[32] *El Pais*, Nov. 25, 1981; also *La Calle*, Dec. 10–16, 1981.

Communists received 3.8 percent of the vote and only 4 seats. Devastated by the Socialist landslide, the Communists turned on themselves, questioning not only the adequacy of their strategy but the relevance and future of the Communist Party itself. The polemics within the PCE took on both a more virulent and a more irrelevant tone since the debates and decisions at Central Committee sessions after 1982 have had little impact on the political life of the country. For a party whose members were used to being at the center of all political discussions, this was a difficult situation indeed. Ultimately, it seemed that the Communists had lost their self-confidence, a quality essential for successful politicians and parties, and one which had been characteristic of the PCE until its resounding defeat in October 1982. Already shaken by the failure to assume a leading role during the transition and by its meager voter support in 1977 and 1979, the PCE now became concerned whether it would ever recover political influence or close the gap in electoral support separating it from the PSOE.

The first casualty of the October 1982 elections was Santiago Carrillo, PCE Secretary General since 1960 and the architect of the party's Eurocommunist strategy. On an earlier occasion, at a Central Committee session in June 1982, he had offered his resignation—rightly confident that his colleagues in the party leadership would reject his move. It was another story at the marathon Executive and Central Committee sessions in November 1982. While few party leaders called openly for Carrillo's resignation, more and more of them were coming to the conclusion that Carrillo's authoritarian style had become the single most important obstacle to the PCE's internal pacification, and that his inability to ameliorate intraparty tensions had contributed decisively to the disastrous Communist electoral showing. Even so, few were willing to mount a direct challenge for the secretary generalship.

Carrillo tried to take advantage of this reluctance by offering his resignation and proposing his successor. The plan had an attractive simplicity. By resigning, Carrillo could sidestep the attacks of those who would seek to remove him at the next PCE Congress. Having thus seized the initiative, he was also in a better position to block the ascent of the man who had become his archrival within the PCE, Nicolás Sartorius, a former *Comisiones Obreras* leader who was not only an eminent theoretician but also a spiritual ally of those who identified with the expelled "renovator" faction.[33]

Followers of Socialist Party candidate Felipe González celebrate his electoral triumph on October 28, 1982.

—CONTACT.

An additional consideration undoubtedly entered Carrillo's mind. By resigning, he was in a position to designate a successor who would defer to him on major issues. Indeed, Carrillo apparently had in mind the creation of a bicephalous secretary generalship, in which he would deal with matters of state (such as representing the PCE when the King consulted with the political parties) and with major political and ideological issues, while his successor would handle internal party affairs and coordination.[34]

With these ideas in mind, Carrillo proposed for secretary general the leader of the Asturian Communist Party (PCA), Gerardo Iglesias. Iglesias was a young man. He had joined the PCE in 1960 at age 15, and he had risen through party ranks as a labor activist. Elected PCA Secretary in March 1978, Iglesias had made a name for himself as a "hammer of the heretics," one who had not hesitated to purge "liberal" dissidents from PCE ranks.[35] During the tumultuous debates that shook the party between 1979 and 1982, Iglesias had shown himself to be a loyal, if not exactly inspired or inspiring, supporter of Carrillo and the *oficialista* faction. Iglesias was also a young man from a working-class background whose orthodoxy could not be simply attributed to his age or to predilections formed during the Stalinist period. He appeared to be

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[33] On the confrontation between Carrillo and Sartorius at the June 1982 Central Committee session (after which Sartorius resigned as PCE Vice Secretary), see *Mundo Obrero*, June 18–24, 1982, and the coverage in *El País*, June 11–14, 1982.

[34] See *Mundo Obrero*, Sept. 30–Oct. 6, 1983, p. 44 for a reference to this.

[35] As Carrillo remarked during an *El País* interview: "It was in Asturias where the conclusions of the 10th Congress had been best applied." *El País*, Nov. 14, 1982.

Party delegates remain seated in silence as Santiago Carrillo, former party secretary general, walks to the rostrum at a national conference of the Spanish Communist Party in December 1982.

—Photo by Bernardo Perez as published in *El País* (Madrid), Dec. 20, 1982.

the ideal candidate, one who would make sure that things in the PCE did not change too much and that Carrillo would retain his influence.

But orderly transitions are difficult, and controlled ones even more so. Iglesias was neither a charismatic speaker nor a bold conceptualizer. He was, however, a proud man and, upon assuming the post of secretary general, his horizons changed. In the first place, he was simply unwilling to become a pawn in another man's efforts to retain power. Carrillo's resignation opened the floodgates of criticism within the party, and Iglesias found himself compelled to propose and to entertain solutions to the PCE's crisis that he could have ignored in his earlier post as regional party secretary.

At first, he was not bold. He did not agree with those who wished to convoke a new congress, and urged instead that a national conference (whose powers were much less extensive) be convened to discuss the 1982 election results and their implications. But even at this early stage, he did not defend Carrillo or the PCE's record as much as the former Secretary General might have liked. Instead, he marked his distance from Carrillo. As secretary general, Iglesias insisted during his first address to the Central Committee (much to the discomfort of Carrillo who was in the audience), he and not another would be in charge. Several weeks later, in an interview with the Madrid daily *El País*, Iglesias pointedly remarked: "I do not mimetically follow one or another person, that is not my style."[36]

No less important than this public distancing from Carrillo were Iglesias's diagnoses of the causes of the Spanish Communist crisis. In the *El País* interview, he alluded to the "loss of contact with social movements" by the Communists prior to October 1982, and he called for the reincorporation of those intellectuals and artists who had either left or been expelled from the PCE.[37]

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[36] Ibid, Nov. 30, 1982; see also the much later interview in *Tiempo* (Madrid), Mar. 25, 1985.

That things were not going well between Carrillo and Iglesias became quite apparent at the party's National Conference in December 1982. The former Secretary General missed the first two days of the meeting, and arrived (to an embarrassing lack of applause) only on the final day. At issue was the report Iglesias presented in the name of the Central Committee, which the Executive Committee to which Carrillo still belonged had debated in the days prior to the conference.[38] The report presented a preliminary analysis of what had gone wrong with and for the Communist Party. Couched in somewhat vague terms, the report nevertheless insisted on the "need for profound criticism, self-criticism, and changes in the PCE." More specifically, Iglesias argued that Carrillo's proposal to create a "democratic front" of the UCD, PSOE, and PCE after the February 1981 coup attempt had been incorrect. Then and now, he said, the PCE should have pursued a "strategy of democratic collaboration" with emphasis on closer ties with the Socialists. Under present circumstances, a pillar of this strategy should be critical but constructive criticism of the Socialist government. In slightly more elliptical fashion, Iglesias also referred to needed improvements in the relationship between the party and "mass organizations," and he criticized the chasm that had developed since the onset of democracy between the party leadership and the PCE's membership.

Iglesias also called for as yet unspecified changes in the party's leadership organs. When broached in the Executive Committee prior to the National Conference, this had elicited sharply negative responses from the still incipient *carrillista* faction. Some changes in the PCE leadership had occurred during the summer of 1982. Marcelino Camacho, who was head of the *Comisiones Obreras*, had resigned from the Executive Committee; the Central Committee elected José Carlos Mauricio, Eulalia Vintró, and Andreu Claret Serra to the Executive Committee.[39] But even with the addition of the Catalans (whose relationship with Carrillo had never been good), the balance in the Executive Committee and in the Secretariat remained clearly with Carrillo. As the *carrillistas* now understood from his report, Iglesias had in mind more profound changes. These proposals would become the source of ever greater controversy as the battle for control of the PCE's apparatus got under way.

While the election of Iglesias as secretary general marked a major transition for the PCE, another significant development was the split in the old guard of the party. Most of the latter (including Executive Committee members Simon Sánchez Montero, Francisco Romero Marín, José María González Jerez, Ignacio Gallego, and Armando López Salinas) had been closely aligned with Carrillo since the early 1960's. Although some of them had viewed the PCE's "Eurocommunist" evolution with concern, generally they provided a solid and dependable base of support for Carrillo in the highest councils of the party. This core of support began to disintegrate during 1982.

One member of this group—Ignacio Gallego—would resign from the PCE in December 1983, and subsequently head the unified pro-Soviet Communist party, *Partido Comunista de los Pueblos de España* (PCPE). Gallego had made no secret of his lack of enthusiasm for the "Eurocommunist" direction of the PCE, and most party members assumed he was in close touch not only with pro-Soviet and hard-line dissidents within the party but also with diplomatic personnel from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Gallego had been the PCE's organizational secretary through the mid-1970's, when his relations with Carrillo became strained. Partly for political reasons and partly for personal ones, however, Carrillo had kept him on the Executive Committee, where he gave expression to the latent pro-Soviet sentiment shared by many militants, but which few of them expressed openly. Though he voted after November 1982 with the *carrillista* faction, Gallego did so primarily because he opposed the direction in which Iglesias and his allies had begun to take the party.

More ominous for Carrillo were the defections of Simón Sánchez Montero and Santiago Alvarez, old friends who parted company with him in late 1982. Of the two, Sánchez Montero was the more important, since he had been closely associated with Carrillo's effort both at the 9th Congress and later to rally support around the "Eurocommunist" position and to contain the combined "renovator" and "hard-line" challenge to Carrillo's power. It is difficult to determine why Sánchez Montero decided to support Iglesias. Undoubtedly personal considerations played a role: Sánchez Montero may have been offended by Carrillo's assumption that he had a right to life tenure in the secretary generalship. He may also have concluded that Carrillo was an obstacle to the recovery of the

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[37] *El Pais*, Nov. 14, 1982, and *Mundo Obrero*, Dec. 3–9, 1982.

[38] See *Mundo Obrero*, Dec. 17–23, 1982, pp. 9ff., for the quotations in this paragraph.

[39] Ibid., July 9–15, 1982.

PCE. Whatever the explanation, Sánchez Montero's support for Iglesias was crucial in the first weeks of the latter's mandate, since it eventually encouraged others in the old guard (for example, Romero Marín and González Jerez) to rally around Iglesias. This did not take place over night, of course. When Iglesias presented his specific proposals for personnel changes to the Executive Committee in February 1983, Romero Marín and González Jerez abstained (as did PCE president Dolores Ibárruri) on a very close vote of 13 in favor and 10 opposed.[40]

The parameters of debate in the PCE changed significantly after Carrillo's resignation. He was now in many respects just another party baron. No longer could "Santiago" and the PCE be identified in one breath, and this opened the doors to a realignment within the party leadership. The change in the old guard's position was both a reflection and a cause of this transformation and presaged changes among other segments of the party. Iglesias rallied a heterogeneous coalition around himself. One group represented the old guard. A second group represented labor activists, whose principal exponents were *Comisiones Obreras* leader Marcelino Camacho and former PCE Vice Secretary General Nicolás Sartorius. They criticized Carrillo's organizational heavy-handedness and his excessively "traditional" (and "instrumental") conception of party–trade union relations. Sartorius also provided a rallying point for a third group, among which could be numbered most Catalan Communist leaders who generally identified with the "renovators."[41] They wanted not only an "updating" of the PCE's program and practices, but the reintegration of the dissidents expelled during Carrillo's last years. A fourth group, representative of younger elements in the party apparatus, threw its support behind Iglesias. Individuals like Enrique Curiel and Juan Francisco Pla had been unstinting in their support for Carrillo, but they were not about to back a loser in the post–October 1982 horse race, especially when Iglesias seemed intent on bringing his own followers into the party administration. They could protect their own positions best by changing sides.

The *carrillistas* thus became the rump of the formerly dominant *oficialista* faction. Their common denominator (at the risk of some oversimplification) was opposition to the "renovators." According to the *carrillistas*, the "renovators" were to blame for the hemorrhage in PCE membership and for the electoral defeat in October 1982. Had they not been "social democrats" in disguise, and had they had more "party spirit," the PCE would have been united for the elections. Even if the Socialists had won, the recovery of the party's political space could have been quickly accomplished. Party leaders were wasting their time in trying to convince the "renovators" to return to the party, since they were neither wanted nor needed. Moreover, to seek the return of the "renovators" was, in effect, to apologize for their expulsion and to imply no confidence in the stewardship of Carrillo.[42] According to his supporters, neither Carrillo nor those who had backed him had anything for which to apologize.

This perspective dominated the analyses of the *carrillistas*, who had been ruthless executors of party policy between 1978 and 1982. Thus, Adolfo Piñedo, Ignacio Latierro, Juan Villalba, and José Luis Pérez de la Fuente had been party secretaries in several regions (Madrid, the Basque country, Valencia, and Galicia) where the "renovator" challenge had been strong but ultimately unsuccessful.[43] By contrast, in Asturias, where Iglesias had been in charge, the "renovators" had challenged, as it were, before their time. Party discipline and self-confidence were still strong in March 1978 when the confrontation had taken place; the national leadership was not yet divided; and the Asturian party had a strong *ouvrièriste* orientation as well as a tradition of discipline. Together, these factors contributed to the defeat of the "renovators" there.[44]

The crystallization of *carrillista* and *gerardista* factions had become apparent by early 1983. As noted earlier, Iglesias's proposal for changes in the organization of the party had been adopted by a narrow margin in the Executive Committee, and even in the Central Committee the vote of 44 in favor and 32 against was probably too close for comfort. But the *gerardistas* were in the majority, and they quickly set about consolidating their control. This meant, in the first place, changing the composition of the Secretariat. Jaime Ballesteros, a long-time Carrillo protégé, remained as PCE vice secretary general and assumed the duties of international secretary, but he was ousted as head of the crucially important organizational department.[45] In his place, Iglesias named Francisco

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[40] On the changes, see *Mundo Obrero*, Jan. 28-Feb. 3, 1983. *El Pais*, Jan. 31, 1983, reported the Executive Committee vote. The Central Committee approved the changes by a vote of 44 to 32.

[41] The PSUC leadership had always had difficult relations with Carrillo, and many blamed him for the party's troubles in Catalonia in 1981–82.

[42] Carrillo explained his view of the PCE crisis (in Barcelona's *La Vanguardia*, Mar. 11, 1983) when he said that some members had not been Communists to begin with and others had stopped being Communists.

[43] See the discussion in Ch. 8 of my *Communism and Political Change in Spain*.

[44] For coverage of the Asturian regional congress, see *El Pais*, Mar. 28, 1978, and *Diario 16* (Madrid), Mar. 27, 1978.

[45] *Mundo Obrero*, Jan. 28–Feb. 3, 1983.

Palero, a relatively obscure provincial secretary from Guadalajara, whose principal merit was that he owed his ascendance to Iglesias. Iglesias also confirmed Eulalia Vintró as the cultural secretary (thereby solidifying his alliance with the Catalan Communists) and proposed Enrique Curiel for the post of vice secretary general.[46] Although Sartorius did not figure among those named, he was becoming the gray eminence behind Iglesias, and his influence was especially visible in the political and ideological arguments Iglesias presented in subsequent months.

Parameters of the Communist Debate

The political debate between *carrillistas* and *gerardistas* focused on the conditions and desirability of unity between the PCE and PSOE, about appropriate relationships between the PCE and "mass-based" organizations, and about the development and extension of internal party democracy. It began with a controversy over what had gone wrong since Franco's death in November 1975. What could or should the party and its leadership have done differently? The *carrillistas* argued that the PCE had done everything it could to assure the success of the *ruptura* with the Franco regime. However, conservative international (read the United States) and domestic (read the UCD, but with a hefty assist from a PSOE that buckled under to pressure from the military, the Church, and other *poderes fácticos*) forces had conspired to prevent the *ruptura*. Despite the party's best efforts to compel the formation of a "government of national concentration," the UCD and PSOE strategy of bipolarization had prevailed. The February 1981 coup attempt (and the subsequent rapid decomposition of the UCD) made the Socialists appear to be Spanish democracy's only salvation. When coupled with the Communists' own internal crisis (blamed on the "renovators"), the Socialist landslide was easily explicable.[47]

What did the *carrillistas* propose that the PCE do under existing circumstances? For one thing, they argued, there should be immediate and constant criticism of the Socialist government. No truce was possible, nor was it desirable to look for points of convergence with the Socialists. As Adolfo Piñedo declared in mid-June 1983: "It is one thing that we demand and call for the unity of the Left as an essential condition of our political project, but quite another that we invent the conditions when they do not exist."[48] This diagnosis left exceedingly little room for accommodation. The *carrillistas* therefore urged the PCE to lead strikes and demonstrations against the Socialist government's conservative economic policies, and particularly against its efforts at industrial reconversion prior to Spain's accession to the European Economic Communities (EEC).[49] The PCE had to offer a choice, not echo government policies. It had to attack the Socialists from the Left, not compete with the PSOE for the Center's political space.

The argument was at odds with the justifications Carrillo had offered during the transition and in the early period of the democratic regime for pursuing alliance with Suárez and the UCD. But the contradiction was more apparent than real. Underlying the *carrillistas*' position (in 1977 as in 1983) was a reflexive anti-PSOE thrust. To the *carrillistas*, the PSOE was a "social-democratic" party, with all its pejorative connotations for communists.[50] In the Spanish context such sentiments were reinforced by the two parties' competition during the Civil War as well as by the more recent battle for political supremacy on the Left during the transition. However much Carrillo insisted on his "Eurocommunist" credentials, he had had his ideas formed by experiences in the 1930's, and he never lost his animosity toward socialists.[51]

But there was another, more immediate, reason for the resentment Carrillo and his allies felt toward the Socialists. They reaped, Carrillo believed, the fruits of decades of Communist labor in the vineyard of Spanish society. This almost pathological dislike for the PSOE and its leaders undergirded Carrillo's search for an accord with Suárez and the UCD in 1977, as well as his demand for frontal Communist opposition to the Socialist government in the wake of the October 1982 elections.[52]

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[46] Ibid.

[47] For a succinct and typical statement, see the editorial in *Ahora* (Madrid), No. 1, July 1984, pp. 4–7. Carrillo began publishing this monthly in mid-1984, alleging the PCE leadership was cutting off debate in the regular party press.

[48] *Mundo Obrero*, June 17–23, 1983.

[49] See Robert Fishman's "Socialist Government without Redistribution: The Spanish Experience," presented at the conference on "Socialist Government in Market Economies," Center of International Studies, Princeton University, January 1986. For the *carrillista* argument against "social pacts," see Julián Ariza's article in *Hora de Madrid* (organ of the PCE's Madrid regional organization), June 19, 1984.

[50] The origins of this visceral distrust of social democracy are not difficult to find. Social democracy was despised by communists from the very beginning and use of the term "social fascism" in the late 1920's and early 1930's was merely the most explicit expression of this sentiment.

[51] Even at the height of the PCE's Eurocommunism, the antisocialist edge had been pronounced. At a September 1973 Central Committee meeting, Carrillo actually said: "However many have been our errors and those of our comrades, the social democrats represent an example of the kind of policy the proletariat should never have followed. And any future unity demands from them a much more profound self-critical revision than the one we have to do." *Eurocomunismo–Socialismo en Libertad* (Eurocommunism—Socialism in Freedom), Madrid Ediciones Forma, 1977, p. 32.

Having once defined the Socialists as their principal political target, the *carrillistas* presented their ideas as to who the PCE's potential social and political allies were. In contrast to the *gerardistas* (who argued in favor of a convergence with ecologists, pacifists, and other "new" social movements), the *carrillistas* called on the PCE to pay more attention to traditional alliance partners, such as the labor movement. A final component of the *carrillista* argument related to the PCE itself and how the party ought to recover its internal cohesion and dynamism. Here the *carrillistas* opposed the Iglesias leadership's efforts to regain the allegiance of the "renovators."[53] Such a course was not only impractical but would lead the party toward even greater concessions on ideological and organizational questions. The concessions would move the PCE further away from the communist ideal and toward complete "social-democratization."

The *gerardistas* brought a different perspective to the post-October 1982 Spanish Communist crisis. As Iglesias explained in late June 1983, the PCE's problems had begun in mid-1979 when the party leadership (and in particular Carrillo) had "failed to comprehend the full magnitude of the changes taking place in the country."[54] Iglesias and his supporters argued that in the aftermath of the March 1979 parliamentary elections, Spanish democracy entered a period of profound crisis. The UCD's swing to the right and its implicit acceptance of the Socialist strategy of bipolarization changed the dynamics of the party system. These circumstances made any accord "between a disunited Left, with hugely disparate positions on the political situation, and a disintegrating democratic Right, assailed by a strong attack from conservative sectors," impossible to attain. But the PCE, Iglesias argued, had continued to call for such a "democratic front" even while warning the electorate against voting for the PSOE. By so doing, the Carrillo leadership had profoundly misjudged the real situation in the country. Spaniards' "desire for change" and support for democracy had increased (especially after the February 1981 coup attempt), even as "reaction was forcing the UCD's policy to turn increasingly to the Right." By painting a catastrophic picture of the situation by "presenting the country with a choice between a democratic front and repression," the Carrillo leadership had "facilitated the PSOE's task, granting it a free hand to interpret and assume as its own the desire for change."

What should the PCE do in the wake of the Socialist landslide? The *gerardistas* had a two-pronged answer. The PCE should not "attack the PSOE's clearly moderate policy." To do so, Iglesias and his allies argued, would be to lose "all our credibility." What the country and the PCE needed was to press for "cooperation between Socialists and Communists." In this way alone could the PSOE's concessions to the Right be thwarted. Such a course would also create conditions for "a genuine progressive alternative" in the 1986 parliamentary elections. Even if the PCE were unsuccessful in compelling the Socialists into forming a coalition, the Communists would have worked "to bar the way for the Right and to prevent the PSOE from governing as moderately as it is now." "There are great opportunities for the PCE," Iglesias declared, "if we put forward a consistent strategy in which criticism of the PSOE is complemented by unity between Socialists and Communists." "To break the two-party system," he went on, "let us work for the alternative of a left-wing government of Socialists, Communists, and other progressive forces."

The other dimension of the *gerardista* strategy for the PCE's "recovery" was "to undertake the renewal of the party as an instrument for political action . . . to discover new forms of work, and to take up and develop certain forms that we have abandoned." The language may have been uninspired, but the *carrillistas* could not have missed its meaning: Carrillo and his supporters had not understood what the "new concept of the mass party" was all about; they had not "normalized disagreements, strengthened participation in deliberations and collective work," or encouraged "autonomy of initiative vis-à-vis society by various party sectors."

The PCE's "regeneration" had profound political as well as organizational implications. In terms of alliance strategy, Iglesias urged the PCE to be flexible toward "new social movements." "The party ought to be very sensitive and attentive toward every kind of more or less stable mass social organization with more or less comprehensive objectives for modifying the current system."[55] And it should pay particular attention to those pacifist and ecologist movements whose "struggle" was "objectively one for transformation." The second aspect of the *gerardista* proposal (one

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[52] See Adolfo Piñedo's articles, "On the Necessity for the PCE to Have a Political Line," *Ahora*, No. 2, October 1984, pp. 6–9; and "On the Recovery of the Left," ibid., No. 4, December 1984, pp. 7–9. For the PCE leadership's contrasting view, see the authoritative article by Executive Committee member Simón Sánchez Montero entitled "PCE Policy Toward the Socialist Government," *Mundo Obrero*, June 24–30, 1983.

[53] Piñedo expressed the *carrillistas'* opposition to "concessions" in an interview-debate published in the PCE's theoretical journal, *Nuestra Bandera*, September-October, 1984.

[54] The quotes in this and succeeding paragraphs are from Iglesias's address to the PCE Central Committee as published in *Mundo Obrero*, July 1–7, 1983, pp. 7–15.

[55] Ibid.

which Iglesias addressed indirectly in his June 1983 Central Committee speech when he referred to the need for a better "dialectical approach" toward "sectoral groups") was to link the PCE's "recovery" to the party's success in "facilitating the return of many Communists."[56] Here again, even though he did not explicitly mention the "renovators," there was no mistaking the thrust of Iglesias's remarks. Unlike the *carrillistas*, he thought that the "renovators" were recoverable. And, even more significant, he still regarded them as "Communists."

When the Central Committee met in late June 1983, the stage had been set for a sharp confrontation between the *gerardista* and *carrillista* factions. As we have seen, debates within the Executive and Central Committees had already been ascerbic. Even so, there were many on both sides of the factional struggle who still hoped that differences could be resolved. After the municipal elections of May 1983 these hopes began to evaporate.[57] The *gerardistas* had been quick to seize on their good outcome as proof of the PCE's recovery, and Iglesias himself wasted little time in ascribing the Communists' success to his policy of maintaining "an intelligent balance between a constant attack on Fraga as the principal opponent, and well-argued and responsible criticism of the most negative aspects of the government's policy."[58] He argued that the Communists should press forward with their efforts to conclude municipal agreements with the PSOE, to engage in a "peace struggle" against Spain's membership in NATO and American military bases on Spanish soil, and to seek negotiations with the Socialist government on economic policy. These proposals were directly contrary to the *carrillistas'* position, who had little hope for agreement with the Socialists. Although they agreed with the *gerardistas* on the "peace struggle," they saw in the NATO issue not so much an instrument for compelling the Socialists toward closer collaboration with the PCE, as a sledgehammer with which to pound the González government for having renounced its earlier call for immediate Spanish withdrawal from NATO.[59]

The 11th PCE Congress

If the May 1983 municipal election results confirmed the *gerardistas* and *carrillistas* in the correctness of their respective positions, then the preparations for the 11th PCE Congress to be held later in 1983 merely hardened them. The agenda for this congress had been the principal item of business at a Central Committee plenum in late June 1983. Iglesias defined the tasks of the 11th Congress as follows: "to develop, promote, and update" the PCE's Eurocommunist character. Iglesias's reference to "Eurocommunism" as a "movement of recovery and creative regeneration of Marxism" clearly conveyed—without use of the word "renovation"—the meaning of this proposal. The battle lines were thus drawn. Iglesias's report to the full Central Committee repeated his call for reconciliation with those who had abandoned the PCE, urged that criticism of the Socialist government be constructive, and called on the party to have an open attitude toward alliance with the "new social movements." The report elicited strong opposition at both the Executive and Central committees. In the former, the vote was 13 in favor, 7 against, with 1 abstention; in the Central

Gerardo Iglesias shown in November 1982, shortly after his election to replace Santiago Carrillo as Secretary General of the Communist Party of Spain.

—Etienne Montes/GAMMA-LIAISON.

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[56] Ibid.

[57] The election results showed the PCE gaining approximately 600,000 votes relative to October 1982, while the PSOE lost more than 2.5 million votes.

[58] *Mundo Obrero*, May 20–26, 1983.

[59] For an analysis of the PSOE's foreign policy, see my *Spanish Foreign Policy Since Franco: Looking Beyond the Pyrenees* (forthcoming), Chs. 1 and 2.

Committee, the vote was 43 for, 27 against, with 1 abstention.[60]

The Central Committee session in particular showed the depth of the fissures that had developed in the PCE. In an address that was notably leftist in tone, Carrillo sharply contradicted the theses in Iglesias's report by describing the PSOE's policies as "liberal-bourgeois," and demanded both greater state control over the economy and a moratorium on Spanish entry into the EEC. Describing himself as "boxed in" by the *gerardista* majority, Carrillo refused to join the commission that would draft the political documents for the 11th Congress. His allies Adolfo Piñedo and Julián Ariza adopted similar positions.[61]

There was evidence at the plenum of further disaggregation in the top PCE ranks. Executive Committee member Ignacio Gallego reacted irately to Iglesias's reference to the "degenerative process in the countries of 'real socialism'," and he launched into praise of the Soviet Union's accomplishments. Vice Secretary General Ballesteros—in a move that was in clear violation of party statutes and that elicited objections from Francisco Romero Marín—tried to present an alternative report to the Central Committee.[62]

There was little room left for compromise after the June 1983 Central Committee plenum. Indeed, in the months leading up to the 11th Congress, this reality began to dawn on ordinary party members. Agonized, almost plaintive letters were published in *Mundo Obrero* in the next six months. One writer implored: "We Communists should stop looking at each other as enemies or adversaries."[63] But the party base was dismayed not simply because acrimonious disputes had erupted in the highest organs of the party. The decision to convene a new party congress also unleashed a bitter fight in party federations and *agrupaciones* for control of the delegations that would attend the congress. Precisely because no single faction had overwhelming support (more than 40 percent of the Central Committee had voted against Iglesias's report in June 1983), the *gerardista*, *carrillista*, and pro-Soviet factions threw themselves headlong into the fray.

Of the three groups, the pro-Soviet faction was the weakest. Due to the expulsion or resignation of many of its stars,[64] the pro-Soviet faction had only scattered support. At the Executive Committee level, there were Gallego and Armando López Salinas; in the Central Committee, the faction had more support including the charismatic but utterly unpredictable leader of the Andalusian agricultural proletariat, Juan Antonio Romero. Among regional party federations, the pro-Soviet faction had some organizational weight in Castille, but its most significant stronghold was in Andalusia where it probably represented 25 to 30 percent of PCE members.[65] The importance of the pro-Soviet faction was not to be underestimated however. Given the close balance between *gerardistas* and *carrillistas*, the pro-Soviets were to prove a crucial swing vote at the Congress.

The numerous pro-Soviet groups that existed outside the official Communist Party also provided an important though negative (from the *gerardista* as well as *carrillista* perspective) reference point for PCE members. Just as the pre–11th Congress debates were beginning, these groups announced their intention to pursue negotiations to create a unified pro-Soviet party.[66] The unification congress met in January 1984 and elected Ignacio Gallego—who had resigned from the PCE Executive Committee in early December 1983—as the secretary general of the *Partido Comunista de los Pueblos de España* (PCPE).[67]

There had been other pro-Soviet splinter efforts in the past, but the creation of the PCPE signaled a new phase.[68] For one thing, it came after nearly five years of continuing crisis in the course of which "historic" party figures were publicly attacking and insulting each other. The PCPE soon boasted several former PCE Executive Committee members, including Jaime

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[60] *El País*, June 26 and July 1, 1983.

[61] Ibid., June 29, 1983.

[62] *Mundo Obrero*, Aug. 5–11, 1983.

[63] Another described the spectacle at Central Committee meetings as "a pack of dogs fighting over meat." See ibid., Nov. 4–10 and Nov. 25–Dec. 1, 1983.

[64] Francisco Garcia Salve, a defrocked Jesuit who had been a leader in the *Comisiones Obreras* as well as a member of the Central Committee, was expelled from the PCE in July 1981; pro-Soviet Catalan Communists had set up their own party in April 1982; and *Comisiones Obreras* leader and Central Committee member Fidel Alonso had been expelled in June 1982 by the *carrillista*-controlled Madrid Regional Committee.

[65] At the Andalusian regional party congress in December 1983, a resolution supporting Eurocommunism had been approved by a vote of 179 for, 57 against, with 41 abstentions. *Mundo Obrero*, Dec. 8–14, 1983.

[66] Involved in this venture were the *Celulas Comunistas* (led by Fernando Sagaseta), the *Movimiento de Recuperación del PCE* (with José Cabo), the *Movimiento de Recuperación y Unificación del PC* (Fidel Alonso and Francisco Garcia Salve), the *Partido de los Comunistas de Cataluña* (Pere Ardiaca and Joan Ramos), and the *Partido Comunista de España Unificado* (J.R. Carvajal). One of the original pro-Soviet splinter groups, the *Partido Comunista Obrero Español*, whose leader was Civil War veteran Enrique Lister, also joined the negotiations but eventually withdrew.

[67] For Gallego's public letter of resignation, see the *Carta de Dimisión de Ignacio Gallego Dirigida al Comité Ejecutivo del PCE* (Letter of Resignation by Ignacio Gallego to the Executive Committee of the PCE), 1983. The PCE's response was published in *Mundo Obrero*, Jan. 20–26, 1984.

[68] On earlier splinter groups, see my article, "The Soviet and Spanish Communist Parties: Policies, Tactics, and Negotiating Behavior," *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Los Angeles), Autumn 1982, pp. 236–65. For a concise exposition of the PCPE's views, see Ignacio Gallego's *Informe/Resúmen al Congreso de Unidad de los Comunistas* (Information/Summary to the Unification Congress of Communists), January 1984, no place of publication.

CARTA DE DIMISION
DE IGNACIO GALLEGO
DIRIGIDA
AL COMITE EJECUTIVO
DEL PARTIDO
COMUNISTA DE ESPAÑA

The cover of a pamphlet in which Ignacio Gallego publishes his "Letter of Resignation to the Executive Committee of the Communist Party of Spain" in December 1983; in the following month, he became secretary general of a new Communist Party (Spain), which later became known as the Communist Party of the Peoples of Spain.

Ballesteros (as of December 1984) and Armando López Salinas (in July 1985). This pro-Soviet group was also different in that its adherents were not simply aging Communists with a nostalgia for the 1920's and 1930's. Gallego was the secretary general and other old-timers joined the PCPE. But there was no dearth of young people involved in the new party, and the PCPE also had a strong nucleus of labor activists. Their impact on the *Comisiones Obreras* was disproportionate to their numbers. They were never strong enough to make a bid for the leadership of the *Comisiones*, but they were a constant thorn in the side of the *gerardista* and *carrillista* factions within the *Comisiones*. Moreover, their very presence reduced the *Comisiones'* stature and encouraged many labor activists to seek an escape from "party" politics.[69] This latest pro-Soviet enterprise had every appearance of seriousness, a quality apparently recognized by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which sent an official delegation to the constituent congress and began to provide the PCPE with both moral and financial assistance.[70]

Important though the convergence among pro-Soviet groups was, the main battle in the pre–11th Congress period was between the *gerardista* and *carrillista* factions. The former had a number of advantages. They had been in control of the party's organizational department for nearly a year. Among other things, this gave them the right to certify the number of delegates any party federation could send to the congress. The *gerardistas* wielded this instrument judiciously but effectively, reducing by a small but not insignificant number the delegation of the *carrillista*-controlled Madrid federation. Locked in a tight battle for a majority at the Congress, the Iglesias leadership also made overtures to the "Leninist" faction in Andalusia led by Juan Antonio Romero. Thus, despite serious misgivings about the enterprise, the Iglesias leadership offered its support for the so-called "March for an Integral Agrarian Reform," the brainchild of Romero, who wanted to organize a 40-day trek through Andalusia by agricultural laborers to protest the high unemployment rate (25-30 percent by official counts) in the region as well as the Socialist government's economic policies in general.[71] The *gerardistas* controlled party federations in Andalusia, Asturias, and Catalonia (these three could claim 37,000 of the total 84,000 PCE members), while the *carrillistas* held sway in Madrid, Valencia, the Basque country, and Galicia. Although control of the latter gave the *carrillistas* an automatic four seats on the PCE Executive Committee, it did not provide them with large numbers of delegates to the Congress. Galicia and the Basque country, for example, only had 3,900 members between them.[72] Despite these disadvantages, at the onset of the Congress the *carrillistas* could not be entirely counted out. Carrillo had been secretary general for a long time, and loyalties toward him (as well as animosities) were still very strong.

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[69] One reflection of this disenchantment was the resignation from the party of Catalan CC.OO. Secretary General José Luis López Bulla, who had been on the PCE Central and the PSUC Executive committees.

[70] PCE President Dolores Ibárruri (and Iglesias) sent a letter to then CPSU General Secretary Yuriy Andropov complaining about this "unfriendly act." *Mundo Obrero*, Jan. 20–26, 1984. Obviously, figures on Soviet aid to the PCPE are impossible to obtain. The PCPE (and its Catalan homologue, the PCC) do not lack for office space and propaganda. Party officials travel a great deal to the Soviet bloc. It can be assumed that much of the support is transferred through mixed trading enterprises.

[71] Ibid., Sept. 9–15, 1983.

[72] On the official regional membership figures, see ibid., Dec. 16–22, 1983. The party claimed a total of 84,652 members in December 1983.

The anticipation and uncertainty surrounding the 11th PCE Congress climaxed on the first day, with a vote on the report Iglesias had presented to the delegates on behalf of the Central Committee. The vote was favorable by the narrowest of margins (386 for, 376 against, and 25 abstentions);[73] nevertheless, this sufficed to generate an ultimately unstoppable momentum in favor of the *gerardista* position. Iglesias's report drew on and developed many of the ideas he and his collaborators had advanced in the course of the previous year.[74] He called for an *alternativa de progreso* to the PSOE government. While emphasizing the importance of "criticizing and mobilizing" against the Socialists, Iglesias also called on the PCE "to avoid creating the danger or the sensation of trying to bring the PSOE down." With respect to the sources of the Spanish Communist crisis, Iglesias identified 1978 as a turning point, and criticized the "methods of leadership" that, he said, affected not only the way Leninism had been discussed at the 9th Congress but also encouraged the party's "growing de-mobilization." Pointedly, he noted that his predecessor's errors had been less "in the political [sphere] than in the way of executing that policy, and in the methods of work within the party." The crisis in membership and the problems with the "renovators" had developed because the previous leadership had been incapable of carrying out "more collective and participatory work." Finally, in what must have been a bitter pill for Carrillo to swallow, Iglesias called for the "recuperation of the revolutionary and class nature of the party."

The 11th PCE Congress signalled the organizational consolidation of the *gerardista* position. By close but still quite predictable margins, the delegates approved the *gerardista* version of the Congress theses, and the election of the new Central Committee left little room for doubt as to the balance of forces. Iglesias was reelected secretary general by a 69 to 31 margin, and his supporters had an overwhelming majority in the Executive Committee. More important, no *carrillista* was appointed to the Secretariat, a body which, in subsequent months, would become a super–Executive Committee.

In the wake of the 11th Congress, Iglesias and his supporters moved to consolidate their influence and control over the PCE. They did this in three ways. The first was to press forward with organizational housecleaning. Within a few weeks of the Congress, the PCE Secretariat focused its attention on those regional organizations where the *carrillistas* remained strong or were in control. Madrid and Valencia were special targets. In meetings with the regional executive committees, Secretariat members pressed the *carrillista* majority to implement the resolutions approved at the 11th Congress.[75] Some of the criticisms were over apparently trivial issues such as the failure to distribute copies of the new party statutes or tickets for the PCE 1984 Fiesta. Others went more directly to the core of the disagreement between the *gerardista* and *carrillista* factions. Specifically, the Secretariat demanded that the regional party organizations adopt a truly "open door" policy toward the "renovators." None of the *carrillista*-controlled organizations was willing to do this. As a result, the Madrid-based PCE leadership began to develop its own parallel party networks in the affected regions. Another set of organizational initiatives involved the decision to bypass regional or provincial party organizations altogether in order to negotiate the simultaneous entry—as in Valladolid in mid-February 1984—of several dozen "former militants."

The second set of initiatives involved cultivation of the PCE's international contacts and credibility. Spanish Communist relations with other communist parties had eroded since 1979. Not only had ties with the CPSU and other Soviet bloc parties deteriorated, but so had the party's links with its West European counterparts. The *gerardistas* needed international contacts not only to legitimate themselves before the party base but also to undercut Carrillo's claims to international stature. After all, he had been one of the founding fathers of "Eurocommunism," and his international experience was unmatched by any other party leader.

Against this background, there developed the *gerardistas'* search for new international relationships. Gone were the heady days when the PCE had refused to deal with parties (such as Czechoslovakia's) which it considered too pro-Soviet. The Iglesias leadership reaffirmed the PCE's earlier criticism of "real socialism," but it did so *sotto voce*. "Communist internationalism," wrote Simón Sánchez Montero in early 1984, involved two principles: "active solidarity with all the peoples who struggle against imperialism," and "reinforce[ment] of links with all Communist parties."[76] In line with this approach, the Iglesias leadership undertook to renew its contacts with ruling communist parties. A PCE delegation traveled to China in April 1984, and Iglesias made trips to Bulgaria, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Romania in May and June 1984. A lower-level PCE delegation (headed by international Secretary Sánchez Montero) visited Hungary in May 1984, and signed a communiqué that referred to "great cordiality and mutual comprehension" at the meeting between the two parties.[77]

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[73] Ibid., Dec. 23-29, 1983.

[74] Ibid., Dec. 16-22, 1983, pp. 17-35.

[75] Ibid., Mar. 30–Apr. 5 and May 24-30, 1984.

[76] Ibid., Feb. 17-23, 1984.

Even before the 11th Congress, there was a noticeable improvement in PCE relations with its Portuguese counterpart, a party known for its close alignment with Moscow. Ties between the PCE and PCP had been frigid since 1974, and the hostility between Carrillo and Alvaro Cunhal had been scarcely veiled. By December 1983, however, relations had improved to a point where Iglesias attended the 10th PCP Congress, and a Portuguese Communist delegation reciprocated by attending the PCE Congress a week later.[78] How to explain these developments? The PCP had not deviated from its pro-Soviet stance in the intervening period, and neither had many of the ruling communist parties represented at the PCE Congress. The answer is that the *gerardistas* were eager to normalize relations with the CPSU and those parties that were aligned with it, not least because they hoped thereby to undercut the pro-Soviet splinter groups.

What were the CPSU and its ruling (and non-ruling) allies doing about the situation? Here the answer is a bit more involved. Certainly, the Soviets had little sympathy for the PCE leadership, although if forced to choose, they would prefer Iglesias to Carrillo. The CPSU and its allies actively supported the creation of the pro-Soviet PCPE in January 1984, and beginning with an official visit by Ignacio Gallego in May 1984 (he was received by the chiefs of the CPSU International Department, Boris Ponomarëv and Vadim Zagladin), there were numerous official exchanges between the CPSU and PCPE.[79] More recently, the CPSU (together with the East German and Polish communist parties) sent delegations to the Fiesta sponsored by the PCPE in late summer 1985.

Nevertheless, the CPSU and its allies also maintained ties with the PCE. Representatives of both the PCE and the PCPE attended the 27th CPSU Congress in Moscow in February 1986, with both Sánchez Montero and Gallego addressing the congress.[80] A certain evenhandedness was also evident in the congratulatory telegram the CPSU sent Dolores Ibárruri on the occasion of her 90th birthday in December 1985. Their emphasis was on the importance of unifying the Communists in Spain.[81] Overall, the Soviet approach reflected both caution and growing sophistication in dealing with "dissident" parties. The Soviets were not entirely confident about the PCPE's prospects, but they were willing to wait. Moreover, they wanted to be sure that Iglesias won his battle with Carrillo. Second, even if they preferred an ultimate victory by the PCPE, their medium-term objective might be a variant of the Greek formula, by which the "autonomist" group (in this case the "official" party) could not claim for itself the status of being Spanish Communism's only representative.

There was a third policy initiative undertaken by the Iglesias leadership in the wake of the 11th Congress. It was to press forward to achieve "social and political convergence" of the PCE and various left-wing political parties and "new social movements," such as the pacifists and ecologists.[82] The idea was to create as large an umbrella as possible (in both political and social terms) in order to challenge more effectively the Socialist government and to lay the groundwork for a left-wing electoral coalition to run against the PSOE in 1986. Iglesias and his supporters had been toying with the notion of convergence for some time. Some sort of electoral alliance made sense given the feebleness of the Communist electoral base. Perhaps because they did not know how the bulk of the delegates might react (but also because in December 1983 it was still too early to lay out a course to follow in 1986), the *gerardistas* had chosen not to raise the issue explicitly at the 11th Congress.

By mid-1984, however, the situation had become more urgent. Accommodation with the PSOE government had become highly improbable. Despite the opposition of the PSOE's so-called *sector critico* and of numerous labor activists affiliated with the Socialist trade union known as the *Unión General de Trabajadores* (UGT), González had shown himself intent on following an economic program that aimed at controlling inflation, reviving private investment, reducing the public sector deficit, and holding down wage demands. Adding to the urgency of the moment were the results of the May 1984 Catalan regional electoral contest. There, despite great expectations, the PSUC received barely more than 8 percent of the vote. This was quite a setback for the Communists in a region where the local party leadership had made the *gerardista* line its own.

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[77] For these and other references, see ibid., May 3–9, 1984.

[78] Unlike other pro-Soviet parties, however, the PCP did not send a delegation to the constituent PCPE congress in January 1984.

[79] For a sharp exchange between the CPSU and PCE, see ibid., Feb. 3–9, 1984.

[80] The two parties' attendance in Moscow was undoubtedly a factor in encouraging the PCE and PCPE to subsequently pursue further discussions about a joint electoral slate. For an evaluation of the 27th CPSU Congress from the PCE perspective, see Sánchez Montero, "A Congress for the Year 2000," *Mundo Obrero*, Mar. 13, 1986. He declared: "Gorbachëv's report foreshadows . . the early and complete normalization of relations between our PCE and the CPSU."

[81] The message stated that the CPSU hoped "for the unity of Spanish communism on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism." See *El País*, Dec. 10, 1985.

[82] For an article analyzing the dilemmas posed by the Green Party's emergence in West Germany and the relevance of this for Spain and the PCE, see Andreu Claret's article in *Mundo Obrero*, Mar. 16–22, 1984.

Whatever the explanation for the electoral setback, Iglesias concluded in mid-1984 that there was "a major urgency in moving forward with alternative proposals from the real Left," and he sought backing from the Central Committee to begin formal discussions with various left-wing parties, among them Ramón Tamames's *Federación Progresista* and Alonso Puerta's *Partido de Acción Socialista* (PASOC).[83] But Iglesias and his supporters made the mistake of suggesting that the PCE might run in coalition with these groups on tickets that would not necessarily carry the Communist emblem.

The *carrillistas* became inflamed by the proposal, seeing in it little more than an effort at a quick fix, one that betrayed the *gerardistas'* continued lack of self-confidence. Carrillo and his allies saw Iglesias's proposals as a rehash of what the "renovators" had wanted in 1980–81, and coined the word "*eurorenovadores*" to describe the *gerardistas*. In seeking an alliance with these groups, Iglesias was calling on the PCE to treat on an equal footing groups composed of former Communists who had either left or been expelled from the party at some earlier date. These groups had, declared a commentator in *Hora de Madrid*, "very limited credibility in contemporary Spanish society."[84] Especially bothersome to the *carrillistas* was the notion of alliance with the group led by Ramón Tamames, a former member of the PCE Executive Committee and another of Carrillo's sworn enemies. The *carrillistas* minced no words in attacking the Iglesias plan, and now openly challenged the legitimacy of the so-called *gerardista* "faction."

In mid-1984, the PCE was still one party, but the *carrillista* faction had begun to act as if it were a separate organization. The regional committees controlled by it generally ignored Secretariat directives and, even when they participated in demonstrations against the Socialist government's economic or foreign policies (issues on which both factions formally agreed), the *carrillistas* always managed to slant their participation so as to give it a sharper anti-Socialist edge or to ensure that their organization not enter into overly close relations with the *gerardistas'* "convergence" targets. Few regional committees escaped the withering cross fire of the *gerardista* and *carrillista* currents. In Madrid, Valencia, and Galicia, where the *carrillistas* still held sway, two parties were in place, each with its adherents and support in different parts of the province or region. The tension between *gerardistas* and *carrillistas* also led to sharp divisions in many municipal governments, since each group had its ideas about how much collaboration there should be with the Socialists. Finally, the PCE's division into two hostile factions led to a weakening of the *Comisiones Obreras*.

The *Comisiones* were the last bulwark of Communist influence in Spanish society. Although the UGT had made great strides in cutting into the *Comisiones* membership, the *Comisiones* remained slightly more popular among workers than the Socialist-led union. *Comisiones* had become a Communist battleground already in the late 1970's and early 1980's. At that time, most of the dissidents had been aligned with the pro-Soviet position. The situation had changed by 1983–84. The pro-Soviet elements remained and held 6 of the 43 seats on the *Comisiones* national executive. But there had been another development in the meantime, reflecting the growing chasm within the PCE. Just as there bloomed a "majority" and a "minority" position in the PCE Central Committee, so there developed similar positions in the *Comisiones* leadership. *Gerardista* labor activists were led by Marcelino Camacho (who nevertheless was able to maintain an image of being above the fray), while the *carrillistas* found their leader in Julián Ariza, once a Camacho protégé but now a prominent member of the internal opposition to Iglesias.[85]

At issue in the trade union sphere were different views on how intransigent *Comisiones* ought to be in dealing with the government regarding wage and price demands, as well as different conceptions with respect to the CC.OO.'s relationship to the PCE. The *carrillistas* wanted a "hard" line on the former, and they insisted on the Communist right to guide CC.OO.[86] The polarization within *Comisiones* had proceeded apace with developments in the PCE, and at the 3rd CC.OO. Congress in June 1984, the *carrillistas* presented their own ticket for the national executive. When the votes were in, the *carrillistas* had 14 members on that 49-member body, while 26 were from the

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[83] Ibid., May 24–30, 1984. See also the article by Nicolás Sartorius, "Political and Social Convergence" ibid., May 31–June 6, 1984.

[84] *Hora de Madrid*, June 5, 1984.

[85] See his article in ibid., June 19, 1984, pp. 6–7, where he stated his categorical opposition to any "social pacts."

[86] As Ariza put it (*Ahora*, No. 8, April 1985, p. 26): "The motor of the CC.OO. are the Communists." The *gerardistas* talked in more ambiguous terms and wanted "social pressure" combined with "negotiations." See the PCE Executive Committee statement published in *Mundo Obrero*, Apr. 13–19, 1984.

gerardista group, 8 from the pro-Soviet one, and 1 from the Trotskyite *Liga Comunista*.[87]

Communism Divided

The chasm between *gerardistas* and *carrillistas* had become unbridgeable by mid-summer 1984, especially after Carrillo launched his own "collective organizer," the journal *Ahora*. No longer was it merely a question of *carrillistas* ignoring calls for discipline emanating from Madrid. They now had a national organ in *Ahora*, from which they could systematically assault official party policies. The temper of the debate between the two sides changed significantly. The *carrillistas* had begun to question the "moral" authority of the national leadership, charging that it was acting contrary to the spirit and letter of the 11th Congress.[88] Most *gerardistas* concluded at this time that there was probably no alternative to expelling the *carrillistas*. Consequently, they began to set the stage for the convocation of "extraordinary" congresses in the regions where Carrillo and his allies held sway. In early 1985, the Central Committee approved a proposal for a new Congress in Madrid, and invited "parallel" delegations from Madrid and Valencia to attend the PCE's National Conference in April.[89]

The prolonged factional struggle within the PCE had generated intense bitterness that was exacerbated by the gloomy prognosis for the party. It seemed that nothing could go right for the PCE. Between December 1983 and February 1985, the PCE lost 8,000 members, so that its total membership fell below 80,000.[90] The Iglesias leadership had emphasized the importance of "convergence." Yet, by early 1985, it had also become apparent that "the prospective *novios* do not want a wedding."[91] Those who did—the *Partido de Acción Socialista*, whose leader Alonso Puerta had lost a bitter fight for control of the Madrid PSOE leadership, and the *Federación Progresista* associated with Ramón Tamames—were armies without soldiers. What was worse, the PSOE and especially Felipe González remained enormously popular. Despite the cloud that hung over the PSOE government because of the pending referendum on Spanish NATO membership, there was little reason to believe it would not have an absolute majority in the Chamber of Deputies after the next election.

None of this hemmed the Spanish Communist drive toward self-annihilation. The showdown between the *gerardistas* and *carrillistas* came in the spring of 1985. Eager to appear as the aggrieved party, the *gerardistas* made public a "pacification" offer to the *carrillistas*.[92] They would incorporate Adolfo Piñedo into the Secretariat and Julián Ariza into the Executive Committee. Carrillo would be asked to join the commission drafting a new Program Manifesto, and he would be invited to those Secretariat meetings at which parliamentary issues were discussed. Carrillo would also be guaranteed a position "on the electoral lists . . .from which he would be re-elected deputy." After the concessions (such as they were) came the demands: cessation of all activity outside of the PCE organization; convocation of conferences or extraordinary congresses in Madrid and Valencia in order to integrâte the minority, in this case the *gerardistas;* incorporation of the *gerardista* group into the leadership of the Galician party; discontinuation of *Ahora*.

The *carrillistas* replied with their own decalogue of demands, the core of which focused on rejection of "convergence" and "democratization of internal party life." But it was a dialogue of the deaf. The climax came at another Central Committee meeting in April 1985 at which the *carrillista* core (Carrillo and 18 other members of the Central Committee) were deemed "self-excluded" from the party.[93]

The ouster of Santiago Carrillo from the PCE Central Committee ended a historic era for the Spanish Communists and for the man who had been PCE secretary general for 22 years. In the wake of his expulsion, the *gerardistas* moved to consolidate their control of the dissident organizations. They convoked congresses in Madrid, Valencia, and Galicia, which removed the *carrillistas* from party leadership there.

Carrillo and his supporters did not, of course, walk quietly into the sunset. They published a special supplement to *Ahora* in which they insisted: "We are the Communist Party of Spain." The claim was exaggerated, but it contained a kernel of truth. Carrillo remained the natural leader for many Communists (perhaps as many as 30 percent of the PCE's membership). His group's existence could not be lightly dismissed. It is not likely to win any deputies in the upcoming parliamentary election, but its participation—in late 1985

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[87] *Mundo Obrero*, June 28–July 4, 1984.

[88] *Hora de Madrid*, Mar. 20, 1985, carried an article charging the PCE's leadership with "a systematic effort at fractionalism and schism."

[89] *El País*, Mar. 29, 1985.

[90] The PCE claimed to have 84,000 members in December 1983. The *carrillista*-controlled *Hora de Madrid* reported on Feb. 19, 1985, that the PCE had 67,400 members in early 1985.

[91] *Liberación* (Madrid), January 4, 1985.

[92] See *Diario 16*, *El País*, and *Liberación*, March 6 to 10, 1985. The full text of the *carrillista* proposals is in *Ahora*, No. 8, April 1985.

[93] *Ahora*, No. 9, May 1985 (Supplement). For Carrillo's last speech to the Central Committee, see ibid., No. 10, June 1985.

Carrillo registered the *Partido Comunista Marxista-Revolucionario* for electoral competition in Galicia—was enough to guarantee a significant erosion in the official PCE vote.

Internecine battles consumed and exhausted the PCE during most of 1985. Court battles over rights to party offices and to the appellation *Partido Comunista* as well as scarcely veiled personal insults became the order of the day, further confusing the average party member. Many members lapsed into inactivity. Somewhere between 4,000 and 5,000 left the PCE to join forces with Carrillo; another 5,000 to 7,000 have migrated after 1984 to Gallego's PCPE.

Three rival groups (the PCE, the PCPE, and the *carrillista* Assembly for Communist Unity) were now in competition for the right to represent Communism's space in Spanish political life. But they were beggars arguing over crumbs. Despite continued uncertainty over how the promised NATO referendum would turn out, as well as some popular discontent with the Socialist government's economic austerity package, the González government remained enormously popular. Even in the best of cases, what the Communists could hope for in the next elections was only a partial improvement on the 3.8 percent they had received in October 1982. The divisions in the Communist camp made even such a prospect improbable. As it was, none of the three groups was strong enough to assert itself over the others in the electoral arena, and if the PCE had the best-known *siglas*, its leaders were also painfully aware of what might occur if the PCPE and the Assembly (singly or in combination) fielded candidates in a national election.

Under these circumstances, the PCE leadership had two alternatives. One was to seek reunification of the Communist "family," the other to reach an electoral entente with noncommunist groups like the *Federación Progresista* or PASOC. Playing for time, the Iglesias leadership pursued (or wished to appear as if it were seriously pursuing) both alternatives. Among the Communists, the PCE's preferred interlocutor was the pro-Soviet PCPE, a party which at least represented, said Iglesias in December 1985, a "cultural current." It should be evident by now why Iglesias might feel that way. At the core of the PCE-PCPE dispute was ideology. With the *carrillistas*, on the other hand, the differences went also deeper. There was a special kind of animosity between the two groups. It reflected what had become the two men's intense personal dislike and lack of respect for each other. Carrillo had sent Iglesias several (public) letters in the year after his "self-exclusion," but Iglesias and his people regarded these as little more than public relations exercises. They never deigned to enter into formal or informal conversations with the *carrillistas*. Several years of vituperation had left their mark.

No sooner had Carrillo and his followers left the PCE than they began to insinuate that they might run their own ticket in the Galician regional elections scheduled for the fall of 1985. Whether this was a ploy to compel Iglesias into negotiations is unclear. In any case, the gambit did not work. Any chance of reconciliation dissipated by October 1985 when Carrillo's supporters (carrying the appellation *Partido Comunista de España Marxista-Revolucionario*) competed in the Galician election. The *carrillistas* won only a little more than 8,000 votes in Galicia, but their concurrence in the election sealed the PCE's fate. The PCE tallied approximately 10,600 votes (a mere 0.84 percent of the total) and saw its hopes for electing deputies to the Galician parliament dashed. What was worse, on this occasion the PCE won only one-third of the votes it had captured in the 1983 municipal elections in Galicia.[94] The Galician elections made reconciliation between the *carrillistas* and the PCE virtually impossible. In their wake, it is true, some members of the PCE Executive Committee urged that a new effort be made to heal the breach with Carrillo, but they were very much in the minority.[95] If reconciliation was ever to occur, it would probably be after the next general election had rendered its verdict on the adequacy of the *gerardista* strategy. In late 1985, the bulk of the Spanish Communist leadership shared the assessment Iglesias made of the entire episode: "Santiago's only project is to turn the PCE to ashes."[96] Fittingly enough, Iglesias's report to the December 1985 Central Committee meeting paid Carrillo a backhanded compliment by identifying his "destructive work" as one of the two major issues confronting the PCE.[97]

In Search of Lost Influence

Throughout 1985 there was little hope of resolving the bitter factional divisions that afflicted the PCE. But this reality neither the Iglesias leadership nor its other Communist rivals could openly acknowledge. Even when speaking of the *carrillistas*, the PCE leadership insisted on its commitment to the reunification of the Communists, albeit under the PCE standard and without modification in the party's executive organs. Be-

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[94] *El País*, Nov. 26, 1985.

[95] Ibid., Dec. 3, 1985.

[96] Ibid., Dec. 4, 1985.

[97] *Mundo Obrero*, Dec. 12–18, 1985 (Supplement).

OTAN
¡NO!
REFERENDUM
SI
UCE
UNIFICACION COMUNISTA DE ESPAÑA

Supporters of the Assembly for Communist Unity (Unificación Comunista de España) *demonstrate in Madrid on February 23, 1986, in support of a referendum that would have required Spain to withdraw from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (the Spanish acronym for NATO is OTAN).*

—GAMMA-LIAISON.

cause ordinary Communist party members attached so much importance to the concept of "unity," the "official" Spanish Communist leadership and its challengers could not stint on efforts in this direction.

Since agreement with the *carrillistas* appeared out of the question, it was only natural for the PCE to seek to bridge the gap with the Gallego-led PCPE. Here the obstacles were not as severe as with the *carrillistas*, but even so they were not insignificant. Many in the PCPE's leadership had been unceremoniously expelled (albeit most while Carrillo had been in charge) from the "official" PCE in the preceding five years. Moreover, Gallego and his party had received the CPSU's open support. It was unlikely to have been given simply so that the PCPE would disband and its leaders rejoin the PCE. Nevertheless, it was in both Gallego's and the PCE's interest to appear flexible, since this would reaffirm publicly their commitment to reinvigorate Spanish communism.

Thus, in late 1985, the pro-Soviet PCPE found itself courted by both the PCE and the umbrella group created by the *carrillistas* known as the Assembly for Communist Unity (*Mesa para la Unidad de los Comunistas*). Despite the animosity of most pro-Soviet diehards for Carrillo, there was support within the PCPE for negotiations with the *carrillistas*. This was not just because Ignacio Gallego and Jaime Ballesteros had once been close to Carrillo. More relevant in this case was the ideological affinity of such noted *carrillistas* as Adolfo Piñedo (former head of the Madrid PCE organization) and Julián Ariza (leader of the *carrillista* faction in the *Comisiones Obreras*) to PCPE positions. Already in May 1985, Piñedo had remarked: "There are many things that unite us [the *carrillistas* and the PCPE]. I would say, politically, very many things."[98] *Carrillista* groups in Madrid and Valencia had joined their PCPE counterparts in organizing demonstrations against the Socialist government's economic policies in June 1985, and they intensified such contacts in the fall during preparations for the NATO referendum. In the *Comisiones Obreras*, too, the *carrillistas* and PCPE supporters worked together against the PCE majority, and both sides attached a great deal of importance to Julián Ariza's attendance at a labor symposium organized at the PCPE's Fiesta in late summer 1985.

In early February 1986 leaders of the *carrillista* Assembly and their PCPE counterparts in Madrid approved a joint document in which they committed their respective organizations to strive for Communist unity and to collaborate actively in the campaign for a 'No' in the NATO referendum.[99] Their agreement came on the heels of the PCE's decision to reject any "mere electoral platform" between the Communist factions,[100] while insisting that a joint candidacy was possible only under the PCE's banner.

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[98] *Hora de Madrid*, May 14, 1985.

Although these initiatives were undertaken with Ca illo's support (and even at his behest), it was nevertheless true that the PCPE leaders also believed they had quite a bit to gain in this venture, perhaps even at the expense of Carrillo. Many in the pro-Soviet party felt an undisguised contempt for Carrillo, but they consented to conversations with the *carrillista* Assembly (or, at least, its representatives) because they considered Carrillo and his followers to be a "weaker" potential partner than the "official" PCE. Many in the pro-Soviet camp also believed that once Carrillo left the political scene people like Piñedo and Ariza would throw their lot in with the PCPE. Negotiations with the *carrillistas* also served to enhance the PCPE's leverage with respect to the "official" PCE. Secret discussions between the pro-Soviet party and the Iglesias-led group had begun in December 1985 and intensified (this time publicly) after the referendum.

Seeking its own leverage, the PCE combined its negotiations with the PCPE with overtures to the ostensible representatives of the Spanish "new left." This had long been the strategic dream of Iglesias and those advising him. They discounted the political potential of the *carrillistas* almost entirely and they believed that the pro-Soviet or hard-line "cultural current" would ultimately be unable to stand on its own since it had very little to offer the Spanish electorate. Either the PCPE would wither or the bulk of its members would eventually rejoin the PCE. Therefore, the PCE should bet on "convergence" with the new "social" movements represented by ecologists, pacifists, and the like. Iglesias and his supporters saw in the upcoming NATO referendum (which the Socialist government had decided to hold in March 1986 to fulfill an earlier campaign promise) the perfect vehicle for realizing this "convergence." To this end, the "official" PCE joined with numerous other Spanish groups and associations (among them, of course, the *Federación Progresista* and the PASOC) in creating the Civic Platform for Spanish Departure from NATO, an umbrella organization which, alongside the more pacifist and less partisan organization known as the State Coordinating Body of Pacifist Organizations, waged the anti-NATO campaign.

The NATO referendum represented the PCE's best hope for escaping political marginality. Strongly influenced by traditions of isolation and isolationism (as well as latent anti-Americanism), the Spanish public was unenthusiastic about remaining in NATO, to put it mildly. The decision to join NATO had been taken by the UCD government in May 1981, and approved by the Spanish parliament in October of that year. The PSOE, then the principal force in the opposition and carrying within itself a strong neutralist orientation, opposed Spanish entry and promised to hold a referendum to pull Spain out of NATO. From 1981 up until March 1986, all public opinion polls showed that a majority of the Spanish electorate supported this position.

Once in power, the Socialists had changed their minds on the NATO question but, contrary to the suggestions from many friendly governments on both sides of the Atlantic, Felipe González did not abandon the referendum idea.[101] Instead, he hoped to use it in order to legitimate his party's change of course on the NATO issue. What moved González to make this decision is impossible to determine. Probably he saw it in terms of his personal credibility (he had made a promise and would keep it), of definitively settling the most controversial issue on Spain's foreign policy agenda, and of reconfirming his popularity with the electorate by accomplishing something no other Spanish politician would dare or be able to do. Few thought he would win. And both the Right and the Communists saw great political advantage to be gained from the government's defeat.

Despite its position as a minority force on the Left, the PCE was the best organized and recognizable group among those opposed to Spanish NATO membership, and it hoped to use the referendum to recapture its lost political standing. For a while it looked as though the Communists and their allies might succeed. The electorate did not favor NATO membership. González's own party was divided on the issue, with the so-called Socialist Left faction actively opposing membership. Nicolás Redondo, the head of the Socialist trade union, had led the fight against the reversal in the PSOE's position at its last Congress in December 1984. But opinion polls and even traditions are one thing. Quite another, it turned out, was the vote on March 12, 1986.[102] Only 60 percent of the eligible electorate voted. Of those voting, over 52 percent were in favor of continued Spanish membership in NATO (admittedly on such conditions as non-integration in the military wing of the Alliance, reduction in the number of American troops stationed in Spain, and prohibition of nuclear weapons on Spanish soil). Those opposed tallied nearly 40 percent, and there were nearly 8 percent blank ballots. Until the last days of the campaign, the Communists held onto the hope that González would lose the referendum. When he won, they lambasted the government's manipulation of public opinion and claimed a "moral" victory in light of the high abstention and of the 8.1 million Spaniards who either voted "No" or cast blank ballots.

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[99] Madrid Domestic Service, Feb. 6, 1986.

[100] *Mundo Obrero*, Feb. 6, 1986.

[101] For an extended discussion, see Ch. 2 of my *Spanish Foreign Policy Since Franco*.

Certainly, this pool of eight million voters represents an opportunity for the Communists in the next election. Whether they succeed in drawing some of them to the PCE standard is not clear. Much depends on the Communist factions' willingness to lay aside their differences and to join forces for an electoral contest. Barring this, there is still the question of how many voters would be affected by joint slates with the *Federación Progresista* and the PASOC.

There is also the "Felipe" factor. He had bet heavily on the referendum, and he won. True, many voters went against his recommendation and others abstained. The former might vote for a Communist ticket, but this is by no means assured. Given the PCE's penchant for self-annihilation, a trait so often displayed in the last seven years, these voters might simply opt to sit the next election out. Such could be the case whether the Communist camp remains divided or not. Indeed, an entente between the various claimants to the Communist electoral space might seem to voters altogether too opportunistic and incoherent. As for those who abstained, the choice was a conscious one, and many in this camp abstained precisely so González would win. In the final analysis, there is also González's enduring popularity. He is nearly as popular as the King. Since the next election—like the last one—will be run as a referendum on his leadership, there may not be much the Communists can do except to hope for a more respectable number of deputies in the parliament.

Much may still occur before the June national election. The "Communist" situation remains quite fluid. Negotiations between the *carrillista* Assembly and the PCPE continued apace, and in late March 1986 representatives of the two groups issued a communiqué in which they reaffirmed their commitment to forging "the unity of all Communists in a single party."[103] But the saga was not over. By mid-April the *carrillistas* appeared to be the odd men out. Discussions between PCPE and the PCE had intensified, and in what was a novel development—as *El País* reported on April 11, 1986—*Comisiones* leader Marcelino Camacho became publicly (though unofficially) involved by leading a *Comisiones* delegation which met with Gallego and other PCPE leaders. In another development, the principal pro-Soviet group outside the PCPE (the Spanish Communist Workers' Party or PCOE led by Enrique Lister) announced its dissolution and decision to rejoin the PCE.[104]

The impact of "unitarian" logic on Spain's Communists should not be underestimated. The prospect of the Andalusian regional election in June 1986 (in which the PCE would run as its candidate for the regional presidency the popular former mayor of Córdoba, Julio Anguita) was a further impetus for those seeking intra-Communist unity. Negotiations between the PCE and PCPE Andalusian regional organizations ended in agreement in mid-April to have a joint slate in the elections there. The Socialist government's decision to call national elections for June 22, 1986 (the same day as the Andalusian regional elections) injected a new element into the equation. It is not yet clear if the Communists will unite for the national election—they have until mid-May to file a joint slate. Alone, the PCE will not do well, although it will do undoubtedly better than the others. If Spain's warring Communist factions manage to file a joint slate, it has a chance to get 7 to 8 percent of the votes. While this would be a considerable improvement over the performance in 1982, it would still leave the Communists on the political fringes.

Regardless of what happens in the next few months, the PCE has seen its dream of playing a major role in Spanish politics shattered. The party, whose preeminence in the anti-Franco opposition could not be questioned, has become a bit player on the political scene. Its division into three factions has weakened the resolve and self-confidence of its membership and sympathizers, all of whom dearly wanted something else. Outside of Catalonia, the PCE never had much of an electoral presence; now it is emasculated as a national force. The outcome is one that the Socialists could not have imagined in their wildest dreams. The disappearance of the Communists as a viable political organization has eliminated the PSOE's major challenger on the Left. Without this challenge, the PSOE h[illegible] little reason to abandon the moderate policies it has pursued so far and which have brought it such success.

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[102] For the results, see *El País*, Mar. 13 and 14, 1986.
[103] Ibid., Mar. 25, 1986.
[104] Ibid.

Chinese Perspectives on the Strategic Defense Initiative

Bonnie S. Glaser and Banning N. Garrett

In an interview published on September 16, 1985, Deng Xiaoping issued a carefully worded official Chinese position on superpower competition in space-based strategic defense systems.[1] "The space arms race," declared China's top leader in the authoritative journal *Liaowang*, "signals the qualitative escalation of the US-Soviet arms race rather than escalation in a common sense."[2] Such escalation, according to Deng, poses the danger that the arms race "will go completely out of control, thus increasing the factors of war rather than reducing the danger of war." For this reason, he said, "China openly opposes any plan leading to a space arms race."[3] Deng also reaffirmed an earlier statement to former US President Richard Nixon that China is "against whoever goes in for development of outer space weapons."[4]

Deng's stand on space-based missile systems reflects Chinese concern that the United States's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program could undermine China's efforts to advance four of his nation's most important objectives: preservation of a peaceful international environment; maintenance of a credible nuclear deterrent; modernization of the Chinese economy; and enhancement of China's position in the international community. The Chinese predict that if the United States and the Soviet Union do not deploy space-based strategic defense systems, the international situation will remain favorable for pursuing these objectives through the end of this century.[5]

Banning N. Garrett and Bonnie S. Glaser are defense consultants with Palomar Corporation, Washington, DC. They have written extensively on the strategic aspects of the US-Soviet-Chinese triangular relationship. They are co-authors of War and Peace: The Views from Moscow and Beijing *(1984) and of an essay on US China policy and the strategic triangle, in the forthcoming* Eagle Resurgent? The Reagan Era in American Foreign Policy, *edited by Kenneth Oye, Robert Lieber, and Donald Rothchild. The authors wish to express their appreciation to the Institute of Contemporary International Relations for hosting their visit and to the Chinese officials and analysts who were generous with their time and candid in expressing their views. The authors retain copyright © 1986.*

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[1] Deng made his first public statement on SDI to Robert Maxwell of the Pergamon Press and Mirror Newspapers on August 2, 1985. Xinhua reported that Deng told Maxwell "that the 'Star Wars' plan must not be carried out because it would cause qualitative changes in the arms race between the two superpowers." Deng "pointed out the 'Star Wars' plan was different in nature from adding a few nuclear warheads or changing a few new types of missiles" (Xinhua [Beijing], Aug. 2, 1985, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* [Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS–CHI*], Aug. 5, 1985). Deng's second public statement on SDI was issued partially in response to American concern—expressed privately to Chinese officials—that Deng's initial comment seemed to indicate Chinese opposition to the US SDI program, but not to Soviet activities in strategic defense. Deng clarified China's stand in a meeting with Richard Nixon on September 6. He maintained that "we are concerned about the escalation of the nature of the arms race and are opposed to any arms race in outer space. We are against whoever goes in for the development of outer space weapons" (Xinhua, Sept. 6, 1985, in *FBIS–CHI*, Sept. 6, 1985, p. B/1). Deng's third and final statement on SDI, up to the time of publication of this article, was published in *Liaowang* as part of an "interview" on September 16 ("Deng Xiaoping Talks Freely About the Situation at Home and Abroad," *Liaowang* [Beijing], No. 37, Sept. 16, 1985, trans. in *FBIS–CHI*, Sept. 30, 1985, p. K/2).

[2] "Deng Xiaoping Talks Freely About the Situation at Home and Abroad," loc. cit.

[3] Ibid.

[4] See Xinhua, Sept. 6, 1985, in *FBIS–CHI*, Sept. 6, 1985, p. B/1.

[5] In July 1985, the Institute of Contemporary International Relations (ICIR) held an important national conference on the strategic environment until 1990. The conference was attended by scholars and officials representing a broad spectrum of government, party, military, and academic institutions, including the State Council, the Central Committee, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of National Defense, as well as numerous research institutes and universities. The participants discussed the likely evolution of the international situation in the coming five years and the appropriate policies that China should adopt to achieve its national and international objectives. We learned of their conclusions during conversations with Chinese in Beijing, Shanghai, and Washington.

Chinese assessments of possible Soviet military responses to the US SDI program have heightened Beijing's concern about the space-based arms competition and its implications for international stability—what the Chinese call the "issue of war and peace." Indeed, most Chinese analysts hold the view that SDI will have a dangerously destabilizing effect on the arms competition between the two superpowers. So long as rough parity exists, they point out, neither side will risk attacking the other. But by extending the "arms race" to outer space—a new realm for such competition—one side could attain decisive superiority over the other. This would disrupt existing strategic parity and heighten the potential for either a preemptive strike by the side facing an imminent strategic disadvantage or an attack by the side that had attained superiority.

Regarding the shorter term, that is, prior to actual deployment of space-based ballistic-missile defense (BMD) systems,[6] Chinese analysts and officials express concern that Soviet opposition to SDI and US

Note on Chinese Research Institutes

Research institutes in China produce a large portion of the analyses on foreign policy issues and strategic matters that inform senior Chinese leaders and policymakers. In the last five years, the role of the research institutes in China's foreign policy decision-making process has grown significantly.* The burgeoning influence of these institutes is due both to the growing expertise of Chinese researchers and to the increasing need on the part of Chinese leaders for sophisticated and well-informed analyses as China has become more deeply involved in world affairs.

Chinese institute researchers initiate studies as well as provide reports in response to requests from government or party leaders. Institute analyses are passed through various channels to top-level policymakers. Personal connections developed by institute directors and senior analysts with members of the political elite are often important in ensuring that institute views are heard. Some reports are sent directly to top decision-making bodies. Others are submitted to the leadership through the Center for International Studies, a research arm of the State Council, which loosely coordinates the research programs and activities of the institutes. The Center is headed by Huan Xiang, a highly respected retired diplomat and key adviser to the leadership on international affairs.

In addition to writing reports, research institutes provide inputs into the policymaking process in China by organizing ad hoc groups, which frequently include government officials, to examine urgent policy questions. The institutes also hold conferences ranging in scale and length from local, one-day seminars to nationwide, week-long meetings. These conferences focus on important international issues, often bring together institute experts and government and party officials, and usually produce policy recommendations for consideration by the Chinese leadership. Conferences were held in 1985 on such subjects as SDI, the strategic triangle, and the strategic environment until 1990.

There are approximately a dozen key research institutes on foreign policy issues and a few that concentrate primarily on strategic and defense matters. Two institutes are directly tied to specific government organizations—the Foreign Ministry's Institute of International Studies (IIS) and the Ministry of National Defense's Beijing Institute of International Strategic Studies (BIISS). While these institutes report primarily to their parent organizations, their studies are also sent to party offices and government ministries with which they are not closely affiliated. A third institute, the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (ICIR), is the largest and most well-endowed among the Chinese foreign policy institutes. Although the ICIR is not a research arm of any particular government ministry, this "independent" institute provides analyses to the State Council and the Party Secretariat and apparently plays an increasingly influential role in advising Chinese policymakers. Several other important foreign policy research institutes—such as the Institute of World Economy and Politics, the Institute of US Studies, and the Institute of Soviet and East European Studies—are organizationally under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. An Institute of Strategic Studies, which was created last year under the PLA Military Academy, will be part of the newly created National Defense University. At present, it has only a handful of researchers studying a broad range of military and strategic issues, but as it expands and develops contacts with foreign institutes, the new defense institute will likely grow in importance and influence.

In addition to their primary function of advising the Chinese leadership, the institutes engage in academic research and educate the public on international issues. While much of their work is classified, some papers are published in institute journals aimed at the general foreign affairs community. Chinese researchers also write articles for publication in newspapers and popular magazines.

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*For a discussion of the role of these research institutes in China's foreign policymaking process and a detailed profile of key institutes, see A. Doak Barnett, *The Making of Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1985.

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[6] In this essay, the term "space-based BMD system" is used to refer to a strategic defense system with the general characteristics that have been envisioned in the SDI program. This system is multi-tiered: it includes ground-based interceptors to destroy warheads during the midcourse and reentry phases as well as space-based lasers, particle beams or kinetic-energy weapons for attacking missiles and warheads in their boost, post-boost, and midcourse phases.

refusal to negotiate limits on its research program could lead to increased US-Soviet tension, repudiation of the ABM Treaty of 1972, collapse of the arms control process, and accelerated buildup of offensive nuclear weapons. Moreover, caution the Chinese, the deployment of a large-scale Soviet strategic defense system could neutralize or at least weaken China's nuclear deterrent force.

But China's national security could be at risk, say the Chinese, even if US and Soviet strategic defense deployments did not increase strategic instability—for example, if the United States and the Soviet Union were to agree to deploy space-based BMD simultaneously. In the strategic realm, Chinese leaders fear that in 20 to 30 years—the period of time their analysts predict it will take for large-scale space-based strategic defense systems to be developed and deployed—China's nuclear forces may no longer provide a credible retaliatory capability to deter a Soviet nuclear attack. In the realm of conventional forces, the Chinese are worried that the current Soviet technological advantage vis-à-vis China will become even more pronounced. The new technologies developed by the United States and the Soviet Union in their BMD research, they fear, could further widen the overall gap in military technology between China on the one hand and the two superpowers on the other. This could place pressure on Chinese leaders to shift resources away from current economic development priorities to China's military modernization program.

Beijing's concerns about the destabilizing potential of SDI are not dissimilar from the reservations expressed by many West European and American analysts. In fact, it was in part the emergence of SDI as a contentious issue in Western Europe and the United States that prompted interest among informed Chinese in foreign policy and military institutes, government, defense, and party organizations, and prominent universities. In response to the growing attention accorded SDI in Europe, the Soviet Union, and the United States, Premier Zhao Ziyang issued a directive to the Foreign Ministry and foreign policy research institutes to conduct research on SDI and its implications for China. During a visit to Beijing and Shanghai in September 1985, we met with many of the analysts who responded to the Premier's call. Throughout our two-week stay, we held discussions with civilian and military analysts from seven research institutes and four military organizations (see box on p. 29), as well as with officials from the foreign and defense ministries.

What emerged from these talks was a picture of informed and diverse opinion with as wide a range of views on SDI as is found in the West. This essay examines these perspectives on SDI, including the implications of SDI for China's national security and Beijing's interests at stake in the US-Soviet BMD competition and arms control negotiations. While our primary aim is to illuminate Chinese thinking on this important topic, we also hope that the candid remarks of many of the participants in these discussions will convey some sense of the spirit and flavor of the debate among Chinese analysts.

In each section below, we first provide either the official Chinese position or the dominant view on the topic under discussion. We then present the various nuances and perspectives offered by the discussants. To help round out our study, we have also included pertinent statements and analyses that have been published in Chinese scholarly journals and official media. This will, we hope, enable readers to gain insight into the complexity of Chinese views on the SDI issue.

The Problem Defined

The Chinese are highly skeptical that US President Ronald Reagan's stated aim of eliminating nuclear weapons is the real goal of the SDI program. Rather, they maintain that SDI is part of an overall US economic, political, and military strategy aimed at enhancing the US position in the global balance of power vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The SDI program, according to this view, is intended to revitalize the US and other Western economies by stimulating rapid development of the US military-industrial complex and by accelerating the overall pace of technological and industrial development. A faster rate of economic growth, the Chinese contend, could provide the United States with the means for widening its lead in science and technology over the Soviet Union and could build domestic support for the Reagan administration and its military programs.[7]

Some analysts also maintain that the US objective is to exploit Soviet economic difficulties and ultimately

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[7] See, e.g., Huan Suan and Li Changjiu, "U.S. Economic Recovery and Foreign Policy," *Guoji Wenti Yanjiu* (Beijing), July 13, 1985, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *China Report: Political, Sociological, and Military Affairs* (Washington, DC—hereafter *JPRS–CPS*), No. 85-110, Oct. 28, 1985. In discussions in Beijing and Shanghai, Chinese analysts and officials expressed concern about the impact of the SDI program on the US economy. A weakened US economy not only could have severely negative consequences for China's Four Modernizations program, they maintain, but also could damage Chinese security by weakening the US global position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Some Chinese contend that SDI will financially drain the US economy, while others say that the economic benefits of SDI will be even greater than the costs and will provide the United States with a reinvigorated economic advantage over the Soviet Union.

"exhaust" the Soviet Union. The United States wants to compel the Soviet Union to take countermeasures to SDI, these analysts assert, so that Moscow will be pressed economically, the modernization of its offensive forces disrupted, and its land-based ICBM's rendered obsolete.[8]

Militarily, say most Chinese analysts, the US SDI program is intended to achieve nuclear superiority (an objective viewed as also being pursued by the Soviet Union), which they define as securing a first-strike capability.[9] Some analysts, echoing the argument of a number of Western critics, warn that if the United States were to attain this goal, it would be able to launch a preemptive strike against the Soviet Union, safe in the knowledge that it could defend itself against

Evolution of Chinese Interest in SDI

On March 23, 1983, when US President Ronald Reagan announced his program for developing a strategic defense system that would eliminate the threat of nuclear weapons, it attracted only limited attention in China. Through the remainder of that year, Chinese researchers focused more on the impending collapse of the US-Soviet INF talks than on SDI. Chinese interest in SDI increased somewhat after the establishment of the Strategic Defense Initiative Office (SDIO) in the US Department of Defense in January 1984. Some military and civilian researchers began to follow the issue, but no intensive efforts were applied to study of SDI and its implications for China.

In the spring and summer of 1984, a series of events led to a marked increase in China's interest in SDI. In March, the United States proposed allied participation in the program, and the following month, French President François Mitterrand put forward the "Eureka" plan for a collaborative West European program to develop advanced technology, primarily for civilian purposes (see fn. 26 to the text). In late June, the Soviet Union proposed talks with the United States on space weapons.

Some Chinese civilian researchers viewed these events as indicating that SDI would become a divisive issue in both US-Soviet relations and US relations with its allies. President Reagan's authorization to the Defense Department in November 1984 to set up a US Space Command to coordinate US military activity in space heightened the interest of some Chinese military researchers as well.

Chinese analysts closely followed the meeting between US Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko in January 1985 and the subsequent resumption of the US-Soviet arms control talks in March. They noted that the negotiations reached a stalemate in the first round due to the Soviet position linking progress in the talks on strategic and theater nuclear weapons to US willingness to negotiate on SDI. The Chinese ascribed importance to statements by Soviet leaders in May 1985 concerning SDI, especially threats by Soviet Defense Minister Sergey Sokolov that the Soviet Union would take countermeasures in response to the US SDI program. They also noted warnings by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachëv that the US program could undermine the arms talks in Geneva. In addition, Chinese analysts viewed SDI as a major issue dividing US and West European leaders in May at the 11th annual economic summit meeting in Bonn, West Germany.

The first important paper on SDI and its implications for China was prepared for Premier Zhao Ziyang in 1984 by Zhuang Qubing, a senior analyst at the Foreign Ministry's Institute of International Studies (IIS). Zhuang's paper was widely reviewed in the government and was influential in shaping views of both officials and institute analysts. An unclassified version was published that October in the IIS journal, *Guoji Wenti Yanjiu* (International Studies).

Several Chinese ministries and research organizations received a directive from the leadership in late 1984 or early 1985 to thoroughly examine the SDI issue and its implications for China. In response to this directive, a large number of analysts in China began researching SDI. Several conferences on SDI were held that year by foreign policy research institutes as well as by defense, science, and technology organizations. In the civilian foreign policy institutes, many of the researchers assessing SDI had previously focused on issues such as US-Soviet relations, Soviet economic reforms, the US economy, relations between the United States and its allies, arms control, and US-Soviet military competition. These analysts had redirected their attention toward SDI not only in response to the leadership directive but for three other reasons as well: (1) Chinese researchers judged that SDI, and strategic defense systems in general, would be an increasingly important element of US-Soviet competition for the foreseeable future; (2) SDI had become an important issue in Europe and in US relations with its West European allies and Japan; and (3) both military and civilian analysts in China judged that the development of strategic defense systems by the United States and the Soviet Union would have direct implications for China's nuclear deterrent.

The Chinese thus concluded that SDI would have significant implications for Chinese security and required continued in-depth study and analysis.

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[8] An analyst at the Institute of Soviet and East European Studies maintained that "the US SDI program is based on the idea that the Soviet Union is in a crisis, the United States is ahead in technology, and the Soviet Union does not have the ability to keep up with the United States in the development of defensive systems . . . . The United States also has the idea that the Soviet Union is experiencing economic difficulties and will need hundreds of billions of rubles to develop SDI, and that the Soviets will be unable to shoulder this burden." He went on to assert that he disagreed with these assessments of the impact on the Soviet economy of a large-scale effort to compete with the United States.

[9] The view that the primary military goal of the SDI program is to achieve superiority was stated by a large number of civilian (fn. continued on p. 32)

a Soviet retaliatory strike. None of these analysts suggests, however, that the United States would actually use its first-strike capability to attack the Soviet Union. Rather, they say, SDI is the means by which Washington hopes to increase its leverage over Moscow in order to achieve political goals, such as gaining concessions in arms control talks or constraining Soviet military actions in the Third World.[10]

One of the most graphic presentations of the dominant Chinese view of the potential impact of SDI on US military capabilities was published under the name Cao Ye in the Beijing journal *Huanqiu*. SDI, Cao wrote, "will lay a foundation for the United States to seize control of outer space. Military history shows that controlling a new spatial sphere through the mastery of new technology will always help one establish military superiority." Thus, according to Cao, the US seeks to develop a warfighting capability in space by combining SDI with other elements of a total defense system:

> *The U.S. holds that by linking the establishment of the antimissile system according to the "star wars program" with the development of anti-satellite projects and the space shuttle plans, it will not only be able to protect its various space facilities, destroy the enemy's missiles and satellites, enable itself to see and hear better, and block the enemy's eyes and ears, but will also enable itself to occupy a commanding position high in the sky and contain the enemy so as to win decisive superiority in future wars.*[11]

Not all analysts, however, see the US quest for an effective strategic defense system through SDI as being motivated by "offensive" intentions to achieve global hegemony. Some consider US intentions as primarily "defensive"—a response to the perceived need to protect US nuclear deterrent forces against a Soviet military buildup that has rendered US ICBM's increasingly vulnerable. This view, held primarily by military analysts and officials with a relatively sophisticated understanding of nuclear strategy and security issues, posits that the US SDI program is aimed at strengthening deterrence rather than at achieving nuclear superiority.[12] The proponents of this view argue that heightened public and congressional awareness of the increasing vulnerability of US ICBM's, of Soviet treaty violations, and of the development of a Soviet BMD program has led to considerable support in the United States for accelerated development of US strategic defense systems to maintain a credible deterrent posture.

Finally, a few knowledgeable Chinese analysts who have spent considerable time in the United States maintain that development of strategic defense systems by the Soviet Union and the United States is part of the evolution of nuclear strategy and military technology. In current US nuclear strategy, they say, deterrence is based not merely on mutual assured destruction, but also on a willingness to fight a nuclear war, including a limited nuclear conflict, should deterrence fail. Such a limited-war strategy, they point out, requires defense as well as offense. Only by making full preparations for fighting a nuclear war, according to proponents of this view, can the United States have a reliable deterrent, "stand firm," and defend its territory and that of its allies in case of outbreak of war.

Assessing Soviet Opposition to SDI

The Chinese see Moscow's strong opposition to the US SDI program as aimed at achieving four objectives: (1) banning the SDI program while continuing to conduct its own research on strategic defense technologies; (2) buying time to reinvigorate the Soviet economy and to catch up with the United States technologically; (3) preventing the United States from obtaining a first-strike capability and, at a minimum, maintaining parity with the United States in strategic offensive forces; and (4) gaining a propaganda advantage over the United States and driving a wedge between the US and its allies and friends in Western Europe and Asia, including China.

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and military analysts at virtually every institute we visited. The assessments of SDI by analysts at any one institute frequently differed, however, and it was not uncommon for experts to disagree openly about this and other issues. The motivations behind the US SDI program have been analyzed in published articles by several experts at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Institute of International Studies (IIS). See, e.g., Zhuang Qubing, "An Analysis of the U.S. 'Star Wars' Program," *Guoji Wenti Yanjiu*, No. 4, October 1984, trans. in *JPRS–CPS*, No. 85-002, Jan. 8, 1985; and Tan Han, "U.S.-Soviet Space Arms Race," *Guoji Wenti Yanjiu*, No. 2, April 1985, trans. in *JPRS–CPS*, No. 85-071, July 22, 1985.

[10] See, e.g., Huan and Li, loc. cit.

[11] Cao Ye, "What Actually Is the Reagan Administration's 'Star Wars' Scheme?" *Huanqiu*, Feb. 23, 1985, trans. in *JPRS–CPS*, No. 85-052, May 24, 1985.

[12] These military analysts and officials are conversant with such issues as ICBM vulnerability, counterforce and countervalue targeting, problems of verification, the military significance of qualitative as well as quantitative differences in US and Soviet strategic forces, and the strategic and arms control implications of SDI. Many of these analysts have spent considerable time studying abroad or representing the Chinese government in the United States or Western Europe. They include analysts at the PLA Military Academy's Institute of Strategic Studies (see fn. 19), some arms control and strategy specialists from the PLA General Staff and the Ministry of National Defense's think tank, BIISS. Other proponents of this view include retired military officials now working as analysts in research institutes and some civilian university professors who have studied in the United States.

Chinese analysts who are familiar with Soviet military programs express doubt that Moscow ever really accepted mutual assured destruction as the cornerstone of deterrence. In their view, the Soviet Union has always favored developing a strategic defense capability as well as offensive nuclear forces. But, they say, the Soviets have not acknowledged conducting research in this area, even though they have continued such research unabated since the 1950's. Indeed, maintain the Chinese, the Soviets not only are engaged in strategic defense research, they also are upgrading their existing ABM system around Moscow to counter evolving threats from Great Britain, France, and China. Soviet concern about the SDI program, according to the Chinese, stems primarily from Moscow's perception that the United States has achieved a significant lead over the Soviet Union in strategic defense research.

The Chinese recognize that there is a wide gap in overall technological development between the Soviet Union and the United States and assert that the SDI program presents the Soviet Union with an unprecedented challenge. The Soviets realize that they are facing an economic crisis, the Chinese say, and that the USSR cannot compete successfully with the United States in developing strategic defense technologies at the same time it is attempting to solve its economic problems. Thus, in the Chinese view, Moscow hopes to pressure Washington into agreeing to a ban on the testing and development of space weapons.[13] The Chinese insist, however, that the Soviets' long-term objective is not to prevent the deployment of weapons in outer space, but rather to postpone the competition with the United States in space-based weapons until the Soviet economy has been strengthened.[14] Such a postponement is critical, note the majority of Chinese analysts, since Soviet leaders genuinely fear that the United States will deploy a space-based defense system first and seriously degrade Moscow's nuclear deterrent.[15]

Experts on the USSR and other Chinese analysts say that Moscow continues to seek nuclear superiority over the United States, but that it realizes this goal is unattainable in the foreseeable future.[16] The Soviets' immediate concern, the Chinese assert, is to maintain parity with the United States, which will place severe strains on the Soviet economy if Moscow fails to obtain a ban on space-based weapons.[17]

The Soviets' political strategy, contend Chinese analysts, is aimed at dividing the United States from its West European allies. A Soviet expert at the Institute of Contemporary International Relations (ICIR) noted that "the Soviets are trying to convince the West Europeans that SDI will [lead to neutralization of] British and French nuclear forces. This is aimed at discouraging them from participating in SDI." Other analysts assert that Soviet strategy is aimed at pulling China away from the United States and winning de facto Chinese support for Moscow's opposition to the US SDI program. For their part, the Chinese do not want to appear to be siding with either superpower on the SDI issue—especially with the Soviet Union—and they clearly recognize that Moscow is trying to exploit China's criticism of SDI to Soviet advantage. Chinese analysts further maintain that the Soviets hope to use the SDI issue—in particular the United States's unwillingness to reach an agreement on limiting the development of space-based weapons—to place the onus for escalation of the arms race on their superpower rival and to justify further increases in Soviet offensive forces.

Global Implications of SDI

A key Chinese concern about SDI is potential Soviet reaction to the US research program and to possible deployment of a space-based BMD system by the United States. Thus, many Chinese military experts and specialists on the USSR have been focusing their research on possible Soviet military, economic, and political reactions to the US SDI program. These analysts for the most part base their assessments on analyses of SDI by Western experts and on statements on SDI by Soviet leaders and defense officials.

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[13] A Soviet expert at the ICIR stated that "the Soviet Union faces the problem of having to set priorities to improve the economy, especially since Gorbachëv took power. Since the end of the 1970's, the Soviet economy has been stagnant and the speed of economic development has declined. The technological gap between the United States and the Soviet Union may grow wider in the future. Soviet leaders are very concerned about this. They want to spend as much as they can on economic development. SDI is a competition in high technology. It will require a lot of money, and it may be too expensive for the Soviet Union, so they want to put a stop to it."

[14] This view was expressed by many Chinese analysts. A Soviet expert at the ICIR maintained that "of course, the Soviet Union wants to develop defensive systems [but] more time will be beneficial to the Soviets. They will wait 10–20 years, until the Soviet economy is stronger, and then they will compete with the United States." An MFA official made a similar argument: "At the moment, the Soviets seem to want to ban SDI because they know that technologically and economically they are not in a good position to compete, although they do believe in defense." Several experts at the Institute of Soviet and East European Studies also expressed this view.

[15] A senior analyst from the Soviet foreign policy section of the Institute of Soviet and East European Studies stated: "The Soviets worry that if the United States realizes its SDI system, the offensive forces of the Soviet Union will be neutralized and US-Soviet parity will be broken. This would plunge the Soviet Union into a dangerous situation. For this reason, the Soviet Union is doing its utmost to oppose SDI."

[16] A Soviet expert from the ICIR assessed US and Soviet strategic goals in the past decade in the context of the shifting balance of power and a changed international environment. He asserted that in the late 1970's, the US goal was to maintain parity with the Soviet Union, while Moscow sought to achieve nuclear superiority. In the 1980's, however, the situation is just the reverse, he contended. Now the US goal is to gain superiority, and the Soviet Union is seeking to maintain a balance, he said.

[17] Chinese analysts insist that despite the great cost to the Soviet economy, Moscow will allocate the necessary resources to keep up with the United States in research and development of strategic defense technologies. Some experts maintain that this competition with the United States might set back Soviet economic reform efforts. A minority view is that the technological developments achieved in defensive weapons research would benefit the Soviet economy in the long run.

The Chinese doubt that the Soviet Union would cooperate with the United States in making a transition to a strategic environment dominated by defense through negotiations on mutual deployment of BMD. Rather, they expect the Soviets to remain hostile to the US program and to use political means to try to block it. Chinese analysts expect the USSR to continue to compete with the United States technologically and militarily and even to employ force to prevent the United States from successfully deploying a space-based BMD system. As a result, Chinese experts generally agree that there are three possible Soviet responses to SDI: an expansion of offensive forces; development of countermeasures to penetrate a BMD system; and deployment of weapons such as anti-satellite weapons (ASAT's) to destroy a space-based BMD system.

Like many Western critics of SDI, most Chinese experts maintain that Moscow will calculate that no BMD system can be 100 percent perfect. The Soviets will base their strategy, the Chinese suggest, on the assumption that even if only a very small percentage of Soviet warheads were to penetrate the US defense system, the United States would sustain unacceptable damage. Thus, they say, the Soviets will react to SDI in the short run by (1) proliferating the number of warheads on their land-based missiles to quantitatively overwhelm the defense; and (2) developing and deploying new offensive weapons with qualitatively enhanced ability to penetrate the US defense system. One analyst from the Institute of US Studies noted that the former response would be especially cost-efficient, since the large throw-weight of Soviet ICBM's would allow Moscow to vastly increase the number of warheads on the missiles it has already deployed.[18]

While a minority of analysts maintain that Moscow will confine its efforts to defeating and destroying the US system, the dominant view among Chinese civilian and military analysts is that the Soviets will build their own space-based BMD system. "There will be no such thing as a one-sided BMD," asserted a senior analyst at the Institute of US Studies. "The Soviets will also develop it." By merely proliferating its warheads, he said, Moscow cannot have confidence that it will be able to defeat the US BMD system. In the event of a nuclear war, the analyst continued, the United States could attack specific Soviet targets, while the Soviet Union could only hope to randomly penetrate the US defense shield. In addition, maintained the analyst, although countermeasures developed and refined by the Soviet Union might be able to reduce the effectiveness of the US defense system, they could not neutralize it entirely. The Soviets' task would be made more difficult, he continued, because Washington surely would take preventive steps to offset such countermeasures. Thus, the analyst concluded, it would not be prudent for Moscow to rely solely on countermeasures to maintain its deterrent. Without an SDI system of its own, added an expert from the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Military Academy,[19] "any nuclear strategy of the Soviet Union will be a suicide strategy."

Those analysts who maintain that the Soviets will succeed in deploying a BMD system frequently point to the recent history of US-Soviet weapons development as justification for their assertion. These analysts cite Soviet development of the atomic bomb, the hydrogen bomb, and MIRV's[20] as evidence that the Soviet Union will be able to match the United States in building a strategic defense system despite the USSR's relative technological backwardness. This argument was voiced primarily by Chinese Soviet experts who contend that the Soviet Union's centralized system allows for more efficient mobilization of manpower and resources to develop the military industry than is possible under capitalism. Not surprisingly, they caution against underestimating the Soviets' capabilities and potential.[21] A Soviet expert at the Insti-

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[18] Chinese military analysts also echo other arguments made by Western critics of SDI. They say, for example, that the Soviets would be able to add a large number of penetration aids to their warheads bus, including decoys and chaff, to confuse the defense system's discriminating sensors during an attack. The Chinese also assert that the Soviets could spin their ICBM boosters to reduce laser effectiveness or deploy fast-burn boosters to reduce the critical boost-phase period during which a missile could be destroyed before its warheads are deployed. Chinese analysts also point to measures the Soviets could take to destroy the adversary's space-based BMD system such as deployment of space mines and ASAT's that are designed for attacking space-based battle stations.

[19] At the end of 1985, China announced that in September 1986 the PLA Military Academy will be formally absorbed by a newly created National Defense University. Since these analysts were affiliated with the Academy when we met with them, we have opted to cite their Academy affiliation throughout the essay. When referring to the Institute of Strategic Studies, which was created last year under the PLA Military Academy but will be part of the National Defense University, we also give its Academy affiliation.

[20] Multiple Independently-targeted Reentry Vehicles.

[21] A senior analyst at the Institute of Soviet and East European Studies claimed that "in basic science, the Soviet Union is not far behind the United States. It lags behind in applied sciences. The Soviet Union has a larger number of scientists than the United States. Its backwardness is attributable to its economic system, and Soviet leaders have realized this and are beginning to take measures to reform the system. After this reform, science and technology will be brought into play."



A Soviet SS-20 transporter-erector-launcher used for crew training and familiarization.

—US Department of Defense photo.

tute of International Studies (IIS) also asserted that Moscow will seek to keep up with the United States not only by relying on its own resources, but also by "using the KGB to steal the secrets of SDI."

One of the concerns frequently voiced by Chinese analysts and officials is that the Soviets will use force either against the US space-based defense system to prevent its deployment or against the United States itself before the system is deployed. In either case, they say, Moscow's response would likely trigger a US retaliation that could lead to a global nuclear war. Even those Chinese analysts who maintain that Washington has no such intentions say that the Soviets genuinely fear that the US is seeking to use SDI to achieve a first-strike capability against the Soviet Union.

Chinese analysts assert that the Soviet Union will not allow its offensive forces to be neutralized by US deployment of a space-based BMD system. Some say that a space-based system will be vulnerable and that Moscow will therefore try to preempt it. "If the United States builds SDI first," an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) said, "the Soviets may go another way—develop an ability to attack the system." Other analysts disagree, however, contending that a Soviet attack on the US defense system would risk a US strike against Soviet space assets and even retaliation against Soviet territory, which could escalate to a global nuclear war.

Chinese analysts also worry that the Soviets might calculate that they had more to lose by letting the United States deploy an SDI system than by taking the risk of launching a first strike against the United States before such a system was deployed. A senior arms control specialist at the Beijing Institute for International Strategic Studies (BIISS), the think tank for the Ministry of National Defense, warned that Moscow could overreact and start a war: "If the Soviets are in a desperate position, the polar bear might become nervous and not be in a clear mind—it might make some miscalculations." A Foreign Ministry expert on the Soviet Union similarly suggested that the Soviets, fearing neutralization of their ICBM's, might launch an attack before the United States succeeded in deploying its BMD system. An expert on the United States from the

Foreign Ministry disagreed with his colleague, however, arguing that Moscow would seek a political rather than a military solution to the SDI threat.

Superpower Strategic Relationship

Implicit in Deng's September 1985 statement on SDI is fear not so much of the continuation of the arms race per se—which the Chinese see as inevitable—but of its extension to outer space and to new areas of potentially destabilizing military technology. Thus, in the Chinese leadership's view, the further deployment of US and Soviet offensive forces, while obviously contrary to Chinese interests, will not in itself necessarily heighten the risk of war. Rather, it is the extension of the arms competition to the new realm of outer space that could, in Deng's words, cause the arms race to "go completely out of control."

As with most aspects of the discussion on SDI, however, there are numerous differences of opinion among Chinese experts, some of which are at variance with Deng's statements. A few military analysts, for example, maintain that instability and an increased danger of war are possible—but not certain—outcomes of SDI. An arms control specialist from BIISS said: "I put a very big question mark on SDI—on both its technological feasibility and its implications for the strategic balance. If the balance will be strengthened, I will raise my hand to support it. But I worry that the balance will be destroyed."[22] Another military analyst, from the PLA Military Academy, maintained that the technology of SDI is not sufficiently developed to determine its implications for stability.

> *It is hard to predict what the capabilities of the BMD systems will be. There is a great deal of room for development in this area, and thus it is likely that it will affect the stability that currently exists. Technological developments will determine whether there will be stability or instability. At present, BMD is inherently unstable because the technology is not yet mature.*

Some analysts suggest that the SDI program of the United States could actually strengthen deterrence. Even if a BMD system were not 100 percent effective, notes an analyst at the Institute of US Studies, it could nevertheless discourage a potential attack if the attacker could not be sure of destroying a sufficiently large portion of the adversary's nuclear forces to prevent an effective retaliatory strike.[23] Another analyst, from the PLA Military Academy, holds out the possibility that SDI could actually enhance stability. If a space-based BMD system could set off a nuclear explosion when it destroyed an ICBM booster—which at present is technically impossible—deterrence could be strengthened, he suggested. Should the system be perfected in such a way, he said, the attacker would confront not only the attrition of its attacking warheads, but also the possibility that launching an attack could lead to the detonation of the attacking warheads over the attacker's own territory. "The attacker would then face a dilemma. If it wants to penetrate the system, it will launch more warheads, but then it will risk being destroyed itself."

A number of Chinese analysts are also concerned that some technologies being developed under the SDI program—lasers and kinetic-energy weapons—could be used as offensive weapons for attacking ground targets. One military official maintained that space-based weapons could be used to attack an enemy's territory, including its cities as well as missile silos.[24] But this view was disputed on technical grounds by an engineer at the Institute of US Studies. Lasers are not yet powerful enough to destroy weapons in space, he reasoned, so "they are nowhere near having enough power for ground attack." In any case, the expert added, it would not be cost-effective to use space-based weapons to destroy missiles in their silos or other ground targets.

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[22] The majority view held by Chinese analysts is that the US SDI program will successfully develop a space-based defense system that will be able to intercept a very large percentage of Soviet missiles. For some analysts, this assessment is based on a scientific understanding of the technologies being explored for SDI. For other analysts, this conclusion appears to be based on a common tendency to assume that the United States can achieve any technological objective to which it applies sufficient resources. A senior analyst at the Institute of US Studies argued that within the next 20 to 30 years, the United States may not be able to achieve its goal of providing protection for US territory and population, but in that period it will be able to deploy a space-based BMD system that will enhance deterrence by protecting the US retaliatory capability. "Although a BMD system is not easy to develop, there is a definite technological base," the analyst contended, and "if it is resolutely pursued, sooner or later it will be successful."

[23] Most Chinese expressed opposition to the deployment of weapons in space, while indicating that ground-based point defense systems for defense of missile sites and other hard targets were not objectionable to China. A group of analysts at the ICIR agreed that a BMD system such as the Soviet Galosh system deployed around Moscow did not pose the same threat of instability as would space-based defense systems. One widely shared concern is that while a ground-based BMD system is purely defensive, a space-based system would likely have offensive capabilities. An analyst at the Shanghai Institute of International Studies contended, however, that even a point defense system can be destabilizing: "A small defensive capability can contribute to offensive capability . . . . If one side deploys something that gives it a sense of security and the other side does not have a sense of security, then this is dangerous. We can't look at one weapon system, we should compare the overall strength of the two sides."

[24] A military analyst from the PLA Military Academy's Institute of Strategic Studies asserted that "SDI has offensive capabilities that can be used in two ways. First, SDI can be used to attack an enemy's territory, including cities as well as missiles. Second, it can be used as a defensive shield for a first strike and can be changed to an offensive system and used to improve the attacker's capability." A BIISS analyst also maintained that space-based weapons will take on an offensive role and that "space-based kinetic-energy weapons will be more important than lasers." In his article, "An Analysis of the U.S. 'Star Wars' Program" (loc. cit), Zhuang Qubing also argues that space-based weapons would have offensive capabilities that could be used against objects in space as well as ground targets.

Western Europe and SDI. In their writings on SDI, Chinese analysts often point to West European fears about SDI to veil their own concerns. An article published in *Liaowang*, for example, outlined purported West European fears that SDI will: (1) lead to an intensification of the arms race; (2) jeopardize the US-Soviet nuclear arms talks; (3) violate the ABM treaty; (4) decouple US and West European security; (5) upset the prevailing US-Soviet strategic balance; (6) increase the likelihood of conventional war in Europe; (7) weaken or even neutralize French and British nuclear deterrent forces; (8) alter US reliance on a strategy of mutual assured destruction and so increase the danger of nuclear war; and (9) provide the Soviet Union with an opportunity to drive a wedge between the United States and its West European allies and to promote further the anti-nuclear movement in Western Europe.[25]

Some Chinese analysts see SDI as creating a dilemma for the West European states: if they do not become involved in SDI research, they may fall even further behind the United States and Japan technologically; if they do become involved, they are likely to become junior partners to the United States. One analyst from the Institute of US Studies maintained that even if there is some European cooperation on SDI, "the United States will keep [key US-developed] SDI technology secret and will not share it," thus exacerbating tensions within the alliance. But the Chinese also point to the possibility that cooperation could result in a drain of skilled West European personnel and material resources to the United States, which they say is quite likely in joint SDI research efforts.

The Chinese support the Eureka program—a French-sponsored European alternative to SDI[26]—as potentially providing an impetus to accelerated technological development as well as greater independence and political unity in Western Europe.[27] Chinese writings point to a direct link between Western Europe's technological capabilities and its international influence. A *Beijing Review* article, for example, noted the current gap between the United States and Western Europe in technology and asserted that "narrowing this technology gap is Western Europe's new imperative, especially because Europe's declining influence on the world economy is a direct result of the technology gap. The success of Eureka could restore Western Europe's decisive influence over world economies and politics." But the writer expressed skepticism about Eureka's prospects: "Conflicting interests among the participating nations and lack of funding are destined to make the success of Eureka a long time in coming."[28]

In discussions of the implications of SDI for Western Europe, Chinese analysts expressed particular concern that the US program could lead to a divergence of West European and US security interests. A specialist on Western Europe at the ICIR maintained that most West Europeans "think that NATO's flexible response strategy has guaranteed the peace of Western Europe and that SDI will weaken deterrence. They think SDI may reduce the effectiveness of their nuclear forces. But they are even more concerned that SDI will decouple US and West European security. They worry that the US will not be able to guarantee West European security."[29] Other Chinese analysts make similar arguments, noting that a US space-based BMD system will not be able to protect Western Europe from Soviet attack while a similar Soviet BMD system will neutralize US strategic deterrent forces. Western Europe, according to this view, would be faced with superior Soviet conventional forces and a dubious security guarantee from the United States. This new strategic situation, note these analysts, could lead to serious strains in the NATO alliance and to increased instability in East-West relations and greater likelihood of conventional war in Europe.

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[25] Li Yuan, "Why Western Europe Worries About Reagan's 'Star Wars' Program," *Liaowang*, Sept. 2, 1985, trans. in *JPRS–CPS*, No. 85-114, Nov. 15, 1985.

[26] Eureka is a multibillion dollar, multiyear program launched by France in April 1985 to sponsor and coordinate European research on many of the same technologies that are being developed by the US SDI program. The Eureka program will focus on civilian research and the development of technologies that are considered key to the job-producing industries of the future, including high-powered lasers, artificial intelligence, high-speed micro-electronics, information technology, and optical fibers. The primary objective of the Eureka program is to reverse the decline in Western Europe's technological capabilities relative to those of the United States and Japan.

[27] A *Renmin Ribao* (Beijing) article examined the political implications of the Eureka program for Western Europe: "Participation in the US 'Star Wars' will make the nations of Europe dependent on the United States for a long time and lose their independent status, while the successes of 'Eureka' will strengthen not only the unifying of Europe but also its independent status." See Zhang Zihua, " 'Eureka' and 'Star Wars'," May 26, 1985, trans. in *FBIS–CHI*, May 30, 1985, pp. A/12-13. Another article linked West European independence with its ability to keep up with the United States in development of advanced technology: "If they do not get a jump on the new technologies, the nations of Western Europe will lag behind economically and will have a difficult time maintaining their independence in international affairs." Xing Hua, "SDI: Western Europe Faces Challenge," *Beijing Review*, Aug. 5, 1985, p. 25.

[28] Xia Zhimian, "Eureka: Cementing the Uncertainty," *Beijing Review*, Nov. 18, 1985, p. 14.

[29] This argument is also made by Li Yuan in his article "Why Western Europe Worries About Reagan's 'Star Wars' Program," loc. cit.

Not all Chinese analysts agree with this view, however. A senior editor at *Shijie Zhishi*, who has written insightful articles on SDI, noted that SDI might be able to strengthen defense of West European countries rather than weaken deterrence. "It is hard to say which one will occur," he said.[30] Another view was expressed by an ICIR analyst who predicted that rather than leading to a major rift between the United States and Western Europe, SDI could encourage West European unity and "create a strong coalition that will promote the revitalization of West European economies and technological development." While there is a possibility that SDI could lead to "fiercer competition between Western Europe and the United States," he said, "this may be beneficial to both sides." A *Liaowang* article suggested that Eureka "will probably be merged with the 'Star Wars' program . . . to form a new US-Europe defense system. Although Europe's anxieties [about SDI] will not go away soon," the writer concludes, "they are not likely to affect the shared strategic interests of the Europeans and the United States."[31]

Arms Control and SDI

The SDI program, in China's view, will be a critical factor in determining the outcome of the US-Soviet nuclear arms control negotiations. While Beijing opposes the deployment of weapons in space as envisioned in the SDI program, the Chinese see the announcement of stepped-up efforts by the United States in strategic defense research as having had some positive consequences. For one thing, they say, it has heightened the Soviet Union's concern about its future position in the military balance, and this has compelled Moscow to return to the negotiating table. For another, SDI has played an important role in shifting international perceptions of the global balance of power in favor of the United States. This has put the Soviet Union on the defensive, according to the Chinese, and forced Soviet leaders, at least publicly, to demonstrate a willingness to compromise on some arms control issues.

Chinese analysts candidly state that China's interests are best served by the current international situation, in which there is rough parity in the US-Soviet strategic balance, with Washington holding a slight edge over Moscow in the global balance of power. The United States has restored its military strength under the Reagan administration, they maintain, and reversed the trend of the late 1970's in which the balance of power had shifted in favor of the Soviet Union. According to this view, the United States should now use the leverage over Moscow that SDI has provided to obtain Soviet concessions in the arms control negotiations. If the United States is willing to consider placing limits on its strategic defense programs, many Chinese contend, there may be an opportunity to reach an equitable agreement on substantial reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both sides.

While the Soviet Union has not given up its goal of achieving nuclear superiority, the Chinese maintain, it has been forced to slow the pace of military spending due to its severe economic problems. Chinese analysts and officials are concerned, however, that US refusal to use SDI as a bargaining chip will lead to a stalemate in the arms control talks and an exacerbation of US-Soviet tensions. In addition, Beijing worries that Washington's intransigence on SDI could reverse the favorable perceptions of the United States globally and cause the Reagan administration once again to appear aggressive in the eyes of the world.

The Chinese are not optimistic about the short-term prospects for concluding a US-Soviet arms control agreement banning the deployment of weapons in space and drastically reducing offensive forces. Some are doubtful that the Reagan administration is sincere about wanting to reach an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union at all.

But Beijing is even more suspicious of Moscow's intentions in the arms control negotiations. The Chinese contend that the Soviet Union used arms control and détente with the United States in the 1970's to mask a massive buildup of its military power. Many Chinese analysts maintain that even if the United States were to agree to abandon the SDI program, the Soviet Union may not be willing to make drastic cuts in its land-based missiles or to place limits on its own research program in defensive technologies and weapons. One reason for this, argues a Foreign Ministry official, is that the Soviet Union "won't let US paper weapons be used to force reduction of actual weapons." An analyst at the Institute of US Studies adds that the Soviet Union will not agree to a ban on testing and deployment of new BMD systems because it is seeking to upgrade its ABM system around Moscow to counter the "limited retaliatory capabilities of Great Britain, France, and China."

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[30] This editor of *Shijie Zhishi* has written articles under the pseudonym Yuan He. See, e.g., "New Trends in U.S.-Soviet Relations" (co-authored by Wu Wei, also a pseudonym), *Shijie Zhishi* (Beijing), May 16, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, May 30, 1985, pp. A/5–8.

[31] Li, "Why Western Europe Worries About Reagan's 'Star Wars' Program," loc. cit.

Chinese experts on the USSR are more hopeful that the Soviets might eventually compromise on arms control after a long period of negotiations with the United States. "There is a characteristic pattern in the Soviet negotiating style," noted an expert on Soviet foreign policy from the Institute of Soviet and East European Studies. "The Soviet Union first adopts a very hard line in the negotiations. After it has staked out a strong position, it will then make compromises. I remember that once Stalin said one should prolong negotiations until everyone is tired and then make an agreement. We should not rule out that possibility."

Most Chinese analysts say that a US-Soviet arms control accord is possible in the long run, but they doubt that an agreement would significantly reduce offensive weapons or ban deployments of weapons in space. They believe that Moscow and Washington would only make small concessions on offensive and defensive weapons while maintaining roughly equal capabilities. Even such a limited arms accord could be concluded only after extensive bargaining and negotiations, Chinese analysts say. At present, they see progress as inhibited by mutual suspicions and the desire on each side to seek an advantage over the other.

If the United States remains unwilling to compromise on SDI, note the Chinese, the Soviet Union will be able to use the SDI issue to gain a significant propaganda advantage over the United States. In discussions with Chinese analysts in September 1985, there was general agreement that the Soviets had scored a tactical victory on the issue by appearing to be more "peace-minded" than the United States. An arms control specialist affiliated with BIISS warned that "if the United States insists on going ahead with SDI, then the Soviets can blame Washington for the next round of the arms race." He added that the US task in Geneva is twofold: to convince the Soviets that the United States is determined to deploy SDI, so that Moscow will be forced to make some concessions; and to present a realistic proposal that will demonstrate to Moscow, Western Europe, and the rest of the world that the United States is not seeking superiority over the Soviet Union. "The United States needs to kick the ball back into the Soviet court with a good offer, proof of Soviet [arms control treaty] violations, and [evidence] of the Soviet BMD program." Another arms control expert from BIISS added that "the United States does not have to announce that it is using SDI as a bargaining chip, but it can play that role to test Soviet sincerity. If the Soviets are serious, they will put forward concrete proposals. But I don't think the Soviets are sincere."

The primary concern of these two military analysts is that Washington manage the BMD competition with the Soviet Union in a way that will enhance stability and improve the global image of the United States. These analysts are knowledgeable about the extent of Soviet BMD research and are concerned about its implications. They insist that it is necessary for the United States to engage in this research to hedge against a Soviet breakthrough in BMD technologies. What concerns these analysts most about the US SDI program is the Reagan administration's seemingly confrontational approach to this area of competition with Moscow. "China is not against your research," one of the BIISS experts asserted, "but keep your mouth shut." "It would have been better if the United States had gone ahead with [SDI], but had not announced it," he added. An expert at the Institute of US Studies echoed this view: "It is a pity that the United States has said so much about SDI publicly. The Soviets are conducting the same research, but they don't admit it. So the first impression of people in China was that the United States started the arms race in space with SDI."

Coverage of Ballistic Missile Detection and Tracking Systems



—Adapted from an illustration on p. 51 of US Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power*, 1986, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1986.

The Chinese see potential benefits for China in a US-Soviet arms control accord because such an accord could lead to an easing of tensions between the two superpowers and contribute to the maintenance of a peaceful international environment. An agreement also could halt or at least postpone the extension of the arms race to outer space and perhaps check the widening of the gap between Chinese military capabilities and those of the United States and the Soviet Union. It is not surprising, therefore, that publicly the Chinese no longer use the rhetoric of the 1970's to criticize arms control. Instead of describing the SALT talks as "sham disarmament"—a cover for continuation of the arms race while both superpowers sought superiority—and as a form of "collusion" of the superpowers against China and other countries, the Chinese now say that arms control and improved US-Soviet relations are in China's and the world's interest. Nevertheless, privately, Chinese analysts remain somewhat suspicious, expressing fears that the United States and the Soviet Union could agree on terms that are harmful to China's security interests.

This concern was perhaps voiced most explicitly by a senior Soviet expert at the ICIR: "The possibility exists that the United States and the Soviet Union will reduce their strategic forces and that Soviet INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] will not be reduced or limited. We think that the United States and the Soviet Union should reduce both strategic and theater forces . . . . We hope that the United States and the Soviet Union will consider the interests of third countries such as China. Third countries will oppose any arms control treaties that are not in their interests."[32]

SDI and Chinese Security

The potential impact of SDI on international stability and the US-Soviet arms competition has received primary attention in Beijing, largely due to the prominent role that SDI has assumed in the strategic arms control talks. A less immediate concern, but one that has more direct implications for Chinese security, is the viability of China's nuclear deterrent in the face of possible BMD deployments by the Soviet Union. Beijing's worst-case assessment is that China's nuclear deterrent force would be neutralized—its ballistic-missile warheads no longer able to penetrate Soviet defenses.

But this is an unlikely scenario. Soviet BMD may not be able to prevent China's nuclear forces from performing their military mission, which is to launch retaliatory strikes in response to a Soviet nuclear attack. Indeed, unlike US forces—which must be able to credibly threaten a wide range of Soviet targets to deter many different types of threats, including threats to US allies and friends—Chinese nuclear forces need only be able to attack a small number of major Soviet cities to maintain a "minimum deterrent" against a Soviet attack. The Chinese have sought to build such a minimum deterrent force by putting at risk a limited number of Soviet high-value targets. The credibility of that deterrent force rests on its ability to ride out a Soviet first strike and reliably deliver nuclear warheads to the target areas in retaliation. Thus, China's minimum deterrent force will be strongest if Beijing can credibly threaten a retaliatory strike against Moscow.[33] Nonetheless, the Chinese would still have some deterrent capability even if they could only threaten major cities in the Far East and Siberia.

The Chinese have long sought to increase the invulnerability of their forces through deceptive and protective basing of land-based ballistic missiles and have recently begun deploying a sea-based deterrent force to enhance survivability.[34] An advanced Soviet BMD system, however, could degrade the ability of Chinese forces surviving Soviet preemption to reliably retaliate, especially against Moscow. Nevertheless, China's limited deterrent goals, its geographic proximity to a few major Soviet cities, and the option of developing countermeasures suggest that Beijing's nuclear forces may be able to retain minimum viability in the face of a less-than-perfect Soviet space-based BMD system.

Both officials and analysts insist that, if necessary, steps will be taken to strengthen China's deterrent force. But countering a Soviet BMD threat would be costly, they say, and China does not want to increase its spending on military modernization. Nonetheless, Chinese military experts have been exploring the relevance for China of many of the countermeasures to space-based BMD systems that have been evaluated in the West. Some are a matter of launch tactics—such as "redout" and "blackout" detonations[35]—and others require technology that could feasibly be developed by China, such as enhanced penetration aids.[36]

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[32] An expert at the Shanghai Institute of International Studies also expressed concern that a US-Soviet arms control agreement could endanger Chinese security interests. "It is good for the Soviet Union and the United States to reach agreements on arms control," he said, "as long as it is not at the expense of third countries."

[33] An analyst at the Institute of US Studies maintained that an expanded Soviet ground-based defense system could pose a serious problem for China's nuclear deterrent forces. He asserted that "the problem for China, France, and Britain is the possibility of a point defense system. I don't know if we can penetrate it. The Galosh system has 30-40 exo-atmospheric and 60 endo-atmospheric interceptors. At this point, it is not a problem for our limited retaliatory forces since there is no need for us to strike Moscow. We can strike Leningrad and Kiev. By the end of the century, a ground-based defense around major cities could pose a problem for China . . . . The Soviets will primarily focus on protecting civilian, not military targets. Chinese forces are targeted only at cities—they are not capable of killing hard targets." Most US experts believe that in the event of a nuclear conflict with the USSR, China would seek to penetrate Moscow's Galosh ABM system.

[34] According to *The Military Balance 1985–1986* (London, International Institute for Strategic Studies), China has two missile-carrying submarines, each with 12 ballistic missiles. China also is reported to have 6 ICBM's, 60 IRBM's, and 50 MRBM's. See pp. 111–13.

In considering possible means for countering Soviet BMD, Chinese analysts have focused on technical as well as tactical solutions. For example, a senior analyst from the PLA Military Academy's Institute of Strategic Studies noted: "We can put a protective shield around the warheads and the missile and can also spin the missile. If we can shorten the boost phase to under 50 seconds, then directed-energy weapons will be useless. It is difficult to achieve, but this can be done." An analyst from BIISS said that nuclear short-range ballistic missiles and tactical nuclear weapons "would be a good idea for China in response to Soviet SDI deployment." Another BIISS analyst maintained that an ASAT capability against Soviet BMD space platforms may be "cost effective" for China. These analysts pointed out that China's geographical proximity to the Soviet Union provides it with advantages over Britain and France in maintaining the viability of its deterrent forces. They also noted that the credibility of China's deterrent is enhanced by its independent political position.

Most military analysts say that they are confident that China's deterrent will be effective during the anticipated long period prior to Soviet deployment of a space-based BMD system. One analyst maintained that "no rational defense system can be deployed by the Soviet Union for at least 20–30 years, and Chinese forces will remain effective during this time." An analyst from the PLA Military Academy similarly asserted: "Strategic defense systems pose a new military challenge to China's nuclear force. But our nuclear forces will be useful for at least 30 years."[37] While such an appraisal may seem to suggest optimism among Chinese leaders, it is worth noting that insisting on the continued viability of China's nuclear forces would be consistent with Beijing's strategy of relying on psychological factors to enhance deterrence.

Test-firing of a submarine-based Chinese carrier rocket in October 1982.

–New China Pictures Company from EASTFOTO.

US-Soviet Condominium

Chinese analysts are quietly concerned that SDI could lead to a US-Soviet condominium at the expense of Chinese security interests. Such a condominium could be even more dangerous to China than the collusion feared by Beijing during the SALT talks in the 1970's. That "collusion" was in the context of the mutual *vulnerability* of the United States and the Soviet Union: military actions by either power—especially against the other's allies and friends—risked escalation to global nuclear war. This restrained both powers from using military force at lower levels. A US-Soviet condominium in the future could give rise to quite a different dilemma. If deployment of space-based BMD systems by both the United States and the Soviet Union eliminated the mutual fear of escalation to nuclear attacks on their homelands, actions by the two powers against third countries—including potential Soviet attacks on Western Europe and China—might be far less constrained. At the same time, other countries without their own defensive shields would be highly vulnerable to military and political pressure from the Soviet Union and the United States. A civilian specialist on NATO succinctly expressed Chinese fears of the potential impact of such a condominium:

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[35] Heat and radiation from a nuclear explosion causes ionization of the surrounding air, which in turn disrupts radar signals—a phenomenon known as "blackout." A nuclear weapon exploded high over the target area would "blackout" radar equipment used for detecting and tracking incoming warheads and for guiding anti-ballistic missile interceptors to destroy the attacking warheads. A similar effect known as "redout" is produced by high-altitude nuclear explosions that blind infrared sensors. An attacking nation could explode a nuclear weapon several miles above its own missile sites to prevent space-based sensors from distinguishing the heat of the missiles from the intense heat of the nuclear blast itself.

[36] Penetration aids, or "penaids," are devices employed by ICBM's, SLBM's, and penetrating bombers to neutralize defenses. Both missiles and bombers employ penaids such as decoys, chaff, and electronic countermeasures to mislead or confuse the defender's radars.

[37] See footnote 33.

> *Only the United States and the Soviet Union have the power and the capability to create these new systems. Other countries, including China, do not. If this program goes forward, I say forthrightly that the United States and the Soviet Union will be able to decide the fate of the world. After deployment of SDI, both sides could use their system to protect themselves and attack others. This is a great danger to world stability. Not only China, but also middle-sized countries such as France worry about this possibility.*

An analyst from the Academy of Military Sciences who voiced similar concerns suggested that the US-Soviet arms talks might become a forum for agreement on mutual deployment of space-based BMD systems, which, he added, would "evoke strong opposition from other countries."[38] He noted that the dominant view in China is that a "bipolar world would return if such systems were deployed by both sides." A BIISS arms control expert added that "SDI would mean cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union to achieve mutual assured security. The other three nuclear powers—Britain, France, and China—cannot have assured security for themselves. So China takes this seriously."[39]

China's deterrent vis-à-vis the Soviet Union relies in part on Moscow's uncertainty as to how the United States would react to a Soviet attack on China. The Chinese are thus concerned that deployment of space-based BMD by the United States and the Soviet Union could weaken US global deterrence, even though it would strengthen Washington's ability to defend US territory. On the one hand, such a strategic development could reduce the likelihood that the United States would respond to a Soviet attack on China; on the other hand, the Soviets' BMD shield would reduce dramatically the effectiveness of a Chinese nuclear retaliatory strike.

Chinese analysts and journalists also openly discuss the potential impact of US and Soviet deployment of space-based BMD systems on the security of Western Europe. They see BMD as potentially undermining the current US strategy of "flexible response," by which the United States commits its strategic nuclear forces to the defense of Western Europe. This could have two consequences, they say, either of which would be devastating for Europe: on the one hand, the United States and the Soviet Union might be more likely to fight a war in Europe since they would not risk nuclear attack on their homelands; on the other hand, the United States might be less likely to honor its commitment to defend its West European allies against a Soviet attack, especially given Moscow's superiority in conventional arms in Europe. In addition, note many Chinese analysts, the fact that only a very short time is needed for Soviet missiles to reach West European territory has caused many West Europeans to doubt that a US BMD system could adequately protect them.[40]

Conclusion

The Chinese are unlikely to change their basic view that the development and deployment of advanced space-based strategic defense systems by the United States and the Soviet Union would seriously threaten China's security interests. The Chinese see their interests as better served by the strategic status quo in which there is rough parity in US and Soviet strategic offensive forces, very limited Soviet BMD deployments, and deterrence based on the ultimate threat of mutual assured destruction. This favorable strategic situation, in China's view, could be undermined by a US-Soviet BMD competition that extended the arms competition to the realm of outer space and to the development of new, potentially destabilizing, military technology.

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[38] An analyst at the Institute of US Studies argued that a US-Soviet condominium is unrealistic because Moscow and Washington will not reach an agreement on a transition to deployment of strategic defense systems; the two sides cannot develop strategic defense systems at the same time, and neither power will share its technology with the other; and "mutual assured destruction" cannot be replaced by "mutual assured survival."

[39] A *Renmin Ribao* article observed that if the ability of nuclear weapons to deter war in Europe is neutralized by the deployment of US and Soviet space-based defense systems while the Soviet Union maintains its superiority in conventional weapons, then the likelihood of a limited war in Europe will increase. See Wei Wei, "Europe on the Eve of the US-Soviet Talks," Mar. 10, 1985, trans. in *FBIS–CHI*, Mar. 12, 1985.

[40] A *Beijing Review* article notes that "European leaders doubt whether the defense system could effectively protect their countries, since Soviet missiles are much closer and would take only a few minutes to reach European soil." See Xia Zhimian, " 'Star Wars' Plan Tests Relations," Apr. 8, 1985, p. 11. In a discussion at the ICIR, a PLA Military Academy analyst indicated similar concern that it would be difficult for a BMD system to intercept Soviet missiles aimed at China because of the close proximity of China to the Soviet Union. Short-range Soviet missiles that did not leave the atmosphere would not be vulnerable to space-based defenses yet could have sufficient range to reach high-value targets. The relatively short flight time between Soviet launch sites and Chinese targets would render even longer range ballistic missiles difficult to attack during their brief midcourse phase if they were not destroyed in the boost phase.

Even if the SDI program does not lead to the extreme consequences feared by many Chinese analysts and officials—such as the disruption of US-Soviet parity or neutralization of China's deterrent forces—the Chinese are likely to continue to view SDI as detrimental to their national interests. Chinese security would be jeopardized by enhanced Soviet BMD capabilities—whether ground-based or space-based—that reduced the credibility of China's deterrent. China also could be "left behind" by the accelerated development of advanced military and civilian technology resulting from the US-Soviet BMD competition.

As long as SDI is confined to a research program, however, it could benefit China by reinforcing current international conditions, which the Chinese see as favorable for achieving their goal of national development. Soviet preoccupation with the US threat and the SDI challenge could serve Chinese interests by keeping Moscow on the defensive globally and by providing the Soviets with further incentives to improve ties with Beijing. While some Chinese analysts and officials privately acknowledge these short-term benefits for China, it is unlikely that Chinese leaders will publicly point to any advantages accruing to Beijing from SDI. To do so could undermine the credibility of China's claim of pursuing an independent foreign policy and compromise China's "principled stand" against the extension of the arms race to outer space.

Chinese leaders have not decided how to respond to SDI beyond their initial, deliberately vague statements opposing the extension of the arms race to outer space. They do not see policy decisions as urgent in the next few years while the United States and the Soviet Union are still in the early stages of research. Meanwhile, the Chinese plan to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the SDI program and its implications for international stability and Chinese security.

The impact of US-Soviet BMD competition on Chinese foreign and defense policies will hinge on several factors: the pace of the Soviet BMD program; US management of its relations with the Soviet Union, of SDI, and of arms control; the effect of SDI on US relations with its NATO allies; the outcome of debates over SDI in the United States and Western Europe; the results of research concerning the feasibility of various SDI technologies and structures; American and Soviet offensive weapons deployments and changes in the US-USSR strategic balance; the relative progress and technological levels of the Eureka and SDI research programs; and the outcome of the ongoing US-Soviet arms control talks in Geneva.

Sino-Soviet Relations. In the short run, the SDI program may provide Moscow with opportunities for expanding its dialogue with Beijing. The Soviets are likely to stress their common ground with China in opposing "the arms race in space" in order to heighten concern in Washington about a possible Sino-Soviet rapprochement. While it is likely that the Chinese will remain suspicious of Soviet aims, Beijing may blame a lack of progress in arms control on US intransigence over SDI, should China perceive the Soviet Union to be seriously seeking an agreement.

In the long run, however, Beijing could seek closer military ties with the United States as a counterbalance to Soviet power if Soviet deployment of an extensive BMD system threatened to neutralize China's deterrent. Chinese leaders are likely to pursue this option only if they calculate that strengthened Chinese military cooperation with the United States would deter rather than provoke Moscow, and that it would enhance China's ability to defend itself.

Sino-American Relations. Chinese leaders place a high priority on minimizing any adverse effects of their indirect criticisms of SDI on Sino-American relations. The Chinese view SDI as a global disarmament issue, not a bilateral matter. They are likely to confine their public criticisms to opposing extension of the arms race to outer space by both the Soviet Union and the United States.

China's Defense Modernization. The Chinese are likely to postpone decisions on whether to modify their nuclear weapons modernization program until they complete their current assessments of the evolving US-Soviet BMD competition. They will closely follow Western technical discussions of countermeasures to BMD systems and will seek to determine the feasibility and cost of various means for China to counter advanced Soviet BMD systems. Possible Chinese responses already being discussed in Beijing include development of an ASAT capability to attack a Soviet space-based defense system and deployment of a ground-based point defense system to enhance the survivability of Chinese missiles.

Disarmament Positions. The Chinese do not expect that their opposition to space-based weapons will substantially affect either the SDI program or decisions by the United States and the Soviet Union to deploy weapons in space. While the Chinese prefer the continuation of the strategic status quo, they also see the "extension of the arms race to outer space" as virtually inevitable. The only question seems to be whether the process can be slowed or temporarily halted.

The Chinese are likely to step up their activity in multilateral forums, such as the UN Committee on Disarmament, in order to enhance China's prestige and to rally opposition to further increases in Soviet and US nuclear arms. But China is not likely to take a leading role in opposing the US SDI program, because it will want to minimize friction with Washington and avoid the appearance of siding with Moscow on the issue.

Castro and Gorbachëv: Politics of Accommodation

W. Raymond Duncan

The events of the 3rd Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba (February 4–7, 1986) signal a new thaw in Cuban-Soviet relations. Not only did Moscow send to Havana a high-ranking team headed by the number two man in the Politburo, Yegor Ligachëv, but Fidel Castro and Ligachëv used the occasion of the Congress to shower high praise upon each other's countries.[1] Ligachëv acknowledged Cuba's international prestige and praised its social and economic advances, assuring Havana that it could "rely upon the Soviet Union" for continued support.[2] For his part, Castro described the Soviet Union as "our closest friend and our best political ally" and underlined that Cuban relations with the Soviet Union "enjoy priority and special attention."[3]

The warming trend was underscored by Castro's attendance at the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (February 25–March 6)—his first visit to the USSR in over two years.[4] Accorded a place of honor among the foreign guests on the dias in Moscow's Palace of Congresses, the Cuban leader paid tribute to CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachëv's "brilliant and valiant main report," which showed "the immense glories /of the/ Soviet people's historic deeds . . . on the road opened by the Great October Revolution."[5]

Yet, less than a year earlier, Castro had in effect snubbed the Soviet leadership by refusing to attend the funeral of Gorbachëv's predecessor, Konstantin Chernenko. Moreover, as recently as 1984, Cuba and the Soviet Union had openly disagreed on important foreign policy issues, in particular about the extent of support for revolutionary regimes and movements and about the desirability of improving relations between the superpowers. While the recent expressions of warmth may seem more dramatic than usual at first glance, fluctuations between accommodation and discord are part of the history of Soviet-Cuban relations.

What then are the developments that have led to renewed warmth between the leaderships of Cuba and the Soviet Union? Is the current accommodation likely to last, or will it give way to renewed discord? To help answer these questions, it is useful to review the interests that cement this relationship, as well as the objective and subjective factors that have strained it in the past. The factors that contributed to the chilly relations in 1984–85 will be used to illustrate how the Soviet-Cuban relationship can tilt out of balance.

W. Raymond Duncan is Professor of Political Science at the State University of New York (Brockport). He has written extensively on Soviet–Third World relations and Latin American politics, his most recent work being The Soviet Union and Cuba: Interests and Influence *(1985). During 1984–86, he is Scholar-in-Residence with the National Intelligence Council in Washington, DC. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official positions of the National Intelligence Council or of the United States Government.*

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[1] Technically, the 3rd PCC Congress was still in progress when this article went to press. Throughout this essay, however, I focus on the events that took place at the Congress's main convocation, which was held February 4–7. For coverage of the 3rd Party Congress see daily entries for Feb. 3–12, 1986, in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service's *Daily Report: Latin America* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS–LAM*), and *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS–SOV*); *The New York Times*, Feb. 9, 1986; and *The Washington Post*, Feb. 5, 1986.

[2] Moscow TASS, in English, Feb. 5, 1986, in *FBIS–LAM*, Feb. 6, 1986, p. Q/2, and *FBIS–SOV*, Feb. 6, 1986, K/1.

[3] See Castro's Main Report to the PCC Congress (hereafter Castro's Main Report), Havana Radio, Feb. 4, 1986, trans. in *FBIS–LAM*, Feb. 7, 1986, pp. Q/1–63, at Q/60.

[4] Havana Tele-Rebelde Network, Feb. 26, 1986, trans. in *FBIS–LAM*, Feb. 27, 1986, p. Q/1.

[5] Ibid.

Serving Mutual Interests

Cuba's alliance with the Soviet Union—measured in terms of magnitude of economic and military aid; the integration of economic, military, and political institutions; and longevity—remains the strongest of Moscow's patron-client ties with Third World countries.[6] It can best be described as a relationship in which neither partner exerts complete control or influence over the other and in which mutual interests of both countries are served but at costs to both sides. Each side regularly seeks to maximize benefits for itself from the relationship and to minimize the costs by exerting various types of influence. It is not a partnership of equals, however. Because Cuba depends heavily on Soviet economic aid to keep its economy afloat,[7] Moscow dominates the relationship. Thus, as one observer has noted, the Soviet Union can force the Cubans to "operate within the parameters set by the Kremlin."[8]

Given that the Soviet Union pumps US$4 to 5 billion a year into Cuba's struggling economy, it is obvious that it has vested interests in that country. However, unlike Brazil, which represents an important market for Soviet exports, or Argentina, which supplies the USSR with much needed wheat, Cuba's value for the Soviets lies in its geostrategic location and its commitment to communism and "proletarian internationalism." This compensates for its lack of purchasing power and its inability to supply foodstuffs to the Soviet Union.

Geostrategically and politically, Cuba gives the USSR leverage in the Caribbean Basin and helps to expand Moscow's presence in the Third World—two key assets in the Soviet Union's competition with the United States. The returns on Soviet investments in Cuba are numerous: intelligence information on the United States gathered at the Lourdes installation near Havana, Moscow's largest and most valuable base of this type outside the USSR; facilities for deploying Soviet Bear D long-range reconnaissance aircraft and naval combatants along North America's East Coast and throughout the Caribbean; and facilities for Soviet military and civilian technicians, including about 7,000 civilian advisers, a 2,800-man military brigade, 2,800 military advisers, plus approximately 3,100 technicians at the Lourdes electronic intelligence installation.[9] In addition, Cuban policies have the effect of diverting US attention from other regions to the Caribbean Basin (whose maritime routes carry about 55 percent of the petroleum imported by the United States, and approximately 45 percent of all US seaborne trade),[10] strengthening Soviet strategic positions in the Third World, bolstering the "world correlation of forces" in favor of socialism/communism against capitalism/imperialism, and facilitating Moscow's role as a global superpower competing with the United States. Cuba thus extends the Soviet political presence in the Third World and gives it a military dimension in the Caribbean.

Castro's interest in allying Havana with Moscow has been based from the beginning on Soviet economic

Fidel Castro addresses the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1986.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

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[6] For further discussion, see W. Raymond Duncan, *The Soviet Union and Cuba: Interests and Influence*, New York, Praeger, 1985.

[7] William J. Durch, "The Cuban Military in Africa and the Middle East: From Algeria to Angola," *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Los Angeles), Nos. 1-2, Spring-Summer 1978, p. 61.

[8] Jacques Levesque, *The USSR and the Cuban Revolution: Soviet Ideological and Strategic Perspectives*, New York, Praeger, 1978; Cole Blasier, "COMECON in Cuban Development," in Blasier and Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Eds., *Cuba in the World*, Pittsburgh, PA, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979, p. 225.

[9] H. Michael Erisman, *Cuba's International Relations: The Anatomy of a Nationalistic Foreign Policy*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1985; also US Department of State, *The Soviet-Cuban Connection in Central America and the Caribbean*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1985, pp. 3–4.

[10] Joseph Whelan, *The Soviet Union in the Third World, 1980–1982: An Imperial Burden or Political Asset*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1984, pp. 295–96.

A Soviet MiG–23 of the sort delivered to Cuba.

—J.P. Quittard/GAMMA-LIAISON.

and military aid, both to shore up Cuba's economy and to defend itself against the United States. Soviet help and support remains important for Cuba's economic survival, its defense, its preservation of the revolution at home, and its quest to spread Castro's brand of "proletarian internationalism."[11]

Economically, cooperation with the Soviets has been especially valuable in terms of direct and indirect subsidies, most notably the purchase of oil from the USSR at below world market prices for internal use and for resale for hard currency, and the export of sugar at above world market prices.[12] It has also gained Cuba membership in the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA). Militarily, cooperation with the Soviet Union has meant deliveries of Soviet military hardware and assistance which, during 1981–84, reached levels unmatched since the 1962 missile crisis.[13] Politically, ties with the USSR have gained for Cuba recognition by other countries of its membership in the world socialist system and has provided it with a "progressive" identity as distinct from its pre-revolutionary identity as a "capitalist" dependency. Finally, alliance with the Soviet Union has helped Cuba shape a vanguard role for itself in backing revolutionary regimes and movements in the Third World, thereby advancing Cuba's ideological objectives.

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[11] *The Soviet-Cuban Connection in Central America and the Caribbean*, op. cit., pp. 3–10; Whelan, op. cit., pp. 305ff.

[12] Cuba has purchased sugar on the open market at prices below its internal costs of production and has resold it to Moscow at a heavily subsidized price. A report by the Cuban National Bank, made public in 1985, indicates one such transaction: Cuba had acquired US$115 million worth of sugar on the world market and sold it to the Soviet Union for US$ 1.16 billion. The proceeds were then used to acquire 6,182 million metric tons of oil from the Soviets. Cuban sales of this "surplus" oil purchased from the Soviets amounted to over US$600 million during 1985. This sum represents over half the country's hard-currency earnings used to import Western goods and technology. See *The Washington Post*, June 5, 1985; and *The Financial Times* (London), Mar. 1, 1986. See also Jerry Flint, "Cuba: Russia's Wondrous Weapon," *Forbes* (New York), Mar. 28, 1983, p. 39; Lawrence H. Theriot, *Cuba Faces the Economic Realities of the 1980's*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1982, pp. 18–21; Blasier, loc. cit., pp. 225–56; and Carmelo Mesa-Lago, *The Economy of Socialist Cuba: A Two-Decade Appraisal*, Albuquerque, University of New Mexico Press, 1981.

[13] This military aid has turned Cuba into a veritable garrison state with over 950 tanks, more than 200 jet fighters (mainly MiG–21's but also MiG–23's), an upgraded navy equipped with frigates and submarines, as well as missile/torpedo–firing patrol boats, and an overall military force of some 160,000 active-duty soldiers and up to 135,000 well-trained and experienced reservists ready for mobilization within two to three days of a summoning. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*, London, IISS, 1985, pp. 146–47; *The Soviet-Cuban Connection in Central America and the Caribbean*, op. cit., p. 6.

Politics of Alliance Management

When either partner in the Soviet-Cuban alliance perceives the costs of advancing its interests through cooperation with the other as outweighing the benefits, it tries to use its influence to bring down the costs. Thus, in the past, when Moscow perceived Havana to be acting in ways that undercut Soviet interests—for example, in 1966–68, when Castro insisted on promoting revolutionary struggle in Latin America while the Soviet policy line advocated peaceful transformation—it has tried to induce Cuba's compliance by cutting back on aid and decreasing petroleum flows.[14] For its part, Havana has been able to exert some influence on Soviet decision-making concerning its policy in the Third World, in particular, the decision in 1975 to back the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) more directly and vigorously.[15] In all probability, Havana also influenced Moscow to revise its position on the efficacy of armed struggle in Central America after the Sandinistas—with active support from Cuba—overthrew Anastasio Somoza's regime in Nicaragua in July 1979.[16]

Not surprisingly, when seeking to influence each other's behavior, both sides have relied on their most valued resources as leverage, including a variety of objective and subjective factors that are used to reward or punish, supply or deny. Thus, the Soviets have drawn upon their key economic and military resources, the Cubans on their value as an ally in a strategic geographic location, their commitment to Marxism-Leninism at home and abroad, and their prestige in the Third World.

The form of influence most frequently used over the years by Moscow and Havana has been of a *cooperative* type. Cooperative influence comes into play when one side bargains with, induces, persuades, or cajoles the other to cooperate on an issue of mutual interest rather than compelling it to do so through sanctions. While the Soviets have at times used more assertive or coercive forms of influence, both Moscow and Havana have found that cooperation has tended to produce the best results.

Soviet-Cuban relations over the past quarter century reflect these two patterns of interaction. Cycles of cooperation have alternated with cycles of friction and conflict. The Soviet and Cuban venture in Angola in 1975 is an instance of the former; the period following the October 1983 invasion of Grenada, an example of the latter.

Chilly Relations, 1984–85

While continuing to be "correct," relations between Moscow and Havana in the early months of 1984 entered a decidedly cool period. This was evidenced by the departure from protocol in Moscow's congratulatory note on the 25th anniversary of the Cuban Revolution. The note arrived without the customary signature of the General Secretary of the CPSU, at that time Yuriy Andropov. It was signed instead in the name of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. A cooling in relations was further indicated by Castro's infrequent references to the USSR in his New Year's address. This took place just weeks after differences of opinion surfaced about what caused the factionalism in Grenada and who was responsible for the murder of Maurice Bishop.[17]

In many respects, the strain in relations reflected deeper problems affecting both Moscow and Havana in the mid-1980's. This period differed markedly from the more hopeful mid-1970's. Problems of managing the "burdens of empire"—that is, of servicing Third World clients rather than bringing them to power—and of coping with US reactions to an expanding Soviet and Cuban presence in the Third World were complicating Soviet international relations. The management of Soviet-Cuban bilateral relations under conditions of shrinking available resources and a continuing poor Cuban economic performance also needed adjusting.[18]

Friction arising from differing perspectives of each partner's geopolitical role also came into play. As a superpower, Moscow had global concerns among which East-West issues had the most attention;

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[14] Levesque, op. cit., p. 135.

[15] Jiri Valenta, "The USSR, Cuba and the Crisis in Central America," *Orbis* (Philadelphia), Fall 1981, pp. 715–46; Peter Clement, "Moscow and Southern Africa," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March-April 1985, pp. 29–50.

[16] Robert S. Leiken, *Soviet Strategy in Latin America*, The Washington Papers No. 93, Washington, DC, Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1982, pp. 37–38.

[17] *Latin American Weekly Report* (London), Feb. 10, 1984, p. 4.

[18] On the rising costs the Soviets face in Third World countries and the foreign policy debates this situation has generated in recent years, see Jerry Hough, *The Struggle for the Third World: Soviet Debates and American Options*, Washington, DC, Brookings, 1986; and Robert G. Kaiser, "Exhausted Empire Faces Up to Shortfalls," *The Washington Post*, Sept. 25, 1984. On Cuba's lagging economy, see Mesa-Lago, op. cit., and Blasier, loc. cit., as well as Jeremy Main, "Castro Tightens Cuba's Belt," *Fortune* (New York), Sept. 16, 1985, pp. 120ff., and Carl J. Migdail, "Why Cuba Chases the Yankee Dollar," *US News and World Report* (Washington, DC), Dec. 8, 1985, pp. 40–41. On falling world petroleum prices and the USSR's declining oil production, as well as other internal roadblocks to higher Soviet economic productivity, see Marshall Goldman, *USSR in Crisis: The Failure of an Economic System*, New York, Norton, 1983.

Havana was more concerned with North-South and regional issues, most notably—though not exclusively—in the geographical proximity of the Caribbean Basin.

This gave rise to differences in policy priorities as evidenced by Cuba's and the USSR's divergent approaches to the revolutionary New Jewel Movement in Grenada. Moscow was tepid in backing Bishop in his leadership struggle with Bernard Coard, reflecting, some have suggested, a Soviet preference for dedicated, mainstream communists.[19] It thus glossed over Bishop's death, referring to the episode in *Kommunist* as merely a "tragic turn of events."[20] Castro, on the other hand, took a more eclectic approach to revolutionary leadership, choosing out of friendship to support Bishop, whose orientation could be called more Caribbean than Leninist.[21] He condemned Coard's actions and tried to save Bishop's life. With respect to the US-led invasion of Grenada, Moscow kept a low profile in the US "strategic backyard," limiting itself to low-key denounciations of the action.[22] By contrast, Cuba actively sought to prevent the US invasion and ordered its soldiers in Grenada to fight.[23]

Divergences in Soviet and Cuban foreign policy priorities also came to the fore at that time over Nicaragua. Apparently, Castro became profoundly annoyed in March 1984 when Chernenko refused to let a Soviet naval flotilla proceed to Nicaraguan ports. The flotilla had been en route to Nicaragua when a Soviet tanker was severely damaged by a US mine in Puerto Sandino, Nicaragua's Pacific harbor. Public media reported rumors that Castro had urged Moscow to have the flotilla proceed to Nicaragua despite the incident, in order to signal Soviet military backing for the Sandinista government.[24] The Soviet refusal to heed Castro's urgings was in line with Moscow's intent to keep the United States preoccupied with Nicaragua, but not to the point of providing a pretext for intervention. This approach conflicted with Cuba's interest in providing the strongest possible backing for the Sandinistas, who have come to represent Havana's sole success in 25 years of supporting revolutions in Latin America.[25]

Differing economic priorities were an equally weighty factor behind the friction. Increasing competition for declining Soviet resources among CEMA states and Third World clients, the escalating costs of aid to Cuba's ailing economy, and the large Cuban foreign debt caused the Soviets to become increasingly impatient with Cuba's poor economic performance. They set a ceiling on aid to Cuba in an effort to pressure Havana into improving management of the Cuban economy.[26] This again threatened to undermine Cuban interests, since Castro wanted more Soviet aid so as to support rapid industrialization in order to diversify the economy and move Cuba away from its traditional role of agricultural supplier.

As a result of these various differences in priorities, relations became visibly strained. Cuba publicly decried the low level of attention that the Soviet Union was giving to Nicaragua's economic and military needs, and complained especially about Chernenko's conciliatory statements in the face of increasingly hostile US pronouncements about the Sandinistas.[27] Then came Castro's refusal to attend the June 1984 CEMA summit meeting in Moscow on the excuse that he was occupied with pressing matters at home.[28] Moscow responded by sending a low-level Soviet delegation to Cuba's 26th of July celebration in 1984.[29] More telling was Moscow's announcement that aid to Cuba in 1984 would not exceed US$4 billion in loans and subsidies and half a billion in military assistance.[30] This action probably influenced Castro's decision neither to attend Chernenko's funeral in Moscow nor to sign the book of condolences and personally visit the Soviet embassy in Havana to express official condolences.[31]

Utilizing Influence

Both Havana and Moscow continued to keep the door of communication open during the chill of 1984–85, even while advancing their own priorities. Thus Cuba assumed a more independent stance by choosing not to become engaged in Ethiopia's war

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[19] Jiri and Virginia Valenta, "Leninism in Grenada," *Problems of Communism*, July-August, 1984, pp. 1–23; Robert Rand, "Grenada's Links with the USSR and Cuba," in Radio Free Europe–Radio Liberty (hereafter RFE–RL), *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 401/83, Oct. 26, 1983, pp. 1–3.

[20] Whelan, op. cit., p. 168.

[21] W. Raymond Duncan, "Soviet Interests in Latin America," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* (Miami, FL), May 1984, pp. 168–75.

[22] Ibid.

[23] *Latin American Weekly Report*, Feb. 10, 1984, p. 4.; Duncan, "Soviet Interests in Latin America," loc. cit.

[24] *The Washington Post*, Mar. 24, 1985.

[25] See Valenta, "The USSR, Cuba and the Crisis in Central America," loc. cit., pp. 715–46; Jiri and Virginia Valenta, "Sandinistas in Power," *Problems of Communism*, September-October, 1985, pp. 1–27.

[26] Main, loc. cit., p. 120.

[27] *The Washington Post*, Mar. 24, 1985.

[28] Ibid., Feb. 4, 1985.

[29] It is interesting to note that in the opening salutations of his speech at Cienfuegos commemorating the 31st anniversary of the assault on Moncada Barracks, Castro did not mention the Soviet delegate by name, although he did acknowledge the delegates from Ghana, Nicaragua, and the German Democratic Republic. See Havana Domestic Service, July 26, 1984, trans. in *FBIS–LAM*, Jul. 30, 1984, p. Q/1.

[30] *The Washington Post*, Feb. 4, 1985; Main, loc. cit., pp. 122 and 127.

[31] *The Washington Post*, Mar. 24, 1985.

REPUBLIC OF CUBA, PORT HAVANA
ECIQUIM-20-76
OVERALL DIMENSINS
GROSS131042 KGS NET 131042KGS

A petrochemical refining column is prepared for shipment to Cuba at the "Volgogradneftemash" manufacturing plant in Volgograd, USSR.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

against the Tigrean and Eritrean national liberation movements, and by keeping open its own lines of communication with leftist insurgents in Central and South America. But it did so without undermining Moscow's position, and also began to cultivate improved state-to-state relations in Central and Latin America, a policy that accorded better with Soviet interests in the region.

Unlike Cuba, Moscow could and did exert *assertive* influence by resorting to economic sanctions to signal its discontent with the other's priorities. First, it leveled off Soviet economic aid. Then it insisted that Cuba raise its levels of productivity and honor its export commitments to the USSR. Yet, like Cuba, Moscow did not try to overexert its influence; instead it employed a "carrot and stick" approach to problems with Cuba, combining assertiveness with cooperation. It continued to purchase Cuban sugar at inflated prices and sell oil to Havana at less than market price; it also deferred from 1986 to 1990 a repayment of US$125 million on Cuba's debt to the USSR.

Soviet and Cuban efforts to improve mutual relations without compromising on important priorities seem to have produced a favorable outcome soon after Gorbachëv came to power. In May 1985, Moscow sent a high-level delegation to Havana, led by Politburo member Mikhail Solomentsev,[32] for ceremonies commemorating the 25th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Republic of Cuba and the USSR. In October, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard A. Shevardnadze came to Cuba and brought "warm wishes" from Gorbachëv. In turn, Castro praised "the world's first socialist state."[33] Considering these signs of a warming in Soviet-Cuban relations, the thaw and the events of the 3rd Party Congress were not entirely surprising.

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[32] Havana Television Service, May 17, 1985, trans. in *FBIS–LAM*, May 20, 1985, Q/1.

[33] TASS International Service, Oct. 30, 1985, trans. in *FBIS–SOV*, Oct. 31, 1985, p. K/1.

Why the Thaw?

From the discussion above, it is obvious that economic considerations are a leading factor behind Cuba's most recent efforts to improve relations with the USSR. Despite years of trying to buoy Cuba's struggling economy, Castro has not been able to correct persistent problems of inefficiency, low worker productivity, absenteeism, and even corruption.[34] While there has been progress in health care, education, and social welfare, Cuba is not a model of "socialist efficiency." It continues to ration food, and there is an extensive black market. Urban areas are dilapidated, and the tourist industry (which Cuba has been trying to invigorate) continues to languish. Moreover, Cuba's inability to meet its export obligations to the USSR and Eastern Europe continues to embarrass the Cuban leadership and irritate the Soviet Union and other CEMA partners.[35] In addition, drought and then a devastating hurricane in 1985 have virtually guaranteed a poor sugar harvest in 1986.[36] The poor weather has thus dashed initial hopes that harvest yields would earn Cuba over US$200 million in 1986. Cuba will now have less, if any, sugar to sell and might be forced to use its scarce hard currency to purchase sugar on the open market in order to meet its commitments to CEMA. This might make it necessary for Cuba to borrow more money from the West in order to import food, food-processing machinery, technology for sugar production, consumer goods, and transportation equipment, as well as to service outstanding debts to the West now amounting to over US$3 billion.[37] Considering the vastness of its economic difficulties, Cuba cannot afford to jeopardize its status of privileged Soviet client (it now receives approximately 51 percent of all Soviet aid designated for communist and noncommunist developing countries).[38] Thus, accommodation to the USSR makes eminent sense.

Cuban sugar shipped via Rotterdam being unloaded in Leningrad.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

A return toward warmer relations with the Soviet Union was also prompted by Castro's growing awareness of the fiscal constraints attendant to supporting Third World revolutionary movements. Indeed, while the limit of Soviet and Cuban staying power in bolstering Third World allies has not been reached, the economic, military, and political costs of backing the regimes in Angola, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua are increasing.[39] Given the escalating costs of Cuba's military involvement in the Third World and Moscow's increasing emphasis on cost-effectiveness, Castro's present accommodation to Moscow's economic reformism seems virtually inevitable.

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[34] See pertinent sections of Castro's Main Report, in *FBIS–LAM*, Feb. 7, 1986, esp. pp. Q/14–19.

[35] See ibid.; and Charles Wolf Jr. et al., *The Costs of the Soviet Empire*, Santa Monica, CA, Rand Corporation, 1983.

[36] Hurricane Kate brought torrential rains and 100-mph winds to western Cuba on November 19–20. It damaged nearly 2.5 million acres of sugar cane, about 25 percent of the island's cultivated land. The hurricane followed a period of drought which had already reduced the expected sugar yield by some 12 percent. Cuba went through droughts in 1981 and 1984, when rainfall was about only 67 percent of the annual average. *Latin American Monitor* (London), December 1985, p. 247. The fall in oil prices is a major problem. Some 40 percent of Cuba's export earnings between 1982 and 1985 were derived from the re-export of oil received from the USSR. Ibid., July 1985, p. 188; and *Financial Times* (London), Mar. 1, 1986.

[37] While sugar can be purchased on the open market for nearly one-tenth of the price at which Cuba sells it to Moscow, the Soviets apparently prefer to subsidize Cuban sugar production to ensure Cuba's integration into CEMA as an agricultural supplier. One wonders how long the Soviets will be willing to pay the high subsidized price for sugar Cuba purchases on the open market. The nature of this exchange poses problems for Cuba as well, since to meet its commitment to CEMA Cuba must use its scarce hard currency to purchase sugar rather than to purchase much-needed Western imports.

[38] Wolf et al., op. cit., Ch. 1.

[39] See the introduction to Hough, op. cit.

Hope of retaining leverage should East-West détente blossom again, was another reason for Castro's accommodation to the Soviet Union. Improvement in relations between the Soviet Union and the West could possibly clash with Castro's more pronounced emphasis on North-South issues and his support for revolution, particularly in Central America. Moscow has undoubtedly assured Castro that any discussions between Soviet and US leaders concerning regional issues would not compromise Cuban interests.[40] In the past, the Soviet Union did not view progress in East-West negotiations as necessarily contingent on its behavior in the Third World.[41] Castro, for his part, has made it quite clear to the Soviet Union that the United States has nothing to offer that could wean him away from his Soviet patrons.[42] Still, renewed Soviet interest in East-West détente marks a change in the international environment in which Soviet-Cuban relations are conducted and—when coupled with other shifts noted above—creates a distinctly changed climate in world politics from what had existed after the collapse of Soviet-American détente in 1979.

Accommodating to the Moscow Line

The proceedings at Cuba's 3rd Party Congress put to rest any doubts that Castro might not realign his economic policies with those of the USSR. Gorbachëv's campaign to modernize the Soviet economy and ensure economic self-discipline with respect to foreign and domestic commitments has struck home in the Cuban capital. Castro's main report to the Congress was a graphic illustration of this. He stressed the need to improve Cuba's "insufficient," "undisciplined," and "mediocre" economy.[43] He succeeded in convincing Moscow that Cuba would emulate Soviet economic reform efforts satisfactorily. This became clear in Ligachëv's statement: "The PCC Congress convincingly shows that you have a realistic economic strategy, and we wish the Cuban Communists success in implementing it."[44]

Obviously taking his cue from Gorbachëv, Castro delivered the most systematic attack since 1970 on poor economic planning and bureaucratic inefficiency in Cuba. First he addressed the problem of the failure of the sugar harvest (only some 10 million tons). Then he went on to point out Cuba's inability to meet export commitments to socialist countries, the slow growth in sugar production levels despite huge investments, and the deficiencies in agriculture as a whole. He decried the shortcomings in construction and transportation equipment; poor economic planning and organization; negligence in health care, education, and environmental control; as well as insensitivity to human problems.[45]

Following a morning oration of some two hours, Castro stated that "deficient officials will continue to be replaced . . . . We will not tolerate laziness, negligence, inability, or irresponsibility." When some delegates were late coming back from a thirty-minute recess, Castro chided them: "We are talking about discipline and some of the delegates are late in returning."[46] It should be noted that the themes emphasized by Castro—accelerating economic development, building discipline, ending corruption, stimulating efficiency, and promoting competent managers—are remarkably consistent with Gorbachëv's main report to the 27th Party Congress of the CPSU, as well as with the predominant themes of the Soviet republican party congresses held in early 1986, prior to the 27th Soviet Party Congress.[47]

In a move resembling decisions in the USSR,[48] Castro changed the composition of the Cuban Politburo by elevating to it several new people who were known for professional competence. In the process, a number of *Fidelistas* were removed. Among those who lost their Politburo seats were Blas Roca (nearly 80 years old), and three men who had only recently been removed from their cabinet posts: Ramiro Valdés, former minister of the interior, Garcia Frias, the former transportation minister, and Sergio del Valle, the former health minister.[49] Castro also replaced Jésus Montané, a long-time revolutionary leader, but in his case the replacement was for reasons of health.[50] Vilma Espín Guillois, wife of Raúl Castro, was promoted from alternate to full Politburo member, the first woman to achieve this position. Moreover, to give a better ethnic balance to the Politburo, Castro added a black man, Esteban (Lazo) Hernández. Election of the new Central Committee produced a membership that was 28 percent black or mulatto.[51]

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[40] Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's October 1985 visit to Cuba was supposed to make this point clear. On Shevardnadze's trip, see Moscow TASS, Oct. 29, 1985, in *FBIS–SOV*, Oct. 29, 1985, pp. K/1–2; and Havana Television Service, Oct. 30, 1985, trans. in *FBIS–LAM*, Oct. 31, 1985, p. Q/1. The visit was also reported by TASS Radio Broadcast, Oct. 29, 1985, and British Broadcasting Corporation, Oct. 30, 1985.

[41] Alexander L. George, *Managing US-Soviet Rivalry*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1983.

[42] See Castro's Main Report, in *FBIS–LAM*, Feb. 7, 1986, esp. pp. Q/50–62.

[43] Ibid., esp. pp. Q/14–19.

[44] Moscow TASS, Feb. 5, 1986, in *FBIS–SOV*, Feb. 6, 1986, K/1.

[45] Castro's Main Report, in *FBIS–LAM*, Feb. 7, 1986, pp. Q/13–21.

[46] Ibid., p. Q/21.

[47] See, e.g., the supplement to *FBIS–SOV*, Feb. 21, 1986, for coverage of some republican party congresses.

[48] Personnel shifts in the CPSU's upper echelons have resulted in the removal of many individuals with whom Castro had been doing business over the years, and their replacement with new efficiency-minded specialists. It is interesting to note, however, that the new Soviet Politburo also added two Cuban experts to its ranks, namely Vitaliy Vorotnikov, former ambassador to Havana (1979–82), who is deeply aware of Cuban economic inefficiency, and Konstantin Katushev, the chairman of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, previously ambassador to Cuba (1982–85).

[49] *The New York Times*, Feb. 9, 1986.

The Politburo changes came after the firing in 1985 of at least 11 top Cuban officials, most of whom were involved in economic management,[52] including Humberto Peréz, veteran of the Cuban Revolution, and Cuba's top economic manager. For a regime long noted for stability and slow turnover of its key personnel, the extensive changes were surprising. Observers had originally speculated that former ministers would simply be removed from their ministries to end any public criticism of their inefficiency, but that they would retain their position in the Politburo and continue to bolster Fidel Castro's personal following at the highest party levels.[53] This is not to say that these personnel changes have left Castro without loyal supporters in the Politburo and the Cabinet. General José Arbantes Fernández, for example, who replaced Valdés in the Interior Ministry, is known to be "fanatically loyal to Fidel."[54]

The 3rd Party Congress was not merely a media event dramatizing Castro's accommodation to Soviet economic pressure. Like any other congress of this type, it also served to enhance the prestige of the host country and its leader. The Congress can therefore be seen as an example of how Cuba musters its own "public diplomacy" capability and exerts indirect influence on the Soviet Union. For example, Castro used the occasion to revalidate his credentials as *lider maximo* of Cuba's quarter-century-old Revolution, of Third World causes, and of international communism and the working class movement. Approximately 200 delegations to the Congress from communist and workers' parties, national liberation movements, socialist parties, and various revolutionary organizations helped confirm Cuba's high prestige. Castro's speeches also reaffirmed the PCC's role as vanguard of the Revolution. But the Congress also served to demonstrate that Cuba was a leading and most faithful ally of the Kremlin and an advocate of Soviet interests. Finally, Cuba demonstrated at the Congress that Marxist-Leninist principles continue to be strong in Cuba's polity and economy.

The signals Cuba sent to Moscow from the Havana Congress did not go unnoticed. Gorbachëv notified Castro that "our Cuban brothers can be sure of the unfailing solidarity of the Soviet Union with the Island of Freedom. Soviet-Cuban friendship is indestructible."[55]

Lingering Foreign Policy Divergence

Even though Havana's 3rd Party Congress was notable for demonstrating the closeness of Soviet-Cuban relations, it also indicated persisting foreign policy differences. On February 7, two days after Castro had delivered his main report, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez took the podium to read a hastily prepared resolution on foreign policy. This resolution called for a Cuban foreign policy marked by "close collaboration with the Soviet Union," and the "solution of international conflicts through dialogue and constructive negotiations." Reflecting Moscow's renewed interest in negotiations with the United States, the resolution emphasized Cuba's "unchangeable attitude in favor of a solution of the historic differences with the United States."[56] This resolution contrasted sharply with the more strident language of Castro's main report.

The introduction of the hastily drafted foreign policy resolution hinted that the Soviet delegation was dissatisfied with Castro's cursory initial treatment of Soviet détente efforts and his glossing over of Soviet-US arms control proposals. Passage of the resolution was important to Moscow, and once the Congress adopted it, the Soviet delegation immediately informed Moscow of Cuba's confidence in a policy "based on Marxism-Leninism . . . and close cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community" as well as of Cuban recognition of the importance of a Soviet-US summit dialogue.[57]

This did not, however, mean that Castro was abandoning his foreign policy priorities. He remained hawkish on regional issues. In his rambling closing remarks to the Congress, Castro lashed out at increased US aid to the *contras* in Nicaragua, stating that "we will do everything possible to step up our aid for the Nicaraguan people."[58] As for renewed US aid to the UNITA forces under Jonas Savimbi in Angola, Castro insisted that Cuban troops would not withdraw, that they would stay there "10 years, 20 years, 30 years . . . if necessary."[59] Daniel Ortega, who headed Nicaragua's delegation to the Havana Congress, reported Castro's offer of additional aid to the Sandinistas immediately after returning home.[60] Moscow's media apparently did not give the offer much prominence.[61]

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[50] Havana Television Service, Feb. 7, 1986, in *FBIS–LAM*, Feb. 10, 1986, p. Q/28.

[51] Ibid.

[52] *Latin American Monitor*, July 1985, p. 188.

[53] Ibid.; and *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* (Bath, England), Vol. 31, October 1985, pp. 33917–19.

[54] *The Washington Times*, Dec. 4, 1985; *Latin American Weekly Report*, Dec. 13, 1985, p. 9.

[55] *Pravda* (Moscow), Feb. 9, 1986, trans. in *FBIS–SOV*, Feb. 10, 1986, p. K/3.

[56] For text of the resolution see Havana Radio Rebelde Network, Feb. 7, 1986, in *FBIS–LAM*, Feb. 7, 1986, pp. Q/69–76, esp. 70 and 75.

[57] *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Feb. 8, 1986, in *FBIS–SOV*, Feb. 12, 1986, pp. K/16–18.

Subtle differences in the Cuban and Soviet approaches to international relations were also in evidence at the 27th Congress of the CPSU. In discussing the present epoch, Gorbachëv stressed East-West strategic matters, the evils of imperialism, the division of world forces between socialism/communism and capitalism/imperialism, and global issues such as the pollution of the world environment. His foreign policy observations constituted about 15 percent of the report and focused on the need to stop the arms race and promote the Soviet version of "disarmament," as well as on the threat of the US "star wars" program.[62] Missing were references to national liberation movements in Africa, the Middle East, or Latin America, as well as promises of strong Soviet economic backing for developing countries. What is more, also missing was a discussion of the very Latin American regional issues that had occupied so much of Castro's attention at Havana's 3rd Party Congress.

In his own brief but energetic address to the Moscow Congress, Castro paid homage to the strength of Soviet-Cuban ties and also acknowledged Moscow's concerns with avoiding nuclear war and preserving world peace. However, he reminded his audience that Third World issues also demanded attention, and that national liberation struggles in "Vietnam, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Angola, Namibia, South Africa, Western Sahara, Palestine, Afghanistan, and Kampuchea" were not fought without great costs. He argued that "the fruit of the blood and lives of many of the best sons of our peoples" should not be reduced in world affairs to "so-called low-level conflicts." As if to urge Gorbachëv to meet Soviet obligations abroad despite his preoccupation with economic reform at home, Castro noted that "all progressive forces face the challenge of hunger, poverty, unemployment . . . and underdevelopment in Third World nations . . . . The Third World countries expect and are sure they will receive maximum solidarity from the socialist community in their struggle for just economic gains."[63]

Clearly, the debate over Havana's North-South and Moscow's East-West priorities is still very much alive. Despite assurances to the contrary, Castro apparently continues to doubt that Soviet-US dialogue has any relevance for easing Cuba's tense relations with the United States, or for his strong affinity with national liberation movements throughout the Third World.

Cuba's Fidel Castro is mobbed by delegates to the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union at the Palace of Congresses in the Kremlin on February 27, 1986.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

Will the Thaw Last?

There is no simple answer to the question of whether the thaw will last. Given the nature of the Soviet-Cuban relationship and its recent history, three alternate scenarios are plausible with regard to future Cuban-Soviet relations. Each is based on the assumption that both partners will continue to push for maximizing the benefits and minimizing the costs of their ties. The first scenario anticipates a period of intense strain, unlike any in the past, which would threaten the very essence of Soviet-Cuban relations. However unlikely such an eventuality may appear now, it cannot be ruled out entirely as a possibility. The second scenario sees rising friction similar to past periods of strain (for example, 1984–85) that may reach a peak just prior to the 1990 deadline for Cuban repayment of debts owed to the Soviet Union. The third scenario envisages a continuation of the present warming trend (albeit with moderate frictions common to all partnerships) and seems the most likely one for the near future.

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[58] Havana International Service, Feb. 8, 1986, in *FBIS–LAM*, Feb. 10, 1986, p. Q/36.

[59] Ibid.

[60] Havana Radio Reloj Network, Feb. 8, 1986, in *FBIS–LAM*, Feb. 12, 1986, p. Q/10.

[61] See, e.g., the coverage of Nicaragua and Cuba in *FBIS–SOV* for Feb. 8–13, 1986.

[62] Moscow Television Service, Feb. 25, 1986, trans. in *FBIS–SOV*, Feb. 26, 1986, pp. O/1–46.

[63] Havana Tele-Rebeide Network, Feb. 26, 1986, in *FBIS–LAM*, Feb. 27, 1986, pp. Q/1–2.

Political Winter. Least likely is the situation in which either the Cubans or the Soviets perceive the costs of the partnership to seriously outweigh the benefits. For this to happen, there would have to be a confluence of frictions of a kind that have happened in the past (for example, in the period 1966–68) with other dramatic developments, such as:

- A precipitous decline in Soviet economic and military aid to Cuba, owing to a shift in Soviet Third-World or East-West priorities;
- Latin America's cancellation of debts to Western creditors, if this induced Castro to follow suit by canceling Cuba's debt to the USSR;
- A split in the ranks of either the Angolan MPLA or Sandinista leaderships, with Moscow and Havana supporting different factions;
- Raúl Castro's assumption of increasing power but his inability to control rising popular discontent and elite factionalism.[64]

Raúl Castro, left, Second Secretary of the Cuban Communist Party and First Vice-Chairman of the State Council and Council of Ministers of Cuba, meets with CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachëv, center, and Konstantin Rusakov in the Kremlin in March 1985.

TASS from SOVFOTO.

Rising frictions. Strain between Cuba and the USSR may increase should Cuba fail to make improvements in economic efficiency and production at all levels, and thereby be unable to meet its export commitments to the Soviet bloc. Moscow would then probably reinstate a hard-line approach to Havana's ineffectiveness, forcing Castro to introduce economic austerity measures and cut back on Western imports. These measure could give rise to popular discontent, particularly over ensuing unemployment, and tarnish Castro's image as a dynamic and effective leader.[65]

Any Soviet attempts to cut back on sales of oil to Cuba, on purchases of Cuban sugar, or on economic and military subsidies could conceivably lead to further strain. Gorbachëv's program of economic modernization could claim a larger portion of Soviet resources, as Soviet hard-currency earnings also decrease due to lower oil prices and fewer sales of military equipment to Third World clients. This might stimulate a reallocation of Soviet resources that would have a negative effect on aid flows to Cuba.

Cuban accentuation of foreign policy differences with the Soviets could also contribute to renewed friction. Possible sources of tension are: lukewarm support for Soviet efforts at détente with the United States; and overextension in supporting the Sandinistas in particular and revolutionary movements in Central and South America in general.

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[64] The question of Raúl Castro's leadership merits some attention. Some observers argue that even if Raul Castro were to amass more power than he has already, Cuba would move into a period of growing political instability should his brother die or become incapacitated. Their hypothesis is based on the assumption that only Fidel Castro is able to control intense elite infighting over economic policy now taking place, which led to the postponement of the 3rd Party Congress from December 1985 to February 1986. According to this analysis, Raúl—though a talented administrator—simply lacks the charisma and personal vitality needed to hold the competing Cuban groups in check. With Fidel no longer ruling Cuba, economic strains would translate into political instability and undermine Cuba's political value to the Soviets. Other analysts discount this hypothesis, arguing that Cuba's institutions, including the PCC, assure against that eventuality, because all groups aspiring to power can pursue their interests through legitimate institutionalized channels. See Juan Benemelis, "Cuban Leaders *and the Soviet Union*," unpublished paper, Radio Marti, US Information Agency, Washington, DC, October 1985; *The Washington Times*, Feb. 3, 1986; and Institute of Inter-American Studies, *Problems of International Studies, 1985*.

[65] Benemelis, op. cit.

Continued fraternity. For the future, a relatively straight-line projection of the current warming in Soviet-Cuban relations seems most likely, assuming that Castro will succeed in retaining for Cuba the status of a privileged Soviet ally by accommodating Moscow. In return for his emphasis on more efficient management of the Cuban economy, on loyalty to the world socialist community and the USSR, and on a foreign policy aligned with that of the Soviets, Moscow will keep Cuba's economy afloat and its military defenses strong. Should Raúl Castro assume a greater role in the daily management of Cuba's domestic relations, Soviet-Cuban ties will probably be strengthened all the more, given his evident pro-Soviet inclinations.[66]

Some aspects of current Cuban policy suggest that continued fraternity is probable. Havana has improved its state-to-state relations with South American governments, an important concession to the Soviet Union, which cultivates strong diplomatic and commercial ties with South America, especially with large industrial states like Argentina and Brazil.[67] It is also seeking rapprochement with the Hispano-Catholic Church in hopes of improving its image in South and Central America, a move that cannot but be applauded in the Kremlin. (There have been rumors that Ramiro Valdés was removed from the Politburo precisely because he opposed such accommodation.) Of course, Cuba is also courting liberation theologians in Latin America since it wishes to use them as added levers against regimes with which it is at odds.[68] In Chile, both Havana and Moscow support armed struggle against the government of Augusto Pinochet.[69]

For the time being, the Kremlin is backing Cuba's call on Latin American states to cancel their debts to Western creditors.[70] Increased Soviet military aid to Nicaragua during 1985 suggests a positive response to Cuba's call for stronger backing for the Sandinistas in their fight against the *contra* opposition forces.[71] Furthermore, both the Cubans and the Soviets back the Contadora process aimed at a political settlement of the Nicaraguan problem.

Cuban activities elsewhere in the Third World also suggest a drawing closer of Cuban and Soviet policy objectives. For example, in Angola, Havana and Moscow remain committed to supporting the MPLA against the strong UNITA opposition. And in Ethiopia, they have agreed to a division of responsibilities.[72]

Conclusion

The warming trend evidenced at the party congresses in Havana and Moscow demonstrates the remarkable tenacity of Soviet-Cuban relations. Despite serious disagreements, both countries continue to perceive the benefits of close collaboration as outweighing the costs. For Castro, the benefits derive from Soviet assistance essential for maintaining Cuba's economy and defense. Hence he is likely to continue accommodating the Soviet line, but only so long as it does not threaten his leadership of the Cuban party and his general standing among Third World revolutionaries, especially in Central and South America. For the Soviets, Cuba's strategic geopolitical position is the main asset. There are also past investments to protect and Moscow's reputation as the "natural ally" of the Third World to safeguard. Even if Gorbachëv's emphasis is on cost-effectiveness in domestic and foreign policies, the Soviet leader will probably still consider Cuba a useful investment as Moscow continues to compete with the United States.

Undoubtedly, Soviet-Cuban ties will experience some ups and downs in the future. Cuba's 3rd Party Congress was not officially closed, and the party's program was approved only in draft form, pending final approval after further discussion by party cadres and local organs. The postponement of the closing of the Congress is unprecedented, and it indicates that the more controversial issues on the party's agenda are still being debated. When the Cuban party reconvenes its Congress later in 1986 to ratify the final party program after it is "enriched" at the grass roots, the program may show changes not only in Cuba's domestic policy, but also in its perception of the Soviet Union. If so, this may have an impact on future Soviet-Cuban relations. Moscow will no doubt be watching to see whether the reconvened Congress will take decisions along lines of which the Soviet Union approves, and whether Cuba, notorious for its economic mismanagement, will continue to match Soviet efforts at economic reform.

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[66] *The Washington Times*, Feb. 3, 1986.

[67] *Latin American Weekly Report*, July 1, 1985, p. 24; and *The New York Times*, May 19, 1986.

[68] E.g., in February 1986 Havana hosted a Cuban National Ecclesiastical Meeting. See Havana Television Service, Feb. 23, 1986, in *FBIS–LAM*, Feb. 25, 1986, pp. Q/1–4.

[69] *Pravda*, Oct. 21, 1985, trans. in *FBIS–SOV*, Oct. 24, 1985, p. K/2; *New Times* (Moscow), October 1985, pp. 25–27, in *FBIS–SOV*, Oct. 23, 1985, pp. K/3–7; *Latin America Weekly Report*, June 28, 1985, p. 5; and Pedro Ramet and Fernanado Lopez-Alves, 'Moscow and the Revolutionary Left in Latin America," *Orbis* (Philadelphia), Summer 1984, pp. 341–61.

[70] See the main reports of Castro and Gorbachëv to their respective congresses, in *FBIS–LAM*, Feb. 7, 1986 and *FBIS–SOV*, Feb. 25, 1986.

[71] *The Washington Post*, Nov. 5, 1985.

[72] See Whelan, op. cit., pp. 244–46.

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As this essay was going to press, the official Cuban newspaper *Granma* reported a 50 percent increase in Soviet economic and trade aid to Cuba for the five-year period 1986–90.[73] According to *Granma*, Soviet First Deputy Premier Ivan Arkhipov signed four trade and economic agreements totaling approximately US$3 billion in new credits. The new agreement lends credence to the scenario of continued fraternity between Moscow and Havana. It indicates Gorbachëv's apparent satisfaction with Castro's reform initiatives, as well as his strong commitment to Cuba. It also demonstrates Castro's continuing ability to broker needed economic and military assistance for Cuba through diplomacy and the policy of accommodation.

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[73] *The Washington Post*, Apr. 12, 1986.

Checklist of Communist Parties in 1985

EDITORS' NOTE: By arrangement with Richard Staar and the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford, CA, we present the latest version of the "Checklist of Communist Parties," covering developments in 1985. This Checklist continues a series presented in Hoover's Yearbook on International Communist Affairs (YICA) *since 1976, and jointly published with* Problems of Communism *since 1981. The current list is a slightly modified version of that which is to appear in the 1986 edition of the* YICA. *The authors and editors welcome corrections, additions, or amendments. Such contributions may be addressed to the Editors,* Problems of Communism, *301 4th Street, SW, Washington, DC 20547, USA.*

Richard F. Staar

IN EARLY 1985, the first deputy chief of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Vadim V. Zagladin, claimed that "fraternal parties now exist in 95 countries" and comprise "more than 80 million militants." These figures reflect little change from data that Zagladin had reported in 1984.[1] In an item for the Novosti Press Agency bulletin, broadcast by Radio Moscow at the end of 1985, Zagladin gave somewhat higher—if less precise—figures, claiming that the "communist movement functions in almost one hundred countries of the world" where "it unites about 90 million people."[2]

Richard F. Staar, coordinator of the International Studies Program at the Hoover Institution (Stanford, CA), resumed editorship of The Yearbook on International Communist Affairs (YICA) *after having served as US Ambassador to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks in Vienna from 1981 to 1983. His monograph,* USSR Foreign Policy After Detente, *appeared in 1985. He is indebted to Dennis L. Bark, John B. Dunlop, Thomas H. Henriksen, Ramon H. Myers, James H. Noyes, William E. Ratliff, and Margit N. Grigory—all members of the* YICA *editorial board—for their contributions to this essay.*

Official claims of this sort project the impression of a massive and united worldwide movement. The desired image is manifest in the new CPSU program, which states:

> *This is the epoch of the transition from capitalism to socialism and communism, of the historic competition of the two world sociopolitical systems, the epoch of socialist and national liberation revolutions, of the collapse of colonialism, the epoch of the struggle of the chief motive forces of social development—world socialism, the workers' and communist movement, the peoples of the liberated states, and the mass democratic movements—against imperialism and its policy of aggression and oppression and for democracy and social progress.*[3]

Such rhetoric notwithstanding, Moscow has been unable to organize a world conference of the so-called workers' and communist movement for the past 17 years. Indeed, there have only been three such gatherings—in 1957, 1960, and 1969—since the last one held under Comintern auspices in 1935, which had called for a united front with socialists. In early 1985, *Borba*, the daily newspaper of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ), carried a report that "a proposal to convene a world conference of communist and workers' parties has been repeated [in Moscow] three times in only two months." According to *Borba*, two successive issues of *Kommunist*, the organ of the CPSU Central Committee, had stressed "the urgent need for a gathering of the 'communist world.' "[4] The SKJ's Presidium rejected this call for a world conference,[5] and subsequent reports indicated that the Italian Communist Party, and probably other West European parties, would not take part in such a meeting. The Chinese, too, have long been on record as being opposed to any such gathering.[6] In a May 1985 interview, the new CPSU leader Mikhail Gorbachëv himself admitted that the holding of a world communist conference at the present time was "inappropriate."[7]

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[1] V.V. Zagladin, "On the Contemporary Communist Movement," *Tribuna* (Prague), No. 5, Jan. 30, 1985, p. 3; cf. idem, "International Life: Communists on the Leading Edge of the Struggle," *Agitator* (Moscow), No. 17, September 1984, p. 39.

[2] Moscow Radio, TASS in English, 1619 GMT, Dec. 13, 1985, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS–SOV*), Dec. 16, 1985, p. CC/3.

[3] *Pravda* (Moscow), Jan. 3, 1986, p. 4.

The Checklist published herewith identifies the 95 or so "countries" with communist movements to which Zagladin presumably referred. In certain instances, where parties have been officially banned, it is difficult if not impossible to know whether any activity takes place inside the country. In some instances, the CPSU apparently acknowledges two parties (in Australia, Costa Rica, Great Britain, India, New Zealand, and Sweden), and in the case of Spain it may even recognize three. Soviet-recognized communist movements also exist in territories not considered to be sovereign under international law: Guadeloupe, Martinique, Palestine, Puerto Rico, Réunion, and West Berlin. In addition to those movements recognized by Moscow as "communist," the Checklist also includes 12 of the most radical of the approximately 20 political movements termed by Moscow "revolutionary democratic" parties.[8] For the most part, these parties are in power and openly espouse Marxism-Leninism, but, in Moscow's eyes, they lack the organizational and ideological development of a full-fledged communist party. These movements are in Afghanistan, Angola, Bahrain, Benin, Congo, Ethiopia, Grenada, Kampuchea, Mozambique, Nicaragua, South Yemen, and Zimbabwe. (To our knowledge, Moscow's inclusion of the Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front in this category, while implicit in a variety of party-to-party dealings, has not been publicly acknowledged.) Only the movements in Bahrain and Grenada are not ruling. The Checklist also notes in italics a few of the more significant communist movements that the CPSU does not recognize. They are frequently pro-Chinese.

If a given party's designation happens to be other than "Communist Party of. . . ," the acronym is provided in the table and the full name is given in the legend. Except where specifically noted, all population estimates are for July 1985.[9] Party membership figures are either the latest recorded official claims, or when such claims are unavailable or seem unrealistic, estimates as of December 31, 1985, by the author of the given country profile in the 1986 *YICA*. Other information in the table includes the name of each party's leader (in most cases the secretary general, or general secretary), dates of the most recent congress or national conference, the party's legal status, and, where relevant, its showing in the latest parliamentary elections.

Party membership claims or our estimates of membership remained fairly stable from 1984 to 1985. Ruling parties in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Kampuchea, Laos, Mongolia, Romania, and Vietnam claimed increased memberships during 1985. Our estimates for members in Brazil and Norway have also been raised. On the other hand, claimed membership declined in the communist parties of Italy, Poland, and Yugoslavia. There were no significant changes reported in the membership size of the communist parties of the Soviet Union and China.

The most publicized change in the leadership of a ruling movement occurred on March 11, 1985, when Gorbachëv succeeded to the general secretaryship of the CPSU upon the death of Konstantin Chernenko. In Albania, the death of Enver Hoxha brought the prompt accession of his hand-picked successor, Ramiz Alia. New leaders are noted in the checklist for parties in Bolivia, Honduras, Norway (AKP), Paraguay, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela—in some cases, e.g., Saudi Arabia, the change is the result of new information rather than of an actual change in leadership.

As can be seen from Table 1 on page 60, a number of communist parties held a congress or national conference (some held two) during 1985. In the case of the Egyptian Communist Party, a clandestine meeting was held either in late 1984 or early 1985. The importance attached by the Soviets to a given party can be seen from the rank of the chief delegate sent by the CPSU. For example, the 2nd Congress of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola–Workers' Party (MPLA–PT) held in early December enjoyed the prestige of attendance by CPSU Politburo member Heydar Aliyev. Congresses of a number of major Soviet-bloc parties, including the CPSU, were scheduled for early 1986, although the Romanian and Hungarian parties held congresses in 1984 and 1985 respectively.

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[4] *Borba* (Belgrade), Feb. 7, 1985, p. 7.

[5] Belgrade Radio, 1725 GMT, Feb. 7, 1985, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Eastern Europe* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS–EEU*), Feb. 8, 1985, p. I/5.

[6] See Kevin Devlin, "PCI Against World Conference," Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty (hereafter RFE-RL), *RAD Background Report* (Munich), No. 22, Mar. 14, 1985.

[7] *L'Unità* (Milan), May 22, 1985, as cited in Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, *Berichte* (Cologne), No. 28, June 1985, p. 4.

[8] See R.F. Staar, *USSR Foreign Policies After Detente*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1985, Table 1.3, p. 14, for a list of the 20 countries with a "socialist" orientation and the names of their movements.

[9] The July 1985 estimates are from US Central Intelligence Agency, *World Factbook: Nineteen Hundred and Eighty-Five*, CR WF 85-001, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1985.

Table 1: Party Congresses in 1985

Party	Congress #	Date (s)
AB (Iceland)	Biennial	Nov. 7–10
CP of Bolivia	5th	Feb. 9–13
	Extraord.	Aug. 2–5
CP of Canada	26th	Apr. 5–8
CP of Colombia	Conference	Mar. 30
CP of Egypt	2nd	Early 1985 (or late 1984)
CP of Finland	Extraord.	Mar. 23
CP of France	25th	Feb. 6–10
CP of Great Brit.	Special	May 18–20
CP of Israel	20th	Dec. 4–7
CP of Japan	17th	Nov. 19–25
CP of Netherlands	29th	Mar. 1–4
CP of Portugal	Conference	Mar. 30
CP of Uruguay	Conference	Dec. 22
CP of Venezuela	7th	Oct. 24–27
CPM (India)	12th	Dec. 25–30
KPRP (Kampuchea)	5th	Oct. 13–16
MPLA-PT (Angola)	Conference	Jan. 14–19
	2nd	Dec. 2–9
MSzMP (Hungary)	13th	Mar. 25–28
PPP (Guyana)	22nd	Aug. 3–5
PRPB (Benin)	2nd	Nov. 18–24
SUP (New Zealand)	7th	Oct. 26–27
VPK (Sweden)	27th	Jan. 3–6
YSP (Yemen)	3rd	Oct. 11–16

Three movements achieved legal status during the year, one in Africa and two in Latin America. After a coup d'état in the Sudan, the communist party in that country received permission to function openly.[10] A new civilian government in Brazil lifted the ban on the communist party, which had been in effect since 1922, except for the years 1945-47. The party announced that it would compete in the November 1986 parliamentary elections.[11] Finally, the movement in Uruguay was allowed to surface after 12 years of illegality, and it held a national conference at the end of the year.[12]

Moscow-recognized communist parties rule in the same 15 countries as last year. The total membership of these ruling parties is approximately 75 million out of the world total of the 80–90 million claimed by Zagladin. Eleven of these parties constitute the pro-Soviet core, including the 10 members of what Moscow calls the "socialist commonwealth"—Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Laos, Mongolia, Poland, Romania (an apparently reluctant member), the Soviet Union, and Vietnam. The Chinese Communist Party alone, however, counts for roughly half of the total of communist members worldwide. Beyond these ruling parties, local communist movements have representatives in governments only on Reúnion and Martinique, in San Marino, and in Syria. Then, of course, there are the 10 ruling "vanguard revolutionary democratic" parties which we have included in the Checklist.

In those communist-ruled states where elections were held during 1985, the general pattern continued to be one of mobilizational "elections" in which 99-plus percent of the electorate voted for single candidates selected by the party. There were, however, two significant departures: in Poland and Hungary. In the first case, some 21 percent of the participating electorate failed to support the candidates of the ruling Polish United Workers' Party—a significant public manifestation of disaffection with the society's communist rulers. In Hungary, in a gesture toward pluralism, voters were offered more than one candidate in all constituencies.

Communist parties generally experienced a drop-off in voter support in elections held during 1985 in countries where they are not the ruling party, e.g., in Belgium (down from 2.3 to 1.2 percent), Cyprus (32.8 to 27.4), Greece (10.9 to 9.9), Mexico (4.3 to 3.2), Norway (0.3 to 0.2), Portugal (18.0 to 15.5), Sweden (5.6 to 5.4), and West Berlin (0.7 to 0.6).[13] Communists lost both of their seats in Belgium, 3 of 15 in Cyprus, 1 of 4 in Martinique, and 5 of 17 in Mexico.

Declining electoral success in democratic states has been accompanied by decreasing membership figures and a variety of factional splits.[14] The Communist Party of Spain has split into three major groups; in Great Britain a New Communist Party of Britain emerged under the leadership of Eric Trevet;[15] and a new League of Communists in the Netherlands (VCN) also surfaced, with some 1,000 members.[16] A split in the Finnish party appears to have been headed off, at least temporarily.

There follows a brief discussion of high points in developments among communist movements in major regions of the world.

Africa (Subsaharan). The response of the South African Communist Party to what it saw as a "state of incipient civil war" was to express concern lest South Africa's workers be diverted "from the true road of revolution."[17]

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[10] Interview with General Secretary M.I. Nugud in *L'Humanité* (Paris) as reported by *Pravda*, Apr. 27, 1985, p. 5.

[11] See statement by General Secretary Giocondo Dias in *Pravda*, Dec. 11, 1985, p. 5.

[12] TASS report from Montevideo in ibid., Dec. 24, 1985, p. 4.

[13] Kevin Devlin, "The Nonruling Communist Parties," RFE-RL, *RAD Background Report*, No. 150, Dec. 27, 1985, pp. 49–54.

[14] James M. Markham, "Sharp Decline by Communists in Western Europe," *The New York Times*, Feb. 3, 1986, pp. 1 and 6.

[15] *Kabul New Times*, Dec. 24, 1985.

[16] *NRC Handelsblad* (Rotterdam), Nov. 4, 1985, p. 3.

[17] R.S. Nyameko, "SACTU Celebrates Its 30th Birthday," *African Communist* (London), No. 100, 1985, p. 55.

In the meantime, Moscow radio continued to offer its transmitters for Zulu-language broadcasts by the SACP–oriented African National Congress.[18]

The MPLA–PT congress mentioned above voted the ouster of pro-Soviet hard-liner Lucio Lara from the Politburo as well as the removal of the country's foreign minister and air force commander from the Central Committee. Nevertheless, the USSR continued supplying military equipment, which totaled about US$2 billion for 1984-85.[19] Soviet-bloc military troops and advisers have suffered casualties in combat against the guerrilla forces of Jonas Savimbi's UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola).

Mozambique, celebrating a decade of independence, found itself faced with its own insurgency in the form of the National Resistance Movement (RENAMO). Relying on the Soviet bloc for military hardware and instructors, the regime in Maputo reportedly also accepted 12,000 troops from neighboring Zimbabwe in its efforts to contain the RENAMO insurgency.[20] At the same time, Mozambique's President Samora Machel appeared to be conducting a "nonaligned" foreign policy by visiting first American President Ronald Reagan and later Soviet General Secretary Gorbachëv.

Zimbabwe, the former Rhodesia, held parliamentary elections in July, at which the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) picked up seven more seats (it now holds 64 of the 80 seats reserved for blacks). Prime Minister Robert Mugabe paid a state visit to Moscow in early December, at which time he declared Marxism-Leninism to be his leadership's philosophy and pledged increasing friendship and cooperation with the USSR.[21]

Small land-locked Lesotho allowed its communists to function above ground, although they could not take part in the electoral process. The party had its CPSU recognition implicitly reaffirmed in June by becoming the 66th party listed on the editorial board of *World Marxist Review*.[22]

The Workers' Party of Ethiopia is reportedly preparing a constitution that is supposed to institute a people's democratic republic.[23] In order to pacify rebel forces within the country, the government in Addis Ababa is resettling approximately 1.5. million people under the pretext of a severe drought and famine. As many as 300,000, or some 20 percent of those being resettled, will likely die in the process, according to Doctors Without Borders. About 100,000 have already lost their lives in the resettlement process.[24]

Mathieu Kerekou, president of the People's Revolutionary Party of Benin (PRPB), finally succeeded in purging from the Politburo and party Michel Alladaye, his only surviving co-conspirator from among the officers who staged the 1972 coup that brought Kerekou to power. At the PRPB's 2nd Congress, in November, the latter appeared to consolidate his position; most of the newly-elected Politburo members seemed loyal to him. On the other hand, the party appeared to be experiencing the first challenge to its control in 10 years as economic conditions worsened and unrest rose among high school and university students.

The Americas. Fidel Castro hosted a conference of representatives of communist parties of Latin American and Caribbean countries from June 12 to June 14 in Havana; the meeting issued predictable denunciations of the United States.[25] By year's end, Cuba had government-to-government relations with 16 Latin American countries, and during the year Havana received a US$600 million line of credit from Argentina. Only Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, and Paraguay had no contacts with the Castro regime. Cuba had some 44,000 troops stationed abroad, most of them in Africa.

Peace talks between guerrillas of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) and the Salvadoran government made no progress during the year. The latter has the upper hand, despite a geographical spreading of the conflict.[26] From exile headquarters in Mexico, the Democratic Revolutionary (Political) Front—an umbrella group comprising the five parties plus several other minor organizations—denounced terrorism and gave hints of returning to El Salvador to participate in the democratic process.[27]

A truce between the government and guerrillas in Colombia virtually ended conflict with the Colombian Revolu-

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[18] See a broadcast of comments by ANC member Thomas Mbeki by Moscow Radio in Zulu to Southern Africa, 1800 GMT, Dec. 9. 1955, trans. in *FBIS–SOV*, Dec. 16, 1985, p. J/2.

[19] *The New York Times*, Dec. 30, 1985.

[20] Radio Truth (clandestine from South Africa) in English to Zimbabwe, Sept. 12, 1985, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Middle East and Africa* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS–MEA*), Sept. 13, 1985, p. U/14.

[21] "Speech by Comrade R. Mugabe," *Pravda*, Dec. 3, 1985, p. 4.

[22] As indicated on the masthead in that journal's June 1985 issue, Toronto edition.

[23] See reportage of Part III of the report by Secretary General Mengistu Haile Mariam, as broadcast by Addis Ababa Domestic Service in Amharic, 1705 GMT, Sept. 3, 1985, trans. in *FBIS–MEA*, Sept. 6, 1985, pp. R/2–3; also see *Pravda*, Sept. 6, 1985.

[24] Clifford D. May, "Moving Ethiopians Causes a Dispute," *The New York Times*, Jan. 28, 1986, pp. 1 and 4; "Today's Holocaust," editorial in *The Wall Street Journal* (New York), Jan. 27, 1986, p. 26.

[25] Moscow Radio, TASS in English, 1740 GMT, June 15, 1985, trans. in *FBIS–SOV*, June 18, 1985, p. K/1.

[26] See articles by James LeMoyne in *The New York Times*, Jan. 10 and 12, 1986.

[27] Michael Radu, "The Structure of the Salvadoran Left," *Orbis* (Philadelphia), Winter 1985, pp. 673-84

CHECKLIST OF COMMUNIST PARTIES IN 1984

L—legal; O—outlawed; R—ruling; U—unrecognized

Subsaharan Africa[a]	**Mid-1985 population**[b]	**Party membership**	**Party leader**[c]	**Last congress**	**Legal status**	**Percent of vote last elect. (date) seats in legis.**[d]
A. Angola (MPLA-PT)	7,953,000	35,000 claimed	José Eduardo dos Santos	2nd, Dec. 2–9, 1985	R	— (1980); all 203 MPLA approved
B. Benin (PRPB)	4,015,000	No current data	Mathieu Kerekou, (Chair., CC)	2nd, Nov. 18–24, 1985	R	— (1984); all 196 PRPB approved
C. Congo (PCT)	1,798,000	9,000 est.	Denis Sassou-Ngouesso (Chair.)	3rd, July 23–30, 1984	R	95.0 (1984); all 153 PCT approved
D. Ethiopia (WPE)	34,483,000[e]	50,000 est.	Mengistu Haile-Mariam (Chair.)	1st (Const.), Sept. 6–10, 1984	R	n/a
1. Lesotho	1,512,000	No current data	Jacob M. Kena	7th, Nov. 1984	U[f]	(1985)
E. Mozambique (FRELIMO)	13,776,000	110,323 claimed[g]	Samora Moïsés Machel (Chair.)	4th, Apr. 26–29, 1983	R	— (1977); all 226 approved by FRELIMO
2. Nigeria (SWPP)	91,178,000	No current data	Dapo Fatogun	1st, Nov. 1978	O	(1983)
3. Réunion	537,000	7,000 claimed	Paul Vergès	5th, July 12–14, 1980	L	31.1 (1985); 11 of 45 to leftist coalition
4. Senegal (PIT)	6,755,000	No current data	Amath Dansoko	2nd, Sept. 28–Oct. 2, 1984	L	0.5 (1983); none
5. South Africa	32,465,000	No current data	Moses Mabhida	6th, Dec. 1984 (in London)	O	n/a
6. Sudan	21,761,000	9,000 est.	Muhammad Ibrahim Nugud Mansur	4th (legal), Oct. 31, 1967	L	n/a
F. Zimbabwe (ZANU-PF)	8,667,000	No current data	Robert Mugabe (President)	5th, Aug. 8–12, 1984	R	76.0 (1985); 64 of 100 (64 0f 80 re-serv. for blacks)

The Americas[a]	**Mid-1985 population**[b]	**Party membership**	**Party leader**[c]	**Last congress**	**Legal status**	**Percent of vote last elect. (date) seats in legis.**[d]
7. Argentina	30,708,000	70,000 est.	Athos Fava	Extraordinary, Sept. 5–6, 1983	L	2.0 (1985); none (FREPU coal.)
8. Bolivia	6,195,000	500 claimed	Simón Reyes Rivera (First Secretary)	5th, Feb. 9–13, 1985; Extraord., Aug. 2–5, 1985	L	2.2 (1985); 4 of 130 (FPU coal.)
9. Brazil	137,502,000	15,000 est.	Giocondo Dias	7th (Natl. Mtg.), January 1984	L	(1982)
10. Canada	25,399,000	2,500 est.	William Kashtan	26th, Apr 5–8, 1985	L	0.5 (1984); none
11. Chile	11,882,000	20,000 est.	Luís Corvalán Lepe	16th, June 1984[h]	O	n/a

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[a] Arabic numerals indicate the 95 countries in which Moscow apparently recognized the existence of communist parties. Listed with capital letters "A" through "J" are 12 significant "revolutionary democratic" parties (a majority of them ruling)—organizations on the verge of evolving into full-fledged communist parties. In italics are several other important rival communist organizations, often pro-Beijing, that are not recognized by Moscow.

[b] Population figures are estimated totals as of July 1985, from US Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook—Nineteen Hundred and Eighty-five*, CR WF 85-001, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, May 1985.

[c] The party secretary general or general secretary, except where some other official is the most important person, in which case his position is noted in parentheses.

[d] An em-dash indicates that the communist party was legal and presumably participated in the election but the percentage of the vote received is not known. Where the party did not participate, the year of the most recent election (where the legislature still sits) is given in parentheses. In some cases, data from pre-1985 elections have been updated since last year's Checklist.

[e] An estimate for 1985 from Arthur S. Banks, Ed., *Political Handbook of the World 1984–1985*, Binghamton, NY, CSA Publications, 1985.

[f] While the party is countenanced, it was not allowed to participate in the 1985 elections.

[g] See *African Communist* (London), Fourth Quarter, 1983.

[h] Held clandestinely in Chile and in exile.

The Americas[a]	Mid-1985 population[b]	Party membership	Party leader[c]	Last congress	Legal status	Percent of vote last elect. (date) seats in legis.[d]
12. Colombia	29,506,000	12,000 est.	Gilberto Vieira White	14th, Nov. 7–11, 1984	L	1.2 (1982); 3 of 199
13. Costa Rica (PVP)	2,655,000	3.500 est.[i]	Humberto Vargas Carbonell	15th, Sept. 15–16, 1984	L	3.2 (1982); 4 of 57 (United People's Coalition)
(PPC)		No current data	Manuel Mora Valverde	14th, Mar. 10–11, 1984	L	n/a
14. Cuba	10,105,000	434,143 claimed	Fidel Casto Ruz	2nd, Oct. 17–20, 1981[j]	R	(1981); all 499 PCC approved
15. Dominican Republic	6,588,000	750 est.	Narciso Isa Conde	3rd, Mar. 15–17, 1984	L	7.1 (1982); none
16. Ecuador	8,884,000	500 est.	René Maugé Mosquera	10th, Nov. 27–29, 1981	L	3.6 (1984); 2 of 71 (Broad Left Front, and 4.0 to Mauge for pres.
17. El Salvador[k]	5,072,000	1,000 est.	Shafik Jorge Handal	7th, Apr. 1979	O	(1985)
F. Grenada (MBPM)	110,000	No current data	Kendrick Radix	n/a	L	5.0 (1984); none
18. Guadeloupe	333,000	3,000 est.	Guy Daninthe	8th, Apr. 27–29, 1984	L	– (1985) 24 of 42 to leftist coalition
19. Guatemala (PGT)	8,335,000	500 est.	Carlos González	4th, Dec. 1969	O	(1984)
20. Guyana (PPP)	798,000	200 est.	Cheddi Jagan	22nd, Aug. 3–5, 1985	L	16.8 (1985); 8 of 53 elect. members
21. Haiti (PUCH)	5,762,000	350 est.	René Théodore	1st, 1979	O	(1984)
22. Honduras[l]	4,394,000	650 est.	Rigoberto Padilla Rush[m]	3rd, Mar. 1977	O	(1985)
23. Jamaica (WPJ)	2,428,000	50 est.	Trevor Munroe	3rd, Dec. 14–21, 1984	L	Boycotted 1983 election
24. Martinique	327,000	1,000 est.	Armand Nicolas	8th, Nov. 12–13, 1983	L	— (1985); 7 of 46 to leftist coalition
25. Mexico (PSUM)	79,662,000	40,800 claimed	Pablo Gómez Alvarez	2nd, Aug. 9–14, 1983	L	3.2 (1985); 12 of 400
26. Nicaragua (PSN)	3,038,000	No current data	Gustavo Tablada	10th, Oct. 1973	L	1.3 (1984), 2 of 96
G. (FSLN)		4,000 claimed	Daniel Ortega (Coordinator, Exec. Commiss.)		R	63.0 (1984); 61 of 96
27. Panama (PdP)	2,038,000	35,000 claimed[n]	Rubén Darío Souza	6th, Feb. 8–10, 1980	L	— (1984); none
28. Paraguay	3,722,000	4,000 est.	Antonio Maidana (First Secretary)[o]	3rd, Apr. 10, 1971	O	(1983)
29. Peru	19,532,000	5,000 est.	Jorge del Prado Chavez	8th (Extraord.) Jan. 27–31, 1982	L	26.0 (1984); 48 of 180 to United Left coal. (6 PCP)
30. Puerto Rico	3,300,520	125 est.	Frank Irrizarry	Unknown	L	— (1984)
Suriname (RVP)	*377,000*	*100 est.*	*Edward Naarendorp*	*1st, 1981*	*L*	*n/a*
31. United States of America	238,848,000	17,500 claimed	Gus Hall	23rd, Nov. 10–13, 1983	L	0.01 (1984); none
32. Uruguay	2,936,000	7,500 est.	Rodney Arismendi	20th, Dec. 1970	L	6.0 (1984); none (in Frente Amp.)
33. Venezuela	17,810,000	4,000 est.	Alonso Ojeda Olaechea	7th, Oct. 24–27, 1985	L	2.0 (1983); 3 of 195

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[i] There is no good basis for judging what percent of the pre-split estimated membership of the Popular Vanguard Party joined Manuel Mora Valverde in the new Costa Rican People's Party which held a rump 14th Congress in March 1984.

[j] The 3rd Congress of the Cuban Communist Party was held in February 1986.

[k] The Communist Party of El Salvador is one of five parties comprising the Farabundo Marti National Liberation movement.

[l] One of six parties in the Honduran Revolutionary Movement (MHR).

[m] Although Padilla claims to be the leader, there is strong evidence that Mario Sosa Navarro is really in charge.

Checklist of Communist Parties in 1985

Asia and Pacific[a]	Mid-1985 population[b]	Party membership	Party leader[c]	Last congress	Legal status	Percent of vote last elect. (date) seats in legis.[d]
34. Australia (CPA)	15,658,000	1,000 est.	Judy Mundey	28th, Nov. 4, 1984	L	— (1984); none
(SPA)		500 est.	Peter Dudley Symon	5th, Sept. 28–Oct. 1, 1984	L	— (1984); none
35. Bangladesh	101,408,000	3,000 est.	Muhammed Farhad	3rd, Feb. 1980	L	— (1981)
36. Burma	36,919,000	3,000 claimed	Thakin Ba Thein Tin (Chair., CC)	3rd (last known) Nov. 1979	O	(1981)
37. China	1,041,346,000	40,000,000 + cl.	Hu Yaobang	12th, Sept 1–11, 1982	R	— (1981); all 3,202 CCP approv.
38. India (CPI)	762,507,000	478,500 claimed	C. Rajeswara Rao	12th, Mar. 21–28, 1982	L	2.7 (1984); 6 of 544
(CPM)		271,500 claimed	E.M.S. Namboodiripad	12th, Dec. 25–30, 1985	L	6.0 (1984); 22 of 544
39. Indonesia	173,103,000	2000 est.[p]	Jusuf Adjitorop (pro-Beijing), Sadiatjaya Sudiman (pro-Moscow)	7th Extraord. Apr. 1962	O	(1982)
40. Japan	120,691,000	470,000 est.	Tesuzo Fuwa (Chair., Presidium) Kenji Miyamoto (Chair., CC)	17th, Nov. 19–25, 1985	L	9.4 (1983) 26 of 511
H. Kampuchea (KPRP)	6,249,000	7,500 est.	Heng Samrin	5th, Oct. 13–16, 1985	R	99.0 (1981); all 117
(DK or KCP)		*No current data*	*Pol Pot*	*3rd, Dec. 14, 1975*	*O*	*n/a*
41. Korea, North (KWP)	20,082,000	3,000,000 cl.	Kim Il-song	6th, Oct. 10–15, 1980	R	100 (1982); all 615 KWP approved
42. Laos (LPRP)	3,585,000[q]	42,000 claimed	Kaysone Phomvihane (Chairman)	3rd, Apr. 27–30, 1982	R	(Dec. 1975) 46-member Sup. Peop. Assemby LPRP apptd.
43. Malaysia (CPM)	15,664,000	3,425 est.[r]	Chin Peng	1965 (last known)	O	(1984)
(MCP)[s]		*800 est.*	*Ah Leng*	*(Unknown)*	*O*	*(1984)*
44. Mongolia (MPRP)	1,912,000	80,200 claimed	Dzhambiin Batmunkh	18th, May 26–31, 1981	R	99.0 (1981) all 370 MPRP approved
45. Nepal	16,996,000	5,000 est.[t]	Man Mohan Adhikary	3rd, 1961	O	n/a
46. New Zealand (CPNZ)	3,295,000	50 est.	Richard C. Wolfe	Jan. 26–28, 1979 (first since 1966)	L	— (1984); none
(SUP)		175 est.	George Jackson	7th, Oct. 26–27, 1985	L	0.5 (1984); none
47. Pakistan	99,199,000	200 est.	Imam Ali Nazish	Ist, 1976 (cland.)	O	(1985)
48. Philippines (PKP)	56,808,000	200 est.	Felicismo Macapagal	8th, 1980	L	(1984)
(CPP)		*15,000 est.*	*Rafael Baylosis*	*Reest. Dec. 26, 1968*	*O*	*(1984)*
49. Sri Lanka	16,206,000	6,000 est.	Kattorge P. Silva	12th, Jan. 27–29, 1984	L	1.9 (1977); 1 of 168
50. Thailand	52,700,000	1,200 est.	Virat Angkhathavorn (active leader)	5th, Feb. 1984 (clandestine)	O	(1983)
51. Vietnam	60,492,000	1,750,000 cl.	Le Duan	5th, Mar. 27–31, 1982	R	97.9 (1981); 496 of of 614; all 614 VCP endorsed

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[n] Based on registration for 1984 elections; the PdP has an estimated 500 to 1,000 militants.

[o] Maidana was arrested in 1980, and Julio Rojas is acting party leader in his absence.

[p] Combined estimate for all factions, including some 250 in exile.

[q] Laotian census of 1985.

[r] The estimate for the CPM includes insurgents in Thailand, plus some 200 or so members in Singapore.

[s] A separate party seeking support from all Malaysians, not just Chinese, as in the case of the CPM.

[t] All factions—75 percent of the total is believed to be pro-Beijing or neutral.

[u] *Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), Jan. 9, 1986.

[v] *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), Jan. 8, 1986.

[w] Includes the population of East Jerusalem. Israeli Central Burau of Statistics.

Eastern Europe and the USSR[a]	Mid-1985 population[b]	Party membership	Party leader[c]	Last congress	Legal status	Percent of vote last elect. (date) seats in legis.[d]
52. Albania (PPSh)	2,968,000	122,000 claimed	Ramiz Alia	8th, Nov. 1–8, 1981	R	99.9 (1982); all 250 Democratic Front
53. Bulgaria	8,980,000	912,000 claimed	Todor Zhivkov	12th, Mar. 31–Apr. 4, 1981	R	99.9 (1981); all 400 Fatherland Front
54. Czechoslovakia	15,503,000	1,650,000 cl.	Gustáv Husák	16th, Apr. 6–10, 1981	R	99.0 (1981); all 350 National Front
55. Germany (East) (SED)	16,701,000	2,293,289 cl.[u]	Erich Honecker	10th, Apr. 11–16, 1981	R	99.9 (1981); all 500 National Front
56. Hungary (MSzMP)	10,645,000	870,992 claimed	János Kádár	13th, Mar. 25–28, 1985	R	99.2 (1985); all 352 Pat. Peop. Front
57. Poland (PZPR)	37,236,000	2,112,191 cl.[v]	Wojciech Jaruzelski	Extraord. 9th, July 14–20, 1981	R	78.8 (1985); all 460 Fatherland Front
58. Romania	22,772,000	3,500,000 cl.	Nicolae Ceaușescu	13th, Nov. 19–22, 1984	R	97.8 (1985) all 369 Front of Soc. Dem. and Unity
59. USSR	277,930,000	18,500,000 cl.	Mikhail S. Gorbachëv	26th, Feb. 23–1981	R	99.9 (1984); all 1,500 CPSU approv. (71.4% CPSU members)
60. Yugoslavia (SKJ)	23,137,000	2,188,943 cl.	Vidoje Zarković (Pres. of Presidium)	12th, June 26–29, 1982	R	— (1982); all 308 Soc. Alliance (all LCY approved)

Middle East[a]	Mid-1985 population[b]	Party membership	Party leader[c]	Last congress	Legal status	Percent of vote last elect. (date) seats in legis.[d]
I. Afghanistan (PDPA)	14,792,000	120,000 claimed	Babrak Karmal	National Conf. Mar. 14–15, 1982	R	Rev. Council rule since Apr. 1978
61. Algeria (PAGS)	22,025,000	450 est.	Sadiq Hadjeres (First Secretary)	6th, Feb. 1952	O	(1982)
J. Bahrain (NLF/B)	427,000	Negligible	Yusuf al-Hassan al-Ajajai	(Unknown)	O	n/a
62. Egypt	48,305,000	500 est.	Farid Mujahid	2nd, 1984 or early 1985	O	(1984)
63. Iran (Tudeh party)	45,191,000	1,500 est.	Ali Khavari (First Secretary)	1965	O	(1984)
64. Iraq	15,507,000	No current data	Aziz Muhammad (First Secretary)	3rd, May 4–6, 1976	O	— (1984)
65. Israel	4,255,000[w]	1,500 est.	Meir Vilner	20th, Dec. 4–7, 1985	L	3.4 (1984); 4 of 120
66. Jordan	2,794,000	No current data	Fa'iq Muhammad Warrad (First Sec.)	2nd, Dec. 1983	O	n/a
67. Lebanon	2,619,000	5,000 est.	George Hawi	4th, 1979	L	(1972)
68. Morocco (PPS)	24,258,000	2,000 est.	'Ali Yata	3rd, Mar. 25–27, 1983	L	2.3 (1984); 2 of 306
69. Palestine CP	4,500,000[x]	200 est.	Bashir al-Barghuti	1st (1984?)	U	n.a
70. Saudi Arabia	11,152,000	Negligible	Mahdi Habib	2nd, Aug. 1984	O	n/a
71. Syria	10,535,000	5,000 est.	Khalid Bakhdash	5th, May 1980	L	0.8 (1981); none
72. Tunisia	7,352,000	2,000 est.	Muhammad Harmel (First Secretary)	8th, Feb. 1981	L	0.8 (1981); none
L. Yemen, Aden (YSP)	2,211,000	26,000 claimed	Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani[y]	3rd, Oct. 11–16, 1985	R	n/a

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[x] Estimate by *YICA* contributor combining data on Palestinians in West Bank, Gaza, Israel, and Jordan

[y] The checklist does not reflect the January 1986 coup in which Ali Nasir was deposed after trying to eliminate factions opposed to him

[z] Excluding the population of West Berlin; disaggregation from *World Factbook* based on West Berlin estimate in *Political Handbook of the World 1984–1985*

[aa] *New Worker* (London), Oct 11, 1985, back page

[bb] Leonidas Kyrkos, the party chairman, is the de facto leader

[cc] Malta Central Office of Statistics

Checklist of Communist Parties in 1985

Western Europe[a]	Mid-1985 population[b]	Party membership	Party leader[c]	Last congress	Legal status	Percent of vote last elect. (date) seats in legis.[d]
73. Austria	7,540,000	12,000 est.	Franz Muhri (Chairman)	25th, Jan. 13–15,	L	0.66 (1983); none
74. Belgium	9,856,000	10,000 est.	Louis van Geyt (President)	24th, March & Dec. 1982 (2 stages)	L	1.2 (1985); none
75. Cyprus (AKEL)	670,000	14,000 claimed	Ezekias Papaioannou	15th, May 13–15, 1982	L	27.4 (1985); 15 of 56
76. Denmark	5,109,000	10,000 est.	Jorgen Jensen (Chairman)	27th, May 12–15, 1983	L	0.7 (1984); none
77. Finland	4,894,000	50,000 claimed	Arvo Aalto (Chairman)	Extraordinary Mar. 23, 1985	L	14.0 (1983); 27 of 200
78. France	55,094,000	610,000 claimed	Georges Marchais	25th, Feb. 6–10, 1985	L	16.2 (1981); 44 of 491
79. Germany (West)	60,082,000[z]	44,500 est.	Herbert Mies (Chairman)	7th, Jan. 6–8, 1984	L	0.2 (1983); none
80. Great Britain	56,437,000	16,000 est.	Gordon McLennan	Special, May 18–20, 1985	L	0.03 (1983); none
(NCPB)		No current data	Eric Trevet (Chair., CC)	"5th," Nov. 23–24, 1985[aa]	L	n/a
81. Greece	9,966,000	42,000 est.	Kharilaos Florakis (First Secretary)	11th, Dec. 15–18, 1982	L	9.9 (1985); 13 of 300
(KKE-I)		*12,000 est.*	*Yiannis Banias*[bb]	*3rd May 17–23, 1982*	*L*	*1.8 (1985); none*
82. Iceland (AB)	241,000	3,000 est.	Svavar Gestsson (Chairman)	Biennial cong., 1985	L	17.3 (1983); 10 of 60
83. Ireland	3,590,000	500 est.	James Stewart	18th, May 14–16, 1982	L	— (1982); none
84. Italy	57,149,000	1,588,376 cl.	Alessandro Natta	16th, Mar. 2–6, 1983	L	29.9 (1983); 198 of 630
85. Luxembourg	367,000	600 est.	René Urbany	24th, Feb. 4–5, 1984	L	4.9 (1984); 2 of 64
86. Malta	332,000[cc]	200 est.	Anthony Vassallo	Extraordinary, May 18–25, 1984	L	1.0 (1981); none
87. Netherlands	14,467,000	10,000 est.	Elli Izeboud (Chairman)	29th, Mar. 1–4, 1985	L	1.8 (1982); 3 of 150
88. Norway	4,160,000	5,500 est.	Hans I. Kleven (Chairman)	18th, Mar. 30–Apr. 2, 1984	L	0.2 (1985); none
(AKP)		*10,000 est.*	*Kjersti Ericsson*	*3rd (or 4th) Dec. 1984*	*L*	*— (1985); none*
89. Portugal	10,045,000	200,753 claimed	Alvaro Cunhal	10th, Dec. 8–11, 1983	L	15.5 (1985); 38 of 250 (Unit. Peop. Alliance
90. San Marino	23,000	300 est.	Ermenegildo Gasperoni (Chair.)	10th, 1980	L	24.3 (1983); 15 of 60
91. Spain (PCE)	38,629,000	86,000 claimed	Gerardo Iglesias	11th, Dec. 14–18, 1983	L	3.8 (1982); 4 of 350
(PCPE)		35,000 claimed	Ignacio Gallego	1st, Jan. 13–15, 1984	L	n/a
(PCEMR)		No data	Santiago Carrillo (?)	None	L	n/a
92. Sweden (VPK)	8,338,000	17,500 claimed	Lars Werner (Chairman)	27th, Jan. 3–6, 1985	L	5.4 (1985); 19 of 349
(APK)		5,000 claimed	Rolf Hagel (Chairman)	27th, 1983	L	(1985)[dd]
93. Switzerland (PdA)	6,512,000	4,500 est.	Armand Magnin	12th, May 21–22, 1983	L	0.9 (1983); 1 of 200
94. Turkey	51,259,000	Negligible	Haydar Kutlu	5th, Oct. or or Nov. 1983	O	(1983)
95. West Berlin (SEW)	1,870,000[y]	4,500 est.	Horst Schmitt (Chairman)	7th, May 25–27, 1984	L	0.6 (1985); none

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[dd] The APK withdrew from contention in the 1985 elections in order not to split the Left vote.

LEGEND OF ACRONYMS

AB	People's Alliance
AKEL	Progressive Party of the Working People
AKP	Workers' Communist Party
APK	Communist Workers' Party
CPA	Communist Party of Australia
CPI	Communist Party of India
CPM	Communist Party of Malaya
CPM	Communist Party (Marxist)
CPNZ	Communist Party of New Zealand
CPP	Communist Party of the Philippines/ New People's Army
DK	Democratic Kampuchea (former Khmer Rouge, also known as the Kampuchean Communist Party—KCP)
FSLN	Sandinista Front for National Liberation
FRELIMO	Front for the Liberation of Mozambique
KKE–I	Greek Communist Party (Interior)
KPRP	Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party
KWP	Korean Workers' Party
LPRP	Lao People's Revolutionary Party
MBPM	Maurice Bishop Patriotic Movement
MCP	Malaysian Communist Party
MPLA–PT	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola–Party of Labor
MPRP	Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party
MSzMP	Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party
NCPB	New Communist Party of Britain
NLF/B	National Liberation Front/Bahrain
PAGS	Socialist Vanguard Party
PCE	Communist Party of Spain
PCEMR	Marxist Revolutionary Communist Party of Spain
PCPE	Communist Party of the Peoples of Spain
PCT	Congolese Labor Party
PdA	Party of Labor
PDPA	People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
PGT	Guatemalan Party of Labor
PIT	Independence and Labor Party
PKP	Philippine Communist Party
PPC	Costa Rican People's Party
PdP	People's Party of Panama
PPP	People's Progressive Party
PPS	Party of Progress and Socialism
PPSh	Albanian Party of Labor
PRPB	People's Revolutionary Party of Benin
PSN	Socialist Party of Nicaragua
PSUM	Unified Socialist Party of Mexico
PUCH	Unified Party of Haitian Communists
PVP	Popular Vanguard Party
PZPR	Polish United Workers' Party
RVP	Revolutionary People's Party
SED	Socialist Unity Party
SEW	Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin
SKJ	League of Communists of Yugoslavia
SPA	Socialist Party of Australia
SUP	Socialist Unity Party
SWPP	Socialist Working People's Party
VPK	Left Party Communists
WPE	Workers' Party of Ethiopia
WPJ	Workers' Party of Jamaica
YSP	Yemen Socialist Party
ZANU–PF	Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front

tionary Armed Forces (FARC), but did not include the National Liberation Army (ELN). The most dramatic terrorist action of the year occurred in November, when the M-19 guerrilla group seized the Palace of Justice in Bogota. All 35 guerrillas and 64 of the hostages were killed when government troops stormed the building.

Communists in Chile also endorsed various acts of terrorism, a stance that was at variance with the position of the National Accord alliance established in September by many opposition groups. The party operates out of Buenos Aires, and its newspaper *El Siglo* purportedly is published in the "deep underground" within Chile.[28]

Communist parties supported the democratic process in Costa Rica, Brazil, and Uruguay (where a constitutional government was restored during 1985). The party in Uruguay held a national conference in December.[29] In Ecuador, the party was a minor member in a broadly based opposition front.

By contrast, the communist movement in Peru comprises the largest group in the United Left political front (IU), which holds about one-fourth of the seats in each house of parliament. The IU consists of four parties and two coalitions, plus smaller groups and individuals. Outside of Peru's orthodox communist party, the Maoist guerrillas of the Shining Path (*Sendero Luminoso*) were capable of undertaking coordinated attacks almost anywhere in the country, including the capital. Their fanaticism would appear to militate against cooperation with other movements.

The Sandinistas in Nicaragua continued to impose harsh restrictions upon the population and closed down the official radio station of the Roman Catholic Church. The Managua regime is openly aligned with Cuba and the Soviet bloc in foreign policy and is largely dependent upon these allies for weapons and other aid.[30]

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[28] TASS dispatch from Buenos Aires in *Pravda*, Jan. 8, 1986, p. 4.

[29] For a report, see TASS from Montevideo, *Pravda*, Dec. 24, 1985, p. 4.

[30] AP dispatch from Managua, *The New York Times*, Jan. 3, 1986; James LeMoyne, "Most Contras to Pull Out of Nicaragua," ibid., Jan. 30, 1986, for figures.

Asia and the Pacific. Ruling communist parties in China, Kampuchea, Laos, and Vietnam generally continued to pursue existing policy directions. In the case of North Korea, however, there was a perceptible warming of relations with the USSR, with 20 Soviet missions visiting the country. The Soviets have been granted liberal access to North Korean ports and transit rights for flights from the USSR to Vietnam; at the same time, the Soviet Union had promised delivery of some 50 MiG–23 fighters to Pyongyang by the end of 1985.[31]

In China, the current leadership sought to ensure a continuation of its modernization drive by instituting widespread personnel changes and by expanding its reformist policies. One-third of the Politburo, 131 Central Committee members, and more than half of the first secretaries of party organizations of provinces or autonomous regions were replaced. Some 960,000 "third-echelon" cadres of the party (in central, provincial, and municipal organizations) have also been screened in an ongoing rectification campaign, and 60,000 of them were expelled. A further screening will affect the 13.5 million cadres in local organs, large enterprises, and institutions of higher education.[32] A similar shake-up took place in the government; in the military, the number of regional commands was trimmed from 11 to 8, with new commanders named in 7 of the 8 new regions.[33]

With regard to the economy, Beijing has alternated between relaxing and tightening controls. Steps in the latter direction included the imposition of restrictions on the use of foreign exchange and a crackdown upon corruption within the party. At the same time, the leadership has reduced the degree of central planning, enlarged the scope of a flexible pricing system, and allowed the functioning of a small but energetic free-market sector.

Roughly 150,000 Vietnamese troops continue to occupy Kampuchea and to wage war against opposition forces there on behalf of the Heng Samrin regime. The Vietnamese have also had heavy artillery exchanges and border skirmishes with Chinese troops along the Sino-Vietnamese frontier.[34] At home, Hanoi is experiencing serious economic problems. The ruling party has announced its intention to pursue a massive resettlement campaign to eliminate villages by grouping farmers in 426 agro-complexes. A quarter of a million individuals would live in each, with about 25,000 of them farming an average total of 20,000 hectares of land.

Little has changed with the nonruling communist parties of Asia. In Bangladesh, the government lifted a 10-month ban on all political activities, but the opposition parties, including the pro-Soviet communist party and other Marxist groups, rejected the government's terms.[35]

In India, the Communist Party (Marxist) or CPM—the smaller of the two major Indian communist organizations—held a congress at the end of the year in Calcutta, where it reelected its long-time general secretary, E.M.S. Namboodiripad. Three separate articles in *Pravda* covered this congress, emphasizing how the CPM has supported Soviet foreign policy initiatives.[36] The CPM captured one of seven seats at stake in by-elections to parliament from Assam state in December.

In neighboring Burma, the local communist party saw its clandestine propaganda radio station—operating out of Yunnan province in China—go off the air on April 16, 1985, an apparent casualty of growing Rangoon-Beijing intergovernmental rapprochement.

The Japan Communist Party (JCP) has yet to reach its target of 500,000 members despite strenuous efforts. The aged JCP official Kenji Miyamoto accused the government of responsibility for an August plane crash (in which 520 passengers—including several JCP leaders—died), and also attacked it for expanding outlays on national defense. The Japan CP is frequently critical of both the Soviet and Chinese communist parties.

In the Philippines, the New People's Army expanded terrorist activities in the countryside and simultaneously pushed "united front" tactics in metropolitan areas. Opposition leader Corazon Aquino met with jailed communist leaders and stated she would accept them into her government if she were to win the February 7, 1986, elections (a statement she later repudiated).[37] The NPA has penetrated from 5 percent (Philippine government figures) to as many as 20 percent (US intelligence) of the nation's 40,000 villages, and in the cities operates through the National Democratic Front (NDF), an umbrella organization embracing workers, women, Moro revolutionaries, Christian clergy, youth, and teachers.[38]

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[31] Moscow Radio, Oct. 24, 1985; *Sankei Shimbun* (Tokyo), Oct. 7 and Dec. 26, 1985; *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), Sept. 26 and Dec. 26, 1985; and *Pravda*, Dec. 25, 1985, p. 4, and Jan. 22, 1986.

[32] *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Feb. 14, 1985, p. 8; *Asiaweek* (Hong Kong), Apr. 19, 1985, p. 7.

[33] *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Aug. 22, 1985, p. 45; and Beijing Zhungguo Xinwen She in Chinese, 0606 GMT, Sept. 18, 1985, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC), Sept. 19, 1985, p. K/18.

[34] Joseph A. Reaves, *Sunday Star-Bulletin* (Honolulu), Sept. 8, 1985; Barbara Crossette (from Hanoi), "Vietnam Reports Chinese Troops Have Stepped Up Border Attacks," *The New York Times*, Jan. 5, 1986; UPI dispatch from Beijing, "China 'Wiped Out' Vietnamese Forces," *San Francisco Examiner and Chronicle*, Feb. 2, 1986, p. A/8.

[35] *Bangladesh Times* (Dacca), Jan. 18, 1985.

[36] TASS dispatches from Calcutta in *Pravda*, Dec. 26, 27, and 30, 1985.

[37] *San Francisco Examiner*, Dec. 29, 1985, pp. A/1 and A/15; cf. Manila Far East Broadcasting Co., 2300 GMT, Jan. 10, 1986, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Asia and Pacific* (Washington, DC), Jan. 11, 1986, p. P/3.

[38] Guy Sacerdoti and Philip Bowring, "Marx, Mao and Marcos," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Nov. 21, 1985, p. 55.

By late 1985, the number of armed insurgents in Thailand had dwindled to a few hundred (from some 12,000 in 1978) as a result of massive defections in connection with a government amnesty program. The communist party's united front efforts in the cities of Thailand have virtually been abandoned.

In May 1985, the Indonesian government executed Mohammed Munir, a member of the PKI Politburo. Three other leaders met the same fate in July. Surviving party leaders live in exile in China, the Soviet Union, and Eastern and Western Europe.

Eastern Europe and the USSR. By year's end, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union seems to be emerging from its 28-month leadership transition. After less than a year in power, Gorbachëv approached the 27th CPSU Congress with many of his enemies and rivals gone from the Politburo or Secretariat. In their place are allies (appointed by Andropov) and his own clients. Three one-time police generals were on the CPSU Politburo at the end of the year: Heydar Aliyev, Viktor Chebrikov, and Eduard Shevardnadze, but there were no army generals except for aging Minister of Defense Sergey Sokolov, who holds only candidate (non-voting) membership.

During 1985, Gorbachëv met individually with each East European party leader except for Nicolae Ceauşescu and saw all of them together on four occasions—at the funeral of Konstantin Chernenko, at Warsaw ceremonies in April renewing the Warsaw Treaty Organization, at a meeting in Sofia in October, and in Prague in November on his way back from the Geneva summit meeting. In December, the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance met in Moscow to launch an ambitious program for bloc cooperation in science and technology. It is not clear how much systemic diversity Gorbachëv will allow to members of the bloc.[39]

In Albania, Ramiz Alia succeeded the late Enver Hoxha and continued the long-time leader's policies, although he allowed a number of visits to the country by governmental delegations from Western Europe. On the Yugoslav front, there was no improvement in relations, largely because of the continuing issue of Yugoslavia's Albanian minority, centered in Kosovo.[40]

Another kind of ethnic issue involved Bulgaria, where extreme pressure was put on Turks to adopt Slavic names and stop speaking their native Turkish in public. Bulgaria's standard of living in general began to deteriorate, and the New Economic Mechanism underwent criticism early in the year. One full member and one candidate member of the ruling Politburo were dismissed, perhaps as scapegoats.[41]

After Gustáv Husák had conferred with Gorbachëv in Moscow, the Czechoslovak party voiced its opposition to any "market-oriented concepts." Information about the "Prague Spring" given in an interview by a member of the Czechoslovak Communist Party's Secretariat to the West German weekly *Der Spiegel* was refuted in the Italian Communist Party's newspaper by Alexander Dubček,[42] who thereby broke a 16-year silence on those 1968 events.

In East Germany, three members left the Politburo of the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED): Erich Honecker's rival Konrad Naumann was dismissed, Herbert Haeber left for "health reasons," and Defense Minister Karl-Heinz Hoffmann died. The purge of Naumann paves the way for Egon Krenz to become Honecker's heir-apparent.[43] The SED sponsored a conference in East Berlin on criteria for effective communist party work, attended by representatives from 11 movements around the world.[44]

A congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party reiterated party endorsement of the country's New Economic Mechanism, a reform which has had its ups and downs since its inauguration in 1968. The conclave was followed by the multicandidate national elections noted above.[45]

Poland today resembles Hungary after 1956 and Czechoslovakia following 1968. The communist regime has proclaimed "normalization" and the end of organized opposition. Yet the ruling Polish United Workers' Party has been able to muster only 127,000 members in the capital city of Warsaw,[46] and overall membership was down some 74,000 from the previous year. Authorities have intensified their drive against dissidents—by the end of 1985, the number of political prisoners exceeded 300 and the Roman Catholic Church was being attacked openly.[47] Despite these efforts, the regime suffered the startling election setback noted above.

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[39] See Vladimir Kusin, "Gorbachëv and Eastern Europe," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January-February 1986, pp. 39–53.

[40] See Elez Biberaj, "Albania After Hoxha: Dilemmas of Change," ibid., November-December 1985, pp. 32–47.

[41] TASS dispatch from Sofia, "Plenum of BCP Central Committee," *Pravda*, Jan. 26, 1986, p. 4.

[42] *L'Unità* (Milan), Nov. 21, 1985, pp. 1 and 18, trans. in *FBIS–EEU*, Nov. 25, 1985, pp. D/7–8.

[43] Paris radio, AFP in English, Nov. 26, 1985, in *FBIS–EEU*, Nov. 27, 1985, p. E/1; William Drozdiak, "New Leader Emerging," *The Washington Post*, Dec. 12, 1985, pp. A/1 and A/27, dispatch from East Berlin.

[44] *World Marxist Review*, September 1985, pp. 62–78.

[45] Paul Lewis, "Voter Choice in Hungary," *The New York Times*, Jan. 23, 1985; Budapest radio, MTI in English, 1704 GMT, Mar. 17, 1985, in *FBIS–EEU*, Mar. 18, 1985, p. F/2.

[46] Special Correspondent in Warsaw, "Fraternal Parties," *Pravda*, Jan. 5, 1986, p. 4; *Życie partii* (Warsaw), Dec. 4, 1985, pp. 3–4.

[47] Janusz Bugajski, "Poland's Anti-Clergy Campaign," *The Washington Quarterly* (Washington, DC), Fall 1985, pp. 157–68.

Romania's cult of personality around the person and family of Ceaușescu has no counterpart elsewhere in Eastern Europe; at the same time, the country's economy is the weakest of the region. Although officially only 2.3 percent of the electorate voted against the regime slate in March 1985 elections, there were reports of peasant riots in December.[48]

Five years after the death of Josip Broz Tito, the man and the system have been criticized for bringing on politicoeconomic crisis in Yugoslavia. With an annual inflation rate of more than 100 percent and a foreign debt upwards of US$23 billion at year's end, the economic problems seem unsolvable. In the month of November alone, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ) lost 75,000 members, mostly blue-collar workers.[49] The problem of ethnic Albanians in Yugoslavia's Kosovo province (77 percent of the local population) appears intractable.

The Middle East. The "communist and workers' parties" of Arab countries issued a number of pronouncements during the year. In March, TASS carried a dispatch from Beirut in which these parties addressed the situation in Lebanon—attacking both the United States and Israel and calling upon the peoples of the Middle East to activate a mass movement that would force foreign troops to leave all occupied territories. A longer statement in a similar vein appeared at mid-year; a third, in August, called for an end to the Iran-Iraq war; and a fourth urged support of Arab Palestinians against "aggressive, expansionist, and racist" Tel Aviv.[50]

In Iran, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni commuted death sentences of imprisoned leaders of the once significant Tudeh party in an effort to persuade Moscow to reduce support for Baghdad in the Iran-Iraq war. This has not happened, although remnants of the Iraqi communist movement are fighting in guerrilla actions alongside Kurdish forces in the far north of Iraq. The USSR also began beaming clandestine broadcasts in Persian from Baku containing personal attacks upon Khomeyni and even calling for an armed uprising against his "despotic medieval regime."

The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan claimed to have increased its membership by 25,000 since 1984,[51] but ongoing rivalry between the Parchami and Khalqi factions precipitated a gun battle at the Arg palace between army members from these factions in September. During the year, Soviet advisers attempted to shift the balance of power toward the Parchami faction, to which party leader Babrak Karmal belongs, and an estimated 118,000 Soviet troops in the country and 30,000 just across the border help maintain the leftist regime in power.[52]

Western Europe. The second conference of communist and workers' parties from the eastern Mediterranean, the Near and Middle East, and Red Sea areas took place in January at Nicosia on Cyprus. A three-and-one-half-page declaration by 14 movements plus other unnamed and presumably clandestine ones called for joint action in the region.[53] The first such conference had been held in 1981 at Athens.

Delegates from 18 West European communist parties met during the summer for two days in Paris to discuss the "economic crisis" in capitalist countries.[54] Otherwise, 1985 witnessed disunity and decline within many of these movements.

The French Communist Party (PCF) held a congress in February, where it decided to give up past attempts to forge "unity of the Left" with the Socialists. In a rare development for a Communist party, only 90 percent of the delegates voted for the leadership, and one dissenter was dropped from the Politburo.[55] The PCF also seemed to be losing its ability to mobilize members of the General Labor Confederation (CGT) to participate in strike actions. The party moved toward the March 16, 1986, parliamentary elections with only 10 percent of the electorate expected to vote for it. A former communist intellectual called the PCF's loss of electoral support "an irreversible regression."[56]

The situation in Spain is even worse, because there are now three main parties. In late April 1985, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Spain (PCE) expelled its previous leader Santiago Carrillo and removed his followers from regional party bodies. A rival pro-Soviet group, the Communist Party of the Peoples of Spain (PCPE), had been established in January 1984. Finally, a new "Marxist Revolutionary" Spanish Communist Party (PCEMR) was registered in October 1985 by the ousted Carrillo. The CPSU recognizes at least the first two, although Gorbachëv had only received PCPE leader Ignacio Gallego by year's end.[57]

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[48] Roger Thurow, "Balkan Paradox," *The Wall Street Journal*, Jan. 27, 1986; Ion Mihai Pacepa, "A Defector's Story," *San Francisco Chronicle*, Jan 29, 1986, pp. C1–2.

[49] Official figures give the inflation rate as 79.5 percent and the debt as US$20 billion. AP dispatch from Belgrade, *The Wall Street Journal*, Feb. 4, 1986; Henry Kamm, "In Post-Tito Yugoslavia," *The New York Times*, Dec. 18, 1985.

[50] TASS dispatch from Beirut in *Pravda*, Mar. 22, 1985, p. 4; ibid., June 21, 1985, p. 4; TASS from Damascus, in ibid., Aug. 7, 1985, p. 5; and Moscow Radio in English, 1228 GMT, Nov. 3, 1985, in *FBIS–SOV*, Nov. 4, 1985.

[51] Special Correspondent in Kabul in *Pravda*, Jan. 16, 1986, p. 5.

[52] Craig Karp, "Afghanistan: Six Years of Soviet Occupation," US Department of State, *Special Report*, No. 135, Washington, DC, December 1985, pp. 8–10.

[53] "Consolidating Joint Action," *Information Bulletin* (Toronto, companion publication to *World Marxist Review*), April 1985, pp. 6–9.

[54] *Pravda*, June 14, 1985, p. 5; and *Le Drapeau rouge* (Brussels), June 15–16, 1985, p. 6.

[55] Pierre Juquin was the person ousted. See *Le Point* (Paris), Feb. 24, 1985; and Paris Domestic Service in French, 1600 GMT, Feb. 10, 1985, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Western Europe* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS–WEU*), Feb. 11, 1985, p. K/4.

[56] Devlin, "The Nonruling Communist Parties," loc. cit., pp. 49–54; the quotation is from James Markham, loc. cit., p. 1.

The last of the three largest West European communist parties is the Italian Communist Party (PCI), which lost 50,000 members between 1984 and 1985.[58] More important, as a result of local elections in May 1985, the PCI no longer controls such large cities as Rome, Venice, Milan, Turin, and Parma.[59] Alessandro Natta, who succeeded the late Enrico Berlinguer as PCI leader the previous year, introduced the "leftist alternative" in an attempt to woo socialists. In mid-December, this line received the support of the PCI Central Committee, even though it probably will meet with as little success as the "historic compromise" approach of 1973–79.[60]

A situation not unlike that in Spain is brewing within the Communist Party of Finland (SKP). Parallel party organizations were formed by pro-Soviet hard-liners in 8 of 17 districts prior to the SKP's May 1985 congress. The majority prevailed, however, and the rebels were replaced by loyalists in the fall. The losers sent a delegation to Moscow toward the end of the year.[61]

The movement in Great Britain also split in mid-year. A hard-line minority was expelled and yet won control over the communist newspaper *Morning Star*.[62]

On Cyprus, the Progressive Party of the Working People (AKEL) saw itself drop from first to third place in December elections.[63] The Greek Communist Party fell below 10 percent of electoral support, thereby losing its parliamentary status as a "party." Nonetheless, it retained its 13 seats. In Portugal, the local party opted to run as part of the electoral Alliance for the Unity of the People.[64]

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[57] Devlin, "The Nonruling Communist Parties," loc. cit.

[58] Interview with PCI Secretariat member Ugo Pecchiolo in *L'Unità*, Nov. 1, 1985, pp. 1 and 16, on membership losses.

[59] E.J. Dionne, Jr., "Italy's Communists Have Lost Their Grip," *The New York Times*, Oct. 6, 1985.

[60] Vienna, ORF Teletext in German, 0901 GMT, Dec. 11, 1985, trans. in *FBIS–WEU*, Dec. 11, 1985, p. L/1.

[61] Devlin, "The Nonruling Communist Parties," loc. cit., pp. 52–53; see also "Statement by the Committee for SKP Organizations," *Pravda*, Dec. 18, 1985, p. 5. The Committee is the pro-Soviet minority.

[62] *Kabul New Times*, Dec. 24, 1985. Coverage given the NCPB in recent issues of the British communist weekly *New Worker* (London) suggests that the faction has also seized this publication.

[63] Special Correspondent in Athens, "Results of Elections," *Pravda*, Dec. 11, 1985, p. 5.

[64] Special Correspondent in Lisbon, "Success of Democratic Forces," ibid., Dec. 20, 1985, p. 5. Subsequently, the Portuguese CP supported a dissident socialist, and in the presidential run-off on February 16, 1986, it swung its support to the eventual winner, former Socialist Prime Minister Mário Soares. See *San Francisco Examiner and Chronicle*, Jan. 26, 1986, and *The New York Times*, Jan. 30, 1986.

Communist Fronts in 1985

Wallace Spaulding

THE BASIC functions performed by the major communist international front organizations during 1985 did not differ markedly from those performed for many years, although—as we shall see—there was a perceptible change in the face that these fronts attempted to present to the untutored observer. As with the counterpart organizations run by the Comintern between the wars, so today's front organizations exist to perform a basic task: to unite communists with persons of other political persuasions to support, and thereby lend strength and respectability to, Soviet foreign policy initiatives. The extent of Moscow's control is evidenced by the fronts' faithful adherence to the Soviet policy line, as well as by the nature of the member organizations that have withdrawn from the fronts over time (certain pro-Western groups after the cold war began, the Yugoslav affiliates following the Stalin-Tito break, and Chinese and Albanian representatives as the Sino-Soviet split developed).

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) is said to control these organizations through its International Department (ID),[1] presumably through those Soviet officials who serve as full-time members of the secretariat headquarters of the various fronts. This is the case for the World Peace Council (WPC), the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF), the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), the International Organization of Journalists (IOJ), the Christian Peace Conference (CPC), and the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL). Judging by past history, it is possible to infer that it may be the Soviet vice-presidents who exercise this control function in three other major front organizations: the International Union of Students (IUS), the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), and the World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW).[2]

In addition to Soviet control of each front through the ID and headquarters personnel, front activity appears to be coordinated by the WPC. This is a sensible arrangement, because the Soviets consider the "peace movement" to be the most important common action by "anti-imperialist" forces and the WPC to be the most important of the groups "based on common specific objectives of professional interests"—that is, of the front organizations.[3] A glance at the nearly 250 persons listed on the WPC's Presidential Committee reveals that they include, in addition to ID Deputy Chief Vitaliy Shaposhnikov, one or more of the top leaders of each of the other fronts just mentioned, except for the IADL (and the latter does have a representative in the approximately 1,500 members of the World Peace Council proper).[4]

Moscow may consider an additional two organizations to be priority front groups. The first is the Asian Buddhist Conference for Peace (ABCP), which—like the WFTU, WIDF, AAPSO, and WFDY, but none of the other international fronts—has two Presidential Committee members.[5] The other is the Havana-headquartered Organization of Solidarity with the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America (OSPAAL), which has a

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[1] US House of Representatives, *The CIA and the Media*, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1978, p. 574.

[2] See Richard F. Staar, Ed., *1981 Yearbook on International Communist Affairs* (hereafter, volumes in this series will be identified as *YICA* with the respective year of publication), Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1981, p. 455.

[3] *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 17, November 1972, p. 103, and No. 3, February 1974, p. 101; J.A. Emerson Vermaat, "Moscow Fronts and the European Peace Movement," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November-December 1982, pp. 43–56.

[4] See WPC, *List of Members, 1983–1986*, Helsinki, pp. 7–33, 167.

[5] Ibid., p. 31.

Colonel Spaulding, USAR (ret.) is a Washington-based observer of international communist affairs. The present article is a slightly revised version of Col. Spaulding's contribution to Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1986, *forthcoming from the Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, CA.*

Table 1: Major International Communist Front Organizations, 1985

Front	Year founded	Headquarters	Claimed membership	Affiliates	Countries
Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO)	1957	Cairo	Unknown	87	No data
Asian Buddhist Conference for Peace[a]	1970	Ulanbaatar	Unknown	15	12
Christian Peace Conference (CPC)	1958	Prague	Unknown	No data	ca. 80
International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL)	1946	Brussels	25,000	No data	ca. 80
International Organization of Journalists (IOJ)	1946	Prague	180,000	No data	120 plus
International Union of Students (IUS)	1946	Prague	10 million	120	112
Organization of Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America (OSPAAL)[b]	1966	Havana	Unknown	No data	No data
Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF)	1945	East Berlin	2 million	135	117
World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY)	1945	Budapest	150 million	ca. 270	123
World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW)	1946	London	500,000	ca. 40	70 plus
World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU)	1945	Prague	ca. 206 million	92	81
World Peace Council (WPC)	1950	Helsinki	Unknown	No data	142 plus

[a] *Asian Buddhist Conference for Peace*, n.p., n.d., pp. 1, 5.

[b] Union of International Organizations, *Yearbook of International Organizations 1985-86*, Munich, K.G. Saur, 1985, entry C3029.

representative on the WPC Presidential Committee;[6] more important, it presumably hosted the coordinating meeting of major front organizations that took place in Havana in October 1985.[7]

Such consultative meetings of the front groups have been held with increasing frequency in recent years. Beginning in 1982, they have been at least annual events, and there were two such meetings in both 1984 and 1985 (the WPC hosted the other 1985 conclave, in Helsinki in April).

DURING 1985, the top leaders of the major international front organizations maintained a "lower profile" (at least in their capacity as front leaders), than has been the case in recent years. This has been accompanied by a concurrent effort to demonstrate and publicize greater involvement in front activities by individuals not previously so notable—apparently an attempt to enhance the credibility of the line being promoted by the fronts. This could be seen in the WPC's "No to Star Wars" appeal, which seemed the primary theme of the fronts' activities everywhere except perhaps in Latin America (where, as we shall see, the debt issue was highlighted).[8] The appeal, which pictured US President Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense initiative (SDI) as offensive rather than defensive and as an attempt to extend the arms race into outer space, was published in the *International Herald Tribune* (Paris) of July 5, 1985. There it was signed by 36 personalities, only one of whom was openly identified with the WPC (its president, Romesh Chandra) and only seven more of whom were identified with national peace committees affiliated with the WPC. Yet, 13 signers were actually WPC vice-presidents (i.e., are among the top 40 members of the organization), 5 were additional members of the WPC Presidential Committee (see above), and 6 more were mere members of the WPC itself.[9] This left only 11 signatories with no known WPC affiliation. This effort to cast the undertaking as "independent," should not obscure the fact that the "No to Star Wars" appeal had earlier been published as a document coming out of the March meeting of the WPC Presidential Committee in Moscow. Yet, even that meeting had stressed participation "by representatives from a wide spectrum of peace and anti-war groupings."[10] The appeal had also been endorsed by a meeting of 13 major communist front organizations in Helsinki in April.[11]

The same playing down of traditional WPC leaders could be seen in preparations for the forthcoming "World Peace Congress Devoted to the International Year of Peace" (to be held in Copenhagen in October 1986). By the time of the June-July 1985 preparatory meeting (also in Copenhagen), it appeared that World Federalist President Hermod Lannung (Denmark) would be the congress chairman.[12] Lannung is a member of the Radical Liberal Party and a traditional pacifist with no direct WPC connection. He is, however, a vice-president of the International Liaison Forum of Peace Forces (ILFPF)—an extension of the WPC, whose president is also Romesh Chandra but which appears more innocuous by virtue of the involvement of relatively "clean" persons in its leadership.[13] The last congress sponsored by the WPC, the June 1983 Prague "World Congress for Peace and Life, Against Nuclear War," had as a co-chairman another ILFPF vice-president, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom Secretary General Edith Ballantyne (Canada); the other co-chairmen were Chandra and Czechoslovakia's vice-president on the WPC, Tomas Travnicek.[14] Although the casting of Lannung as sole chairman would seem to reflect an effort to mask more effectively Soviet/communist involvement, he told a newspaper reporter that the initiative for the Copenhagen congress had come from "rather East European–oriented" individuals.[15]

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[6] Ibid., p. 33.

[7] *CPC Information* (Prague), Nov. 1, 1985. See also *YICA 1985*, p. 388, for earlier mention of OSPAAL's possibly growing importance.

[8] See *New Age* (New Delhi), Mar. 31, 1985; and *Flashes from the Trade Unions* (Prague), Oct. 18, 1985.

[9] WPC, op. cit.; and *New Perspectives* (Helsinki), No. 6, 1985, p. 2.

[10] *Peace Courier* (Helsinki), No. 4, 1985, pp. 1, 10.

[11] See IUS, *Secretariat Reports* (Prague), No. 4, April 1985.

[12] *Morgenavisen / Jyllands-Posten* (Arhus), Dec. 12, 1985.

As for the prospects of any ILFPF deviation from the general Soviet line, note that the organization's January "Vienna Dialogue" gave appropriate emphasis to opposing the "militarization of space" and that the ILFPF sponsored an "International Dialogue" specifically devoted to this subject in Geneva in June. Moreover, at least three persons working with Lannung on preparations for the Copenhagen congress—Mikis Theodorakis (Greece), Luis Echeverria (Mexico), and Francisco da Costa Gomes (Portugal)—are WPC vice-presidents who had also signed the aforementioned "No to Star Wars" appeal.

The "International Peace Conference on the Pacific and Asian Regions," held in Sydney, October 24–27, 1985, was handled somewhat differently but still involved a masking process. It was technically sponsored by a "broad Australian Preparatory Committee" rather than by the WPC itself. The conference was presided over by Ernest Boatswain, and John Benson served as secretary; the fact that both are members of the WPC Presidential Committee was not mentioned.[16] Chandra, however, was cited as the WPC president when he made the conference's closing address.

Although there had been other regionally-oriented meetings involving the WPC from early September to early November 1985 (Buenos Aires, September 3–6; Guayaquil, October 21–23; and Athens, November 1–3), the Sydney session was the only one that had been mentioned in the WPC's *Peace Courier* as of the end of 1985. Perhaps it was the success of the meeting itself in enlisting "clean" participants—e.g., Deputy Prime Minister Lionel Bowen, Mayor of Sydney Douglas Sutherland, and Australian Council of Trade Unions President Simon Crean, that prompted the publicity. Or it may have been the perceived opportunity to build on the gains made in neighboring, "nuclear-free" New Zealand (which, like Australia, had a Labour government) that made it so important in Soviet eyes. The conference expressed "strong support for New Zealand's peace initiatives and the example and leadership the New Zealand government and people have given the world peace movement." Predictably, the Sydney gathering criticized "Star Wars" and applauded Soviet peace initiatives.[17]

In the trade union field, this same sort of masking took place during the year, with the WFTU ostensibly taking a back seat to "independent" actors. A February "Conference of Asian and Pacific Trade Union Centers on Development and the New International Economic Order"—key front themes for the Third World[18]—was hosted in New Delhi, not by the WFTU but by its Indian affiliate, the All-India Trade Union Congress (AITUC). Participation by affiliates of the socialist-oriented International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and Christian-oriented World Confederation of Labor (WCL) was stressed, even though representatives from the latter groups were submerged in a majority from WFTU–affiliated organizations.[19] Most significant in this respect, the new Asian and Oceanic Trade Unions Coordinating Committee set up by this meeting had as its president New Zealand Federation of Labor (NZFOL) President John Knox and ex–WFTU Secretary K.G. Srivastava (India) as its secretary (presumably the latter would be the "full-timer" at the committee's New Delhi headquarters.) Although Knox's union is an ICFTU affiliate, he personally served on the WPC in 1980–83 and was one of the currently non–WPC members who signed the 1985 "No Star Wars" appeal.[20] Also, WFTU Secretary General Ibrahim Zakariya (Sudan) served on the presidium of the February New Delhi conference. The meeting's advocacy of trade union "unity of action," opposition to transnational corporations, and support of "peace" were similar to positions adopted at the October meeting of the WFTU General Council in Moscow.

Consistent with the trend noted above, this latter meeting (the principal WFTU gathering in 1985) played up the participation of over 100 representatives from

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[13] See *YICA 1984*, p. 429.

[14] Prague Domestic Service in Czech, 1930 GMT, June 26, 1983, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Eastern Europe* (Washington, DC), June 27, 1983, p. D/10.

[15] *Information* (Copenhagen), Dec. 31, 1985.

[16] *Peace Courier*, No. 12, p. 6.

[17] Ibid.

[18] See *YICA 1985*, p. 389.

[19] See *Flashes from the Trade Unions*, Mar. 1, 1985.

[20] On his World Peace Council affiliation, see WPC, op. cit., p. 103.

Table 2: Meetings of Fronts in Havana in 1985 at which Debt Issue Arose

Meeting	Number of delegates	Sponsor	Date	Cuban host
Meeting on Situation of Women in Latin America and the Caribbean	200+	Continental Front of Women (FCM)	June 3–7	Vilma Espin de Castro
Fourth (org.) Congress, Federation of Latin American Journalists (FELAP)	150+	FELAP	July 5–8	Ernesto Vera
Latin American Trade Union Conference on the New International Economic Order and Foreign Debt	330±	Cuban Workers' Central (CTC)	July 15–18	Roberto Veiga
Meeting on the External Debt of Latin America and the Caribbean (for political and other "personalities")	1,200±	Cuban Foreign Ministry	July 30–August 3	Carlos Rafael Rodríguez
Latin American Youth and Student Dialogue on the Foreign Debt	600±	Cuban youth organizations	September 11–14	Carlos Lage
Latin American Press Forum on the Regional Financial Crisis	120±	Prensa Latina	September 17–19	Pedro Margolles

SOURCE: *Granma* (Havana), Weekly edition in English, June 16, July 14 and 28, Aug. 11, and Sept. 22 and 29, 1985.

non–WFTU–affiliated organizations.[21] Similarly, a new International Mineworkers Organization (IMO) was set up in September with non–WFTU Arthur Scargill (UK) as president and ex–WFTU official Alain Simon (France) as secretary general. The latter had been secretary general of the now defunct WFTU Trade Union International of Miners and Energy Workers (whose unions have now gone into the IMO). A similar "balance" was shown at the vice-presidential level, with the USSR's Mikhail Sibrenyy "offsetting" Australia's Barry Swain. Moreover, Scargill and Swain themselves can be characterized as confirmed leftists.[22] Thus, the widely touted blending of pro-Soviet and pro-Western groups in this nearly 4-million-strong Paris-centered organization appears to be heavily weighted toward the East. One might expect the WFTU's trade union internationals in fields other than mining to seek comparable "trade union unity" if they can find enough radical unions within the functional internationals of the ICFTU and/or WCL.

In retrospect, the practice of combining a radical but non–WFTU president with a secretary or "working head" who has a past history of WFTU involvement appears to have been initiated in 1982, when the International Trade Union Committee for Peace and Disarmament (the "Dublin Committee") was established. The Dublin Committee's president is James Milne, who, though president of the ICFTU–affiliated Scottish Trades Union Congress, has—like Knox and Scargill—been involved in leftist affairs; he became a member of the World Peace Council in 1983 and was one of the "non–WFTU" members who attended the Moscow meeting of the WFTU's General Council in 1985.[23] Dublin Committee Secretary Brian Price (UK) apparently continued on as a WFTU official, making the situation only slightly different from the two cases just cited. In light of all this, it is not surprising that the Dublin Committee held an Asian regional session in New Delhi just after the aforementioned February Conference of Trade Union Centers in that same city (indeed, many of the same persons attended both meetings).[24]

AGAIN, the major worldwide communist fronts ostensibly took a back seat in a series of six conferences in Havana in the June–September 1985 period which were largely focused on opposition to Latin American repayment of accumulated foreign debts (see Table 2). As enunciated by Fidel Castro, this regional variant of the NIEO theme argued that Latin American nations could not possibly pay all their foreign debts, that they should not make any more payments of principal or interest, that they should form a "united front" on this issue and coordinate their economic policies in other ways, and that the creditor nations should reimburse their respective banks for the nonpayments from monies saved by a 10–12 percent cut in defense expenditures. That Castro very much took the lead here does not appear to be much of a "masking," until one remembers that the audience is a Latin American one and that the Cuban leader is likely to have more credibility and respect from this group than would some official of a worldwide front organization widely known to be dominated by the Soviets.

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[21] See *Flashes from the Trade Unions*, Oct. 18, 1985.

[22] See, e.g., *The Washington Times*, Sept. 24, 1985. This source noted that Scargill had taken his National Union of Miners out of the Western-oriented Mineworkers International Organization in 1983.

[23] WPC, op. cit., p. 85; and *Morning Star* (London), Oct. 8, 1985. *The Times* (London), Apr. 15, 1975, characterized Milne as an outright communist.

[24] *Flashes from the Trade Unions*, Mar. 8, 1985.

The tone for the whole effort was set in Castro's March 21 interview with Mexico City daily *Excelsior*. The salience of the interview is suggested by the broad play it received in pro-Moscow media.[25] The six Havana conferences were openly dominated by Castro, who attended most of their sessions, formally addressed them, gave press conferences in connection with them, and informally mixed with their delegates during session recesses. Even though the first two of these conferences had not been called primarily to discuss the debt issue, Castro's presence insured that the debt issue would receive paramount attention.[26]

Several additional points should be noted here. First, Vilma Espin de Castro, Ernesto Vera, and Roberto Veiga—vice-presidents of the WIDF, the IOJ, and the WFTU, respectively—hosted the first three of these meetings in their capacities as leaders of the Cuban national affiliates of the pertinent international fronts.[27] Similarly, although three session chairman of the trade union meeting were WFTU officers and two chairman of the "personalities" meeting were associated with the WPC, they were identified in their national capacities only.[28] Also, Cuba's IOJ vice-president Vera participated in the press forum only in his national capacity.[29] It was only in the youth meeting that session chairmen were publicized in their international front capacities—IUS Secretary Victor Paredes (El Salvador) and WFDY Vice-president Jore Prigoshin (Argentina).[30] On the other hand, those associated with moderate or even conservative organizations were also given prominent roles, and their political orientation was emphasized (e.g., Workers Central of Venezuela leader César Olarte at the trade union meeting, ex-President of Colombia Alfonso Lopez Michelson at the "personalities" one, and Jorge Cahve of Venezuela's *Elite* magazine at the press forum).[31] And certain categories of persons were sometimes played up to give the meeting the appearance of "balance," most notably Christian and Indian leaders at the youth conference.[32] All in all, the series of Havana meetings had a rather broad-based appearance (an appearance that approximated reality only in the case of the "personalities" meeting).[33]

Castro was notably polite toward and even complimentary of those at these conferences who propounded solutions to the debt problem that contrasted with his own (most dramatically in the case of the views expressed by Ecuadorean presidential representative Julio Emanuel at the "personalities" meeting). Morever, Castro's government has been quite correct and conventional in its dealings with Cuba's Western creditors.[34] The Soviet Union, too, while publicizing Castro's debt solutions and crediting the Havana conferences with "arousing enormous interest" and Castro with influencing Third World leaders on the subject,[35] nevertheless also gave favorable publicity to the efforts of Latin American governments to settle the debt problem along less radical lines.[36]

Reaction of the international communist fronts varied. The WFTU endorsed the "Havana Appeal" that emerged from the trade union meeting: this called for annulment, *or* a moratorium, *or* immediate suspension of payments, *or* indefinite postponement of payment—i.e., essentially a "no-payment-now" solution that was consonant with Castro's proposal and was also supported on October 23 by a coordinated day of Latin American trade union rallies, demonstrations, and strikes.[37] By contrast, the IOJ Presidium at its meeting in July in Quito (the principal gathering of the organization during the year) did little more than suggest that individual debtor nations renegotiate their loans, despite the gathering's Latin venue.[38] On balance, it would appear that the whole effort on the debt issue from the perspective of the communist international fronts was directed more toward mobilizing Latin American opinion against the United States, the "North" in general, and the allegedly US international financial tools (the World

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[25] Moscow TASS, Mar. 28, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC), Mar. 29, 1985, pp. K/1–2; *Information Bulletin* (Prague), No. 13, 1985, and *New Perspectives*, No. 4, 1985. The subject also was taken up by meetings in June of various other Latin American regional fronts—The Trade Union Unity Committee of Central America in Managua, The Latin American Continental Students Organization in Bogota and Santiago de Cuba, and The Latin American University Professionals in Quito (The latter two organizations are represented on the WPC directly, while the first is represented thereon indirectly through its parent organization, the Permanent Congress of Trade Union Unity of Latin America [CPUSTAL]). See WPC, op. cit., p. 168; and *New Perspectives*, No. 6, 1985, p. 2. The debt issue was also mentioned, though not centrally, in a statement issued in Havana on May 31 by the leaders of two other regional fronts, AAPSO and OSPAAL (again, both represented on the WPC).

[26] See *Granma* (Havana—daily in Spanish), June 6, 1985, and *Granma* (Havana—weekly in English), July 14, 1985.

[27] *Granma* (weekly), June 16 and July 14 and 28, 1985; *YICA 1984*, pp. 429, 430, 432.

[28] Ibid., July 28, 1985; 10th WFTU Congress, *Appeal and Resolutions*, n.p., n.d., pp. 50–57; *Granma* (daily), Aug. 4, 1985, and WPC, op. cit., pp. 10–57.

[29] *Granma* (daily), Sept. 18, 1985.

[30] Ibid., Sept. 14 and 16, 1985.

[31] *Granma* (weekly), July 28, Aug. 11, and Sept. 29, 1985.

[32] *Granma* (daily), Sept. 13, 14, and 16, 1985.

[33] *Granma* (weekly), Aug. 11, 1985.

[34] *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Aug. 16, 1985.

[35] *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Nov. 21, 1985.

[36] See, e.g., *New Times* (Moscow), No. 41, October 1985, pp. 20–24.

[37] *Granma* (weekly), July 28; *Granma* (daily), Oct. 18, 1985; *Flashes from the Trade Unions*, Nov. 8, 1985.

[38] *The Democratic Journalist* (Prague), September 1985, p. 5.

Bank and the International Monetary Fund), than it was toward reaching any specific practical solution to the problem.

THE FRONTS experienced some setbacks in their efforts during 1985. For example, Soviet Peace Committee Secretary Grigory Lokshin described the "harm" done the peace movement by the "lying and damaging concept of 'equal responsibility of both super-powers' for the arms race and for the threat of war," the linking of the peace movement to the campaign for civil liberties in Eastern Europe, and the recognition of the "unofficial" peace movements of that area, which stressed both these themes.[39] He was referring to the line pursued by European Nuclear Disarmament (END). Indeed, it was END's decision to invite "unofficial" peace movements to its Fourth Convention in July at Amsterdam that was cited as the reason for the refusal of the official Soviet-bloc peace organizations to attend the meeting.[40] Nevertheless, the USSR was doubtless gratified that END announced at Amsterdam that—despite having failed to prevent the emplacement of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe—it would try to prevail upon the nations of that area to refrain from cooperating in the "Star Wars" program.[41]

The biggest front meeting of the year—the 12th World Youth Festival, which met in Moscow from July 27 through August 3—had mixed results. Although admittedly initiated by the WFDY and IUS, the huge gathering (some 20,000 foreign and 2,000 Soviet delegates attended) tried to project the image of a pluralistic gathering manifesting broad-based consensus in support of Soviets views.[42] But, both the Yugoslavs and the Democratic Youth Committee of Europe openly criticized the Soviets for dominating the Festival's organization.[43] Also, many Western delegates were critical of the fact that they had either been prevented from bringing literature into the USSR or had been kept from distributing what they had managed to bring in,[44] despite prior assurances from Festival authorities.[45] Then, there were objections by various national groups: for example, West Germans complained over an initial decision to recognize a separate West Berlin delegation, again contrary to agreement.[46]

Most important, there was anger that Soviet interpreters omitted any criticisms of Soviet policies in their translations of foreign delegates' speeches.[47] The greatest furor in this regard arose over excision of criticism of Soviet policy in Afghanistan from translation of the statement by Swedish delegate Katrina Larsson.[48] Indeed, the Afghan issue caused trouble across the board: reportedly, some 60 persons (even including communists) from Norway, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Italy, as well as Sweden, criticized the Soviets on this point.[49]

The Soviet press gave the Festival only mild praise, stating merely that the gathering had furthered the unification of youth against the "aggressive policies of imperialism."[50] More significant, at the November 2 plenum of the Central Committee of the Komsomol (the Soviet communist youth organization), one of the Komsomol secretaries complained about the ineffectiveness manifested by "certain" Soviet youth in debating with their foreign contemporaries at the Festival, and specifically alluded to the Afghan issue in this context. Some observers cite the Festival events as contributing to the subsequent dismissal of Aleksandr Kolyakin as Komsomol secretary for ideology.[51]

SEVERAL developments with regard to the leadership of the major fronts should be noted. In the WPC, where Romesh Chandra (India) remains president, there has been no replacement named for Frank Swift, who gave up his post as executive secretary to return to union work in the United Kingdom. New WPC vice-presidents noted during 1985 were: Orlando Fundora Lopez (Cuba) and Rubens Iscaro (Argentina); new secretaries identified were Kvetoslav Ondraček (Czechoslovakia) and Djanghir Atamali (a second one from the USSR).[52]

Sandor Gaspar (Hungary) and Ibrahim Zakariya (Sudan) continue as president and secretary general, respectively, of the WFTU. Freda Brown (Australia) and Mirjam Vire-Tuominen (Finland) remain president and secretary general, respectively, of the WIDF.

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[39] See *Today's Peace Movement—A Few Problems and Perspectives*, Vienna, International Institute for Peace, 1985, pp. 23–26.

[40] See statement by Soviet WPC Secretary Tair Tairov in *Disarmament Campaigns* (The Hague), July-August 1985, p. 8. On similar difficulties presented the Soviet-bloc delegates at END's 1984 convention in Perugia, see *YICA 1985*, p. 389.

[41] *The Times* (London), July 8, 1985.

[42] *Political Affairs* (New York), October 1985, p. 16; *Novosti*, July 19, 1985, cited in Sergei Voronitsyn, "The Moscow Youth Festival: A Summing Up," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, *Radio Liberty Research* (Munich), No. RL 282/85, Sept. 2, 1985.

[43] Voronitsyn, loc. cit.

[44] Elizabeth Teague, "Post-Mortem on Youth Festival Reveals Flaws in Komsomol's Ideological Work," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, *Radio Liberty Research*, No. RL 376/85, Nov. 12, 1985.

[45] BBC Caris Report No. 99/85, June 24, 1985.

[46] *Soviet Analyst* (Richmond, England), Aug. 7, 1985, p. 2.

[47] Teague, loc. cit.

[48] Stockholm International Service in Swedish, 1000 GMT, July 30, 1985, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Western Europe* (Washington, DC), July 31, 1985, p. P/1; and *Daily Gleaner* (Kingston), Aug. 25, 1985.

[49] *Daily Gleaner*, Aug. 25, 1985; and Teague, loc. cit.

[50] Voronitsyn, loc. cit.

[51] Teague, loc. cit.

[52] *New Perspectives*, No. 5, 1985, pp. 1–2.

The WFDY continues under the leadership of President Walid Masri (Lebanon) and Secretary General Vilmos Cserveny (Hungary), but has new vice-presidents Cesar Navarro (Chile), Abd-al-Basit Musa (Sudan), and Francisco Moya (Cuba) and new secretaries Vladimir Johannes (Czechoslovakia) and Henrik Andersen (Denmark). Another WFDY Secretary Joe Sims (US) has apparently left his position, and no replacement has been identified.[53]

Ahmad Hamrush (Egypt) was not confirmed in the AAPSO presidency,[54] and Nuri Abd-al-Razzaq Husayn (Iraq) is now listed as acting president as well as secretary general of that organization.[55] Abd-al-Muhammad Wahhab al-Zintani (Libya) and Vital Balla (Congo) were newly noted as AAPSO vice-presidents during 1985.[56] The IUS, led by President Miroslav Stepan (Czechoslovakia) and Secretary General Georgios Michaelides (Cyprus), has a new Soviet vice-president in the person of Sergey Chelnikov and two newly noted secretaries, Philip Gardner (US) and Victor Paredes (El Salvador).[57] WFSW Secretary General John Dutton died during the year and was replaced by Reginald Bird (UK). O.M. Nefedov is the new Soviet vice-president of WFSW, while Jean-Marie Legay (France) remains its president.[58] President Kaarle Nordenstreng (Finland) and Secretary General Jiři Kubka (Czechoslovakia) still hold the top jobs in the IOJ, while Lodongiin Tudev (Mongolia) and Manuel Tome (Mozambique) are new IOJ vice-presidents.[59]

The (Sixth) All-Christian Peace Assembly, which met in July, left in place the three top leaders of the CPC—President Karoly Toth (Hungary); the Continuation Committee chairman, Metropolitan Filaret of Kiev and Galicia (USSR); and Secretary General Lubomir Mirejovskiy (Czechoslovakia). Georgiy Goncharev (USSR) and Christoph Schmauch (US) joined incumbent Alfred Christian Rosa (Sri Lanka) as deputy secretaries general of the CPC.[60] New CPC vice-presidents noted since the Assembly were: Metropolitan Pankriti of Stan Zagora (Bulgaria), Dr. Alexey Buyevskiy (USSR), Hans Joaquim Oeffler (FRG), and Alice Wimer (US).[61]

The IADL remains under the leadership of President Joe Nordmann (France) and Secretary General Amar Bentumi (Algeria), while the Ulan Bator–based ABCP is led by its President, Khambo Lama Khatkhuu Gaadan and its Secretary General, Prof. Ch. Judger, both of Mongolia.[62] Susumu Ozaki (Japan) apparently remains president of OSPAAL, and Rene Anillo Capote (Cuba) is its new secretary general.[63]

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[53] *WFDY News* (Budapest), No. 10, 1985, p. 4.

[54] See *YICA, 1985*, p. 390.

[55] Domestic Service in Anharic (Addis Ababa), 1900 GMT, Oct. 11, 1985, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Middle East & Africa* (Washington, DC), Oct. 16, 1985, p. R/1.

[56] *Pravda* (Moscow), Jan. 21, 1985.

[57] *World Trade Union Movement* (Prague), No. 11, 1985, p. 53; *World Student News* (Prague), No. 1, 1985, p. 27; and *Granma* (daily), Sept. 14, 1985.

[58] *Flashes from the Trade Unions*, May 17 and Aug. 30, 1985; and *Népszabádsag* (Budapest), Nov. 5, 1985.

[59] *The Democratic Journalist*, Nos. 7-8, 1985, p. 2.

[60] *CPC Information*, July 12, 1985.

[61] Ibid., Sept. 2, Oct. 2, and Nov. 19, 1985.

[62] WPC, op. cit., p. 105.

[63] *New Perspectives*, No. 6, 1985, p. 2.

Books

East German Quest for Legitimacy

Angela E. Stent

MARTIN McCAULEY. *The German Democratic Republic Since 1945*. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1983.

DAVID CHILDS. *The GDR: Moscow's German Ally*. London, Allen and Unwin, 1983.

KLAUS VON BEYME and HARTMUT ZIMMERMANN, Eds. *Policymaking in the GDR*. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1984.

EBERHARD SCHULZ, HANS-ADOLF JACOBSEN, GERT LEPTIN and ULRICH SCHEUNER, Eds. *GDR Foreign Policy*. Edited and introduced by Arthur Stahnke. Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 1982.

THE German Democratic Republic (GDR) is a state on the dividing line between East and West, whose political development over the past 15 years has provided a barometer of the changing climate in East-West relations. Until recently, however, it was explored almost exclusively in studies by experts from West Germany, while being virtually ignored by scholars writing in English. In the United States, East Germany was a social science orphan with no field willing to accept it as part of its own. For scholars of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, it seemed too Western; for experts on Germany it was too much of a Soviet clone. Suspended between Bonn and Moscow, isolated for two decades, dismissed by some as a non-state, the GDR received scant or biased attention.

The picture has changed considerably in recent years. Several books written in English or translated from German into English have appeared, deepening our knowledge of the GDR and placing it in a comparative political perspective. The four volumes reviewed in this essay are representative of this trend. They provide a factual and analytical framework for understanding East Germany's domestic and foreign policy, and they offer the mainstream consensus on the GDR. Two are written by Englishmen—Martin McCauley and David Childs; the other two, the von Beyme/Zimmermann and the Schulz et al. volumes, are collective studies by leading West German experts in the field that were translated into English. Unfortunately, the German works, particularly the von Beyme/Zimmermann volume, suffer from careless editing[1] and uneven translation, with the text at times reading more like German than English. Nonetheless, these two books offer valuable insights into the society and politics of the GDR, provided that the reader is willing to tackle their somewhat indigestible prose.

McCauley's work is a historical treatment of four decades of social and political developments in the GDR, with a useful 70-page chronology at the end. Although its narrative is interspersed with some illuminating analytical points, any overall interpretation of GDR history seems to be left to the reader. David Childs's book combines factual history with analysis and deals well with the major issues of GDR politics and society. His book is not only livelier than McCauley's, but also does a better job of conveying the flavor of life in the GDR; in fact, it is the best of the four in capturing the varied textures and shadings of contemporary East German life.

The von Beyme/Zimmermann volume (which has an excellent 80-page bibliography) provides little historical context. In contrast to the volumes by the English authors,

Angela E. Stent is Associate Professor of Government and Director of the Russian Area Studies Program at Georgetown University (Washington, DC). She has written numerous articles on Soviet policy toward West and East Germany. She is the author of From Embargo to Ostpolitik: The Political Economy of West German–Soviet Relations, 1955–80 *(1981), and the editor of* Economic Relations with the Soviet Union: American and West German Perspectives *(1985). She is currently working on a book about Soviet policy toward the Western Alliance since 1969.*

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[1] For example, the affiliation of Dr. Jacobsen is identified as the Foundation for Science and Politics in Ebenhausen, Saarland. Ebenhausen is in Bavaria.

which deal solely with East Germany, *Policymaking in the GDR* analyzes that country from a comparative perspective. It tries to apply Western social science theories—for instance, systems theory, cybernetics, and Weberian sociology—to the GDR. As a result of this comparative approach, the von Beyme/Zimmermann volume highlights different aspects of East German society than those emphasized by McCauley and Childs. Class, economic decision-making, and "output policy" are discussed in terms that stress the similarities between East Germany and other advanced industrial societies rather than the uniqueness of the GDR. Finally, the Schulz et al. volume, an abridged version of a much larger book in German,[2] offers a comprehensive treatment of East German foreign policy, and constitutes the best English-language account on the subject to date.

All the books under review shed light on three central issues in the study of East Germany: the regime's struggle for legitimacy and the degree to which the 1970's period of détente has helped to legitimize the East German government at home and abroad; the extent to which East Germany has been able to establish a viable national identity in the same period; and the impact of détente on East Berlin's relations with Moscow and Bonn.

CENTRAL TO ALL these studies is the issue of GDR legitimacy. While many Western scholars question to what degree East European populations recognize the legitimacy of their own governments, the consensus is that a historic consciousness of nationhood by Poles, Czechs, or Hungarians endows their respective governments with some degree of legitimacy. East Germany, however, is different in this regard. As McCauley notes, "While the power of the state is great, the authority or legitimacy is low" (p. 4). One reason for this is the fact that East Germans do not have a clear historical legacy. While there certainly is a *German* history, there is no distinct *East* German past prior to World War II.

But how could the East German government have expected to secure legitimacy, given the fact that until 1974 the East German constitution included a commitment to the reunification of the two Germanies? Until that time, in fact, the ruling Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) officially regarded East Germany's separate status as temporary. As a result, the SED's search for acceptance from the East German population was burdened by contradictions; at the same time, the SED's search for international recognition was complicated by the West's ostracism of the GDR. From the start, therefore, the regime faced a two-front struggle for recognition, one at home and the other abroad.

In their studies, Childs and McCauley divide the history of the East German struggle for legitimacy[3] prior to the inter-German rapprochement of December 1972 and Bonn's recognition of the East Berlin regime into three major periods. The first, from 1945 to 1953, was marked by the founding of the state, the forced merger of the East German Social Democratic (SPD) and Communist (KPD) parties into the ruling SED,[4] and Soviet economic exploitation of the GDR (whereby East Germany paid substantial reparations to the USSR and thereby lost much of its remaining industrial capacity). The second, from 1953 to 1961, saw the beginning of East Germany's economic recovery and the SED's consolidation of power.[5] During the third period, from 1961 to

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[2] Eberhard Schulz, Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Gert Leptin, and Ulrich Scheuner, Eds., *Drei Jahrzehnte Aussenpolitik der DDR* (Three Decades of the GDR's Foreign Policy), Munich-Vienna, R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1979.

[3] The GDR's *Legitimationsdefizit* can be traced to its ambiguous origins. In 1945, none of the victors had a plan for Germany. The initial arrangement of dividing Germany into zones was considered a temporary solution. But Germany quickly became both a cause and a victim of the Cold War. Before the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, and France were ready to contemplate seriously the future of Germany, accommodation between Stalin and the West had become impossible and Germany remained divided. Invoking a simplistic, revisionist explanation, McCauley claims that Western fears of Soviet expansionism at that time were "greatly exaggerated" and that containment "promised to provide the overseas markets necessary for the expansion of the US economy" (p. 33). He neglects entirely Stalin's role in bringing about the Cold War and the extent to which his imposition of pro-Soviet regimes on a reluctant Eastern Europe was perceived by the United States government to be a breach of the Yalta agreement that could have presaged further Soviet expansion into Western Europe. McCauley asserts that "the Soviets would have preferred to reach an agreement with the Allies on an all-German reunification" (*The German Democratic Republic Since 1945*, p. 44). His assertion is not supported by evidence. David Childs's conclusion that "few in Washington, London or Paris were enthralled by the prospect of German reunification," is probably more correct (*The GDR: Moscow's German Ally*, p. 45). One might add Moscow to that list. Despite all that the Soviets wrote and said, the evidence indicates that the Soviets too did not favor a reunified Germany, even one under their control—at least so Anastas Mikoyan was to claim later on. See Hubert Ripka, *Czechoslovakia Enslaved*, London, Victor Gollancz, 1950, p. 134.

[4] At the time of the merger (1946), the SED was still a mass party, with more Social Democrats in its ranks than Communists. After Tito's expulsion from the Cominform in 1948, the SED became a Soviet-type party, and those still professing social democratic values were purged.

[5] During this period the exploitative Stalinist policy of reparations was terminated and the GDR's economy began to revive. Walter Ulbricht, whom McCauley describes as a "reluctant de-Stalinizer" began to consolidate the power and authority of the SED. Yet his ability to create a viable state was constantly challenged by the existence of an open frontier in Berlin, through which 2.7 million East Germans "voted with their feet" for West Germany between 1949 and August 13, 1961, the date marking the construction of the Berlin Wall. The Wall stemmed the flood of refugees to the West and ultimately enabled the SED to stabilize its rule. It began to build a viable nation-state, a process facilitated by its stronger economic ties with West Germany.

1971, the East German "economic miracle" was brought about as the country's per capita GNP rose to the ninth highest in the world.[6]

The East German leadership employed various means in its pursuit of domestic legitimacy before 1972. Of central importance was the quite successful effort to improve the material quality of life, thus demonstrating the state's ability to meet the basic economic needs of its citizens. The GDR now has the highest standard of living of any CEMA (Council of Economic Mutual Assistance) country. McCauley and Childs each also stress the importance of the GDR's success in international sporting events as a way of advertising the superiority of the East German government and the socialist system, as well as of gaining international recognition.

Other efforts of the German Democratic Republic to win domestic recognition met with less success. The regime sought, for example, to develop a distinct socialist culture of its own, but failed in its efforts to mobilize full support from the intelligentsia, in particular that of the key artists and writers. Unlike the majority of the leading political figures in the GDR (who spent the war years in the USSR), most of these intellectuals had emigrated to the West during the Nazi period. Upon their return, they were unwilling to accept the norms of Soviet socialist realism, even though many of them professed to be communists. For a number of years they maintained an uneasy coexistence with the regime, but ultimately refused to accept the party's various political restrictions on art and literature. The SED also tried to increase popular approval through a reconciliation with the churches, or through the formation of four non-communist parties which, though subordinate to the SED, were to provide a limited legal forum for alternative activity.

THE BASIC TREATY (*Grundvertrag*) between the two Germanies in 1972[7] redefined the nature of East Germany's quest for legitimacy and posed new challenges. While recognition by the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) considerably bolstered the legitimacy of the GDR, it also brought with it the danger of greater West German penetration of East German society. Perhaps the most vivid example has been the "nightly emigration" to the West that takes place in the majority of East German living rooms where at least 85 percent of the country's citizens watch West German television. Not only can they follow the exploits of the Ewing family on *Dallas*, they can also see West German news and political programs that contradict the official government version of political reality.

In other respects as well, the rapprochement with West Germany represents a potential challenge to the stability of the regime. East Germans are allowed to hold West German currency and use it to shop in the hard-currency Intershops. However, one's ability to acquire FRG marks does not depend on one's productivity at work; it is solely a function of having relatives in the Federal Republic. As Childs notes, this means that the GDR is "divided into two classes—those with, and those without West marks" (p. 146). This calls into question the guiding principle of developed socialism: "from each according to his ability, to each according to his work."

The rapprochement with West Germany has challenged the SED in still other areas, perhaps most notably in the party's policy on religion, since it sanctions contacts between the churches of East and West Germany. As Childs shows, the Federal Republic now indirectly finances a variety of hospitals, old-age homes, and kindergartens in the GDR through monies given by the West German Catholic and Protestant churches to their counterparts in the East (p. 93). This has helped to legitimize religious worship more than the SED might have wanted. Moreover, contacts between West German and East German religious groups that criticize the arms race, have also facilitated the growth of an independent East German peace movement critical of both the USSR and the United States.

The GDR's response to the dangers arising from West German influence has been an intensification of the policy of *Abgrenzung* (inadequately translated as "demarcation").[8] In practice, this has meant an effort to insulate the East German population from the potentially destabilizing effects of closer government-to-government relations between the two Germanies. Members of the army (NVA) have been forbidden to have contacts with West Germans. Strenuous attempts have been made to distinguish East German from West German society by contrasting the difficulties of life under competitive capitalism with its high unemployment with that of *gemütlich* socialism with full employment. A special television program called "The Black Channel" has been created to counter the claims of some West German programs (Childs, p. 240).

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[6] The GDR has virtually copied the Soviet economic system; it even has its own version of the Kosygin reforms (the New Economic System). During the 1960's and 1970's East Germany's economic performance was more impressive than that of the USSR, although this impressive performance has not been fully reflected in the level of the standard of living.

[7] The Basic Treaty between East and West Germany was signed in November 1972. The treaty normalized intra-German relations. It neither contained Bonn's formulation of "one German nation" nor referred specifically to the GDR's sovereignty. The West Germans had demanded "special relations" with East Germany, but the GDR insisted that their relations be those between two independent states. Finally, a compromise was reached whereby the FRG did not recognize the GDR in international law, adopting the formula of "two states in one nation" and the two countries agreed to exchange "permanent representatives" instead of ambassadors. Both countries applied to join the United Nations and were accepted in 1973.

[8] The policy of *Abgrenzung* vis-à-vis West Germany dates back to the late 1960's when it was first introduced by Walter Ulbricht in the hopes of establishing a separate East German identity by stressing the ideological differences between the two Germanies. (See Childs, *The GDR: Moscow's German Ally*, pp. 90–91.) In 1971, after relations with West Germany were normalized, East Germany's Erich Honecker intensified this policy.

Has *Abgrenzung* been a success? The answer is unclear. As all the authors stress, the East German system today is stronger than it was before 1972 and has gained greater popular acceptance. It has dealt with the West German challenge by forcing "undesirable" critics like the popular singer Wolf Biermann and the philosopher Rudolf Bahro to move to the Federal Republic, and it has also allowed increasing numbers of disgruntled citizens—35,000 in 1984—to emigrate to the West.[9] There has also been an increase in cultural repression, as is well documented by McCauley (p. 186) and by Irma Hanke (p. 233) in the von Beyme/Zimmermann volume. To some extent, then, *Abgrenzung* has worked. The GDR has not been undermined by the inter-German rapprochement. Indeed, some would argue that it has been strengthened, a point to which I shall return later. Arthur Stahnke is most optimistic in this regard, criticizing in his introduction to *GDR Foreign Policy* some of the other contributors for underestimating "the level of popular support for the GDR political system" (p. ix).

WHILE VARIOUS AUTHORS may disagree about just how much domestic legitimacy the GDR has secured for itself, they all seem to agree that the regime has gained significant international acceptance since 1972, and that this in turn has had some impact on the domestic situation. Prior to West Germany's recognition of East Germany, the only states that recognized the GDR were the other members of the Warsaw Pact and a few Third World countries. Such limited recognition was the result of the Hallstein Doctrine (in effect from 1957 to 1967),[10] which claimed that the Federal Republic of Germany was the sole representative of the German nation. Under the terms of this doctrine, any state that recognized East Germany could not have diplomatic relations with the FRG. Forced to choose between West and East Germany, most nations chose the former. The GDR retaliated with its own Ulbricht Doctrine, claiming that the GDR would not establish diplomatic relations with any nation that recognized the Federal Republic. This tactic proved to be of little consequence, however, and the GDR remained an international outcast for some 23 years.

As Hanns-Dieter Jacobsen demonstrates in his contribution to the von Beyme/Zimmermann volume, East Germany used foreign trade in its battle against the Hallstein Doctrine during its years out in the cold. In the 1950's and 1960's, the country's foreign economic relations were primarily oriented toward gaining political acceptance—an objective that was best served by creating bilateral ties that fell just short of full diplomatic recognition. Ultimately, however, the two functions of foreign trade—"to achieve international recognition (this entailed a readiness to use economic resources which were urgently needed at home) and to support the production process in the GDR"—came into conflict (p. 151).

Ironically, the Basic Treaty of 1972, while enabling the GDR to achieve a greater international stature, deprived it of the one form of legitimacy it had sought most: de jure recognition as a separate state by the Federal Republic. As Melvin Croan (in Schulz et al., p. 209) and Gerhard Wettig (in von Beyme/Zimmermann, p. 283) stress, the *Grundvertrag* between East and West Germany represented a compromise, a modus vivendi, with an agreement to disagree on some issues.[11] The same was true of the 1971 Four-Power Berlin agreement,[12] as Hans-Heinrich Mahnke points out in his comprehensive chapter on the legal aspects of the Berlin issue in the Schulz et al. volume (pp. 87–93). For East Germany, West Germany is a foreign country. For West Germany, however, East Germany is a separate state within the same nation. Although the GDR derives significant economic benefits from this special position, politically its status has been a thorn in the side of the regime, a constant reminder that Bonn refuses to treat the GDR as an equal nation-state.

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[9] The German Information Service, New York.

[10] The *Alleinvertretungsanspruch*—the claim of West Germany to speak for the whole of Germany because East Germany was an illegitimate state—was concretely implemented in the form of the Hallstein Doctrine. It was first enunciated by West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer (1949–63).

[11] The treaty normalized intra-German relations on the basis of the status quo and the signatories agreed to disagree on the question of the GDR's sovereignty. See also fn. 7.

[12] The Four Power Berlin Agreement was initialed on September 3, 1971. The main points of the agreement were that, in the interests of reducing tension in Berlin, the USSR would ensure unimpeded access to Berlin from West Germany, and West Berlin could maintain and develop its special ties with the FRG, although West Berlin was not a constituent part of West Germany. The Four Powers agreed to disagree on the question of West Berlin's status, because the Western powers maintained that the agreement should cover the whole city, whereas the USSR claimed it could apply only to West Berlin. For the text of the agreement see Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, *Die Berlin Regelung* (The Berlin Regulation), 1971, pp. 157–71.

Nevertheless, recognition by the Federal Republic did enable the GDR to gain international diplomatic acceptance. FRG de facto recognition meant that other states could now establish relations with both Germanies. As Eberhard Schulz notes in his chapter in *GDR Foreign Policy*, "conducting an active and convincing foreign policy" has enabled the GDR regime to increase its domestic legitimacy (p. 20). Since 1972, the GDR has gained membership in the United Nations, established diplomatic ties with almost all nations, actively pursued economic, political, and cultural ties with Western Europe, and greatly increased its presence in the Third World, providing logistical and technical assistance to those countries in which the USSR is heavily involved.

One significant aspect of the GDR's quest for international legitimacy not addressed in these books is the question of East German ties with the United States. But this has only recently become an issue; until a few years ago, the United States paid very little attention to the GDR. This was due in part to the GDR's close relationship to the Soviet Union and a US perception of it as the most loyal Soviet ally carrying out Moscow's bidding around the world and fencing in its population with the most heavily fortified border in the world. It was also due in part to deference to the Federal Republic, which took responsibility for conducting relations with East Germany and was uneasy that other Western nations might increase the GDR's legitimacy by dealing with it as an equal. In the early 1980's, when it became clear that the GDR was interested in preserving the fruits of improved relations with West European states—despite deteriorating United States–Soviet relations—the United States changed its stance and initiated more high-level contacts with the GDR as part of its policy of differentiation toward Eastern Europe. While discussions on US–GDR relations continue, any improvement in them will depend to some extent on East Germany's settlement of the wartime claims for compensation by American citizens and groups. Indeed, one factor that has complicated the GDR's acceptance in the West has been its refusal to pay reparations to the victims of Nazism residing in the West. West Germany has taken on the entire burden for compensating various individuals and the State of Israel.[13]

THE GDR'S REFUSAL to accept the Third Reich as part of its historical legacy is but one facet of the more general problem of coming to terms with the past and forging an East German national identity. McCauley argues that prior to the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 there was tension between the Soviet and German traditions in the GDR. In order to develop a modicum of stability, the East German regime felt the need to stress the Soviet aspects of its system. After the building of the Wall, however, the GDR felt more secure about turning to German traditions in order to forge a national identity. Indeed, some would argue that the GDR has preserved German, particularly Prussian, characteristics much more than the Federal Republic has. Traditional Germany is alive and well in East Berlin.

Nevertheless, problems have beset the search for an East German identity. For one thing, the GDR has been rather selective in its claims to the legacy of the old Germany, as Ulrich Scheuner points out (in Schulz et al., p. 46). While denying that it is the heir to the negative aspects of German history, most notably the Third Reich, East Germany has been quick to lay claim to the achievements and the renown of great personalities, from Martin Luther to Carl von Clausewitz. For another, the Federal Republic's partial recognition of the GDR has intensified the latter's difficulties in this regard and compelled it to try to differentiate itself all the more clearly from the Federal Republic because of the continued awareness among its citizens of a common German heritage in spite of the division.

Although a number of the authors reviewed here discuss in detail the evolution of the GDR's definitions of state and nation, they do not come to any clear agreement about whether the GDR has succeeded in developing a national identity that is separate from that of the Federal Republic. Childs argues that the GDR has thus far failed: "Yet many East Germans remain sullen, bitter, alienated and angry. They do not necessarily identify with the Federal Republic as they do not identify with the GDR. They regard themselves as Germans. They identify with 'Germany' "(p. 317). Other scholars, for instance Gebhard Schweigler, dispute this view.[14]

CULTURALLY, POLITICALLY, and economically, the GDR remains uneasily poised between Moscow and Bonn. The inter-German relationship has, of course, improved markedly since 1972. Siegfried Kupper, in his excellent chapter on the GDR's *Deutschlandpolitik* in the Schulz et al. book, examines how the GDR's policy evolved from a search for an all-German solution to an effort to differentiate between the two German states. "The more improbable German reunification appeared to be to the leaders in the East and West," he argues, "the more they talked about it"(p. 271). Since 1972, Kupper claims, a major GDR goal has been to "create the preconditions for the collapse of the existing state and social system in the FRG" (p. 263). While official propaganda might indicate this to be the case, one may question to what degree the Honecker regime treats this as a practical objective.

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[13] Talks on compensation for American citizens are currently under way between the United States and the GDR. For a fuller discussion of US–GDR relations, see Ronald Asmus, "Washington's View of Bonn and East Berlin," *Deutschland Archiv* (Cologne), No. 3, March 1985, pp. 256–63.

[14] See Gebhard Schweigler, *National Consciousness in Divided Germany*, Beverly Hills, Sage Publications, 1975.

Although the GDR has been concerned about the domestic political effects of rapprochement with West Germany, it cannot deny that the inter-German relationship has brought with it major economic benefits it would be loathe to give up. Because the Federal Republic now regards the GDR as part of its domestic market, East Germany, as Horst Lambrecht notes in the Schulz et al. volume, receives significant visible and invisible economic support from the FRG, including de facto membership in the European Community. Lambrecht characterizes East Berlin's attitude toward the economic/political trade-offs of inter-German economic relations as "ambivalent" since GDR officials view it as "politically undesirable but economically extremely advantageous, if not actually necessary" (p. 330). Indeed, the GDR would have to sacrifice most of these considerable economic benefits in return for the political satisfaction of gaining de jure recognition from the FRG.

Even so, the GDR continues to demand full recognition of its nationhood and statehood from the FRG. The *Grundvertrag* was merely a compromise by which both states agreed to disagree; it did not remove the constant tension between the two which becomes evident during times of international crises. An example is the GDR's reaction to the crisis in Poland between August 1980 and December 1981. Probably compelled by a fear that East Germany might be infected by the "Polish bacillus," Honecker took certain measures designed to limit contact with West Germany, among them the unsuccessful demand for full recognition of GDR citizenship by the FRG, and the doubling of the minimum currency exchange for visitors to the GDR from West Germany.[15]

Nevertheless, the evidence of the last two years indicates that the GDR is committed to an inter-German rapprochement: it has responded quite positively to West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl's intensification of Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik*[16] and to his *Deutschlandpolitik*, even to the point of defying Moscow by trying to maintain cordial relations with Bonn after the deployment of US Pershing and Cruise missiles in West Germany. This is mainly due to the fact that Kohl's *Deutschlandpolitik* has had a beneficial impact on the GDR. As Wettig points out, "The West German government is concerned to create conditions of external and internal stability in East Germany. It, therefore, regards unrest in the GDR as undesirable"(in von Beyme/Zimmermann, p. 296).[17] Kohl's *Ostpolitik* has also shored up the East German economy by providing new credits and has in some ways increased the GDR's legitimacy by negotiating with it on various matters. The more the FRG deals with the GDR, the more in fact it recognizes the latter as a separate state.[18] One might go so far as to argue that Kohl's *Ostpolitik* makes reunification less likely.

EAST GERMANY'S commitment to an inter-German rapprochement has produced some friction with the Soviet Union. However, the books reviewed here were published before the 1984 GDR–USSR disagreement and do not cover the events that led up to it. These events centered on Honecker's proposed visit to the Federal Republic, the first such visit by a GDR party chief. A few months before the scheduled visit, Moscow launched a campaign against West Germany, accusing it of renewed revanchist designs on Eastern Europe. The attack was clearly aimed at East Germany as well, and the GDR responded by joining Hungary in stressing the need for continued, cooperative ties between smaller socialist countries and the West.[19] In the end Moscow prevailed on Honecker to cancel his visit, but the incident served to strengthen his domestic position by giving the appearance that Honecker has asserted himself against Moscow.

Despite the evidence of East German–Soviet friction, the GDR remains dependent on the USSR for its political and economic viability.[20] Prior to 1971, East Berlin had very little room for maneuver in its relations with Moscow. Ulbricht's removal for resisting Soviet *Westpolitik* toward Bonn clearly signaled the limits for independent action. As Croan points out, "East Germany's ruling elite has always been and still remains critically dependent on the Soviet Union for political, strategic and diplomatic support" (in Schulz et al., pp. 185–86). After all, the USSR created the GDR and still occupies it. And lacking a full measure of legitimacy, East Germany needs Soviet support to ensure its continued existence.

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[15] *Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), Oct. 10 and 13, 1980.

[16] See Angela E. Stent, "Soviet–West German Relations under Helmut Kohl: Continuity or Change?" in Angela E. Stent, Ed., *Economic Relations with the Soviet Union: American and West German Perspectives*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1985, pp. 27–47.

[17] This quote is mistranslated in the book and is an example of the problems that plague this volume. The text in the book reads: "The West German government is concerned to create conditions of external and internal stability in West Germany." Or am I missing a point?

[18] Probably the most graphic illustration of the commitment of both Germanies to maintaining their rapprochement is the fact that the continuing unmasking of East German spies in high places in Bonn has had no major effect on the inter-German relationship.

[19] See Ronald Asmus, "The Dialectics of Détente and Discord: The Moscow–East Berlin–Bonn Triangle," *Orbis* (Philadelphia), Winter 1985, pp. 743–74.

Yet, since 1972, East Berlin has gained somewhat greater freedom of action, particularly in negotiating noncrucial issues with the FRG. The precise nature of its increased independence from Moscow is disputable. After all, *Abgrenzung* from the FRG has been combined with an *Annäherung* (rapprochement) with the USSR. The cancellation of the Honecker visit indicates that East German independent action is constrained.

Moscow has used the inter-German relationship as a channel for East-West dialogue, though Soviet leaders will support this dialogue only as long as they feel that they can control it. The Soviets still use this relationship to remind West Germans that the latter have a stake in maintaining good ties with the USSR, irrespective of Soviet-American relations.[21] The ambiguous status of Berlin gives the Soviets a lever over the GDR, and, as Croan points out, they realize that it is in their interest to keep alive East German anxieties about the destabilizing effects of inter-German ties (in Schulz et al., p. 225). Such anxieties reinforce the GDR's dependence on the USSR. Moscow wants to leave the German question open in such a manner so as to maximize Soviet influence in both East and West Germany.

While the treaties of the 1970's may have resolved the German question legally, in the long run, they have failed to do so politically. In the eyes of the West, the future of East Germany is unresolved, while for the Soviet Union, it is West Germany's future that remains open. Each side wants to ensure that *its* Germany will remain in its camp, while the other Germany will emancipate itself from its superpower protector. As long as this situation prevails, the GDR will face an uphill struggle in its efforts to secure full sovereignty and establish legitimacy both in the eyes of its own people and the eyes of other nations.

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[20] See Angela E. Stent, "Soviet Policy Toward the German Democratic Republic," in Sarah M. Terry, Ed., *Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1984, pp. 55–60.

[21] See Angela E. Stent, "The USSR and Germany," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September-October 1981, pp. 1–24.

Rethinking the Iranian Revolution

Muriel Atkin

ELENA A. DOROSHENKO. *Shiitskoye dukhovenstvo v sovremennom Irane* (The Shiite Clergy in Contemporary Iran). 2nd rev. ed., Moscow, Nauka, 1985.

SEMËN L. AGAYEV. *Iranskaya revolyutsiya, SShA i mezhdunarodnaya bezopasnost'* (The Iranian Revolution, the USA, and International Security). Moscow, Nauka, 1984.

SEMËN L. AGAYEV. *Iran: rozhdeniye respubliki* (Iran: The Birth of the Republic). Moscow, Politizdat, 1984.

ARYEH Y. YODFAT. *The Soviet Union and Revolutionary Iran.* London, Croom Helm, and New York, St. Martin's Press, 1984.

THERE IS MUCH to displease the Soviet leadership with Iran's Islamic Republic: the clergy's unexpected dominance of the levers of political power; the elimination by the clergy of its rivals on the left, including the Tudeh (Communist) party; the regime's criticism of the Soviet Union. Yet the advent of the Islamic Revolution had initially raised great expectations in Moscow about the nature of the developments in Iran. And even after some serious blows had been dealt to Soviet hopes that the developments would prove "progressive," a prominent Soviet official (and expert on the Middle East) still considered it possible to link Iran's revolution of 1978–79 and the Communists' coup in Afghanistan in 1978, calling them the two popular revolutions in the Middle East.[1]

The dramatic changes in Iran occasioned a flurry of Soviet publications intended to explain, at first, why the developments there were promising, and later, what had gone wrong. Some of these publications were written by experts who had been studying Iran long before its recent turmoil. While it is true that all Soviet experts must operate within the boundaries of prevailing official political opinion, some nuance of interpretation does exist, as is illustrated by the contrast between the views of Elena A. Doroshenko and Semën L. Agayev, the two Soviet authors whose books are reviewed here. But these experts do not merely reflect the political opinions of the leadership in Moscow, they contribute to their formulation as well. Although they are based in academic institutions, they are expected to provide studies which inform the policymakers.[2]

Different experts are linked to officials with differing views. Agayev, for example, is associated with Rostislav A. Ul'yanovskiy, a deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee's International Department; Doroshenko is associated with Yevgeniy M. Primakov, until recently the director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, and now director of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations.

FOR MORE than a decade, Elena Doroshenko, a member of the Institute of Oriental Studies, has been the Soviet Union's leading scholar of religion in modern Iran. In the wake of the Islamic Revolution, she has figured prominently among academics offering explanations of the Iranian upheaval. Recently she revised her most important work published before the Islamic Revolution, a 1975 study of Iran's Shiite clergy.[3]

When the monograph first appeared, it was part of a trend emerging in Soviet scholarly studies to go

Muriel Atkin is Associate Professor of History, George Washington University (Washington, DC). She is author of Russia and Iran, 1780-1828, *published in 1980, and numerous articles on Soviet-Iranian relations.*

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[1] R.A. Ul'yanovskiy, introduction to Agayev, *Iran: rozhdeniye respubliki*, p. 15.

[2] Ul'yanovskiy, "Moral Principles in Politics and Politics in the Sphere of Morals," in Agayev, *Iranskaya revolyutsiya*, p. 15; B.N. Ponomarëv, "High Award of the Motherland—to the Main Center of Soviet Oriental Studies," *Aziya i Afrika segodnya* (Moscow), December 1980, pp. 3, 5.

[3] Although the men whose work centers on the fostering of Islam do not literally constitute a clergy in the sense that the term is used in Christianity, it is a useful term to apply to the diverse corporate group devoted to promoting Islam, from the humblest teacher of the Koran to children to the most revered interpreter of Shiite doctrine.

beyond stock criticism of religion. Rather than present religion as a bad, un-Marxist, nonmaterialist fantasy rooted in earlier, oppressive stages of social evolution, Doroshenko and many of her colleagues chose to examine religion in terms of how it affected this-worldly phenomena—its influence on people's social, political, and economic behavior.[4] But this intellectual current did not engulf such influential people as Ul'yanovskiy, who continued to advocate the more stereotyped, negative interpretation of religion as an important tool for dulling the minds of people in capitalist society and for perpetuating clerical oppression of the masses.[5]

In the new version of her monograph, Doroshenko refines the approach used in the first edition, further reducing, though not entirely eliminating, ideologically based judgments. In addition, she carries the discussion forward to the end of the 1970's and gives more attention to Ayatollah Khomeyni and others who rose to prominence during the Islamic Revolution (pp. 163–72).[6] Doroshenko also revives her discussion of Iran's earlier political controversies in light of the victory of the Islamic republicans.

One of the main strengths of Doroshenko's approach lies in her reliance on detailed description rather than on overt Marxian analysis. This quality is important not only because the author is a knowledgeable specialist and has much information to convey, but also because by emphasizing careful description she argues implicitly that meticulous research is as important an element of scholarly discourse as is proper ideology.

The significance of this approach becomes clear when one compares Doroshenko's work with that of the late Ye. A. Belyayev, a leading Soviet Islamicist of the previous generation. Belyayev's treatment of Shiism contains just enough description to illustrate his thesis that religion offers a false, often illogical solution to human problems. Thus, for example, when he discusses one of the most important Shiite observances—the mourning during the month of Moharram for the martyrdom of Husain (the Prophet's grandson)—Belyayev focuses on those practices that are likely to strike his readers as bizarre and repugnant (self-flagellation or some believers' refusal to wash during that month). The implication is that the Moharram observances are fanatical and barbaric.[7]

By contrast, Doroshenko's discussion avoids pejorative labels and stresses the great significance this mourning period has for Shiites. Gone is Belyayev's emphasis on the more extreme practices; instead, there is the description of practices such as the opening of their houses by the wealthy to neighbors coming for mourning ceremonies. Although processions of flagellants are mentioned, they are introduced as part of a larger process of public displays of faith that have turned into political demonstrations on occasion (pp. 74–75).[8]

While Doroshenko includes the de rigueur citations from the Marxist patristic literature, she does so with restraint. Indeed, in the second edition of *Shiitskoye dukhovenstvo*, she cites the work of the US scholar Shahrough Akhavi far more often than the "classics of Marxism-Leninism."[9]

While revising her book, Elena Doroshenko appears to have also revised her assessments of the strength of Islam in Iran and the influence of the Shiite clergy. Her views had originally been strongly colored by Marxist conventions about the nature of social progress. For example, in the introduction to the first version of her book, she ascribed the power of the clergy in Iranian society to, among other things, the fact that until recently 90 percent of the Iranians were illiterate fanatics.[10] In the second version, the sentence remains the same, except that the Iranian "fanatics" are now referred to as deeply religious (p. 7).[11]

Doroshenko has also discarded her earlier argument that the evolution of society and the spread of socialism, communism, and modernization in Asia were undermining Iranian belief in Islam, and in turn were forcing the Shiite clergy to fight a rearguard action (in league with the monarchy) to preserve its own influence and to combat socialism.[12] This perspective is evident in the following passage near the end of the first edition:

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[4] Among other noteworthy examples of this trend in the mid-1970's (prior to the upsurge in Islamic activism that gave the issue greater urgency) are L. R. Polonskaya, "New Tendencies in the Modernization of Islam (The Case of Pakistan)," in *Religiya i obshchestvennaya mysl' stran Vostoka* (Religion and Social Thought in Countries of the East), Moscow, Nauka, 1974; M. T. Stepanyants, *Islam v filosofskoy i obshchestvennoy mysli zarubezhnogo Vostoka (XIX–XX vv.)* (Islam in the Philosophical and Social Thought of the Non-Soviet East [19th-20th Centuries]), Moscow, Nauka, 1974; and S. A. Tokarev, *Religiya v istorii narodov mira* (Religion in the History of the Peoples of the World), Moscow, Politizdat, 1976.

[5] Ul'yanovskiy, "Moral Principles," p. 4.

[6] For example, the first edition slighted Ali Shariati, a social theorist who combined certain elements of Marxism with his own interpretation of reformist Islam and greatly influenced the ideology of the Mojahedin-e Khalq guerrillas, whereas the second edition devotes 10 pages to his life and work.

[7] E. A. Belyayev, *Musulmanskoye sektantstvo* (Muslim Sectarianism), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Vostochnoy Literatury, 1957, p. 28.

[8] See also Doroshenko, *Shiitskoye dukhovenststvo v sovremennom Irane*, 1st ed., Moscow, Nauka, 1975, pp. 58–59.

[9] Shahrough Akhavi, *Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran*, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1980. Overall, Doroshenko demonstrates a broad familiarity with Western scholarship on Iranian Shiism.

[10] Doroshenko, *Shiitskoye dukhovenstvo*, 1st ed., p. 6.

[11] The label "fanatic" still appears occasionally in the second edition, mostly in connection with anti-leftist activities in the Islamic Republic.

[12] Doroshenko, *Shiitskoye dukhovenstvo*, 1st ed., pp. 7, 111, 149, 159, 161.

> *Faced with the growth of national liberation movements in developing countries and the spread of "the spirit of unbelief," which has captured ever broader circles of the population, the ruling circles in Iran are uniting with the clergy as well as with the rulers of other countries of the East, for the purpose of strengthening Islam.*[13]

Such assertions are missing from the second edition. Instead, Doroshenko depicts Islam as growing stronger in the late 20th century and becoming associated with liberation movements. Her argument is that modernization in Iran has not weakened Shiism after all, but has strengthened its hold on the masses by increasing the gulf between the haves and the have-nots. Similarly, the influence of the Shiite clergy on ordinary Iranians is not waning, because the clergy has ably responded to the challenge of modernization by adapting Islam to contemporary conditions. If, ultimately, the strength of Shiism in contemporary Iran is the product of backwardness, she concludes, it is nevertheless exceedingly strong (pp. 3, 65, 75, 77, 135). Finally, while noting that the clergy's political activism can be traditionalist, the author differentiates between two contrasting types of traditionalism, a conservative-reactionary one and a patriotic one devoted to the protection of the lowly (pp. 97, 215 fn. 12).[14]

Among the most dramatic changes in Doroshenko's interpretation is her treatment of the political crisis of the early 1960's, which developed when the clergy denounced the government for a series of reforms subsequently dubbed the White Revolution. In the first edition of her book, Doroshenko treated the Shah's reforms as progressive in Iran's context, emphasizing those provisions that dealt with land reform and the improvement of the status of women. According to her, these reforms were opposed by the "reactionary part of the landowners and clergy" as well as by nationalist clerics. While she attributed considerable disruptive power to the clergy, she was guarded when discussing clerical objectives. In any case, she concluded that the clergy's opposition to the reforms cost it public support.[15] Her view was typical of the interpretation found in Soviet sources published prior to the Islamic Revolution, according to which the Shah, for all his faults, was a modernizer who brought Iran out of the "feudal" era.

In the revised account, the reforms under the Shah become targets for criticism. Many negative statements about the opposition have been deleted (although the economic interests of the clergy receive occasional mention as being a factor in its opposition to the reforms) and its positive aspects elaborated. No longer is the focus on land redistribution and women's rights, but on the Shah's efforts to strengthen his own position and his ties to the United States while ensuring Iran's dominance in the Persian Gulf. Far from playing a reactionary role, the clergy is now credited with mobilizing broad public support by making "sharp attacks on the economic and ideological expansion of the imperialist powers in Iran and the monarchy's dictatorial regime" (pp. 28, 74, 120–21, 124). Gone is the notion that the clergy alienated its followers by opposing reform.

In light of the Islamic Revolution, Doroshenko has greatly expanded her discussion of Ayatollah Khomeyni's life and politics. Her account of his activities now includes the information that, while in exile for opposing the White Revolution, Khomeyni continued to speak out on topical issues and to build an effective clandestine network inside Iran. She characterizes his message as one of advocating a theocracy while opposing the Shah's dictatorship, pervasive corruption, and the power of imperialism over Iran. According to Doroshenko, this "won him the sympathy of the broad popular masses" (pp. 127, 162–63, 202–03).

No longer does Doroshenko accuse Khomeyni of using the tenets of Islam to oppose social and economic reform; now she judges his concept of a theocracy to be remarkable within Shiism because of its activism. As she points out, for Khomeyni the martyred imams are significant not merely because they died for their faith, but because they fought misrule and injustice. Moreover, the role of the highest ranking Islamic jurists is not only to interpret religious law and wait for the return of the Hidden Imam, but also to be active leaders in changing society (p. 159).[16]

Given the author's views on the influence of Khomeyni and Islam in the Iran of the 1970's, it is not surprising that Doroshenko ascribes to the clergy a dynamic and crucial role in making possible the revolution of 1978–79. Still it puts her in direct opposition to other Soviet interpreters of Iranian events, men like Agayev, who portray the clergy as joining the revolutionary struggle only after it was well under way. Indeed, in *Iran: rozhdeniye respubliki*, Agayev argues that the clergy tried to sell out the revolution at the last moment by making a deal with the last prime minister under the monarchy, Shapour Bakhtiar. Agayev further contends that the old regime was brought down in February 1979 by an uprising led by the Fedayan-e Khalq and the Mojahedin-e Khalq guerrillas (with the participation of the Tudeh party) without any contribution by the clergy or its adherents (pp. 56–58).[17]

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[13] Doroshenko, *Shiitskoye dukhovenstvo*, 1st ed., p. 158.

[14] In making this argument Doroshenko draws on the work of A. I. Ionova, another leading Soviet scholar of Islam who has risen to prominence since the late 1970's.

[15] Doroshenko, *Shiitskoye dukhovenstvo*, 1st ed., pp. 105–109.

[16] See also Doroshenko, *Shiitskoye dukhovenstvo*, 1st ed., p. 118.

While Doroshenko accepts the standard Soviet argument that the initiative for the revolution lay not with the clergy but with the masses, she nevertheless portrays the clergy as having played the leading role in opposing government policies throughout the 1970's, and not just in the last months of the monarchy. In addition to ascribing importance to Khomeyni personally and to his network of supporters, she argues—as do other Soviet authors—that the clergy was uniquely equipped for opposition politics in the 1970's, because it had not been as repressed as was the secular opposition; thus the clergy was able to preserve its institutional structure and lines of communication throughout the country. However, when elaborating on this point, Doroshenko goes beyond other Soviet authors by contending that it was the clergy's special position in Iranian society that enabled it to be more open in its criticism of the regime. According to her, not only did mosques retain their vital importance as places of prayer, but they evolved into forums for political discussion. Moreover, though some clerics came from wealthy families, the diversity in social origins among the clergy helped make it attentive to the urban poor. Hence, by the end of the 1970's, it was the clergy around whom the "progressive intelligentsia" and students rallied and not vice versa (pp. 4, 65, 69, 191–92).

SEMËN AGAYEV, a specialist on Iran, is affiliated with the Peoples of the Near and Middle East Institute of the Azerbaydzhan Academy of Sciences, the leading Soviet center outside of Moscow for the study of the modern Middle East. Since the late 1960's, he has published extensively on Iranian politics and foreign relations. His two books under review here, both introduced by Ul'yanovskiy, differ strikingly from Doroshenko's in their approach to the study of Iran. Not only are they emphatically polemical rather than scholarly, but each serves primarily as a vehicle for criticism of anti-Soviet and anti-communist elements both in Iran and in the United States. Nonetheless, these volumes, like some of Agayev's other works, are informative precisely because they detail current trends in the Soviet political assessment of the Iranian revolution.[18]

Given Ul'yanovskiy's prominence as a section head in the International Department, his introductions to the Agayev volumes deserve some comment, even if they simply repeat arguments he has made elsewhere. The introduction to *Iranskaya revolyutsiya, SSha i mezhdunarodnaya bezopasnost'* is in fact a reprint of an article that first appeared in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* and is little changed here except for specific references to the way Agayev's book illustrates Ul'yanovskiy's points.[19] In this essay, Ul'yanovskiy makes briefly the same argument that Agayev makes in roughly 250 pages, namely, that the United States and Iran's clerical politicians are the villains of the hostage crisis and the Iranian revolution. According to Ul'yanovskiy, the American government contributed significantly to the making of the hostage crisis. Once the crisis developed, Jimmy Carter and later Ronald Reagan justified their actions in terms of high principles. But, in fact, he points out, they used the crisis to advance their own political interests, stimulate jingoism and anti-Sovietism, and strengthen the American military presence in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. At the same time, Iran's Shiite clergy, by leading the mass movement that became the revolution and by invoking Islam to rally public support, assumed moral responsibility for carrying out profound social changes once the revolution had triumphed. Instead, the clergy usurped the revolution for its own rightist ends, and betrayed the aspirations of the masses. Ul'yanovskiy stresses that much of this change in political direction occurred during and immediately after the hostage crisis, when the clergy began to repress all who disagreed with them, and especially the genuine revolutionaries of the left. He concludes his essay by arguing that the clergy's efforts to Islamicize society are unrealistic and must inevitably fail. (Many of the same points are also restated in his introduction to Agayev's other book, *Iran: rozhdeniye respubliki*.)[20]

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[17] See also S.M. Aliyev, "The Anti-Monarchical and Anti-Imperialist Revolution in Iran," in *Narody Azii i Afriki* (Moscow), 1979, No. 4, pp. 53, 57; K.A. Merkulov, *Islam v mirovoy politike i mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniyakh* (Islam in World Politics and International Relations), Moscow, Mezhdunarodnoye Otnosheniya, 1982, pp. 256–58; L.S. Sklyarov, "The Establishment of New Organs of Power in Iran (1978–1981)," *Iran: Istoriya i sovremennost'* (Iran: History and Contemporaneity), Moscow, Nauka, 1983, pp. 201–02.

[18] Notably his "Left Radicalism, Revolutionary Democracy, and Scientific Socialism in the Countries of the East," *Rabochii klass i sovremennyy mir* (Moscow), May-June 1984, pp. 133–47.

[19] Ul'yanovskiy, "Moral Principles in Politics and Politics in the Sphere of Morality," in Agayev, *Iranskaya revolyutsiya*, pp. 3–14; idem, "Moral Principles in Politics and Politics in the Sphere of Morality," *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (Moscow), June 22, 1983, p. 10.

Little need be said about how Agayev elaborates in *Iranskaya revolyutsiya* on Ul'yanovskiy's points. His assertion that the unsuccessful attempt to rescue the hostages in April 1980 was a "planned failure" which successfully accomplished its secret mission of bolstering President Carter's image and demonstrating American military strength is typical of his polemical style. According to him, American military officials knew that the rescue mission involved great risks if it progressed beyond the first stage to open combat, which would take place near to the Soviet border. Thus, by recalling the American force from Tabas, the United States enjoyed the benefits of demonstrating its power of intimidation at low cost to itself. Agayev further argues that the operation was a "military adventure of the type that later becomes the norm for the foreign policy of the U.S.A." (pp. 181 and 163–70).

The book's most noteworthy contribution is its assessment of the consequences of the hostage crisis. For all of the Soviet Union's relish in America's discomfiture at the time of the crisis, the results of that crisis were negative for the Soviets, concludes Agayev. The reason the seizure of the United States embassy became so important in Iranian domestic politics, he argues, is because it coincided with a powerful tide of anti-Americanism. Agayev praises this attitude for being linked in the popular mind with a quest for profound social change, but he complains that the hostage crisis diverted the Iranians from proper objectives to the less significant issue of the hostages themselves. As a result, when the hostages were finally released, none of Iran's most important demands had been met. Instead, it was the United States that benefited while the Iranian people suffered. The United States strengthened its political and military position in the region, and American corporations received substantial compensation from the Iranian government. In Iran, the clergy achieved political dominance, but then became unresponsive to the people's needs (pp. 31, 81–82, 133, 264–66, 270).

In *Iran: rozhdeniye respubliki*, Agayev focuses on the period from the last weeks of the monarchy to the seizure of the American embassy in Tehran and the resignation of Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan. His thesis is that the revolution itself was a popular uprising in favor of the "socialist transformation of society," which happened to voice its objectives in Islamic terms (pp. 311, 316). The clergy then exploited the popular victory to seize power for itself and thwart any substantial revolutionary change. Agayev illustrates these points with frequent quotations from the Koran and various unidentified sources. He also allows himself to gloat over the misfortunes of all those of whom he disapproves.

The most interesting aspect of this book is its very different treatment of some of the topics covered in *Shiitskoye dukhovenstvo*. Where Doroshenko introduces nuances, Agayev offers diatribe. The two authors' treatment of the social theorist Ali Shariati (1933–77) is a case in point. Agayev credits Shariati with contributing politically to the revolutionary movement by linking Islam with opposition to the Shah. However, the author describes Shariati as a man using Islamic language to disguise ideas that came "dangerously close" to atheist socialism, and he punctuates this description with a quotation from the Koran that warns against attributing one's own words to Allah (p. 42). By contrast, Doroshenko gives much more attention to Shariati's ideas taken as a whole and argues that while he borrowed certain concepts from Marxism, he also differed on major points, including his rejection of atheism and his belief that only through Islam could the Muslim world be saved from bourgeois corruption. To her, Shariati is not a sly manipulator, but an eclectic thinker whose most distinguished trait was his courageous opposition to the monarchy (p. 170).

One aspect of *Rozhdeniye respubliki* offers the tantalizing prospect of some insight into Soviet ideas about the future of the Islamic Republic: Agayev's comparison of Khomeyni with Robespierre. The author raises the question in his introduction whether such a comparison is apt, then proceeds to start every chapter by quoting rather unilluminating citations from or about Robespierre, and finally concludes that a degree of similarity does exist between the methods of both revolutionary leaders' followers. Given the analogy of Islamic Republicans to Jacobins, any reader seeking some indication of Soviet expectations about the outcome of Iranian developments may well wonder just what is or will be seen as the counterpart of the Thermidorian Reaction.[21] Agayev mentions that, unlike in revolutionary France where it remained for the Jacobins to destroy feudalism, in Iran feudalism was defeated before the late 1970's. Therefore, Iran's Thermidorian reaction occurred early—before the victory of the Islamic Revolution—in the form of the Bakhtiar administration (pp. 311–34).

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[20] In their works both Agayev and Doroshenko repeat similar arguments about the fate of the Islamic Revolution. See Agayev, *Iran: rozhdeniye respubliki*, pp. 6–13, 308–09; Doroshenko, 2nd ed., pp. 46–47, 192, 207–09.

[21] Thermidor is the 11th month of the French Revolutionary Calendar. The Thermidorian Reaction refers to the coup d'état of 9 Thermidor (July 27, 1794), which marked the downfall of Robespierre and the end of the Reign of Terror.

THE TWISTS and turns of Iran's Islamic Revolution cleary surprised Soviet observers, and they responded by revising their interpretation of the events there. Yet, in a broad sense, there are still certain political parameters that define the range of permissible opinion. For example, all Soviet sources now invariably view the revolution as a promising opportunity that went wrong.

Nonetheless, significant variations do exist within those parameters, as is illustrated by the two Soviet authors reviewed here. Some Soviet observers, like Agayev, aim primarily at providing a rationale for current policy, citing just enough selective information to support an argument in favor of that policy. Others, like Doroshenko, place greater emphasis on more substantive research, producing evidence with a weight of its own rather than merely confirming the accepted opinion of the moment. Both types of works are important as much for what they do not say as for what they do say.

GIVEN THE UPSURGE of interest in Iran that the Islamic Revolution occasioned among Americans and the concern about the Soviet role in the developments there that proved so disadvantageous to the United States, a book offering a brief overview of Soviet-Iranian relations could provide the American reader with a useful introduction to this subject. Initially, it might seem that Aryeh Yodfat's *The Soviet Union and Revolutionary Iran* would serve such a purpose. The author is well-read, writes in an effectively concise style, and offers some prudent judgments. Unfortunately, however, there are so many serious problems with his facts, sources, and methodology that the book's positive features are overwhelmed by the negative ones. Not only does this book fail to give the specialist any new insight into Iranian-Soviet relations, it is also likely to misinform the nonspecialist.

Yodfat's chapters on the historical background (dating back to the late 19th century) say nothing of note that has not been said better in works already available in English.[22] Moreover, there are some serious lapses in Yodfat's recounting of history. For example, when discussing the opening decade of this century, he rightly notes the importance of the 1907 Anglo-Russian agreement, which allotted a sphere of influence to Russia in northern Iran and to Britain in the southeast (pp. 3–8); yet he omits mention of Iran's Constitutional Revolution of 1905–11 or the fact that Russia intervened both politically and militarily in the ensuing turmoil.[23]

Some of the explanations Yodfat offers are also simplistic and ill-informed. He asserts, for example, that the open opposition to Mohammad Reza Shah was made possible by the policy of "liberalization" Jimmy Carter urged upon the Shah (particularly in the area of human rights) and that the possibility of Carter's disapproval of the Shah's actions deterred the Iranian leader from crushing the opposition (as he had done in 1963). Yet, the author offers no substantiation of this important point. Clearly, the assertion accords well with Yodfat's view that the United States has a track record of letting down its Third World allies and playing into the hands of countries siding with the Soviet Union against American interests (pp. 35–36, and 27–28).

The fact is that the Carter administration did not push the human rights issue in the case of Iran nor did it give encouragement to the middle-class intellectuals who by 1977 were beginning to criticize the Shah more openly. When Carter visited Iran in December 1977 he was conspicuously silent about human rights, much to the dismay of those middle-class intellectuals. In any event, it was not they who made the revolution but, above all, Khomeyni and his vast network of clerical and lay followers, as well as various leftist guerrilla organizations. None of these people or groups were predisposed to seek American permission to make a revolution. The incident that set into motion the cycle of protests culminating in the fall of the monarchy—namely, the January 1978 protest demonstration by seminarians in Qom—was not provoked by the American stance on human rights but by an Iranian newspaper article in which the Minister of Information attacked Khomeyni. Finally, the Carter human rights policy could not possibly have deterred the Shah from acting against the opposition because he was not to be deterred, though he may have acted indecisively and ineffectively. During 1978, his forces continued to jail and kill opponents of the regime. Not until late in that year, when the tally of casualities was already high, did the Carter administration begin to criticize the Shah.[24]

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[22] For works focusing largely on Iranian foreign policy, Russian and Soviet relations with Iran, or communism in Iran, see particularly Firuz Kazemzadeh, *Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864–1914*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968; idem, "Soviet-Iranian Relations: A Quarter Century of Freeze and Thaw," in Ivo J. Lederer and Wayne S. Vucinich, Eds., *The Soviet Union and the Middle East*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1974; idem, "Russia and the Middle East," in Ivo J. Lederer, *Russian Foreign Policy*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1962; Rouhollah K. Ramazani, *The Foreign Policy of Iran, 1500–1941*, Charlottesville, University of Virginia Press, 1966; idem, *Iran's Foreign Policy, 1941–1973*, Charlottesville, University of Virginia Press, 1975; Shahram Chubin and Sepehr Zabih, *The Foreign Relations of Iran*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1974; John C. Campbell, "The Soviet Union and the Middle East: 'In the General Direction of the Persian Gulf,'" *The Russian Review* (Cambridge, MA), April 1970, pp. 143–53, and July 1970, pp. 247–61; Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1982; Sepehr Zabih, *The Communist Movement in Iran*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1966.

[23] Mohammed Ali Shah, urged on by the Russian ambassador, used the Persian Cossacks (organized and commanded by the Russians) to stage a counter-coup against the constitutionalists. Russian troops occupied Tabriz, the capital of Iranian Azerbaijan and a center of constitutionalist opposition; they also entered northeastern Iran in an unsuccessful attempt to restore Mohammad Ali to the throne and stayed on even after failing in their primary objective.

Another problematic aspect of Yodfat's book is his handling of sources. In his discussion of Soviet policy toward Iran since 1978 he often ascribes attitudes to the Kremlin that are based solely on a superficial and literal reading of statements in the Soviet mass media. On this basis he asserts, for example, that the Soviets "genuinely believed that American intervention [in Iran] was imminent" in 1978 and thus "were greatly surprised when it did not come" (pp. 48–49). (The Soviets certainly made much of the alleged danger of American intervention for propaganda purposes, but that hardly proves that they "genuinely" thought it likely.) He also argues that it was the United States that created the crisis in Iran by stirring up the latent opposition there in hopes of taming the overly independent Shah. The book is replete with such uncritical assessments.

At other times, Yodfat overlooks essential information in the Soviet media. For example, he contends that through the end of 1978 the Soviet Union still thought that the monarchy might survive in Iran and, therefore, refrained from anything more than mild criticism of the Shah in the mass media. He reports that the occasional calls for the Shah's ouster were "not in the main press" (p. 50). However, already on September 12, 1978, *Pravda* had carried an article quoting a Tudeh statement to the effect that the monarchy was incapable of solving the social problems that underlay Iran's political crisis. The statement predicted that the Iranian people would continue their "just fight" until they achieved their "national and democratic goals." The next day a similar article quoted the Tudeh's call for a provisional coalition government.[25] On November 4, 1978, *Pravda*, this time without attribution, referred to the efforts of the Iranian people to "liquidate 'despotism, corruption and tyranny'."[26]

Finally, not only does Yodfat use Soviet sources poorly, but he confines himself to a very limited range of them, relying on the mass media exclusively when dealing with the post-1978 period. He ignores journal articles and books, such as those by Doroshenko and Agayev, that contain a wealth of information about Soviet attitudes toward Iran. Unfortunately, to study contemporary Iran without consulting such sources is to underestimate the range of Soviet opinion on the subject and the relevance of this opinion for Soviet policy toward Iran.[27]

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[24] Barry Rubin, *Paved with Good Intentions*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1980, pp. 195–96, 201, 205–06; Shaul Bakhash, "Who Lost Iran," *The New York Review of Books*, May 14, 1981, p. 22.

[25] *Pravda* (Moscow), Sept. 12, 1978, p. 5, and Sept. 13, 1978, p. 5.

[26] Ibid., Nov. 4, 1978, p. 5.

[27] The best work to date that does mine Soviet publications for information about Moscow's recent policy toward Iran is Robert O. Freedman's thorough and knowledgeable *Soviet Policy toward the Middle East since 1970*, 3rd ed., New York, Praeger, 1982.

Soviet Military Politics

Dale R. Herspring

YOSEF AVIDAR. *The Party and the Army in the Soviet Union.* Jerusalem, Magnes, 1983.

PAUL J. MURPHY, Ed. *The Soviet Air Forces.* Jefferson, NC, McFarland, 1984.

ELLEN JONES. *Red Army and Society.* London and Boston, Allen & Unwin, 1985.

JIRI VALENTA and WILLIAM POTTER, Eds. *Soviet Decisionmaking for National Security.* London and Boston, Allen & Unwin, 1984.

DAVID HOLLOWAY. *The Soviet Union and the Arms Race.* 2nd ed. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1984.

JONATHAN ADELMAN. *The Revolutionary Armies.* Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1980.

JONATHAN ALFORD, Ed. *The Soviet Union: Security Policies and Constraints.* New York, St. Martin's, 1985.

RECENT events such as the Reagan-Gorbachëv summit, the subsequent limited warming in US-Soviet relations, as well as the 27th CPSU Congress all serve to focus attention anew on the Soviet military and its role in the politics of the USSR. With regard to foreign policy, what is likely to be the Soviet military's response to improved US-Soviet relations? On the home front, how will the marshals and admirals respond to Mikhail Gorbachëv's effort to modernize the economy if it should turn out to involve reallocating funds away from the military? Further, to what degree is the military, as a distinct institution, likely to oppose Moscow's new leader on such issues? Finally, what will be the long-term impact on military politics in the USSR of the ouster of a dynamic professional soldier of the stature of Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov from his posts as chief of the general staff and first deputy minister of defense? The answers to these questions will have important implications for the course of Soviet domestic politics as well as US-Soviet relations.

Three general conceptual approaches have been suggested for analyzing civil-military relations in the USSR. Roman Kolkowicz has advocated an interest-group model, in which Soviet military politics are characterized by constant conflict between two definable dichotomous institutions.[1] In this view, the party's primary concern is to control the military, with the result that there is constant tension between the two institutions. A unitary approach, advocated by William Odom,[2] sees Soviet military officers, just like party cadres, as executants of party policy, and maintains that the former share a common orientation with the latter. Conflict, to the degree it occurs, is largely intra-institutional, that is, it pits lower levels of the bureaucracy against higher ones. Finally, Timothy Colton has advocated a "participatory" model which, while it sees the military as an institution having its own interests, argues that so far the party has satisfied the military's core interests.[3] Consequently, conflict has been minimal. The most profitable way to look at civil-military relations, Colton argues, is to focus on the degree of military participation in national security decisionmaking. All of the authors reviewed here rely to varying degrees on one or another of these three models.

YOSEF AVIDAR in his study of Soviet civil-military relations focuses on the decade from the death of Stalin

Dale R. Herspring, a Foreign Service Officer with the US Department of State, is the author of numerous works on communist militaries, including The Soviet Union and Strategic Arms, *(1984, co-authored with Robbin Laird). The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the US Government.*

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[1] Roman Kolkowicz, "Interest Groups in Soviet Politics: The Case of the Military," in Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes, Eds., *Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1978, pp. 9–25.

[2] William E. Odom, "The Party-Military Connection: A Critique," in ibid., pp. 27–52.

[3] Timothy J. Colton, "The Party-Military Connection: A Participatory Model," in ibid., pp. 53–75.

(1953) to the ouster of Nikita Khrushchev (1964). Avidar devotes particular attention to the Zhukov affair and to the impact on party-military relations of Khrushchev's efforts to cut back on the Soviet armed forces in the early 1960's. Conceptually, Avidar relies on the interest-group model. The key to Soviet military politics during this period, in his opinion, is the degree to which Khrushchev satisfied the military's interests. Thus, when party and military interests coincided, as during the period from 1953 to 1957, relations were tranquil. However, with the ouster of Marshal Georgiy Zhukov and the reassertion of party control through the Central Committee resolution of October 1957, relations worsened. A further deterioration occurred in subsequent years as a result of the U–2 affair of May 1960, the forced withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba in 1962, and Khrushchev's efforts to cut the military both in size and budget. The result was increasing alienation of the military, which, Avidar maintains, contributed significantly to Khrushchev's ouster in 1964.

The book edited by Paul Murphy contains a number of worthwhile articles tracing the development of the Soviet Air Forces since the 1917 revolution.[4] For example, the first article, by Stuart Cohen, addresses the overall question of civil-military relations and employs a conceptual framework similar to that utilized by Avidar. Party-military relations (or in this case party–air force relations) are seen as antagonistic. Thus the primary task of the party-political apparatus is to control the military.

Ellen Jones, in her excellent study of Soviet manpower issues, adopts a different conceptual approach. After a lengthy discussion of problems presented by the increasing number of minority recruits in the Soviet military (the impact of which she sees as meliorated somewhat because the educational level of all Soviet youth, including those from minority nationalities, is rising), of the demographic problems represented by the shrinking number of young people (for which she suggests a number of viable solutions), and of the importance of the armed forces for political socialization, she argues that rather than being antagonistic, the relationship between the party and the military is symbiotic. And, she adds, interdependence between civilian and military officials is likely to grow in coming years as the military's social role increases. She concludes that "the interdependence of military and civilian institutions is based on much more than shared values" (p. 220).

Jones adopts a similar approach in her article on military research and development in the book edited by Jiri Valenta and William Potter. In contrast to those who maintain that institutional (that is, bureaucratic) factors contribute significantly to research and development, Jones argues that the process is primarily driven by the party's military policy and the country's military doctrine. Her views closely resemble those of William Odom.

The third group of authors reviewed here utilize a framework closer to Colton's. David Holloway, for example, in his updated study of the role of military power in the Soviet Union from 1917 to the present, most clearly articulates the Colton position when he states:

> *. . . the party, by stressing the importance of conflict between states and the need for cohesion and solidarity at home, has provided an ideology that gives clear purpose to the Armed Forces' existence. Party policy has given the officer corps a good standard of living and high status, and has furthered their professional interests by allocating generous resources to defense. Finally, the party has provided capable and cautious leadership (with some glaring exceptions) in foreign policy, avoiding risky adventures that might provoke war.* (p. 158)

The result, according to Holloway, has been a smoother relationship than either Avidar or Cohen recognizes, but one that carries the potential for more conflict than Jones seems to foresee.

Those who accept the Colton approach (implicitly or explicitly) recognize that the relationship between the two institutions has not always been conflict-free. Jonathan Adelman, for example, in his outstanding comparative study of the impact of the early developmental period on Chinese and Soviet civil-military relations, notes that the Red Army differed radically from the People's Liberation Army (PLA) because the former was initially viewed by party leaders as a hostile organization—to be subverted and then controlled—whereas in China, the party and army were one.

Analysts in the third group focus on determining the area and extent of military influence (or "participation," to use Colton's term) in decisionmaking. They agree on a number of things. First, the Politburo is the key decisionmaking body; the military as an institution is clearly subordinate to it. For example, David Fewtrell, in an article in the collection of essays edited by Jonathan Alford, notes that although the Defense Council certainly plays a role in matters affecting the allocation of

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[4] Of particular interest is the article by Philip Peterson in the Murphy book, entitled "Reorganization Trends," which discusses developments not only in the Air Forces, but in the Soviet military in general. Peterson's assertion that "the Soviets are reorganizing their services to more effectively insure the capacity to conduct combined-arms actions at each echelon of strategic and operational leadership" (p. 277) has serious implications for Western planners and strategists.

A second area of general agreement is that the Soviet military's primary source of authority in national security decisionmaking is its monopoly over expertise and informa- security decision-making is its monopoly over expertise and information. As Dimitri Simes puts it in his article on the Brezhnev period in the Valenta and Potter book, "the absence of alternative sources of expertise in a position to challenge the uniformed military leaves the Politburo no choice but to rely heavily on the judgments of marshals and admirals" (p. 83). Likewise, Raymond Garthoff, writing in the same volume, notes that the Soviet military has a strong voice in SALT matters, "not only owing to its responsibilities for security, but also owing to a near monopoly of expertise and relevant information. Soviet military leaders, well aware of this advantage, will not easily share this source of power" (p. 155). In essence, regardless of who makes the ultimate decision on military matters, it is the military that provides data on which such decisions are based.

A third area of agreement is that the bureaucracy plays an important role in decisions affecting weapons development programs, although there remains disagreement over *how* important this role is. Arthur Alexander, in his now classic study of the weapons procurement process, which is reproduced in the Alford volume, assigns greater weight to the bureaucratic process. Holloway, by contrast, argues that both the bureaucratic process *and* policy decisions by political organs play important roles. In Holloway's words, "the build-up of military power since the late 1950s must be seen as the product of conscious political choices, and not only as the result of pressure from a military-industrial complex" (p. 160). In this regard, Valenta's article in the Valenta/Potter volume on Soviet decisionmaking leading to the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia is particularly noteworthy. It illustrates the complexity of the decisionmaking process and shows the limitations of the "rational decision-maker" mode of analysis of this process. Since no one in the Soviet Union would dare override a Politburo decision, the key question is to ascertain the extent to which the military as an institution is able to influence decisions before they get to the Politburo.

A final point, on which all the writers reviewed here agree, is the importance that both political and military leaders of the Soviet Union ascribe to military power as a means of furthering the foreign policy interests of the USSR. For example, from his reading of Soviet writings, Holloway argues that military power is seen as fulfilling three major functions: first, to deter a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union; second, to defend the socialist community; and third, to aid national liberation movements (p. 82). There would appear to be a proclivity on the part of Soviet political leaders to be responsive to the military's requests for funds, equipment, and manpower when such requests are framed in the context of furthering these objectives, particularly the first two.

THE MATERIAL reviewed here deals primarily with events prior to 1980. A review of developments in the area of Soviet military politics since that time would be useful as a means both of evaluating the three approaches represented here and of looking at the likely course of events in coming months and years.

The most notable development in Soviet military politics during the early 1980's was Marshal Ogarkov's open defiance of the Soviet political leadership. Beginning in 1981, he feuded with the leadership in general and with the USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal Dmitriy Ustinov, in particular. For example, at a time when the political leadership continued to support détente and improved US-Soviet relations, Ogarkov publicly questioned the utility of both.[5] This difference of opinion was particularly evident in the respective books published by Ogarkov and Ustinov in 1982.[6] In his volume, Ogarkov adopted a much harder line on topics such as the nature of the threat facing the USSR (he saw the nature of imperialism as being unchanged, aggressive, and predatory); the value of détente (he stressed military force, not détente, as the key to the USSR's security); and the danger of a conflict (he accused the United States of preparing for war). Ustinov's positions on all of these questions were more upbeat. He saw détente as having positive as well as negative aspects; he viewed military force as important, but only as one of a number of tools to protect Soviet national security interests; and although he felt that the international situation was serious, he avoided suggestions that the United States was preparing for war. In addition, Ogarkov also was more outspoken regarding the military's views on broader issues of national security decisionmaking and long-term economic planning.[7]

For purposes of this essay, it is worth noting that at no time during the early 1980's did the Soviet military *as an institution* adopt independent positions in public. During the entire time when Ogarkov was publicly feuding with Ustinov, none of the Chief of the General Staff's colleagues openly supported him on any of the issues mentioned above. If anything, the overwhelming majority of professional soldiers appear to have looked not to their chief of staff, but to their defense minister and to the political leadership for guidance on policy-related matters. An extensive search of Soviet military writings revealed not a single citation from Ogarkov on the subject of East-West relations in the published writings of any of his principal subordinates.

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[5] I discuss this problem in greater depth in an unpublished manuscript, "Marshal Ogarkov and the Structure of Soviet Military Politics: 1980–1985."

[6] Cf. N.V. Ogarkov, *Vsegda v gotovnosti k zashchite otechestva* (Always in Readiness for the Defense of the Fatherland), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1982; and D.F. Ustinov, *Sluzhim rodine, delu kommunizma* (We Serve the Country and the Communist Cause), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1982.

[7] See my article "Nikolay Ogarkov and the Scientific-Technical Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs," forthcoming in *Comparative Strategy*.

This failure of the Soviet military to line up along institutional lines in juxtaposition to the party is particularly significant given the uncertainties of political leadership in the USSR during the early 1980's. The ossified direction of an ailing Brezhnev, followed by the brief tenures of Yuriy Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko, meant the absence of a strong political leader to counter the hard-charging, aggressive Chief of Staff. Based on the framework suggested by Avidar, one might have expected senior military officers—many of whom probably privately supported Ogarkov—to back him up. The result could have been an expansion of military influence in both foreign and domestic policies. But they held back. Why?

One is tempted to point to the good living standards enjoyed by the Soviet officer corps and the availability of budget resources in sufficient amounts to construct a modern military machine.[8] Could the military leaders feel they were already getting everything they wanted, and hence considered Ogarkov's comments/demands excessive? Probably not. The defensive tone of Ustinov's speeches during the 1980's to military officers, and expressions of concern by Ogarkov and others over the size of the military budget (Ogarkov called strengthening the country's defensive capabilities "a vital necessity" in his 1985 book),[9] suggest that there are at least some in the military who are not satisfied with the party leadership's views on these subjects. Therefore, any attempt by Gorbachëv to reallocate funds away from the defense budget is likely to result in grumbling from the military, as might hints at further steps toward warmer relations with the United States.

EVENTS of the 1980's would tend to support the conceptual approach adopted by Holloway and others. Ogarkov did not view himself as a mere executant of party policy yet the military as a whole did not behave as an interest group. While Ogarkov doubtless saw himself as a loyal party member, he clearly believed it appropriate for a senior military officer to participate in the formulation of policy in sensitive areas.

Ogarkov's ouster is bound to have an important impact on civil-military relations. His "assignment to other duties" deprives the military of an articulate and technically sophisticated spokesman in the country's highest political-military councils and is all the more significant if, as one suspects, he was even more aggressive in defending military interests (as he saw them) in private. Although it could be argued that the replacement of the deceased Ustinov, basically a civilian, by Marshal Sergey Sokolov, a career soldier, should provide for stronger military influence at the highest levels of the political-military decisionmaking process, Sokolov's background would suggest otherwise. A review of Sokolov's writings over the past 10 years leaves the reader with the impression that Sokolov has spent most of his life as an apparatchik (his primary area of responsibility prior to becoming defense minister appears to have been logistics). Unlike Ogarkov, he does not appear to have authored a single major doctrinal or operational concept throughout his career. In Sokolov, then, Gorbachëv is probably dealing with a person of less presence, one who is less likely to oppose him at the highest level on domestic or foreign policies. Although Ogarkov's successor as chief of the general staff and first deputy minister of defense, Sergey Akhromeyev, is bright and is thought by some to be an Ogarkov protégé, he has for now—at least—hewed more closely to the party line.[10]

All of this could change, however. Sokolov is thought by many to be at most an interim leader. Given his age (he will be 75 in July), he is likely to leave the Soviet political scene in the not-too-distant future. This could bring Akhromeyev to the top military post, and conceivably the promotion might make this talented officer more assertive. Sokolov's departure could also conceivably open the door for Ogarkov himself to become defense minister, a possibility that has been rumored in some circles.[11] In view of Ogarkov's strong will and intellect, such a development would have important implications for Soviet military politics. While Gorbachëv undoubtedly recognizes the importance of Ogarkov's talents for the creation of a modern, efficient military, the party chief would want to make sure that he had sufficient strength within the upper ranks of the Soviet political leadership to control Ogarkov's strong personality before bringing him back to central responsibilities.

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[8] See, e.g., the articles in the Murphy book, which chronicle the continued improvement in the capabilities of the Soviet Air Forces; also, John Collins, *US-Soviet Military Balance 1980–1985*, Washington, DC, Pergamon-Brassey, 1985.

[9] N.V. Ogarkov, *Istoriya uchit bditel'nost'* (History Teaches Vigilance), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1985, p. 80.

[10] See, e.g., S. Akhromeyev, "On Guard of Peace and Socialism," *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Moscow), Feb. 22, 1985; idem, "The Superiority of Soviet Military Science and Soviet Military Art—One of the Most Important Factors of Victory in the Great Fatherland War," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 3, 1985, pp. 49–63; idem, "The ABM Treaty—An Obstacle on the Path to the Strategic Arms Race," *Pravda* (Moscow), June 4, 1985; and idem, "The Great Victory and the Lessons of History," *Novyy Mir* (Moscow), No. 5, 1985, pp. 3–20.

[11] See, e.g., Robert Hutchinson, "Ogarkov Tipped as Next Soviet Defense Minister," *Jane's Defense Weekly* (London), Oct. 25, 1985, pp. 929–33.

AS ALMOST all of the authors reviewed here have noted, however, only a small part of the interaction between the military and civilian organizations occurs at the level of the chief of staff or defense minister. What then of the bureaucracy? Will anything change here as a result of Ogarkov's ouster? Briefly, the answer is no. The bureaucratic process appears to be too strongly embedded for the departure of even an individual like Ogarkov to change it radically. Personalities and policies play a key role at the highest levels of the Soviet political spectrum. But their impact within the bureaucracy is more modest.

It is not that the bureaucracy is unresponsive to policy choices from above. Indeed, individual decisions can be enforced in particular areas, as Jones's analysis of Moscow's response to demographic problems illustrates. Furthermore, a forthcoming study on Soviet military policy by Michael MccGwire shows that major changes have occurred in Soviet military doctrine and forces as a result of conscious decisions by the political-military leadership.[12] Nevertheless, conversations with Soviets as well as a review of Soviet writings suggest that under normal circumstances, the bureaucratic process often has a life of its own.

Most likely, the military's monopoly of expertise will combine with the systemic secrecy prevalent in the Soviet Union to ensure that the military as an institution will retain its pivotal position in areas directly relevant to national security.

On broader policy issues, there are some signs that senior Soviet military officers may be concerned over aspects of Gorbachëv's arms control policies as well as his efforts to cut back on military spending.[13] However, they currently appear to lack the strong dynamic leader necessary to challenge the country's top political leader. This could change were Gorbachëv to run into serious domestic problems or if US-Soviet relations deteriorate further. For the present, the role of the Soviet military at the highest level of decisionmaking can best be described as subdued, but restive.

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[12] Michael MccGwire, *Soviet Military Objectives*, Washington, DC, Brookings, forthcoming. This book, which explores the impact of external influences on Soviet military doctrine and force structure, will doubtless elicit considerable interest in both academic and government communities.

[13] See Dale R. Herspring, "The Soviet Military in the Aftermath of the 27th Party Congress," forthcoming in *Orbis*.

Correspondence

NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to
The Editors,
Problems of Communism
US Information Agency,
4th Street, SW,
Washington, DC 20547, USA

DKP LEGALITY

TO THE EDITORS: In the March-April 1985 issue of *Problems of Communism* there is an interesting and well-documented article entitled "Checklist of Communist Parties in 1984." A reading of the "Checklist" did, however, raise one question on which I would appreciate further clarification.

On page 97, entry number 52 refers to the existence of a Communist Party in West Germany, which has 50,842 members, is led by Herbert Mies, and enjoys the right to function as a legal organization. However, the information at my disposal indicates that the Communist Party is banned in the Federal Republic of Germany. I would appreciate learning from the analysts of the "Checklist" whether or not the information I have is correct.

In the FRG, the Communist Party was dissolved as the result of a sentence handed down by the Federal Constitutional Court on August 17, 1956. The party appealed to the Human Rights Commission of the Council of Europe, alleging that this sentence violated Articles 9 (freedom of thought), 10 (freedom of expression), and 11 (freedom of association) of the European Convention on the Human Rights of Man of November 4, 1950. This complaint was submitted as number 250-57 before the Commission against the Federal Republic of Germany.

The demand was declared inadmissible by the Commission. The Commission deemed that the Federal Constitutional Court was correct in having declared that the German Communist Party was unconstitutional and thus deserved to be dissolved. It is to be recalled that the Fundamental Law of the Federal Republic of Germany (Article 21, paragraph 2) declared unconstitutional those parties that, by virtue of their program or the activity of their members, tend to threaten the free and democratic constitutional order or to overthrow or endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Perhaps the most important of the arguments used by the Commission was that which stated: The aim is to prevent totalitarian elements from being able to exploit to their benefit principles recognized by the Convention, i.e., to invoke the rights of freedom to suppress the rights of man. I expressed this last point of view in a footnote to page 48 of my essay "Central America Between the White House and Revolutionary War," published in the spring of 1980 during the Carter presidency.

When I see the Communist Party of West Germany classified as "legal" in your "Checklist," I presume that the situation has changed. If this is the case, could you please furnish me with the particulars concerning when and how this change took place?

DR. EMILIO MAZA
Guatemala City

THE EDITORS RESPOND: Dr. Maza correctly notes the August 1956 decision of West Germany's Federal Constitutional Court to outlaw the Communist Party of Germany. That party, the *Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands* (KPD), was never relegalized.

However, in September 1968 a new, legal German Communist Party (*Deutsche Kommunistische Partei*—DKP) was constituted. The DKP, which quickly absorbed much of the membership of the outlawed KPD, has been allowed to operate in the Federal Republic of Germany as a legal organization ever since. (On this development, see Richard F. Staar, Ed., *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1969*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1970, pp. 349–57.)

THE EDITORS

ON SHABASHNIKI

TO THE EDITORS: Patrick Murphy in his etymological explanation of the word *shabashniki* ("Soviet *Shabashniki:* Material Incentives at Work," *Problems of Communism*, November-December 1985) neglects to mention that the word actually comes from the Jewish day of rest —*Shabbes* in Yiddish, or *shabash* as it appears in Ozhegov's dictionary of the Russian language (Moscow, Russkiy yazyk, 1983, p. 790).

At the same time, I would like to take this opportunity to let you know how much I appreciate your journal.

ISABELLE T. KREINDLER
Department of English
University of Haifa
Israel

ON IMRE NAGY AND KÁDÁRISM

TO THE EDITORS: In his otherwise interesting review in the January-February 1986 issue of *Problems of Communism*, Vladimir Tismaneanu repeats a few factual errors and questionable judgments contained in *Hungary 1956 Revisited*, written by Ferenc Fehér and Agnes Heller.

1. Imre Nagy's "last words" to the court in 1958, as quoted by Fehér and Heller, are indeed moving: "One thing alone would repulse me: to be rehabilitated by those who will murder me." Alas, according to the testimony of his co-defendants who survived the trial, Nagy said nothing of the sort. He declined to take advantage of his right to address the court; he did not ask for leniency. Only after the death sentence was pronounced did he make a one-sentence statement, in which he asserted his faith in the ultimate judgment of history and the labor [communist] movement. Nagy was a genuine hero; there is no need to enhance his reputation with fictitious additions.

2. Fehér and Heller claim that Nagy rejected "Khrushchevism" as being a "paternalistic consolidation of Stalin's decaying work." Nagy had done nothing of the sort. He had admired Khrushchev for trying to make up with Tito and especially for his de-Stalinization campaign. Whether a Eurocommunist or not, Nagy was a true believer who lost his faith in Khrushchev only when Soviet troops entered Hungary on November 1, 1956, and crushed the revolution three days later. Again, it is unnecessary to embellish Nagy's past by assigning to him political attitudes held by Fehér and Heller and decidedly not by Nagy himself.

3. Nagy's associate, Géza Losonczy, did not confess to being a Titoist spy "during his last year." Losonczy was first arrested, tortured, and tried in 1951, when he made his "confession." He was released in 1954. He was a member of Nagy's cabinet during the 1956 revolution. He died in prison in 1957.

Finally, while this is not the place to begin a debate about Kádár's Hungary, allow me to object to Dr. Tismaneanu's reference to what he calls "the fellow-traveler-style literature concerning Kádár's 'liberal' despotism." Although the word "liberal" does not apply to the Kádár regime, that government *is* a more tolerant and indeed paternalistic dictatorship than any other in the Soviet bloc. US Secretary of State George Shultz is hardly a fellow traveler for having referred to Kádár as a "wise man" to whom, he found, it was "well worth listening." Having contributed a brilliant analysis of Nicolae Ceauşescu's Romania to the January-February 1985 issue of *Problems of Communism*, Mr. Tismaneanu surely knows the difference between domestic conditions in contemporary Romania and Hungary. All communist despotisms are not alike.

CHARLES GATI
Dept. of Political Science
Union College
Schenectady, NY

MR. TISMANEANU RESPONDS: I am really indebted to Professor Charles Gati for his illuminating comments on my essay on critical Marxism. In my opinion, a resumption of the debate concerning the fate of Marxism—both as theory and practice—in Eastern-Central Europe would be more than welcome. The main thrust of my article was to indicate the innovative approach to the moral and political dilemmas of Soviet-type regimes undertaken by the distinguished scholars who are grouped in the Budapest School.

At the same time, I did wish to dispel a certain aura of benevolence surrounding not only the Kádár regime, but also the Yugoslav one, both perceived in the West, and not without *some* legitimate reasons, as less oppressive and dogmatic than other post- or neo-Stalinist societies. I share with Professor Gati the conviction that there are enormous differences between Ceauşescu's grotesque performance and Kádár's paternalistic behavior, distinctions that cannot be overlooked by any fair-minded student of communist affairs.

All this notwithstanding, it seems to me obvious that Kádár's more "enlightened" pattern of domination has failed to bring about more than a mere promise of genuine political pluralism. True, all communist despotisms are not alike, but they are still communist despotisms. The forced exile of the members of the Budapest School in Hungary and the harassment of certain intellectuals there who have spelled out "inconvenient" ideas (Miklos Haraszti, Gaspar Miklos Tamás, et al.) are more than telling in this respect.

I would not deny the enviable fact (enviable at least from the Romanian or Czech perspective) that critical intelligence is less humiliated in Hungary than in other communist countries. But I think this situation should not be allowed to overshadow the Budapest regime's authoritarian features, which strikingly manifest themselves whenever the ruling party is confronted with real opposition. Economic reforms in Hungary may be a source for optimism, but the communist party is still the sole repository of political authority, even if it does not rely as decisively as some communist regimes on the political police and censorship.

It was only in this sense that I made an ironic comment on the fellow-traveler-style literature concerning the Hungarian experience under János Kádár. It is precisely this kind of semi-jubilant assessment of the Kádár regime that tends to engender feelings of frustration among Hungarian dissident intellectuals who are depicted by official propaganda as professional troublemakers working against the long-term interests of Hungarians. The margin of freedom is certainly wider in Hungary than in Ceauşescu's neo-feudal despotism, but observance of many basic human rights still belongs to the realm of unfulfilled desiderata in both of these states.

With regard to Imre Nagy's controversial "last words," I would dare to say that they belong to the oral tradition of the radical practice in this century. Professor Gati may be right in his belief that these words were apocryphal, a figment of imagination generated by passionate commitments to Nagy's memory. György Krasso, a Hungarian intellectual, who is among the most knowledgeable persons regarding the 1956 Revolution, offered the following information in an interview published in the Hungarian *samizdat* periodical *A Hirmondo* (The Messenger), No. 2, December 1983: "What became known was what he [Imre Nagy] did *not* say. The official press and the official white book on the case obviously contained nothing on the subject. But almost every publication issued in the West contained the text of a dramatic declaration. According to this version, Imre Nagy, availing himself of the right to speak his last words, is reported to have said that he had twice tried to save the honor of socialism in the valley of Danube, but that in both cases he had been prevented from doing so . . . . And that he was afraid of only one thing—that his murderers would be amongst those commemorating him . . . . A similar version of this last speech can also be found in [Sandor] Kopacsi's book (*In the Name of the Working Class*, London, 1979). Kopacsi was, of course, present at the trial, but even so, it seems that these words were in fact never pronounced. According to a version which *would seem more accurate* [Italics added—V.T.], Imre Nagy did *not* avail himself of the right to speak his last words; he said that the circumstances of the trial proved there was no point in saying anything. However, later, when the death sentence had been passed, and the judge, in accordance with the rules of judicial proceedings, asked him whether he wanted to appeal for pardon, he replied that he was not going to; he said he would have been rehabilitated by the international labor movement. Now, taking into consideration Imre Nagy's character, I think this version—so far unpublished—is more likely than the other one" ("The Memory of the Dead," interview with György Krasso, *Survey* [London], Summer 1984, p. 144).

It results that both versions, i.e., that mentioned by Heller and Fehér and the one defended by Krasso, converge on the most significant point: Imre Nagy's enduring commitment to the cause of humanist socialism, which for him was something absolutely different from, or opposite to, the frozen logic of bureaucratic domination. He went beyond the limited register of Khrushchevism, which was nothing but a desperate attempt to get rid of the most embarrassing and terrifying features of mature (read paranoid) Stalinism. Imre Nagy's political writings in 1955 and 1956, as well as his practical decisions as head of the Revolutionary Hungarian Government were thus primarily inspired by concern for the future of democracy in a really emancipated social space. Such a project may have been naïve and doomed to failure, but it was nevertheless inspired by the noblest motivations.

I have been told of more than one former Stalinist for whom the revelations of the 20th CPSU Congress amounted to an existential watershed, a painstaking break with an abhorred past. It was the privilege of Nagy (and his group) to have anticipated these crucial semantic, political, and ideological changes, and to have called for a *total* reconsideration of the *whole* socialist experience.

As for the strait jacket imposed by Kádárism on historical research, it is significant that the records of the Nagy affair, including the interrogations and trial, have not been published in Budapest. This is perhaps an indirect avowal of the regime's inability to face its specious legitimacy, or better said, to admit that its birth certificate was signed in blood.

VLADIMIR TISMANEANU
Foreign Policy
Research Institute
Philadelphia, PA

CORRECTIONS

Due to a printer's error, part of a sentence in Robert Sharlet's review essay "Politics of Soviet Law," published in the January-February 1986 issue of *Problems of Communism*, was omitted. The first two full paragraphs on page 59, column 3, should read:

> "For his part, Ioffe has in view primarily the period since Stalin, in which he sees a series of profound contradictions between the theory and the practice of Soviet law.
>
> On the other hand, the two legal scholars are in sharp disagreement over the function of law and the role of the jurist in the Soviet system. These differences are further magnified by the fact that Ioffe is drawing on past experience while Hazard is looking to the future."

* * *

In the insert to the map of Afghanistan on page 3 of the January-February 1986 issue of *Problems of Communism*, the large block of territory at the lower righthand corner was inadvertently mislabeled. The country should, of course, have been identified as India.

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

GORBACHËV AT THE HELM

Building Power and Authority

Thane Gustafson and Dawn Mann

Economic Program

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Imre Nagy and Moscow, 1953-56

Charles Gati

Moscow and South Yemen

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Watching China's Military: A Personal View

Harlan W. Jencks

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Cover: General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachëv addresses delegates at the opening session of the 27th Party Congress on February 25, 1986. Photo by TASS from SOVFOTO.

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IN THIS ISSUE OF

Problems of Communism

Articles

Gorbachëv's First Year: Building Power and Authority

Thane Gustafson and Dawn Mann

In his first year as general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachëv has gone a long way toward restoring the power of his office. The time was opportune to instigate a heavy turnover of cadres, and he seized the opportunity. But his power needs to be reinforced by authority, which is contingent on a viable program. Gorbachëv's economic blueprint for the Soviet Union contains some serious inherent contradictions. Their resolution will necessitate hard choices that will test Gorbachëv's strategy for building both power and authority.

Realities of Gorbachëv's Economic Program

Boris Rumer

Mikhail Gorbachëv's program to get the Soviet economy moving seems to differ little from the failed efforts of his predecessors. The effort to renovate and modernize existing production capacities is likely to founder because of insufficient output of machinery, and even if successful, would aggravate geographic imbalances in the economy. Measures to further centralize planning while decentralizing line decision-making will accomplish little without realistic pricing. More fundamentally, the continued primacy given to political power in the USSR stands in the way of intensification and rationalization of the economy.

Imre Nagy and Moscow, 1953-56

Charles Gati

The unfolding drama of the 1956 Hungarian revolution showed vividly flexibility, as well as duplicity and confusion, in Soviet policy-making. The decisions on Hungary made by Soviet leaders after Stalin's death in 1953 were largely influenced by their own infighting over the policy course at home. As Imre Nagy was trying to shape a popular revolution in Hungary into a form acceptable to Moscow, he eventually realized that he had been duped by the Soviet leadership. Only then did he emancipate himself from Moscow's tutelage and so became the symbol and hero of the Hungarian revolution.

Moscow and Aden: Coping with a Coup

David Pollock

Two weeks of bloody fighting in January 1986 ousted President Ali Nasir Muhammad of the People's Democratic Republic of [South] Yemen, the only avowedly Marxist state, and closest ally of the Soviet Union, in the Arab world. This latest link in a long chain of violent internal political crises in Aden offers an instructive illustration of acute factional rivalry within Marxist Third World regimes, and of assertive Soviet responses to it. In South Yemen as elsewhere, the Soviets appear to have underestimated, at considerable cost, the enduring force of factional, tribal, and indeed national loyalties underlying an imported ideological veneer.

(Abstracts continued on reverse side)

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Note

Watching China's Military: A Personal View

Harlan W. Jencks

Although the volume of material written about Chinese military affairs has expanded exponentially in recent years, much of it has been of poor quality. Little is known about how Chinese military decisions are made, and access to Chinese military installations is still extremely limited. Yet, there is a small corps of serious and qualified China specialists, known collectively as China military watchers, who publish informative and insightful studies on Chinese military affairs.

Essay-reviews

PCI Weighs Soviet Foreign Policy

John A. Baker

The Italian Communist Party (PCI), which had differentiated itself from the Soviet domestic model of socialism after 1956, was slow in breaking with the Soviet foreign policy line. Not until 1980-81, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, did PCI Secretary General Enrico Berlinguer voice his devastating critique of Soviet foreign policy as a "policy of power." Recent studies indicate that today the PCI elite holds varying views on Soviet foreign policy, ranging from those approximating Berlinguer's critique and supporting the PCI's estrangement from the Soviet Union, to those less critical of Soviet policy and aiming for rapprochement between the PCI and the CPSU.

GDR Dichotomies

David Childs

Life in the German Democratic Republic, according to official GDR media, is getting better and better. There are new victories on the production front, more homes built, more teachers trained, more books published. To some, however, "real existing socialism" in East Germany has meant the creation of an unreal world by the media, the failure of an economic system, the preponderance of special privilege, and the hypocrisy of "democratic centralism."

Gorbachëv's First Year: Building Power and Authority

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Thane Gustafson and Dawn Mann

Mikhail Gorbachëv has now been General Secretary of the CPSU for more than a year. It is still much too soon to take his measure as a leader, but it is not too soon to begin analyzing his strategy for building power and authority. How does his approach differ from that of his predecessors? What does it tell us about the political resources available to a general secretary in the third generation of the Soviet system?

The most fundamental question about any political system is how power is derived and distributed in it. Yet among observers of the Soviet polity, no question is less settled. Western writings a generation ago stressed the crucial importance of control over party cadres. For example, Zbigniew Brzezinski noted:

> *In the Soviet Union the division of power means the sharing of a single resource: control over the Party organization. . . . Industrial authority, scientific knowledge, military expertise, national popularity, personal wealth, ethnic group support, are neither autonomous nor deployable on the plains of politics in the same manner [as in other systems].*[1]

Yet, while Nikita Khrushchev's control over the "cadres weapon" remained intact to the end, it did not save him from being overthrown. And under Leonid Brezhnev this instrument of power appeared to erode, both in frequency and effectiveness of use. Wrestling to reconcile such facts, Western scholars over the last 20 years have attempted to assess the changes in the sources of power in Soviet politics.[2]

Their main theses can be summed up in this way: the range of resources for power has broadened, and some of Brzezinski's "non-deployable resources" have become factors that general secretaries must now reckon with. Unwritten conventions on promotion and representation have come to limit a general secretary's choices in applying the cadres weapon. The distribution of political forces has shifted: the party apparatus in the provinces matters less, while the major state institutions in Moscow have increased their presence and influence. The end result is oligarchy rather than one-man rule, a politics of accommodation instead of dictate. The power of any one general secretary may increase the longer he serves, but the

Thane Gustafson is Director of the Soviet Studies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University (Washington, DC), and Dawn Mann is a Research Associate at the Center. *The authors are grateful to Timothy Colton, Werner Hahn, Jerry Hough, Michel Tatu, and Elizabeth Teague for their helpful criticism. Personnel analysis for this article was assisted by SOVT/Le Monde in Paris and by SOVSET', a computer network linking the Soviet studies community in North America and Western Europe. The authors thank the F. H. Prince Charitable Trusts for their support. A preliminary version of this article was presented at the March 1986 meeting of the British National Association for Soviet and East European Studies, Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge.*

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[1] Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Power, USA/USSR*, New York, Viking, 1964, pp. 194–95.

[2] See especially Grey Hodnett, "The Pattern of Leadership Politics," in Seweryn Bialer, Ed., *The Domestic Sources of Soviet Foreign Policy*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1980, pp. 87–118; T. H. Rigby, "A Conceptual Approach to Authority, Power, and Policy in the Soviet Union," in T. H. Rigby, Archie Brown, and Peter Reddaway, Eds., *Authority, Power, and Policy in the USSR*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1980, pp. 9–31; and Paul Cocks, "The Rationalization of Party Control," in Chalmers Johnson, Ed., *Change in Communist Systems*, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1970, pp. 153–90.

long-term trend is for the power of successive general secretaries to decline,[3] while that of various groups rises.[4]

A distinct but complementary line of analysis holds that Western scholars have consistently exaggerated the role of *power* in Soviet politics while neglecting that of *authority*. The essential strategy for a general secretary is to convince the political elite of the legitimacy of his policy programs and of his own competence or indispensability as a leader, and thus to build the necessary consensus for effective rule.[5] In this view, the office of general secretary was weakened because its incumbent was unable to build lasting authority.

The "new views" left several questions unresolved. First, how can effective authority exist without power? Thus, the real challenge is to understand the relationship between the two. Second, was the decline of the general secretary's power necessarily permanent? T. H. Rigby, drawing on Max Weber's typology of authority, reminded his readers that the Soviet bureaucracy exists not to apply rules but to meet targets. Therefore, the Soviet system always retains the potential to favor a charismatic leader.[6] Third, were scholars erecting into laws of Soviet politics what in fact were the products of Brezhnev's personality and the circumstances under which he came to power? By 1982, after 18 years of Brezhnev's "stability of cadres," the political elite was evidently less afraid of a strong leader than it was desirous of one.

This was more or less the state of Western discussions at the time Brezhnev died. Yuriy Andropov's accession and the changes he launched in his 15 months in office suggested how much might still be achieved by a general secretary with an effective strategy for building power and authority.[7] This potential has been the special fascination of Gorbachëv's first year.

I. BUILDING POWER

Not since the 1930's has there been so vast a turnover of the Soviet political and administrative elite in so short a time. In the Politburo and in the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers, a majority of today's membership was either moved in or up in less than a year.[8] In the Council of Ministers as a whole, 39 of the 101 members of March 1985 are gone,[9] while in the Central Committee, 14 of 23 heads of department have been replaced.

Outside the central apparatus, the first secretaryship has changed hands in 24 of 72 second-order party committees (Moscow city, 6 krays, 49 oblasts, and 16 autonomous republics) in the Russian Republic (RSFSR), and in 23 of 78 similar committees in the non-Russian republics.[10] Four out of 14 first secretaries of republican parties are new. The sweep has reached far down into the ranks of the party and state hierarchy. In Uzbekistan, over half of the officials in posts on the nomenklatura lists supervised by the all-Union and Uzbek central committees have been replaced;[11] the situation is similar in Kirgizia and may soon be repeated in Turkmenistan.[12] The Moscow city committee has been a prime target since Viktor Grishin's dismissal.[13] Throughout the country perhaps one-fifth of all officials of primary party organizations have been removed,[14] and the number of government officials transferred or dismissed may reach into the tens of thousands.[15]

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[3] Archie Brown, "The Power of the General Secretary of the CPSU," in Rigby, Brown, and Reddaway, op cit., pp. 135–57.

[4] Just which groups gain power in such circumstances has been controversial. According to Harry Gelman, the Politburo continues to monopolize power (see Gelman, *The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Detente*, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1984). Jerry Hough, on the other hand, suggests a greater, perhaps even decisive, role for the Central Committee (see Hough, "Soviet Succession: Issues and Personalities," *Problems of Communism* [Washington, DC], September-October 1982, and "Gorbachëv's Strategy," *Foreign Affairs* [New York], Fall 1985).

[5] The most systematic and original thinking along these lines is that of George Breslauer in *Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders: Building Authority in Soviet Politics*, London, Allen and Unwin, 1982.

[6] T. H. Rigby, "Political Legitimacy, Weber, and Communist Mono-organizational Systems," in T. H. Rigby and Ferenc Feher, Eds., *Political Legitimation in Communist States*, London, Macmillan, 1982, pp. 1–26.

[7] This theme is developed further, together with an analysis of recent Western scholarship, in Thane Gustafson, "The Andropov Accession," in Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Ed., *Soviet Politics in the 1980s*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1985, pp. 3–22.

[8] From March 1985 to March 1986 there were eight additions to the Politburo (Yegor Ligachëv, Nikolay Ryzhkov, Lev Zaykov, Nikolay Slyun'kov, Sergey Sokolov, Yuriy Solov'yev, Nikolay Talyzin, and Boris Yel'tsin), two promotions (Viktor Chebrikov and Eduard Shevardnadze), and five departures (Viktor Grishin, Grigoriy Romanov, Nikolay Tikhonov, Ivan Kuznetsov, and Boris Ponomarëv). To compare, Khrushchev made two even vaster sweeps of the Politburo in the 1950's, first making 29 changes during a contraction from 1958 to 1961. (It should be noted, however, that it took him five years to accomplish the first sweep, and three more for the second.)

[9] This figure is based on personnel with ministerial rank and excludes transfers and promotions within the Council itself (thus, for example, Talyzin, Yuriy Batalin, and Ivan Silayev are not counted). The chairmen of republic councils of ministers, though technically ex officio members of the all-Union council, are not included in the calculation. Five agricultural ministries and one state committee were absorbed into the new State Agro-Industrial Committee in November 1985; of the six officials involved, only two (Yevgeniy Sizenko and Leonid Khitrun) are still members of the Council of Ministers today.

[10] This count excludes autonomous oblasts.

[11] See Inamdzhon Usmankhodzhayev's speech at the 27th CPSU Congress, as reported in *Pravda* (Moscow), Feb. 28, 1986. However, the purge in Uzbekistan began before Gorbachëv's accession.

[12] See ibid., Mar. 31, 1986. So far, Tadzhikistan has escaped major changes. In Kazakhstan, despite Dinmukhamed Kunayev's survival, only 31 percent of the 1381 republic central committee were reelected. See Bess Brown, "The Sixteenth Congress of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan: Personnel Changes," *Radio Liberty Research* (Munich), RL 91/86, Feb. 21, 1986.

But as one looks for possible political strategies behind these astonishing statistics, one finds ambiguities. The new leadership has taken substantial advantage of the advanced age of the Brezhnevian elite to ease out many of its oldest members, but far from all of them. Their replacements are younger, but not strikingly so. As a result, the so-called postwar generation has still not quite replaced its predecessors.

The average age of the new full and candidate Politburo members appointed under Gorbachëv is 61, and that of new members of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers is 57.[16] This brings the combined average down to 63 for the Politburo and to 62 for the Presidium, which is still high by past standards (55 was the average age of the Politburo elected in 1966). Similarly, the average age of new ministers and state committee chairmen appointed in the last year is 57, actually slightly older than their counterparts were when appointed in the first decade of the Brezhnev era.[17] Gorbachëv is still the youngest member of the Politburo,[18] being somewhat younger than his prime minister and most of his new ministers, and 11 years younger than his apparent second-in-command, Yegor Ligachëv.

It appears that the principal victims of the sweep have been older officials—at least this is the case at the upper levels, where we have the best age data on those dismissed. Among the RSFSR obkom first secretaries born in or before 1920, for example, 12 out of 15 lost their posts in the last year, a much higher proportion than for the group as a whole.[19] Similarly, of the members of the March 1985 Presidium of the Council of Ministers, 8 out of 11 are now gone. But it is striking how many very senior officials remain in their jobs. More than one-third of the full members of the new Central Committee, for example, have held their positions for 10 years or more. Some of the oldest members of the Council of Ministers are still there, such as the 81-year-old Minister for Nonferrous Metallurgy, Pëtr Lomako.

In other respects, too, the changes have been smaller in scope than one might have expected. The Central Committee is again the best example: 59 percent of the full members of the 1981 Central Committee still living were reelected, a sharp drop to be sure from the 89 and 87 percent reelected at the last two party congresses but about the same as in 1956 and more than in 1961 (see Figure 1). Two unexpected factors help explain the surprisingly high proportion of holdovers: (1) for the first time since the October Revolution, the number of full members on the Central Committee actually declined, from 319 to 307; and (2) five prominent former Brezhnev officials, though retired from their principal posts, retained their places on the Central Committee.[20] But for that, Gorbachëv would easily have had a majority of new full members.[21]

Certain groups have been relatively untouched so far. Few top KGB positions have changed hands. The military-industrial ministries have had no top-level dismissals,[22] although the long-time head of the Military-

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[13] Of the Moscow city party officials elected in January 1984, only the following remained after the *gorkom* (city committee) conference of January 1986: 81 out of 175 *gorkom* members, 3 out of 14 bureau members, and none of 6 secretaries (a seventh, Lev Spiridonov, appointed after January 1984, has likewise departed). These numbers, however, include changes made before Gorbachëv's accession. We are indebted to Professor Timothy Colton for this information.

[14] *Pravda*, Feb. 12, 1986.

[15] Many job shifts are connected with management reorganizations; thus the Ministry of Instrument Making, Automation Equipment, and Control Systems (*Minpribor*) is reassigning 800 middle-level officials as a result of the elimination of the middle link in the management system. See Ye. Panov, "The Branch Makes The Choice," *Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya* (Moscow), July 19, 1985, p. 2.

[16] The seven new members of the Presidium are Talyzin (born 1929), Vsevolod Murakhovskiy (1926), Ivan Silayev (1930), Ryzhkov (1929), Batalin (1927), Yuriy Maslyukov (1937), and Lev Voronin (1928).

[17] The average age of ministers/state committee chairmen appointed in the years 1966–75 was slightly over 55. (These figures are based on the age of new ministers and heads of state committees, but not Presidium members.) There is no one in the current Council of Ministers as young as E. K. Pervyshin was when appointed minister of the communications equipment industry (41) or Talyzin was on appointment as minister of communications (45). The youngest of the new group is V. A. Bykov, head of the newly-renamed Ministry for the Medical and Microbiological Industry, who was born in 1938. For background, see T. H. Rigby, "The Soviet Government Since Khrushchev," *Politics* (Canberra), May 1977, pp. 5–22.

[18] Boris Yel'tsin is a close second, having turned 55 in January 1986.

[19] The retirees' dates of appointment are evenly scattered from 1956 to 1978; six were appointed under Khrushchev (Timbora Mal'bakhov, Anatoliy Drygin, Ivan Yunak, Vasiliy Konotop, Valeriy Marisov, and Stepan Avramenko) and six under Brezhnev (Filipp Knyazhev, Viktor Grishin, Nikolay Priyezzhev, Fëdor Meshkov, Ivan Bespalov, and Pavel Leonov). In other words, they do not constitute a cluster of readily identifiable protégés or clients.

[20] The holdovers are Nikolay Baybakov, Boris Ponomarëv, Nikolay Tikhonov, Sergey Gorshkov, and Vladimir Tolubko. The last two are former high military commanders. Kuznetsov might be considered part of the list as well, but he may retain his functions as first deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

[21] Among Central Committee candidate members, the turnover is much greater. Of the 170 candidates elected in 1986, only 49 had been among the candidate members elected in 1981. However, another 23 of the 1981 group were promoted to full membership in 1986, and 11 had been promoted between 1981 and 1986.

[22] The aged minister of the electronics industry, Aleksandr Shokin, retired in November 1985 because of bad health. Ivan Silayev, Minister of the Aviation Industry, was promoted to the head of the Council of Ministers' new Bureau for Machine-building (with the rank of deputy chairman of the Council).

Figure 1: Rates of Reelection of Surviving Full Members of the CPSU Central Committee, 1956-86



Industrial Commission, Leonid Smirnov, has retired.[23] Changes among RSFSR obkom first secretaries 65 years old or younger have all been promotions, with only one exception;[24] and all 9 of the first secretaries appointed by Brezhnev since 1977 are still in place.[25] Last, some republics, particularly Ukraine, have undergone far fewer changes than the rest. As a general rule, turnover rates have been greater at higher levels than at lower, and closer to the center than to the periphery.[26]

What, then, is more important as a gauge of Gorbachëv's strategy and power—the unprecedented changes of the last year or the fact that they were not more far-reaching? Does the record suggest a powerful but judicious general secretary, or one who must share power and reckon with internal divisions and the possibility of spreading resistance and opposition? To arrive at some answers, we explore four test questions:

- Has Gorbachëv gained clear control over the levers of cadres selection and have the levers themselves regained their traditional functions?
- Has the center's control over cadres been successfully wrested from local leaders and has the General Secretary broken up local networks and established his own?
- Has the new leadership broken with the unwritten conventions on personnel that gradually became the norm under Brezhnev?
- Does Gorbachëv have only a brief window of opportunity to make personnel changes and, if so, how long will it remain open?

We shall examine each of these questions in turn.

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[23] Smirnov was replaced by Maslyukov who, after a rapid rise through the Izhevsk machine-building factory and the Ministry of Defense Industry, and a tour in Gosplan, is now the youngest member of the Presidium.

[24] Among RSFSR obkom first secretaries born in 1921 or since, there have been 11 promotions but only 1 retirement, that of Vladimir Nikulin, born in 1928. Nikulin was one of the last Brezhnev appointees, having risen through the ranks of the Kalmyk hierarchy to reach the top of the obkom in 1978, a typical Brezhnevian career. The official reason given for his retirement was ill health. See *Pravda*, Dec. 21, 1985.

[25] They are Anatoliy Balandin (Orenburg oblast), Fëdor Kulikov (Penza oblast), Nikolay Mal'kov (Magadan oblast), Yevgeniy Murav'yev (Kuybyshev oblast), Vladimir Odintsov (Severo-Osetinskaya ASSR), Grigoriy Posibeyev (Mariyskaya ASSR), Yuriy Prokop'yev (Yakutskaya ASSR), Pëtr Tret'yakov (Sakhalin oblast), and Gumer Usmanov (Tatarskaya ASSR).

[26] In Armenia, 50 percent of the 1986 Central Committee are new; in Lithuania only 30 percent. See Elizabeth Teague, "Turnover in the Soviet Elite under Gorbachëv: Implications for Soviet Politics," paper presented at a May 8, 1986 meeting of the Washington, DC, Chapter of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies.

Cadres Selection

The classic lever for personnel control from the earliest days of the Soviet regime has been the Organizational Party Work Department of the Central Committee. Under previous general secretaries, the head of that department was normally a carefully chosen protégé. However, throughout the Brezhnev era, the official in charge was Ivan Kapitonov, who did not owe his career to Brezhnev or to any other of the top leaders.[27] His very lack of visible political ties appeared to reflect the new leadership's determination to maintain collegial control over personnel policy and to prevent a reoccurrence of Khrushchev's abuse of the cadres lever.[28] The turnover of the top elite slowed steadily from what it had been under Khrushchev. The Central Committee, in particular, came to resemble a life peerage, as Figure 1 demonstrates.

The decline in turnover was especially noticeable among provincial party leaders in the Russian republic. From October 1965 to February 1971, 43 out of 72 first secretaries were replaced; from February 1971 to September 1976, only 19; and from September 1977 to November 1982, a mere 9. Few obkom first secretaryships changed hands twice under Brezhnev, and when they did, the change frequently involved a promotion.[29]

As cadres turnover declined, the Organizational Party Work Department took on trouble-shooting assignments in other areas. Boris Yel'tsin, Grishin's replacement as head of the Moscow city party committee, told the 27th Party Congress:

> *The Organizational Party Work Department is clearly overworked. Is there anything it is not involved in—railroad cars, fodder for livestock, and fuel? All that is important, of course. But the most important thing of all is cadres, and that is precisely the work that was neglected. The Party Organizational Work Department knew little about party cadres and monitored their work poorly . . . . How else can one explain the collapse that was allowed in several oblast, kray, and republic-level party organizations?*[30]

Wielders of the "cadres weapon": at left, Georgiy Razumovskiy, new CPSU Central Committee secretary for cadres; at right, Yegor Ligachëv, Razumovskiy's predecessor and now presumably second-in-command of the CPSU Politburo after Mikhail Gorbachëv.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

These words imply that Andropov and Gorbachëv faced a double task, that of reasserting control over the Organizational Party Work Department and of returning it to its traditional duties. In the spring of 1983, Andropov replaced Kapitonov with a new chief of cadres, Yegor Ligachëv. Like Kapitonov, Ligachëv did not owe his career to the General Secretary or any of the new leaders,[31] but it was clear from the first that he was chosen for the purpose of overseeing an active personnel policy. In April 1985, Ligachëv was promoted to full member of the Politburo and replaced in the Organizational Party Work Department by Georgiy Razumovskiy, formerly kraykom first secretary in Krasnodar and an individual whose career suggests a close association with Gorbachëv.[32]

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[27] Kapitonov rose through the ranks of the Moscow party apparatus, heading the city committee from 1952 to 1954 and the oblast committee from 1954 to 1959. He then headed the Ivanovo oblast committee from 1959 to 1964. Kapitonov was appointed CC secretary with responsibility for party cadres in 1965 and retained that position until Andropov became general secretary.

[28] For most of the Brezhnev period Kapitonov's formal superior for cadres policy was Andrey Kirilenko, who appeared to be Brezhnev's man. However, Kapitonov may have been informally accountable to other members of the Politburo as well, including Mikhail Suslov. For reviews of the apparent roles of Kapitonov and Kirilenko in cadres policy, see Harry Gelman, *The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Detente*, pp. 55, 75–76, and 254; and T. H. Rigby, "The Soviet Regional Leadership: the Brezhnev Generation," *Slavic Review* (Columbus, OH), March 1978, p. 9.

[29] Rigby, "The Soviet Regional Leadership," loc. cit., pp. 11–12.

[30] For the text of Yel'tsin's speech, see *Pravda*, Feb. 27, 1986.

[31] Ligachëv had spent the previous 18 years as first secretary of the Tomsk oblast committee. T. H. Rigby speculates that Ligachëv may have been sponsored originally by Suslov (Rigby, "The Soviet Regional Leadership," loc. cit., p. 11). Jerry Hough, on the other hand, points out a connection with Kirilenko, under whom Ligachëv served in the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee in the early 1960's (Hough, "Andropov's First Year," *Problems of Communism*, November-December 1983, p. 59). Neither of these ties, however, appears especially strong.

The implications of Ligachëv's appointment and subsequent promotion for Gorbachëv's own control over the levers of personnel are not yet clear. Gorbachëv is thought to have been in charge of party cadres under both Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko; Ligachëv, in other words, initially reported to him. With Razumovskiy's appointment and Ligachëv's elevation to the Politburo, Ligachëv may continue to oversee cadres policy, but from a position of greater power. At the 27th Party Congress Ligachëv spoke with authority about cadres—at greater length in fact than Gorbachëv himself. And Ligachëv's use of the word "collegial" to describe the work of the Politburo and the Secretariat (he was the only speaker at the Congress to do so) hardly suggested someone who regards himself as the General Secretary's man. In sum, the machinery for personnel control has been reactivated, but Gorbachëv may share control over it with senior colleagues.

Central Control

Under Brezhnev the power of local patronage went by default to regional and local leaders, who used it to build followings of their own. The cadres weapon, in other words, did not disappear; it was simply being wielded at a lower level.[33] Several speakers at the 27th Party Congress commented on the consequences. Boris Yel'tsin observed that in the Brezhnev years certain people and positions belonged to "zones beyond criticism, particularly in Central Asia." Ligachëv was even blunter:

> *The necessary trust in cadres gave way to a blind trustfulness, and basically, to an absence of monitoring. Words about a "caring attitude" toward cadres, though correct in themselves, frequently served to cover up a policy of benign neglect and all-forgiving indulgence. The line calling for "stability of cadres" was systematically turned into a policy of immobility.*[34]

Since Brezhnev's death, and especially under Gorbachëv, the center has sharply reasserted its powers and prerogatives in local cadres policy. The most spectacular case is Uzbekistan, where many local officials have been replaced by outsiders sent from the Central Committee in Moscow and from elsewhere, while a new generation of Uzbek party officials has been sent to higher party schools around the RSFSR.[35]

To strengthen the power of the center, the new leadership has dusted off an old device and put it to an intriguing new use. Over half of the new obkom first secretaries and republican first secretaries appointed under Gorbachëv were previously rotated to the Central Committee in Moscow for a brief tour of duty, most often with the rank of "inspector."[36] This maneuver evidently began under Andropov, though the officials involved only began taking up their obkom positions under Gorbachëv. The post of "inspector" is associated in party history with a postwar purge of provincial leaderships, and that is presumably the association that its revival is meant to convey today,[37] though the designation of inspector occurred from time to time under both Khrushchev and Brezhnev. This technique must help the General Secretary in at least three ways: it gives him a close look at candidates for promotion; it gives him an effective instrument for purging the local apparatus; and once the former inspector takes his post as first secretary he presumably views himself (and is viewed by others) as "Moscow's man." Thus, rotation through the Central Committee could offset the factors that weakened the loyalty of regional officials under Brezhnev.[38]

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[32] Razumovskiy's career parallels Gorbachëv's in two respects: he rose as primarily an agricultural official, and he served for many years in Krasnodar Kray, which borders on Stavropol'. In particular, he chaired the Krasnodar Kray government's Executive Committee from 1973 to 1981, then headed the Agro-Industrial Complex Department of the USSR Council of Ministers from 1981 to 1983, when he was appointed first secretary of the Krasnodar Kray party committee. His earlier service in the Central Committee's Agricultural Department (1971–73) suggests possible ties to Gorbachëv's predecessor and early sponsor, Fëdor Kulakov.

[33] One symptom of this is that while the turnover rate of republic party leaders and RSFSR obkom first secretaries slowed sharply, the rate of movement below them remained high. See Jerry Hough, *Soviet Leadership in Transition* Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1980, pp. 70–75; idem, "Changes in Soviet Elite Composition," in Seweryn Bialer and Thane Gustafson, Eds., *Russia at the Crossroads: The 26th Congress of the CPSU*, London, Allen and Unwin, 1982, pp. 57–60.

[34] For Ligachëv's speech, see *Pravda*, Feb. 28, 1986.

[35] See Usmankhodzhayev's speech, ibid. Usmankhodzhayev hinted that there had been a first round of "restoration of order," presumably following Sharaf Rashidov's death at the end of October 1983, but that more recently the Uzbek Party "felt with new force the assistance of the CPSU Central Committee." This referred to a second round of purges that began after the Uzbek Central Committree plenum in June 1984, i.e., under Konstantin Chernenko.

[36] Of the 24 new RSFSR obkom and kraykom first secretaries appointed since March 11, 1985, 16 had been rotated to the Central Committee, 12 of them as inspectors; of the 23 non-Russian obkom secretaries, 6 had done a Central Committee tour, but in some cases only at a republic-level central committee. Of the four new republican first secretaries, Saparmurad Niyazov (Turkmenistan) and Absamat Masaliyev (Kirgizia) had recently done tours at the Central Committee, as had Masaliyev's second secretary. See Bess Brown, "New Party First Secretary in Turkmenistan," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 11/86, Dec. 23, 1985; and idem, "New Kirgiz First Secretary Cleans House," ibid., RL 15/86, Dec. 31, 1986.

[37] The position of inspector was first created in 1946. Stalin appointed N. S. Patolichev to head a new Central Committee office, an Administration for Checking Party Organs. Stalin and Patolichev called the Administration's officials "inspectors" and gave them wide powers. The purpose of the new body was to shake up the local party organs, which Stalin believed had grown lax during the war years. This episode is described in Werner Hahn, *Postwar Soviet Politics*, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1982, pp. 46–47, 54–55; and in Patolichev's memoirs, *Ispytaniye na zrelost'* (A Test of Maturity), Moscow, Politizdat, 1977.

Despite these measures, pockets of local patronage remain. The clearest case is the Ukrainian republic, whose party organization was extensively purged in the early 1970's after the removal of its previous leader Petro Shelest. The control of his successor, Volodymr Shcherbytskyi, has not yet been challenged, perhaps because he sided early with Andropov and Gorbachëv.[39] In Kazakhstan, by contrast, over 500 leading officials of the republican party machine have been purged without the removal of Dinmukhamed Kunayev himself, although he clearly opposed the changes.[40]

Has Gorbachëv begun to establish his own network? Brezhnev was as vigorous as any of his predecessors in one aspect of cadres policy: as he grew older, he advanced more and more former associates from his days in Moldavia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. But unlike Khrushchev, who installed his protégés at all levels, Brezhnev concentrated on the top. Gorbachëv has promoted several of his past associates from Stavropol', but so far mostly at the middle level. The only major exception is the chairman of the new State Agro-Industrial Commission, Vsevolod Murakhovskiy, who had succeeded Gorbachëv as kraykom first secretary in Stavropol'.[41]

What is striking about those recently promoted is the diversity of their backgrounds. This may reflect a deliberate strategy on the part of the General Secretary to widen the base of his support. The earliest cluster of high-level promotions under Gorbachëv consisted of officials first placed at the threshold by Andropov. Several of these had past connections with Andrey Kirilenko or Kirilenko's former party base in Sverdlovsk.[42] Since that first wave of promotions, other clusters have emerged as well. After the removal of Grigoriy Romanov,[43] several Leningraders appeared on the scene—notably Boris Aristov (Minister of Foreign Trade), Yuriy Solov'yev (the new Leningrad city party chief), Vasiliy Zakharov (new second secretary of the Moscow city party committee), and Lev Zaykov (the newest full member of the Politburo).[44] A third cluster is a group of officials from the southern regions of the country near Stavropol'. Beyond Murakhovskiy and Razumovskiy, the most prominent examples are

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[38] T. H. Rigby's "Soviet Regional Leadership" (loc. cit., p. 23) contains some thought-provoking observations on the factors affecting the extent to which patronage relationships produce loyalty to the patron. In contrast to Khrushchev, who frequently appointed former subordinates to first obkom secretaryships, Brezhnev limited this practice to his most senior appointments. Consequently, his appointments at the obkom level produced only the weakest form of patronage-loyalty relationship, one based on the act of appointment itself.

[39] For valuable background on Ukrainian cadres policy, which demonstrates that the practice of "trust in cadres" was not followed until after Shcherbytskyi's control was solidly established, see Mark R. Beissinger, "The Ukrainian Party Apparatus Compared," (manuscript to be published in 1987). Shcherbytskyi may have begun to distance himself from Brezhnev as early as 1980. In an interview in *Pravda*, of Dec. 28, 1980, Shcherbytskyi spoke of an unnamed leader who takes an "uneven attitude toward subordinates," keeping some "close at hand," while "others he will seem to hold at a far distance." In words that could be interpreted as a swipe at Chernenko, Shcherbytskyi warned that if the leader did not give all his subordinates access to him to raise important questions, he would end up being surrounded by a circle of obsequious people "who very skillfully find his weak points and use them for their own advantage." As a result, the leader's opinion of subordinates who are far away may become poisoned; he will label them "upstarts" and "quarrelsome," while in reality they are the "real enthusiasts," the ones who are "needed most of all."

[40] On Feb. 9, 1986, *Pravda* commented, "Numerous leading officials have been removed recently from the positions they occupied, but only at the insistence of the center. In other words, the Bureau and the Secretariat of the Kazakh Party, even though they knew about those officials' unworthy behavior and their failures on the job, did not take the necessary decisions."

[41] Another official with past ties to Gorbachëv is V. I. Kalashnikov, now first secretary of the Volgograd obkom, who rose through the ranks of Stavropol' to become kraykom secretary from 1975 to 1982. V. Volodin, obkom first secretary of Rostov, may be the same man who was agricultural secretary of Stavropol' obkom until 1983. In addition, several senior CC officials have ties with Gorbachëv: Veniamin Afonin, head of the Chemical Industry Department, served in Stavropol; Anatoliy Luk'yanov of the General Department was at Moscow State University with Gorbachëv, as were Valentin Chikin (the new editor of *Sovetskaya Rossiya*), Ivan Frolov (the new editor of *Kommunist*), and Lev Spiridonov (new first deputy editor of *Pravda*).

[42] The group of currently prominent people who served under Kirilenko in Sverdlovsk (1955–62) is small but select. It includes Yakov Ryabov (now deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers), Gennadiy Kolbin (appointed first obkom secretary in Ul'yanovsk under Andropov), and Lev Voronin (chairman of Gossnab and deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers). In some cases the tie is doubtful. Nikolay Kruchina (now head of the Central Committee's Administrative Organs Department) was a minor Komsomol official in Sverdlovsk oblast in Kirilenko's time; more significant, he was deputy head of the CC agriculture department under Gorbachëv in the late 1970's. Nikolai Ryzhkov was a junior official in Uralmashzavod in Sverdlovsk, while Boris Yel'tsin was rising in the field of mining construction; neither one was prominent enough at the time to be considered a Kirilenko protégé. Not all Sverdlovsk graduates have done well: Viktor Krotov, for example, became minister of Minenergomash under Brezhnev but was dismissed under Andropov. Other Kirilenko associations go back to his days in Dnipropetrovsk: Viktor Chebrikov's and Shcherbytskyi's initial ties were to Kirilenko rather than to Brezhnev.

[43] Gorbachëv's speech to the Leningrad party aktiv in May 1985 was full of praise for Leningrad as a pioneer in technological and industrial innovation—while Romanov, the man who had run Leningrad during this period, was nowhere to be seen. Gorbachëv's co-optation of Romanov's base in Leningrad came so quickly and was so overt that one wonders how long it had been in preparation. Could Romanov have been brought to Moscow in the spring of 1983 partly to get him away from Leningrad?

[44] Two other recent appointees with backgrounds in the Leningrad party apparatus include Anatoliy Dumachev (formerly second secretary of the Leningrad obkom under Romanov and subsequently first secretary of the Leningrad gorkom, now chairman of the State Committee for Vocational and Technical Education) and Valeriy Bykov (briefly head of a gorkom in Leningrad oblast', now minister of the Medical and Microbiological Industry). Dumachev's appointment can hardly be considered a promotion—unless Gorbachëv attaches truly exceptional importance to technical education.

Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, formerly head of Georgia's party, and Aleksandr Vlasov, the new minister of internal affairs.[45]

The Western press has made much of the highly visible group of appointments from the Urals and Siberia, but there is no reason to believe that it forms any sort of united group. A Yuriy Batalin or Boris Shcherbina, who rose through the energy industry, will hold different views from an Abel Aganbegyan, who advocates balanced Siberian development; Yel'tsin appears to differ from both Nikolay Ryzhkov and Ligachëv on issues such as publicity and party privilege; and Yakov Ryabov and Lev Voronin, despite a common background in Urals defense industries, now have different responsibilities and presumably different outlooks. Holdovers such as Viktor Dolgikh and Guriy Marchuk, though Siberian, appear to stand outside the new ruling group; and Mikhail Nenashev, though he rose through Magnitogorsk, does not necessarily have any "Siberian" views at all. In short, there is no single "eastern" faction.

Promotion Patterns

Under Brezhnev, personnel selection for certain important positions came to follow regular patterns. In the more technical ministries, new ministers were usually career specialists who rose through the ranks of their ministries to the position of first deputy.[46] Obkom first secretaries increasingly rose through their own oblasts, following careers that took them through a succession of local party and government posts.[47] Gorbachëv himself had the classic "Brezhnevian" career: 23 years rising through the ranks in the Stavropol' party organization, with no experience elsewhere (apart from his student days at Moscow State University) until his promotion to Moscow.

Under Gorbachëv, the predictable patterns of the Brezhnev era have weakened but have not disappeared entirely. Among the 29 "rank-and-file" ministers and heads of state committees appointed under him (i.e., other than those who are simultaneously members of the Presidium), 10 were previously first deputies or near equivalents,[48] and another 5 rose through closely related institutions. The career technical expert is clearly still the dominant type (19 out of 29).[49] The "party generalist," once dominant in the government, is limited to a handful of positions, most of them highly political.[50]

A similar pattern exists within the Presidium and even the new Politburo, giving a strongly technocratic cast to the new leadership. Only two of the new Politburo members, Ligachëv and Yel'tsin, could be considered to have had purely "party" careers;[51] three others have had "mixed" careers alternating between party and government; while the remaining five are co-opted government officials.[52] Such co-optation or choice of persons with mixed careers was not unknown in the Politburo under Brezhnev, but the representation of the pure party official has noticeably weakened since his death.[53]

The pattern of movement in another important group, the RSFSR obkom first secretaries, also shows a decline but not a disappearance of the Brezhnevian pattern. Only half of the 24 new appointees (to judge from the limited information currently available about them) made their careers in the region they now head (see Table 1). Under Brezhnev, the share of "natives"

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[45] In addition, at least two deputy chairmen of the new State Agro-Industrial Committee are southerners, notably deputy chairman A. A. Nikonov (head of the Stavropol' Agricultural Institute during Gorbachëv's tenure there) and G. A. Romanenko (newly appointed director of the Agricultural Institute of nearby Krasnodar). The authors are grateful to Werner Hahn for this information.

[46] T. H. Rigby documented the importance of the minister-technocrat under Brezhnev, particularly in the more technical ministries, in "The Soviet Government since Khrushchev," loc. cit.

[47] Rigby, "Soviet Regional Leaders," loc. cit. Again, the principal exception to this, particularly in the first decade of the Brezhnev era, was Ukraine.

[48] Gennadiy Voronovskiy, Yuriy Brezhnev, Veniamin Korolev, Serafim Kolpakov, Vladislav Kolesnikov, Nikolay Lemayev, Apollon Systsov, and Mikhail Shchadov were all first deputy heads of their agencies. Sergey Voyenushkin and Arkadiy Shchepetil'nikov were republic-level ministers who were promoted to head the counterpart central ministry.

[49] Within this group, however, are some novel and even unorthodox appointments. Two new ministers in the machine-building sector (Vladimir Luk'yanenko and Yevgeniy Varnachev) were appointed from major plants in the provinces. Four others were "co-opted specialists," i.e., officials who oversaw major technical operations from a party post (Vladimir Klyuyev, Valeriy Bykov, Konstantin Katushev, and Boris Gostev). Even some of the former first deputies have had careers that mark them as "new" men; for example, the new minister of the electronics industry, Vladislav Kolesnikov, was one of the first semiconductor specialists in Soviet industry, beginning in the 1950's.

[50] The "party generalist" is defined as an official who has spent most of his career in line party administration. There are 5 among the new ministers/chairmen: Shevardnadze (foreign affairs), Aristov (foreign trade), Vlasov (internal affairs), Nenashev (publishing), and Dumachev (vocational and technical education).

[51] The definition has to be stretched a bit in the case of Yel'tsin, who was in the construction industry until the age of 37.

[52] Shevardnadze, Chebrikov, and Solov'yev have held both major government and party positions, although Solov'yev's first major party position did not come until he was 38. Zaykov, Ryzhkov, Sokolov, Slyun'kov, and Talyzin had never held top party positions, except for Zaykov, who headed the Leningrad obkom after Romanov moved to Moscow in 1983. Of the new members of the Presidium, only Murakhovskiy has held major party posts.

[53] Nikolay Tikhonov, Andrey Gromyko, and even Kunayev were all co-opted state officials, and of the candidate members in November 1982 only Ponomarëv and Solomentsev could be termed "pure" apparatus men—and even the latter had had extensive factory experience. Still, in the November 1982 Politburo, half of the voting members had "pure" party careers.

Table 1: Last Positions of New RSFSR Obkom First Secretaries

(excluding Central Committee assignments)

	From same oblast/kray/ASSR
Obkom second secretary	Nikolay Yermakov, Viktor Zorkal'tsev, Valentin Kuptsov
Other secretary in obkom	Ivan Polozkov, Yegor Stroyev, Ivan Boldyrev, Yuriy Petrov
Gorkom first secretary	Leonid Sharin
First secretary of autonomous oblast	Yevgeniy Yeliseyev
Chairman oblast executive committee	Boris Volodin,[a] Yevgeniy Podol'skiy
First dep. chairman oblast executive committee	Vladimir Toropov
	From a different oblast/kray/ASSR
Obkom first secretary	Boris Yel'tsin, Aleksandr Khomyakov
Obkom second secretary	Pëtr Grishchenko, Mikhail Knyazyuk, Yuriy Liventsov
Other secretary in obkom	Vadim Bakatin, Aleksandr Plekhanov
Chairman oblast executive committee	Vladimir Zakharov[b]
	From Moscow central government
USSR minister	Valentin Mesyats, Yuriy Solov'yev
USSR deputy minister	Nikolay Tatarchuk
	Previous position unknown
	Pavel Smol'skiy

[a] Volodin previously served in Stavropol'.
[b] The post listed was in Sakhalin in the early 1980's; Zakharov's last previous position is unknown.

SOURCE NOTE: The authors are grateful to Werner Hahn and Elizabeth Teague for their help in compiling this information.

in such appointments was close to 70 percent; Gorbachëv's approach, which began under Andropov,[54] marks a return to the pre-1965 pattern.[55]

In the non-Russian republics, the proportion of "outsider" appointees is even higher, most notably in Uzbekistan. This may be because the new leaders in Moscow do not regard a brief tour at the CPSU Central Committee to be enough to overcome local ties. For the longer term, a new generation of Uzbek leaders is being trained at higher party schools around the country.[56]

One might have thought that 18 years of Brezhnevian personnel policy would produce a generation of party leaders with little experience of regions outside their own, provincial in every sense of the word, and ill-suited for national leadership—especially in contrast to the Moscow-based government technocracy. But Gorbachëv's first year has witnessed a mass migration of "provincials" to leading positions in Moscow. Not only have 11 obkom first secretaries been promoted to major positions, but many of the new members of the USSR Council of Ministers have come from the provinces, whether directly or indirectly.

This trend evidences more than a deliberate political strategy on the part of Andropov and Gorbachëv; it also reflects the fact that under Brezhnev the country's economy and technological structure became more diversified. The revival of Leningrad, the growth of high-technology industries in the Urals, the increase in the economic importance of Siberia, and the agricultural modernization of the south have created new managerial talent that is evidently anything but backward. In contrast, one notes the relative decline of the Moscow party apparatus, once a disproportionately significant source of leading cadres for the national government and the entire country. The virtual exclusion of Moscow party cadres from the new leadership, though in the near term a consequence of Viktor Grishin's disfavor, is the culmination of trends that have been under way for some time.[57]

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[54] Eight of 16 RSFSR first secretaries appointed under Andropov had previously held positions in the same oblast.

[55] Rigby, "Soviet Regional Leaders," loc. cit.

[56] Usmankhodzhayev's speech, *Pravda*, Feb. 28, 1986.

[57] The decline of the Moscow party apparatus is examined as part of a major study currently being prepared by Timothy Colton on Moscow and its government.

The Presidium of the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union responds to the applause of delegates at the opening session on February 25, 1986. In the front row, from left to right, are "second secretary," Yegor Ligachëv, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachëv, and Soviet President Andrey Gromyko; in the second row, left to right, Boris Yel'tsin, Vladimir Dolgikh, Vasiliy Kuznetsov, Marshal Sergey Sokolov, and Nikolay Talyzin; in the third row, left to right, Vsevolod Murakhovskiy, Aleksey Antonov, Yuriy Batalin, Lev Voronin, and Guriy Marchuk.

–TASS from SOVFOTO.

Continued Turnover?

Will the apparent revival of the cadres weapon turn out to be a passing thing, a "window of opportunity" that is already closing? The logic of this idea is that Gorbachëv enjoyed uniquely favorable circumstances at his accession: a conveniently superannuated, corrupt, and incompetent senior leadership; an absence of serious rivals at the top; the good fortune of coming into office one year before a party congress; and a widely shared mood for change at all levels of the system. But these advantages are already fading and will not recur.

Turnover cannot continue at the pace of Gorbachëv's first year, but the changes just reviewed suggest that the new leaders have already created the means for a lastingly vigorous cadres policy. The Organizational Party Work Department is back to its task of supervising cadres and is busy breaking up local patronage networks. New cadres are being drawn both from the center and from local elites (sanitized by rotation through Moscow). According to Ligachëv, this policy will continue:

> *We will draw from the ranks of local comrades and from those of officials transferred from the center and from other regions of the country. In that way experience is transmitted faster and the overall level of cadres rises more quickly.*[58]

The center has also served notice that, once appointed, the new local party leaders will not be allowed to build patronage networks of their own. Several speakers at the 27th Party Congress recommended that local officials be made to give regular accounts of themselves at Central Committee headquarters; presumably such accounts will focus especially on matters of personnel.

The atrophy of the cadres weapon under Brezhnev was a direct consequence of its hypertrophy under Khrushchev. The new leaders wish to avoid the extremes of constant pressure and excessive lenience. To quote Ligachëv again: "In the past, as you know, comrades, in these matters we had both hard frosts and thaws, but what we need is simply stable good weather."[59]

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[58] Ligachëv's speech, *Pravda*, Feb. 28, 1986.

The policy of "stable good weather" will increase not only the power of the center but probably also that of the general secretary himself. The changes since Brezhnev's death have brought in a diverse group without a single cluster large enough or like-minded enough to dominate. The strongly technocratic cast of the new appointees, whatever it may portend for Gorbachëv's authority-building strategy, may give him—a professional politician—a lasting edge in maneuver. Finally, since most of the new appointees are older than Gorbachëv himself, this is likely to extend his options, since no new "Generation of 1938" appears to be taking shape in the party leadership.

In sum, though one cannot be sure whether Gorbachëv has achieved sole control of the cadres weapon today, the revived cadres machinery and the reinvigorated policy on cadres matters seem likely to increase his power steadily as time goes by. But his power depends at least as much on what he tries to use it for and whether he is able to build and maintain a consensus in the elite. This brings us to the question of authority.

II. BUILDING AUTHORITY

Authority is "the power of legitimacy," the special power of a leader whom others obey because they view his commands as legitimate. The authority of both Khrushchev and Brezhnev eroded badly by the end of their reigns, and the succession of ailing men in the first half of the 1980's appeared to portend a permanent weakening of authority, not only of the general secretary's office but of the political system as a whole. The new Moscow gorkom first secretary, Boris Yel'tsin, could hardly have put it more bluntly:

> *We must not be mesmerized by the steady political stability of the country. How many times can one allow the same mistakes and not take into account the lessons of history?*[60]

Devising an effective strategy for building authority, though perhaps more urgent now than ever before, has been the constant preoccupation of general secretaries. The basic problem is that strategies acceptable to the political elite increasingly fail to yield policy results. George Breslauer summed up the resulting situation in four propositions: (1) there is a constant tension in the Soviet political system between centralized, mobilizational approaches and reformist ones based on local initiative, economic methods, and broader political participation; (2) the consistent winners in Soviet politics are programs that rely on party activism, political intervention, and pressure, while reformist programs are restricted and obstructed; (3) to make the mobilizational approach work, general secretaries are obliged to set ambitious goals and targets that strain resources and foster unbalanced planning; (4) but the increasing failure of this approach continually generates more pressure for change and reform.[61] Neither Khrushchev nor Brezhnev were able to break this cycle of futility. At bottom it is due to a growing contradiction between the elite's need for security and faith in control and the system's requirements for effectiveness and efficiency. Will Gorbachëv be trapped in the same dilemmas as his predecessors, or has he devised an authority-building strategy that stands a better chance of success? This would involve breaking with the centralizing mobilization approach of the past and protecting the reformist elements of his program.

A striking initial feature of Gorbachëv's approach to authority-building is its pragmatism. Except for his speech at the 27th Party Congress, Gorbachëv has used a minimum of doctrinal quotations, more frequently invoking instead popular aspirations and support as the ultimate source of his authority. Gorbachëv's program has two main goals: to revitalize the economy and to restore order in society. To evaluate this strategy's chances for success, we must address three questions: (1) Are both parts of the strategy sound, that is, internally consistent and feasible? (2) Do both have support and at what levels? (3) Do they reinforce one another or conflict?

Contradictions in Economic Strategy

Gorbachëv's economic strategy consists of two phases.[62] The first aims to accelerate immediately the growth rate of national income. The second, longer-term part of Gorbachëv's strategy is to promote a radical restructuring of the country's entire industrial stock, particularly the machinery sector, so as to put the Soviet Union on the "rails of intensification" toward the "world level" of productivity. There is nothing in this program that Gorbachëv's predecessors would have disagreed with. What makes his strategy potentially different is that he proposes to achieve it by reallocating resources and by reforming the "economic mechanism."

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[59] Ibid.

[60] Yel'tsin's speech to the 27th Party Congress in ibid., Feb. 27, 1986. This theme could be found in Andropov's writings, too. See his article on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of Karl Marx's death, "The Teaching of Karl Marx and Certain Questions of the Building of Socialism in the USSR," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 3, 1983, pp. 9ff.

[61] Breslauer, *Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders*, pp. 278–84.

[62] For an excellent overall analysis of Gorbachëv's economic program, see Ed A. Hewett, "Gorbachëv's Economic Strategy: a Preliminary Assessment" (and accompanying commentary by Philip Hanson), *Soviet Economy* (Washington, DC), March 1986, pp. 285–312.

Much of this program is only now being spelled out in detail, but it is already clear that it contains two serious internal sources of tension. These will force choices—indeed, they are already doing so. First, the near-term goal of accelerating growth competes with the long-term one of promoting innovation and reconstruction. In effect, the new leadership is sending two signals to ministries and managers that are contradictory: to meet production targets and simultaneously to innovate. On past form, they will choose to meet targets.

Second, the technological modernization program competes directly, at least in the near term, with consumer welfare. It is not always realized in the West to what extent Brezhnev had shifted priorities away from basic industrial investment, particularly manufacturing, and toward consumption and consumer-related investment.[63] Gorbachëv's economic program proposes to reverse this trend. The new five-year plan provides for a sharp increase in the investment share of machine-building, chemistry, metallurgy, and electronics; and indeed, the early signs are that as the five-year plan gets translated into annual ones these increases will even exceed the initial targets. Investment in energy and agriculture will continue to grow strongly. In contrast, investment in the consumer sector and in "non-productive" spheres is being held back.[64] It is hard to see from the numbers announced so far how Gorbachëv proposes to double the rate of growth of nonfood consumer goods and services.[65]

The danger, in sum, is that Gorbachëv's economic strategy as it is currently designed will force Soviet managers into a frantic race to increase gross output in key industrial branches, to resist or fake innovation and productivity increases, and to withdraw resources from consumer-related sectors. That will hardly build Gorbachëv's popularity or, more importantly, the motivation of workers.

Why then does Gorbachëv insist on immediate increases in growth? First, as a practical political matter, increased growth rates are the most visible indicator of change. Gorbachëv's reputation as a problem-solver, whatever else he may do, rises or falls on that single figure. Second, only through a faster generation of wealth can the leadership hope to address simultaneously all three of the country's most pressing needs: defense, consumption, and industrial modernization.

But how is this burst of growth to be realized? The scientific-technological revolution will require a decade or more to begin paying off; and even the most successful fuel-switching or loss-reducing reallocations in energy and agriculture will take five years to show real results. Gorbachëv's answer is the "human factor." He is counting on a restoration of discipline and order, together with the beginnings of an improvement in the economic mechanism, to generate in the near term the extra productivity that will accelerate growth.

If the desired burst of productivity does not occur and real growth (as opposed to inflation) does not accelerate, then the new leadership will face some serious decisions that could strain its unity. Gorbachëv's technocratic allies might not object to putting consumer welfare on temporary hold. Prime Minister Ryzhkov, commenting on the growing share of productive investment planned for the 12th Five-Year Plan, justified it as an "essential maneuver":

> *Naturally, this will entail a certain change in shares in the allocation of national income: the share of accumulation will rise. But subsequently the share of accumulation is projected to stabilize or even to decline slightly.*[66]

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[63] From the 8th Five-Year Plan (1966–70) through the first four years of the 11th (1981–84), the share of accumulation in national income declined from 28 to 25.5 percent. (B. Plyshevskiy, "Accumulation and Intensification," *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta* (Moscow), No. 3, 1986, p. 2. "Accumulation" in Soviet parlance is net capital expenditures (i.e., gross capital investment less depreciation) plus net increases in inventory and reserves. What remains is "consumption," which includes some military spending. Within the accumulation envelope, agriculture and inventory grew rapidly, leaving relatively smaller shares for industrial investment. (Inventory, in particular, grew from 116 billion rubles in 1980 to 148 billion in 1985. See L. Abalkin "The Dialectics of Interaction," *Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya*, Mar. 20, 1986.) Within that sub-envelope, investment in extractive industries, especially energy, squeezed the manufacturing sector further.

[64] According to preliminary calculations by Ed Hewett, a 25 percent increase in "productive investment" implies only a 7 percent increase in "non-productive" investment over the 12th Five-Year Plan.

[65] In his recent speech to the workers of the Volga Automotive Plant in Tol'yatti, Gorbachëv stated that a "reallocation of resources in favor of the social program has taken place" (*Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta*, No. 16, 1986, p. 4). This is somewhat mystifying in light of the numbers given at the 27th Party Congress, which place such strong emphasis on industrial modernization that they would appear to exclude such a reallocation. (For background, see the recent joint report of the CIA and DIA to the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress, "The Soviet Economy under a New Leader," Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, Mar. 19, 1986.)

[66] See Nikolay Ryzhkov, "On the Basic Directions of the Economic and Social Development of the USSR in 1986–1990 and in the Period to the Year 2000—Report of the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N. I. Ryzhkov," *Pravda*, Mar. 4, 1986.

Gorbachëv's own words do not contain any such notion of postponement; on the contrary, he speaks of consumer welfare as an essential source of near-term popular support: "The social programs are pressing; the Soviet people must feel in a short time the results . . . ."[67] Or, as he said last year in Leningrad:

> *If we don't get 4 percent—and we need even more than that—then the question arises: what to do? Cut back growth rates of living standards? Curtail the program to raise the material welfare of the people? We can't go in that direction.*[68]

But scarce rubles are scarce rubles. Gorbachëv is leaning very heavily indeed on changes in the behavior of managers and workers to provide for increases in living standards over the next five years. On past form, that will not work. Success depends on how far Gorbachëv is willing to go to try to change behavior, whether through discipline or through reform, and how persistent he will be.

Restoring Order and Discipline

Gorbachëv's second authority-building strategy is to restore order and discipline and strengthen social justice. Gorbachëv believes this to be a popular issue, but it is also a potentially explosive one if not addressed. As he said in one of his first speeches as general secretary:

> *Obviously, we are all sensitive to the fact that recently the issues of moral order and social justice are being raised at all levels of our society more and more sharply and insistently. We at the Central Committee are aware of this heightened sensitivity. . . . Our people are becoming more intolerant of abuses, breaches of the law, bureaucratism, parasitism, drunkenness, prodigality, waste, and other negative phenomena.*[69]

Gorbachëv's program has two distinct parts. First, basic order and discipline must be reestablished; workers must come to work sober; crime must be curbed. The core of this part of the program is the anti-alcohol campaign. Second, the new leadership pledges to curb corruption and abuses of official privilege; the key phrase here is the elimination of "unearned income." Leaving aside the obvious difficulties in the first part of the program, we focus here on several sources of tension in the second.

Unearned income is a grab-bag of illegal gains: speculation, theft and resale of state property, bribery, underground enterprise, moonlighting with state equipment, illegal rents, etc. But in Gorbachëv's usage "unearned income" includes all incomes that are not directly gotten through legal labor. Thus idlers receive unearned income, but so do those who collect bonuses or guaranteed salaries incommensurate to their actual contribution to labor. Even "levelling" (i.e., the widespread practice of evening out bonuses and benefits regardless of performance) is in the same class with corruption since it weakens morale and motivation.[70]

This program may be popular in principle, but in practice it is going to run into problems. Gorbachëv understands as well as anyone that the "second" economy is a response to the ills of the "first." His answer is that one must make illegal paths less necessary by giving freer rein to local initiative, which can then be appropriately regulated:

> *Just try to have a repair done in your apartment. You have to find a moonlighter, who will steal his materials on some construction site, so that in any case they come out of state supplies. Don't we have enough sense to size up the situation realistically?*[71]

At the 27th Party Congress, Gorbachëv recommended that enterprises be allowed to sell off above-plan output and unused materials and equipment; that cooperative and individual housing be encouraged; and that individuals be permitted to supply consumer services. In recent weeks the Politburo has been discussing measures to implement these ideas.[72]

However, the line between individual enterprise and "unearned income" will be hard to draw and harder still to stick to. Gorbachëv was careful at the 27th Party Congress to emphasize the difference: "While cutting off unearned income, we must not allow a shadow to fall on those who receive extra pay through honest labor."[73] Once individual entrepreneurs start to make money and to draw substantial resources, the temptation will be irresistible to step in with restrictions and regulations. Gorbachëv himself stipulated that individuals providing services must do so under the aegis of established collective bodies. From there to instituting output targets, price controls, and supply plans will be but a step.[74] And that will put new life into the second economy.

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[67] See M. S. Gorbachëv, "Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union—Report of General Secretary of the CPSU CC Comrade M. S. Gorbachëv," *Pravda*, Feb. 26, 1986.

[68] "Steadfastly Advance," *Pravda*, May 18, 1985.

[69] Ibid.

[70] Lately there has been a good deal of discussion in the Soviet press over the definition of unearned income. For an informative recent sample, see A. Shokin, "Where Do Unearned Incomes Come From?" *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta*, No. 15, 1986, p. 10.

[71] "Steadfastly Advance," *Pravda*, May 18, 1985.

[72] Ibid., Mar. 29, 1986.

[73] Gorbachëv's report to 27th Party Congress, ibid., Feb. 26, 1986.

The leadership's main concern about unearned income is that it weakens collectivism and leads to a "private-property mentality." Throughout his speech to the Party Congress Gorbachëv contrasted the virtues of collectivism to the evils of individualism. Gorbachëv reaffirmed the collectivist foundations of Marxism, calling for collective incentive systems, collective observance of public festivals, and the like. Rewards need not be equal, but unequal rewards should go to collectives, not to individuals.[75] Gorbachëv sounded a new note by suggesting that the family might be deemed an acceptable collective unit, for example, in collective farming contracts. Indeed, the stress on the importance of the family was striking throughout Gorbachëv's speech.

The second major aim of the campaign to restore order is to curb abuses of official position and privilege. This too is popular in principle, but potentially explosive in practice, especially when it comes to the privileges of party cadres. Shortly before the 27th Party Congress, *Pravda* had the daring to publish a letter criticizing party privileges.[76] This brought a sharp rebuke at the Congress from party secretary Ligachëv, although other speakers appeared divided on the issue. Some, like Volgograd obkom First Secretary Vladimir Kalashnikov, echoed Ligachëv. Others, like Moscow First Secretary Yel'tsin, Bashkir First Secretary Midkhat Shakirov, and Party Control Commission Chairman Mikhail Solomentsev, called for greater accountability and review of party cadres. Clearly, the strategy of building authority by strengthening order and social justice cannot be pursued very far without becoming controversial and divisive, both within the elite and among the population at large. The root of the problem is that both the elite and the public are ambivalent over the line between individualism and collectivism, over definitions of legitimate income, and finally, over the thorny issue of equity and privilege.

In sum, the approach used in both of Gorbachëv's major programs contains much that is familiar from the past. It relies heavily on political mobilization, intervention, and pressure from the center; the programs are highly ambitious and will strain resources and foster unbalanced planning. Consequently, they are unlikely to succeed as currently designed. But unlike the initial programs of Brezhnev and Khrushchev, Gorbachëv's approach contains a strong reformist element from the start, and is therefore potentially different. In the past, the reformist element has been weakened during implementation. Will it now, on the contrary, be strengthened?

Reformist Vitality

Though one may think of the Soviet elite as divided between friends and foes of change, one should not imagine that their positions remain immutable. Both conservatives and reformers have reflected on the recent decade of economic stagnation and political drift, and there has occurred on both sides a complex process of learning. By the time of Brezhnev's death, one could discern two broadly different diagnoses of what had gone wrong with the system and what needed to be done about it. By caricaturizing only slightly, it is possible to call one diagnosis "economizing" and the other "technological." Both start from the same proposition, namely that the core problem of the Soviet economy today is poor productivity. But for the economizers the chief culprits are risk-averse managers and lazy workers, who are themselves products of bad economic mechanisms and incentives. The technological view, by contrast, blames bad machines, poor planning, weak investment, and timid innovation.

Both views agree on the need for discipline and order—hence the initial popularity of that line—and both call for changes in the economic structure and in the system of incentives. But ultimately the two have very different priorities. For an economizer such as Tat'yana Zaslavskaya, the main thing is to improve the performance of workers and managers by improving incentives, above all in agriculture and light industry. For a technologist such as Konstantin Val'tukh, the foremost requirement is more and better investment, above all in manufacturing.[77]

Gorbachëv's earlier career in agriculture, his speeches and writings once he had moved to Moscow, and the rumors circulating in Moscow before his accession, all suggested that he would be an "economizer." The man one might have taken for the archetypal technologist was Romanov, who had presided over a decade of far-reaching technological modernization in Leningrad.[78]

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[74] Indeed, that step is already being taken, as is evident from the new controls imposed by the latest agricultural decree. See *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta*, No. 15, 1986, p. 4.

[75] This had been one of the principal themes of Andropov as well, see "The Teaching of Karl Marx," loc. cit.

[76] See T. Samolis, "Purification" *Pravda*, Feb. 13, 1986.

[77] This basic division recalls earlier debates over agricultural policy, particularly in the mid-1960's. In those debates Brezhnev took the "technological" view that only massive investment in agricultural infrastructure could bring a radical modernization of the countryside, while Kosygin advocated the "economizing" position, stressing economic methods and better management.

Yet the surprise of Gorbachëv's first year was that he behaved more like a technologist than an economizer. He stressed industry far more than agriculture,[79] scientific revolution and organizational redrawing more than prices or incentives, and investment rather than consumption. Despite two important moves—an enlargement of the garden plot program and the creation of a new State Agro-Industrial Committee (Gosagroprom)—Gorbachëv almost seemed to avoid agriculture, especially the issue of local farm management.[80]

Throughout his first year, Gorbachëv's proposals for change seemed timid and conventional. Though he spoke of changing the economic mechanism, he had little to say that was concrete or insightful about the difficult issues involved, particularly prices and performance indicators. Instead, Gorbachëv seemed to show a fatal fondness for redrawing the organizational chart, the classic device of all his predecessors. Thus, the elimination of the industrial associations, the merger of a half dozen agricultural agencies into Gosagroprom, and the creation of hazily defined new conglomerates for energy and civilian machine-building were entirely within the bounds of the past. Was this political calculation, a tactical maneuver to play to the group of technocrats who were his initial appointees? Was it a reflection of Gorbachëv's real priorities? Or did Gorbachëv's early moves simply show that he, like Andropov in his early months, had "no ready recipes"?

At any rate, Gorbachëv's speech at the 27th Party Congress marked a definite change. After sounding the by then familiar themes of industry and technology, Gorbachëv announced some real innovations in agricultural policy. Farmers would be assigned fixed five-year procurement targets; anything produced above that amount could be disposed of "according to the farmers' own judgment." For certain types of basic produce, farmers would have the option of settling part of their procurement obligation through a money tax, a policy that Gorbachëv described as an adaptation of the Leninist tax-in-kind (*prodnalog*), which was the central feature of the New Economic Policy of the 1920's. These initiatives have since been spelled out in an official decree.[81]

With the word "*prodnalog*," Gorbachëv clearly crossed a symbolic divide: until then, he had refrained from making public references to NEP.[82] But he went even further by calling for a "radical reform" and citing Lenin's use of the same expression in defense of an overhaul of financial policy, including prices.

Which is the real Gorbachëv? It is instructive to compare Gorbachëv's positions at the 27th Party Congress and thereafter to the most outspoken statement of the economizing position, namely, the famous Zaslavskaya "secret report," leaked to the West in the summer of 1983.[83] Zaslavskaya's analysis of the ills of the Soviet system can be summed up in four major points: (1) the country is saddled with an economic mechanism that was appropriate in the 1930's but is outmoded today; in particular, it is based on administrative commands rather than economic signals. (2) Its incentive mechanism is based on a narrow vision of worker motivation that may have fit when workers were hungry and docile, but which fails to actuate them now. (3) The system is also based on a naive ideal of social justice that ignores the reality of contradictory interests (however "non-antagonistic" these may be in a socialist society). (4) Attempts by the center to deal with the resulting problems through coercion will inevitably backfire, since workers and peasants today have many ways of evading or ignoring commands from the center. Instead, workers must be given a meaningful sense of participation in their work, and the work itself must be made more pleasant and fulfilling.

How much of this diagnosis did Gorbachëv appear to adopt at the 27th Party Congress? On the first point, which is the most sensitive doctrinally, Gorbachëv echoed Zaslavskaya's position:

> *The forms of productive relations now in effect . . . took shape under conditions of extensive development of the economy. They have gradually grown obsolete, have begun to lose their stimulative role, and in some respects have become a brake.*[84]

Gorbachëv also agreed that more economic signals and direct money exchange are needed in place of administrative mechanisms:

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[78] Blair A. Ruble, "Romanov's Leningrad," *Problems of Communism*, November-December 1983, pp. 36–48.

[79] Gorbachëv gave only one major speech on the subject of agriculture until the Party Congress, an address in Tselinograd in September 1985.

[80] He was publicly prodded for this by Zaslavskaya. See *Izvestiya* (Moscow), June 1, 1985.

[81] The official summary of the decree can be found in *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta*, No. 15, 1986, pp. 2, 4–5.

[82] This was so noticeable that Moscow wags quipped that Gorbachëv was in favor of NEP all right—but that in his lexicon it stood for "*navesti elementarnyy poryadok*" (imposing basic order).

[83] Tat'yana Zaslavskaya, "Doklad o neobkhodimosti boleye uglublënnogo izucheniya v SSSR sotsial'nogo mekhanizma razvitiya ekonomiki" (On the Necessity to Study More Profoundly in the USSR the Social Mechanism of Economic Development), as printed by RFE/RL, *Materialy samizdata* (Munich), Issue 35/83, Aug. 26, 1983.

[84] Gorbachëv's report to the 27th Party Congress, *Pravda*, Feb. 26, 1986.

It is time to overcome the bias against commodity-money relations and their underuse in planning practice . . . . If, for example, it is necessary and justified to use economic norms instead of particular directive indicators, that does not signify a departure from the principles of planned management . . . .[85]

Gorbachëv has also consistently acknowledged the growing sophistication of consumer wants and at the 27th Party Congress referred repeatedly to the need to provide "moral" incentives alongside material ones,[86] to improve worker participation, and to make work more creative.

Gorbachëv was understandably more cautious about acknowledging the center's limited power to control evasion or disobedience below, but he has shown an awareness of the problem, as for example in his speech in Tol'yatti in April 1986:

Here's what one occasionally hears: "The Party Congress adopted good decisions, but at the local level everything is as before. Help us to make order." Of course we will help, we will make demands and raise questions. But to speak frankly—can every question really be resolved from the center?[87]

In short, Gorbachëv appears to have adopted the essence of the economizers' positions, but with a conservative twist that is more than tactical. There are two words, just as symbolic as "*reforma*" and "*prodnalog*" that Gorbachëv has not used in public so far, and they are "*interes*" (interest) and "*rynok*" (market).[88] If he did, that would imply much greater acceptance of limits to the power of the center than Gorbachëv is apparently willing to consider.

Gorbachëv gives the impression of being a man with a basically conservative temperament, one who envisages the future as technological and centrally-managed, and who remains unshaken in his belief that economic acceleration and efficiency can be combined with central planning. He would probably settle for the 1965 Kosygin reforms if he could, but appears to recognize that he cannot. The reformist themes in his speeches have become stronger, not weaker, over the past year and are still gaining.

Opposition to Reformism

But it is clear that there is widespread opposition to Gorbachëv's programs. In her "secret report," Zaslavskaya gave a list of the opponents of reform that included just about everybody. Gorbachëv is only slightly more optimistic. In his speeches he claims to see popular support for order and discipline, for peace, for higher living standards and faster growth, but nowhere does he claim to see a constituency for reform. On the contrary, Gorbachëv acknowledges widespread if mostly covert resistance and opposition, and above all enormous inertia, at every level of Soviet society. The signs are that in the past year Gorbachëv and his allies had to struggle especially hard with the planners. The Politburo rejected four drafts of the 12th Five-Year Plan, the review of which started even before Gorbachëv's accession. If one compares what Gorbachëv finally got with what he originally said he wanted, it looks as though he was obliged to compromise.[89]

Resistance to changes in the economic mechanism has been especially great. As Gorbachëv said in his Congress speech, "Unfortunately . . . any change in the economic mechanism is regarded as almost a retreat from the principles of socialism." Other speakers were even more explicit, for example, Mikhail Shkabardnya, head of a key electronics ministry:

The impression is created that the planning organs, who are in thrall to established methods of management, are more preoccupied with polemics about tinkering with the economic mechanism than with a real overhaul.[90]

But resistance is just as strong at lower levels, among the middle-level officials who stand to lose power. In words reminiscent of Gogol's tales, Shkabardnya's reform-minded chief planner described a mythical character, Iks Igrekovich Zetov, the covert opponent of reform who works in the bowels of the system:

Our enterprises have to follow an instruction book 200 pages long containing 208 plan indicators. Behind each one there lurks an official named Iks Igrekovich Zetov, who will fight for each indicator because his job depends on it. Iks Igrekovich won't give up without a fight, don't imagine otherwise.[91]

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[85] Ibid.

[86] The word Gorbachëv actually used, "*dukhovnyy*," is better translated as "spiritual."

[87] Speech of Comrade M. S. Gorbachëv at the Meeting with the Workers of Tol'yatti City, *Pravda*, Apr. 9, 1986.

[88] In his Congress speech, Gorbachëv does use the word "market" at one point, but in a neutral sense—"We must fill the market with a diversity of goods and services."

[89] See Hewett, loc. cit.; and Philip Hanson, "Gorbachëv's First Year: the Economy," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 68/86, Feb. 11, 1986.

[90] See Shkabardynya's speech, *Pravda*, Feb. 27, 1986.

[91] Ye. Panov, "The Enterprise Decides," *Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya*, July 19, 1985, p. 2.

In reality, it is probably only partly accurate to think of Soviet society as split between friends and foes of change. Rather, there is some of both, if in varying proportions, inside every Soviet citizen. To capitalize on the desire for change while disarming the ever-present Iks Igrekovich, Gorbachëv blends the themes of change and stability. Nearly all of his formulas come in pairs: he calls for both discipline and reform, condemns both unearned income and levelling, stresses both central planning and local autonomy, advocates youth but also experience, promises both a "demanding" but also a "caring" attitude toward cadres. Through such attention to balance and dosage, Gorbachëv has been working for a consensus, as Andropov did before him.

But consensus-building alone is not enough; Gorbachëv is attempting to split the opposition by singling out official enemies and scapegoats while rewarding the rest. The ministries, the industrial associations, and the corrupt local party machines are the targets, while younger party cadres and industrial experts are promoted and rewarded. Resistance may reach high up, however; even in the newly-promoted leadership there are mixed views about change, though they do not amount to organized opposition. At the 27th Party Congress, Prime Minister Ryzhkov was noticeably reticent about reform; Minister Shkabardnya, about the "human factor"; oblast First Secretary Gennadiy Vedernikov, about farmers' profits; Ligachëv, about subjecting party privileges to public scrutiny; regional politicians, about canceling big new projects; and so forth. In contrast, several secretaries like Yel'tsin, Dzhumbar Patiashvili of Georgia, Vladimir Kalashnikov of Volgograd, and Yuriy Petrov of Sverdlovsk went further than Gorbachëv in calling for changes. But so far these are only variations around the common themes of Gorbachëv's coalition.

Authority-Building Strategy

Every general secretary since Stalin has faced the problem of adapting the Soviet system's traditional values to new circumstances. The requirements of a modern society and economy drive today's Soviet leaders toward a truth that is particularly difficult for descendants of Bolshevism: to maintain control one must partially surrender control. This point departs so sharply from Soviet practice that it is hardly surprising that Gorbachëv's predecessors shrank from it and that even now, after a decade of near-crisis, the Soviet elite and Gorbachëv himself find it supremely hard to accept.

Boris Yel'tsin, left, seen talking with a delegate at the Kremlin Hall of Congresses during an intermission at the 27th CPSU Congress.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

As a result, the most apparent characteristic trait of Gorbachëv's approach to policy is ambivalence. He does not break decisively with the centralizing, mobilizational style of the past, and his policies are an uneasy mixture of conservative and reformist elements. His economic strategy has raised popular expectations; yet it depends for its success on an immediate burst of productivity from below, for which the only real inducements so far are pressure, exhortation, and promises. Gorbachëv's two major programs send conflicting signals to all levels of the system. Since managers must choose which signal to follow, they will probably play safe. Yet, if Gorbachëv cannot show results quickly, his momentum could weaken and opposition could soon mount.

Nevertheless, Gorbachëv's way may be the only politically feasible one. Any reform is at once an adaptation and a reaffirmation of established values. Equally important, the mixture of conservative and reformist elements in his approach has some tactical advantages. On the "macro" level, the infusion of new resources into sectors long starved for them is likely to produce an initial rush of real progress; so will the sheer stimulus of change and the immediate effects of the discipline campaign.[92] In addition—to put it cynically—Gorbachëv can count on the Soviet statistical system to show substantial progress in every category. Much of that will be inflation and gold-plating; but even the *appearance* of results will give Gorbachëv valuable political momentum and time.

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[92] For a good discussion of this point, see Vladimir Kontorovich, "Discipline and Growth in the Soviet Economy," *Problems of Communism*, November-December 1985, pp. 18–31.

On the "micro" level, people will know from their shopping bags whether the progress is real. But here too Gorbachëv has strong cards. The first is his apparent determination, especially evident in the weeks since the 27th Party Congress, to take bold measures to cut waste and to stimulate local initiative in services and farming. Everything depends on whether people will see something to be gained if they take a chance, and something to be lost if they stand in the way. This last point brings us back to cadres policy and the interaction of power and authority.

III. INTERACTION OF POWER AND AUTHORITY

Power and authority naturally affect one another. Effectiveness in policy builds authority, which in turn adds to power by weakening the constraints on its use and by enhancing its effects. At the same time, power judiciously used reinforces effectiveness in policy (for example, through the appointment of able people) and thus contributes to authority. A general secretary who wishes to have either must therefore look to both.

Gorbachëv already appears to have recovered much of the general secretary's traditional basis of power. The evidence for this is not so much the simple fact of turnover, but rather the signs that the machinery for cadres control has been refurbished, that local patronage systems have been broken up or appear about to be, and that Gorbachëv has resurrected old techniques and put them to new uses. Whatever long-term forces may be at work in the political system, the loosening of central control that took place under Brezhnev now appears to have been due above all to the latter's own personality, style of rule, and the circumstances under which he came to power. Gorbachëv's first year, in contrast, seems more like a reversion to the familiar power-building style of Khrushchev and even Stalin.

Gorbachëv's authority-building strategy likewise reverts to some themes and points of style not seen since Khrushchev. Gorbachëv's approach has the populism, the zest for change and experimentation, and even some of the confrontational manner of Khrushchev. Like him, Gorbachëv plays to popular expectations, and he leans heavily on the party apparatus (in both senses of the word).

However, Gorbachëv's approach also shares the weaknesses of his predecessors' authority-building strategies. His goals strain the available resources, and his plans are taut. His programs rely heavily on political intervention and pressure. Since Gorbachëv also stresses local initiative and autonomy, the signals he is sending through the system are ambiguous.

The resolution of these ambiguities will depend partly on how Gorbachëv's own thinking evolves in response to the early results of his programs. But an equally important issue will be whether he can make his power and his authority work in tandem, one reinforcing the other. In this respect, Khrushchev and Brezhnev are negative models: Khrushchev overused his power while Brezhnev underused his, yet in the end both lost authority. Can Gorbachëv do better?

The immense turnover of the last year has brought in a mixed group of people, none of whom are very young and most of whom already were in high positions under Brezhnev. They are undoubtedly as anxious as Gorbachëv to get the economy moving, but there is little in their background (though no less than in Gorbachëv's) to suggest the economic sophistication and openness of mind required to deal with the uncertainties and upheavals that necessarily attend real change. So there is a real question whether Gorbachëv's cadres policy is effectively serving the reformist element in his programs.

This problem will grow more pressing as reform proceeds. Local autonomy and initiative, if truly implemented, will produce new winners and losers throughout the political system. Gorbachëv must use his control over cadres to encourage the winners and to protect both them and himself from the losers. Only then will his strategies for building power and authority be in balance. At this point, all one can say is that the necessary levers have been readied; it is still too soon to say how persistently they will be used.

One point that augurs well for persistence is the striking continuity between Gorbachëv's approach to power and authority and Andropov's. Nearly all of the officials appointed under Andropov are still in office or have been promoted—with the one major exception of Romanov.[93] The essential policy themes are also the same, especially the combination of discipline and apparent willingness to consider new economic solutions (although one might argue that Andropov laid more stress on discipline, while Gorbachëv emphasizes incentives). The main difference is that while Andropov admitted in November 1982 that he had no ready recipes for change, by April 1985 Gorbachëv had developed the outlines of the approach he has pursued, though with gradually increasing detail, especially in agricultural policy.

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[93] For example, the only RSFSR obkoms to have changed hands under both Andropov and Gorbachëv are Leningrad (Zaykov to the Politburo), Tomsk, and Krasnodar (Mel'nikov and Razumovskiy to the heads of Central Committee departments). One obkom secretary appointed under Chernenko has also moved up under Gorbachëv—Vlasov of Rostov, now Minister of Internal Affairs.

The test of Gorbachëv's power and authority will come when he is forced to face the ambiguities in his programs and to challenge some of his own and Andropov's appointees. This test may not come right away, because Gorbachëv will gain leeway for a while from the ambiguity of existing success indicators, the recovered power of the general secretary's office, and the availability of scapegoats as well as promising candidates for promotion.

Gorbachëv is further aided by the collective learning that has taken place in the entire elite over the last two decades. If the reformist impulse prevails over the conservative one this time, it will be partly because three crucial conditions may now be present that were previously lacking: (1) broad agreement that the status quo cannot continue; (2) some realistic diagnosis of the problems; and (3) a set of practical measures. These decades have witnessed a gradual learning about all three, which has not produced consensus but which has evidently moved a core of influential people (including Gorbachëv himself) toward a common perception of crisis and a greater shared understanding of the properties and limits of their own system.

Gorbachëv's popular support might also endure even if his programs do not succeed at first. Gorbachëv could very well have been right last year when he told his Leningrad audience what sort of leader he thought the population wanted:

> *People love leaders who are strict, organized, demanding, who show concern, who show through their personal example a conscientious attitude to state business. And they always support such leaders.*[94]

But ultimately Gorbachëv's success in restoring full power and authority to the general secretary's office will depend on his ability to revitalize the system. No politician could have come to this task with greater advantages; few could have used them better. But the hard part is only beginning.

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[94] "Steadfastly Advance," *Pravda*, May 18, 1985.

Realities of Gorbachëv's Economic Program

Boris Rumer

The dramatic events in Soviet internal politics in the first half of the 1980's have coincided with an equally dramatic development in the Soviet economy: an unprecedented decline in the rate of growth of fundamental economic inputs—manpower, raw materials and fuel, and capital investment. According to data reported by Soviet economist Abel Agenbegyan, the first half of the present decade saw a 3 percent increase in the size of the Soviet labor force, a 5 percent increase in the output of the extractive industries, and a 17 percent increase in capital investment. Each figure marks a sharp decline from the past: in the second half of the 1970's, the respective growth indices were 6, 10, and 23 percent; and in the first half of that decade, they were 6, 26, and 44 percent. Moreover, Agenbegyan predicted that in the second half of the 1980's, expansion in the amounts of these basic inputs will decelerate still more.[1]

This growing resource constriction has compelled Soviet economic theoreticians to revise their basic paradigm for economic planning and to seek to achieve planned results with a minimum expenditure of resources. The result is a quest for "intensification" pursued with all the intensity of earlier campaigns such as those for "electrification" and "industrialization."

It is one thing to proclaim such goals, another to realize them. All evidence suggests that the current campaign is not faring very well. According to Dmitriy Chernikov, deputy director of a research institute of the State Planning Committee (Gosplan), the role played by intensification in Soviet economic growth has actually been decreasing in recent years. A macroeconomic analysis of Soviet growth—using production functions—conducted by his institute found that productivity's share as a factor in national income growth had declined from 40 percent in 1966–70 to 25 percent in 1981–82.[2]

Nor did the passing of Leonid Brezhnev change this pattern of slowdown. Indeed, in the years 1984 and 1985, growth in Soviet national income was at its lowest levels for the entire postwar period—a mere 2.4 and 3.1 percent. In the same period, there was a sharp cutback in the growth of investment. Production of oil, of coal, and of many types of machines and equipment actually declined. The share of national income (which includes mainly consumption and net investment) in Soviet gross social production declined from 47 percent in 1981–82 to 41 percent in 1983–84; over the same period, capital productivity rose only 2.5 percent, and labor productivity increased by a mere 0.5 percent.[3]

The Soviet economy is clearly in severe straits, although it may be premature to declare it in a state of "crisis," if by that one means the imminence of structural collapse or conditions threatening the very survival of the system. Apocalyptic predictions must be viewed with a heavy dose of skepticism. Soviet economic history teaches that even the most productive phases of development have not been without serious hardships, shortages, and other difficulties.

Boris Rumer is a Research Associate at Harvard University's Russian Research Center. He is author of Investment and Reindustrialization in the Soviet Economy *(1984) and of numerous articles on the Soviet economy. The author wishes to thank Professor Abram Bergson for useful discussion of a number of points raised in this article.*

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[1] A. Aganbegyan, "Important Positive Shifts in the Economic Life of the Country," *EKO* (Novosibirsk), No. 6, 1984, p. 9.

[2] D. Chernikov, "Scientific-Technological Progress and Structural Shifts in Social Production," *Ekonomika i Matematicheskiye Metody* (Moscow), No. 4, 1984, p. 593.

[3] *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1984 g.* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1984—hereafter, *Narkhoz 1984*), Moscow, Finansy i Statistika, 1985, p. 53, 56, 166, 177–83, 375, 425; also *Pravda* (Moscow), Jan. 26, 1986, p. 1.

Soviet Premier Nikolay Ryzhkov delivers his report on "Guidelines of the Economic and Social Development of the USSR in 1986-90 and for the Period to 2000" at the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on March 3, 1986; seated behind Ryzhkov, from left to right, are Yegor Ligachëv, Mikhail Gorbachëv, and Andrey Gromyko.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

The Soviet economic predicament, I would submit, need not be either irreversible or irreparable. But a turn-around is possible only under conditions of fundamental reforms in the economic system. It is precisely such a transformation that many had come to expect from the new leadership under Mikhail Gorbachëv. Indeed, the expectations even extended beyond the economy to include the possibility of a liberalization of all spheres of public and cultural life.

Propagandists in the party bureaucracy did not shy away from exploiting and manipulating this spontaneous enthusiasm of the general population regarding the young and dynamic new leader: this undertaking began even while former General Secretary Konstantin Chernenko was still alive. Robert Kaiser of *The Washington Post,* returning from Moscow in September 1984, reported widespread rumors there that Gorbachëv was strongly interested in the reformist work of Arkadiy Stolypin.[4] One can well imagine the effect of such a rumor upon nationalistic members of the Russian intelligentsia, for whom Stolypin is the epitome of a prescient, patriotic statesman, since he engineered an economic reform to save Russia at a critical juncture in its history. In a vein common to all the Soviet media, *Pravda* of November 13, 1985, wrote of "a spirit of renewal and life-giving draughts . . . blowing through the great Soviet house, driving out the stagnant odors." And the poet Andrey Voznesenskiy wrote on the eve of 1986: "Rejoice, rejoice, rejoice, rejoice, rejoice at the new spirit over the land! Rejoice in the storm that is blowing away those perched in exalted ranks! [But] it is not enough just to throw out the Bourbons; one must find a new path."[5]

To be sure, the new leader has replaced many old Bourbons, and his first months as party general secretary were marked by a surfeit of speeches full of promises, summonses, and challenges to undertake decisive and (a favorite adjective) "undeferrable" actions to achieve a major transformation in the economy. But his zeal for "transformation" waned markedly toward the end of 1985, and his verbose report at the 27th CPSU Congress was barely distinguishable from Brezhnev's cliché-ridden rhetoric. In reality, the new General Secretary has so far undertaken no radical steps to revive the economy—which speaks tomes about both his acumen and possibly also his indecisiveness. Instead, he is basically engaged in patching up and repairing—using old techniques inherited from his predecessors.

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[4] See his "Exhausted Empire Faces up to Shortfall," *The Washington Post*, Sept. 23, 1984.

[5] *Pravda*, Dec. 30, 1985, p. 3.

Primacy of Politics

The problem is that Gorbachëv can act only within the limits of the existing system based upon the authority of the party bureaucracy. Thus a fundamental transformation of the economy is possible only if the structure of power itself is changed. The rigidly centralized system of economic management has achieved consummate development as a model for the comprehensive exercise of control over the economy by the central party bureaucracy. Each sector of the economy is controlled and directed by a corresponding department of the Central Committee of the CPSU (machine-building, chemical, agricultural, construction, transportation, etc.) through the transmission belt of the respective sectoral ministry. The current system has been consolidating since 1965 (when Brezhnev eliminated Khrushchev's *sovnarkhozy*), and it is difficult to imagine an alternative that would preserve fòr the central party apparatus the same primacy of political power over the economy. That some in the USSR express hopes for a decentralization of economic management—which would entail weakening of this control—reflects the ineradicable naïveté of the given segment of the Soviet intelligentsia.

It is characteristic of the true state of affairs that shortly after the appearance of the famous memorandum of Academician Tat'yana Zaslavskaya (criticizing the brutal centralization of economic management, hinting that certain circles were dedicated to its preservation, and urging a shift to economic rather than political-administrative management of the economy), there appeared in the leading theoretical and political journal of the CPSU Central Committee, *Kommunist*, an article stressing "a political approach to the economy."[6] The author, P. Ignatovskiy, chief editór of Gosplan's authoritative journal *Planovoye Khozyaystvo*, quoted from Lenin: "Politics must have priority over the economy, and to think anything else would be contrary to the ABC's of Marxism." He further cited Lenin:

> *We do not need new decrees, new institutions, new methods of struggle. We need to check the suitability of people and to verify actual implementation.*

What was needed, Ignatovskiy claimed, was "firmness of state direction over production." Significantly, this article appeared when General Secretary Yuriy Andropov was already bedridden and Gorbachëv in effect was directing the work of the Politburo. The article seemed designed to rein in over-zealous advocates of reform and reassure the party apparatus that the new leadership, despite all its reformist rhetoric, had no intention of altering the basic power structure.

Gorbachëv's behavior seems to confirm his firm commitment to the Leninist principle of political predominance in economic affairs. The consequences of such an approach are readily apparent in Soviet agriculture, a sector that Gorbachëv once controlled as a Central Committee secretary. Brezhnev sharply augmented investment in the Soviet agro-industrial complex, increasing the sector's share of total Soviet investment to a surprisingly high 38 percent.[7] Yet such gargantuan investments and a substantial increase in the use of machinery and fertilizer did not prevent a decline in the productivity of agriculture. Harvests shrank even in areas with the most fertile soil. Indeed, over the last three decades, the USSR has lost a third of its surface stratum of humus.[8] Although expenditures on agricultural production increased by 42 percent in the 1970's, both labor productivity and productivity per hectare declined by more than 50 percent.[9] In 1980, more than half of all collective and state farms were operating in the red.[10]

Over the past quarter-century, Soviet leaders have issued countless decrees (more than 250) encompassing every aspect of production and nonproduction spheres of agriculture. But not once has official doubt ever been expressed about the wisdom of retaining the kolkhoz-sovkhoz system. Everyone knows that this system is the crux of the problem in rural production, and that measures such as an expansion of the private sector in agriculture are the only road to productivity. To be sure, Gorbachëv did raise the topic of the family farm during his address to the 27th Party Congress.[11] However, the idea struck little resonance among others who addressed the Congress, and nothing in the leader's comments suggested an inclination to liquidate the kolkhoz-sovkhoz system. To deviate from the existing system in such a manner would mean the triumph of an economic over a political approach.

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[6] "On a Political Approach to the Economy," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 12, 1983. Tat'yana Zaslavskaya, *Doklad o neobkhodimosti boleye uglublënnogo izucheniya v SSSR sotsial'nogo mekhanizma razvitiya ekonomiki* (Report on the Need for Deeper Study in the USSR of the Social Mechanism of Economic Development), as printed by Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty, *Materialy samizdata* (Munich), No. 35-83, Aug. 20, 1983.

[7] V. Garbuzov, "The Food Program and Tasks of Finance Organs," *Finansy SSSR* (Moscow), No. 7, 1982, p. 6.

[8] *Voprosy Ekonomiki* (Moscow), No. 1, 1986, p. 88.

[9] P. Klemyshev, "The Technical and Economic Level of Agricultural Production," *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, No. 3, 1984, pp. 82–83.

[10] Garbuzov, loc. cit., p. 6.

Planning for the 12th Five-Year Period

The primacy of political over economic interests is evident in the 12th Five-Year Plan, adopted by the 27th CPSU Congress. The chief political decision underlying this plan—the relative shares of national income to be distributed to current consumption and to investment—must have been reached under truly dramatic circumstances. The preceding five-year plan (for 1981–85) had explicitly targeted an increase in the share of the consumption fund, at the expense of investment.[12] But when anticipated revitalization and increased effectiveness in the investment sphere did not materialize, it proved necessary to increase investments and make cutbacks in consumption. The share accorded to consumption declined from 76 percent in 1980 to 73 percent in 1984. Production of consumer goods, as a share of total industrial production, declined from 26 percent in 1980 to 25 percent in 1984. Over the same period, the annual rate of growth in new housing declined from 8 percent to virtually nil. Moreover, the share of investment going to industries in "Group B" (those producing consumer goods), which was supposed to rise in 1981–85, sank to a postwar low of 4 percent, while the share of investment going to "Group A" industries (those manufacturing producer goods) was at 31.5 percent. The share of investment in housing construction, health care, trade, and other social and consumer sectors of the Soviet economy fell from 35.4 percent of total investment in 1966–70 to 29.7 percent in 1981–84. During the same period, the

Spring sowing in 1985 at the Shirokoye State Farm in the Crimea.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

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[11] M. S. Gorbachëv, "Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union—Report of General Secretary of the CPSU CC Comrade M. S. Gorbachëv," *Pravda*, Feb. 26, 1986.

[12] See Premier Nikolay Tikhonov's report to the 26th CPSU Congress, *XXVI S"yezd KPSS: Stenograficheskiy otchët* (The 26th CPSU Congress: Stenographic Report), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1981, p. 17.

share of total investment going to light industry and the food industry fell from 12.2 percent to 10 percent.[13]

It was against this backdrop that the Soviet leadership set out its priorities for the 12th FYP. In the realm of macroeconomic choices there appeared to be essentially two alternative courses to be pursued:

- The regime could reduce the growth of investment and restructure industry by focusing investment on one sector at the expense of others (on machine-building, at the expense of extractive industry, including the oil and gas sectors). Under these conditions, economic growth would—in the short term—decelerate even more substantially. But the concept would be to "retreat now in order to move ahead later."

- Or the leadership could increase investment in heavy industry across the board at the expense of consumption, and restructure industry amidst a simultaneous growth of overall production.[14]

In February 1984, Gosplan research official Vadim Kirichenko insisted on the need to increase the growth of investments in the 12th FYP. In contrast, Aganbegyan declared in June that the growth of investment in the 12th FYP would be half that registered in the 11th FYP.[15] Clearly a debate had commenced. On one side were adherents of the traditional hard line, who insisted upon increasing investment at the expense of consumption. On the other side were those who postulated the need for a "radical reform," one that could activate the reserves of the economy. This could raise productivity without increasing investment and thereby permit the maintenance or even raising of the level of consumption, which would, in turn, make more realistic the effort to expand the use of material incentives to spur effective economic performance.

In a June 1985 speech, Gorbachëv seemed to evade this critical issue, although his discussion of various "maneuvers" or changes in the structure of investments could be construed as favoring the reformist approach.[16] But in the fall of 1985—during the final stages of preparation of the 12th FYP—forces favorable to the conservatives appeared to gain the ascendancy. The retirement of Gosplan's 75-year-old chairman, Nikolay Baybakov (an irreconcilable foe of decentralization and economic liberalization),[17] was misconstrued by many as a defeat of the neo-Stalinists; actually, Baybakov retained his membership on the Central Committee at the 27th Party Congress. And the new Soviet government team of Premier Nikolay Ryzhkov and Gosplan Chairman Nikolay Talyzin, technocrats unduly idealized by some Western analysts, clearly rejected the course of reform and embarked on the second alternative. As Ryzhkov put it at the Congress:

> *Given its commitment to a course of accelerating [economic growth], the Central Committee of the CPSU has deemed it expedient to increase the tempo of growth of productive capital investment in the 12th Five-Year Plan. Naturally, this entails certain changes in the proportions of distribution of national income —an increase in the share of accumulation [i.e., investment]. This tack is necessary in order to attain both current and strategic goals. In the next [stage] there is the intention to stabilize or even slightly reduce the share of accumulation.*[18]

The stress on "accumulation" implied a reduction in the share of consumption, an unpalatable fact Ryzhkov preferred not to state directly. Just what "current and strategic goals" the Soviet leadership have for the economy were suggested in a May 1985 speech by Gorbachëv in Leningrad. He likened the goals of the Soviet economy in the current period to those on the

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[13] *Narkhoz 1984*, pp. 426, 132, 435, 379, 381. Aganbegyan erroneously claims that the lower growth rate for investment during the 11th FYP was caused by "reallocation to consumption in order to raise the standard of living." See his "The General Course of Economic Policy," *EKO*, No. 11, 1985, p. 4.

Some sense of the price that the Soviet citizen has had to pay for this reallocation is shown in the case of Tol'yatti, a city of 600,000, described in a resolution of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers as "a new city of automobile-builders, which satisfies every requirement of contemporary urban planning" (see *Avtomobil'naya Promyshlennost* [Moscow], No. 1, 1984, p. 1). According to a more recent account, more than half of the city's population lives in Avtozavodskiy Rayon, which lacks any movie theater, cultural center (*dvorets kul'tury*), park, or swimming pool. The waiting list for places in kindergarten reportedly has thousands and thousands of names on it (see *Literaturnaya Gazeta* [Moscow], Apr. 16, 1986, p. 10).

[14] In 1982, Vadim Kirichenko, director of a Gosplan research institute, observed that "the time has finally come to make a choice between alternative possibilities in investment policy: either to preserve the tendency to reduce the tempo of increases in capital investment, or . . . shift to a regime of increased investment activity. The turning point in this respect should be the 12th Five-Year Plan." See V. Kirichenko, "On Some Questions on the Further Improvement of Planning and Management of the Economy," *Planovoye Khozyaystvo* (Moscow), No. 9, 1982.

[15] Cf. V. Kirichenko, "Improving the Investment Process," *Izvestiya Akademii Nauk SSSR, Seriya Ekonomicheskaya* (Moscow), No. 2, 1984, p. 15, and A. Aganbegyan, "Important Positive Shifts in the Country's Life," *EKO*, No. 6, 1984, p. 10.

[16] M. Gorbachëv, "A Fundamental Question of Party Policy," *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, June 12, 1985, p. 1.

[17] See Boris Rumer, "Structural Imbalance in the Soviet Economy," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), July-August 1984, p. 25.

[18] Nikolay Ryzhkov, "On the Basic Directions of the Economic and Social Development of the USSR in 1986–1990 and in the Period to the Year 2000—Report of the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N. I. Ryzhkov," *Pravda*, Mar. 4, 1986.

Rolled wire being produced in a new shop at the Byelorussian Metallurgical Works.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

eve of World War II, when "it was felt that the threat to the socialist government was increasing" and preparations for war were under way. "There will," he said, "be no banking on a tranquil life."[19] The 12th Five-Year Plan's priorities are already evident in the economic plan for 1986, according to which investment is to increase by 7.6 percent—a sharp change from the modest 2.7 percent growth recorded in 1985, and the highest rate since 1975.[20] The economic program of the new leadership proposes to tackle a multitude of problems simultaneously: an energy program, a food program, a complex program for developing consumer goods and improving the service sector, a program for the development of machine-building, and, of course, maintaining the armaments program. In all the rhetoric there is a startling lack of concreteness. If one strips away the florid phraseology, however, two main tendencies stand out: a grandiose program of reindustrialization, and measures to improve economic management.

The reindustrialization drive stresses the reconstruction and modernization of existing enterprises. An integral component of this approach, indeed its precondition, is a drastic reduction in plans for the introduction of *new* productive capacities. Instead, the main flow of investment (50 percent) is to be directed toward existing capacities; this compares to only 35 percent in 1984.[21] In this process of modernization, the write-off of old machinery and equipment is planned to rise by 2 to 2.5 times. To meet expanded equipment requirements it is planned to increase machine-building output by 40 percent during the period 1986–90.[22]

The second main tendency is the effort to improve economic management through two principal devices: on the one hand, a greater centralization of management; and on the other, a simplification of ties between central ministries and enterprises with an eye to fostering greater independence of decision-making by the latter. The essence of this somewhat abstract formula consists in shifting enterprises to complete business accountancy (*polnyy khozraschët*) and in trying to eliminate unnecessary intermediate links between enterprises and their respective ministries.

Behind the rhetoric, these measures represent an attempt to solve basic economic problems while conserving, or even intensifying, the centralization of management, i.e., to avoid the pain of radical economic reform. It is absurd to advertise them as "new initiatives." Soviet leaders have been trying to implement exactly this program for more than half a century—with scant success. Stalin in his speech to the 17th CPSU Congress in 1934 insisted upon the need to expand the scale of reconstruction, and ever since the early 1970's, when the CPSU Central Committee adopted a resolution on this matter, the theme of redirecting the main thrust of investment into reconstruction and modernization has been stressed.[23] Yet, in 1984, the share of investment going to new projects in industry was 60 percent of the total investments. And despite calls at the 1976 and 1981 party congresses to accelerate the

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[19] "Steadfastly Advance," *Kommunist*, No. 8, May 1985, p. 26.

[20] "The Plan for the First Year of the 12th Five-Year Period," an editorial in *Planovoye Khozyaystvo*, No. 1, 1986, p. 7.

[21] See Ryzhkov's report, loc. cit.; and *Narkhoz 1984*, p.381.

[22] Gorbachëv report, loc. cit.; Ryzhkov report, loc. cit, p. 3; and *Narkhoz 1984*, p. 157.

[23] I. V. Stalin, "Responsibility Report to the 17th Party Congress," *Sochineniya* (Works), Vol. 13, p. 312, Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1951; and *KPSS v resolyutziyakh i resheniyakh s'yezdov* (The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses), Moscow, Politizdat, 1978, pp. 153–54.

Soviet Amortization Policy

The system for amortizing capital that is currently in effect is one of the Soviet economic system's oldest procedures. It took form during the industrialization of the 1920's, when the basic issue was the *creation*, not the *renewal* of capital stock. While the linear method of writing off capital adopted then may have been entirely appropriate under those specific circumstances, it has outlived its utility. With Gorbachëv (like Andropov and Brezhnev before him) urging a speedier renewal of fixed capital, it is essential to adopt a policy of accelerated capital retirement, such as has spurred technological innovation in developed capitalist societies.

The existing system of amortization is based on norms that are differentiated by type of fixed capital. These norms are reviewed by financial authorities of the state in a cumbersome process that takes place at considerable intervals. Thus, the norms introduced in the 1930's continued to apply, with some adjustments, right up until 1963; norms adopted in 1963 remained in effect until 1975; and the 1975 norms remain in effect today, with every indication that they will remain in effect through to the end of the current decade. (The norms introduced on January 1, 1975, were the result of a decree published in 1969.) The use of such norms for such lengthy periods clearly fails to correspond to real or desired rates of technological advance.

The obvious solution would be to adopt techniques of accelerated (regressive) retirement. However, this faces several obstacles. The first of these is ideological. To the Marxist guardians of the Soviet political economy, accelerated amortization is a discredited tool of capitalist monopolies used to cheat the public by concealing profits from taxation, and hence has no validity for a socialist economy.*

Opponents of accelerated amortization also raise objections of a more practical nature. They note, for example, that increases in total amortization under an accelerated schedule would in the first few years raise production costs and hence reduce enterprise profits. Writ large, this would have the unpleasant consequence of at least temporarily reducing Soviet national income statistics.

Finally, such accelerated amortization is possible only if Soviet machine-building industries are capable of replacing the capital being written off according to accelerated schedules. As the discussion in the text demonstrates, this is not the case.

*See, e.g., A. Dodonov, "On Several Problems of the Theory of Amortization," *Ekonomicheskiye Nauki* (Moscow), No. 5, 1973.

writing-off of outmoded fixed capital, such write-offs continue to be exceptionally low—1.3 percent of the existing stock in 1984.[24]

Likewise, the struggle to simplify economic administration and to shift to *khozraschët* commenced with the first five-year plan. Government decrees in 1929 and 1931 sought to simplify the management structure, reinforce the rights of enterprise managers, and shift to the use of financial levers to regulate and control enterprises (in essence, *khozraschët*), but, according to Vyacheslav Molotov, the decrees were not implemented because of "tremendous resistance from the business apparatus."[25] The idea of shifting to a "two-link" system of economic administration—i.e., enterprise and ministry—was proposed at least as early as 1934, when Lazar Kaganovich sang its praises at the 17th CPSU Congress.[26] But nothing has come of the idea in 50 years, which bodes ill for Gorbachëv's current optimism regarding its prospects today.

If the whole program of reconstruction and modernization has drifted helplessly for so many years, if even Stalin—with all his well-known methods—could not establish business accountancy, then it should be clear that there must be serious obstacles to these measures. It is ludicrous to attribute the whole problem to the resistance of the bureaucratic apparatus. The causes must be sought at a deeper level.

Obstacles to Industrial Renovation

The speeches of Gorbachëv and Ryzhkov at the 27th Party Congress highlight reconstruction and technological modernization of existing enterprises as the main thrust of investment policy for the 12th FYP period and indeed for the entire period until the year 2000.[27] At first glance, the program appears feasible and sensible. Theoretically, it would shorten the time period for obtaining results and thereby accelerate the circulation of capital; it would also reduce per unit expenditures for increasing capacity; and it would accelerate the introduction of new machinery.

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[24] *Narkhoz 1984*, p. 157. The figure was 1.4 percent in 1980 (see *Narkhoz 1980*, p. 147).

[25] Raymond Hutchings, *The Structural Origins of Soviet Industrial Expansion*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1984, p. 51. Stalin, too, admitted in a speech before an economic conference in 1931 that the government had not been capable of overcoming this resistance. See ibid., p. 52.

[26] Ibid., p. 43.

[27] Gorbachëv, "Political Report . . . ," loc. cit., and Ryzhkov's report, loc. cit. Gorbachëv had earlier struck this note in programmatic speeches in April and June 1985. See *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Apr. 24, 1985, and *Kommunist*, No. 12, 1985.

Such calculations ignore certain serious consequences of the approach for the Soviet economy over the longer term. An investment strategy focusing primarily on further development of existing enterprises will mean an overemphasis on the western regions of the USSR, where the vast majority of current industrial capacity is located, where natural resources are exhausted, where the infrastructure is already overloaded, and where ecological limits are being reached. The policy threatens to aggravate the territorial polarization of economic sectors—a manufacturing industry in the western part of the country and an extractive industry in the east. One must also take into account the enormous distances and serious transportation difficulties resulting from such a situation.

But, these arguments aside, there are serious practical obstacles to reconstruction. For one, the existing capital plant of Soviet industry is so aged that modernization will entail substantial, even radical, renovation of buildings and other structures. Indeed, this kind of renovation is devouring the lion's share of investment funds.[28] But such construction draws down on the amounts available for new machinery and equipment.

More important, the investment sphere of the Soviet economy is totally unprepared for the renovation policy: the necessary scientific, design, planning, and machine-building bases are not in place. For example, design organizations have traditionally concentrated on new enterprises, that is, on standard serial projects that are easier to design and hence more profitable for the design organization.

Construction firms avoid renovation projects, where labor intensity is reportedly 20 to 35 percent higher than in new construction.[29] And machine-building enterprises find it more profitable to manufacture serial equipment, rather than the customized machines required for the specific conditions of an enterprise undergoing renovation. Finally, no material incentives are offered to offset for managers the risk of reduced bonuses for failing to meet production targets while renovation is in progress. Managers prefer to construct new plants, for they cannot be assigned production targets for them until construction is completed.

The crux of the program is the renewal of fixed capital and the write-off of outmoded machinery. At the 27th Congress, Ryzhkov announced the need for "serious changes in amortization policy."[30] But how likely is the realization of such a policy? The 1975 "reform" of amortization norms (on the issue of amortization reform, see the box on the facing page) did not succeed in reducing the normal periods of service for fixed capital; indeed, the average term of service for industrial goods rose by 13 percent in the 1970's.[31]

Machine-Building Problems

The principal reason for the slow amortization was that the machine-building industry proved incapable of producing the necessary replacements. Indeed, the beginning of the 1980's was marked by an unprecedented fall-off in the production of important machinery products—turbines, locomotives, gas and oil drilling equipment, diesel and electric motors, metal-cutting machines, transport and construction equipment, and other products. The decline was not only quantitative but qualitative, with the number of new models and the share of such items in total output declining.[32] Symptomatic of the problems was the situation in engine-building: despite a desperate need to expand production of fuel-conserving diesel engines, only 23 percent of truck motors and 1 percent of bus motors currently being produced are diesels.[33]

How seriously are we to treat the 12th Five-Year Plan's goal of a 40 percent increase in output for the machine-building industry over the next five years? For this to occur, there would have to have been a marked upturn in investment in this sector during the 11th FYP period (1981–85), yet 1984 data revealed a drop in the share of investment going to machine-building in comparison with 1980 and a decline in the introduction of new productive capacities in many branches of ma-

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[28] Boris Rumer, *Investment and Reindustrialization in the Soviet Economy*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1984, pp. 21–23.

[29] V. Danilov in *Pravda*, Dec. 17, 1980; T. Bakayeva and V. Zadorozhnyy, "Calculating the Influence of Structural Shifts in Construction," *Vestnik Statistiki* (Moscow), No. 10, 1977, p. 18.

[30] Loc. cit.

[31] The acceleration in amortization norms originally proposed by sectoral research institutes were moderated by Gosplan when the 1975 reform was actually instituted. For industry as a whole, the normative length of service of fixed capital was shortened from 29 years to 25.4 years. Moreover, over the period 1972–80, the average lifespan of machinery and equipment increased rather than fell (from 12.5 to 14 years), while the average age of buildings and installations rose from 36.6 to 43.1 years. See Chernikov, loc. cit., p. 594.

[32] See Boris Rumer, "Soviet Investment Policy: Unresolved Problems," *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1982, pp. 53–68.

The President of the USSR Academy of Sciences has reported that domestic producers can meet only one-third of the demand for apparatus and high-tech equipment for research and development work. See A. Aleksandrov, "Introductory Remarks to the Annual General Meeting of the USSR Academy of Sciences," *Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR* (Moscow), No. 6, 1982, p. 11.

[33] See N. Smelyakov, "Development of the Homeland's Export Deliveries," *Kommunist*, No. 14, 1984, p. 43.

Workers at the Volzhskiy Motor Works in Tol'yatti adjust MP-II robots manufactured by the plant for installation at this and other Soviet industrial enterprises.

–TASS from SOVFOTO.

chine-building. Moreover, even if replacement of machinery is to occur at half the planned annual rate of 5 to 6 percent in 1986–90, it would require an increase of 3.5 million tons in the annual output of rolled steel. In 1985, the increase in production of rolled steel was only 0.7 million tons.[34]

True, the 1986–90 plan calls for a new surge in investment. However, it does not appear that there will be much progress toward reducing an excessive emphasis on investment in the extractive sector, a shift called for even by Gorbachëv.[35] Investment in the oil and gas industry grew from 14 percent of total industrial investment in 1975 to 22 percent in 1984.[36] According to the 12th FYP, investment in this sector is to be 47 percent greater in 1986–90 than in 1981–85. Although investment in machine-building is slated to increase 80 percent over the same period,[37] one has little confidence in Soviet achievement of this goal, given the problems noted above.

In addition, the drive to increase production of machinery is currently affected by yet another in a long line of Soviet economic campaigns. This is the ill-conceived stress on robotics. Production of robots in the USSR is growing at an accelerating pace—from 1,400 units in 1980 to 15,000 units in 1985.[38] However, neither the organization of production in machine-building nor the productive or human infrastructure is prepared to adapt to this new technology; the reliability and quality of the new machinery is inferior; and neither its repair nor servicing has been organized. Hence, application of robots is ineffective and has become a burden for machine-building enterprises. Reportedly, more than 90 percent of the robots put into production have freed one man or less per work shift. The maximum annual savings achieved through the use of any single robot is less than 4,000 rubles, while the expenditures related to its use comprise approximately 40,000 to 50,000 rubles, excluding operating costs.[39] The new leadership's campaign to accelerate the production of "revolutionary technology" in machine-building has resulted in the diversion of enormous resources without regard to economic and technologically rational proportions between the traditional and radically new technology. Soviet machine-building is simply not yet prepared for "robotization." The history of the Soviet economy has many similar instances of impulsive injections of massive investment in a given sector without the appropriate preparation of the infrastructure and allied sectors. The consequences of such imbalanced investment are always onerous (one need only cite the example of Khrushchev's "big chemistry") and will make their adverse impact felt upon all spheres of the economy for a long time to come. Apparently, the current Soviet leadership has not learned the lessons of the past.

Under these circumstances it is not surprising that reconstruction is making little headway. Many industrial sectors still lack plans for reconstruction. Even the modest goals set out in the annual economic plan for

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[34] See V. Fal'tsman and A. Ozhegov, "Writing-Off of Capital Funds: Investment Possibilities and Limitations," *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, No. 6, 1983, p. 65. These specialists of the Central Economic-Mathematical Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences argue that there is so little room for maneuver in the production of machinery and equipment that few changes can take place in less than seven years from the date of their initiation.

[35] "A Fundamental Question . . . ," loc cit.

[36] *Narkhoz 1984*, p. 381.

[37] Ryzhkov's report, loc. cit.

[38] *Narkhoz 1984*, p. 179.

[39] See L. Volchkevich, "Robots of Today and Tomorrow," *Izvestiya* (Moscow), June 3, 1985.

1985 were not attained, for example, in the oil-refining, coal, steel, machine-building, paper, and food industries.[40]

Sharp reduction in the introduction of new productive capacities, a shift of emphasis to the modernization of existing capacities, a jump in depreciation rates for outdated fixed capital—all of these have been written into the 12th Five-Year Plan. They connote a radical change in the economic proportions and balances that have developed over the course of half a century. Over this period, resources have been directed primarily at expanding fixed capital, at the expense of replacing it. This distortion of economically justifiable proportions in the creation of fixed capital, manifested in an artificial increase in net investment, has made it possible to sustain high tempos of growth. But the price has been the accumulation of worn-out machinery and old industrial plants. To overcome the inertia of this entire process would require a temporary, but abrupt reduction in production and in national income. Past Soviet leaders have never been willing to accept such a decrease in national income. One can question whether Gorbachëv is ready to pay this price to redeem the economic sins of his predecessors.

Obstacles to Management Reform

The steps to be taken in an effort to improve economic management represent the murkiest aspects of Gorbachëv's report to the 27th Party Congress and the 12th Five-Year Plan itself. The prospects for these measures are equally murky.

The objective of centralization is reflected in the creation of super-centralized administrative units in Moscow—either through the replacement of existing ministries (in the case of the State Agro-Industrial Committee–Gosagroprom) or the imposition of a higher coordinating body above existing ministries (in the case of the Office of Machine-Building). Just how functions will be shared among Gosplan, the State Committee on Science and Technology, the State Construction Committee, the State Committee for Material and Technical Supply, the ministries, and the new administrative units (not to mention the production-branch departments of the Central Committee) is probably not even clear to Gorbachëv himself at this point. More important, it strains credibility to think that the Soviet establishment really expects these current exercises in combining and splitting administrative units to have any more beneficial effect upon economic performance than similar measures did under Khrushchev.

How do things stand with *khozraschët*? This effort to establish full cost-accounting for Soviet managers—very close in concept to commercial accounting of firms operating in a market economy—runs athwart a fundamental systemic problem: pricing. All distribution and allocation rests upon prices; all plan indices for assessing the economy are derived from prices; and all enterprise results and bonuses are calculated using prices. But the existing system of price-setting brings the commercial interests of individual enterprises into fundamental conflict with national economic objectives. Both Gorbachëv and Ryzhkov spoke at the 27th Congress about the need to improve price-setting. But Soviet leaders have been discussing this matter since the first five-year plan. The issue became particularly salient in the 1960's, when it stood at the very center of discussion on the abortive economic reform.

Problems with Prices

Have matters improved in the last two decades? Prices still are highly artificial and far removed from economic realities, torn between the Marxian labor theory of value and Western concepts of marginal utility. Food and housing are highly subsidized and available at unrealistically low prices. At the same time, Soviet industrial enterprises charge more than they should for products. One account describes the "round-about" methods that enterprises employ to this end:

> *They overstate the manufacturing cost of non-comparable production . . . by ascribing to this disproportionately large volumes of overhead costs. After making symbolic changes in the consumption characteristics [of a product], they obtain a new designation for the old product and formally, legally make a significant increase in its prices . . . . The jacking-up of wholesale prices, which provides the employees of enterprises with a "soft life," encourages the inflation of overhead costs, the wasteful expenditure of raw materials and resources, retards the growth in labor productivity—in a word, undermines the fundamental principles of* khozraschët.[41]

A particularly great opportunity for unjustified price increases occurs in the production of new non-standardized and custom machinery (i.e., individual units and small series). Such items are not included in the official price lists approved by the State Price Committee, but are worked out in agreements between producer and customer. (The stress on cost savings in reconstruction projects reduces opportunities for manufacturers to take much advantage of this mechanism in such projects.)

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[40] A. Stepun and V. Balakin, "Factors for Increasing the Effectiveness of Capital Construction," *Planovoye Khozyaystvo*, No. 12, 1985, p. 23.

[41] A. Malafeyev, "Steps and Interconnections of Economic Theory and Economic Practice," *Ekonomicheskiye Nauki* (Moscow), No. 12, 1984, p. 6.

The bargaining begins with the list price of a similar item, which is then adjusted to reflect the estimated return from utilization of the new, modified machine. However, a selective study by the State Price Committee found that this economic return is overstated by 30 to 50 percent, sometimes several hundred percent.[42] So far, no effective limits on pricing for equipment have been established—both because of methodological difficulties and because such limits would deprive machinery manufacturing plants of important material incentives. Indeed, machine-building enterprises have since received the right—on an experimental basis—to tack on a 30 percent price premium for machines deemed to be "highly effective."[43] The vagueness of definition and poor techniques for assessing effectiveness of new technology provided yet another opening for enterprises to raise prices.

Uncontrolled inflation is as pernicious for a planned economy as for a market economy. Yet, the Soviet system is so constructed that no one has a vested interest in reducing prices on industrial production—not the producer, not the consumer, not even the Ministry of Finance. G. Kulagin, director of a large machine-building plant, explains the situation:

The System—at What Price?

In a command economy of the Soviet type, manipulation of prices is theoretically one of the most important levers permitting the state to influence the tempo and course of economic development, to affect the structural movements of the economy. Unfortunately, traditional Soviet price-setting methods are particularly ill-designed for an era of intensification.

Price-setting in the USSR derives from Marx's labor theory of value, with prices determined on the basis of labor expenditures (direct and indirect) going into a given product rather than from some calculation of its quality and utility. It makes badly operating enterprises look good, and it justifies excessive expenditure of resources. Such an approach acts as a barrier to technological progress. At present, there is no suitable mechanism for measuring the relative utility of various types of machinery serving the same consumption purpose. It is obvious that to change over to a path of raising productivity and conserving resources, it is necessary to reject this principle of price-setting and to make utility the first criterion in determining prices.

Here we find a collision between ideological orthodoxy and the demands of economic practice. "Practice" demands, above all, calculation of consumption value. But Soviet economists, for ideological reasons, cannot admit that the labor theory of value has failed to work, or concede the viability of the concept of "marginal utility." Instead, they must resort to convoluted concepts such as "social utility." Thus, Soviet scholar Stanislav Shatalin writes that the law of costs, as the basis for pricing, is giving way to "*the law of setting prices on the basis of social utility*."*

Recognition that price is a function of utility, not just of the expenditure of labor, implies repudiation of Marx's labor theory of value, something that party ideologists can hardly accept: if the labor theory of value is undermined, what then remains of Marxism in general? Yet, more pragmatically-minded members of the Soviet elite are pressuring theoreticians to straighten out the pricing problem and get on with the practical task of accelerating technological progress. Thus Professor Yuriy Borozdin argues in a lead editorial in *Pravda* of Dec. 6, 1985, that one must "reject the approach: the higher the expenditures, the greater the price, and switch over to the demand: the greater the effect/utility, the higher the price."

Soviet economists today continue to seek an unrealizable compromise—one that simultaneously takes into account both costs calculated in terms of labor value, and real marginal utility. The resulting dilemmas are unresolvable. If the price is based not only upon expenditures but also upon the consumer value of the product, what is one to do when quality/utility increases at the same time that expenditures decline, or vice versa?

At a round-table discussion of *khozraschët*, published in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* of May 20, 1985, noted Soviet price specialist Pavel Bunich and Oleg Yun', deputy chief of the section for improving planning and economic stimulation at Gosplan, acknowledged that price-setting is "a maze that one best not get into."

The sheer volume of work facing the State Price Committee is staggering. Every year it receives, reviews, and confirms more than 200,000 production prices on new items. (This excludes a whole plethora of ad hoc prices that do not even pass under its scrutiny.) Every hour, the committee must review 86 prices; *every two minutes it must set the price on three items*. Hence only spot checking is possible.

**Funktsionirovaniye ekonomiki razvitogo sotsializma* (Functioning of the Economy of Developed Socialism), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo MGU, 1982, pp. 64, 82.

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[42] Lira Rozenova, "Price and Efficiency in Machine-Building Production," *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, No. 2, 1984, p. 30.

[43] M. Yartsev, "The Price of the Project," *Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya* (Moscow), Apr. 18, 1984, p 2.

> *One of the serial machines that we had successfully and quickly put into operation began, with time, to produce an indecently large profit. Because the surplus profit was turned over to the budget and the growth of the mass of profit had no effect upon the growth of our incentive funds, we ourselves proposed to reduce the price of this machine. The ministry was not easy to convince, but in the end agreed. The State Committee on Prices also gave its assent. Oddly enough, it was the Ministry of Finance that objected, and indeed in the most categorical fashion. At first, we could not understand this paradox: it seemed to us that the financial administration, more than any one else, should be interested in a price reduction. But then everything became clear: by taking away [the enterprises'] surplus profit as a free surplus, the Ministry of Finance easily and simply accumulates this in the budget as income. Hence a reduction in price would cut this inflow into the budget.*[44]

For its part, the State Price Committee can do very little to correct the situation. Most prices pass through the committee's bureaucracy without effective control, with enterprises and ministries taking advantage of competition-free conditions to overstate their results and thereby reap excessive profits.

The inflation present in Soviet industrial pricing is reflected right up to the macroeconomic level of national indicators of economic performance. Recent articles in the Soviet press criticizing official statistics evidence a growing top-level awareness that things are actually a good deal worse than the data from the Central Statistical Administration suggest, and unhappiness with the imperfect data that everyone in the system must use. In *Pravda* of December 30, 1985, economic observer Vasiliy Selyunin and economist Grigoriy Khanin subjected Soviet statistics to a scathing criticism, asserting that data on production (allegedly given in comparable prices) actually contain "a hidden rise in prices on machinery and construction products that is not officially recognized." Another prominent Soviet economist, Solomon Kheinman, wrote: "There is an outright falsehood to be found in economic practice—the selection of indices that knowingly inflate the volume of production."[45] Analysis of statistical data on the production of machinery and equipment in physical, rather than price, terms confirms this view.[46] It is even conceivable that the Soviet economy has been experiencing an absolute decline in industrial production since the late 1970's.

The implications of this dysfunctional price system for the orderly management of the economy from the center, let alone for the development of rational bases for individual enterprise decision-making, are staggering. Attempts to reform this system by formulating prices that can make *khozraschët* feasible—so that the interests of both the state and the enterprise are satisfied—while preserving the command economy are doomed. Transition to a pricing system based upon the concept of marginal utility is tantamount to transition to a market economy. This is the fundamental and unresolvable contradiction of the Soviet economy.

Conclusion

We have examined several intrinsic problems of the Soviet economy. Without a fundamental shift in the system's priorities from political to economic considerations, these problems will not be solved, and Gorbachëv's economic programs as outlined in the 12th Five-Year Plan and various major addresses will not be realized. It is possible that Gorbachëv, once he has consolidated his power, will emerge as a great reformer, but his steps so far have been tentative and incomplete. In pondering the challenge of reform, the Soviet leader would do well to recall the advice of Winston Churchill regarding Khrushchev's bid to reform Soviet politics after the 20th CPSU Congress of 1956: one cannot take two jumps to get across a precipice.

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[44] G. Kulagin, "Nomenklatura, Price, Profit," *EKO*, No. 11, 1985, pp. 94–95.

[45] See *EKO*, No. 11, 1985, p. 39. There is sufficient concern over the problem so that the chairman of the economic department of the Moscow Police School, K. Ulybin, recently proposed to treat the raising of prices as "economic sabotage and to punish it accordingly." See his article, "The Deficit and the Mutual Action of Partners," *EKO*, No. 12, 1984, p. 26.

It is perhaps significant that in mid-1985, Lev Volodarskiy, head of the Central Statistical Administration for two decades, was relieved of his responsibilities.

[46] See *Narkhoz 1984*, pp. 175–77, 179–81, 183, 195.

Imre Nagy & Moscow, 1953-56

Charles Gati

There are several unmarked graves in the northeast corner of one of Budapest's many cemeteries. On appropriate anniversaries a few mourners—family and friends—come by and stand there. Occasionally, they bring flowers. Because the authorities have refused to confirm it, the visitors can only surmise that three of the martyrs of the 1956 Hungarian revolution are buried there.[1] The three are Imre Nagy, prime minister and leader of the revolution, General Pál Maléter, his young and brave defense chief, and Miklós Gimes, one of Nagy's associates and a particularly gifted journalist. They were tried together and executed in 1958.

For Hungarians who remember him or know of him, Nagy was a rare politician. With his large and thick moustache, innocent, round face, inevitable pince-nez, and jovial demeanor, he looked, and was, straightforward and trustworthy. Though only 60 years old in 1956, his associates affectionately referred to him as *az öreg*, the old man, or as *Imre bácsi*, Uncle Imre. For that group of young anti-Stalinist, reform-minded Communists who surrounded him for a few short years before 1956—writers, and journalists, and other political and intellectual hangers-on—Nagy was both a genuine father figure and the last hope for socialism with a human face. But during the revolution itself, when suddenly everything seemed possible, he became the last hope for freedom and independence for all Hungarians. Before it was all over, he had realized their dream by withdrawing Hungary from the Warsaw Pact and reconstituting the postwar, multiparty coalition government of 1944–47.

Of course, his associates helped. The most astute anti-Stalinists from his original entourage—Géza Losonczy, Ferenc Donáth, and Miklós Vásárhelyi—eventually opened his eyes to the nature and scope of the revolution under way. Zoltán Tildy, the veteran leader of the Smallholders' Party and postwar president, emerged from eight years of house arrest to become his calm, de facto deputy. But Imre Nagy was both the leader and the symbol of the 1956 Hungarian revolution. And when he died for it in 1958, he did so without denying what he had done and without recanting what he had stood for.[2] A genuine hero, he belongs on the pedestal where his compatriots have put him.

Yet it is one of the paradoxes of political life in Eastern Europe that, until the last days of this short-lived revolution, Nagy was also the man Moscow counted on, and could count on, to preserve its interests in Hungary. Indeed, from the time of the first demonstration, on October 23, until October 31, Nagy could only envisage a Hungarian future based on Soviet tutelage. At first, acting with Soviet concurrence, he sought to make order by promising "reforms," assuming that such a promise would end the uprising. He also assumed that a communist party, attuned to his interpretation of what had to be done,

Charles Gati is Professor of Political Science at Union College (Schenectady, NY). He is also associated with the Research Institute on International Change and the W. Averell Harriman Institute for the Advanced Study of the Soviet Union, Columbia University (New York). The present study is taken from his book, Hungary and the Soviet Bloc, *scheduled for publication by Duke University Press. © Duke University Press, 1986.*

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[1] Béla Lipták, "Searching for the Grave of Imre Nagy," *The Wall Street Journal* (New York) Oct. 9, 1985.

[2] Even the Hungarian government's *White Book*, which quotes most tendentiously from Nagy's testimony during the trial, suggests his stubborn determination. See *Nagy Imre és büntársai ellenforradalmi összeesküvése* (The Counterrevolutionary Conspiracy of Imre Nagy and His Accomplices), Budapest, n.p., n.d. [1958]. Of Nagy's "accomplices" who received prison sentences and were released in the early 1960's, Ferenc Donáth and Miklós Vásárhelyi—whom I was able to interview on several occasions—live in Budapest, and Sándor Kopácsi lives in Toronto. Unfortunately, Kopácsi's published recollections are neither particularly revealing nor always factually accurate. See Sándor Kopácsi, *Az 1956-os magyar forradalom és a Nagy Imre per* (The Hungarian Revolution and the Imre Nagy Trial), New Brunswick, NJ, Magyar Öregdiák Szövetség/Bessenyei György Kör, 1980.

would implement his reformist ideas and policies. That is why so much of what he did at that time turned out to be too little and too late.

Nagy's first turning point came on October 28 when he reached the conclusion that the *party* too had to be changed. He had come to understand—and Moscow agreed—that the time for reform had passed, and hence his—and Moscow's—all but impossible historic mission was to reconcile Soviet power-political interests with those of a new Hungarian political order. He consulted with Anastas Mikoyan and Mikhail Suslov, the two Soviet Politburo emissaries who were in Budapest, and with Yuriy Andropov, the Soviet ambassador to Hungary, to gain their approval for the transfer of the functions of the party's hapless Central Committee to a new, centrist, six-member Presidium. So anxious was Nagy not to circumvent Moscow that he called the Kremlin from Andropov's office that morning to obtain confirmation of the authorization he had just received from the Soviet representatives in Budapest. Whether he spoke with Nikita Khrushchev himself or someone else is not known, but he was authorized to make the change. Two days later, on October 30, when the new party leadership proved unable to impose order, Nagy was ready to meet one of the revolution's major demands by establishing a pluralistic political system. Before making his decision, however, he once again asked for—and received—Mikoyan's approval for the creation of a genuine, four-party coalition government. In short, during the first week of the revolution, Nagy knew or thought he knew what the Soviet Union wanted him to do "to save the cause of socialism" in Hungary, and he acted accordingly.

Only his second turning point, which came on November 1, signified a parting of the ways between Nagy and Moscow. Soviet troops having reentered Hungary the night before, Nagy realized that the Kremlin was no longer interested in finding a political solution under his leadership to the Hungarian crisis. He felt betrayed. In vain had he consulted with the Kremlin; in vain had he gained Soviet approval for every major measure he had adopted between October 23 and October 31. This was the moment, then, when Nagy, a Moscow loyalist all his life, became a Hungarian revolutionary. On November 1, without Soviet concurrence, his government declared Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and the country's neutrality. On November 4, when its troops reached the capital, the Soviet Union overthrew Nagy's government and crushed the revolution.

My purpose here is neither to describe the revolution nor to judge Nagy's performance. My interest is in drawing attention to the apparent flexibility, confusion, and duplicity in Soviet conduct and to the crucial impact of Kremlin infighting on Hungarian politics before and during the revolution.

From Moscow to Moscow

Except for a brief absence from late 1949 to early 1951, Imre Nagy was a full member of the Hungarian communist party's Politburo from 1944 to 1953. Having spent almost 15 years in the Soviet Union as the Hungarian party's expert on agriculture, he returned from Moscow to play a not insignificant role in the execution of the 1945 land reform. In 1945–46, he served as minister of internal affairs for a few months; but when he proved too gentle in that post, he was asked to relinquish it and take up another. He is known to have expressed reservations about the scope and tempo of the changes in agriculture in the winter of 1947–48, and about the collectivization campaign in 1949, but then—as minister of crop collection for a few months—he was put in charge of implementing the very policies he had questioned. In 1952, he became a deputy premier with responsibility for agriculture. During these years, however, he was never an influential decision-maker.

Although Nagy publicly supported whatever the Hungarian communist party decided to do, and although he exercised "self-criticism" whenever the Politburo majority considered his views erroneous, his colleagues disliked him from the beginning, and both Secretary General Mátyás Rákosi and his deputy Ernő Gerő were said to have hated him.[3] If so, and given Rákosi's extensive powers, how could Nagy have kept his seat on the Politburo all those years and why was László Rajk rather than the occasionally "difficult" Nagy chosen to be the "leader" of a "Titoist conspiracy" in 1949 and sentenced to death? The only reasonable answer, confirmed by the then pro-Rákosi acolyte Zoltán Vas, is that Nagy was protected by the Kremlin. It is probable that Georgiy Malenkov and Lavrentiy Beria in particular considered Nagy a reliable and loyal party man. What is certain is that Nagy had early and important supporters in Moscow, perhaps Stalin himself, who imposed Nagy on Rákosi at the end of 1944. At that time Rákosi, while still in Moscow, had informed Vas (who had already reached southern Hungary with the Red Army) that the "Christian" Nagy and not the "Jewish" Vas was to be the fifth highest-ranking member of the Politburo after the (Jewish) foursome of Rákosi, Gerő, Mihály Farkas, and József Révai. Having thus been installed by Moscow, Nagy survived—literally—through the dark years of Hungarian Stalinism because somebody somewhere in the Kremlin looked after him, and, for this reason, Rákosi did not dare to touch him.

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[3] Information in this paragraph is drawn from the unpublished version of Zoltán Vas's extraordinary, 500,000-word memoirs. Vas was Rákosi's close associate for over 30 years and frequently a member of the Hungarian party's Politburo from 1945 to 1952. Stalin's death frustrated Rákosi's plan to accuse Vas of being the head of a "Zionist conspiracy" in 1953. For the heavily censored version of Vas's memoirs, see *Viszontagságos életem* (My Vicissitudinous Life), Budapest, Magvető, 1980, and *Akkori önmagunkról: Önéletírás II* (About Our Previous Selves: Memoirs II), Budapest, Magvető, 1982.

Soviet confidence in Nagy was conclusively demonstrated in 1953, after Stalin's death in March and just before the outbreak of the June 17 riots in East Berlin. On short notice, the Kremlin invited a group of Hungarian leaders to Moscow for a meeting on June 13–14, specifying the precise composition of the Hungarian delegation.[4] The group included Rákosi and Gerő, but not Farkas and Révai—a curious signal. Others who were told to appear were Nagy, then a deputy prime minister, István Dobi, the nonparty figurehead of the Presidential Council, and four younger party leaders (András Hegedüs, Béla Szalai, István Hidas, and Rudolf Földvári). According to Hegedüs, there might have been some tension between the new Soviet leaders and the Hungarians prior to the June meeting, but—even though he was a Politburo member—he did not know what it was about. There was no discussion of differences during the flight from Budapest to Moscow; he was in the dark as to what to expect. Because both he and Nagy were specialists in agriculture, it occurred to him that they might receive some "helpful criticism" from their Soviet comrades about that. If so, Hegedüs says, he looked forward to it. But agriculture was not an important issue on the agenda.

The Soviet delegation included every important member of the post-Stalin CPSU Presidium, as the Politburo was then called: Malenkov, Beria, Khrushchev, Vyacheslav Molotov, Nikolay Bulganin, Anastas Mikoyan, Lazar' Kaganovich, as well as Marshal Klement Voroshilov, the Kremlin's veteran Hungarian expert. In no uncertain terms they let the Hungarians know that the Soviet Union was deeply dissatisfied with Rákosi's leadership. The Hungarian economy was on the verge of collapse. The collectivization campaign had gone too far. The purges had decimated the party. Thus, Rákosi must give up either his position as prime minister or his position as the party's first secretary; he held too much power. Obviously well-informed, Beria even wanted to know why the wife of secret police (ÁVO) chief Gábor Péter and Rákosi's personal secretary was among those recently arrested. In reply, according to Hegedüs, Rákosi mumbled something about Stalin having told him that Péter was a CIA agent. Beria lost his cool: "As an old Bolshevik, you Rákosi must know that we really know how to break someone's back!"

From Nagy's account, it appears that at one point the Soviet leaders called Rákosi aside for what turned into a particularly nasty, personal confrontation. For a start, Beria accused Rákosi of trying to become "the Jewish king of Hungary." Referring to "Turkish sultans, Hapsburg emperors, Tatar kings, and Polish princes" who had all once ruled Hungary, Beria warned: "But, as far as we know, Hungary has never had a Jewish king. Apparently, this is what you have become. Well, you can be sure that we won't allow it."[5] At the same meeting, as related to Nagy by Malenkov, the Soviets asked Rákosi: "'Whom do you recommend as your deputy?' He could name no one. He had objections to everyone whose name was mentioned; he had something against everyone. Everyone was suspect except he alone. This appalled us very much." Nagy was also told by Molotov that Rákosi had "wanted a premier who would have no voice in the making of decisions." Later, at a plenary session, the Soviet leaders "proposed" Nagy's appointment as prime minister and Gerő's and Hegedüs's appointments as Nagy's deputies. There and then, they also changed the composition of the Politburo, from which Farkas and Révai were excluded for reasons neither asked nor given.

Nagy's appointment was all the more significant because it was not yet clear whether he, as prime minister, or Rákosi, as party first secretary, would be number one. In the Soviet Union, the head of the government, Malenkov, was number one. For that reason, according to Hegedüs, Rákosi feared that his demotion was even more serious than it turned out to be. As they left one of the conference rooms in the protocol-conscious Kremlin, Rákosi was politely prompted by Nagy to precede him. But, as Hegedüs was shocked to witness, Rákosi pushed Nagy ahead: "You go, Imre, you're the leader now."

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[4] Except for Beria's reference to Rákosi having become "the Jewish king of Hungary" (see fn. 5, below), all quotes in this summary of the June 13–14, 1953, meeting in the Kremlin are drawn from the published accounts of two participants, Imre Nagy and András Hegedüs. See Nagy, *On Communism: In Defense of the New Course*, New York, Praeger, 1957, and Hegedüs, *Élet egy eszme árnyékában* (Life in the Shadow of an Ideal), Vienna, Zoltán Zsille, 1985, esp. pp. 188–97.

[5] Tamás Aczél and Tibor Méray, *The Revolt of the Mind: A Case History of Intellectual Resistance Behind the Iron Curtain*, New York, Praeger, 1959, p. 159.



Premier Imre Nagy delivers a speech to the Hungarian Parliament on January 21, 1954; at his side is Hungarian communist party chief Matyas Rákosi.

—EASTFOTO.

The New Course that Nagy was told to pursue as prime minister[6] received only perfunctory support from Rákosi, who was put on the defensive by every new measure announced by Nagy—about agriculture, about the new emphasis on light industry, and about the rehabilitation of political prisoners. After all, he had been in charge when those "mistakes" were made. For almost two years, then, Rákosi kept returning to Moscow for permission to reverse the reformist course—and to oust Nagy. On one such occasion, according to Nagy,[7] Khrushchev said: "Rákosi is responsible for the arrests. Therefore he does not want to release these people. He knows that he is guilty and will compromise himself." On another occasion, Khrushchev complained that "the detainees are being released slowly. This is Rákosi's fault, because he hasn't taken the matter in hand. Rákosi alludes to the fact that his nerves are bad. Nerves don't count." When Rákosi tried to use the news of the ouster of Beria, presumably one of Nagy's supporters, to discredit Nagy, Khrushchev rebuffed the pro-Rákosi forces: "They can't hide behind Beria as Rákosi is trying to do. We were there, too, when these errors were ascertained, every one of us!" Malenkov echoed that view: "The faults we noted in June are being remedied very slowly. Rákosi has not taken the lead in remedying the faults." Khrushchev also attacked Gerő: "Gerő has no words of self-criticism or feeling of responsibility for the serious mistakes of the economic policy."

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[6] I make no attempt here to treat the reforms enacted during the New Course and the intellectual ferment of 1953–56. For details, see Nagy, *On Communism* and numerous scholarly and journalistic accounts, including Miklós Molnár and László Nagy, *Imre Nagy: Réformateur ou révolutionnaire?* (Imre Nagy: Reformer or Revolutionary?), Geneva, Droz, 1959; Tibor Méray, *Thirteen Days that Shook the Kremlin: Imre Nagy and the Hungarian Revolution*, New York, Praeger, 1959; and Aczél and Méray, *Revolt of the Mind*. For a comprehensive and elegant scholarly treatment of this subject, see Bennett Kovrig, *Communism in Hungary: From Kun to Kádár*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1979, pp. 267–98. Two key documents from 1953 surfaced only in 1985 in a Hungarian *samizdat* publication in Budapest called *Hírmondó*. One, translated into English by Bill Lomax, is Nagy's previously suppressed speech to the Hungarian party's Central Committee on June 27, 1953; see "Imre Nagy's Secret Speech," *Labour Focus on Eastern Europe* (London), Summer 1985, pp. 3–16. The other is the resolution of the same Central Committee session, passed on June 28, 1953, but withheld from the public; see "The June Resolution," *Irodalmi Ujság* (Paris), Vol. 36, No. 3, 1985, pp. 11–14. Significantly, Nagy's 1953 "secret speech" to the Central Committee indirectly confirms Nagy's and Hegedüs's subsequent accounts of what the Soviet leaders so vividly said during the June 13–14 confrontation in the Kremlin.

[7] All quotes in this paragraph are from Nagy, *On Communism*.

As the struggle within the Hungarian party continued, the Kremlin presently appeared to favor Nagy over Rákosi. Nagy appreciated the confidence of "the leading Soviet comrades" in him, their "sincere, plain and sharp criticism, which was given in a true party spirit," "their readiness to offer fraternal help [and] the great trust which they extended toward us."[8] In reality, that "trust" appeared to be limited; after all, both Rákosi and Gerő were allowed to retain their highly important positions despite all that they had done. "I have to keep Rákosi . . . because in Hungary the whole structure will collapse if he goes," Khrushchev argued.[9] Yet, to the extent the Soviet leadership preferred Nagy, it was for good reasons. He had been in Moscow for many years. He was not Jewish. He could speak Russian well. He was a loyal supporter of Soviet policies, under Stalin and now under his successors as well. He had played no role in the Hungarian party purges. By temperament, he was earnest, disciplined, and reliable, even if frequently stubborn. Though an early critic of the tempo of forced collectivization, he never publicly questioned party policy once it was adopted. As the new Soviet leaders were about to introduce their own New Course, Nagy was very much on their wavelength. He was the man they needed.

On the Kremlin's Waiting List

As late as October 1954, Nagy was still riding high; Gerő, after a brief vacation in Moscow, was uncharacteristically supportive of him. But Soviet signals began to change in November. Mihály Farkas, that barometer of Soviet sentiments, was the first to reflect the new line: "There is no New Course, . . . it is rightist to pursue it, . . . the old road must be pursued, only some mistakes to be corrected."[10] In charge of culture and the press at the time, Farkas accordingly dismissed several Nagy supporters from the editorial staff of the party daily *Szabad Nép* on December 16.

Rákosi had just returned from a Soviet vacation, too. In Moscow, he learned of the imminent palace conspiracy against Malenkov, and the corresponding new party line against the New Course and against rightist deviationism. Looking for an opportunity to discredit Nagy, Rákosi began to say—behind closed doors still—that in Hungary, too, rightist deviationism had become the main danger. He said that it was an error to have favored light industry and to have allowed collective farms to disband. By so identifying Nagy's policies with the just-discovered "errors" of the recent past, Rákosi anticipated the charges Khrushchev would make against *his* as yet unnamed opponent (Malenkov) at the end of January 1955.

It was against the background of the ascendancy of this newly formed anti-Malenkov coalition that an urgent invitation was sent to a group of Hungarian leaders to appear in the Kremlin on January 7, 1955. The Hungarian delegation was composed of Nagy, Rákosi, Gerő, Szalai, and Farkas. The Soviet Politburo was represented by Malenkov, Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Molotov, Kaganovich, and Bulganin. This time, Nagy was put on the carpet. Following Soviet custom, the task of attacking him was given to his mentor Malenkov who, with a thick file in front of him, began to quote from Nagy's recent speeches and articles and then accused him of "slander against the party," of contradicting "the Leninist principle of [democratic] centralism," of "underestimating the party's governing role," of minimizing "the class struggle," of "opportunism, chauvinism, and demagogy." Obviously well briefed, Malenkov also cited facts and figures to show how the New Course, for which only Nagy was now said to be responsible, had exacerbated Hungary's economic problems. Malenkov even knew of and complained about a small anti-Soviet demonstration during a Soviet-Hungarian water polo game in Budapest.[11]

It is clear in retrospect that Khrushchev, once one of the strongest supporters of Nagy and the New Course, had turned coat in order to get rid of Malenkov with the help of such Stalinist opponents of the Soviet New Course—and of Malenkov—as Kaganovich and Molotov. (Soon enough, in mid-1957, Malenkov would join Molotov and Kaganovich in an unsuccessful attempt to oust Khrushchev.) At this time, though, they all wanted to discredit Nagy in order to demonstrate the harm Malenkov's policies had supposedly done even outside the Soviet Union. As for Malenkov, he followed the usual Bolshevik formula which required him to save

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[8] "Imre Nagy's Secret Speech," *loc. cit.*, p. 5.

[9] As quoted in George Mikes, *The Hungarian Revolution*, London, Deutsch, 1957, p. 61.

[10] Ferenc A. Váli, *Rift and Revolt in Hungary: Nationalism versus Communism*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1961, p. 155.

[11] For a detailed account of this encounter, see Méray, *Thirteen Days*, pp. 22–28. The source for Méray's summary is not indicated, but subsequent public charges against Nagy generally confirm its accuracy.

Civilians and soldiers in Budapest burn photos of Stalinist communist leader Matyas Rákosi during the 1956 Hungarian Revolution.

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himself by implementing the *anti*-Malenkov position. Malenkov was to purify himself by accepting responsibility for his, and Nagy's, advocacy of the New Course in the Soviet Union and in Hungary, a policy *everyone* in the Politburo had favored. By degrading himself in this fashion, Malenkov was to be demoted but not ousted for the time being. In the summer of 1955, a secret Soviet memorandum, sent to the communist leaders of Eastern Europe, clarified the meaning of and gave the rationale for this Byzantine, Mafia-like affair. Seweryn Bialer, who saw it in Poland at the time, summarized the memorandum in this way: "The policy of Malenkov, aside from the harm which it threatened in Soviet domestic matters, *concealed serious dangers for the countries of the people's democracies and for the relations of the Soviet Union with these countries, an example of which is the situation in Hungary.*"[12]

After Malenkov's demotion in February, Nagy's turn came in early March. His errors? "Undervaluing the leading role of the party," "rightist opportunist deviation...concerning the peasants," revision of "the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat," and more.[13] The only significant difference between Malenkov and Nagy was that Nagy did not exercise self-criticism and did not accept a lesser position in the government. That difference prompted Mikhail Suslov, the Kremlin's new Hungarian specialist, to show up in Budapest to persuade Nagy to follow the "Malenkov formula." Would Comrade Nagy confess his errors? No. Would Comrade Nagy accept a lesser position in the government as Malenkov had? No.[14] In mid-April, Nagy lost all his positions. He remained an ordinary party member until November 1955, when he was expelled from the party he had helped found in 1918. The day it happened, an irate Nagy told Tamás Aczél, a friend: "Look what they've done to me. . . . after so many years as a party militant. . . . These absolute nonentities. . . . But I told them the truth. . . . I told them the truth. . . ."[15]

For now, Rákosi had prevailed. He used the Malenkov affair as he had not been able to use the Beria affair, to take revenge for the humiliation he had suffered. For during the Beria affair, Khrushchev and Malenkov had still been allies, and hence there was no need for Khrushchev to turn against Nagy and the New Course. During the Malenkov affair, however, Khrushchev needed the Stalinists to defeat Malenkov, and hence the New Course had to be reversed. Considerations of power preceded considerations of principle, and Nagy became the unwitting victim of a very complex Kremlin free-for-all as well as of Rákosi's pernicious maneuverings.

Presently, Nagy became a pensioner. He took long walks, held extensive talks with his growing number of admirers, and enjoyed his sudden, immense popularity. He also wrote a series of political essays and studies (which would be published in the West in 1957 under the title *On Communism*). In these studies he defended his Marxist-Leninist positions, angrily denounced Rákosi and his supporters, and respectfully praised the post-Stalin Soviet leaders' views and policies. Nagy took courage from the fact that Moscow apparently had not authorized his arrest; that in mid-1955 the Soviet Union made up with Tito's Yugoslavia, a leader and a country he admired; that the Austrian State Treaty, the Geneva Summit, and especially the

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[12] Seweryn Bialer, "The Three Schools of Kremlin Policy," *The New Leader* (Washington, DC), July 29, 1957, p. 10. Emphasis added.

[13] *Szabad Nép* (Budapest), Mar. 9, 1955.

[14] Aczél and Méray, *Revolt of the Mind*, p. 324.

[15] Quoted in Méray, *Thirteen Days*, p. 41.

Imre Nagy, prior to his reemergence as Hungarian leader.

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20th CPSU Congress all pointed to change for the better, including his own vindication and rehabilitation. He also took courage from the outpouring of support he received from intellectuals, mainly disillusioned Communist writers and journalists, whose "revolt of the mind" was gaining new adherents and new momentum every day.

By the summer of 1956, with the main act of the Malenkov drama and the 20th Congress behind them, and with signs of high elite tension and persistent instability in Hungary, the Soviet leaders began to take a second look at Rákosi. They were under tremendous pressure by their new friend Tito to oust him. Tito had taken the unusual and undiplomatic step of publicly and vehemently denouncing Rákosi and his cohorts. "These men," said Tito, "have their hands soaked in blood, have staged trials, given false information, sentenced innocent men to death. They have had Yugoslavia mixed up in all these trials, as in the case of the Rajk trial, and they now find it difficult to admit before their own people their mistakes."[16] Tito had long despised Rákosi and favored Nagy; already in 1955 and especially in 1956, contacts were made between Yugoslavia and some of Nagy's supporters. In fact, Nagy managed to send several of his essays and at least one personal letter to Tito via the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest.[17]

At long last, on July 17, 1956, Mikoyan—on his way to Belgrade and as a present to Tito—stopped in Budapest to tell the Hungarian Politburo that Rákosi must go. This "wise leader" of Hungary, as he was officially called in Stalin's time, or the "bald murderer" as he was called by many, did not want to believe that Mikoyan was speaking for the Soviet leaders.[18] Only after Khrushchev confirmed the bad news on the telephone did he resign, admitting a few of his errors and complaining of poor health. Then he left for the Soviet Union. His replacement was neither Imre Nagy nor the centrist János Kádár, but Ernő Gerő. Moscow still must have believed that order and stability could be restored by the Hungarian party following more or less the same policies Rákosi had pursued—but without Rákosi himself.[19]

Why not Nagy? Were not the Russians having second thoughts about him, too? The first piece of evidence suggesting that they were came from a Hungarian sculptor, Zsigmond Strobl Kisfaludi, who was in Moscow at the beginning of the summer of 1956. He was commissioned to make a bust of Marshal Voroshilov. After a few drinks, Voroshilov was reported to have told the maestro: "Things do not go well in your country. . . . Rákosi? A vulgar blackguard. . . . And Gerő is just as worthless. . . . There is only one honest man in the whole party leadership [sic]. He is Imre Nagy."[20] Then there were other signs, too. Yuriy Andropov, the new Soviet ambassador, kept inviting Nagy, just a pensioner, to his residence on Bajza Street for long and apparently pleasant discussions. Suslov called on him in mid-June, again offering the prime ministership if Nagy would only exercise self-criticism.[21] Returning from Belgrade, Mikoyan made another brief stopover in Budapest on July 21 to see Nagy and to assure him that it was Rákosi and not the Kremlin that had ordered his expulsion from the party. Alarmed by growing tension in Hungary, Mikoyan also asked for Nagy's help to find a way out.[22]

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[16] *Documents on International Affairs, 1955*, London, Oxford University Press, 1958, p. 271.

[17] Information by Miklós Vásárhelyi.

[18] Váli, *Rift and Revolt*, pp. 234–35.

[19] There are contradictory reports on who was the Kremlin's first choice at this time. On the one hand, Tito reported in his famous Pula speech of November 11, 1956, that the Soviet leaders had "made it a condition [of Rákosi's removal] that Rákosi would go only if Geró remained." (See Paul E. Zinner, Ed., *National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1957, p. 524.) On the other hand, András Hegedüs reports that when Mikoyan landed in Budapest, he and Rákosi received him at the airport. In the car, on their way to a guesthouse, Mikoyan suddenly turned to Rákosi: "The Party Presidium [Politburo] thinks that in the given situation, claiming ill health, you must resign, Comrade Rákosi. Comrade Hegedüs must take over the position of the First Secretary." Hegedüs, who was cognizant of his modest talents, reports that he declined the appointment. See Hegedüs, op. cit., pp. 242–45.

[20] Quoted in Méray, *Thirteen Days*, p. 47.

[21] Hegedüs, op. cit., pp. 240–41.

Thus, with Tito as a key player now and Nagy as Tito's obvious choice, the Russians were increasingly interested in Nagy and the authority he could command. But they were hesitant. On the one hand, Nagy was stubborn; he still refused to exercise self-criticism and thus follow the "Malenkov formula." On the other hand, with Malenkov on the sidelines, Nagy no longer had to be a scapegoat for Malenkov or his policies. Therefore, what began to matter to the Kremlin *now* was that Nagy, though a nonparty pensioner, remained loyal to the Soviet Union and to the party, and that he was needed. Hungary was bursting at the seams. As the day of reckoning, October 23, 1956, approached, then, Nagy—his authority to be used and his loyalty to be manipulated—was available, and he seemed to be once again at or near the top of the Kremlin's waiting list.

Nagy was finally readmitted to the party on October 13, but not before Gerő and his current deputy, János Kádár, had held further and no doubt anxious consultations with Mikoyan and Suslov, and Khrushchev had arranged for Gerő to meet "accidentally" with Tito in the Crimea.[23] There, on the condition that Nagy would be promptly rehabilitated and as a gesture of goodwill toward Khrushchev, Tito agreed to receive Gerő in Belgrade the following week. Gerő had no time to waste. In Budapest, before leaving for Belgrade to formally apologize to Tito for the Hungarian party's past behavior,[24] Gerő worked out a compromise that called for Nagy's readmission to the party without preconditions. Thus, Nagy did not have to recant and the party did not have to admit its error for having ousted him in the first place. To his associates' dismay, Nagy accepted the formula. However much he despised Gerő, it was more important for Nagy to demonstrate that he was a disciplined communist. Above all, he seemed to appreciate the Soviet comrades' efforts on his behalf; he was grateful to them for letting him repair to the party he loved, the party that had endowed his life with meaning, significance, and a mission for almost 40 years.

Revolution or New Course?

On October 23, when peaceful demonstrations began in support of the dramatic changes then taking place in Poland—including the elevation of Władysław Gomułka to his old position as first secretary of the Polish party—Nagy and his supporters met at Géza Losonczy's apartment to assess the situation.[25] They perhaps on his associates too, to rejoin the regime and thereby help reestablish a measure of stability in the country. So they held a caucus and talked politics. They seemed to agree that Nagy should accept his old position of prime minister only if his worst Stalinist enemies were ousted and his adherents offered responsible assignments. They thought that Kádár, who never belonged to Nagy's group, should be the party's first secretary and that Imre Mező and József Köböl, who shared some of Nagy's views, should be Kádár's deputies. Nagy and several of his closest associates—Losonczy, Ferenc Donáth, Sándor Haraszti, and Zoltán Szántó—were regarded as strong candidates for the Politburo. They also agreed on a dozen or so people, mainly writers and journalists, whom Nagy would recommend for Central Committee membership.

By nighttime, with Stalin's large statue toppled and the radio building under siege, the Hungarian revolution was under way.[26] The army, instead of following orders and attacking the crowds, handed over its weapons to the insurgents. At party headquarters, Gerő, having just returned from Belgrade, was preparing to address the country on the radio. He was constantly on the telephone with the Kremlin and with Soviet ambassador Andropov. When Nagy was brought in, Gerő offered him the prime ministership. Nagy accepted the offer. Hegedüs, the current occupant, readily agreed to be demoted; he stayed on as Nagy's deputy. Hegedüs would later recall, "We all understood that. . . there was no other political solution but Imre Nagy's entry into the government."[27] Tired and confused, Nagy asked for no further personnel changes as yet. Generally, he let Gerő take the lead.

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[22] Méray, *Thirteen Days*, p. 55. Méray reports that at this meeting "Mikoyan overflowed with amiability."

[23] Veljko Mićunović, *Moscow Diary*, Garden City, NY, Doubleday and Co., 1980, pp. 116–17.

[24] Hegedüs, op. cit., pp. 249–50.

[25] For a small segment of Losonczy's diary and other testimony about this meeting, see *Nagy Imre és büntársai ellenforradalmi összeesküvése*, loc. cit., pp. 34–36. One of the participants also gave me a detailed description of what happened at Losonczy's apartment.

[26] This section deals only with the Soviet Union's relationship with Nagy and with other events of "high politics" that are essential to an understanding of that relationship. For comprehensive accounts of the revolution itself, see the sources already cited, esp. in fn. 6.

[27] Hegedüs, op. cit., p. 259.



The head from a statue of Stalin dragged through the streets of Budapest after being cut off on the night of October 25, 1956.

-Pictorial Parade.

(Gerő had already obtained Khrushchev's approval for Nagy's appointment.)[28]

During its almost continuous series of meetings that had begun at midnight, the Central Committee sought to appease the insurgents and disarm the political opposition by removing a few of the worst Stalinist diehards from the Politburo and replacing them with Nagy, two of the less militant Nagy supporters (Köböl and Szántó) and two centrists close to Kádár (Gyula Kállai and Sándor Gáspár). Of Nagy's best friends, Losonczy was named only an alternate member of the Politburo and Donáth one of the party's secretaries under Gerő and Kádár.

Having been co-opted to the leadership in their absence, Losonczy and Donáth refused to take up their assignments.[29] They thought the changes were cosmetic, and they found Nagy aloof and indeed unwilling to implement the understanding about personnel that they had reached at Losonczy's apartment less than 24 hours earlier. They were dismayed to find that Nagy lacked any understanding of—any "feel" for—what was happening outside party headquarters. They failed to convince Nagy that he must immediately turn against Gerő. They were upset that while he had reproached Gerő for the past—for having brought about this situation—he had not taken issue with him about what to do next. As they saw it, Nagy was not responding to the revolution in the streets but was merely reflecting the atmosphere at party headquarters.

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[28] Ibid., p. 260.

[29] The following interpretation of Nagy's early behavior is based on information derived from Méray, *Thirteen Days*, p. 88ff.; Hegedüs, op. cit., pp. 260–77; and information by György Heltai, Zoltán Vas, and Miklós Vásárhelyi, all associates of Nagy. For a fine description and analysis of what happened at party headquarters and of "high politics" during the revolution, see also Váli, *Rift and Revolt*, pp. 280–305.

Specifically, how could Nagy have agreed to declare martial law? How could he have failed to object to the overnight announcement, made on behalf of the Council of Ministers of which he was the designated head, that demanded that all "fascist, reactionary elements" stop their "counterrevolutionary activities"? Worse, why was Nagy silent when Gerő, in consultation with Andropov, arranged on the night of October 23 for Soviet troops stationed in the countryside to leave their barracks and offer "fraternal assistance"? As Hegedüs confirms too,[30] Nagy was passive or agnostic, if not agreeable, on the key issues of the day, including that of requesting Soviet aid.

Nagy's agnosticism on calling for Soviet help became particularly clear when Gerő and Andropov asked Nagy to sign the formal request for it. Having been silent when the issue was discussed, Nagy simply avoided them; he walked away without saying yes or no. In the end, with Andropov still insisting on having something in writing, *former* Prime Minister Hegedüs signed the document. He did so on October 26, three days after Soviet troops had been called in and hence when he was no longer the country's prime minister. The letter was predated to make it appear that it had been signed sometime on October 23, when *formally* Hegedüs was probably still the prime minister and Nagy the prime minister-designate. Of course, the reason why Gerő and Andropov did not ask Hegedüs to sign it already on October 23 was because at that time they still tried to get Nagy's signature in order to compromise him.

Nagy failed to assert himself as well on another, potentially crucial, issue. On October 25 at a Central Committee session, Nagy's friend Ferenc Donáth introduced a motion. Against the background of Gerő's provocative speech on the radio 36 hours before, Donáth's moderate proposal was intended to calm the country's angry, explosive mood. In his motion, Donáth urged the party to express its understanding of the reasons for the people's fury and to identify itself with some of the popular demands. The motion was intentionally somewhat vague, but its message was quite positive and its tone conciliatory if not soothing. If passed *at this early date* and subsequently amplified, it might well have reduced the chances for the continuation of the violent confrontation under way. Incredibly, only Losonczy and Márton Horváth, the latter a political chameleon, supported Donáth's motion. When Nagy, their hero, voted against it, Donáth and Losonczy left party headquarters for home. (They returned four days later.)

With both Mikoyan and Suslov at party headquarters from October 24 to 26, Nagy thus reverted to his 1953 political program and mentality. The fighting spirit of Imre Nagy of 1955 or early 1956 was not in evidence. Having declared martial law, Nagy went on to ask the people to trust him and to let him proceed toward the full implementation of the "June way," the 1953 New Course. New Course? Only a devoted party apparatchik could still think in terms of ending the era of the "personality cult," of correcting "past errors," of shifting economic priorities. The "enemy" was misleading the good people of Hungary? The students and workers on the streets, fighting for freedom and independence, were stunned; the party jargon was jarring and the content it conveyed insulting. They no longer thought in terms of the party, its alien jargon and its warring factions. Years of suppressed hostility had suddenly found expression in new expectations and demands, of which one more than any other could be heard time and again: *Ruszkik haza!* (Russians, go home).

It was all very puzzling. While a nonparty, private citizen in 1955–56, Imre Nagy had grown considerably. His studies written at the time had shown his understanding of the growing gap between the party and the people. With insight and compassion, he had warned that if political and economic reforms were denied, the consequences could be catastrophic. He understood well that *tactical* changes, a minor concession here and "one step backward" there, would not be adequate. He demanded that the party adopt a new *strategic* direction that, based on the concept of sovereignty, would lead to equitable relations between the Soviet Union and Hungary. He took the Soviet leaders' declarations about de-Stalinization, especially those made at the 20th Congress, at face value. He had not reached the point of advocating a return to the postwar, multiparty coalition era, but in his scheme of things those who did not belong to the party would still have equal access to the country's resources and a say about the country's orientation. He seemed prepared to go beyond the creation of a mere Popular Front.

Nagy had also understood the meaning of the post-Stalin riots in East Berlin, Plzeň, Prague, and in the Hungarian industrial towns of Csepel, Ózd, and Diósgyőr. He had prophetically warned in 1955, and hence before the 20th CPSU Congress:

> *The degeneration of power is seriously endangering the fate of socialism. . . . Today, probably a return to the policy of the New Course. . . could still check the growing crisis and avert catastrophe. But it is doubtful*

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[30] Hegedüs, op. cit., pp. 260–77.

whether a return to the June principles would suffice as a solution tomorrow . . . . if this does not happen soon, there is a danger that the masses, having lost their faith, will reject both the June way and the communist party, and it will become necessary to make a much greater retreat in order to keep the situation under control.[31]

Taking the pulse of the growing crisis, the Imre Nagy of 1955–56 had thus come face to face with the imperatives of reform and independence, though he had also believed in the possibility of shaping a Marxist, humane, and Hungarian political order within the post-Stalinist framework of the Soviet bloc.

Yet, during its initial days, the revolution brought to power the Muscovite reformer of 1953 vintage. It was almost as if Nagy did not know or did not want to know that a revolution had begun, that the people had transcended his "June way and the communist party," and that, therefore, it *had* "become necessary to make a much greater retreat." Was he a realist who understood the limits of Soviet tolerance or had he lost his nerve? Did responsibility make him waver? Did he become a victim of the siege mentality that engulfed party headquarters? Did he find Gerő's—and Mikoyan's and Suslov's and Andropov's—arguments about the dangers of "counterrevolution" so persuasive as to break ranks with his ardent supporters and forget his own prophetic warnings? The whole country wondered.

The most widely accepted explanation was that Nagy had become a prisoner of party headquarters. In a special sense, this was—and remains—a plausible explanation. For Nagy *was* a prisoner of the communist political mentality permeating party headquarters—the prisoner of a limited ideological horizon and of intraparty intrigues—from which there was no easy escape. His prophetic words about a coming crisis

Soviet Party First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev speaks with a delegate to the 20th CPSU Congress in February 1956; behind him are Nikolay Bulganin and Mikhail Suslov. —SOVFOTO.

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[31] Nagy, *On Communism*, pp. 49–50.

notwithstanding, Nagy could only imagine but did not expect something like *this* to happen. Those around him at party headquarters could not even imagine such a revolution taking place.

As Hegedüs describes the scene at party headquarters, the basic question was not even considered at first: could the party make such timely and significant concessions as would satisfy all or most of the insurgents? Instead, the question on everyone's mind was this: how could the party most effectively isolate and then break down this counterrevolutionary insurgency? Thus, all of the initial speeches and measures reflected the traditional mentality of authoritarian leaders, communist and otherwise, for whom the only question is not how to solve the problem but how to protect their power. For leaders of this kind—for Gerő and his colleagues—the answer was self-evident. First, they must use force to defeat the rebellion. Second, by first co-opting him and then making him appear to be the man in charge of breaking down the rebellion, they must discredit and then defeat Imre Nagy as well.

From the moment Mikoyan and Suslov arrived at party headquarters on October 24, unannounced and in an armored car, it was obvious that on the second point the interests of the Soviet Union and of the Gerő group diverged. The Soviet Union wanted to end the rebellion, a task for which it judged Nagy and not Gerő to be the right man. While Gerő had expected to get the job done, consolidate his and his group's hold on the levers of power, and then remove Nagy, the Soviet Union wanted Gerő out of the way so as to restore order quickly, and if possible, avoid further violence. Mikoyan and Suslov told Gerő immediately that his speech of the night before had been unduly provocative and that he must go.[32] A TASS report issued in Moscow also signaled the Kremlin's preference; it mentioned Nagy twice by name. He was given credit for the declaration of martial law, which was said to have been necessary to repel "fascist thugs" and "enemy elements," and for having "called on the whole people to maintain calm and order."

With Mikoyan and Suslov in attendance, the Politburo replaced Gerő with János Kádár on the next day, October 25. Nagy broke the news on the radio. He also offered amnesty to those who "immediately stop fighting and surrender their arms," and then mentioned for the first time that the government would soon initiate negotiations with the Soviet Union concerning various aspects of Soviet-Hungarian relations including the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungarian territory. "Under the leadership of the party," as Nagy said, the rebellion must be ended. His policies and words had Moscow's approval.

If Nagy's announcement had been made just one day, let alone one week, earlier, it would have had an extraordinary effect. He spoke of amnesty, not counterrevolution. He called for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, not for their "fraternal assistance." Next to him was Kádár, a victim of Stalinist purges, not Gerő, who held responsibility for Stalinist purges. True, Nagy affirmed the "leadership" of the communist party, but what changes he announced! Alas, coming as they did after the ÁVO had just massacred over 100 demonstrators at Parliament Square, Nagy's words fell on deaf ears. The initiated few understood that he was making some headway with the Kremlin's representatives and with the remaining diehards at party headquarters. But, as would happen again and again in the coming days, his announcement did not play well in the streets. He was a step or two behind the latest, increasingly impatient demands. At this point, for example, it was no longer sufficient to declare that the government would "initiate" negotiations about the withdrawal of Soviet troops; the streets, resounding with the rhythmic *Ruszkik haza!* wanted him to report results. *It was too little and too late.*

Conversely, the popular demands made on Nagy were *too many and too soon*. One delegation after another kept telling him what to do and especially to be more daring. He replied, impatiently, that they should go home and implement his policies. Nagy remained a cautious reformer. Above all, he did not want to go beyond the understanding he had reached with Mikoyan and Suslov, which appeared to approximate the deal the Kremlin had made with Gomułka in Poland: "wider internal autonomy for the Hungarian party, measures of liberalization, 'domesticism' taking account of Hungarian peculiarities, discarding of compromised Stalinists, revision of trade agreements with the Soviets, and also the later withdrawal of Soviet troops." Such a compromise "would help to maintain the essence of party rule and Soviet control, but would do away with ostensible shortcomings and satisfy sensitivities of national feelings."[33]

This was the general idea that Mikoyan and Suslov had left behind them when they returned to the Soviet Union. It is not known precisely how Moscow maintained high-level contact with Nagy while the two Soviet trouble-shooters were gone for four days, between October 26 and 30. Presumably, there were many conversations on the telephone. Of course, Ambassador Andropov was in Budapest. Most important, the Soviet troops were there. But it is clear that *until October 30 or 31 Moscow was supportive of Nagy's decisions,* including the appointment of a few noncommunists to his cabinet (October 27), the formation of a more or less centrist six-member party Presidium to take over the functions of the Central Committee (October 28), and the abolition of ÁVO (October 29).

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[32] Hegedüs, op. cit., p. 271.

[33] Váli, *Rift and Revolt*, p. 285.

Not without some ambiguity, Moscow kept signaling its approval of what Nagy was doing. In contrast to Khrushchev's early skepticism about a political solution, voiced privately on October 24,[34] Radio Moscow now praised the "newly formed Hungarian government headed by Imre Nagy" for having mastered the situation, adding that "the calculations of the counterrevolutionary insurgents are suffering failure."[35] At a diplomatic reception in Moscow on October 29, Soviet Foreign Minister Dmitriy Shepilov referred to "the well-known fact" about counterrevolutionary activities, but he confirmed that the sooner these activities ceased "the sooner would the Soviet troops withdraw." At the same reception, Marshal Georgiy Zhukov, the minister of defense, said: ". . . the situation in Hungary is improving. A government has been formed *which is enjoying our support* and the support of the Hungarian people."[36] In his memoirs, Khrushchev confirmed that the Kremlin had vacillated between "crushing the mutiny" and getting "out of Hungary." "I don't know how many times we changed our minds back and forth," he recalled.[37]

It can only be surmised that, after their return to Moscow on October 26, Mikoyan and Suslov convinced the Soviet Politburo of the *possibility* that Nagy might still find a political solution to the crisis. Indeed, when they returned to Budapest on October 30 to take a second look at the situation, they were outgoing and even friendly. Hungary was following the "Polish formula." The atmosphere at party headquarters and in the Parliament building was excellent. Their discussion with Nagy, Kádár, and Tildy went exceptionally well. Mikoyan spent an hour with Tildy, who raised several issues, including the possibility of reestablishing the 1945 four-party coalition government and thus meeting one of the revolution's most important demands. Mikoyan, who had apparently anticipated the question, agreed. A jubilant Tildy immediately told József Kővágó, the designated mayor of Budapest and one of the leaders of the Smallholders' Party, that Mikoyan "accepted everything."[38] Indeed, Mikoyan and Suslov appeared willing to settle two other key issues as well. In their discussion with Nagy and Kádár, they agreed to the prompt withdrawal of Soviet troops and to negotiations about Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact.

An enterprising reporter from the new revolutionary newspaper *Igazság* managed to enter party headquarters where he found himself face to face with Mikoyan and Suslov (whose presence in Budapest had not been announced). The young journalist was not told very much, but he could report that all seemed well. They smiled, and they even shook *his* hand on the way out of the building.[39]

Nagy made his historic announcement on the radio at 2:28 P.M. on October 30, 1956:

> *In the interest of the further democratization of the country's life the cabinet abolishes the one-party system and places the country's government on the basis of democratic cooperation between the coalition parties as they existed in 1945. In accordance with this decision, a new national government with a smaller inner cabinet has been established, at the moment with only limited powers. The members of the new cabinet are Imre Nagy, Zoltán Tildy, Béla Kovács, Ferenc Erdei, János Kádár, Géza Losonczy, and a person to be appointed by the Social Democratic Party.*

Next at the microphone was a fragile but exultant Zoltán Tildy of the Smallholders' Party, once a Calvinist minister:

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[34] On October 24, Khrushchev told the Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow that, if possible, he wanted to find a political solution. "But Khrushchev gave the impression that he had no faith in such a solution." See Mićunović, *Moscow Diary*, p. 127.

[35] For the text of this broadcast, see Melvin J. Lasky, Ed., *The Hungarian Revolution*, New York, Praeger, 1957, p. 104. The following day (Oct. 28, 1956), *Pravda* (Moscow) carried a similar article entitled "The Collapse of the Anti-People Adventure in Hungary," which prompted the Hungarian party daily *Szabad Nép* to take issue with the Soviet claim that a counterrevolution was taking place in Hungary. In point of fact, the *Pravda* article, like the Radio Moscow broadcast the night before, contained an essentially positive message; even its very title referred to the *collapse* of the insurgency. The nuance is important here: at this time, Soviet signals stressed the "collapse of the counterrevolution" rather than the idea that what transpired in Hungary should be classified as a "counterrevolution." For a unique and even moving rebuttal of *Pravda*, see Miklós Molnár, "Reply to *Pravda*," *Szabad Nép*, Oct. 29, 1956. For an English translation, see Lasky, *Hungarian Revolution*, p. 135.

[36] Lasky, *Hungarian Revolution*, pp. 132–33, emphasis added. For the original report on the reception, see T. Popovski's account in *Borba* (Belgrade), Oct. 30, 1956.

[37] *Khrushchev Remembers*, translated and edited by Strobe Talbott, Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1970, p. 418.

[38] József Kővágó, *You Are All Alone*, New York, Praeger, 1969, pp. 197–202.

[39] "Eye to Eye with Mikoyan and Suslov," *Igazság*, Nov. 1, 1956.

> *Hungarian Brothers! The will of the nation, the national revolution has prevailed. I stand before the microphone deeply moved. I don't have a prepared text, my speech may be disjointed, but with my heart overflowing with love and joy I salute the beloved youth of Hungary . . . . We are a small nation, but we want to live in this country in our Hungarian way and in freedom. I am convinced that once the peoples and leaders of the Soviet Union face not a humiliated but a free nation and its representatives, they will see how different our relationship can be, how much more understanding, respect, and affection there will be . . . . Let there be no more sacrifice, no more destruction. Let us all be faithful to ourselves, to this historic moment, let us make peace and order in our country. Rejoice my Hungarian brothers and let's get to work.*[40]

For the first time since the revolution began one very long week before, the Nagy regime was not far behind the people's demands. Although some Soviet troops were still in the country, the government could list quite a few accomplishments. Most of the Stalinists had cleared out of party headquarters. Nagy had obtained a measure of authority. Under Pál Maléter's leadership, the Hungarian army had restored a modicum of order. Though some of the insurgents, waiting for the Soviet troops to leave, held on to their weapons, they were beginning to line up behind the government. The "much greater retreat" Nagy had anticipated in 1955 "in order to keep the situation under control" had already been implemented—with the Kremlin's apparent approval.

Whatever suspicions Nagy may have still entertained about Soviet duplicity were dispelled later that evening—or so it seemed at that time. For next morning's *Pravda* was to carry the official declaration of the Soviet government, which no longer characterized the Hungarian situation as a "counterrevolution." "The course of events has shown," the Soviet government stated, using its customary jargon, "that the working people of Hungary. . . are rightfully raising the question of the need to eliminate the serious defects in the field of economic construction, of improving further the material well-being of the population and of combating bureaucratic distortions in the state apparatus." The operative parts of the official declaration then stated:

> *It is known that, in accordance with the Warsaw Treaty and governmental agreements, Soviet units are stationed in the Hungarian and Romanian republics. . . . With a view to ensuring the mutual security of the socialist countries, the Soviet government is ready to review with the other socialist countries of the Warsaw Treaty the question of Soviet troops stationed on the territory of the above-mentioned countries . . . . Since it considers that the further presence of the Soviet Army units can serve as a cause for even greater aggravation of the situation, the Soviet government has given instructions to its military command to withdraw the Soviet Army units from Budapest as soon as this is considered necessary by the Hungarian government.*[41]

The Kremlin Had Enough

This statement appeared in the morning edition of *Pravda* on October 31, 1956. It was almost certainly on that day, while Mikoyan and Suslov were still so agreeable in Budapest, that the Soviet Union decided to overthrow the Nagy government. My reading of the evidence suggests that, the initial *military* decision to mobilize the Soviet armed forces having been made prior to the publication of the *Pravda* declaration, the ultimate *political* decision to deploy the forces, invade Hungary, and overthrow the Nagy government was made on Wednesday, October 31, in Mikoyan's and Suslov's absence.

The evidence for this contention is: (1) it was during the night of October 31 and the morning of November 1 that new Soviet troops entered the country; (2) Imre Nagy's relationship with the Russians suddenly deteriorated during the morning hours of November 1; and (3) on November 1, Khrushchev, Molotov, and Malenkov were already secretly consulting with the Polish leadership in Brest, near the Soviet-Polish border, following which Khrushchev and Malenkov went on to Bucharest the same day to brief the Romanian, Bulgarian, and Czechoslovak leaders.[42] Moreover, Khrushchev confirmed in his memoirs that the decision to intervene was made while Mikoyan and Suslov "were not present."[43]

On Thursday, November 1, Nagy was awakened with the news of Soviet troops crossing the Soviet-Hungarian border. He tried to get in touch with the Kremlin but could not. (Mikoyan and Suslov were on a plane between Budapest and Moscow, while Khrushchev, Molotov, and Malenkov were on their way to Brest.) Nagy ordered a news blackout on the apparent

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[40] Both quotes are from *Magyar Nemzet* (Budapest), Oct. 31, 1956.

[41] *Pravda*, Oct. 31, 1956.

[42] Mićunović, *Moscow Diary*, p. 132.

[43] *Khrushchev Remembers*, p. 417.

Soviet invasion, as a result of which there were many rumors but few reliable facts. As many of the insurgents drew their conclusion from what they saw—the ongoing and visible evacuation of Soviet forces from Budapest—there was a curious mixture of joy and anxiety in the air. One newspaper headline captured the mood of the day: *Are They Coming or Going?*

Nagy held at least five meetings with Ambassador Andropov on November 1. He demanded to know what was going on. After checking with the Kremlin, Andropov at one point returned to Nagy's office in the Parliament building to assure the Prime Minister that the Soviet government stood by its "historic" declaration of October 30 and that Soviet troops had *entered* Hungary only to safeguard the security of Soviet troops *leaving* Hungary. This was too much for Nagy. He bluntly warned Andropov that Hungary was prepared to declare its neutrality. When Andropov failed to return with a satisfactory reply, Nagy knew that the "Soviet comrades" had deceived him.[44] But he was no comrade any more, certainly not theirs.

Nagy called into session the executive committee of the communist party to obtain its support for a declaration on Hungary's neutrality and on the country's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. Two members of the committee, György Lukács and Zoltán Szántó, as well as Sándor Haraszti, ex officio member as editor of the party daily, expressed reservations. But the motion easily carried. Nagy took the proposal to his cabinet. There everybody supported him. Then Nagy made this statement on the radio a few minutes before 8:00 P.M.:

The Hungarian National Government, imbued with profound responsibility toward the Hungarian people and history, and giving expression to the undivided will of millions of Hungarians, declares the neutrality of the Hungarian People's Republic. It is on the basis of independence and equality, and in accordance with the spirit of the UN Charter, that the Hungarian people wish to live in true friendship with their neighbors, with

Some of the Soviet officers who led the intervention that crushed the Hungarian Revolution in November 1956.

–Pictorial Parade.

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[44] For months to come, in Romanian exile as well as in Hungarian jails, Nagy's refrain about the Soviet leaders remained the same: "Becsaptak . . . elárultak" (They deceived me . . . they betrayed me).

> *the Soviet Union and with all peoples of the world. . . . Working millions of Hungary! Revolutionary determination, sacrificial work, and consolidation of order [will] protect and strengthen our homeland—the free, independent, democratic, and neutral Hungary.*[45]

Prior to Nagy's speech on November 1, Kádár had disappeared from Budapest in the company of Ferenc Münnich, an old Kremlin loyalist and a former Hungarian ambassador to Moscow and Belgrade. Both had backed Nagy's moves. Kádár had been a strong and enthusiastic supporter of the formation of the multiparty system. He had voted in favor of declaring Hungary's neutrality. In a radio speech recorded earlier that day, he had referred to "our glorious revolution." Earlier that day he had also defended the cabinet's decision about neutrality and the Warsaw Pact in a confrontation with Andropov. In the presence of the whole cabinet, he reportedly told the Soviet ambassador that if Soviet tanks were to reenter Budapest, he would personally join the armed struggle against them.[46] It can only be surmised that sometime that day Münnich and Kádár were informed of the Soviet decision to intervene, and they decided to break ranks with Nagy and the revolution.

The remaining events of November 1–4 can be summarized briefly. Most of them fell into a pattern of duplicity. Throughout the country, Soviet troops were in evidence everywhere; they were coming from bases in the Soviet Union and Romania. They were no longer in evidence in Budapest, however, and the Soviet Union kept assuring the Nagy government that it was still prepared to negotiate the details of their withdrawal from the whole country. Indeed, negotiations on that subject began during the day on November 3 and considerable progress was being made.[47] But on that fateful night, all pretense was gone when General Ivan Serov, the Soviet security chief, broke up the "negotiating" session and arrested all members of the Hungarian delegation. At dawn on November 4, 1956, Soviet forces, having entered Budapest overnight and occupied the Parliament building, crushed the revolution.

During the last three days before the attack on Budapest, Hungarians had allowed themselves the luxury of a bit of self-deception. Among ordinary people, optimists could still find evidence of a Soviet willingness to reach an acceptable compromise. If they were *coming*, why were they *going?* There was no panic. At least in Budapest, life was returning to something approaching normalcy. More food was available, some of the streetcars and buses were operating, several factories were reopened. The city was flooded with announcements about the formation of social and political organizations and parties, and every shade of political opinion was reflected in dozens of new newspapers and weeklies. The scope of Soviet troop movements was not widely known.

In the Parliament building and at party headquarters, the facts about Soviet troop movements were well known. One of the least appealing members of Nagy's group, Zoltán Szántó, approached the Yugoslav embassy on Thursday, November 1, with a request for asylum. That afternoon Münnich, Kádár, and apparently three or four other leading Communists departed for the Soviet side. But Nagy remained calm. Judging by his activities, he may have considered it a possibility—a most remote possibility, to be sure—that the Kremlin had not yet made the final decision, or if it had that the Soviet Politburo might still reverse itself. If so, what should he do? What would impress the Kremlin? First, and most important, was the further consolidation of domestic order and stability. For it would be one thing for Moscow to invade a conflict-ridden country in which Communists—mainly ÁVO officers—were being killed; it would be something else to invade a peaceful country in which law and order prevailed. For this reason the government kept issuing almost desperate pleas for discipline and self-restraint. Second, Nagy had reason to believe that the Kremlin might be sensitive to world opinion. Andropov had asked him on November 1 not to turn to the United Nations; this sort of thing seemed to matter to Moscow. At the time, Nagy had agreed to wait on the condition that the influx of Soviet troops would be stopped. When it did not, he responded not only by sending several appeals to the UN but by notifying all diplomatic missions in Budapest about the situation.

There was nothing else to do. On November 3, Nagy declined to give a press conference he had scheduled for foreign journalists; he asked Tildy and Losonczy to make a statement instead and to answer questions. They made a heroic effort to project calm—and to let Moscow know that Hungary was eager to protect the "gains of socialism." That afternoon, István Bibó, a minister of state in Nagy's last cabinet, asked General Béla Király, the highest-ranking Hungarian army officer after Maléter, how long Hungary could resist. Budapest could be held for one or two days at most, Király replied, but probably only for a few hours.[48] Bibó appeared resigned. So did Nagy. He had done what he could. He had tried to satisfy the Kremlin's needs and concerns. He had been mindful of the security interests of the Soviet Union and of the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe. He had accepted the "Polish formula" for Hungary. He had believed that the Soviet leaders trusted him and wanted him to build a Hungarian-style socialist system. Only after he had lost Moscow's trust on October 31, or perhaps the day before that, did he choose to proceed on his own. Nagy's cautious patriotism prevailed as he refused to order the Hungarian army to do battle against impossible odds.[49]

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[45] *Magyar Nemzet*, Nov. 2, 1956.

[46] Méray, *Thirteen Days*, p. 194.

[47] Agreement was reached on the following: (1) Soviet troops will leave Hungary before January 15, 1957; (2) While the troops remain in the country, the Hungarian government will take care of their needs; (3) Hungary will repair all Soviet monuments and will bid respectful farewell to the departing Soviet troops; (4) After the two delegations consult their respective governments, they will meet at 10:00 p.m. at the headquarters of the Soviet forces stationed in Hungary [near Csepel, outside of Budapest] in order to sign an appropriate document. See Béla Király, *Az elsö háború szocialista országok között* (The First War between Socialist Countries), New Brunswick, NJ, Magyar Öregdiák Szövetség/Bessenyei György Kör, 1981, p. 58.

The Question of Soviet Motives

Having briefed their allies first in Brest (accompanied there by Molotov) and then in Bucharest on the impending intervention on November 1, and after a brief stopover in Moscow, Khrushchev and Malenkov continued their secret journey to the Yugoslav island of Brioni to see Tito on November 2. The Yugoslav side was represented by Tito, his two closest associates Eduard Kardelj and Aleksander Ranković, and by Veljko Mićunović, the Yugoslav ambassador to the Soviet Union. The discussion, all about Hungary, lasted for 10 hours. The Soviet leaders left for Moscow the next morning. Mićunović kept detailed notes about the proceedings in his diary.[50]

Of the two Soviet leaders, Khrushchev seemed to carry the day. He said they came to inform the Yugoslavs "about the Soviet Union's decision" and to hear Tito's views. Khrushchev ticked off four "external" reasons and an "internal" one for what Moscow was about to do. They were the following: (1) Communists were being murdered in Hungary; (2) Nagy withdrew from the Warsaw Pact, declared neutrality, and appealed to the United Nations; (3) capitalism was about to be restored in Hungary; (4) the British-French-Israeli intervention in Suez would divert the world's attention from Soviet "assistance"; and (5) if he failed to act, Stalinist diehards and especially leaders of the Soviet army would hold the "loss of Hungary" against the new political leadership in the Kremlin. As to implementation, Malenkov added that the Soviet armed forces were ready to act. They must go in "frontally and with great force," he said, because the Soviet Union was "completely isolated from the Hungarian people."

Factually, some of Khrushchev's reasons for the Kremlin's decision to intervene seemed more justified than others. (1) Communists, especially officers of the ÁVO, were indeed tortured and killed during the early days of the revolution. Their number was small; comparable outbreaks in history had produced many more summary executions. Still, Khrushchev could have been deeply disturbed by pictures carried in the Western press of Communists being cruelly treated and in some cases hanged on lampposts. (2) Hungary formally withdrew from the Warsaw Pact, declared its neutrality, and appealed to the United Nations only *after* new Soviet troops had entered Hungary; indeed, the threat of intervention *caused* these measures and declarations to be adopted rather than the other way around. (3) Capitalism, perhaps on a small scale, might have returned to Hungary, especially in agriculture and the service industries. What actually happened at the time, however, was that every political party affirmed again and again that the "gains of socialism" would not be reversed. (4) The Suez crisis was very possibly the reason for the timing of the intervention rather than for the intervention itself. (5) According to Khrushchev, certain army and Stalinist elements maintained that "as long as Stalin was in command everybody obeyed," while the present group of Kremlin leaders could not even hold on to Hungary. He implied that the anti-Stalinists had to show firmness, outdo the Stalinists if necessary, in order pursue the course of de-Stalinization. Doing nothing would only play into the hands of Molotov and Kaganovich. This was but a veiled appeal for Tito's empathy—and it was something the Yugoslavs could understand and appreciate.[51]

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[48] Ibid., p. 59.

[49] Nagy made the following statement on Radio Budapest at 5:19 a.m. on November 4: "This is Imre Nagy speaking, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People's Republic. Today at daybreak Soviet forces started an attack against our capital, obviously with the intention to overthrow the legal Hungarian democratic government. Our troops are fighting. The government is in its place. I notify the people of our country and the entire world of this fact." Lasky, *Hungarian Revolution*, p. 228. In point of fact, Nagy refused to order General Király to engage his troops. For their two dramatic conversations during the night of November 3, see Király, op. cit., pp. 62–64.

[50] This paragraph is based on Mićunović, *Moscow Diary*, pp. 130–42.

[51] Of course, there must have been other Soviet considerations as well, ones that either Khrushchev did not mention to Tito or that Mićunović did not include in his *Moscow Diary*. For example, the Chinese leaders were known to have advised the Kremlin against military intervention, at least at the beginning, while the Romanians, fearful of the impact of the revolution on the large Hungarian minority in Romania, were early advocates of such an intervention. Moscow might also have taken account of the preoccupation of the United States with presidential elections that week which might have influenced the timing of the intervention. For a sound analysis of Soviet policy, see Paul E. Zinner, *Revolution in Hungary*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1962, pp. 320–26.

What can be made of Khrushchev's reasoning, of Soviet motives? To the extent that his explanation was offered in such a secret setting and to the extent that its summary—from a highly intelligent and sophisticated participant's diary—can be regarded as reliable, his points offer unusually valuable insights into the Kremlin's own assessment of the decision to intervene. That much said, it is still important to add that a decision of this magnitude is not likely to have been made on the basis of such specific reasons alone. Nor is it necessarily true that the leaders' motives were completely apparent even to themselves. Indeed, in my view, Khrushchev's explanation should be interpreted to mean that the Soviet leaders responded primarily to their sense of threat, to their fear of vulnerability, to their concern about the reputation and hence the power of the Soviet Union. As Khrushchev said in Brioni: "If we let things take their course, the West would say we are either stupid or weak, and that's one and the same thing. We cannot possibly permit it, either as communists and internationalists or as the Soviet state." This rings true; fear is a great inventor. By saying "if we let things take their course," Khrushchev seemed to be alluding to what *might happen.* More lynchings? Capitalism? Neutralism today, NATO tomorrow? What then of the Soviet sphere in Eastern Europe, who's next to go? Whether these developments were or were not likely to happen did not really matter; what mattered was that they might. Therefore, the Soviet leaders had to respond by force to overcome their fear of all the uncertainties Hungary implied. Among these uncertainties, the fear of losing control over the bloc, and then being seen by the West as weak, appeared to be their most compelling reason to act.

As the Kremlin's leading anti-Stalinist, Khrushchev's power was also very much on the line. His name was synonymous with the 20th Party Congress, with de-Stalinization. The Hungarian revolution, which began as an intraparty struggle between Stalinists and anti-Stalinist reformers in 1953, would not have happened in the absence of the Congress, in the absence of de-Stalinization, in the absence of Khrushchev. True, Khrushchev had denounced Nagy in 1955. But his colleagues knew, and Khrushchev feared that they remembered, who was ultimately responsible for de-Stalinization in Hungary. Thus the Hungarian revolution found Khrushchev politically vulnerable, so much so that he had to prove anew that he could be firm and indeed uncompromising. As he had done in 1955, then, he once again deserted Nagy—whose anti-Stalinist views were so very close to his own.

In retrospect, it is as futile to speculate about what Imre Nagy should or should not have done (or what Khrushchev could or could not have done had he had more political room to maneuver) as it is to bemoan the Hungarian people's lack of realism. For the Soviet intervention was only marginally related to what Nagy had done or had failed to do. It was not caused by his "provocative" declaration about neutrality and the Warsaw Pact. In fact, the opposite is true: it was the (second) Soviet intervention on the night of October 31 that prompted Nagy, *now* a heretic and patriot, to shed his past as a Muscovite loyalist and issue his historic declaration.

It is also futile, even cynical perhaps, to instruct the people about what they should or should not have done. Unrealistic as any popular uprising in Eastern Europe may be, once such an uprising begins it cannot be expected to be modest, limited, prudent, and properly calibrated. Because 1956 was a response both to the complete suppression of the country's independence and to extremely harsh dictatorial rule, it was a revolution made by people for whom a hero's death had become a meaningful alternative to a coward's submission. Thus the revolution's excessive demands, its lack of realism, was a function of what the Hungarian people had been denied. They only reacted to the excessive demands that had been made on them, to the lack of realism in the policies of the Kremlin and the Rákosi-Gerő regimes since 1947–48.

As for the personal drama between Khrushchev and Nagy, the tragedy of their encounter was that while Khrushchev's behavior was circumscribed by the fears and the intricate politics of the Kremlin, Nagy's eventual resistance was fueled by a true believer's sense of revulsion over being betrayed.

Moscow and Aden: Coping with a Coup

David Pollock

Two weeks of bloody fighting in January 1986 ousted President Ali Nasir Muhammad of the People's Democratic Republic of [South] Yemen (PDRY), the closest Soviet ally on the Arabian Peninsula and indeed in the entire Middle East. Today, six months later, the upheaval in South Yemen's capital of Aden has been largely forgotten amid all the turmoil elsewhere in the region. Still, poor and sparsely populated as it is, South Yemen's strategic location and unique status as the only avowedly Marxist Arab country merit close and continuing interest. Moreover, this latest link in a long chain of violent internal political crises in Aden offers an instructive illustration of two important themes in contemporary international affairs: acute factional rivalry within a Third World Marxist regime, and assertive Soviet responses to it. The recent crisis in South Yemen is all the more intriguing in light of evidence that the Soviets mounted a limited but effective military intervention there during the January battles, and that even now the situation in that volatile corner of the Arabian Peninsula is still not fully stable.

Background

While a detailed historical analysis of South Yemeni politics, of Soviet Mideast policy, or even of Soviet–South Yemeni relations is beyond the scope of this essay, a brief background sketch is required to set the stage for the latest relevant developments in all three areas.[1] Ever since South Yemen gained independence from Britain in 1967, the Soviets have been deeply and increasingly involved in all aspects of its economic, and military affairs. Indeed, even before the British withdrew, the Soviets provided indirect support for one of the two major rival (and regionally and tribally distinct) local guerrilla movements. Here, as elsewhere, Moscow picked pragmatism over ideology, in this case supporting the non-Marxist but Egyptian-allied Front for the Liberation of South Yemen (FLOSY) at the expense of Yemen's ideologically more "correct" National Liberation Front (NLF). Yet, when the latter movement won its struggle against both British power and local rivals, and then turned to Moscow for aid against sporadic Saudi-backed tribal resistance, the Soviets moved quickly to support it.

The new regime soon became even more radical. Less than two years after independence, South Yemen's original leader was replaced in the first of a

David Pollock, formerly Associate Editor of Problems of Communism, *is Near East Analyst in the Office of Research, US Information Agency. He has taught Mideast politics at Harvard, Cornell, and George Washington universities. He is author of* The Politics of Pressure: American Arms and Israeli Policy Since the Six-Day War *(1982). The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the US Government.*

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[1] For background on South Yemen and its relations with Moscow, see Norman Cigar, "State and Society in South Yemen," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), May-June 1985, pp. 41–58; idem, "South Yemen and the USSR: Prospects for the Relationship," *The Middle East Journal* (Washington, DC), Autumn 1985, pp. 775–95; Fred Halliday, "Yemen's Unfinished Revolution: Socialism in the South," *MERIP Reports* (New York), October 1979; Mark N. Katz, *Russia and Arabia*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986; Joseph Kostiner, *The Struggle for South Yemen*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1984; Laurie Mylroie, *Politics and the Soviet Presence in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen: Internal Vulnerabilities and Regional Challenges*, Santa Monica, CA, The Rand Corporation, 1983; Stephen Page, *The Soviet Union and the Yemens: Influence in Asymmetrical Relationships*, New York, Praeger, 1985; B. R. Pridham, Ed., *Contemporary Yemen: Politics and Historical Background*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1984; and Robert W. Stookey, *South Yemen: A Marxist Republic in Arabia*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1982.

For a review of recent Soviet writing on the area, see Jacob Landau, "Soviet Works on the Arabian Peninsula," *Middle East Studies* (London), January 1985, pp. 89–92. I am indebted to these authors, and particularly to discussions with Dr. Katz and Dr. Cigar, for their analyses of South Yemeni affairs.

Fires in Aden during the January 1986 coup that pitted factions of the Yemen Socialist Party against one another.

–SYGMA.

series of palace coups, and his successors abruptly began the process of nationalizing large sectors of the country's backward economy. Soviet reaction to the change of leaders set a pattern that has endured to the present day: Moscow "praised each one while he was in power, but quickly embraced his successor,"[2] while continuing to provide each new South Yemeni regime with economic and especially military assistance and advisers. Soviet economic aid to South Yemen was limited and inefficient, and, to judge from occasional hints in the media, neither side was entirely happy with its results.[3] Military aid, by contrast, was extensive. Over the past 15 years, Moscow has supplied Aden with over US$2 billion worth of weapons, enough to equip a reasonably modern force of about 30,000 men (plus a somewhat larger number of militia and internal security forces).[4]

Part of the reason for Soviet interest in South Yemen, in the early years, lay in Moscow's active competition with Beijing for influence in this newly independent country, as elsewhere in the Third World. Over the next decade, however, that factor dwindled into insignificance as China essentially withdrew from the field. South Yemen's own increasingly Soviet-style Marxist line offered an ideological basis for continued close relations with Moscow. On foreign policy issues, too, Aden offered Moscow almost total support. While the two sides agreed to disagree, for example, about the hypothetical Soviet proposal for an international Arab-Israeli peace conference, Aden has been the only Arab (or indeed Muslim) capital—except, of course, for Kabul—to endorse the Soviet position consistently and unequivocally on the much more immediate issue of Afghanistan. Even so, Aden's comparatively isolated status within the Arab camp has considerably devalued such services to Soviet regional objectives.

Instead, the Soviet stake in South Yemen became primarily a military/strategic one. Although the PDRY did not allow sovereign Soviet bases on its territory,

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[2] Katz, op. cit., p. 90.

[3] Ibid., pp. 87–90; Cigar, "South Yemen and the USSR," pp. 778, 785, 788–89; Page, op. cit., Chs. 2–4, passim, esp. pp. 109 fn. 71, 113–16.

[4] Cigar, "South Yemen and the USSR," pp. 777–78; and Katz, op. cit., pp. 83–87. See also The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1985-86*, London, IISS, 1985, p. 87. These figures are actually fairly modest by Mideast standards; but, to put them in perspective, one might note that the Soviets have provided about the same quantity and quality of arms to South Yemen as to neighboring (and periodically threatened) North Yemen, which has more than four times the population.

Soviet air and naval forces gained practically unlimited access to important facilities there. These amply proved their worth during the massive transshipment of Soviet arms and troops across the narrow Bab Al-Mandab straits to Ethiopia during the Horn of Africa conflict of 1977–78. When Somalia, in response, expelled the Soviets from their major coastal positions at Berbera, Aden became a natural substitute; ever since, it has been the Indian Ocean port most frequently visited by the growing Soviet fleet, reportedly including its nuclear submarines.[5] A treaty of friendship signed by the two countries in 1979 merely codified this intimate bilateral connection.

Of particular importance in this context is the passageway through the straits off Aden. This transit route is so important for Soviet naval traffic that one British analyst (not noted for excessive alarm about Soviet power projection) has dubbed it Moscow's "Panama Canal"; its significance is further attested by the three visits that Admiral Sergey Gorshkov, as commander of the Soviet Navy, paid to the South Yemeni capital since 1974.[6] Over the past decade, indeed, the value of Aden's maritime "choke point" has been magnified by a whole series of regional strategic developments: the reopening of the Suez Canal; the massive Soviet-bloc influx into Ethiopia; the insecure conditions around the Straits of Hormuz due to the Iran-Iraq war; and finally, the resulting premium on oil pipelines to the Red Sea.

In the last two years, the Soviets have also been upgrading their long-range (as far afield as Diego Garcia) aerial reconnaissance squadrons based near Aden.[7] The number of well-placed Soviet-bloc military and internal security advisers in the country swelled, as their large-scale evacuation during the January 1986 battles revealed, to include several thousand Soviets and several hundred East Germans and Cubans. In addition, South Yemen reportedly hosts some operational Soviet and Cuban combat units, along with training camps and other facilities for several different PLO factions and a variety of radical terrorist organizations.[8] Altogether, in the words of an American expert, South Yemen has become "as closely tied militarily to the Soviet bloc as any state can be without actually being a member of the Warsaw Pact."[9]

This substantial military investment makes South Yemen, quite apart from its limited diplomatic and ideological value to Moscow, an important Soviet ally. As a result, the Soviets have had to pay close attention to the complex links between Aden's internal politics and its foreign policy, which have occasionally proved difficult for Moscow to manage. One authority has succinctly summarized the Soviet dilemma:

> *. . . the PDRY's attempts to spread revolution have hindered Soviet efforts to establish good relations with Saudi Arabia and the other conservative Arab Gulf states. At other times the Soviets have feared that South Yemen's . . . relations with these same states might lead Aden to distance itself from Moscow. Thus, both revolutionary and moderate leaders in Aden have posed problems for Moscow.*[10]

In 1978, according to credible published reports, Soviet-bloc advisers actively assisted in the forcible ouster of one South Yemeni leader, Salim Rubayyi' Ali. He had strayed too far in the direction of better ties to Saudi Arabia, while opposing the Soviet airlift to Ethiopia and Moscow's insistence on a "vanguard" South Yemeni socialist party; his belated attempts to repair frayed relations with Moscow proved insufficient.[11] But two years later, Moscow apparently acquiesced in the exile of his slavishly pro-Soviet replacement, Abd Al-Fattah Isma'il, bringing to power a more moderate leader, Ali Nasir Muhammad.

The motive for this change of course probably lay in Moscow's reassessment of the situation both inside South Yemen and even more so among its neighbors. The Soviets were now intent not on subverting but on cultivating the conservative governments of the Arabian Peninsula, for a variety of reasons: the utter collapse of a guerrilla insurgency in Oman, which led Moscow to conclude that there was "little profit in assisting rebels who are unlikely to come to power"; the perceived opportunities and dangers created by the 1979 revolution in Iran; the prospect of much-needed economic aid from South Yemen's oil-rich neighbors for a less belligerent regime in Aden; the desire to stabilize friendly Soviet relations with the government of North Yemen, which had been a particular target of Isma'il's wrath; and the Soviets' own preoccupation with and anxiety over Afghanistan. All of this led the Soviets to support a more moderate leader in South Yemen, and Ali Nasir was their man.[12] This new strategy was presumably coordinated during frequent high-level Soviet–South Yemeni consultations. These included visits to Aden by Moscow's ranking Third World trouble-shooter, International Department Deputy Chief Karen Brutents, in March 1982 and October 1983, although no convincing account of the precise lines of Soviet policy formulation in this area can be pieced together from the public record.[13]

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[5] Nimrod Novik, "The Super-Powers in Southern Arabia: The End of a Decade," in Colin Legum, Ed., *Middle East Contemporary Survey*, Vol. 3, 1978/79, New York, Holmes and Meier, 1980, pp. 59–73; Jacob Goldberg, "The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen," in ibid., pp. 715–35; Page, op. cit., Chs. 3 and 4; Cigar, "South Yemen and the USSR," pp. 781–82.

[6] Fred Halliday, "The USSR and the Red Sea: Moscow's 'Panama Canal,'" in Abdel Majid Farid, Ed., *The Red Sea*, New York, St. Martin's, 1984, pp. 123–36; Katz, op. cit., p. 85.

[7] Cigar, "South Yemen and the USSR," p. 781.

[8] Ibid., pp. 781–84; and see below for sources on the January 1986 evacuation of foreigners. According to various press reports from Aden and Djibouti at that time, somewhere around 4,000–6,000 Soviet-bloc nationals were evacuated from South Yemen during the first week of fighting there, leaving behind perhaps several dozen comrades who were killed in the crossfire and an unknown number of others who continued their activities in the country. These numbers suggest that the Soviet-bloc presence in South Yemen was considerably larger than earlier published estimates, although some of the evacuees were probably dependents.

[9] Katz, op. cit., p. 87.

[10] Ibid., p. 63.

[11] Haim Shaked and Tamar Yegness, "The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen," in Colin Legum, Ed., *Middle East Contemporary Survey*, Vol. 2, 1977/78, New York, Holmes and Meier, 1979, pp. 655–74; Page, op. cit., pp. 68–72, 76–78; Katz, op. cit., pp. 90–93, 95–97.

By late 1983, however, this record suggests that Moscow had begun to sense that the political pendulum in Aden had once again moved too far in a moderate direction. There were public signals of Soviet impatience with the slow pace of socialist transformation in South Yemen, and with what one local wit dubbed Ali Nasir's "Riyalpolitik" (that is, pursuit of Saudi petrodollar subsidies in return for moderation). Ali Nasir, like Rubayyi' Ali before him, attempted to parry these Soviet complaints with extra doses of revolutionary rhetoric and fulsome praise for Soviet "fraternal assistance." Moscow reciprocated with some lukewarm praise of its own, but quietly stepped up contacts with some of the South Yemeni leader's rivals, including key Politburo and military figures Ali Antar and Salih Muslih Qasim.[14]

Finally, in March 1985, the Soviets apparently encouraged the return from his Moscow exile of Ali Nasir's immediate predecessor and most dangerous opponent, Abd Al-Fattah Isma'il.[15] The intent was probably to further narrow Ali Nasir's margin for maneuver, while ostensibly fostering party unity. But, as one American observer noted prophetically at around the time,

> *Ali Nasir may be expected to try to consolidate his power . . . by eliminating his rivals . . . . It is not clear whether the Soviets . . . would accept this.*[16]

The showdown between Isma'il and Ali Nasir came more rapidly and more violently than anyone, including the Soviets, had expected, and with results more bizarre than anyone could have foreseen. Indeed, when the crisis first erupted, the Soviets themselves were unclear for a while about just what they could and could not accept in Aden. With this background in mind, a closer look at the dramatic denouement of January 1986 is now in order.

Crisis and Coup

Almost from the moment he sent Isma'il into Soviet exile in 1980, Ali Nasir had had to contend with other rivals for power.[17] Not surprisingly, rivalry intensified when Isma'il returned five years later and predictably made common cause with Ali Nasir's other opponents; perhaps the most surprising thing about it was that he did it so energetically and so soon. There were internal political crises in Aden in the spring of 1985 and again in October, when a new party congress was held and a new Politburo and Central Committee formed. In the latter instance, factional rivalries became so bitter that outsiders—like George Habash of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a prominent Arab radical with long-standing close ties to South Yemen's leaders—were reportedly called in to mediate. The results of the October 1985 meetings were publicly hailed as a healing compromise. In fact, however, they appeared, on balance, to mark a further erosion in Ali Nasir's position, which had been under severe challenge for more than a year—and they left the underlying differences festering just below the surface of South Yemeni political life.[18] The following January,

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[12] Robert Burrowes, "The Ali Abdallah Salih Regime: 1978–1984," *The Middle East Journal*, Summer 1985, pp. 287–316; Joseph Kostiner, "The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen," in Colin Legum, Haim Shaked, and Daniel Dishon, Eds., *Middle East Contemporary Survey*, Vol. 7, 1982/83, New York, Holmes and Meier, 1985, pp. 729–43; Cigar, "South Yemen and the USSR," p. 788; Page, op. cit., pp. 92, 99, 104, and Ch. 5, "Moscow, the PDRY and Oman: The Limitations of Influence, 1967–84"; Katz, op. cit., pp. 37–38, 73, 97–99, 184–85.

[13] Page, op. cit., pp. 91–92, 110.

[14] Cigar, "South Yemen and the USSR," pp. 777, 784, 788–92; idem, "State and Society in South Yemen," pp. 56–58; Page, op. cit., pp. 88–89, 116–18; Katz, op. cit., p. 101.

[15] Katz, op. cit., p. 94 fn. 133; Cigar, loc. cit.

[16] Cigar, "South Yemen and the USSR," pp. 790–91.

[17] *Al-Watan Al-Arabi* (Paris), Feb. 28–Mar. 6, 1986, pp. 27–29; Page, op. cit., pp. 105–07; Katz, op. cit., pp. 93–94, esp. fns. 224–26. [For purposes of clarity, Arabic names are rendered in conventional rather than strictly phonetic transliteration throughout the text and citations of this article—Author.]

[18] *Al-Tadamun* (London), Nov. 2–8, 1986, p. 14, trans. in Joint Publications Research Service, *Near East/South Asia Report* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *JPRS-NEA*), Jan. 24. 1986, pp. 112–13; Sulayman Nimr, "Yemen Looks to the Brothers for the Cost of the War of the Comrades," *Al-Mustaqbal* (Paris), Mar. 1, 1986, pp. 28–30; Cigar, "South Yemen and the USSR," pp. 790–92. See also the interview with Ali Nasir's eventual replacement, Haydar Abu Bakr Al-Attas, in *Al-Mustaqbal*, Feb. 22, 1986, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Middle East and Africa* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-MEA*), Feb. 24, 1986, pp. C/4–5.

(cont. p. 54)

وتنفيذ الخطة الخمسية وتحقيق الوحدة اليمنية

Party leader Ali Nasir Muhammad addresses the 3rd Congress of the Yemen Socialist Party in October 1985: the third person to his left is Salih Muslih Qasim (in uniform); sixth from Ali Nasir's left is Ali Antar (also in uniform); and directly behind Ali Antar, Abd al-Fattah Isma'il. The sign in the background reads: "Aden, October 1985"; the

Lebanese Communist Party Secretary General George Hawi was apparently called to Aden on another fruitless mediating mission.[19] The South Yemeni civil war began on the very next day.

The underlying reasons for this explosion included the perennial personal competition for power, coupled with regional (or "tribal") and to some extent also ideological divisions. For example, Ali Nasir could count on a concentration of supporters among his fellow Hassaniya tribesmen from his own native region of Abyan; while three of his leading opponents in the Politburo, Ali Antar, Ali Shayi' Hadi, and Salih Muslih Qasim, hailed from the Radfan tribe of the Lahij region. Isma'il, significantly, was actually from the North Yemeni part of the greater Yemeni "homeland," and championed the "radical" cause of forcing the pace of overall Yemeni unity. In this he was joined by Ali Antar and other influential opponents of Ali Nasir—and it was on this issue of unity with the North that internal South Yemeni political crises characteristically crystallized.[20]

Ali Nasir was later accused by his victorious opponents (not untypically for South Yemen, or indeed for other Marxist regimes) of contradictory crimes, including "rightist," "leftist opportunist," and even "Nazi" tendencies.[21] His real sins, it appears from a close and disinterested reading of the record, were probably that he went too far in opening up South Yemen (and

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The "working paper" circulated by South Yemen's ruling Yemen Socialist Party in September 1985 presented a strictly orthodox, Soviet-style Marxist analysis and program; for a critique of its "autocratic" and "atheistic" character by an exiled opposition group, see *Al-Wahdah* (Cairo), Sept. 15, 1985, trans. in *JPRS-NEA*, Jan. 15, 1986, pp. 117–26. On inter-Yemeni issues, however, the emphasis in official South Yemeni publications remained on peaceful cooperation rather than on "revolutionary" unity; see, e.g., the series of articles on bilateral economic linkages in *14 Uktubar* (Aden), Sept. 24, 26, 27, 1985, trans. in *JPRS-NEA*, Feb. 5, 1986, pp. 86–93.

[19] For Hawi's visit, see the report on Aden radio, Jan. 12, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 14, 1986, p. C/7; and the sensationalized account in *Al-Anba'* (Kuwait), Mar. 6, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Mar. 10, 1986, pp. C/3–4.

[20] For background on these issues, see Burrowes, loc. cit.; and Page, op. cit., p. 91.

[21] See, e.g, press statement by the (new) YSP Central Committee on Aden radio, Jan. 24, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 27, 1986, pp. C/1–7; Aden radio, Jan. 31 and Feb. 1, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 3, 1986, pp. C/4–5.


من أجل الدفاع عن الثورة اليمنية

banner on the rostrum, "For the Sake of Defending the Yemeni Revolution, Implementing the Five-Year Plan, and Achieving Yemeni Unity."

—*14 Uktubar* (Aden), Oct. 13, 1985.

perhaps particularly his native province) to outside economic and political influences, and not far enough in promoting "radical" movement toward Yemeni unity and other such causes; and, especially, that he favored his supporters at the expense of his opponents.[22] Thus it was a volatile mixture of overlapping personal, regional, and ideological rivalries, all of which had been simmering for several years, that boiled over in a violent showdown in Aden during January 1986.

As for the sequence of events in the few days leading up to the shoot-out on January 13, it is not easy to sort out the fragmentary and conflicting accounts. Each side has accused the other of an intricate conspiracy of duplicity and brutality whose success depended upon firing the first shot; both sides are probably right. Ali Nasir, in other words, most likely tried to pre-empt his own imminent forcible ouster or assassination by having his rivals murdered at a "special" Politburo session.[23] Murdered most of them were, including Isma'il, Antar, Qasim, and Hadi. But then the South Yemeni President's plans went awry. Enough of his opponents survived, and enough military commanders and troops switched sides at the last minute, to defeat Ali Nasir's "loyalist" forces in 10 days of civil war that followed the Politburo massacre. Estimates of the resulting damage and casualties vary, but a plausible figure might be around 7,000 killed and several billion dollars worth of property and installations destroyed. Ali Nasir himself, having committed the tactical error of seeking refuge outside the capital before the clashes erupted, was now forced to flee the country altogether for sanctuary in Ethiopia and North Yemen.[24] His attempt to use what one of his victorious rivals was soon calling "Mafia ways"[25] to resolve South Yemen's political battles had backfired disastrously.

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[22] See, e.g., Aden radio, Feb. 5, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 6, 1986, pp. C /3–4; and, especially, the tendentious but revealing interview with Salim Salih Muhammad in *Al-Siyasah* (Kuwait), Feb. 15, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 19, 1986, pp. C/6–7.

[23] For varying accounts of the "double conspiracy," see the rebel radio broadcasts on Jan. 19, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 21, 1986, pp. C/2–15; Ali Nasir interviews in *Al-Majallah* (London), Jan. 28–Feb. 4, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 5, 1986, pp. C/2–3; *Al-Ittihad Al-Usbu'i* (Abu Dhabi), Feb. 13, 1986, pp. 10–11, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 14, 1986, pp. C/4–9, esp. p. C/8; *Al-Watan Al-Arabi*, Feb. 21–27, 1986, pp. 25–26; Al-Attas speech on Aden radio, Feb. 6, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 6, 1986, pp. C/3–6; Al-Bayd interview in *Arab Times* (Kuwait), Feb. 11, 1986, in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 13, 1986, pp. C/6–7; *Al-Siyasah*, and Doha radio, Jan. 15, 1986, trans in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 15, 1986, p. C/4; *Al-Khalij* (Sharjah), Jan. 16, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, pp. C/5–6; and *Al-Ittihad* (Abu Dhabi), Jan. 24, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 27, 1986, pp. C/8–10; *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Mar. 26, 1986.

Early Soviet Reactions

In view of the Soviets' very extensive presence in South Yemen, one obvious issue is whether they knew of and perhaps even approved the showdown in Aden in advance. The question was posed in stark terms by an anonymous Kuwaiti journalist: "Did the Soviet leadership abandon Ali Nasir Muhammad before the eruption of the recent fighting, or after it discovered that the sides opposing him were stronger?"[26]

Western analysts have lined up on opposite sides of this issue. Some have laid an anti–Ali Nasir conspiracy squarely at Moscow's door. With so many well-placed experts entrenched in Aden, they say, the Soviets must have known about each faction's plans and must have been able to alter the course of events almost at will. Others have exonerated Moscow from the charge of premeditated overthrow of a friendly ruler in this instance, on the grounds that the Soviets supported Ali Nasir right up until the end, and that, had they actually wanted to get rid of him, they could have arranged to do it in a much less sloppy fashion.[27]

The truth, as so often in the Middle East, appears to lie somewhere in the middle. It seems fairly certain that, for reasons of its own wider regional strategy, Moscow on the whole did support Ali Nasir's efforts to improve relations with the nearby conservative states, despite its ever more obvious misgivings about how far that process might go. Moscow was therefore probably not at first a partner in the plot against the South Yemeni leader. It also appears that the Soviets were taken by surprise at the timing and, especially, at the sheer violence of armed rebellion in Aden. On the other hand, Moscow's earlier encouragement of Ali Nasir's rivals implicated it in that rebellion, if only unwittingly. Moreover, Soviet specialists undoubtedly had some inkling of imminent political trouble between the two major South Yemeni factions; the signs were apparent even to outside observers. And, most important of all, as the following discussion will demonstrate, the Soviets recovered from their initial surprise quickly enough to intervene against Ali Nasir, and thereby help ensure the continued allegiance of his successors as the tide of battle turned in their favor.

The evidence that Moscow was caught by surprise and unable to control events in Aden is circumstantial but compelling. There is, first of all, the hasty and uncoordinated nature of the Soviets' effort to evacuate their nationals from the war-torn capital.[28] Then there is the rather unusual spectacle of a Soviet embassy subjected to hostile fire, apparently by disgruntled partisans of one or perhaps even both South Yemeni factions; observers arriving in Aden two weeks later recounted that the embassy still sported a banner reading, "Don't Shoot—Soviet Citizens Inside!"[29] Even more telling is the nature of the coup itself. For one thing, the vaunted East German internal security advisers were nowhere to be seen; the various South Yemeni leaders apparently preferred to rely, at least as a last resort, on coteries of heavily armed personal bodyguards. For another thing, the leaders of *both* major factions, it will be recalled, were removed from the picture; Ali Nasir ended up in exile, but his leading rivals ended up dead. It simply strains credulity to imagine that such a scenario could have been part of a Soviet design. A plot to eliminate *all* of South Yemen's rival leaders, and replace them with yet more pliant nonentities, is too Machiavellian even for Moscow—or at least too clairvoyant to be credible.[30]

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[24] For accounts of the fighting, see the various contemporary radio reports trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 16, 1986, pp. C/3–6, and Jan. 17, 1986, pp. C/2–3; and subsequent daily editions through Jan. 24, 1986; *The New York Times*, Jan. 16, 17 , 22, 30, 1986; *The Washington Post*, Jan. 16 and 25, 1986; press statement by the (new) YSP Central Committee on Aden radio, Jan. 24, 1986, loc. cit.; *Khaleej Times* (Dubai), Jan. 30, 1986, in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan . 31, 1986, pp. C/5–6; *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), Feb. 11, 1986; *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Feb. 25, 1986. See also the various partisan but plausible accounts in the South Yemeni exile opposition paper *Al-Amal* (Cairo), Jan. 19, 1986, trans. in *JPRS-NEA*, Mar. 10, 1986, pp. 101–09.

[25] Interview with Salim Salih Muhammad reported in *The New York Times*, Feb. 1, 1986.

[26] *Al-Qabas* (Kuwait), Jan. 28, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 30, 1986, p. C/1.

[27] An argument that Moscow actually planned Ali Nasir's overthrow has been made by, among others, Jeane Kirkpatrick, in *The Washington Post*, Feb. 4, 1986. Arguments that the Soviets were not directly implicated have been published by Mideast experts Patrick Seale, in *The Observer* (London), Jan. 19, 1986; Mark Katz, in *The Washington Post*, Feb. 8, 1986; and David Hirst, in *The Guardian* (Manchester), Feb. 12, 1986. See also *Khaleej Times*, Jan. 30, 1986, in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 31, 1986, pp. C/5–6.

[28] *The New York Times*, Jan. 23, 1986; *The Times* (London), Feb. 10, 1986. For other reports of Soviet casualties and damage to the Soviet embassy in Aden, see *Al-Khalij*, Jan. 20, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 21, 1986, p. C/16; and *Al-Ittihad* (Manama) and Radio AFP (Paris), Jan. 23, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 23, 1986, p. C/7.

[29] *The Washington Post*, Feb. 23, 1986.

[30] French ambassador Pierre Audebert went so far as to describe the Soviets as "completely bewildered and out of their depth" in this crisis (interview in *Le Monde* [Paris], Jan. 29, 1986). For an unsubstantiated report of internal Soviet differences on how to handle the situation, see *Al-Qabas*, Jan. 28, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 30, 1986, pp. C/1–3.

Some of the foreign residents evacuated from Aden during the January 1986 coup in South Yemen debark from the Soviet cargo ship Skulptor Gulubkin *in Djibouti on January 19.*

–Patrick Chauvel/SYGMA.

Further evidence of the Soviets' initial confusion and vacillation, and of their eventual policy reversal, can be found in a close reading of their public statements during the crisis.[31] During the entire first week of fighting in South Yemen, Soviet media were more than usually cautious in their public statements about the unsettled situation there. Very little appeared in print, and Soviet radio and television generally refrained from commentary and simply repeated brief, ostensibly factual accounts from local sources. Even so, the selective nature of Soviet reportage during this first phase of South Yemen's crisis offers some insight into Moscow's initial reactions. For example, Soviet radio very quickly (late on the first day of fighting in Aden) repeated the Ali Nasir regime's claim to have foiled a "counterrevolutionary" coup; and, over the next three days, Soviet media held back news about the large-scale combat under way in the PDRY capital. As late as January 16, in another indication that Moscow still supported Ali Nasir, a Soviet television commentary referred to his opponents as "putschists."[32]

Late that day, however, as an emergency PDRY delegation arrived in Moscow and fighting intensified in Aden, Soviet reportage shifted to a more neutral posture, noting vaguely that the situation in Aden was still "tense" or "complex" and that there were "conflicting accounts" about the fate of individual figures. Neither Ali Nasir nor his rivals were mentioned by name, and TASS reports carefully avoided taking sides in the ongoing South Yemeni power struggle.[33] Still, the failure to acknowledge the incumbent leader whom Moscow had until just then supported, and the emphasis on South Yemen's party at the expense of individual political figures, marked a shift no less dramatic for being implicit. While it is hard to say whether this shift in Soviet coverage reflected a change in Moscow's perceptions or in its preferences (or, more likely, some combination of the two), it does suggest that the Soviets had already decided to keep their options open, and perhaps to broker a compromise between the rival factions, rather than to back Ali Nasir's bid to retain supreme power.

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[31] The account that follows is based on published translations of Soviet print and broadcast coverage of South Yemeni events, appearing in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union/International Affairs* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-SOV*), "Middle East and North Africa" section, various daily editions for the period Jan. 14–28, 1986; and on translations of Arab and Western coverage appearing in *FBIS-MEA*, section on "The Arabian Peninsula," over the same period, esp. Jan. 23 and 24. Specific reports will be cited as appropriate.

[32] See esp. Moscow radio, Jan. 15, 1986, in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 16, 1986, p. H/2; and Soviet radio and television reports, Jan. 16, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 21, 1986, pp. H/2–5.

[33] See, e.g., *Pravda*, Jan. 19, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 21, 1986, pp. H/3–4; and the various Soviet broadcasts on Jan. 16, 18, 19, 20, and 21, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 21, pp. H/2–5, and Jan. 22, 1986, p. H/1.

All during the following week, a new theme was added to Soviet print as well as broadcast media treatment of South Yemen: the crisis there was termed "purely an internal affair," in which "any form of outside interference" was "impermissible." This stance was publicly attributed to both Soviet and South Yemeni authorities.[34] Since the most likely form of such "outside interference" would have been North Yemeni intervention on Ali Nasir's behalf, the Soviet warning was tantamount to indirect support for the rebels. "The Soviet Union stood by us," in the words of Salim Salih Muhammad, the new assistant secretary general of the [South] Yemen Socialist Party, "in halting any foreign intervention."[35] By that time, it appears, Soviet officials were already engaged in intensive consultations aimed at ending the battle by finding a suitable successor to the beleaguered South Yemeni leader.

Of course, with most of Ali Nasir's leading rivals now dead (or, as seems to have been true of Isma'il, gravely wounded),[36] the list of possible replacements had considerably narrowed. The choice therefore rather fortuitously fell on a heretofore marginal player, Haydar Abu Bakr Al-Attas. He had survived the massacre and subsequent carnage simply by virtue of being out of the country, on an official visit to India en route to China, at the time. After secluding himself in his New Delhi hotel to receive reports and ride out the storm, Al-Attas had the foresight to fly on to Moscow instead of Beijing (along with Foreign Minister Abd Al-Aziz Al-Dali) for unscheduled crisis consultations.[37] A technocrat by training, and a more or less neutral figure in Aden's endemic intrigues, Al-Attas had held the prestigious but practically powerless post of prime minister; now he was suddenly the right man in the right place at the right time to take over South Yemen's presidency. He was alive and well; his lack of clear-cut factional identification had abruptly been converted into an asset, making him an acceptable compromise candidate; and he was particularly well placed, from his temporary but well-timed vantage point in Moscow, to return to Aden in triumph.[38] It is thus no accident that one veteran exiled South Yemeni opposition figure labeled Al-Attas "an Adeni Karmal," in a bitter allusion to the Afghan communist who enjoyed a similarly meteoric rise to power when the Soviets intervened in that country in December 1979.[39]

Thus, during the week of heavy fighting in and around Aden, the Soviets had recovered from their initial uncertainty and disorientation, shifting rather quickly from pro–Ali Nasir partisanship to what can best be described as increasingly anti–Ali Nasir "neutrality." Apparently, Moscow had at first held on to some vestiges of hope that the conflict could still be mediated, either by the Soviets themselves or through the good offices of some other friendly third party such as Libya or one of the various Palestinian factions. But when the ever more confident South Yemeni rebels rejected such mediation (let alone power-sharing or compromise with Ali Nasir), the Soviets decided to support the new claimants to power—flying in (on January 24) a new leadership team headed by Al-Attas directly from Moscow and expressly for this purpose.[40]

The turning point toward Moscow's abandonment of Ali Nasir appears to have come a few days earlier, around January 19 or 20. It was then that the Soviets publicly warned against the very outside mediation that they themselves had previously encouraged; and it was then that they appear to have finally rejected a desperate bid by the fugitive Ali Nasir to journey to

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[34] TASS reports, Jan. 20, 1986, in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 21, 1986, p. H/5–6; Moscow radio, citing a Soviet foreign ministry spokesmen, Jan. 21, 1986, in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 22, 1986, p. H/1; TASS report, Jan. 24, 1986, in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 27, 1986, p. H/1; *Pravda*, Jan. 21 and 24, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 23, 1986, p. H/1, and Jan. 24,1986, p. H/4; TASS report, Jan. 25, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 27, 1986, pp. H /1–2. See, in addition to the Soviets' own broadcasts, those by rebel leaders on Jan. 19, 24, and 27, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 21, 1986, p. C/5; Jan. 27, 1986, pp. C/8–9; and Jan. 28, 1986, pp. C/2–5.

[35] Interview in *Al-Siyasah*, Feb. 15, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 19, 1986, pp. C/6–7.

[36] See esp. *Al-Ittihad*, Jan. 29, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 30, 1986, p. C/ 6.

[37] Soviet media initially broadcast only a perfunctory report of Al-Attas's reception by Politburo member Geydar Aliyev; TASS report, Jan. 16, 1986, in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 17, 1986, p. H/1. On January 19, *Pravda* reported that Al-Attas and the accompanying PDRY foreign minister, Abd Al-Aziz Al-Dali, had met with CPSU Central Committee secretaries Yegor Ligachëv and Boris Ponomarëv two days earlier; trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 21, 1986, pp. H/3–4. A later report mentioned another such meeting, held on Jan. 23; see TASS report, Jan. 24, 1986, in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 27, 1986, p. H /1.

[38] See, e.g., *Al-Qabas*, Jan. 28, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 30, 1986, p. C/1; interview with French ambassador Audebert, loc. cit.

[39] Interview with Muhammad Ali Haytham in *Al-Watan Al-Arabi*, Feb. 14–20, 1986, pp. 32–33. See also his interview in *Le Monde*, Feb. 7, 1986; and the intriguing but clearly sensationalized account in *Jeune Afrique* (Paris), Feb. 5, 1986.

[40] For an interesting analysis of Soviet options in this early phase of the crisis, see *Al-Bayadir Al-Siyasi* (Jerusalem), Jan. 18, 1986, pp. 10-11. See also the report about internal opposition to the new leadership, as carried on Manama radio, Jan. 27, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 28, 1986, p. C/6.

Moscow for consultations.[41] And it was then, judging from the best available evidence, that the Soviets began to intervene directly in favor of the forces opposed to Ali Nasir.

Soviet Intervention

While difficult to document conclusively, an account of Soviet intervention can be reconstructed from published sources, both Arab and Western, with due allowance for possible selectivity, bias, or outright fabrication.[42] Several days into the fighting, Soviet assistance for the rebels was confined to provision of offshore transmission-boosting equipment for their radio broadcasts, as each side in South Yemen's civil war struggled to win the vital "battle of the airwaves." A week or so later, however, as Ali Nasir remained on the run, the Soviets apparently began providing the rebels with some intelligence and logistical support, and ultimately also with limited but useful tactical combat assistance. Reliable accounts in both Arab and Western publications refer to Soviet as well as Cuban participation in directing the insurgents' artillery fire, supplying them with ammunition and other materiel, and even bombing Aden's airport runways in order to neutralize the country's largely pro–Ali Nasir air force. This activity appears to have reached a crescendo around January 24, as Ali Nasir's replacements arrived from Moscow while rebel forces consolidated their control over the capital. The following day, Moscow radio declared that "the situation in Aden is gradually returning to normal," and that "fighting there has ceased completely."[43]

Whether or not this Soviet involvement actually tipped the military balance against Ali Nasir is a moot and also an unanswerable question. According to one report, Soviet aid did in fact shift the seesaw battle back in favor of the rebels just as they were beginning to run out of ammunition.[44] More likely it merely hastened a rebel victory already in the making, which in turn helps to explain when and why the Soviets intervened as they did. Thus, in a pattern reminiscent of their behavior in other Arab crises, the Soviets appear to have escalated their direct intervention just when the conflict was ending, as the confusion of battle and the risks of larger-scale confrontation abated. In this instance, though, the participation of Soviet troops even in limited combat rather than merely front-line advisory roles marked an unusual—if perhaps not entirely unprecedented—departure from normal Soviet practice in the Arab arena over the past 15 years.

Official Western comment about this new element in the picture was fairly cautious. A week into the fighting, US officials publicly claimed they had no proof that the Soviet Union was directly involved; a bit later, however, they pointed to "a credible pattern of increasing and significant Soviet support for the rebel group," while conceding that the relevant reports remained "scattered and unconfirmed."[45] By January 23, in a clear signal that those reports were being taken seriously, State Department officials told reporters that American diplomats had urged their Soviet counterparts not to intervene in Aden.[46] Meanwhile, the French ambassador to Aden, an eyewitness to the fighting until he joined the mass evacuation of foreigners from the capital, dropped an unmistakable public hint about Moscow's involvement. Alluding to claims by the Soviets that all the crates they delivered to Aden harbor during the battles there were "medical supplies," he simply said, "I doubt it."[47]

Soviet spokesmen predictably disavowed any military role in this crisis, while warning others to keep out. One anonymous *Pravda* "rejoinder" rejected American charges as "mythical."[48] Similar rebuttals continued to appear long after the entire episode had largely disappeared from the Western press, suggesting some sensitivity about this issue. For example, an intriguing commentary broadcast in early February on Radio Baku in Azeri, and apparently directed at listeners across the border in Iran, responded to the "uncritical" treatment in an Iranian newspaper of "fabrications" concerning Soviet intervention in the internal affairs of a fellow Muslim society. The broadcast denied what it called the "propaganda clamor about Moscow's, God forbid, conspiracies in various parts of the world and the legend of the communist threat."[49] As for the South Yemenis themselves, spokesmen for both rival factions denied reports of Soviet interference in their battles.[50] But South Yemeni sources, according to one curious report in the Arab press, admitted that some people might have "mistakenly" attributed unidentified wartime flights over Aden to Soviet forces—when in fact, those sources claimed, the mystery pilots were actually Israelis![51]

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[41] See the suggestive reports on Kuwait radio, Jan. 16 and 17, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 16, 1986, p. C/4, and Jan. 17, 1986, pp. C/2–3; Sanaa radio, Jan 19, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 21, 1986, p. C/17; various Arab and French print and radio reports on Jan. 21–24, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 24, 1986, pp. H/1–4 ; Radio AFP and Radio Monte Carlo, Jan. 24, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 24, 1986 , p. H/1; Ali Nasir interviews in *Al-Majallah*, Jan. 28–Feb. 4, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 5, 1986, pp. C/2–3; and in *Al-Ittihad Al-Usbu'i*, Feb. 13, 1986, pp. 10–11, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 14, 1986, pp. C/4–9. See also reports on Radio Monte Carlo, Jan. 23, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 24, 1986, p. A/11; *Arab Times*, Jan. 26, 1986, in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 28, 1986, p. C/1; *Jane's Defence Weekly* (London), Feb. 15, 1986; and *Le Monde*, Feb. 7, 1986.

[42] *Al-Siyasah*, Jan. 20, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 22, 1986, p. C/ 2; Radio Monte Carlo and FBIS Editorial Report, in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 23, 1986, pp. C/6–7; *The New York Times*, Jan. 24, 1986; *The Wall Street Journal* (New York), Apr. 15, 1986; *Al-Khalij*, Jan. 26, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan 27, 1986, p. C/7; Abu Dhabi radio, citing commentary in the local paper *Al-Wahdah*, Jan. 29, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 29, 1986, pp. C/11–12; *Al-Ittihad*, Jan. 31, 1986, trans. in *FBIS–MEA*, Feb. 3, 1986, p. C/6; *Al-Qabas*, Jan. 28 and Feb. 6, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 30, 1986, pp. C/1–3, and Feb. 10, 1986, p. C/2; *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Feb. 8 and 15, 1986.

[43] TASS report, Jan. 25, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 27, 1986, pp. H/1–2. For several days thereafter, however, Soviet broadcasts noted that the situation was still being "stabilized"; TASS reports, Jan. 28 and 29, 1986, in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 29, 1986, p. H/1; and Jan. 30, 1986, p. H/1. Even after another month had gone by, an authoritative Soviet report conceded that "the process of normalization continues in Democratic Yemen" (*Pravda*, Feb. 25, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 26, 1986, p. H/2).

[44] *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Feb. 15, 1986. See also the curious TASS report on Jan. 21, 1986, that "the opposing factions are experiencing a certain exhaustion of military opportunities" (trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 22, 1986, p. H/1).

[45] *The New York Times*, Jan. 22, 1986; State Department press briefing, Feb. 6, 1986.

[46] *The New York Times*, Jan. 24, 1986.

[47] Interview on Paris radio, Jan. 27, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 28, 1986, p. C/8.

Soviet Comments on the Crisis

Almost as interesting as the actual Soviet role during the January battles has been the published Soviet commentary about South Yemen once the immediate crisis subsided. By January 31, the Moscow media were already engaged in rewriting recent history. *Pravda*, ignoring the earlier erroneous Soviet reports of Ali Nasir's victory during the first four days of fighting, now recalled that

> *immediately after the tragic events in Aden of 13 January, the majority of news organs throughout the world . . . noted the clear-cut position of the Soviet Union which called for an end to the armed clashes and the reconciliation of the sides, and resolutely opposed any outside interference.*[52]

The new South Yemeni president, *Pravda*'s subtle distortion of the record continued, was being falsely labeled "Moscow's pointman—and this merely because at the time of the events of 13 January, when he happened to be out of the country, he was in Moscow on his way home."

Since early February, however, Soviet coverage of South Yemen has reverted to its normal scope. What little there is has emphasized the return to normalcy in that country in the security, economic, and political spheres, including the "proper" selection of new leaders, the continuity of policies, and the lasting friendship with Moscow.[53] The freshly installed South Yemeni leaders who attended the 27th CPSU Congress in Moscow in February-March were accorded strictly routine media treatment: the Soviet press ignored their reported meeting with Mikhail Gorbachëv and their extraordinarily open press conference (on which more below) at the South Yemeni embassy.[54]

Soviet statements about South Yemen to Arab or West European media outlets have been only slightly more forthcoming, going so far as to admit surprise and to express regret and concern over the "tragic" events there. Interestingly, while endorsing the general argument that only "imperialism and reaction" could have benefited from the crisis, the Soviets have for the most part not echoed South Yemen's own occasional accusations of CIA or Israeli Mossad intervention in that country.[55] Nor have the Soviet media repeated the

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[48] *Pravda*, Jan. 31, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 4, 1986, pp. A/4–5. See also Kuwait radio, Jan. 16, 1986 (quoting Soviet Deputy Defense Minister Vladimir Govorov, who was visiting Kuwait at the time), trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 16, 1986, p. C/1; and Kuwait radio, citing a local Soviet diplomat, Jan. 25, 1986, in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 27, 1986, p. H/3.

[49] Trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 7, 1986, p. H/4. See also TASS report on Moscow radio, Feb. 21, 1986, in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 25, 1986, p. CC/9; *Pravda*, Apr. 26, 1986, and TASS version of the article "Slanderers At Work," in *FBIS-SOV*, Apr. 29, 1986, p. A/10; and May 1, 1986, pp. H/3–4.

[50] Aden radio, Apr. 20, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Apr. 21, 1986, p. C/2 (repeated by TASS, Apr. 21, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Apr. 22, 1986, p. H/3); Manama radio, Jan. 29, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 29, 1986, p. C/8; Abu Dhabi radio, Feb. 9, 1986, citing Ali Nasir statement to the local paper *Al-Ittihad*, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 11, 1986, p. C/8.

[51] *Al-Ray Al-Amm* (Kuwait), Feb. 4, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 5, 1986, p. C/6. See eyewitness account in *The New York Times*, Jan. 22, 1986.

[52] *Pravda*, Jan. 31, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 4, 1986, pp. A/4-5 (translation very slightly altered for clarity). Another Soviet account notes simply that Attas "was on an Asian tour when the tragic events occurred and returned home from Delhi via Moscow" (see A. Ulanskiy, "The January Crisis," *New Times* [Moscow], No. 6, Feb. 17, 1986, p. 10, in *FBIS-SOV*, Mar. 5, 1986, pp. H/1–2).

[53] See, e.g., TASS reports, Jan. 31, Feb. 1, 7 and 12, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 3, 1986, p. H/3; Feb. 5, 1986, p. H/2; Feb. 10, 1986, p. H/2; and Feb. 13, 1986, p. H/1; *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Feb. 20, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 21, 1986, p. H/5; TASS report, Feb. 21, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 26, 1986, p. CC/16; *Pravda*, Feb. 9 and 25, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 10, 1986, p. H/2, and Feb. 26, 1986, p. H/2.

[54] Soviet media seem to have reported only a meeting of the PDRY delegation with Ligachëv and Aliyev; *Pravda*, Mar. 4, 1986. Compare Al-Bayd's homecoming statement on Aden radio, Mar. 8, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Mar. 10, 1986, p. C/3; and his interview in *Al-Anba'*, Mar. 6, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Mar. 10, 1986, pp. C/3–4.

[55] One exception is a commentary by Pavel Demchenko, which attributed South Yemen's "difficulties" both to its "traditional heterogeneity and tribal fragmentation" and to "subversive actions by foreign reactionary and imperialist forces" (*Pravda*, Jan. 24, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 24, 1986, p. H/4). Also, Konstantin Geyvandov, a "senior political commentator for *Izvestiya*," was reported to have told a Jordanian reporter that "recent events in the PDRY" were "part of US and Israeli attempts to create problems in the Arab arena" (*Sawt Al-Sha'b* [Amman], Jan. 26, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 31, 1986, pp. H/3–4). For allegations by the new South Yemeni leaders of outside interference in the January crisis, see, e.g., Aden radio, Feb. 7 and 8, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 10, 1986, pp. C/6–10; Aden radio, Feb. 10, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 11, 1986, (cont. p. 61)

The delegation of the Yemen Socialist Party, headed by Secretary General Ali Salim Al-Bayd, in Moscow for the 27th CPSU Congress, places a wreath at the Lenin Mausoleum.

–TASS from SOVFOTO.

public and very personal South Yemeni charges leveled against the defeated Ali Nasir; instead, as will be seen below, the Soviets have simply dropped the former leader from their public vocabulary.

Ali Nasir Abandoned

By the end of January, Ali Nasir's military situation had become hopeless, and he again sought sanctuary in Ethiopia. He had received a sympathetic hearing, but little else, during a tour of friendly Arab capitals (Tripoli, Damascus, and Algiers), all of which were constrained by distance, by limited resources, and above all by an understandable reluctance to get involved in someone else's losing battle against their Soviet patron's apparent wishes. The exiled leader was back in North Yemen and reportedly also in South Yemen, outside of Aden, during February, before fleeing to the Ethiopian capital for the third and last time in early March.[56]

Throughout this period, even as he issued increasingly shrill denunciations of the "crazy separatist clique" that had replaced him in Aden, Ali Nasir continued to appeal, almost pathetically, for Soviet support. He publicized elaborate proposals for power-sharing among all "legitimate" South Yemeni forces,

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p. C/4; *Al-Khalij*, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, pp. C/2–4. More recently, the Lebanese leftist newspaper *Al-Safir*, alluding to US Vice President George Bush's expression of "concern" about South Yemen during his visit to North Yemen in March, has accused Washington and Sanaa of jointly plotting to overthrow the new regime in Aden (see *The New York Times*, May 25, 1986). For earlier allegations along these lines, see *Al-Qabas*, Feb. 6, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 6, 1986, pp. C/1–2; and *Al-Ittihad*, Apr. 12, 1986.

[56] Ali Nasir's peregrinations were widely reported in the Kuwaiti and United Arab Emirates press; see also *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat* (London), Jan. 21, 1986. For one report of an interview with Ali Nasir "inside South Yemen," published long after his initial escape, see *Al-Siyasah*, Feb. 21, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 24, 1986, pp. C/5–6.

and denied that the Soviet Union had turned against him—even though his personal envoys were now reportedly rebuffed by Moscow and other Soviet-bloc capitals.[57] Indeed, by early March, according to a number of informed Arab accounts, mediators from the Soviet Union and its allies (including Nayyif Hawatmeh, head of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and Lebanese communist party leaders) would no longer hear of Ali Nasir's return to Aden in any capacity; the best deal they were willing to contemplate was for him to accept exile in exchange for the political rehabilitation of his supporters.[58]

By this time, even Ali Nasir could probably see the handwriting on the wall; and so he reportedly stood firm (with the stubborn support of Ethiopian leader Mengistu Haile Mariam) in rejecting the suspect Soviet offer to take up residence in Moscow.[59] As for the diehard partisans of the former South Yemeni leader, they appear to lack the leadership, motivation, access to Aden, outside assistance, and sheer numbers that would be required to have much immediate effect on the current political situation.

The Rebels in Power

By early February, once it had the military situation fairly well under control, the new regime in Aden turned to the task of sorting out and consolidating the post–Ali Nasir political order. So many of the previous leaders had just been "martyred," and so many others had fled the country, gone into hiding, or been discredited along with Ali Nasir himself, that rudimentary issues of staffing the top government, party, and military positions perforce preoccupied the new elite in Aden.[60] A series of hastily convened "rump" sessions of higher political organs settled some of these issues. Al-Attas was confirmed in his new position as head of state (chairman of the Supreme People's Council Presidium, or, less formally, president); he relinquished the prime ministership to an even less well-known fellow Politburo member, Yasin Sa'id Nu'man. Al-Dali, meanwhile, retained the post of foreign minister in the new Cabinet. As for the party, a new Politburo and a new secretary general, Ali Salim Al-Bayd, were selected. Several weeks later, the regime announced the "martyrdom" of Isma'il, the last surviving leader of the original plot against Ali Nasir.[61]

Behind this official facade of legitimacy, however, none of the nominal new leaders appears to have a secure power base. Al-Attas and Al-Dali are both relatively neutral, nonideological technocrats (the former was trained as an engineer; the latter, as a dentist) acceptable both to diverse South Yemeni factions and to Moscow. Neither figure, however, appears to have outstanding political skills or much political following. Al-Bayd, for his part, may have other handicaps: health problems at present and ideological problems in the past.[62] In fact, the new "strongman" in Aden, judging from published reports about him and from his own prominence in the official Adeni press, appears to be Al-Bayd's freshly installed titular deputy in the party hierarchy, Salim Salih Muhammad.[63] Also, given the still uncertain security situation and the proclivity of South Yemeni factions to resort to arms in settling political scores, the new armed forces and internal security chiefs and their deputies are probably also key players behind the scenes.

Closely related to the question of personalities is that of the political complexion of the new leadership in Aden. For the time being, at least, the extreme radicals are in eclipse. Many of their leaders, as noted, were killed early in the January fighting; some who survived, including North Yemeni opposition leader-in-exile Sultan Ahmed 'Umar, have not been promoted to high positions. Indeed, the new regime is striving to project an image of relative moderation in both foreign and domestic policy. Messages and delegations abroad have consistently (and so far credibly) emphasized South Yemen's continued obeisance to principles of "mutual respect" and "noninterference in internal affairs"—thus attempting to reassure the country's neighbors that Aden will not revert to a policy of subversion, and to elicit Arab acceptance and financial assistance in return.[64] In the domestic arena, top officials of the new regime have pointedly remarked to both Arab and Soviet audiences that full-fledged communism might be "centuries away" in South Yemen, which would pursue a "*gradual* movement along the path of socialist orientation."[65] Nevertheless, there is little reason to believe that tensions over the proper degree of radicalism have disappeared. They may well resurface once the new South Yemeni regime copes with its most urgent internal and external security concerns.

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[57] See, e.g., Ali Nasir interviews in *Al-Ittihad*, Feb. 12, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 13, 1986, pp. C/7–8, and in *Al-Watan Al-Arabi*, Feb. 21–27, 1986, pp. 25-26.

[58] As late as mid-February, Ali Nasir had publicly referred to an (apparently imaginary) *Pravda* article that called for a South Yemeni "national reconciliation," and a subsequent Kuwaiti account repeated that claim; see the reports in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 14, 1986, p. C/7, and Mar. 10, 1986, pp. C/3-4. See below for reports of recent Soviet-backed mediation efforts.

[59] *Al-Jumhuriyah* (Cairo), Feb. 4, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 7, 1986, p. R/1.

[60] Once the new political appointments and purges or detentions discussed below were well under way, the new regime replaced many of the old one's military commanders as well. In April, new chiefs were formally installed for South Yemen's navy, air force, and popular militia, all of which had sided to a considerable degree with Ali Nasir. See Aden radio, Apr. 9, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Apr. 10, 1986, p. C/3.

[61] Aden radio, Feb. 6, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 7, 1986, pp. C/1–3; and Feb. 8 and 10, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 10, 1986, pp. C/3–10.

[62] Al-Bayd, in addition to his other rumored medical problems, may have been wounded slightly during the Politburo massacre. For a reference to his earlier political problems, see Cigar, "State and Society in South Yemen," p. 47. For an interview with Al-Bayd shortly before the coup—in which he remarked prophetically that "today you have power, and yesterday you were on the street"—see *Al-Amal* (Sanaa), Dec. 8, 1986, trans. in *JPRS-NEA*, Mar. 10, 1986, pp. 85–100, esp. p. 99.

[63] See, e.g., *Al-Khalij*, Jan. 26, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 27, 1986, pp. C/5–6; and Jan. 30, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 3, 1986, pp. C/2–3; *The Financial Times* (London), Jan. 30, 1986; Aden radio, Feb. 3, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 3, 1986, p. C/2.

Of equal significance is the lopsided regional and tribal composition of the new Politburo. It is about evenly divided between "rebel" Lahijis and "neutral" Hadramis; but conspicuous by their absence are members from Abyan, Ali Nasir's home province, or from Aden itself. Questioned about this deficiency, one of the new leaders retorted rather defensively that the party was not a parliament and therefore did not need to be representative.[66] But the persistence of unresolved personal, ideological, and tribal issues surrounding the South Yemeni leadership suggests that a new power struggle may not be too far away.[67]

In the meantime, the new regime appears to have its hands full just keeping track of suspected partisans of Ali Nasir. One official did not contradict a suggestion that 10,000 such suspects had been arrested; while another spokesman claimed that, as of mid-February, about a thousand of them had already been released.[68] More recently, on March 29, South Yemen announced a general amnesty for all except the ringleaders of Ali Nasir's camp, including refugees.[69] (The latter, according to other reports, may number as many as 18,000, some of whom are still organized in quasi-military formations.)[70] As for the ousted President himself, however, his return has been ruled out by his replacements in Aden, who have lately even talked of trying him in absentia.[71] Significantly, Al-Bayd denounced Ali Nasir by name in a speech to the Soviet party congress in Moscow in March, and again in a speech to the East German party congress the following month.[72] Moreover, in an extraordinary press conference at the South Yemeni embassy in the Soviet capital, he publicly dismissed reports that the Soviets had urged Aden to effect a "national reconciliation" with the "criminal" former leader.[73]

The new government's effort to isolate Ali Nasir and consolidate its own power at home is also the primary basis for its approach to foreign policy. First and foremost, Aden's leaders have sought to assure themselves of continued Soviet diplomatic, political, economic, and military backing by stressing their loyalty and gratitude to Moscow at every opportunity. Frequent consultations with Soviet-bloc ambassadors and various visiting delegations in Aden have been the hallmark of the post–Ali Nasir leaders. Their statements to date lack most (although, as we shall see, not all) of the earlier nuances that suggested even minor policy differences between Aden and Moscow, or any differences within the South Yemeni regime regarding the "strategic" and "vital" nature of bilateral ties.[74]

At the same time, the new regime has sought to preempt the prospect of Arab support for Ali Nasir or other dissident forces by stressing, as already noted, its own continued adherence to his regional "good neighbor" policy. In this connection, South Yemeni spokesmen have gone so far as to gloss over all the evidence of initial Ethiopian or North Yemeni (and other Arab) support for the deposed President. They have also quite openly solicited Arab aid for their economy, already woefully poor and mismanaged and now further ravaged by civil war.[75] For a while, too, the selectively "open door" approach begun under Ali Nasir was explicitly extended by his successors to additional Western and possibly even American economic and diplomatic ties. But lately, perhaps with an eye on Moscow, the new regime appears to have backtracked on this a bit; for example, it sounded an especially strident note in the Arab chorus of condemnation of the US air raid on Libya.[76] On this issue, there may be some divergence of views in Aden: Al-Attas, who is reported to enjoy business connections with Saudi interests, has sounded rather more enthusiastic about such economic linkages (and less inclined to cite foreign "reactionary" or "imperialist" plots against South Yemen) than has the outspoken Salim Salih Muhammad.[77]

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[64] See especially the surprisingly frank interviews with Al-Attas and Al-Bayd in *Al-Nahar* (Beirut), Feb. 14, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 19, 1986, pp. C/4–6. For a more concise example of the many recent official statements along these lines, see Al-Dali interview in *Al-Siyasah*, Feb. 12, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 14, 1986, pp. C/2–3.

[65] Interview with Salim Salih Muhammad in *Al-Siyasah*, Feb. 15, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 19, 1986, p. C/6; text of Al-Bayd's speech to the CPSU Party Congress, *Pravda*, Mar. 6, 1986 (emphasis added).

[66] Al-Bayd interview in *Al-Nahar*, Feb. 14, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 19, 1986, pp. C/4–5.

[67] See, e.g., Marc Yared, "South Yemen: Marxism or Ethnic Solidarity?" *Jeune Afrique*, Feb. 26, 1986.

[68] Al-Attas interview in *Al-Mustaqbal*, Feb. 22, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 24, 1986, p. C/5; *Al-Ray Al-Amm*, Mar. 18, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Mar. 20, 1986, p. C/2; Doha radio, citing statement by Al-Attas to *Al-Ittihad*, Mar. 19, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Mar. 20, 1986, p. C/2.

[69] Aden radio, Mar. 29 and 30, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Mar. 31, 1986, pp. C/3–4.

[70] *Al-Ittihad*, May 4, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, May 5, 1986, p. C/7; *Al-Khalij*, May 22, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, May 23, 1986, p. C/1.

[71] *FBIS-MEA*, June 4, 1986, pp. C/2-3. An unconfirmed Arab report claims that two prominent partisans of Ali Nasir have already been sent into Soviet exile; see Abu Dhabi radio citing the local newspaper *Al-Ittihad*, Apr. 27, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Apr. 30, 1986, p. H/3.

[72] *Pravda*, Mar. 6, 1986. Based on Al-Bayd's departure date of Feb. 14, 1986, reported on Aden radio, it appears that he stayed three full weeks in Moscow on that occasion; see *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 18, p. C/3. The Secretary General also attended the Bulgarian Party Congress in April in Sofia (see *14 Uktubar*, Apr. 1, 1986).

[73] Aden radio, Mar. 5, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Mar. 7, 1986, p. C/2. The Soviet media, not surprisingly, completely ignored this decidedly unconventional press conference in their capital.

[74] Examples of such meetings and statements are legion; see the frequent reports on Aden radio, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, various daily editions, Jan. 24, 1986, to date.

[75] See, e.g., the official statements broadcast on Aden radio, Jan. 31, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 31, 1986, pp. C/1–2; and Feb. 6, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 7, 1986, pp. C/1–3, Al-Attas interview in *Al-Siyasah*, Feb. 13, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 18, 1986, p. C/1.

Regional Repercussions

The long-term implications of the latest South Yemeni upheaval are, like everything in the Middle East, uncertain, but some actual or potential repercussions are already apparent. A quick survey can hardly do them justice. Nevertheless, it may be useful to outline them here, particularly as they may affect the larger picture of Soviet policy in the region.

Among the interested nearby observers of this year's turmoil in South Yemen, the one of greatest potential importance is the Yemen Arab Republic, or North Yemen. It shares with the South not just a border but also a large measure of tribal affiliation, intellectual community, formal commitment to Yemeni unity, primary dependence on Soviet weapons, and, most important of all, a recent history of close but often hostile contacts across the common frontier. North Yemen's president was assassinated by an envoy from the South in 1978; and there were serious border skirmishes in 1972 and again in 1979, ending each time, in typically paradoxical inter-Arab fashion, in agreements on eventual unity between the northern and southern halves of "the Yemeni homeland." The last major crisis between the two countries—sparked by another flare-up in Sanaa's war against the National Democratic Front, a radical opposition guerrilla group based in Aden—was peacefully resolved in 1982. But underlying tensions remained; and Ali Nasir's commitment to peaceful inter-Yemeni relations was not shared by some of his political rivals. As a result, Sanaa could only view the armed challenge to Ali Nasir's leadership in Aden as a matter of grave concern, all the more so because of suspicions of Soviet involvement and temptations for some North Yemeni elements to respond. At the same time, Sanaa was leery of letting this crisis roil its own cordial relations with Moscow, which had continued to provide it with arms and on occasion with discreet diplomatic support throughout the vicissitudes of inter-Yemeni affairs.

Thus, when large-scale fighting suddenly erupted in Aden, the North Yemeni government of President Ali Abdallah Salih reacted cautiously. Over the next few weeks, according to several reliable press reports, Sanaa and Moscow exchanged a number of high-level delegations and messages warning each other against intervention in Aden, each side apparently not quite believing the other's protestations of innocence.[78] In fact, North Yemen's sympathies were clearly with Ali Nasir. On January 16, as the rebels began to turn the tide, Sanaa announced the arrival of a "loyalist" minister from Aden; and over the next few days, President Salih kept in close contact with various like-minded Arab leaders in a vain attempt to end the rebellion by arranging a cease-fire in Aden. The North Yemenis were then reported to have welcomed the fallen South Yemeni President himself to their capital, arranged to fly him to Ethiopia for urgent talks with that country's ruler, and even allowed Ali Nasir back into the border area between the two Yemens as fighting in the South continued.[79]

As late as January 23, even as the rebels were consolidating their control in Aden, Sanaa's official radio pointedly declared support for "legitimacy" (i.e., Ali Nasir's government) in "the southern part of the homeland."[80] Even after the next day's rump session of South Yemen's ruling bodies formally replaced the fugitive leader, North Yemeni diplomats reportedly continued to object, at least in private, to the "illegitimate" nature of those proceedings.[81] A month later, in one of the few recent official statements on the matter, North Yemen's prime minister still avoided explicit recognition of the new regime in Aden, while taking pains to pledge continued *peaceful* steps toward unification of the two states.[82] The low-level contacts between them reported by other Arab media outlets were at first not publicized by Sanaa;[83] so far, at least, North Yemen has not reciprocated the effusively conciliatory statements coming from the South.[84] Clearly, the North Yemenis are in no rush to embrace the new regime in Aden, concerned as they undoubtedly are about its latent hostility and about the Soviet role in helping bring it to power in the first place.

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[76] For early reports of a possible South Yemeni opening to the West, see, e.g., *The New York Times*, Feb. 1, 1986; Salim Salih Muhammad interview in *Al-Anba'*, Feb. 8, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 10, 1986, pp. C/9–10; *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Feb. 25 and Mar. 12, 1986; and *14 Uktubar*, Apr. 1, 1986. For examples of more recent hostile South Yemeni media treatment, especially of the US, see, e.g., *14 Uktubar*, Apr. 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 14, and 15, 1986; Aden radio, Apr. 8, 1986, trans in *FBIS-MEA*, Apr. 9, 1986, pp. C/4–5; Aden radio, Apr. 15, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Apr. 15, 1986, pp. C/2–3; Aden radio, Apr. 16, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Apr. 16, 1986, pp. C/4–5; Apr. 17, 1986, pp. C/2–3, and Apr. 18, 1986, p. C/4; Aden radio, Apr. 18, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Apr. 21, 1986, p. C/2; Aden radio, Apr. 22, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Apr. 22, 1986, p. C/2.

[77] See, e.g., the somewhat different tones on this issue adopted by the two leaders in separate Aden radio broadcasts on Jan. 31 and Feb. 3, 1986, both trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 3, 1986, p. C/2; also *The Christian Science Monitor*, Feb. 11, 1986.

[78] Radio Monte Carlo, Jan. 17, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 17, 1986, p. C/4; *Arab Times*, Jan. 26, 1986, in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 28, 1986, p. C/1; *Al-Khalij*, Jan. 27, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, p. C/7; Abu Dhabi radio, Jan. 28, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, p. C/9; and Sanaa radio, Jan. 31 and Feb. 1, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 3, 1986, pp. C/7–8, for reference to an exchange of messages between Salih and Gorbachëv. North Yemeni broadcasts on Jan. 14 and 25 and Feb. 3 also referred to unspecified contacts with Moscow; see *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 15, 1986, p. C/12; Jan. 28, 1986, p. C/10; and Feb. 4, 1986, pp. C/6–7.

[79] See, e.g., *Al-Khalij*, Jan. 20, 21, 25, 26, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 21, 1986, p. C/2; Jan. 22, 1986, p. C/1; Jan. 27, 1986, pp. C/8–9, 13. For an early report on North Yemeni–PLO attempts to arrange a cease-fire in Aden, see *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat*, Jan. 19, 1986.

But neither has the North tried to intervene directly in the South's unsettled affairs. The absence of sufficient support (either inside or outside South Yemen) for such a risky initiative helps explain this caution; but it also owes much to Sanaa's sensitivity about Soviet concerns. Probably the most that Sanaa will attempt—except in the unlikely event that Moscow voices strong objections—is quiet encouragement for Aden to rehabilitate some of Ali Nasir's supporters and maintain his relatively moderate foreign policy line.[85]

As for bilateral Soviet–North Yemeni ties, they were strained by these events. Routine economic and cultural exchanges and agreements have continued, but for a while, to cite one symbolic expression of such strains, these contacts were featured more prominently in Soviet than in North Yemeni media.[86] By mid-March, however, the North Yemeni president publicly voiced "great satisfaction" with "a message from the Soviet leadership."[87] Indeed, this crisis is hardly likely to produce a drastic realignment of North Yemen's carefully balanced foreign policy. Whatever bitterness North Yemenis may harbor about the outcome, they cannot now afford to alienate the Soviet Union too much—precisely because they must look to it to help restrain the newly unstable South. Thus the Soviets have once again managed to straddle this obscure but explosive regional conflict with only minor damage to their interests on both sides, at least for now.

South Yemen President Ali Nasir Muhammad, left, with Ethiopian leader Mengistu Haile Mariam in Aden in autumn 1984.

—*Al Thawri* (Aden), Dec. 1, 1984.

Aside from North Yemen, the other regional bystanders to the crisis in South Yemen can be roughly divided into pro-Soviet and pro-Western camps; each exhibited interesting reactions to events in Aden. In the former camp are, first of all, South Yemen's two partners in a 1981 mutual security treaty: Ethiopia and Libya. The avowedly Marxist and reflexively pro-Soviet regime led by Mengistu Haile Mariam in Ethiopia adopted an atypically independent posture toward the conflict in Aden, offering support for Ali Nasir for some time after the Soviets had switched sides. Mengistu's motives are a bit mysterious. He may have harbored some gratitude toward the deposed South Yemeni leader for helping Ethiopia against Somalia, despite some internal opposition, during the 1977–78 Ogaden war; he may have felt some empathy for a friendly fellow leader faced with violent domestic challenges; he may have distrusted some of Ali Nasir's rivals; or he may simply have decided to set a precedent of support for an incumbent ruler. In any case, Mengistu welcomed the fugitive Ali Nasir and his entire political entourage to the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa, a short flight across the Bab Al-Mandab straits from Aden. Mengistu then apparently tried to reconcile the increasingly successful rebels with what was practically a rival government-in-exile (plus a good part of South Yemen's modest navy, which had also defected to Ethiopia). Indeed, the official Ethiopian media kept supporting Ali Nasir for at least a week after his formal removal from office by the new authorities in Aden.[88]

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[80] Sanaa radio, Jan. 16, 18, 20, 23, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 17, 1986, p. C/4, Jan. 21, 1986, pp. C/16–18, and Jan. 24, 1986, p. C/9; Kuwait radio, Jan. 18, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 21, 1986, p. C/4.

[81] Abu Dhabi radio, citing report in *Al-Ittihad*, Jan. 25, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 27, 1986, p. C/5; *Al-Khalij*, Jan. 26, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, p. C/8.

[82] Sanaa radio, Feb. 25, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 26, 1986, p. C/4. See also *Al-Khalij*, Jan. 28, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 29, 1986, p. C/9; Sanaa radio, Feb. 3, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 4, 1986, p. C/7.

[83] See, e.g., *Al-Siyasah*, Feb. 19, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 20, 1986, p. C/4; Aden radio, Mar. 8, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Mar. 10, 1986, p. C/6. In fact, several weeks after the new PDRY regime was in place, a North Yemeni diplomat was still quoted as denying that his government had contacts with anyone but "the legitimate leadership under President Ali Nasir"; Manama radio, Feb. 4, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 5, 1986, p. C/7. See also *Al-Ittihad*, Mar. 17, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Mar. 18, 1986, p. C/2.

[84] See, e.g., *Khaleej Times*, Jan. 30, 1986, in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 31, 1986, pp. C/5–6; Al-Attas press conference reported by Aden radio, Jan. 31, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 3, 1986, p. C/1; *Al-Watan* (Kuwait), Feb. 23, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 25, 1986, pp. C/1–2; Al-Dali interview in *Al-Khalij*, Mar. 13, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Mar. 14, 1986, p. C/4; *14 Uktubar*, Apr. 2 and 4, 1986.

[85] See, e.g., *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Feb. 8, 1966.

[86] Compare, for example, the Soviet and North Yemeni accounts of a trade delegation to Moscow on Jan. 28, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 29, 1986, pp. H/1–2.

[87] Sanaa radio, Mar. 15, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Mar. 18, 1986, p. H/1. For background on Soviet relations with North Yemen, see Mark N. Katz, "Sanaa and the Soviets," *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1984, pp. 21–34.

The effect of all this, not surprisingly, was to create serious frictions in Ethiopia's relations with both the Soviet Union and South Yemen. In early February, Mengistu reportedly personally stood up to Soviet demands for Ali Nasir's "extradition" to Moscow; a month later, when Ethiopia's leader met his new South Yemeni counterparts at the party congress in the Soviet capital, a heated argument reportedly developed.[89]

Nevertheless, even if Ali Nasir retains political asylum in Addis, Mengistu will probably have little choice but to accept the new fait accompli in Aden. By mid-February, South Yemen publicized the arrival of Ethiopian "humanitarian" assistance. By mid-March, official PDRY spokesmen, who had earlier tended to deny or dismiss rumors of bilateral differences, more confidently allowed that even though Ethiopia's government had "once sympathized with the former chairman," its relations with Aden had already "begun to improve"—a fairly believable indication, precisely because of its modesty, that indeed they had.[90] More recently, an official representative of the new regime was publicly received in the Ethiopian capital.[91] And as for Ethiopia's relations with Moscow, there is no sign that this intense but ephemeral and narrowly focused disagreement has had a major adverse effect, nor is there any reason to anticipate that it will.

Libya, the third member of the 1981 tripartite alliance, was further removed ideologically and geographically from South Yemen, and less directly drawn into the recent crisis there. But Libyan leader Mu'ammar Al-Qadhdhafi, like Ethiopia's Mengistu, kept demonstratively in contact with the exiled Ali Nasir and his envoys, and initially offered him at least moral support. Qadhdhafi also offered, in a typically grandiose and futile gesture, to support a Palestinian proposal to mediate between the two warring South Yemeni factions. By late March, however, Tripoli radio publicized a visit by the foreign minister of the new Adeni regime.[92] In fact, as compared with Ethiopia's involvement, Libya's interest in or leverage over events in Aden has not been as great—especially in the wake of Qadhdhafi's clashes with US forces in March and April. Consequently, the effect of South Yemen's crisis on Libya's links with the Soviet Union has probably been even more marginal than in Ethiopia's case.[93]

Of the handful of other pro-Soviet Arab regimes, Syria merits brief mention here for its especially equivocal reaction to the turmoil in Aden. Syria, while not in South Yemen's tripartite Mideast radical alliance, was a fellow founding member of the "rejectionist" Steadfastness Front formed nearly a decade ago in response to Egyptian President Sadat's "capitulationist" policy toward Israel; and Damascus was another early destination of the itinerant Ali Nasir. But Syrian President Hafez Al-Assad chose to receive envoys from both sides in South Yemen, avoiding a premature commitment to either. The government-controlled Syrian press even publicized messages from loyalist and rebel leaders on the same day, referring to Ali Nasir as the "president" and to Al-Attas as the "president-designate" of the PDRY.[94] Other Syrian statements mainly repeated Soviet warnings against outside interference in Aden.[95]

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[88] Addis Ababa radio, Jan. 21, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 22, 1986, p. C/1; *The Ethiopian Herald* (Addis Ababa), Jan. 22, 1986; Addis Ababa radio, citing the local paper *Serto Ader*, Jan. 30, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 31, 1986, p. R/1, Paris AFP radio, Feb. 1, 1986, and *Al-Ittihad*, Feb. 2, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 3, 1986, p. R/1.

[89] *Al-Anba'*, Mar. 6, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Mar. 10, 1986, pp. C/3–4; *Al-Jumhuriyah* (Cairo), Feb. 4, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 7, 1985, p. R/1

[90] Aden radio, Feb. 7, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 10, 1986, p. C/12; *Al-Ittihad*, Mar. 11, 1986, citing statement by PDRY official Ali Ahmad Al-Sallami, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Mar. 12, 1986, p. C/2.

[91] See the various reports trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, May 5, 1967, pp. C/6–7; and the YSP Central Committee communiqué of May 29, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, May 30, 1986, pp. C/1–3, esp. p. C/2.

[92] Tripoli radio, Mar. 30, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Mar. 31, 1986, p. Q/11. For earlier statements by the new South Yemeni regime about relations with Libya, see Aden radio, Feb. 15, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 18, 1986, p. C/3; and interview with Al-Dali in *Al-Bayan* (Dubai), Mar. 14, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Mar. 17, 1986, p. C/7.

[93] For an analysis of Soviet ties with Libya, which have not been as pervasive as those with South Yemen, see Lisa Anderson, "Qadhdhafi and the Kremlin," *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1985, pp. 29-44.

[94] Abu Dhabi radio, citing *Al-Ittihad*, Jan. 23, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 23, 1986, p. C/5; Damascus radio, Feb. 6, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 7, 1986, p. H/1; *Al-Ba'th* (Damascus), Feb. 7, 1986. See also Abu Dhabi radio, citing *Al-Ittihad*, Jan. 23, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 23, 1986, p. C/5.

[95] Damascus radio, Jan. 18, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 21, 1986, p. H/3; Aden radio, Jan. 28, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 29, 1986, p. H/1.

At the same time, two radical Palestinian factions headquartered in and heavily influenced by Damascus, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), adopted a similarly noncommittal posture. Both enjoyed some respect in Aden, derived from continuing contacts that date back to pre-independence, Arab Nationalist Movement days. These factions went one step further than their Syrian hosts in actively attempting to mediate, both in Aden itself and in Moscow, between the rival South Yemeni camps. But by mid-February, as the new regime in Aden solidified its power with apparent Soviet support, both Syrian and radical Palestinian reportage shifted toward implicit acceptance of the victorious rebellion by omitting any further mention of Ali Nasir—though failing to add their voices to the diatribes against him coming from his former capital.[96] The "mainstream" PLO headed by Yasir Arafat ended up taking essentially the same position.[97]

In so doing, Syrian and Palestinian responses to South Yemen's crisis conformed to the overall pattern of grudging acceptance by radical, pro-Soviet Mideast forces of the forcible ouster of a former friend. And yet, even if their bilateral relations with Moscow are not rapidly or greatly disrupted, and even though this is by no means the first time Moscow has abruptly switched sides in a regional dispute, it must be a little disconcerting for these Mideast radicals to see so loyal and long-standing a leader as Ali Nasir unceremoniously consigned to political oblivion. Any lingering doubts on this score can only have been reinforced by the ouster of Babrak Karmal as Afghan president and party leader in May 1986.

Among the pro-Western Arab countries, by contrast, the greater degree of press freedom produced an interesting diversity of published reportage and commentary on the crisis in the PDRY, including the issue of outside intervention there. Some of this commentary emphasized the internal character of the crisis. Other editorials, though, were evenhandedly critical of both superpowers—whether for their alleged involvement on opposite South Yemeni sides or, on the contrary, for their alleged collusion in avoiding entanglement by consigning whole Arab countries into exclusive spheres of influence.[98] A few commentaries, oddly enough in English-language newspapers, focused their criticism on the United States, if only for its own "provocative" criticism of the Soviet role in South Yemen.[99] And in Oman—which had only very recently established diplomatic relations with Moscow, and which had a large stake in maintaining a tranquil border with South Yemen—the government-supervised media avoided any commentary on the crisis there at all.

But much of the moderate Arab media commentary was quite critical of the latest twist in Soviet policy toward South Yemen, sometimes bitterly so. Claims that Soviet forces had instigated or intervened in the fighting, and comparisons with Afghanistan, led to warnings about the "dangers, difficulties, and obstacles" in store for Arab governments that "opened even a window for the Soviets," or even for radical fellow Arabs. An Egyptian columnist, for example, cited South Yemen as evidence that "countries under Soviet hegemony enter into a cycle of bloody conflict far removed from their peoples' economic development."[100] Similar sentiments were scattered in some newspapers of Jordan, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates. More surprising were the almost equally outspoken objections to Soviet policy in the politically independent papers of Kuwait, whose diplomatic ties to Moscow had been unique (until late 1985) among the Arabian Peninsula monarchies. "Shall we say this is another Hungary or a new Prague?" asked one Kuwaiti columnist; "it is sufficient," he continued, "that we are now saying 'The Hell of Aden' instead of 'The Garden of Eden!'"[101]

These early misgivings about events in Aden were reflected not just in the press coverage but also in the government policies of the nearby pro-Western Arab states. For a couple of weeks, most of them continued to receive Ali Nasir's envoys and to refer to him in public almost as if he still held power.[102] Several more weeks elapsed before any of these states acknowledged hosting any high-level emissaries of the new regime in Aden. By mid-March, however, some two months after the coup, the foreign minister that this new regime had carried over (via Moscow) from the old one was able to make an unexceptional official tour to five out of the six conservative Arab members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—excluding only Oman from his itinerary but, significantly, including Saudi Arabia, the largest, wealthiest, and most anti-communist country of the lot.[103] Since that time, Oman has joined the others in publicizing an official meeting with a representative of the post-coup leadership of its radical neighbor,[104] and South Yemeni delegates have resumed their usual marginal role in the endless pre-summit inter-Arab consultations. Preliminary indications, then, are that all these countries are beginning to drift back toward a "business as usual" policy regarding South Yemen.

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[96] See, e.g., Radio Monte Carlo, Jan. 18, 1986, and Damascus radio, Jan. 20, 1986, both trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 21, 1986, p. A/1; and statement by the "Pan-Arab Command of the Arab Revolutionary Forces" broadcast by Tripoli radio, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 5, 1986, p. Q/5.

[97] See, e.g., various radio reports trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 23, 1986, p. A/1; Jan. 24, 1986, pp. A/5–6.

[98] See, e.g., *Al-Jazirah* (Riyadh), Jan. 20, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 27, 1986, pp. C/12–13.

[99] See, e.g., the analysis in *Arab Times*, Jan. 26, 1986, in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 28, 1986, p. C/1; and the editorial in *Khaleej Times*, Jan. 30, 1986, in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 31, 1986, pp. C/5–6.

[100] *Al-Akhbar* (Cairo), Feb. 10, 1986.

[101] *Al-Ray Al-Amm*, Jan. 17 and 29, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 23, 1986, p. C/1 (translation very slightly altered for clarity), and Jan. 31, 1986, p. C/1; *Sawt Al-Sha'b* (Amman), Jan. 20, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 22, 1986, p. F/2; *Al-Quds* (Jerusalem), Jan. 15, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 15, 1986, p. C/3; *Al-Qabas*, Jan. 29, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 30, 1986, pp. C/1–3; ; *Al-Wahdah* (Abu Dhabi), Jan. 29, 1986, as quoted on local radio and trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 29, 1986, pp. C/11–12

[102] See, to take but one example, the reference on Jeddah radio to "President" Ali Nasir, Jan. 25, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 27, p. C/9

The same seems likely to hold true, broadly speaking, for Gulf Arab relations with South Yemen's Soviet patron as well. To be sure, the crisis in Aden may temporarily set back Moscow's concerted campaign to enhance its diplomatic and political presence on the Peninsula.[105] But the Soviets have as usual been both patient and persistent in this effort; and recent history suggests that the adverse effects on outside opinion of their latest intervention will largely wear off before too long, the more so as these Arab states resume their preoccupation with other violent confrontations in the Mediterranean and in the Gulf.

Thus, there could be a somewhat longer lag than previously anticipated before another GCC country follows the fresh example of Oman and the United Arab Emirates in establishing diplomatic relations with Moscow, or before either of those two countries welcomes a large resident Soviet diplomatic presence. Such considerations were most likely taken into account in Moscow, only to be overridden by the imperative of preserving the vastly greater existing Soviet presence in South Yemen. Ironically, of course, it is precisely this presence, up to some indeterminate threshold, that gives nearby countries an added incentive for cultivating correct relations with the USSR. So, unless the new South Yemeni leaders revert to a hostile stance toward their neighbors, or the Soviets themselves become even more actively involved in Aden, the medium-term outlook is for Soviet-GCC relations to get back on a course of incremental improvement.

Prospects and Implications

Despite the gradual return of a "business as usual" atmosphere in South Yemen's domestic and foreign affairs, past experience suggests that the prospects for continued stability are fairly dim. After the 1978 coup, for example, a new regime in Aden had also announced that it would maintain Rubayyi' Ali's "moderate" foreign policy; and the country's conservative neighbors had also tried to preserve that approach by applying economic and diplomatic pressure. And yet, within two years, both a new border war with North Yemen and a new internal political upheaval in Aden had erupted. The conflicts behind such unrest remain unresolved.

In the latest crisis, to be sure, many of the leading South Yemeni extremists have been literally removed from the scene; and their lesser-known replacements, while ruling out the return of Ali Nasir, have vowed not only to continue his "moderate" policy abroad but also to reconcile with his "misguided" adherents at home. These goals will almost certainly enjoy Soviet support, for the sake both of South Yemen's internal stability and of its rapprochement with Ethiopia, North Yemen, and other nearby states, each of which has its own reasons to remember Ali Nasir with something akin to nostalgia.[106] Indeed, published reports claim that representatives from the Soviet Union, Ethiopia, the two Yemens, and a number of other Arab interlocutors (Syria, Libya, Algeria, Lebanese Communists, radical Palestinian factions, and maybe even some Egyptians) are still engaged in exploratory talks aimed at some form of "national reconciliation" in Aden.[107] Under these circumstances, even the eventual return of Ali Nasir cannot be completely discounted.

Nevertheless, some warning signs are already apparent. Even as the new regime proceeds to "normalize" the situation, there have been unconfirmed but generally plausible accounts of continued trouble in and around Aden: shortages; chaotic administration; local disorders; new executions, arrests, and detentions; and perhaps even a few assassination attempts and anti-government demonstrations.[108] All these in-

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[103] Aden radio, Mar. 19, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Mar. 19, 1986, p. C/2; and various radio reports from the Arab capitals on Al-Dali's itinerary, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, daily editions for the period Mar. 13–18, 1986.

[104] See, e.g., Salalah radio, Feb. 3, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 4, 1986, p. C/2.

[105] For an interesting pre-coup Arab view of Soviet "progress" in this regard, see Riyad Najib Al-Rayyis, "Gulf Summit in Wake of Soviet Relations: Policy of Searching for How and How Much," *Al-Mustaqbal*, Nov. 9, 1985, pp. 32–33, trans. in *JPRS-NEA*, Jan. 24, 1986, pp. 5–10.

[106] See, e.g., the recent interview with Soviet foreign ministry spokesman Vladimir Lomeyko in *Al-Safir* (Beirut), May 15, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, May 20, 1986, pp. H/1–5, esp. p. H/5.

[107] *Al-Watan*, May 8, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, May 12, 1986, p. C/3; *Al-Ittihad*, May 14 and 26, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, May 16, 1986, pp. C/1–2, and May 28, 1986, p. C/2.

[108] A month after he took over, Al-Attas noted that "we have released a number of detainess and we are still detaining others"; see his interview in *Al-Siyasah*, Feb. 22, 1986, loc. cit. In a similar vein, Minister of Interior Salih Munassar Al-Siyayli stressed that, in view of continuing "rumors" of

(cont. p. 69)

gredients, combined with the country's byzantine rivalries and the widespread suspicion that some influential figures may still be hiding out, are a recipe for more unrest, even if not on as large a scale as in January.

As in the past, the Soviet Union can be expected to help the new regime cope with its troubles, and probably to intervene more directly if they threaten to become unmanageable. Still, there are already a few hints of latent tensions in this intimate but unstable relationship. For one thing, as noted above, the extent of South Yemeni "national reconciliation" remains a touchy issue, with Moscow (as usual in such cases) reportedly pressing for a faster and more comprehensive rapprochement between rival factions, including the followers if not the leader of Ali Nasir's camp. For another thing, recent South Yemeni statements suggest some renewed dissatisfaction with the extent of Soviet economic assistance in rebuilding the country's damaged economy as well. Numerous delegations of experts have come and gone, and a little Soviet-bloc aid has apparently actually arrived. More has been promised, including—ironically enough, for a country that boasts its own underused refinery and some undeveloped oil reserves—50,000 tons of petroleum products this year.[109] Even so, in late March, Aden radio broadcast an appeal for Moscow to "expand" and "implement" its promised aid programs; and as late as mid-April, Al-Bayd himself expressed the hope that the Soviets "will resume" economic aid to Aden.

Still another unsettled issue involves the Soviet military role in South Yemen. Precious little information has yet been published about the fate of all the Soviet facilities, advisers, and arms deliveries since the January crisis; in fact, in all the reports of close consultations between South Yemen and the Soviet bloc during this period, only a very few military delegations (including one to Aden, one to Moscow, and another to Eastern Europe) have been mentioned.[110] But it seems likely that much of South Yemen's arsenal was depleted or destroyed during the January battles; that not all of the evacuated Soviet advisers have returned; and that, even as Moscow retains its key military facilities and pervasive armed presence in the country, the precise nature of this bilateral security connection in the new, post-coup conditions has not yet been fully defined.[111] Meanwhile, of course, recent events argue that the Soviets, for all their massive presence in South Yemen, may not always be able to anticipate or fully control events there.

The last point offers an insight, important if not terribly original, into some of the broader problems of Soviet policy in the Third World. In South Yemen as elsewhere, the Soviets have underestimated—at considerable cost—the enduring force of factional, tribal, or indeed of national loyalties underlying an imported ideological veneer. Certainly, Soviet encouragement of Isma'il's return to Aden was a blunder, one that backfired when the violent internal power struggle erupted around him less than one year later. And Moscow compounded the error by its false reading of the situation in South Yemen once that power struggle got under way. As one Soviet spokesman admitted, in a rare burst of candor,

> *if you fastidiously reproach me for this or that wrong assessment in this situation of crisis, which was completely unfathomable for several days—oh, well, we all make mistakes!*[112]

Some Western analysts have gone much further. They argue that last January's events in Aden were the first real foreign policy crisis of an untested Gorbachëv administration, and exposed critical flaws both in the new crisis-management team and in overall Soviet policy toward the Middle East or even the entire Third World.[113] A more balanced view is that, while the Soviets can be faulted for failing to prevent the explosion, they can also be credited with managing a rapid and decisive rebound—albeit at some political price in the region, and with much the same truculent secrecy that characterized their response to the Chernobyl nuclear disaster a few months later. It is well to recall that Soviet intervention in the South Yemen crisis, sloppy and belated as it was, enabled Moscow to emerge quickly with its interests in Aden more or less

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opposition, every "violation of security should be responded to by force"; Aden radio, Feb. 17, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 18, 1986, pp. C/4–5. For outside reports of arrests, executions, demonstrations, and other disorders during this period, see, e.g., *Al-Anba'*, Feb. 9, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 12, 1986, p. C/4; *Al-Ittihad Al-Usbu'i*, Feb. 13, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 18, 1986, p. C/5; *Al-Ray Al-Amm*, Mar. 6 and 10, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Mar. 7, 1986, p. C/3, and Mar. 10, 1986, pp. C/5–6; Cairo radio, citing *Al-Nahar*, Mar. 22, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Mar. 24, 1986, p. C/4; and *Al-Ittihad*, Mar. 17, 1986, citing visiting PDRY foreign minister Al-Dali's denial of "reports" about an attempt to assassinate Al-Attas, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Mar. 18, 1986, p. C/3.

[109] Aden radio, May 22, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, May 23, 1986, p. C/2.

[110] Aden radio, Feb. 24, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 25, 1986, p. H/4; Aden radio, Mar. 8, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Mar. 10, 1986, pp. C/4–5.

[111] For early and unsubstantiated reports about these issues, see, e.g., *The Times* (London), Feb. 10, 1986; and Manama radio, Feb. 13, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 13, 1986, p. C/6.

[112] Interview with Nikolay Portugalov, described as a "Soviet foreign policy expert" and "staff member of the CPSU Central Committee," on Vienna radio, Feb. 27, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Mar. 5, 1986, pp. CC/1–3.

[113] See, e.g., the news analyses in *The Washington Post*, Jan. 22, 1986; and *The Christian Science Monitor*, Feb. 18, 19, 20, 1986. Compare the remarkably judicious analysis in *Ukaz* (Jeddah), Jan. 27, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 6, 1986, pp. C/9–10.

intact, and its relations with neighboring countries only slightly strained.

In this respect, a capsule comparison with some other Third World clients of the Soviet Union is instructive, even if it cannot by its nature capture the special nuances of each case. In Grenada and in Afghanistan, where two other pro-Soviet Marxist regimes were riven by violent factional rivalries, Moscow has fared far worse: in the former instance primarily because of forceful external intervention; in the latter, primarily because of forceful internal resistance. Neither factor has been present in South Yemen. "We all remember Grenada," mused Nayyif Hawatmeh, the pro-Soviet Palestinian leader, at the height of the fighting in Aden that he and other like-minded mediators were attempting to stifle. "Grenada," he continued, "should not repeat itself in the PDRY!"[114]

A glance a bit further back, of course, reveals that a number of self-professed socialist or even Marxist-Leninist regimes have managed to break with Moscow without direct outside help: Egypt, Somalia, Yugoslavia, China, and Albania, to name a few. In none of those cases, though, was the entire military, economic, and political order (and particularly the ruling party apparatus) as closely tied to, dependent upon, and to some extent at least genuinely enamored of the Soviet Union as is the case in South Yemen.[115]

Some South Yemeni leaders, like some of those in other Third World Soviet clients, may resent certain features of their patron's policy: too many intrusive advisers, not enough economic aid. But they seek the uncertain rewards of a closer Western connection only at their own peril; there may be a more "reliable" replacement waiting in the wings. If they then try to reassure Moscow of their fidelity, it may be—as both Rubayyi' Ali and more recently Ali Nasir himself discovered to their dismay—too little and too late. And even if a leader is merely spectacularly ineffective, as in Afghanistan, the Soviets have demonstrated their ability to depose one figure and impose another: either violently (as with Hafizullah Amin in December 1979), or quietly (as with Amin's own Soviet-selected replacement, Babrak Karmal, in May 1986), as the case may be.

Thus the case of South Yemen illustrates both the limits and, especially, the extent of Moscow's influence among its Third World clients. It may be, as one analyst has written, that the Soviets have not been able either "to ensure that their favorite stays in power" in Aden, or even to preserve an "illusion of complete agreement" on every military or diplomatic issue.[116] Nor have they been able, as the latest crisis demonstrates, to prevent a destructive outbreak of factional infighting among their own friends. But in Aden—as in other areas where Moscow's vested interests are extensive, where its capabilities for intervention are already in place, and where the risks of large-scale counterintervention are correspondingly low—the Soviets have been and will likely remain able to maintain the allegiance of their troubled (and often troublesome) allies.

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[114] Interview in *Al-Khalij*, Jan. 22, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Jan. 23, 1986, p. C/3–4. See also the interview with Helmut Sonnenfeldt in *Le Point* (Paris), Jan. 27, 1986.

[115] A similar argument can be found in Cigar, "South Yemen and the USSR," pp. 793–94.

[116] Page, op. cit., p. 210. Significantly, however, Page concludes that "since 1967 the USSR has moved from . . . an extremely weak position in southern Arabia to being the strongest outside power" there—in part because of the leverage supplied by South Yemen (p. 212).

Note

Watching China's Military: A Personal View

Harlan W. Jencks

SINCE THE "opening" of relations between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the United States in 1971-72, the volume of material written about Chinese military affairs has expanded exponentially.[1] Unfortunately, much of this outpouring has been of poor quality, and error and misconception have been especially evident in the writings about the use of the "China card" in superpower relations. Over-enthusiastic speculation about possible arms sales to China, moreover, persists despite the remarkably small scale of actual sales.[2] The purpose of this essay, therefore, is to examine the current state of Chinese military studies in the West and to assess its evolution in recent years, noting in particular accessibility of sources and issues of interest. What follows is an overview, admittedly impressionistic and personal, of the work and views of those whom I consider to be serious and reasonably qualified. These include scholars, intelligence professionals, and journalists who specialize in China and publish on PRC military affairs. For purposes of brevity, I shall refer to this loosely defined community as China military watchers.

I use the term "community" advisedly. It has been said that those who study the Soviet Union always agree, and all hate each other, whereas those who study China always disagree, and are all friends. China military watchers are, indeed, friends. Moreover, there are few enough of us so that a quorum can gather around a moderately large conference table—and does fairly frequently. The observations that follow are based partly on my participation recently in three such conferences—one in Garmisch, West Germany, in May 1983; one in Washington, DC, in October 1984;

Harlan W. Jencks is Adjunct Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School (Monterey, CA) and Research Associate at the Center for Chinese Studies, University of California, Berkeley. He has published numerous articles on Chinese foreign policy and military affairs and is the author of From Muskets to Missiles: Politics and Professionalism in the Chinese Army, 1945-1981 *(1982). The author is grateful to Harvey Nelsen, Parris Chang, William Tow, James Townsend, Tim Wright, Gerald Segal, John Frankenstein, and Paul Godwin for comments on an earlier draft. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official positions of the US Navy or of the United States Government.*

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[1] See, e.g., US Defense Intelligence Agency, *A Selective Annotated Bibliography on the Chinese People's Liberation Army*, No. DDB-2600-4737-85, 3 Vols., Washington, DC, DIA, 1985. Cf. Edward J.M. Rhodes, *The Chinese Red Army, 1927–1963: An Annotated Bibliography*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1964.

[2] Actual weapons transfers from the West have included an artillery shell plant from the United States (1985); probable purchase of naval gun-mounts from Italy (perhaps in 1985); and tank technology from Israel (possibly in 1982). (For a brief discussion of the probability of Israeli arms sales to China, see Yitzak Shichor, "The Middle East," in Gerald Segal and William T. Tow, Eds., *Chinese Defence Policy*, London, Macmillan, 1984, p. 272.) French and British avionics packages for the F-7 fighter have been purchased, and a similar package may soon come from the United States for the F-8. A contract with a British consortium to upgrade Chinese destroyers was signed in December 1982, and then canceled. The two biggest "dual-use" purchases were in 1975 for a British Rolls-Royce jet engine plant (the project was abandoned some time in 1979), and in 1984 for 24 US Sikorsky S-7OC helicopters (most are now reportedly grounded for lack of the maintenance package the Chinese refused to buy). Despite all the rumors and negotiations, no warplanes, armored vehicles, or anti-tank/air defense missiles have been sold to China by any Western country, with the possible exception of a few sample end-items. Some observers suspect that there are perhaps a hundred French, Italian, Israeli, and/or British technical advisers in the Chinese arms industry. For a discussion of arms sales to China, see William T. Tow, "Arms Sales to China," in ibid., pp. 149–63.

and the third at the International Studies Association Conference in Anaheim, California, in March 1986.

There is also a large body of staff personnel who labor in obscurity within the policy, intelligence, and military bureaucracies of various governments but who have considerable input to government publications. As Moltke the Elder observed, however, "staff officers have no names," so they remain unknown to the "outside" world. Their personal contacts with the China military watchers of published scholarship are sporadic, although many of the latter have emerged from within their ranks. Their contacts with each other are also remarkably limited.[3]

Today, it is no longer true that China military watchers always disagree. There seems to be substantial agreement on quite a number of major issues, although of course China military watchers debate details endlessly. Indeed, the consensus is so broad that it has prompted some of us to wonder if we are not engaged in an incestuous exercise of reenforcing each other's errors. This is especially troubling, for China military watchers are as diverse a group as ever gathered around a conference table.

Our concern about too much consensus stems, at least in part, from the sobering experience of February 17, 1979. Virtually all of us, unless we were privy to current classified information, were quite surprised by the Chinese invasion of Vietnam. We all agreed that China lacked the military capability to defeat the Vietnamese without unacceptable losses. We all also noted that if the Chinese tried it anyway, they would run the grave risk of precipitating Soviet intervention. As it turns out, we quite correctly enumerated all the excellent military, economic, and political reasons the Chinese had for not attacking Vietnam. In fact, Chinese leaders now admit that they did not do well militarily, that the danger of Soviet intervention was very real, and that the war was economically costly.[4] Yet, the fact remains that China *did* invade Vietnam. The chastening conclusion was that even when well-informed observers correctly grasp all the objective military and other factors, Chinese decision-makers need not necessarily draw the same "logical" conclusions. Today's widespread consensus is therefore as much troubling as it is reassuring.

John Frankenstein quite correctly points out that most openly published "China military watching" is not military analysis at all. "Most of our work is really a subset of political analysis, not defense analysis."[5] By training, most China military watchers are political scientists or historians, though perhaps half of us have personal military experience. Since our (limited) sources are the same and our training is similar, it is little wonder that there is much consensus. Unfortunately, "defense studies" is also a poorly defined field distinguished by its emphasis on economics, operations analysis, conflict modeling, and so forth. Naturally, studies of this nature require the kind of quantitative data we just do not have on the PRC defense establishment.

Sources

China military watchers have benefited relatively less than other China scholars have from the "opening" of the PRC. Firsthand observation of China's military system is still at the stage of occasional guided tours, conducted for delegations of foreigners who are not, for the most part, China scholars. However, over the past several years, a few official US delegations have been given fairly close looks at selected parts of the PRC military establishment. Unfortunately, the Chinese usually insist upon confidentiality from foreign military delegations. Thus, little has been published, for example, about the findings and experiences of US military delegations concerned with military training and with fighter avionics.

In 1985, however, the Chinese permitted unprecedented access to and open publication of articles about certain military-industrial sectors for which they particularly desired foreign technology and investment. Two notable examples were a Rand Corporation team's evaluation of the electronics and metallurgical industries,[6] and an aerospace technology team composed of US experts from government and industry.[7]

While the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has sent numerous delegations to the West, including at least a dozen to the United States, Westerners have learned little from them. When Chinese professional soldiers visit abroad, the flow of information is maddeningly unidirectional. PLA delegations have intensively studied everything from the National Training Center at Fort Irwin to the National War College in Washington, DC, but they have been extremely reticent to reveal anything about their own training or operations.

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[3] Two gatherings of these self-described "technical elves" were convened in Washington, DC, in March 1985 and May 1986 to try to establish contacts across bureaucratic lines. It is telling that the meetings were organized by a military officer who has made his mark in open publications. See Richard J. Latham, "Summary of Discussions at the Conference on PRC National Security Affairs: An Assessment of Analytical Trends," unpublished circular letter, March 21, 1985.

[4] See Harlan W. Jencks, "Lessons of a 'Lesson': China-Vietnam, 1979," in Robert E. Harkavy and Stephanie G. Neuman, Eds., *The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World*, Lexington, MA, D.C. Heath, 1985.

[5] Private correspondence from John Frankenstein, Apr. 6, 1986.

[6] Jonathan D. Pollack, *The Chinese Electronics Industry in Transition*, N-2306, Santa Monica, CA, Rand Corporation, 1985; and K.C. Yeh, *Industrial Innovation in China with Special Reference to the Metallurgical Industry*, N-2307, Santa Monica, CA, Rand Corporation, 1985.

[7] See the series in July 1985 by Craig Covault in *Aviation Week and Space Technology* (New York), Jul. 8, p. 16; Jul. 15, p. 61; Jul. 22, p. 69; and Jul. 29, p. 55.

So, despite occasional tantalizing peeks, the best places to study PRC military affairs remain Hong Kong, Tokyo, and the major China studies centers in the West. In short, China military watchers are only barely better off than other Western social scientists and historians were 10 years ago. We catch glimpses from train windows, watch military parades from afar, and occasionally interview a PLA leader, but the day-to-day business of Chinese national defense is still closed to us. For the most part, we continue to rely heavily on the "China-watching" research methods of the 1950's and 1960's. To be sure, China military watchers understand that the Chinese have good reasons to keep military matters secret, so we do not get indignant when certain subjects and geographic areas are declared "off limits." That is just the nature of our endeavor.

Partially off-setting this problem is the fact that a fairly high percentage of China military watchers have access to the classified information produced by their respective governments. But this is not nearly as great an advantage as one might suppose, particularly with respect to the analysis of long-range trends and the interplay of military considerations with economic, political, and social factors. It is worth noting that while not every China military watcher reads classified information, intelligence agencies and other governmental bureaucracies are voracious readers of our unclassified publications, and frequently commission our unclassified research.

A few new sources of information have appeared in the post-Mao era, and this has made "China military watching" a good deal more productive. Opportunities to study Chinese military technology are periodically afforded by military industrial exhibitions, both in China and abroad. Beginning with the AUSDES exhibition in Australia in May 1984, China's defense industries have been exhibiting their wares on the world arms market. PRC arms sales have expanded rapidly since 1982, and Chinese weapons are now in widespread use, especially in Africa and the Middle East.[8] PRC arms marketing has necessitated disclosure of technical characteristics on much of the equipment in current PLA service, and once sold abroad, Chinese weapons are often subject to detailed scrutiny.

The Chinese have also hosted several exhibitions, most notably the naval electronics exhibition (NATSEDES-83) in Shanghai in July 1983. Another, the Asian Defence Technology Exhibition (ASIADEC-86), is set for November 1986.[9] NATSEDES-83 pointed up the interesting relationship between the PLA (probably the General Staff Department) and the Hong Kong magazine *Xiandai Junshi* (Contemporary Military Affairs) which advertised itself as co-sponsor of the exhibition.[10] Since it began publication in late 1976, *Xiandai Junshi*'s highly "patriotic" coverage has generally followed the Chinese Communist Party line. Its PRC sources are excellent, and it is clearly a conduit to the outside world of what the PLA high command wishes outsiders to know (and think) about Chinese defense issues.[11]

Within China, several magazines are now published to stimulate popular interest in modern military affairs and technology. Examples include *Bingqi Zhishi* (Ordnance Knowledge) and *Hangkong Zhishi* (Aviation Knowledge).[12] These publications mostly are written about abstract categories of weapons (nuclear warheads, cruise missiles, "stealth" aircraft, and so forth) and almost always use foreign weapons systems as examples. From such magazines, though, it is possible to glean insights into Chinese strengths, weaknesses, and interests. It is also worth noting that these magazines are enormously popular in China, and most issues sell out quickly. They are available on newstands in China, and are freely exported abroad.

Issues

With these considerations in mind, it is useful to examine the major issues that have dominated contemporary Western studies of the Chinese military—namely, modernization, national defense strategy, and civil-military relations.

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[8] On sales of fighter planes to Iraq, Iran, and Egypt, see *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, Apr. 11, 1983, pp. 16–18, and Aug. 15, 1983, pp. 129–34 and 160–61. Chinese export orders in late 1984 reportedly included US$200 million in naval vessels for Egypt and US$2 billion (sic) in tanks and other "assorted hardware" for Iraq. (See Gordon Jacobs, "China's Military and Economic Support," *Asian Defence Journal* [Kuala Lumpur], November 1984, p. 71). The PRC's Northern Industrial Corporation (NORINCO), the export arm of the Ministry of Ordnance Industry, was reportedly China's fifth largest exporter in 1985, with US$1.6 billion in sales—and NORINCO handles neither aircraft nor ships! (*Xiandai Junshi*, May 5, 1985, p. 11).

[9] See announcement in *Jane's Defence Weekly* (London), Jan. 11, 1986, p. 20.

[10] *Xiandai Junshi*, July 1983 and September 1983, cover stories and passim.

[11] *Xiandai Junshi* is published in traditional Chinese characters, as opposed to the simplified characters used in the PRC, and contains some material (especially advertising) in English. Most issues contain reports on PRC weapons, which are invariably hailed as modern and effective, even when they are copies of 30-year-old Soviet types. The magazine plays up the PLA's foreign contacts, evidently to increase competition for PLA business. It also gives highly favorable coverage to PRC political-military initiatives (the 1979 invasion of Vietnam, "peaceful reunification" with Taiwan, and so forth).

[12] *Bingqi Zhishi* is a bi-monthly and *Hangkong Zhishi* is a monthly. Both are published in Beijing.

Modernization. This is currently the most "written-about" subject in Chinese military studies. For decades, China military watchers have been trying to tell the world about the PLA's relative backwardness. Recently, we have emphasized that weapons and equipment are only part of the problem. Frank Romance, Georges Tan Eng Bok, and others have pointed out the need for modernization of strategic and tactical doctrine.[13] Harvey Nelsen and Paul Godwin, inter alia, have written on the importance of reorganization.[14] Godwin, William Heaton, and I have emphasized the importance of modern training and professional education.[15] Virtually all China military watchers have noted the vital importance of personnel modernization: the recruitment and promotion of young educated cadres, and the retirement of old peasant guerrilla fighters.

The consensus view on modernization has been well summarized by John J. Sloan in congressional testimony, and by Tom Robinson. Sloan listed six major categories of required Chinese military improvements: (1) weapons; (2) training/education/readiness; (3) doctrine and tactics; (4) defense technology and industry; (5) logistics; and (6) organization/command and control. He stated that weapons clearly had the lowest priority, largely because the other improvements were prerequisites for the effective absorption and use of advanced weapons. Moreover, the other improvements were relatively less expensive and more likely to benefit the overall economy.[16] After making many of the same points in *China Quarterly* in June 1982, Robinson concluded: "If a prediction may be ventured therefore, it is for relative stability of direction and pace of Chinese military modernization along lines by now clearly evident."[17] In mid-1986, there is no reason to modify Robinson's conclusion.

One particularly important policy aspect of the "modernization" consensus is the virtual unanimity regarding the outlook for arms sales to China. In the same June 1982 issue of *China Quarterly*, Douglas Stuart and William Tow wrote, "It is likely that China and the U.S. will continue to expand their arms trade relationship in the medium term. Actual weapons purchases will probably be infrequent, however, and of limited financial or military importance."[18] They had made the same point in 1981 with respect to Chinese purchases of arms from European countries.[19]

In June 1984, just before Defense Minister Zhang Aiping visited the United States, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense James A. Kelly testified to Congress that "the Chinese face enormous needs with limited funds, and they must be careful shoppers. In most cases, they do not consider procurement of end items to be a viable option; they want the technology with which to manufacture their own weapons."[20] Despite Kelly's statement, backed by the overwhelming unanimity of official and unofficial China military watchers, newspaper headlines on June 15 heralded a new era in US-Chinese military relations: "U.S. and China Agree on Arms Sale" (*Washington Times*); "U.S. Sets First Arms Sale to Peking" (*Washington Post*); "Weinberger Negotiates Arms Deal with China" (*USA Today*); "China, U.S. Near Pact on American Arms Sales" (*Wall Street Journal*). The cause of all this excitement was the *unilateral* announcement by the US Defense Department of an agreement *in principle* that *if* the Chinese should wish to purchase certain types of weapons, and *if* they could come to terms with American defense contractors, the Defense Department is willing *in principle* to *allow* the sales to take place. The myth of the "vast untapped China market" is alive and well, and the Sino-Western arms trade "will probably continue to be characterized by inflated expectations and dashed hopes."[21]

National Defense Strategy. Here, too, there is general consensus on China's defense strategy, currently characterized by Chinese leaders as "people's war under modern conditions."[22] The Chinese clearly do not expect war with any of their neighbors any time soon, especially not with the Soviet Union. China's overall security strategy, notes Jonathan Pollack, "will remain very heavily focused on the political, diplomatic, and psychological elements of statecraft . . . . They will refine many of their present military policies rather than discarding them outright."[23]

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[13] Francis J. Romance, "Modernization of China's Armed Forces," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley), March 1980, pp. 298–310; Jonathan D. Pollack, *China's Military Modernization, Policy, and Strategy*, P-6641, Santa Monica, CA, Rand Corporation, 1980. A brilliant essay on the terminology and epistemology of Chinese military thought is Georges Tan Eng Bok, "Strategic Doctrine," in Segal and Tow, op. cit., pp. 3–17.

[14] Harvey W. Nelsen, *The Chinese Military System*, 2nd. ed., Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1981; and Paul H.B. Godwin, "Toward a New Strategy?" in Segal and Tow, op. cit., pp. 36–49.

[15] William R. Heaton, "Military Professional Education in China," *China Quarterly* (London), March 1980, pp. 122–28; and Harlan W. Jencks, *From Muskets to Missiles: Politics and Professionalism in the Chinese Army, 1945–1981*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1982, pp. 151ff.

[16] John J. Sloan in *The Implications of US-China Military Cooperation*, a workshop sponsored by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, January 1982, pp. 26–36. (The year of publication given by the US Government Printing Office is 1981).

[17] Thomas W. Robinson, "Chinese Military Modernization in the 1980's," *China Quarterly*, June 1982, p. 252.

[18] Douglas Stuart and William Tow, "Chinese Military Modernization," ibid., p. 269.

[19] Stuart and Tow, "China's Military Turns to the West," *International Affairs* (London), Spring 1981, pp. 286–300.

[20] Quoted in "China's Defense Chief Here To Discuss Sales," *The Washington Post*, June 12, 1984.

[21] Douglas Stuart and William Tow, "China's Military Turns to the West" (preliminary draft, December 1980), p. 8. (See fn. 19 for published article.)

Two recent versions of the consensus view are my own *China Quarterly* article of June 1984, and Gerald Segal's Institute of Conflict Studies monograph of late 1983.[24] Both drew heavily on earlier work by Paul Godwin and Jack Harris.[25]

An interesting point of disagreement within the larger consensus is whether "people's war under modern conditions" is, in fact, really "new," or whether it is merely a modification of the people's war doctrine first worked out by Mao Zedong during the Yan'an period (1937–45). A slight majority, myself included, hold the latter view, which is of course the official PRC position as well.[26] Others, most notably Segal, identify two elements of "people's war under modern conditions" that are so new as to make the doctrine qualitatively different from Mao's: the nuclear and maritime elements.

China's nuclear strategy has long been characterized as "minimal deterrence."[27] Recently, there have been significant new developments in the PRC nuclear program, including new missiles (a submarine-launched ballistic missile and the CSS-4 ICBM) and tactical nuclear warheads, and possibly multiple reentry vehicles. These have prompted questions as to China's capabilities and intentions to conduct counterforce targeting, controlled escalation, and even nuclear warfighting. Gerald Segal, Jonathan Pollack, Robert Wang, and Robert Sutter have made important contributions to the study of PRC nuclear policy and the closely related issue of arms control.[28] Parenthetically, there are indications that the Chinese are beginning to take serious interest in arms control.[29]

The "maritimist" shift in Chinese strategy is much debated. The leading advocate of the existence of this shift is David Muller, whose brilliant *China as a Maritime Power* is unquestionably the best study of the PLA navy.[30] Taking a longer historical view, Bruce Swanson cautions that while "maritimist" views have occasionally gained official favor in China, they invariably are eclipsed—and usually sooner rather than later. He writes:

> *China's naval and maritime successes over the past decade have placed the navy in a strong position at the highest leadership levels, both civil and military. A consensus seems to be taking shape and plans are being devised calling for even bolder maritime policies. Serious problems do exist and . . . China has a poor record at maintaining constant growth or planned modernisation programmes in the naval and maritime spheres.*[31]

Two much-noted reporters on Chinese naval affairs are Gordon Jacobs and Bradley Hahn, both of whom have been widely published in military journals such as *Jane's Defence Weekly*, *International Defence Reporter*, and *Naval Institute Proceedings*. Jacobs's work is good solid journalism. Hahn, however, is much given to speculation, and I believe he gives extremely optimistic "high-side" estimates of Chinese military, industrial, and technical capabilities. Hahn's work has not gone unnoticed in Beijing, and he has had unprecedented access to PLA warships. His work therefore cannot be ignored, though it must be evaluated carefully.

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[22] "People's war under modern conditions" is both the strategy for warfighting and the military component of China's war deterrent. In the event of Soviet attack, the PLA is expected to conduct an "active defense" combining guerrilla, positional, and mobile warfare. Should all mobile and positional forces be overcome, China's ultimate recourse is protracted guerrilla resistance to conquest and occupation. The three fundamentals of "people's war" are its defensive character, mass mobilization, and protraction. These characteristics are compatible with a wide variety of tactics and weapons, including even nuclear weapons. See Jack H. Harris, "Politics of National Security in China," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March-April 1979, pp. 64–66.

[23] Pollack, *China's Military Modernization, Policy, and Strategy*, p. 14.

[24] Segal, *The Soviet 'Threat' at China's Gates*, London, The Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1983; and Jencks, "People's War Under Modern Conditions: Wishful Thinking, National Suicide, or Effective Deterrent?" *China Quarterly*, June 1984, pp. 305–19.

[25] Paul H.B. Godwin, "China's Defense Modernization: Of Tortoise Shells and Tigers' Tails," *Air University Review* (Montgomery, AL), November-December 1981, pp. 2–19; Harris, loc. cit., pp. 64–66.

[26] For the official view, see Fu Zhong, "Mao Zedong's Military Science Is Forever the Chinese People's Treasure," *Hongqi* (Beijing), Aug. 1, 1981, trans. and summarized in *Xinhua*, Aug. 2, 1981; and Li Jijun, "The Characteristics and Historical Position of Mao Zedong's Military Thought," *Hongqi*, Jul. 16, 1982, pp. 11–16, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-CHI*), Aug. 5, 1982, pp. K/15–23.

[27] Jonathan Pollack has produced a distinguished body of work on Chinese nuclear strategy dating from before his widely noted "Chinese Attitudes Toward Nuclear Weapons, 1964–1969," *China Quarterly*, April-June 1972, pp. 244–71, and continuing today.

[28] See, e.g., Segal, "China's Nuclear Posture for the the 1980's," *Survival* (London), January-February 1981, pp. 11–18; Pollack, *Security, Strategy, and the Logic of Chinese Foreign Policy*, Berkeley, University of California, Institute of East Asian Studies, 1981; Wang, "China's Evolving Strategic Doctrine," *Asian Survey*, October 1984, pp. 1040–55; and Sutter, *Chinese Nuclear Weapons and American Interests—Conflicting Policy Choices*, Washington, DC, Congressional Research Service, 1983.

[29] In December 1983, for example, party General Secretary Hu Yaobang and Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro issued a joint statement calling on the United States and the Soviet Union to resume INF limitation talks "in good faith." See Vice Premier Li Peng's speech in *Jingji Ribao* (Beijing), Jan. 24, 1985. A good recent analysis is Gerald Segal, "China and Arms Control," *World Today* (London), August/September 1985, pp. 162–66.

[30] Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1983.

[31] Swanson, "Naval Forces," in Segal and Tow, op. cit., p. 96. Also see Swanson's *Eighth Voyage of the Dragon: A History of China's Quest for Seapower*, Annapolis, MD, Naval Institute Press, 1982.

Civil-Military Relations. On this multi-faceted issue, there not only is disagreement but outright conflict among several schools of thought. The most hotly debated points are civilian control versus PLA praetorianism, and the role of the PLA high command in power politics.

At one extreme stand two correspondents for the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, David Bonavia and Mary Lee. They view the Chinese political process almost exclusively in terms of factional politics and personal cliques.[32] For brevity, I shall refer to this as the "factionalism" school. Proponents of this view emphasize the resistance of some PLA elders, notably Ye Jianying, to "de-Maoization" and the undoubtedly adverse effects upon the army of some of the current economic and social reforms. They maintain that a high percentage of current PLA cadres were appointed during the Cultural Revolution, and presume, therefore, that these cadres are still "Whateverists" who oppose Deng Xiaoping's reforms on principle.[33]

Proponents of the "factionalism" school hold that, after Deng's passing, "the military" is likely to depose party General Secretary Hu Yaobang and Premier Zhao Ziyang, both loyal supporters of Deng, unless Deng succeeds in purging his numerous military opponents first. They see Deng making slow but significant progress in this purge, while encountering persistent and stubborn resistance. Meanwhile, Bonavia, in particular, has been watching for a PLA coup d'etat, and actually once reported one (quite mistakenly).[34] Less extreme spokesmen of this school include Parris Chang of Pennsylvania State University and Jürgen Domes of Saar University (West Germany).[35] China military watchers of this school continue to adhere, at least in part, to the so-called Whitson thesis and therefore make much of field army affiliations. The "Whitson thesis," popularized by William Whitson, actually originated among Nationalist Chinese analysts. Based on the explicit assumption that the Communist Party and army are similar to the Kuomintang Party and army, the thesis contends that both are ruled by a "warlord"-style "balance of power." "Each member of the [Communist] high command, with rare exceptions, has belonged to one of six possible elite systems—the central elite and five field army elites—which continue to compete . . . ."[36] Much of the Hong Kong press (notably *Ming Pao* and *Cheng Ming*) tends to see PRC civil-military relations in this light, as do virtually all China military watchers published in Taiwan.[37]

At the other end of the spectrum of opinion stand Ellis Joffe of the Hebrew University and I,[38] representing what I shall call, for brevity's sake, the "professionalism" school. Joffe's work on the subject spans the past 25 years, and includes his widely noted *Party and Army: Professionalism and Political Control in the Chinese Officer Corps.*[39] His contribution to the Garmisch conference volume sums up this school's view nicely as he describes the strong predilection of the PLA and its leaders for "political quiescence," though he does caution that "if the military made no attempt to overstep the limits of political activity set down for it by the Party [in the 1950's], it did not hesitate to clash with the Party leadership when its professional interests were involved."[40] Joffe notes that China's military leaders are committed to the "principle of civilian supremacy over the military, a commitment born out of their nationalism and buttressed by their indoctrination, training, and experience."

Adding organisational strength to these factors has been the network of controls instituted by the Party in

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[32] See, e.g., Mary Lee, "The Economic Front, *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong—hereafter *FEER*), Feb. 21, 1985, pp. 24–25; David Bonavia, "The Ashes of History," ibid., Feb. 23, 1984, p. 30; and idem, "No Talking in the Ranks," ibid., Dec. 15, 1981, pp. 26–27.

[33] A recent outspoken exposition of this view is Shu-shin Wang's review-essay, "Revamping China's Military," *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1985, pp. 111–17. "Whateverists" refers to those Maoists who cite Mao's sacred authority as justification for their positions: "Whatever policy Chairman Mao has decided upon, we shall resolutely defend; whatever instructions the Chairman has issued, we shall steadfastly obey." Quoted in Parris Chang, "Chinese Politics: Deng's Turbulent Quest," *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1981, p. 3.

[34] When some PRC official mentioned that Deng had "withdrawn to the second line," Bonavia reported that "the situation has all the earmarks of a bloodless coup." See "Deng Takes a Back Seat," *FEER*, Feb. 12, 1982, pp. 12–13.

[35] Chang, op. cit., pp. 1–21. Domes's most recent work is his well-researched and thoughtful *P'eng Te-huai: The Man and the Image*, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1985.

[36] William W. Whitson and Chen-hsia Huang, *Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politics, 1927–71*, New York, Praeger, 1973, pp. 498–517 (the quotation is from p. 499).

[37] See, e.g., Yü Yü-lin, "The Role of the PLA in Mainland China's Power Transition," *Issues and Studies* (Taipei), December 1985, pp. 76–92. The biographical sketches of PLA leaders that frequently appear in *Issues and Studies* generally are accurate and remarkably detailed.

[38] Jencks, *From Muskets to Missiles*; and idem, "China's Civil-Military Relations, 1949–80," in Morris Janowitz, Ed., *Civil-Military Relations: Regional Perspectives*, Beverly Hills, CA, Sage Publications, 1981, pp. 120–59. Also see Alister I. Johnson, "Changing Party-Army Relations in China, 1979–1984," *Asian Survey*, October 1984, pp. 1012–39.

[39] Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1965.

[40] Joffe, "Civil-Military Relations," in Segal and Tow, op. cit., p. 19.

> *the armed forces which, despite its weakness during certain periods, has acted as a powerful check on military officers. A further check has been the innate conservatism of the professional military as well as their discipline.*[41]

In stark contrast to the "factionalism" school, Joffe concludes that "the professional military seem to have little ground for serious disaffection with the Deng leadership."[42]

> *More important, it is unlikely that many professional commanders were among the dissidents, given their long-standing doubts about the applicability of Maoist principles and their concern with material development as the basis for military modernisation. At any rate, no high-ranking officer* associated with the professional military *has publicly spoken out against the leadership's economic or ideological policies. In fact,* these officers *have probably supported Deng and his colleagues, thereby creating a coalition that transcended institutional lines and brought together, as has happened in the past, moderate Party leaders and the professional military* against *their more politically minded military colleagues, who were allied with other Party leaders.*[43]

Here, Joffe touches on one of the knottiest problems in analyzing China's civil-military relations: the institutionally cross-cutting nature of political issues, and of the coalitions that form over them. Closely related are the perennial arguments among China military watchers about which PRC leaders are "military" and which are "civilians." In my view, much of the debate about civil-military relations boils down to debate over who is or is not "military." As I have noted elsewhere, in sharp contrast to the Soviet high command, "the PLA's leaders are not co-opted into the top circles of the . . . Party—they were there from the outset."[44] They have always been political *as well as* military leaders. Ye Jianying, for example, "undoubtedly views himself (and is viewed by others in China) not solely as a representative of the military, but as a national leader whose concerns are not restricted by institutional boundaries."[45] Precisely so: in my view, not everything Ye says should be regarded as "the military view." His political activities as an individual leader must be distinguished from his consistent efforts, over the decades, to keep the PLA as an institution out of politics.

Tellingly, Shu-shin Wang used Ye as a primary example to discredit my position in the course of a blistering attack on my book in a review essay in this journal.[46] Wang, Bonavia, and others in the "factionalism" school refuse to make any distinction between "old warriors" like Ye,[47] and the Chinese officer corps as a whole. Their view seems to be that the officer corps is not a "whole" at all, but a collection of conflicting factions.

Parris Chang is undoubtedly correct in identifying the underlying issue in civil-military relations as the continuing conflict of institutionalized versus personalized politics. He contends that while civil-military relations are in a "different mode" from the Maoist era, strong personalities are still likely to be decisive. Although he certainly does not predict a coup, he believes that the institutionalization of Chinese politics is still so uncertain that we cannot be at all sure what the PLA will do after Deng Xiaoping dies. Chang holds that Joffe and I have far overstated the degree of military professionalization, which is a key component of institutionalized politics.[48]

This brief discussion of the contentious issue of civil-military relations has been far from rigorous, and no doubt "leans to one side," so the reader is encouraged to consult other sources. Lest anyone think that attacks are only conducted by one side of the debate, I must confess to my gleeful participation in subjecting Parris Chang to "mass struggle and criticism" over the same issues at the Washington conference in 1984, when he was a minority of one. Despite it all, I must add, we are still friends.

Influence

Given the consensus China military watchers share on most issues, one would expect us to have significant influence on policy-making. In fact, while it is hard to evaluate, we seem to have little—at least in the United States. As noted above, we have generally been conservative and skeptical about the "China card," the advisability of arms sales, and the extent of the Chinese arms market. Nevertheless, the policy momentum in Washington and London (at least) has reflected an official desire for more and closer military relations and sales. The most that can be said for the influence of China military watchers is that our constant nay-saying *may* have prevented even greater movement in that direction.

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[41] Ibid., p. 20.

[42] Ibid., p. 30.

[43] Ibid., pp. 32–33 (emphasis added).

[44] Jencks, *From Muskets to Missiles*, p. 28. See Jonathan R. Adelman, "The Formative Influence of Civil Wars: Social Roles of the Soviet and Chinese Armies," *Armed Forces and Society* (Chicago), 5, No. 1, 1978, pp. 93–116.

[45] Joffe, "Party and Military in China: Professionalism in Command?" *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1983, p. 56.

[46] Shu-shin Wang, loc. cit., p. 115.

[47] This apt term was coined by Ross H. Munro, in "China Turns to Its Old Warriors," *Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), Mar. 9, 1977, p. 2.

[48] Private discussion with Parris Chang, Jan. 16, 1986.

Kelly's testimony in June 1984 reflected the scholarly and intelligence communities' consensus on the potential of the PRC arms market, for example, but did not really address the *desirability* of arms sales. That more important issue was addressed in the congressional workshop in late 1981 (see note 16), and indicated that while the US arms industry was anxious to sell to China, China military watchers were extremely cautious. Today, however, American policy appears to be based on the *a priori* assumption that arms sales and military cooperation are desirable. The questions being asked of American China military watchers by policy-makers in 1986 concern "how much, what kind, and how"; but not "if." Even the uniformed military seems to have finally caught the fever.[49] High-level "China card" thinking has spawned programs that have acquired lives of their own; with them arise career opportunities for civilian and military officials. The result seems to be that China military watchers within the Defense Department are now jumping on the bandwagon, consciously or unconsciously preferring to be "team players." Policy trends seem to be influencing them, rather than the opposite.

Conclusion

By way of summary, I will paraphrase Harvey Nelsen's summation at the Washington conference: The "bad news" is that we still know rather little about how Chinese military decisions are made. We are still trying to describe structures and functions—just as we were in the 1960's. "Our consensus may be wide, but it isn't very deep."[50] "Better news," said Nelsen, is that we have a pretty good grasp on Chinese military science and technology, and on civil-military relations. At that conference, with Parris Chang as the sole dissenter, there was indeed consensus on civil-military relations. As I have indicated above, however, Nelsen was wrong. There is a minority of China military watchers with strongly conflicting opinions.

The "good news," said Nelsen, is that China military watchers share a consensus on Chinese strategic priorities and long-range policy as well as on short- and long-term modernization policy and resource allocation. "More bad news," however, is that PLA modernization will ultimately be bad for the United States, further complicating that superpower's security interests in Asia and worldwide.

But the most interesting news of all may be that there is very little any one country can do to affect PLA modernization. The Chinese have developed lots of foreign contacts, trade, and resources. They have lots of options.

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[49] The climate of opinion among American military officers is easier to feel than to document, but it has palpably shifted. In the late 1970's, I heard many senior and middle-grade officers express strong reservations about any sort of US-PRC military relationship. One flag-rank officer in a Joint Command headquarters actually referred to the Chinese as "the enemy" in a 1978 conversation. Since then, Defense Secretaries Harold Brown (1980) and Caspar Weinberger (1983), Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General John Vessey (1985), and at least two dozen generals and deputy secretaries have visited the PRC. The US Navy seemed most recalcitrant about the "China card" until Secretary of the Navy John Lehman's 1984 visit. Admiral James Watkins, the Chief of Naval Operations, visited in May 1986, and the Navy currently gives the impression of "leading the charge" on the technology transfer.

[50] Telephone discussion with Harvey Nelsen, July 1985.

PCI Weighs Soviet Foreign Policy

John A. Baker

ADRIANO GUERRA. *Dopo Breznev* (After Brezhnev). Rome, Editori Riuniti, 1983.

ADRIANO GUERRA. *Il giorno che Chruscev parlo* (The Day Khrushchev Spoke). Rome, Editori Riuniti, 1986.

ARMANDO COSSUTTA. *Dissenso e unità* (Dissent and Unity). Milan, Editori Nicola Teti, 1986.

GIAN CARLO PAJETTA. *Le crisi che ho vissutto: Budapest, Prague, Varsavia* (The Crises I Have Experienced: Budapest, Prague, Warsaw). Rome, Editori Riuniti, 1982.

ITALIAN COMMUNISTS analyzing Soviet policy toward Europe face a persisting quandary. For them, as for the founders of their party who thought the Bolshevik revolution would spread across Central Europe toward Italy, seeing communism recede or fail in Eastern Europe is strategically unwelcome. Yet, its maintenance or restoration by violence, as in Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and Poland (1981), is unhelpful in the extreme to the domestic political momentum of the Italian Communist Party (PCI).[1] Indeed, the impact of each successive application of violence since 1956 has caused the party to be torn between the conflicting reactions of a shocked Italian electorate, on the one hand, and an initially vocal (1950's) but later dwindling and aging (1970's and 1980's) pro-Soviet element within its ranks on the other.

One solution to the party's quandary of how to restore its flagging electoral momentum and prevent party fragmentation would be to return openly and completely to the fold of European socialists (descendants of the despised Second International) via the eclectic "Euroleft," a concept now receiving more attention in the PCI press than does "Eurocommunism." In fact, the PCI, which characterizes itself as an "integral part of the European Left," is edging toward such a solution. Ultimately, however, this solution would require a break with the party's historic communist identity. This might produce a disaffection in the left of the party's following, which could be exploited by radical movements and, perhaps, by Soviet-supported factions, as has occurred in Spain.

It would be easier for the PCI, of course, if a more humane, democratic form of communist rule were to arrive in Eastern Europe of the type Alexander Dubček forecast in Czechoslovakia during the Prague Spring of 1968. The desire of Italian Communists for this solution, and the chronic wishful thinking about the "reformability" of the Soviet model of socialism it engenders, place a continuing burden on those within the party foreign affairs elite who know better than to expect such change.

Members of that elite, especially those who have spent time in the Soviet Union, know that significant change in Eastern Europe requires a Soviet leadership capable of contemplating reform and evolution without giving in to anxiety about discipline deemed essential for a competitive Soviet superpower. Without such significant reform, fundamental change in Soviet foreign

John A. Baker, a retired Foreign Service Officer, is Director of Education for the Atlantic Council (Washington, DC). He served in Moscow, Belgrade, Prague, and Rome, and was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs and, later, for Intelligence and Research. He has taught Soviet foreign policy at the National War College and will be teaching the subject at George Washington University this autumn.

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[1] In fact, PCI analysts are now beginning to point out that the source of current problems plaguing the communist movement in Eastern Europe lies in the violence, or threat of violence, employed during the installation of postwar communist regimes in that area, for example, as happened with the emasculation of Stanisław Mikołajczyk's Polish Peasant Party in the 1947 elections in Poland and the Czechoslovak coup in February 1948.

policy is doubtful and easily reversible, should it begin to occur. Yet, CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachëv, despite his able public diplomacy, shows no evidence of tolerating pluralism in Eastern Europe, much less in the USSR. This has reinforced reservations, formed among the PCI foreign affairs elite after the 1968 Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, about the possibility of internal Soviet political reform.

This view is not shared by those few leaders and members of the party nostalgic for a strong link to Moscow and by some of the younger, less historically conscious leaders. The former group, however, failed to move the party leadership at the recent 17th PCI Congress (April 1986) away from its basic position of reserve toward Moscow. The latter group, not wishing to be identified with the pro-Soviet element, withdrew certain anti-American amendments at the Congress after these were endorsed by the pro-Soviet group.

The four books under review here illustrate the diverse viewpoints within the Italian Communist Party that have emerged as a result of the quandary it faces. Two books, Adriano Guerra's *Il giorno che Chruscev parlo* and Armando Cossutta's *Dissenso e unità,* were published this year on the eve of the PCI's 17th Congress in Florence. The other two, Guerra's *Dopo Breznev* and Gian Carlo Pajetta's *Le crisi che ho vissuto* date back to the period of the 16th Congress in Milan (1983) and the preparations for it. Of the three authors, Pajetta has the most readable and spirited style, while Guerra shows the most flair for interesting analysis.

IN HIS TWO BOOKS, Adriano Guerra, director of the party's Center for the Study of International Politics (CESPI), a policy think tank established in 1978 by the late PCI Secretary General Enrico Berlinguer, presents views that are close to Berlinguer's 1980-81 critique of Soviet foreign policy as a "policy of power."[2] Yet, he does not presume to lay down an official party line. In fact, his analysis, which draws on his experiences as a journalist assigned to Poland and the USSR, and on his service as a member of the party's foreign policy elite, differs on some points from and is generally more cautious than the one set forth in the official party documents drafted in 1980-81 under Berlinguer's aegis by Guerra's predecessor at CESPI, Romano Ledda.

Guerra argues in *Dopo Breznev* that in 1975 the Soviet Union saw the United States as liberated militarily and politically by its withdrawal from Vietnam: militarily, because it was freed of its commitments to Vietnam in terms of forces and funds; politically, because its need for détente with the USSR decreased and it could concentrate on pursuing further rapprochement with China (a process that originated during the Vietnam war and accelerated after Mao Zedong's death in September 1976). According to Guerra, the Soviets perceived growing US efforts to accent the human rights issues in the "Third Basket" of the Helsinki Agreement (1975) as an indication of the United States's lessening need for détente. This, he maintains, caused the Soviets to fear that the political momentum they had gained in the early 1970's from strategic parity with the United States, as well as from détente, would be lost. As a result, the Soviets focused their attention on the Third World and on the leadership of the revolutionary currents there by supporting politically sympathetic but hard-pressed liberation movements.

In short, Guerra sees the Soviets' use of arms assistance and proxy forces in the Third World, as well as the eventual commitment of Soviet forces to Afghanistan, as a response to circumstances that the Soviet leaders feared might be exploited by the United States or China to reverse Soviet gains abroad. Some examples of such circumstances were: the threat to the Marxist liberation movement in Angola; the Chinese threat, as perceived by Hanoi, to Vietnam's drive for hegemony in Southeast Asia; the threat to Haile-Mariam Mengistu from Somali-supported insurgents; and the threat to the shaky communist government in Kabul resulting from internecine party struggles and from broad opposition from Islamic fundamentalists. Guerra places less emphasis than had Ledda on Soviet willingness to use force in Africa and Asia as being a function of the American "Vietnam syndrome"—that is, American reluctance to counter force with force in the Third World in defense of a bipolar global balance of power.

Unlike other analysts, who view the deployment of SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles targeted on Western Europe as designed to compensate for Moscow's declining political hold on Eastern Europe, Guerra gives relatively little attention to it. He evidently shares the widely held perception among PCI elites that this deployment was a mindless concession by the Soviet party leadership to the powerful military, which was anxious to preserve its hard-won nuclear parity. Convinced by its intelligence on American missile technology, the military believed that by 1977 the United States was irrevocably set on a course of "modernizing" its intermediate-range missile forces in Western Europe by introducing Pershing II's. (Soviet sources have now admitted to PCI interlocutors that early deployment of SS-20's was a serious error.)[3]

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[2] This term surfaced in mid-1978 when the erstwhile director of CESPI, Romano Ledda, applied it to Soviet policy in the Horn of Africa. Later, Berlinguer used it in discussing Soviet foreign policy leading up to and including the invasion of Afghanistan. Ledda again used the term in the officially adopted report to the PCI Central Committee on October 6, 1981.

Guerra's analysis of the Soviet "policy of power" during the years 1975–78 is kinder to the Soviets—if by nothing else but by its attribution of primarily defensive motives to Soviet foreign policy—than that developed by his predecessors in CESPI. Furthermore, like most PCI analysts, he also sees Soviet use and advocacy of force in Afghanistan in 1980 and in Poland in 1981 as motivated by defensive security concerns. This type of analysis provided the underpinning to the PCI's vigorous opposition to any punitive sanctions against the USSR by the West. The PCI leaders believed that such sanctions threatened the international context of détente that they needed for their domestic strategy of coalition-building.

But Guerra does not spare the Soviets for having found themselves in a situation in which their security and global competitiveness depended on repeated use of Soviet or proxy forces. He links the development of this situation directly to the declining political appeal of the Soviet model of communism. Hence, he fully supports Berlinguer's judgment, made in the wake of the declaration of martial law in Poland, that the Soviet model has "exhausted its propulsive force." In some respects, Guerra's analysis is a more palatable explanation for a party which, since 1956, had clearly differentiated itself from the Soviet model of socialism but which had continued, right down through 1968 and beyond, to identify with the main lines of Soviet foreign policy, avoiding any global critique of it until after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

THE PUBLICATION of Guerra's *Il giorno che Chruscev parlo* (January 1986) appears to have been timed to coincide with the preparations for the congresses of both the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (February 1986) and of the PCI (April 1986). It is worth noting that one of the first reviews of this book, written by Paolo Spriano (the PCI's most respected historian) for Italy's premier noncommunist daily, *Corriere della Sera* of Milan, focused almost exclusively on the book's appendix, which consists of the full text of Khrushchev's secret speech of February 25, 1956. Spriano, who has periodically criticized his party for insufficient effort at educating its members about the nature of Soviet reality, gives predominant attention to the horrors Khrushchev revealed in his speech. He thereby underlines what he identifies to be the main thrust of Guerra's book, that is, the paradox that, less than a year after his exposure of Stalin, Khrushchev had become the "repressor of the Hungarian revolt, the guardian of the empire inherited from the despot he execrated."[4]

The appearance of *Il giorno che Chruscev parlo* just one month prior to the 27th CPSU Congress (billed by some as the most significant since the 20th Congress) and three months before the PCI Congress (also advertised as the most significant one since the 8th Congress in December 1956)[5] can hardly be seen as coincidental. The author's carefully researched account of the events of 1956 carries the message that hopes for change elicited at the 20th Congress by the newly ascendant Khrushchev were considerably reduced in dimension before the year was out. The series of internal and external reactions to Khrushchev's dramatic policy pronouncements and shocking revelations produced events that eventually compelled Khrushchev to resort to armed force in defense of the Soviet position in Central Europe and of his own uncertain position in the struggle for leadership in the Kremlin.

The degree to which Khrushchev's position was uncertain, even at the 20th CPSU Congress where important policy shifts bearing his imprint were announced, is accented by Guerra's treatment of the delicate timing of the secret speech. Developing a clue from Zhores and Roy Medvedev's *Chruscev: Gli anni del potere* (Khrushchev: The Years of Power, Milan, Mondadori, 1977), Guerra argues that the timing actually depended on the precise moment when the "anti-party group,"[6] for whom the relevation of Stalin's crimes and errors was most damaging, was vulnerable. That moment came when the CPSU Presidium (the Politburo) was without a mandate—that is, after its mandate had expired with the conclusion of the 20th Congress and before a new Presidium had been selected by the Central Committee emerging from the Congress. Guerra accepts the hypothesis of Guiseppe Boffa, CESPI's president and a historian on the CPSU, that the narrow window of time available to Khrushchev was the morning of February 25. The Congress had already concluded its formal public sessions, but the delegates had not yet left Moscow and could still be convened hastily and secretly in the Kremlin.

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[3] This information is based on statements by several members of the PCI Central Committee who specialize in Soviet affairs, made to the author in the spring of 1985.

[4] *Corriere della Sera* (Milan), Jan. 12, 1986.

[5] The 8th Congress took place amid substantial turmoil in the PCI and the defection of one-tenth of its two million members, including many of its leading intellectuals. The causes of this internal crisis were precisely the events which followed Khrushchev's speech and which Guerra describes toward the end of his book: Khrushchev's suppression of the Hungarian uprising and the reluctant but clear endorsement of that act by the erstwhile PCI leader, Palmiro Togliatti, as a necessary means of preventing a rollback of communism in East-Central Europe.

[6] The "anti-party group" consisted of those members of the CPSU Presidium led by Vyacheslav Molotov, Lazar' Kaganovich, and Georgiy Malenkov, who would have succeeded in pushing Khrushchev out of his leading position in June of 1957 had he not convened the Central Committee, which confirmed his leadership and branded his rivals as being "anti-party." When all members of this group were finally identified, it became apparent that in June of 1957 Khrushchev was in the minority on the Presidium.

Guerra amply demonstrates that Khrushchev's incomplete hold on power in 1956 led to his utilization of the secret speech as a tool in his struggle for power until briefings on the speech were suddenly halted in the spring of 1956. The speech only exacerbated the Kremlin's leadership struggle, and Khrushchev's use of the anti-Stalin material did not put an end to the struggle. The author's treatment of the sequence of events following the Congress also shows that the publication of the speech by *The New York Times* (June 4, 1956) magnified the effect on Eastern Europe and the French and Italian Communist parties of the 20th Congress's policy shifts toward "non-inevitability of war" and "national roads to socialism."

Guerra's discussion of the dramatic days of the Hungarian uprising in the fall of 1956 is sensitive and characteristically cautious. He is critical of the "wavering" and "inadequate" role played by Imre Nagy, who became prime minister in the wake of the confusion and fear that enveloped the Hungarian party after the highly emotional popular response to the October 23 demands enunciated by members of the Petöfi circle.[7] Guerra is at pains to point out that while the sieges of the radio station and the party newspaper which began on October 23 were "insurrectional" in nature, their purpose was to obtain publicity for the demonstrators' demands. There were no acts of violence, and no persons were hurt until Soviet forces were employed—apparently with the acquiescence (now confirmed by Andras Hegedüs, the Hungarian prime minister who was replaced by Imre Nagy on October 24, 1956) of the frightened Hungarian party leadership.

But Nagy, Guerra observes, was unable to control the events that followed the initial Soviet intervention. "What happened in Budapest between October 24 and the beginning of November" Guerra asserts, "was characterized by the on-the-scene presence of decisively reactionary and rightist forces" (p. 197). Among the "forces" he cites are Cardinal Mindszenty, who refused to recognize the legitimacy of Nagy's government in a radio message of November 3; Radio Free Europe which purportedly opposed the Nagy government; and renegades involved in "white terror and anticommunist pogroms"(p. 196).

Yet, the "reactionary right" did not play the decisive role that official Soviet and Hungarian documents attributed to it, states Guerra. What ultimately counted was the lack of unity among the majority of those "who did not want any type of capitalist restoration" and "wouldn't have permitted it to occur." (Guerra quotes from a December 2, 1983, interview with György Krasso, a leading participant in the events of 1956. The interview appeared in the Hungarian *samizdat*.) Guerra focuses on the workers' councils as a force that Nagy should have co-opted more successfully, but he fails to substantiate his assertion that it was the councils and the revolutionary committees that pushed Nagy to denounce the Warsaw Pact "at the moment at which internal and international factors perhaps worked in favor of a negotiated solution" (p. 195). Guerra thus ignores the argument, currently made by others in the PCI,[8] that Nagy's bid for neutrality on November 1 was a desperate appeal triggered by the information that, despite the agreement of October 30 worked out with Soviet representatives Anastas Mikoyan and Mikhail Suslov, Soviet armed forces were already heading back toward Budapest and reinforcements were crossing Hungary's eastern border.

That Khrushchev had to endorse intervention in Hungary in November 1956 not only to preserve unchallengeable Soviet influence in Eastern Europe but also his own primacy in the CPSU leadership was an obvious lesson for his successors. At the 27th CPSU Congress, Gorbachëv's calls for "radical reform" were followed by a severe lecture by Viktor Chebrikov, the KGB representative on the Politburo, on how dissenters would be dealt with in the future should they dare raise their heads. The lesson is that traditional Bolshevik concepts of rule die hard and that those who attempt to reform them too abruptly may either have to trim their sails or reap the whirlwind. This message was not lost on the PCI, which published a front-page report in the party paper *L'Unità* by its Moscow correspondent on Chebrikov's counterpoint to Gorbachëv's call for "radical reform."

One might conclude that perhaps Guerra chose to write about the historic events of 1956 as a reminder that the appearance of a new Soviet leader advocating change and improvement does not necessarily guarantee meaningful reforms in the near future; nor does it guarantee renewed appeal and efficacy for the Soviet model of socialism that would allow it to survive and prosper without periodic use of repressive force. This message would seem to be consistent with the thrust of Guerra's *Dopo Breznev*, namely, that the militarization of Soviet foreign policy is basically a function of Soviet failure to reform internally and of its vulnerability to liberalizing East European responses to any serious internal reform effort in the USSR.

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[7] The Petöfi Circle consisted of a group of Hungarian intellectuals whose gathering in Budapest at the statue of a Polish statesman was intended to show symbolic support of Gomułka's successful accession to power in Warsaw. The gathering promoted a set of demands for liberalization in Hungary. These demands immediately generated popular support and calls for their publication and broadcasting. This was an unprecedented challenge to the Hungarian party and led it to call for the "assistance" of Soviet armed forces in Budapest.

[8] For example, Fedorigo Argentieri of the Eastern European division of the Gramsci Institute.

Guerra's specific message to thoughtful participants in the deliberations prior to and during the PCI Congress could be summarized as follows: despite frustrations that result from the low priority accorded détente in US foreign policy, there are no solid reasons to alter the PCI's skeptical view of the Soviet model, Gorbachëv's promising words and hopeful intentions notwithstanding. The PCI's identification with the West European Left (whose voting strength outside of Italy now owes little to communist parties), is thus the right one and in fact the only one for a party wishing to count within a Western democratic system.

IDEOLOGY rather than analysis appears to underlie the work of Armando Cossutta, whose most recent book *Dissenso e unità* appeared early in 1986, almost simultaneously with Guerra's *Il giorno che Chruscev parlo*. Cossutta's book is a collection of articles and Central Committee speeches from the 1982-85 period. It constitutes a political effort to call the party back to its anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist ideological roots, from which, Cossutta contends, it has broken away. According to him, Ledda's officially endorsed global critique of the Soviet "policy of power" in October 1981 and Berlinguer's devastating critique of the Soviet model of socialism three months later represented such a "break."

Cossuta's volume continues the theme of his earlier book, *Lo Strappo* (The Break), published in 1982 as part of Cossutta's unsuccessful effort to prevent the PCI's 16th Congress from endorsing Berlinguer's critique. It begins with the five amendments to Berlinguer's thesis that Cossutta presented to the 16th Congress and ends with repeated calls for the next (17th) Congress to revise or abandon the "equidistant" positions adopted by the previous Congress.

Cossutta wants to reposition the PCI unequivocally within the ranks of a world communist movement which, he insists, still exists, despite its inability to convene as such since 1969. He wants to reverse the growing rapprochement with the European noncommunist left in general, and the West German Social Democratic Party (SPD) in particular. He feels that this rapprochement has blurred the party's basic anticapitalist identity and mission.

While the 17th Congress did indeed assume a more explicitly critical posture toward the Reagan administration and its policies, and make favorable references to Soviet disarmament initiatives, it cannot be said to have advanced the objectives outlined by Cossutta in *Dissenso e unità*. Instead of underlining the communist nature of the party, the dominant theme of the Congress was the PCI's identification as an "integral part of the European Left" (an objective to which Gorbachëv now even aspires). The greatest novelty at the Congress was the attendance for the first time of official representatives from several major West European socialist parties. And, according to one observer at the Congress, Joan Urban, author of the authoritative volume *Moscow and the Italian Communist Party* (Cornell University Press, 1986), the focus of attention, despite Cossutta's appeals, was not on the high-ranking Soviet delegate (nor on the Chinese Communist emissary, who refused to remain seated next to him), but on the SPD delegation.

Responding to pressure from within the party, as well as from noncommunists who contrast the PCI's professed belief in pluralism with its continued practice of a modified "democratic centralism" and its rejection of factionalism, the PCI has indeed developed a unique tolerance for dissent. However, as Cossutta was to discover, the degree of this tolerance is not yet so liberal as to accept the type of "dissent" implied in the title of his book. Not only did the party's main publishing house, Editori Riuniti, not publish his book but, to Cossutta's evident annoyance, he was not reelected to the party's 39-man directorate.

GIAN CARLO PAJETTA's *Le crisi che ho vissuto*, which appeared in 1982 before the 16th Congress, presents neither a carefully reasoned historical argument, nor an ideological argument. What the author offers is basically an anecdotal, sometimes sentimental, but frequently colorful series of clearly selective reminiscences[9] of events of the international communist movement in the postwar period. Pajetta, the leading, living political participant in those events, writes about Stalin's death and funeral, at which the PCI delegation demonstrated more emotional grief than did their Soviet hosts; PCI leader Palmiro Togliatti's encouragement in the spring of 1956 of Yugoslav autonomy *within* the movement (unity with diversity); Khrushchev's historic but not fully successful effort at reconciliation with Tito; and the Soviet intervention in 1956 to suppress the Hungarian "counterrevolution" (a word Pajetta claims never to have used for those events) and the PCI's reluctant endorsement of it spurred on by its pro-Soviet membership and even, as Pajetta claims, Tito's fears of Western penetration into Hungary.

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[9] The book contains reminiscences not included in *La lunga marcia dell'internazionalismo* (The Long March of Internationalism–Editori Riuniti, 1978), a volume containing a lengthy interview with Pajetta on which the interviewer, Ottavio Cecchi, imposed a more ordered analysis of events.

Pajetta also recounts the events of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. According to him, August 20, 1968, found the top PCI leadership, Pajetta included, vacationing serenely in the USSR, their anxieties, as well as those of most other Westerners, assuaged by the bilateral Soviet-Czechoslovak meeting on their common border and by its sequel, the Warsaw Pact meeting in Bratislava in early August. Pajetta (who does not acknowledge the reluctance attributed to him to participate in the PCI's initial August 21 critique of the Soviet intervention) remarks that PCI relations with "Soviet comrades" since that time have been dialectical, while those with the Czechoslovak Communist leadership that defended the intervention have been virtually nonexistent. Pajetta also manages to discuss the Solidarity movement and the declaration of martial law in Poland on December 13, 1981, but without once quoting Berlinguer's dramatic judgment that the propulsive force of the Soviet model of socialism was exhausted. He vigorously denies that the critique represented a "break" with party traditions.

Except for the 10-page Epilogue dealing with the PCI's argument with the Soviets over martial law in Poland, Pajetta's book deals exclusively with events prior to the mid-1970's. In essence a personal memoir, written in a spirited, conversational style, it is valuable more as an eyewitness account of events than as historical analysis. It appears to have been assembled shortly after the Berlinguerian critique and the PCI's estrangement from the Soviet Union in 1981 over issues of both foreign policy and the unreformed domestic Soviet model. Despite his role as senior foreign affairs leader, Pajetta is not believed to have been as significant a participant in this process of estrangement as were Romano Ledda, Giorgio Napolitano, and others.

It is not clear whether Pajetta's purpose in writing *Le crisi che ho vissuto* was to underline the PCI's distancing from Moscow by reminiscing about the historical events that led to it, or whether it was to identify himself—but not too specifically—with a critique of the Soviet Communist Party, something which may not have rested comfortably with his years as a committed anti-imperialist closely aligned with Soviet foreign policy. Perhaps it was a combination of the two, since Pajetta has been loyal to both his party and a vision of internationalism that always leaves a door open to the leading "anti-imperialist" power. The ambivalent nature of PCI policy toward the Soviet Union, which Pajetta, as party foreign affairs coordinator, has come to symbolize, has been reduced after the 17th Congress by the replacement of Pajetta by Giorgio Napolitano, leader of the PCI's "right" and prominent actor in the courtship of the European (and American) left of Center, particularly the SPD.

THE FOUR BOOKS reviewed above were written by Italian Communists with different personalities, professional training, orientation, and style. They belong to the generation of Italian communists once active in the wartime resistance and liberation, who are currently dominant in the party leadership. That such varied views coexist at rather high levels of the PCI's decision-making machinery should surprise no one who is familiar with that party or, for that matter, with Italy. That they have emerged within a certain time frame tells us quite a bit about the process under way in the PCI.

Despite episodic criticism of Soviet excesses, the party took a long time arriving at a critical global judgment of Soviet foreign policy, calling it in 1980-81 a "policy of power." Its discovery that the Soviet model of socialism had lost its appeal was novel only because the discoverers still called themselves Communists. Yet, the party's ability to reach and enunciate these judgments has helped it hold its own in Italy during a wave of change in European politics in which few other politically significant communist parties have been able to maintain their organizational strength and electoral support.

The PCI hopes to conserve its strength and to be ready for the next swing of the political pendulum to the left, even if this swing does not occur until the end of the current decade or some time in the next one. Whether or not this will be possible depends to a considerable degree on what image of socialism the Soviet Union will project into Western Europe and what kind of foreign policy the reality behind that image will foster and allow.

Should this reality, that is, the Soviet model of socialism, not change significantly, the PCI will have to face future Soviet-inflicted embarrassment to the banner of the hammer and sickle that the PCI still carries—unless, in the meantime, it finds itself a fully accepted place within a predominantly noncommunist European Left. The absence of any mention of Lenin or Leninism at the recent 17th PCI Congress, and the scarce references even to Marx, is indicative of the party's continuing movement in that direction.

GDR Dichotomies

David Childs

ELMAR DIETER OTTO. *Nachrichten in der DDR: Eine empirische Untersuchung über Neues Deutschland* (News in the GDR: An Empirical Analysis of *Neues Deutschland*). Cologne, Wissenschaft und Politik, 1979.

GABRIELE ECKART. *So sehe ich die Sache: Protokolle aus der DDR* (This Is How I See Things: Protocols from the GDR). Cologne, Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1984.

GISELA HELWIG. *Jugend und Familie in der DDR: Leitbild und Alltag im Widerspruch* (Youth and Family in the GDR: Conflict Between Ideal and Reality). Cologne, Special Edition of *Deutschland Archiv*, 1984.

G. E. EDWARDS. *GDR Society and Institutions: Facts and Figures.* London, Macmillan, 1985.

ARTHUR W. McCARDLE and A. BRUCE BOENAU, Eds. *East Germany: A New German Nation Under Socialism?* Washington, DC, University Press of America, 1984.

FRANZ LOESER. *Die unglaubwürdige Gesellschaft: Quo Vadis, DDR?* (The Incredible Society: Quo Vadis, GDR?). Cologne, Bund-Verlag, 1984.

AS THE German Democratic Republic (GDR) celebrated 40 years of "liberation" in the autumn of 1985 an air of uncertainty hung heavily over the territory between the Oder and the Elbe. Amid rumors that party leader Erich Honecker might step down to make way for a younger man—one presumably able to accept more readily the role of subaltern to the new ringmaster in Moscow—party functionaries braced themselves for the 11th Congress of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) set for April 17–21, 1986. But, as events of the congress show, Honecker did not allow himself to be put in the dustbin of history. Instead, he strengthened his own position in the Politburo and ensured the continuation of an era he had set in motion in 1971.[1]

The key posts in the party remained firmly in the hands of the apparatchiki, most of whom are old and some of whom are sick. Honecker and Kurt Hager (responsible for culture and science) are 74; the second- and third-ranking members in the SED hierarchy, Willi Stoph and Horst Sindermann, are 72 and 71 respectively. And Hermann Axen, the chairman of Foreign Affairs in the Volkskammer (parliament), is 70. Moreover, Honecker loyalists Werner Eberlein, Siegfried Lorenz, and General Heinz Kessler were elected to full membership on the party's Politburo.[2]

The 11th SED Congress praised the CPSU and its 27th Party Congress, but rejected General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachëv's call for self-criticism in combatting stagnation, complacency, and corruption. Instead, the SED congratulated itself on its many achievements since the 10th Congress of 1975. Honecker, for his part, made much of the

David Childs is Reader in Politics at The University of Nottingham (UK). From 1981 to 1986, he served as Chairman of the United Kingdom's Association for the Study of German Politics. Among his publications are Honecker's Germany *(1985);* GDR: Moscow's German Ally *(1983); and* East Germany *(1969).*

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[1] To many observers, Honecker's tenacity came as no surprise. In November, he had been able to oust Konrad Naumann, a vocal critic, from the Politburo and from his post as first secretary of the Berlin SED organization. His successor, Günter Schabowski, already a member of the Politburo, was Honecker's personal nominee. In addition, Herbert Häber, an advocate of a more friendly line toward West Germany, was also dropped from the Politburo—perhaps as a sop to Moscow.

[2] These leadership changes should not be cause for concern in the Kremlin. Indeed, two of the new appointees are well-known in Moscow. Eberlein spent his youth in the Soviet Union (where his father disappeared), and in his younger years he was often called upon to serve as an interpreter at meetings of top Soviet and GDR leaders. Kessler, whose father was a Communist, deserted to the Red Army from the Wehrmacht in 1941 and became a cofounder of the National Committee for a Free Germany (NKFD).

SED's victories in developing the GDR's economy and raising the people's standard of living.

Such actions were quite unexpected. The SED had always been fairly orthodox in following the Soviet line. In the past, it had at least paid lip service to self-criticism, even if it had not taken it seriously in practice. During the past year, there had been signs that this pattern would be repeated at the 1986 congress. It was not.

Will the proceedings of the congress find resonance in the real life of the GDR? Outwardly, of course, the GDR authorities project the usual calm. The media record new victories on the production front, more homes built, more teachers trained, more books published, more holidays taken. Life, it seems, is getting better and better.

Some, however, see a different reality. Doris Cornelsen of the German Institute for Economic Research in West Berlin, for example, concludes in her excellent study of the East German economy, 1981–85, that while the GDR has had some success in reducing its foreign debt, the consumer has had to pay for this, especially in 1982 and 1983, which were particularly bad years.[3] Indeed, buried in Honecker's speech to the congress was the warning that consumer goods of high quality would be sold at prices that "yield the necessary profit for the manufacturer and society at large."[4] He also warned that exports to the USSR were a significant precondition toward ensuring future imports of raw materials, fuels, machinery, and installations and plants from the Soviet Union. The difficulty, however, is that the GDR must import Western technology in order to improve the quality of its exports. But it cannot pay for such imports in rubles. How, then, can it earn the necessary deutschmarks, yen, and dollars to pay for necessary imports from the West if it has to export ever larger quantities of higher quality goods to the USSR? Solving this conundrum remains the top priority for the SED's economic experts.

BUT THE SED and the East German media will keep the GDR public oblivious of this problem. Only the need for more exports is stressed in public. Reverses for consumers are not reported in the GDR press and other media, for, as SED propagandist Hermann Budzislawski explains in his essay on socialist journalism (in McCardle and Boenau), the socialist journalist will structure his news so that "the morale of his class is strengthened" (p. 333).

Yet, the GDR media find this most difficult to achieve because they rarely report the news the population is interested in. For example, when so many people East and West of the Elbe were concerned with the widespread strikes in Poland, the August 26, 1980, issue of *Tribüne*, the organ of the East German trade unions, ignored events there and instead devoted two and one-half pages (out of eight) to an interview given by Honecker to the British publisher Robert Maxwell, who was publishing the General Secretary's autobiography. More recently, when the world outside the Warsaw Pact was horrified by the news of the Chernobyl' nuclear disaster, the April 29, 1986, edition of the SED party paper, *Neues Deutschland*, kept this news from its front page. Instead, it gave its readers the good news that the GDR trade union would be holding its 11th congress in April 1987—one year hence! This story shared the front page with the news that the West German Communist Party was publishing a book of Honecker's speeches, and that Honecker had sent greetings to the Emperor of Japan in honor of that country's national day. Chernobyl' was mentioned on page 5, where it was accorded about one square inch of space.

Such practices obviously help to destroy the media's credibility, a credibility that is further shaken by their occasional abrupt change of attitude toward a particular individual or state. This happened in the case of the late Shah of Iran, who, as the price of oil soared, went from a "murderer" and "US puppet" to a welcomed guest of the GDR government. (Ironically, shortly before his overthrow, the Shah was scheduled to visit the GDR, where both he and his wife were to receive honorary doctorates.) It also happened following Honecker's visit to Japan in 1981. Thereafter, notes Franz Loeser in his autobiography under review here, the GDR media had to jettison their earlier characterization of that country as an instrument of US imperialism in favor of a new, positive attitude (p. 76). More recently, the GDR media has found it difficult to respond to events in South Yemen, a state about which they had given much misleading information in the past. Part of their problem, as Elmar Dieter Otto shows in his analysis of *Neues Deutschland*'s news coverage, is that they often rely on TASS or other Soviet sources rather than attempt their own assessments.

THE UNREAL world of the GDR media features in a number of the interviews conducted by Gabriele Eckart in the GDR in the early 1980's. Her method is that of Studs Terkel—tape-recorded intereviews of a cross-section of a community (in this case agricultural) in which the interviewees tell about their lives in an unstructured way. The project, it should be mentioned, was not meant to be anti-GDR, but on completion SED leaders evidently thought it too risky and publication was canceled. Eventually, Eckart's study found its way into West Germany, where it was published.

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[3] Doris Cornelsen, "The Economy of the GDR, 1981–1985," in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Des Parlaments* (Bonn), Jan. 25, 1986.

[4] See Honecker's report to the Central Committee, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Eastern Europe* (Washington, DC), Apr. 21, 1986, pp. E/9–56.

The book is interesting, and the interviews—21 of them—appear authentic, but it must be remembered that the subjects thought (rightly so) that they were being interviewed by a loyal citizen of the GDR with official blessing. In many cases at least, this would have led to self-censorship by the interviewees, although this apparently was not true of Inge, an 18-year-old gardener:

> *What I find good in our state is that you don't have to be afraid about your job. And with housing...you have to wait, but then you get one and not at such [high] rents as over there [in West Germany]. But in political matters everything's too restrictive for me. If you say one wrong word to the wrong person [you may find yourself in trouble]....There's one of them [party members] in our [work] brigade, so I don't talk about politics. And the press here, it's so that you don't hear about some things, crime, for instance. And a lot of things are so glorified, yet everyone sees [for] themselves how things are.*

Complaints similar to those of a 57-year-old manager are also often heard in the GDR. He wants to be able to travel where he wants; and he is appalled by, among many other things, the fact that youngsters are not free to express themselves in school, and by SED meetings at which there is no real discussion, the questions having been worked out weeks in advance by the leadership. There is the 17-year-old apprentice and Free German Youth (FDJ) secretary who remarks that the church is the only place where one can stretch one's mind. And there is Heinz (21), also a gardener, who expresses strong reservations about the FDJ and its methods. He too criticizes the GDR's media, especially television, which he finds so exaggerated as to insult the intelligence of the people. As a result, he watches only shows from the West.

IN HER BOOK on youth and the family and the conflict between the ideal and reality, Gisela Helwig finds it useful to quote from a number of Eckart's interviews. She quotes Horst (34), the editor of a factory newspaper who is disgusted by the double standard prevalent in SED circles. He cites as an example the head teacher who owned a West German car (Volkswagen Golf) but who came down heavily on apprentices in her charge because of their interest in pictures of Western automobiles. Horst also criticizes the GDR educational system for its selectivity and privilege. Although he himself had been educated at an elite boarding school in Ludwigsfelde, he was unable to study or to try for the careers he would have liked, but was instead directed by the FDJ into journalism. He further expresses disgust over the way the parents of his fellow students, many of them diplomats, were able to secure special privileges for their offspring.

Helwig's own analysis of the educational system of the GDR tends to support Horst's criticisms. Her material reveals that the GDR's aim of providing equal opportunities for all has in no sense been realized. She quotes East German sources to show that the educational qualifications of the parents have greatly influenced the progress of their children. At the end of the 1970's, she notes, only 9 percent of students came from families in which either both parents were unskilled workers or only one of them was skilled. A further 20 percent came from families in which both parents were skilled workers. At the other end of the spectrum, 33 percent of students were from homes where either both parents were university graduates or one was and the other had completed a *Fachschule* (professional school) training. It goes without saying, of course, that in all cases, students and parents had passed the political reliability test.

Helwig skilfully uses a wide variety of sources, both GDR and West German, including reports issued over a period of 11 years by an investigating council of the Academy of Sciences of the GDR, which had been given the task of analyzing the position of women in socialist society. That the reports of a council of this kind are semi-secret, meant only to be read by a select circle of scholars and researchers within the Academy, reveals a great deal about the GDR.

Helwig's book is interesting and competent but contains no surprises. How could it? Are familial relationships so very different in different industrial societies? I believe not. In the GDR, however, the family is under greater pressure than in West Germany; far more mothers go out to work; many work shift work; housing is poor (it has improved in the last decade, notes Helwig, but much needs to be done); shopping is problematic; and the state interferes in daily life in ways that would be unacceptable in the West. Also, the already high rate of divorce keeps on rising. According to the *Statistisches Jahrbuch der DDR*[5] for 1985, the divorce rate per 10,000 of population rose from 14.2 in 1960 to 30.2 in 1984.

Unfortunately, there appear to be no GDR analyses of the causes of matrimonial breakdown in recent years. G. E. Edwards addresses this important social issue but cites a GDR survey from 1974, the same one that had been published in an earlier book by Helwig.[6] According to this survey, adultery was the top reason for divorce (22 percent), followed by "incompatibility of character and views" (14.4 percent), problems with alcohol (10.4 percent), sexual problems (10.0 percent), physical violence (9.3 percent), and "married too quickly without knowing each other" (6.5 percent). But these causes are *in part* the result of larger socioeconomic factors. Heavy alcohol consumption, for example, can be traced partly to too much money chasing too few goods, boredom, loneliness, and bad housing driving people out of their homes and into bars. Adultery is made more likely when both partners work outside of the home and, in a considerable number of cases, work different shifts. Of course, the trends in the GDR are similar to those in other states on both sides of the ideological divide, but the SED, far from having any solutions to this and associated problems, cannot conceal the fact that "Marxism-Leninism" has no answers.

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[5] East Berlin: Staat-Verlag, 1985.

HELWIG'S attempt to confront the complex reality of the GDR is in sharp contrast to the picture presented by Edwards. Edwards, of Loughborough University in England, tells of "her own experience of twenty years of close observation of the East German scene and many visits to the country spread out over the period." She admits that "not many statistics are available on some topics, [and that] on others they may be incomplete for some years and for others again they may be completely unobtainable" (p. xvii). She also cautions readers that "GDR sources are sometimes over-optimistic in describing what is happening in their country and it is only by reading between the lines and knowing the country well that it is possible to assess where the problems lie" (p. xvii).

Alas, I do not find much evidence of her reading between the lines. In fact, Edwards seems all too ready to accept official explanations, values, and statistics without much questioning. She tells us in her chapter on youth, for instance, that "90 percent of young men who are eligible for military service belong on a voluntary basis" to the paramilitary Society for Sport and Technology, the GST (p. 124). Most Westerners who know the GDR, however, would question her use of the word "voluntary" in this context. (Indeed, if a GDR youth were to refuse to "volunteer," his or her chances for a meaningful or productive career would be virtually nil.) She goes on to say that "through the GST it is possible to learn to drive, navigate, dive and fly. Radio technical training, shooting and parachuting are also offered" (p. 125). It is well known, though, that shooting is an integral part of the basic training of the GST not an optional extra!

Edwards also seems to distort her picture of the GDR through omission. For example, she mentions that since September 1978 *Wehrkunde* (defense studies) has been introduced into all schools, but she fails to mention the controversy and anger among parents about its introduction. Readers hear about the SED's version of the peace movement but hear nothing about the genuine unofficial one. Edwards also takes seriously the statistic that 40 members of the Volkskammer are FDJ nominees aged 18–25. This would be of some significance if the 500-member Volkskammer were a real parliament!

Edwards's reliance on official GDR data produces several other distortions of reality. Despite her words of caution at the start of her book, she takes seriously GDR crime statistics and then places them in comparative perspective: "The crime rate in the GDR has been consistently lower than in Western countries (for instance some five to six times less crimes per 100,000 of population than is the case in the Federal Republic) and has not shown the explosion which Britain has experienced in the last decade . . ." (p. 153). But how can one compare crime statistics of such a tightly controlled society as the GDR with those of West Germany or Britain? Perhaps Edwards's efforts would have been better spent had she tried to find out why there is so much juvenile delinquency in the GDR, despite all the police, propaganda, controls, and regimentation.

The other chapters on the family, women, and the elderly suffer from the same defects. This should perhaps come as no surprise since all but one of the 70 or so sources listed in her bibliography appear to be East German. Moreover, Helwig's 1974 book from which she quotes is not even cited. It is a pity that a book that looks at areas neglected by British and American (but not West German) writers on the GDR is not more searching.

The volume edited by Arthur McCardle and Bruce Boenau suffers (though to a somewhat lesser degree) from the same weaknesses as that of Edwards. Although the editors have attempted to produce a reader covering a full range of topics—e.g., "Germany and the GDR," "The political system of the GDR," and "The society of the GDR"—the bulk of their book, which draws heavily on official GDR documents, allows the SED to present itself. Of the 23 articles, only four are not SED-orientated. And, despite the good intentions of the contributors, the essays are filled with jargon and official propaganda. Given the vast body of critical literature on the GDR (including that by former and even current SED members), I would have thought that a more balanced presentation would have enhanced the book's effectiveness. Fortunately, the editors do raise pertinent questions at the end of each chapter, and this helps to round out the presentations and improve the book to a certain degree.

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[6] See her *Frau '75* (Women, 1975), Cologne, n.p., 1975.

THIS IS NOT to say that the work of East German scholars should be ignored entirely. Indeed, as the studies by Helwig and Edwards indicate, SED experts are attempting more and more to use the same methods of research as social scientists in the West. Despite the progress since the 1960's, however, their situation remains a difficult one. Any material that could possibly give aid or comfort to "class enemies" must be kept secret—statistics on juvenile delinquency, suicides, and similar matters for instance—and no fundamental criticism of the system is tolerated.

This is made clear in Franz Loeser's *Die unglaubwürdige Gesellschaft*, a personal account written by a former insider, a man high up in the intellectual establishment who "knows many of the Politburo members personally" (p. 52). Loeser has had a varied life, which he recounts in the first part of his book. Of Jewish descent, he was born in Breslau in 1924. Most of his family perished in the holocaust. He ended World War II as a sergeant in the British army medical corps. He witnessed the horrors of Hiroshima in 1945 and the intolerance of McCarthyism in the United States a little later. It was the political atmosphere in the United States that led Loeser to return to Britain, and to studies at the University of Manchester and a job with one of England's largest department stores. But he had already decided he wanted to return to "democratic" Germany, and he spent several years waiting to be admitted. It was only the intervention of Harry Pollit, leader of the British Communist Party, that secured his passage, in 1956, and ensured a warm welcome for him and his British wife from SED leader Walter Ulbricht. He then rapidly ascended into the heaven and hell of the GDR's "new class." He was appointed professor of philosophy at Humboldt University, and "elected" a member of the Presidium of the Peace Council, chairman of the Paul Robeson Committee, and secretary of the SED at the Institute of Philosophy.

In part two of his book, Loeser takes the lid off the GDR's "real existing socialism." He has much of interest to relate. He mentions a survey on the effectiveness of *"Die Aktuelle Kamera,"* the most important news program on GDR television. When the program commenced at 7:30 pm, an estimated 3 percent were watching it. By 7:31, this had declined to a mere 0.2 percent. He pours scorn on the "feudal life-style of a feudal despot," the late Gerhard Grüneberg, czar of East German agriculture (p. 78). And he attacks the "pope" of GDR ideology, Kurt Hager, for his ignorance and arrogance and for having condemned GDR science to "servility and sterility" (p. 89).

Loeser reminds us how history has to be rewritten to fit in with the changes in the SED leadership. He condemns the hypocrisy of "democratic centralism," the failure of the economic system, and the SED's attitude of "anything goes" if it brings in hard currency. This includes everything from the sale of political prisoners to West Germany to the printing and export of pornographic literature banned in the GDR but thought suitable for the decadent West!

Loeser paints a depressing picture of the average GDR citizen. The degeneration of socialism, he says, has led to the degeneration of the human beings living under it. It has bred "a petit bourgeois philistine whose needs are not satisfied and whose personal freedom is limited. The consequence is that a frustrated, disillusioned, aggressive type of human being has developed, who tries to escape from his oppression, whenever possible, by withdrawing from public life behind his own four walls" (p. 115). Loeser claims that GDR citizens show their frustration by being far more aggressive and unfriendly in public than "the British, Japanese, Californians or citizens of Cologne" (people he has personally experienced).

ALTHOUGH MOST of what he writes has been written before by a wide variety of witnesses, some will find his picture of the GDR exaggerated. Some will regard him as an unreliable commentator, considering his own history of service to the SED. Others will see him as an alarmist, citing as evidence his warning that fear could lead to the establishment of a military dictatorship. Yet the fact is, Loeser has given up a great deal rather late in life to bear witness against the god that failed! Having met him, I am inclined to accept his testimony in its essentials. He is an important witness reminiscent of Wolfgang Leonhard.

It will be interesting for American readers to learn that his experiences have forced him to the conclusion that American "bourgeois democracy" is far more real than the fictitious democracy of "real existing socialism." Like others before him, he is trying to salvage as much of his past as possible by advocating a form of democratic socialism for the GDR. This, he believes, is what the youth between the Elbe and the Oder really want.

Correspondence

NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to
The Editors,
Problems of Communism
US Information Agency,
301 4th Street, SW,
Washington, DC 20547, USA

ON NICARAGUA

TO THE EDITORS: May I comment on the important article "Sandinistas in Power" by Jiri and Virginia Valenta in your September-October 1985 issue. Such is the heat of debate in North America and Western Europe about Nicaragua that I must begin by stating that I am a friend of self-determination for small peoples, and not of the particular government they appear to have chosen in this case, namely Sandinismo. The Valentas' article is well-documented and transparently honest. I would appeal to the authors to write another addressing the following observations.

The 1984 election. It is good to see a *bien pensant* treatment that does not get hung up on Arturo Cruz's "not having been allowed to stand." This treatment states that "a most crucial aspect of the election was its lateness." It was, however, held within the five years promised by the Sandinistas when they seized power in 1979. Those who think 1984 was too late should have said so in 1979. Maybe the authors did; I do not know. Five years is not an abnormal time for revolutionary governments taking over in Third World countries. Consider Uganda now. Nobody is protesting.

The article says that the elections "offered the voter only a semblance of choice" and a little later correctly records that the rightwing opposition scored 29 percent. It seemed to me (and I was a member of two all-party observer teams from the British Parliament that visited Nicaragua at different times during 1984) that nearly a third of a people voting for the right opposition to a left revolutionary government indicates, and largely so, the reality of choice. Those who were not deterred by the obstacles Arturo Cruz and his allies found so daunting, and were prepared to get their hands dirty in democratic politics on the ground, did perfectly well.

Public ownership of land. The discussion here still needs to be raised a notch or two. The authors produce a table—and I am aware of the difficulties of doing statistics in any Third World country—that shows 100 percent of the land of Nicaragua having been in private ownership in 1978. I know the Somoza family were ruthless private exploiters as well as horrible dictators, but what about foreign embassies, for instance? And were Nicaraguan government buildings, barracks, etc., really all in the Somoza name?

The authors also show in this table that the "FSLN goal" is 25 percent private ownership. The authority for this is "Authors' interviews in Managua." I wonder with whom?

Armed forces. "Costa Rica is particularly vulnerable" to the Nicaraguan armed forces, "having only a paramilitary police force but no army." So it was to the Somoza regime. Nothing new in that. The new president of Costa Rica is now busy mending fences with Nicaragua.

The contras. "The anti-Sandinista insurgencies are symptomatic of conditions created by most Leninist-orientated regimes in the Third World." Maybe. They are also symptomatic of conditions created by most Central American governments at most times in the last 30 years. It seems obvious to the more distant eye of the West European in the 1980's that the main trouble the United States found with Sandinist Nicaragua was that instead of conforming to the approved pattern, namely rightwing government and leftwing insurgents, it reversed things—a leftwing government with rightwing insurgents.

China. Since the article was written, Nicaragua has established diplomatic relations with China. This affects some of the conclusions in the article.

Indeed, it is the *conclusion* of the article that looks to me to be cockeyed, and not borne out by what precedes it. The numerous unsuccessful attempts in Eastern Europe to make communism more pluralistic and more humane have all taken place in countries where communism was imposed by the Soviet Army, which happened to be on the scene because of joint Allied efforts to extirpate Nazism. And "communist" is the word that East European governments are proud to use. The Soviet army is not in Nicaragua, and "communist" is not a word that the Sandinistas use. Nevertheless, the authors believe that liberalization in Nicaragua seems precluded by something else, namely that "the FSLN regime has internalized Soviet and Cuban models of repression." For this argument to hold water, the authors would have to show that the East European governments had not internalized Soviet and Cuban models of repression. But they have.

The FSLN appears to be a coalition of nationalist leftwing revolutionaries, some of whom are pro-Soviet and some of whom are not. US aid to the contras would appear to play into the hands of the former at the expense of the latter.

WAYLAND KENNET, M.P.
Social Democratic Party
London

(Lord Kennet was a member of a three-member British Parliamentary Human Rights Group that visited Nicaragua in November 1984 to observe the elections. David Ashby, a Conservative M.P. and Alf Dubs, a Labour M.P. were the other members.—Eds.)

THE VALENTAS RESPOND: It is rewarding for scholars when an important public figure like Wayland Kennet of the Social Democratic Party and the British Parliament takes the time to read and respond thoughtfully to their writings. It was even more gratifying to find that Lord Kennet judged our article "important," "well-documented," and "transparently honest." To be sure, Lord Kennet counters these generous credits by taking the authors to task for what he describes as "cockeyed" conclusions. He further appeals to them to write another article addressing a number of his own observations. For the time being, however, we have to limit our response to this letter.

The 1984 election. Lord Kennet alleges that Arturo Cruz had been daunted and deterred by the obstacles facing him in the election, implying also that Mr. Cruz and his allies were unprepared "to get their hands dirty in democratic politics on the ground." These allegations seem a bit unfair to this honest democrat and former Sandinista leader. Incidentally, Mr. Cruz recently conceded that he made a tactical error by not participating in the elections, as this would have given the opposition more public exposure. But his participation would not have altered the outcome. In case Lord Kennet is unaware of it, the FSLN leaders are on record as having asserted that they would never allow the opposition to prevail in elections. If any group was daunted by the prospect of an open and fair competition, it was the FSLN leaders, and this is why they took five years to organize the elections. The careful groundwork they laid for them ensured that the contest would be no exercise in democratic politics "a la Gran Bretaña." The "reality of choice" facing the Nicaraguans was more akin to that which existed in East-Central Europe (Czechoslovakia and Hungary) between 1945 and 1948. There also the opposition was tolerated but restrained from posing a meaningful alternative by the selective use of repressive measures of a creeping totalitarianism.

Public ownership of land. The figures cited in the article are based almost exclusively on published Sandinista sources. Those that are not were derived from interviews conducted in Managua in confidentiality.

Armed forces. The threat to Costa Rica from Nicaragua under the FSLN is more serious than under Somoza because of the FSLN's stated desire to support revolution throughout Central America (see the *General Platform of the FSLN*). This is what is new under the FSLN.

Contras. The latest events in Nicaragua as well as in Afghanistan and Angola and the recent bloodshed in "socialist-oriented" South Yemen support our contention that the anti-Sandinista insurgencies are symptomatic of conditions created by most Leninist-oriented regimes in the Third World.

It is too simple to identify the contras as "rightwing insurgents" and the FSLN government as "nationalist" and "leftwing." This characterization ignores the existence of UNO (National Unification Union), led by democrats such as Arturo Cruz and Alfonso Robelo, of social democrats like Alfredo César, who heads the left-leaning Southern Opposition Bloc (BOS) of the anti-FSLN insurgency, and a whole host of guerrilla leaders resembling the legendary revolutionary commander Eden Pastora. It also does not take into account the hundreds of dissatisfied former Sandinistas or thousands of other Nicaraguans from all walks of life in both the northern and southern branches of the resistance. These people battle the FSLN National Directorate because of their conviction that it has betrayed the revolution that all of them supported.

Finally, to say that the US objects to the Sandinistas because they do not conform to the "approved pattern, namely rightwing government and leftwing insurgency," is to keep a very "distant eye" on the matter, indeed. Perhaps Lord Kennet underestimates the willingness of US policy-makers to learn from previous mistakes in supporting rightwing dictatorships. After all, the US did withdraw crucial support from Somoza; more recently, it helped to dismantle the dictatorships in both Haiti and the Philippines.

China. The fact that the FSLN established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China in the fall of 1985 does not affect our conclusions. This opening by the FSLN occurred after six years of refusal to deal with Beijing, in spite of appeals by some opposition leaders in favor of diplomatic relations and, more important, after a considerable improvement in Sino-Soviet relations. If Lord Kennet consults some of the secret documents uncovered in Grenada, he will find that in 1981 the PRC was listed by the NJM (New Jewel Movement) leaders as one of the "countries with which Grenada does not wish to develop close relations" (See "List of Countries with Which Grenada Does not Wish to Develp Close Relations," in Jiri Valenta and Herbert J. Ellison, Eds., *Grenada and Soviet/Cuban Policy: Internal Crisis and U.S./O.E.C.S. Intervention*, Boulder, Co, Westview Press, 1986, p. 463). A similar list almost certainly existed as of 1981 in Managua, with whose leaders the NJM had developed close ties. The available evidence about the FSLN decision to establish diplomatic ties with China points to a strong parallelism with, if not dependence on, Moscow in foreign policy matters. In some circles this is known as "proletarian internationalism."

Cockeyed conclusion. We found Lord Kennet's concluding remarks a bit in the vein of English humor. For what, after all, is there to criticize but the conclusions when all else is in order, or nearly so? More seriously, Lord Kennet is surely not a student of comparative communism or he would not have stated that "communism [in Eastern Europe] was imposed by the Soviet army." Although true in many instances, it was certainly not in the case of Yugoslavia or Albania, countries which had large and influential communist parties by 1945. Nor was the Soviet army deployed in Czechoslovakia prior to the invasion of 1968, in China in the post–World War II period, or in Nicaragua after 1979. Moreover, as the Cuban trajectory illustrates, the presence of the Soviet army is not always a sine qua non for building a Leninist system, and the Leninist system is adaptable to widely varying cultural and physical conditions.

The issues here are not just the Soviet military presence and a country's particular geography, but also the different models of communism. In the case of the FSLN, there has been an increasing emulation of the more repressive models and disregard for the early, albeit unsuccessful attempts to pluralize communism in Hungary and in Czechoslovakia and, more recently, in Poland, and the experiments with reform communism occurring today in Hungary, Yugoslavia, and China. Thus, not surprisingly, the FSLN has closest relations with the USSR, Cuba, East Germany, and Bulgaria.

This is so because the FSLN leaders are not just "nationalist leftwing revolutionaries," as they might appear to the more "distant eye" of some nonetheless well-intentioned West European observers. The evidence points to the fact that most, if not all, of the nine *comandantes* who effectively monopolize power in Nicaragua are (in spite of tactical differences) dedicated pro-Soviet and/or pro-Cuban Leninists who still have not digested or who have chosen to ignore the experiences of so-called deviant communist leaders and parties that have sometimes dared to challenge the Soviet model. The Soviet army is indeed not inside Nicaragua, but there are plenty of Cuban, Bulgarian, and East German advisers and ample Soviet arms to help the FSLN ensure Nicaragua's Leninist orientation. It is also true that the FSLN leaders may not use the word communist to describe themselves, but, when frank, they have proudly described themselves more "scientifically" as Marxist-Leninists. Incidentally, the Leninist orientation and the military buildup preceded the Reagan administration.

JIRI AND
VIRGINIA VALENTA
Miami, FL

CORRECTION

The first five lines of text in column 1, page 95 of Dale Herspring's essay-review of "Soviet Military Politics" in the March-April 1986 issue of *Problems of Communism* were inadvertently garbled. The first two lines should have completed the sentence begun at the end of page 94, and the fourth and fifth lines should not have been repeated. We provide the corrected text of these lines below:

> resources for the military, it is the Politburo that has the final say.
>
> A second area of general agreement is that the Soviet military's primary source of authority in national

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JULY-AUGUST 1986 VOL XXXV

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COVER: Miyamoto Kenji, long-time leader of the Japan Communist Party. Photo by *Yomiuri Shimbun*.

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IN THIS ISSUE OF

Problems of Communism

Articles

Japanese Eurocommunists: Running in Place

Peter A. Berton

In the recent double election, the Japan Communist Party became the third largest opposition party in the Japanese Diet, moving ahead of the Democratic Socialists. But the JCP's position in the Japanese political arena has never been more precarious. It is isolated from the other parties on the left and no longer can count on its traditional bases of support, the intellectual elite and student and other activists. The JCP's biggest problem, however, is that the Japanese public by and large sees itself not as downtrodden and exploited but as middle class.

Social Policy under Gorbachëv

Walter D. Connor

Examination of Mikhail Gorbachëv's emergent policy in the social arena suggests that it may bring a new discipline to Soviet society; may create, under new conditions of work organization and reward, as many highly-motivated winners as disgruntled losers; may even, by design or by accident, impart a new dynamism in certain areas of Soviet life. However, it is a policy committed to conserving, indeed strengthening the grip of the Soviet state on the critical levers of the social process.

Worker Roots of Solidarity

Roman Laba

Although a general consensus maintains that Polish intellectuals provided the impetus for Solidarity, the demands advanced in 1970, 1971, and 1980 by the workers from the Baltic seacoast indicate that these workers initiated the program and organization of Solidarity. Long before the intellectuals founded the Committee for the Defense of Workers (KOR) and the Catholic Church became socially active, politically conscious coastal workers clearly set forth the demand for free trade unions which would be later championed by Solidarity. Their concerns extended beyond wage and working conditions within the factory to a systemic critique of the Leninist state--its power and privilege.

Notes

Soviets on Nuclear-War-fighting

Tsuyoshi Hasegawa

By the early 1980's, the top Soviet political leadership had incorporated "mutual assured destruction" into Soviet military doctrine. But the Soviet high command, and notably Nikolay Ogarkov, were reluctant to accept this concept, which postulates that in a nuclear war neither the attacker nor the defender can emerge victorious. Marshal Ogarkov was relieved of his position as chief of the General Staff when he continued to insist that a defender could withstand a nuclear first strike and defeat an aggressor after retaliating with a second strike. It is by no means clear that Ogarkov's dismissal means an end to military opposition or that the military has now incorporated mutual assured destruction into Soviet war-fighting strategy.

(Abstracts continued on reverse side)

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Shifts in CPSU ID

Wallace Spaulding

The emergence of Anatoliy Dobrynin as Boris Ponomarëv's successor as chief of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party is the occasion for providing an updated listing of current knowledge about who mans the geographic sectors and desks of this important instrumentality of Soviet dealings with communist and other parties outside the Soviet bloc.

Essay-reviews

Soviet Third World Policy

Mark N. Katz

Expanded Soviet involvement in the volatile affairs of the Third World has turned this major portion of the globe into an arena of serious superpower competition and potential confrontation—with vital resources, strategic sea lanes, and political influence at stake. Yet, analysis of Soviet intentions and policies in this area is still underdeveloped. Do Soviet writings about the problems of establishing and maintaining friendly radical regimes in the Third World really evidence a willingness to settle for less, or does the frequent attention of Soviet military writers to cases of Western intervention in the Third World attest to a growing interest on the part of Moscow in like actions? Opportunities and crises will continue to arise in the Third World, lending studies of these issues growing importance.

Dissent and Soviet Society

Harvey Fireside

Recent literature reviewing the history of dissent in the Soviet Union suggests that the state has generally been effective in preventing dissident opinion from challenging party dominance of society. At the same time, it appears that a new cycle of officially sanctioned criticism and change is in full swing, which could generate new ferment among Soviet intellectuals directed at the serious obstacles to reform in the USSR.

Japanese Eurocommunists: Running in Place

Peter A. Berton

Japan is situated in Asia, but it is an atypical Asian country. It was the first to modernize and industrialize, and the first non-Western country in the modern era to become an imperialist power. Today, Japan is mostly associated with the Western world. In the post–World War II period, Japan followed Germany's example in staging the world's second economic miracle, and in 1964 it became the first non-Western member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). A decade later, in the mid-1970's, Japan joined six of the world's most advanced industrialized democracies, all of which are in Western Europe and North America, to make up the economics-oriented "Big Seven." And in the early 1980's, it overtook the Soviet Union in GNP to become the second largest economy in the world.

It should therefore come as no surprise that by the late 1960's the Japan Communist Party (JCP), which earlier had favored Beijing over Moscow in the Sino-Soviet dispute, openly associated itself with the independent, parliamentarian Eurocommunist parties of Western Europe. In fact, in July 1972, on the occasion of the party's 50th anniversary, the JCP staged an "International Conference on Theory" devoted to the problems encountered by communist parties in advanced capitalist countries. Delegates from the Japanese, Italian, French, Spanish, British, West German, and Australian parties shared parliamentary experiences, compared united front tactics, and discussed methods for making the transition from capitalism to socialism in a democratic setting. The JCP held similar symposia in 1979 and 1982.[1] Throughout the 1970's and 1980's, Japanese and West European Communist leaders exchanged visits, attended each other's party congresses, funerals, and other significant occasions, and constantly exchanged messages. So strong was this association that when I was asked to contribute a chapter on the JCP to a book on Eurocommunism between East and West, it seemed appropriate to entitle it "Euro-Nippo-Communism."[2]

But Eurocommunism has faded in recent years. French Communist cabinet ministers have come and gone, and the percentage of votes received by the Eurocommunist parties in national and local elections has gone down. In fact, the lead article in this journal a few months ago was entitled, "Decline and Fall of Spanish Communism."[3]

What about the Eurocommunist JCP? Has it fared

Peter Berton is Professor of International Relations and Coordinator of the Asia/Pacific Regional Studies Program at the School of International Relations, University of Southern California (Los Angeles). From 1970 to 1983, he was the editor of the international interdisciplinary journal, Studies in Comparative Communism. *He is the author of numerous books and articles on Soviet and Asian affairs, including* The Russian Impact on Japan: Literature and Social Thought *(1981) which he coedited, and he has written extensively on the Japanese communist movement and its international ties. The author wishes to thank Paul F. Langer for a careful reading of this essay and for his many helpful criticisms and suggestions, and Bae Yeon Won and Ishtiaque Zaman for timely research assistance.*

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[1] See, e.g., *World Peace, National Self-Determination and Social Progess: International Theoretical Symposium Marking the 60th Anniversary of the Japanese Communist Party*, Tokyo, Japan Press Service, 1982.

[2] Peter Berton, "Japan: Euro-Nippo-Communism," in Vernon V. Aspaturian et al., Eds., *Eurocommunism Between East and West*, Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1980, pp. 326–62.

[3] Eusebio Mujal-Leon, "Decline and Fall of Spanish Communism," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March-April 1986, pp. 1–27. See also Julius W. Friend, "After Eurocommunism," *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Los Angeles, CA), Spring 1986, pp. 55–65.

any better than its European counterparts, or has it too lost considerable electoral and political support? This essay examines the fortunes of the JCP and offers some thoughts on the JCP's prospects for the immediate and longer term future. Among the topics covered are the JCP's electoral record; its relations with other Japanese opposition parties and its parliamentary behavior; its structure, leadership, and bases of support; its publications empire; its role in communist international front organizations; its recent party congresses; and its relations with other communist parties. In looking at these various aspects of JCP activity, one cannot help but be struck by the persistence of the underlying theme of conflict—the conflict between the desire to instill party discipline and the need to retain and attract new party members by appearing to be "free and democratic," between the need to be "independent" and to distance itself from major ruling communist parties and the desire to be accepted by them. In the end, however, it is a story of stagnation, decline, and growing isolation at home but increasing activity within the international communist movement.

Electoral Record

The electoral record of the JCP reveals as much about electoral politics in Japan as it does about how the JCP is perceived by the Japanese electorate. Japan's National Diet is divided into two houses, the (lower) House of Representatives (*Shugiin*) and the (upper) House of Councillors (*Sangiin*). Elections to the 512-member lower house, by far the more powerful of the two, are held every four years unless dissolved sooner by the prime minister or by the representatives themselves. Elections to the 252-member upper house are fixed at three-year intervals, with half of the seats up for reelection. Councillors serve a six-year term, and represent either a national or a local (prefectural) constituency. There are also elections to local offices, and these are generally held every four years.[4]

House of Representatives. Ten years ago, in the 1976 House of Representatives election, the JCP suffered its first stunning electoral setback since the late 1950's: Communist representation in the lower house was cut in half from 40 to 19 (out of a total of 511), despite an increase in the total vote for Communist candidates from 5.7 million to 6 million (the percentage of the vote was marginally down from 10.88 percent to 10.66 percent). This poor showing reversed a momentum that had begun slowly in the 1950's and 1960's and then increased dramatically as JCP representation in the lower house rose from one member in 1958 to five in 1963 and 1967, to 14 in 1969, and to 40 in 1972 (see Table 1).

How have the Communists fared in the four lower house elections since 1976? The JCP's total vote declined from 6 million in 1976 to 5.8 million in 1979, rose a little to 5.9 million in 1980, then dropped substantially to 5.4 million in 1983 and 1986. Moreover, some rather dramatic fluctuations in JCP representation took place despite relatively small shifts in percentage of total vote. Indeed, although the number of Communist representatives jumped from 19 in 1976 to 41 in 1979, the JCP's percentage of the vote more or less remained at 10.7 percent (see Table 1). In the three subsequent elections, the size of the JCP contingent in the lower house shrank once again, falling to 29 in 1980 and to 27 in 1983 and 1986. The drop in percentage of total vote during the same period was from 10.7 to 9.0.

The erratic relationship between percentage of vote and number of representatives suggests the unique nature of the Japanese electoral system and of the political parties that operate in it. First, there are 130 electoral districts, each generally having three to five seats (only Okinawa prefecture is a single-seat constituency).[5] One peculiarity of the multi-seat electoral districts is that very often only a few thousand votes separate the bottom successful candidate and the top runner-up loser (*jiten*). Multi-seat districts also encourage coalition-building, especially among Japan's small opposition parties. Second, unlike the United States, Japan has no mandatory reapportionment of seats according to population after each decennial census. This means that 40 years of rural migration to the cities has resulted in serious underrepresentation of the urban population in the National Diet. Some electoral districts in the major cities have four times as many voters on their rolls as small towns and rural areas do. Furthermore, within the major megalopolises, there are big discrepancies between the older districts and the new high-rise bedroom communities.

There are six major political parties in Japan. Heading the list is the ruling conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the overwhelming victor in the recent double election (upper and lower houses). The LDP—which has benefited greatly from the overrepresenta-

---

[4] For the most up-to-date analysis of the Japanese political system, see Ronald J. Hrebenar, Ed., *The Japanese Party System: From One-Party Rule to Coalition Government*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1986. For analyses of the JCP, see Hong N. Kim, "The JCP's Parliamentary Road," *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1977, pp. 19–35; and Paul F. Langer, "The New Posture of the CPJ," *Problems of Communism*, January-April 1971, pp. 14–24.

[5] Following the May 1986 redistricting, one district in Hokkaido now has six seats, and four three-seat constituencies now have only two seats.

Table 1: JCP and Elections to the House of Representatives, 1946-86[1]

Date of election	Seats won	Votes[2]	Percent of vote
April 1946	5	2,130,000	3.8
April 1947	4	1,000,000	3.7
January 1949	35	2,980,000	9.7
October 1952	0	890,000	2.6
April 1953	1	650,000	1.9
February 1955	2	730,000	2.0
May 1958	1	1,010,000	2.6
November 1960	3	1,150,000	2.9
November 1963	5	1,640,000	4.0
January 1967	5	2,190,000	4.8
December 1969	14	3,190,000	6.8
December 1972	40	5,700,000	10.9
December 1976	19	6,030,000	10.7
October 1979	41	5,760,000	10.7
June 1980	29	5,940,000	10.1
December 1983	27	5,380,000	9.4
July 1986	27	5,380,000	9.0

[1] Beginning with the 1972 election, all figures for seats, votes, and percentages include Communist candidates who ran as independents.

[2] Rounded to the nearest 10,000.

SOURCES: Nihon Seiji Keizai Kenkyujo (Japan Institute for Political and Economic Affairs), *Nikkyo, Minsei, Shakaishugi Kyokai, Shin Sayoku—Kenkyu, Chosa, Taisaku no Tebiki* (The Japan Communist Party, Japan Democratic Youth League, Socialist Association, and the New Left—Research, Surveys, and Policy Handbook), Tokyo, November 1983, p. 258; *Asahi Shimbun* (Tokyo), Dec. 20, 1983; and *Yomiuri Shimbun* (Tokyo), July 8, 1986.

tion of the rural population, its electoral base—has been in power ever since its formation in 1955. The Japanese Socialists, once unified in a single party, have since 1960 been split into two parties: the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), and the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP). The JSP, the largest opposition party in parliament, is a doctrinaire Marxist organization that maintains close contact with the Soviet Union and China and has until very recently advocated *unarmed* neutrality for Japan. The DSP, one-third the size of the JSP, is a moderate, socialist party not unlike its socialist or labor counterparts in Western Europe. Rounding out the list are the Komeito (or "clean government party,"), the political arm of the mass lay Buddhist organization *Soka Gakkai* (Value Creation Society); the New Liberal Club (NLC), an offshoot of the LDP and at the time of the recent election part of the coalition government headed by the LDP;[6] and the JCP.

At one time, all Japanese political parties except the LDP and the NLC were considered "progressive" parties of the left, but in recent years the Democratic Socialists and the Komeito have shifted toward the center and are today seen as centrist parties ready to participate in a coalition government with the LDP should the latter (together with the NLC) fail to get a working majority in the National Diet. That leaves only the JSP and the JCP as real parties of the left. While the JCP presents a monolithic facade, the JSP is split into left, center, and right wings, the leftist Socialists actually being to the left of the JCP on the political spectrum.

The intersection of party and electoral system has generally been unfavorable to the JCP. In the December 1983 lower house election, for example, 15 candidates won by getting only 40,000 to 50,000 votes, while 15 candidates lost with 100,000 to 130,000 votes. Interestingly, among the successful candidates with the small number of votes, 10 were from the LDP, 2 the JSP, 1 the Komeito, 1 independent, and 1 the JCP. By contrast, 7 JCP candidates lost with over 100,000 votes.[7] Moreover, JCP candidates received over 1 million votes in Hokkaido, Shizuoka, Kanagawa, and Saitama prefectures (the last two are a part of the Tokyo megalopolis), but did not win a single seat of the 70 allotted to these four prefectures.[8]

The JCP was also badly hurt by coalitions made at the local level by other opposition parties. In some districts, JCP candidates may well have won the fourth or fifth seat against candidates of the Komeito or the Democratic Socialists running separately and splitting each other's vote, but lost to a combined Komeito-DSP candidate. In fact, in the December 1983 election, 59 joint candidates were put up in 58 electoral districts and 46 of them won.

Of course, the Communists may pick up some seats in future elections should the DSP and the Komeito (or the JSP for that matter) fail to reach electoral agreements, but such fluctuations in representation associated with the small pluralities of multi-seat districting undermine the party's chances of establishing continuity in parliament. In those elections in which the JCP ended with a smaller number of seats in the lower house, it had a large number of *jiten* runners-up who made it in the next election, only to lose in the election after that. For example, two high-ranking JCP leaders, Kaneko Mitsuhiro,[9] director of the Secretariat, and Murakami Hiromu, a member of the Standing Committee of the Presidium, were elected in 1972 in the Tokyo 8th District and Osaka 3rd District, respectively; they both lost in 1976, won in 1979 and 1980, again lost in 1983 (Kaneko by only 3,076 votes), and both won

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[6] In early August 1986, following the reduction of its lower house contingent from eight to six members in the July double election, the NLC is in the process of disbanding, with most of its members rejoining the LDP.

[7] *Asahi Shimbun* (Tokyo), Dec. 20, 1983, p. 9.

[8] Ibid., p. 8. In the July 1986 elections, one district each in Hokkaido, Saitama, and Kanagawa prefectures elected a Communist candidate; two of these districts had seats added in the LDP May 1986 redistricting, and further, two of the three newly elected Diet members were runners-up in 1983.

[9] In accordance with Japanese usage, the surname is given first.

石井いく子
金子満広
松本善明

Japan Communist Party Presidium Chairman Fuwa Tetsuzo, left, and JCP Secretary Kaneko Mitsuhiro, right, tally party results in the July 7, 1986, Japanese national elections.

—Yomiuri Shimbun.

again in 1986 (Kaneko by 4,613).[10] In other words, whereas a number of JCP runners-up may well be in a position to win in the next election, by the same token there are a number of successful JCP parliamentarians whose margin of victory is precariously thin. This was perhaps best illustrated in the 1986 election as Senaga Kamejiro, one of the vice-chairmen of the Presidium, won in Okinawa by 102 votes, while a Communist candidate in Kyoto lost by a mere 61 votes.[11]

On a slightly more promising note for the JCP, a recent Supreme Court ruling has more or less forced the LDP to devise a plan to redress the great discrepancy between urban and rural representation in the National Diet. Numerous plans have been proposed to reapportion seats on a plus-minus (urban-rural) basis according to population. One such proposal would have 35 districts gain a total of 73 seats and 60 districts lose an equal number.[12] According to my calculations, had this arrangement been in effect in December 1983, the JCP would have gained 17 seats in the districts with more representation and would have lost only 3 seats in districts with reduced representation, yielding a net gain of 14 seats (or a hypothetical total of 41 seats). This figure constitutes 8 percent of the total number of seats, closer to the JCP's 9.4 percent of votes than to the 5.3 percent of the seats that the party now holds. Interestingly, in the July 1986 elections, the JCP won four of the eight extra seats created by new LDP legislation—based on a "plus eight" (urban seats) and "minus seven" (rural seats) formula—which had been pushed through in May 1986. (The LDP won the other four seats.)[13] The JCP thus may expect a larger representation in the lower house as a result of more equitable apportionment of seats to urban areas (14 of its 27 seats are in Japan's two largest megalopolises, Tokyo and Osaka). It is not surprising, therefore, that most recent reapportionment plans introduced by the LDP have been quite modest, and that all have been rejected by the opposition parties, which obviously want a more thoroughgoing redistribution of seats according to population density.

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[10] *Asahi Shimbun*, Dec. 20, 1983, p. 9; and *Yomiuri Shimbun* (Tokyo), July 8, 1986, p. 5.

[11] *Yomiuri Shimbun*, July 8, 1986, p. 5.

[12] See *Asahi Shimbun*, Dec. 20, 1983, p. 6.

House of Councillors and local offices. The JCP has witnessed similar electoral trends in the upper house. Support for Communist candidates peaked in the 1974 election when they received 11.8 million votes (6.8 million votes in the local and 4.9 million votes in the national constituencies). This constituted 12.8 percent of the votes in the local and 9.3 percent in the national constituencies, for a total of 20 seats in the upper house. In 1983, the voting for the national constituency was changed from voting for a *candidate* to voting for a political *party* (proportional representation). Following the pattern of the lower house, the JCP's strength in the upper house has also fluctuated since 1974 from 12 to 16, the present (1986) figure being 16 members.[14]

At the subnational level, the JCP vigorously participates in the elections of (1) prefectural and megapolis governors, and mayors of cities, towns, city wards, and villages; and (2) prefectural, municipal, city ward, and village assemblies. Two trends are worth noting in the contest between conservative and so-called progressive forces in the major Japanese urban centers. First, during the 1960's and most of the 1970's, the urban local governments slipped from conservative LDP control, as the opposition parties managed to elect governors or mayors of the six largest cities in Japan. This led the JCP to make the oft-repeated claim that 48 million Japanese lived under "progressive administrations." Then, in the late 1970's, the conservatives, often in coalition with the DSP and the Komeito, recaptured control of the major cities one after another. In the April 1983 gubernatorial and mayoral elections, only in Fukuoka did the JSP-JCP candidate win; in the other races, the winners were candidates backed by the LDP and the centrist parties. In the April 1986 gubernatorial election in Kyoto, the JCP candidate (actually the candidate of an umbrella organization called the "Conference for New Democratic Prefectural Administration Serving the Prefectural People," which included the JCP) lost to a candidate supported by all the other parties, including the LDP and for the first time the JSP.

While the number of JCP national legislators fluctuated during the past decade, the total number of JCP members or JCP-backed candidates in prefectural and local assemblies rose quite rapidly throughout the 1970's, from 1,700 to 3,600. In the 1980's, the number has stabilized around 3,650. In some instances, like in the case of national elections, the number of votes or the percentage of the vote does not correlate with the number of successful candidates. Thus, in the Tokyo Municipal Assembly elections in June 1985, the JCP increased its contingent from 16 to 19 (some years before they had had 24 assemblymen), even though both the number and the percentage of the total vote it received declined in comparison with the previous election.[15]

This brief analysis of the JCP's electoral record at all levels of government for the past decade indicates that the party may have reached a plateau in terms of electoral support at the 5–6 million mark in national elections, constituting 9 to 10 percent of the voting public (but 15 percent in Tokyo, 19 percent in Osaka, and over 22 percent in Kyoto, a Communist stronghold). Of course, given an average voter turnout of some 70 percent, the JCP's percentage of the total eligible vote may be much smaller. The combined number of Communist members in both houses of the National Diet is around 40, which is considerably less than the 59 it had reached in 1974 and 1979. The lower house contingent usually fluctuates between 20 and 40, depending upon a number of domestic and international factors. At the local level, the situation is more promising, as the party puts considerable effort into being of direct service to the public (see below).

Opposition Party and Public Servant

A major reason why the Liberal Democratic Party has remained in power so long is the fact that the opposition parties are so badly split. And part of the reason for the lack of cohesion among the opposition parties is the role played by the JCP in the Japanese political system and the attitudes of other parties toward the Communists. As a party with a relatively small parliamentary delegation, the JCP has naturally championed the idea of a coalition government composed of all "progressive" parties. Thus, at its 11th Party Congress in 1970, the JCP made an appeal for the realization of a "democratic coalition government" by the end of the decade. Following impressive gains in the 1972 general election, the JCP announced more optimistically at its 12th congress in 1973 that the aim to establish a "democratic coalition government was being transformed into an attainable objective."[16]

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[13] See *Sankei Shimbun* (Tokyo), July 3, 1986, p. 3.

[14] Nihon Seiji Keizai Kenkyujo (Japan Institute for Political and Economic Affairs), *Nikkyo, Minsei, Shakaishugi Kyokai, Shin Sayoku—Kenkyu, Chosa, Taisaku no Tebiki* (The Japan Communist Party, Japan Democratic Youth League, Socialist Association, and the New Left—Research, Surveys, and Policy Handbook), Tokyo, November 1983, pp. 218–23 (hereafter cited as *Nikkyo no Tebiki*); and *Sankei Shimbun*, July 8, 1986, p. 9

[15] *Yomiuri Shimbun*, July 8, 1985, evening ed., p. 1.

But these were pipe dreams. Opposition party politics in Japan dictated a different reality. The DSP and the Komeito were both staunchly anti-communist, particularly the former, which had split off from the Socialist Party in 1960 in part because of an unwillingness to have anything to do with the Communists. By 1975 the two parties had moved sufficiently toward the center that they even began thinking about a possible coalition with the LDP instead of being a part of a "progressive" anti-LDP coalition. That left only the JSP as a possible coalition partner for the JCP. But the Socialists continued to be split into ideological factions, some of which would not cooperate with the Communists under any circumstances. This time, however, the JSP as a whole began to move toward the right, and in January 1980 it signed an accord with the Komeito by which it agreed to maintain the US-Japanese Security Treaty, approve the existence of the Self-Defense Forces, and, most important, exclude the JCP from any future coalition. This completed the isolation of the Communists in the Japanese political arena.

More recently, the JSP, under a new leader, Ishibashi Masashi,[17] has tried to shed its doctrinaire image. It has proclaimed itself the "New JSP" (*Nyu Shakai To*), sent a delegation to the United States, and distanced itself further from the Communists. Now, when the opposition parties make joint statements, they routinely exclude the JCP, as, for example, in May 1986, when they opposed the LDP decision to dissolve the lower house and hold double elections. The Communists retaliate by calling the present political system the "Imperial Rule Assistance Politics," a snide reference to the prewar and wartime merger of all political parties into a single political organization called the Imperial Rule Assistance Association.

Parliamentary behavior. JCP legislators follow strict party discipline. They are in the forefront of opposition attacks on "money politics" and corruption of the ruling conservatives, and they can be relied upon to support the public against environmental hazards, consumers against taxation, and middle and small businessmen against any legislation that might favor big business, the mainstay of the LDP. They also support labor against business interests, especially the current drive to increase productivity by reducing the work force. The JCP also opposes the breakup and denationalization of the National Railways. In connection with the JCP's anti-nuclear policy (see below), the party is in the forefront of trying to obtain more relief for the victims of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings.[18]

The JCP is the most hostile of all Japanese political parties to the country's alliance with the United States. Communist Diet members persistently (and predictably) take a hard line on issues concerning Japanese relations with the United States, vehemently opposing the US-Japan Security Treaty, visits by US naval vessels to Japanese ports, especially of nuclear submarines, expanded cooperation between Japanese and US (and South Korean) armed forces, and a host of economic measures that are related to trade disputes with the United States. Curiously enough, however, the JCP is not the party most opposed to Japan's rearmament (it is the Socialists who until very recently had advocated the extreme position of unarmed neutrality). In fact, the JCP's foreign policy slogan is "independence, peace, neutrality, and self-defense."

Serving the public. Communist Diet members invariably speak out against legislation that might adversely affect the general public, consumers, small businessmen, and the like. Although the JCP lacks the electoral clout in the Diet to translate its rhetoric into national legislation, it has been able to provide numerous services to the public at the local level. Particularly important are the "Livelihood Consultation Service Stations," which handle such things as citizens' and small businessmen's tax problems, complaints against indifferent and ineffective local bureaucrats, installment-sales fraud, housing loan swindles, as well as more personal matters such as divorce and "finding a wife."[19] At the 17th Party Congress in 1985, the party boasted of having over fifteen-and-a-half thousand such service stations, which handled 1.67 million cases in the past three years, saving the public billions of yen, and resolving a good many cases.[20] This is one area in which the JCP directly benefits the public, and itself, at least at the local assembly level.

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[16] See, e.g., "Struggle for Life, Rights, Sovereignty and Peace for the Establishment of a Progressive United Front and Democratic Coalition Government" and "The Proposal of the Communist Party of Japan Concerning the Program of a Democratic Coalition Government," *Akahata* (Tokyo), Nov. 21, 1973; and the JCP Central Committee Publishing Bureau's *Bulletin: Information for Abroad* (Tokyo—hereafter *Bulletin*), Nos. 303 and 304, November 1973. See also "The JCP and Prospects for a Coalition Government," in Haruhiro Fukui, "The Japanese Communist Party: The Miyamoto Line and Its Problems," in M. Kaplan, Ed., *The Many Faces of Communism*, New York, Free Press, 1978, pp. 303–16.

[17] Ishibashi resigned after the JSP's July 1986 electoral debacle.

[18] In April 1986, the JCP offered an amendment demanding the enactment of a *Hibakusha* (atomic bomb victims) relief law, which if passed would have provided economic assistance, including an annuity for the *Hibakusha*, special benefits to bereaved families, medical allowances, nursing benefits, and "benefits for funerals and festivals." It was voted down by the Liberal Democrats. See *Japan Press Weekly* (Tokyo), No. 1494, Apr. 26, 1986, p. 8.

The Party Organization

It is a sign of JCP stability (and stagnation) that the party structure and its leadership have changed little during the past decade. Miyamoto Kenji, the JCP's undisputed leader, has been in power since the mid-1950's. In 1982, at age 74, he took the title of chairman of the Central Committee, which paved the way for the promotion of the 52 year-old "crown prince," acting chairman and former director of the Secretariat Fuwa Tetsuzo (born Ueda Kenjiro), to the chairmanship of the Presidium. Although this has presumably freed Miyamoto from worrying about day-to-day party activities, he is still very much in charge. (In December 1984, for example, Miyamoto headed the JCP delegation that went to Moscow for a summit meeting with General Secretary Konstantin Chernenko.) Fuwa is assisted by five deputy chairmen, including his 59-year-old brother Ueda Koichiro, and by the party Secretariat, which is now directed by the 62-year-old Kaneko Mitsuhiro, a rising star and the number three man in the party hierarchy after Miyamoto and Fuwa.[21]

Headquarters of the Japan Communist Party in the Yoyogi district of Tokyo.

—*Yomiuri Shimbun.*

The nerve center of the JCP is the national Party Headquarters in the Yoyogi district near the juncture of the Central and the Yamate Loop lines of Tokyo's railroad network. From the elevated train one can see the *Nihon Kyosan To* (JCP) sign over a nondescript office building. Actually, the party occupies several buildings, including a small bookstore across from the main entrance to Party Headquarters.[22]

The central party organization consists of a 49-member Presidium (which includes a 20-member Standing Committee of the Presidium, or the Standing Presidium);[23] a Party Secretariat of 11 members; Control and Audit committees (19 and 3 members, respectively); Editorial Committee for Central Party Publications; and numerous specialized agencies, consisting of a new Peace Problems Policy Conference (since April 1985), 19 committees,[24] 14 bureaus,[25] 15 departments,[26] the Central Party School, and the Social Science Research Institute. There are also two campaign committees on educational and electoral matters; eight functional committees;[27] and the JCP Diet members group guidance structure, which encompasses several groups and committees as well as a secretariat.[28]

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[19] See Miyamoto's traditional New Year interview with the editor of *Akahata*, Jan. 8, 1977; and *Bulletin*, No. 367, April 1977, p. 15.

For a discussion of JCP policies and activities in the Kyoto area, see Ellis S. Krauss, "The Urban Strategy and Policy of the Japan Communist Party: Kyoto," *Studies in Comparative Communism*, Winter 1979, pp. 322–50. For a description of party activities in both urban and rural settings, see George O. Totten, "The People's Parliamentary Path of the Japanese Communist Party," in *Pacific Affairs* (Vancouver, BC), "Part I: Agrarian Policies," ibid., Summer 1973, pp. 193–217, and esp. "Part II: Local Level Tactics," ibid., Fall 1973, pp. 384–406.

[20] See "Resolution of the 17th Congress of the Japan Communist Party," *Akahata*, Nov. 25, 1985; and *Bulletin*, No. 556, January 1986, p. 33.

[21] For biographical information on Communist leaders, see Peter Berton, "The Japan Communist Party: The 'Lovable' Party," in Hrebenar, op. cit. See also Mizushima Tsuyoshi, *Shokugyo Kakumeika—Nikkyo Kambu 160 Mei no Rirekisho* (Professional Revolutionaries—Biographies of 160 JCP Leaders), Tokyo, Zembo Sha, 1970.

[22] For a map of the party complex and the location of various party offices, see Mizushima Tsuyoshi, *Kore ga Kyosan To* (This is the Communist Party), Tokyo, Zembo Sha, 1977, pp. 13–16.

[23] For an analysis of the JCP leadership and the groupings of the Presidium members, see Fukui, loc. cit., pp. 287–98.

It is not surprising, then, that more than 1,000 party apparatchiks work in the JCP headquarters. In addition, there are 10,000-plus apparatchiks in prefectural and district committees, and some 70,000 chiefs and members of branch leadership committees.[29] Regular contact with the provincial apparat is maintained through periodic conferences of prefectural and district chairmen, and through meetings of chiefs of provincial functional departments, such as those dealing with publications and elections.

The JCP is run dictatorially by Miyamoto and his protégés. In true "democratic centralist" fashion, they co-opt and appoint all levels of party apparatchiks, prefectural and district committee members, staff at the Tokyo headquarters, the Central Committee with its Presidium and Standing Committee, and all delegates to the party congresses. One measure of this control is the number of Miyamoto's personal secretaries or assistants who now sit on the party Presidium (by one account, some 14 out of 50 in 1982), as well as the disproportionately high number of Tokyo Headquarters apparatchiks who get promoted to senior positions in the party.[30]

Women make up 40 percent of the JCP's membership but play only a small role in Miyamoto's party. To be sure, the JCP takes particular pride in the number of female members officially endorsed and elected under party auspices. Indeed, in the lower house elections in December 1983, the JCP elected seven female parliamentarians compared to two for all the other parties combined.[31] But women are seriously underrepresented in the party hierarchy. Only 30 of the 206-member Central Committee elected at the 17th Party Congress in 1985 were women.[32] Moreover, there is but one woman on the Standing Committee of the Presidium, two in the Presidium, and none on either the Secretariat or Control and Audit committees. In total, of almost 200 top posts in the party 15 are filled by women. Actually, the 15 turn out to be only 9 individuals, since one of them (Yamanaka Asako) wears no less than five hats, and two other women have two posts each.[33]

Membership. The JCP has fallen far short of its ambitious membership goals, announced at the 8th Party Congress in 1961 when membership totaled some 80,000, of having 300,000 members by 1963 and 1 million by 1970.[34] Party membership did reach 300,000, but not until 1970; and the 1 million goal seems unattainable even by the year 2000.[35] In 1977, the party began to talk about a goal of half a million members, but this figure also seems difficult to reach. In July 1982, at the 16th congress, the party announced the figure of 480,000 members, but three years later, at the 17th congress, the figure was down to 466,000 (see Table 2).

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[24] The committees are concerned with such issues as international affairs, economic policy, security and diplomatic affairs, JCP policy in the National Diet, policy on ad hoc administrative reforms, promotion of united front, social security, liaison with mass movements, old and disabled citizens, youth and students, peace problems, military bases, audio-visual propaganda, environmental problems and natural disasters, religion, sports, intellectuals, petitions, and journals.

[25] Among the concerns of the bureaus are labor, farmers and fishermen, urban activities and small and medium enterprises, elections and local government, ideology, propaganda, publications, as well as party organization, personnel, and finance and business.

[26] The departments deal with such issues as women, children, Burakumin outcasts, culture, education, science and technology, public relations, legal affairs, and welfare.

[27] These committees bring together personnel to deal with such matters as international problems, national and local policy, united front, mass movements, educational affairs, party organization and discipline, propaganda, and elections.

[28] The guidance structure consists of the General Assembly of JCP Diet Members Groups, House of Representatives and House of Councillors Party Diet Members groups, House of Representatives and House of Councillors Policy committees, and the Party Diet Members Group Secretariat. See *Nikkyo no Tebiki*, pp. 218–23. For brief descriptions of the functions of party agencies, see *Nihon Kyosan To Shokai* (An Introduction to the Japan Communist Party), Tokyo, JCP Central Committee Publishing Bureau, 1976, pp. 71–75, 159–62, and 206–13.

[29] Introductory speech by Miyamoto at the 1st National Conference, *Akahata*, Apr. 14, 1984, and *Bulletin*, No. 522, May 1984, p. 24.

[30] See "Two More Miyamoto Secretaries Became Members of the Presidium," *Zembo Tokubetsu Tsushin* (Tokyo), No. 778, Aug. 11, 1982, pp. 7–9.

[31] See, e.g., *Asahi Shimbun*, Dec. 20, 1983, p. 8. In the 1979 elections, 14 out of 22 female candidates and 8 out of 11 elected representatives were Communists.

[32] See *Akahata*, Nov. 25, 1985, p. 2. This was actually twice as many women as had been elected to the 15th Central Committee in 1980.

[33] Women are only slightly better represented on less prestigious party bodies: there are two women among 14 members of the Editorial Committee for Central Party Publications; and six among the more than 50 heads of committees, bureaus, and departments. One woman is on two 25-member campaign committees, and the same woman serves among the eight heads of functional committees. Three women serve in leading positions in the parliamentary groups (out of 19). See *Nikkyo no Tebiki*, pp. 218–23.

[34] "First Unified Two-Year Plan for the Expansion of Party Influence," cited in Kyosuke Hirotsu, "The New Line of the Japan Communist Party for the 1970s: Special Features and Problems of the Eleventh Party Congress," *Review: A Quarterly Journal for the Study of Communism and Communist Countries* (Tokyo), No. 26, September 1970, pp. 34–35.

[35] Other ambitious, but not very realistic, goals have included: *Akahata* readership of 8 million; over 100 representatives in the National Diet; 3 million supporters each among students and labor unionists; and 20 million votes.

These membership figures are party claims, however, and Japanese government analysts dispute them. They point out that during periods just before party congresses the JCP announces membership goals and carries on its membership rolls quite a number of "sleepers" (i.e., those whose membership has technically lapsed but against whom no action has been taken).[36] By government estimates these "sleepers" account for some 20 percent of the membership (or about 100,000 people).[37]

One measure of the party's rather desperate attempts to hang on to these "sleepers," and thus camouflage its declining membership, is the revision of one of the party rules. It used to be that either nonpayment of party dues or nonattendance at party meetings for six months constituted grounds for expulsion, and the lower organizations routinely terminated inactive members. In January 1981, however, Miyamoto warned against the "easygoing cancellation of the [party] registration." First, the rule was changed requiring a year's inactivity instead of six months. Then at the 16th Party Congress the pertinent Article XII was amended to make expulsion of inactive members even more difficult. The new rule provides that before a member can be expelled, the lower organization must bring the matter up to the district committee, which in turn must receive approval from the prefectural organization, and in some cases must even consult with the Central Committee.[38]

Given party leaders' open concern and government analysts' projections, it seems not unreasonable to speculate that out of the JCP's 400,000-plus membership, there are probably only some 100,000 dedicated party members and another 200,000 who are somewhat less committed. Nonetheless, even if this is the case, JCP membership figures are quite impressive when one realizes that it has more actual members than all the other Japanese opposition parties combined. Internationally, the JCP is the third largest nonruling communist party in the world, after the Italian and French.

Table 2: Membership in the Japan Communist Party, 1945-85

Date	Event	Members
December 1945	4th Congress	1,000
February 1946	5th Congress	7,000
February 1947	6th Congress	7,000
February 1951	4th Conference	84,000
July 1955	6th Conference	45,000
July 1958	7th Congress	40,000
July 1961	8th Congress	80,000
November 1964	9th Congress	150,000
October 1966	10th Congress	270,000
July 1970	11th Congress	300,000
November 1973	12th Congress	347,000
July 1976	13th Congress	379,000
October 1977	14th Congress	393,000
February 1980	15th Congress	438,000
March 1981	National Conference of Prefectural and District Chairmen	442,000
July 1982	16th Congress	479,000
July 1983	Fifth CC Plenum	478,000
November 1983	Sixth CC Plenum	471,000
January 1984	Seventh CC Plenum	469,000
April 1984	First National Conference	432,000
November 1984	14th Conference of Prefectural Chairmen	453,000
November 1985	17th Congress	466,000

SOURCES: Nihon Seiji Keizai Kenkyujo (Japan Institute for Political and Economic Affairs), *Nikkyo, Minsei, Shakaishugi, Kyokai, Shin Sayoku—Kenkyu, Chosa, Taisaku no Tebiki* (The Japan Communist Party, Japan Democratic Youth League, Socialist Association, and the New Left—Research, Surveys, and Policy Handbook), Tokyo, November 1983, p. 248; *Akahata* (Tokyo), Nov. 25, 1985; and *Zembo* (Tokyo), February 1986, p. 12.

Publications and finances. These two topics are inevitably intertwined in any discussion of the Japan Communist Party. In fact, the party has been jokingly called "The Yoyogi Newspaper Publishing Company, Limited." Of course, all communist parties recognize the power of propaganda, but probably only the JCP is able to finance practically all of its operations from the sale of its publications. The party publishes a daily and Sunday party organ, *Akahata* (Red Flag)—its financial lifeline, as well as one of its primary measures of success (along with party membership goals, the JCP constantly sets *Akahata* subscription goals). It also publishes a whole array of weeklies, monthlies, quarterlies, and semiannuals covering such issues as ideology and theory, international affairs, parliamentary matters, agriculture, labor economics, culture, science and technology, as well as numerous publications aimed at specialized audiences, including, among

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[36] According to a secret document prepared by the Party Central Committee in November 1980, the number of JCP members who came under Article XII of the Party Constitution (nonpayment of dues for six months, etc.) increased from 55,100 in January 1975 to 84,700 in November 1980. Mizushima Tsuyoshi, *Watakushi no Yoyogi Tokuhain: Nihon Kyosan To no Shindan* (My Yoyogi Correspondent: A Diagnosis of the JCP), Tokyo, Zembo Sha, November 1981, p. 131.

[37] According to a confidential party report circulated at the 7th Plenum in January 1984. Cited in *K.D.K. Information* (Tokyo), No. 5/84 (May 1, 1984), p. 5.

[38] *The 16th Congress of the Japanese Communist Party: Atami, July 27–31, 1982*, Tokyo, Japan Press Service, 1982, pp. 194–95 and 258.

Publications of the Japan Communist Party

Name, subject, periodicity	Approximate circulation
Akahata (Red Flag) — party daily, mass circulation political newspaper, postwar edition since October 1945	600,000
Akahata — Sunday edition, weekly, since March 1959	2,700,000
Akahata — study and party activities edition, weekly	170,000
Akahata — weekly commentary on policy and theoretical problems	200,000
Akahata — in braille, monthly, since January 1975	1,000
Akahata Shashin Nyusu (Akahata Illustrated News) — wall newspaper for propaganda and advertising purposes, three times a month, since August 1965	80,000
Akahata — reduced-size, bound edition for libraries, monthly (of both daily and Sunday editions), since 1961	6,000
Gakusei Shimbun (Student Newspaper) — weekly, since February 1961	35,000
Zen'ei (Vanguard) — theoretical monthly, since February 1946	60,000
Riron Seisaku (Theory and Policy) — monthly collection of resolutions, decisions, policies, and other important documents, since October 1967	17,000
Sekai Seiji (World Politics) — semi-monthly journal on international affairs, since July 1956; originally entitled *Sekai Seiji Shirjo* (Materials on World Politics)	16,000
Kurashi to Seiji (Life and Politics) — monthly reports on parliamentary affairs (national, prefectural, and local), since October 1959; originally entitled *Gikai to Kyosan To* (The Diet and the JCP)	17,000
Asu no Noson (The Village of Tomorrow) — monthly journal on the agricultural movement, since May 1966; originally entitled *Rodo, Nomin Undo* (The Labor-Farmer Movement)	13,000
Gekkan Gakushu (Student Monthly) — for new party members, since April 1961	80,000
Josei no Hiroba (Women's Forum) — monthly journal for female party members, since March 1979	160,000
Konnichi wa, Kyosan To desu (Hello, This Is the JCP) — illustrated monthly, since September 1983	Unknown[1]
Bulletin: Information for Abroad — irregular publication (in English, French, and Spanish) for foreign communist parties, since 1961	2,000
OTHER PUBLICATIONS DISTRIBUTED OR PROMOTED BY THE JCP	
Bunka Hyoron (Cultural Review) — monthly, since December 1961	40,000
Keizai (Economics) — monthly, since June 1962	30,000
Rodo Undo (Labor Movement) — monthly, since May 1966; originally entitled *Rodo, Nomin Undo* (The Labor-Farmer Movement)	32,000
Kikan Kagaku to Shiso (Science and Thought Quarterly) — since July 1971	7,000
Minshu Bungaku (People's Literature) — monthly organ of the Nihon Minshushugi Bungaku Domei (Japan Democratic Literature League), since December 1965	4,000
Shin Fujin Shimbun (New Japan Women's Association Newspaper) — weekly	280,000
Minshu Seinen Shimbun (Japan Democratic Youth League Newspaper) — weekly (also appears semiannually in reduced-size bound edition for libraries, 3,000 copies)	145,000
Domei Katsudo (Activities of the Japan Democratic Youth League) — weekly for League cadres	35,000
Warera Kokosei (Our High School Students) — weekly of Japan Democratic Youth League	40,000
Seinen Undo (Youth Movement) — theoretical monthly of Japan Democratic Youth League	40,000
Gakushu no Tomo (Study Companion) — monthly for working youth	100,000
Shonen Shojo Shimbun (Newspaper for Boys and Girls) — weekly, since March 1969	100,000

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[1] During elections "delivered to almost every home in the country." See "Fuwa's Central Committee Report to the 17th Congress," *Akahata*, Nov. 20, 1985.

SOURCES: Nihon Seiji Keizai Kenkyujo (Japan institute for Political and Economic Affairs), *Nikkyo, Minsei, Shakaishugi Kyokai, Shin Sayoku—Kenkyu, Chosa, Taisaku no Tebiki* (The Japan Communist Party, Japan Democratic Youth League, Socialist Association, and the New Left—Research, Surveys, and Policy Handbook), Tokyo, November 1983, p. 255; *Nihon Kyosan To Shokai* (An Introduction to the Japanese Communist Party), Tokyo, JCP Central Committee Publishing Bureau, 1983 edition, pp. 242-46; and JCP publications.

others, women, youth, students, and children (see box on p. 10). Circulation of these publications (excluding *Akahata*) ranges from 4,000 to 28,000, totaling over 1.5 million copies. In addition, the Central Committee Publishing Bureau puts out millions of pamphlets, especially during elections, and a whole range of books.[39]

Akahata has become a publication of some magnitude and substance. It maintains permanent correspondents in such communist centers as Hanoi, Moscow, Prague, East Berlin, Bucharest, Belgrade, as well as in Paris, London, Rome, Mexico City, and Washington. In the past, *Akahata* also had permanent correspondents in Beijing (expelled in 1967 during the Cultural Revolution) and Pyongyang (a position currently vacant). The paper also dispatches special correspondents to many other centers on all continents and has at its service some 13,000 correspondents or stringers in Japan, as well as more than 50,000 unpaid delivery workers.

Since *Akahata* subscription figures are used by the party as a measure of the success of JCP activities, a brief look at its publishing history seems in order. The period of greatest growth occurred in the 1960's (the Sunday edition of *Akahata* was started in 1959), when circulation went from 300,000 to 1.8 million. Another million was added by 1973; 3.25 million was reached by the time of the 14th Party Congress in 1977; and subscriptions peaked in 1980 at some 3.55 million. Over the next six years, *Akahata* subscription totals dropped to 3.4 million in July 1982 and to just "over 3 million" in November 1985.

While these setbacks may signify that JCP organs had reached their limits of expansion, the magnitude of the party's publishing deserves recognition. Indeed, *Akahata* easily surpasses the circulation of the party newspaper of any other nonruling communist party. In fact, Miyamoto bragged that his colleagues in the French and the Italian communist parties were astounded when they learned about *Akahata*'s 3 million-plus readership.[40]

But if party publications are valuable as conveyor belts of JCP ideology and policy, they are at least as valuable as sources of income. Fully 90 percent of the JCP's total income comes from sales of these publications, which continuously show a healthy profit. By contrast, membership dues account for only about 5 percent of party income.[41]

Amazingly, insofar as official reporting is concerned, the JCP is the richest political party in Japan, even though, of course, the LDP enjoys the generous support of big business, and political donations are more easily concealable than the JCP income from its publishing empire.[42] In 1980 (an election year), the JCP's reported income was US$93.3 million compared to $88.8 million for the LDP. In 1981, the JCP income was $95.0 million, followed by $58.6 million for the LDP, $42.4 million for the Komeito, $23.2 million for the JSP, and $6.0 million for the DSP.[43] This is even more remarkable when one considers that the other opposition parties enjoy the financial support of large labor union federations and of a religious organization in the case of the Komeito. This also means that the JCP is not indebted to outside interest groups, which gives it an advantage over the other parties since they sometimes get bad publicity because of "money politics" and charges of conflict of interest.

Affiliate Organizations

In Japan, as in most other countries, the communist movement comprises much more than just the Japan Communist Party. Other integral components of the movement are the party's youth and women's affiliate organizations.

Japan Democratic Youth League. The Japan Democratic Youth League (*Nihon Minshu Seinen Domei*, or *Minseido*) was established in April 1923 as the Japan Communist Youth League and became the Japan branch of the International Communist Youth League.[44] It shared the vicissitudes of the JCP throughout the prewar period, and its members suffered persecution, arrests, and assassinations. After the war, in February 1946, two months after the reappearance of the JCP, the youth organization was reestablished as the Japan Youth Communist League. Its initial membership was about 3,000.

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[39] For circulation figures, see *Nikkyo no Tebiki*, p. 255; *Nihon Kyosan To Shokai*, 1983 ed., pp. 234–52; and Mizushima, *Kore ga Kyosan To*, pp. 94–105. In addition to election campaigns, special pamphlets are issued on many occasions. For example, over 4 million pamphlets were distributed in the wake of the purge of Presidium Vice-Chairman Hakamada Satomi and his subsequent exposés of the party and Miyamoto's dictatorial control (see p. 15 of text). Many books and journals are published under the imprint of Shin Nihon Shuppan Sha (New Japan Publishing Company), a party affiliate organization.

[40] *Shukan Asahi* (Tokyo), May 30, 1975, cited in Richard F. Staar, Ed., *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs: 1976*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1976, p. 304. The circulation of the daily edition of *L'Unità* is roughly a half a million and *l'Humanité* considerably less.

[41] The JCP claims that 75 percent of the LDP, 40 percent of the DSP, and 28 percent of the NLC budgets come from corporate contributions, whereas 34 percent of the JSP and 15 percent each of the DSP and the Komeito budgets come from party dues. See *Nihon Kyosan To Shokai*, 1983 ed., p. 264. The section on party finances is entitled "People-Supported Clean Party Finances," pp. 256–66.

[42] The LDP is of course structured in such a way that finances of the various factions and support groups need not be reported by central party headquarters.

[43] *Nikkyo no Tebiki*, p. 289. Because of the recent revaluation of Japanese currency, the JCP's income is now around US$150 million.

[44] See ibid., Part 5, pp. 293–360.

In June 1946, it joined with other youth organizations on the left to form the Japan Youth Council (*Seinen Kyogikai*). In 1951, League members were part of the Japanese youth delegation to the Third World Youth and Students Peace and Friendship Festival in East Berlin. During the turbulent 1960's, however, many of Japan's youthful revolutionaries (much like their counterparts in Western Europe) deserted the communist party, which they felt had become too rigid, bureaucratic, and conservative, and most student organizations on the left split into pro-JCP and anti-JCP groups.

Today, there are literally dozens of "New Left" youth and student groups in Japan, but their combined membership is a fraction of the JCP Youth League's.[45] However, while JCP membership grew in the 1970's and early 1980's (albeit at a greatly reduced rate), the membership of the League reached its peak of 234,000 in 1966; today, its membership stands at 210,000.[46] Circulation of the organization's weekly *Minsei Shimbun* (Japan Democratic Youth League Newspaper) also reached its peak of 310,000 in 1966, and now stands at half that mark. The number of JCP members in the League too is down somewhat from a high of 70,000 in the 1969–76 period.

The motto of the League is "Study, Play, Struggle," and besides the organization's congresses, which are held every two or three years, the highlight of its activity since 1973 has been the annual "Yangu Jampu" (Young Jump) assemblies (attracting 2,000 to 4,000 young people).[47] These assemblies combine excellent entertainment with pep talks and long-winded lectures by Miyamoto and other top party leaders.

The stagnation in the JCP youth affiliate, of course, has a direct bearing on the future of the party itself, as a healthy youth organization normally guarantees the growth of the parent organization. Therefore, it was very discouraging for party leaders to discover that whereas 55 percent of the party membership in 1970 was under 30, the figure was down to 43 percent (some 160,000 members) in 1976, 25 percent (120,000) in 1982, and only 15 percent (70,000) in January 1985.[48]

New Japan Women's Association. The New Japan Women's Association (*Shin Nihon Fujin no Kai*, or *Shinfujin*) was organized as the JCP's "women vanguard corps" in October 1962 following a decision at the 8th Party Congress held in July 1961.[49] The organization was designed to deal with a wide range of problems (rising prices, education, medical problems of infants and children, environmental issues, cultural affairs, sports), wherever possible in conjunction with other groups; it was also charged with many tasks, among them to organize women's auxiliaries in labor unions, women in rural areas, and renters groups in apartment complexes.

Like its youth league counterpart, the *Shinfujin* has seen its membership rise sharply in its formative years only to level off in later years. At its founding meeting, for example, the *Shinfujin* claimed a membership of 34,000. Between its 3rd and 4th congresses (from February 1965 to May 1967), *Shinfujin* membership almost doubled, from 53,000 to 100,000. Membership growth slowed considerably in the 1970's and the early 1980's, and at the organization's latest congress (the 12th, held in June 1984), membership was given at 182,000, roughly the size of the JCP youth affiliate. The resolutions adopted at the latest congress included the usual good things about children's education, health and cultural living for the elderly, and the "three equalities" for women (equality in society, equality at work, and equality at home). In addition, there was one very topical resolution against Tomahawk missiles and "for a complete prohibition of nuclear weapons!"[50]

Thus, while the triad of the party and its youth and women's affiliates can claim a combined membership of over three-quarters of a million, it is clear that all three organizations are no longer growing at the same rate as during the periods of rapid expansion, and may in fact be in a period of continuing stagnation.

The Party's Larger Network

Beyond the party's youth and women's affiliate organizations, JCP influence is felt in certain labor unions and in numerous front organizations which focus on a wide range of issues such as peace, international friendship, nuclear disarmament, welfare, and livelihood protection. Several of these organizations are constituent members of international communist front organizations, even though their membership is by no means exclusively Communist. Many of the organizations are also part of larger Japanese federations of organizations on the left, some of which, especially those originally co-sponsored by the Communists and Socialists, have split into JCP and JSP groups. Most notable among these was the anti-nuclear movement of the early 1960's.

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[45] Ibid., Part 9, on the New Left, pp. 703–98.

[46] These are figures announced at the 18th Congress held in July 1984. "What Was Noteworthy at the 18th National Congress of the Democratic Youth League," *Koan Joho* (Tokyo), No. 371, August 1984, pp. 79–94.

[47] The Japanese seem to love to use foreign phrases like "Young Jump" whether or not it makes any sense in the original language.

[48] Hirotsu Kyosuke, "The 17th [Communist] Party Congress and the Miyamoto Organization," *Koan Joho*, No. 393, June 1986, p. 11.

[49] *Nikkyo no Tebiki*, pp. 515–24; and Shiso Undo Kenkyujo (Research Institute on Ideological Movements), Comp. *1981-nemban Nihon Kyosan Tokei Dantai Yoran* (1981 Handbook of JCP Lineage Organizations), Tokyo, Zembo Sha, 1981, pp. 625–47 (hereafter cited as *1981 Yoran*).

[50] "Circumstances Surrounding the 12th National Congress of the New Japan Women's Association," *Koan Joho*, No. 370, July 1984, pp. 64–83.

Some analysts have singled out the youth, women's, and small businessmen's organizations as the party's "Three Great Families" (*Gosanke*, an ironic reference to the three main branches of the ruling Tokugawa family during the 17th to 19th centuries). More recently, three other organizations have been jokingly designated as the JCP's "New Three Great Families"—the associations of doctors, lawyers, and tax accountants—in recognition not only of the importance the party attaches to these professions but also of the significant role these organizations have played in projecting an image of the JCP as a party that is helping people in their daily lives.[51]

Front organizations. Government law enforcement agencies keep careful track of the numerous leftwing (and some rightwing) organizations, and several anti-communist research organizations put out handbooks and other reference works identifying leftwing front organizations and their members, as well as JCP activities in public and private enterprises and labor unions.[52] It is the ties of these organizations to international communist fronts and the JCP's organization, manipulation, or infiltration of these bodies that has concerned the authorities over the years, especially after the anti-government forces' spectacular show of strength and influence during the anti–Security Treaty riots and demonstrations in 1960.

Since it would take a separate study to describe and analyze the organizational framework and principal objectives of these overlapping and related organizations and groups, I shall here focus only on several of the more prominent ones.[53] Perhaps most notable is the All-Japan Federation of Commercial and Industrial Organizations (*Zenkoku Shoko Dantai Rengokai*, or *Zenshoren*), the third organization in the original "Three Great Families" of the party (along with the JCP's youth and women's affiliates). This federation grew out of the party's attempts back in 1947 to organize the 2.5 million small and medium businessmen to oppose high taxation. It was formally launched in August 1951, when some 300 representatives from 37 different businessmen and citizen groups gathered in Kyoto. The organization grew rapidly, gaining 170,000 members by 1961 and over 350,000 in the early 1980's. *Zenshoren* too has its own official publication, and the readership of this semimonthly is reportedly over half a million.[54]

Other well-known organizations include the Japan Peace Committee, the Japan Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs, the JCP faction of the General Federation of All-Japan Student Governments, the Japan Conference of Journalists, and the Japan Scientists Association.

A close comparison of the leadership lists of JCP front organizations and communist international fronts clearly reveals a connection between the two. For example, Hirone Tokutaro, professor of Physics at Yamagata University and one of six directors of the Japan Scientists Association, is also a vice-president of the World Federation of Scientific Workers; Suzuki Shiro, president of the Japan Conference of Journalists, is a vice-president of the International Organization of Journalists; Ozaki Susumu, one of two standing directors of the Japan Liaison Society of International Lawyers, is a vice-president of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers; Kasai Akira, a Central Committee member of the Japan Democratic Youth League, is one of the secretaries of the World Federation of Democratic Youth; and Kushida Fuki, a member of the Standing Committee of the New Japan Women's Association and chairman of the Federation of

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[51] *1981 Yoran*, Preface, pp. 2–3.

[52] Thirty-nine of the most important organizations are described in some detail in *1981 Yoran*; 699 professors are listed in Shiso Undo Kenkyujo, Comp., *Zenkoku 244 Daigaku, Gakububetsu Sotenken: Daigaku Kyoju Shinshiroku, Sayoku Hen* (General Examination of 244 Universities in Japan by Department: Who's Who of University Professors, Leftwing), Tokyo, February 1984; and "Outside Organizations of the JCP," Part 7 in *Nikkyo no Tebiki*, pp. 441–630.

[53] A recent handbook lists some 11 organizations in the peace movement, 12 international friendship associations, 8 legal assistance societies (including lawyers' groups), 15 welfare and livelihood protection organizations (including doctors' groups), 9 women and 6 youth and student groups, 11 academic and publishing organizations, 56 leftwing publishers and over 100 "democratic" bookstores, 31 organizations belonging to the Liaison Conference of Cultural Organizations, over 150 groups belonging to the National Conference of Choral Groups, some 300 music lovers clubs, almost 100 theatrical performance groups, about 300 children's theatrical troupes, some 10,000 members of movie fan groups, the New Japan Physical Education Federation consisting of 40 prefectural federations, 12 different sports societies, 2,000 circles of almost 50,000 members, and 32 workingmen's fishing groups. See "Outside Organizations of the JCP," loc. cit.

[54] Ibid., pp. 489–96 and *1981 Yoran*, pp. 98–128. For a description of the activities of the most important of these organizations, see Totten, "Part I: Agrarian Policies," pp. 193–217, and "Part II: Local Level Tactics," pp. 384–406.

Women's Organizations, is a vice-president of the Women's International Democratic Federation.[55]

Most of the Japanese front organizations are very active, and a schedule for the month of June 1984 lists 45 national congresses, meetings, and conferences. These include the 12th National Congress of the New Japan Women's Association, the 34th National Congress of the Japan Peace Committee, the 21st General Meeting of the Japan-Cuba Friendship Society, the 154th Meeting of the Standing Board of Directors of the Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs, and the 25th National Congress Commemorating the 30th anniversary of the All-Japan Federation of Organizations Protecting Livelihood and Health.[56]

Umbrella organizations. To some extent, the scope and activities of these JCP front organizations make up for the inability of the party to gain control over the nation's major labor union federations, which provide support to the Socialist Party and the Democratic Socialists. In an effort to expand JCP influence throughout the labor union movement (the party has successfully penetrated a number of individual labor unions),[57] in December 1974 the JCP launched the Conference of Trade Unions to Promote a United Front, which now encompasses more than 1.8 million workers through 400 locals and which has spawned its own youth and women's affiliates.[58] At the "1985 Special General Meeting" held in December, the Conference leadership made plans for the spring 1986 labor offensive, one of the organization's four "joint actions," the others being opposition to rightwing tendencies in the labor movement, efforts to expand the capabilities of the unity of progressive forces, and the struggle to prevent nuclear war and completely eliminate nuclear weapons (the last point added in December 1983).[59]

Another umbrella organization was launched in the wake of the 1980 anti-JCP agreement between the JSP and the Komeito. This was grandly labeled the National Forum for Peace, Democracy and Progressive Unity. The Forum claimed a membership of 4.35 million (comprising 2,700 constituent organizations, 33,000 distinguished individuals who support or take part in the Forum, and 320 provincial and local forums).[60]

Shifting JCP Fortunes, 1977–85

The past decade has witnessed a sharp decline in electoral support for JCP candidates. The JCP's disastrous showing in the election to the lower house in December 1976 was followed by a dismal performance in the July 1977 upper house election. The JCP has been hurt by bad publicity—some of it its own doing, some not. Domestically, the party has suffered because of the resurfacing of the Miyamoto "lynching case," a reference to the prewar charge that back in the 1930's during a party interrogation, Miyamoto killed another JCP member suspected of being a police informant. Not only did the JCP lose seats in the House of Councillors, but Miyamoto himself, a leader of a major party, came in as number 41 in the national constituency out of 50 successful candidates. Abroad, the death of Mao Zedong in September 1976 and the arrest of the Gang of Four one month later revealed the seamy side of Chinese politics, and the defection of a Soviet MiG–25 pilot to an airfield in Hokkaido highlighted both the Soviet military threat to Japan and the closed nature of the Soviet system.

At the 14th Party Congress, held in October 1977 shortly after the elections to the upper house, the JCP leadership blamed the party's poor showing on an anti-communist "second postwar reactionary offensive" that they say had begun in the mid-1970's. As a result, the congress seriously concerned itself with this "anti-communist counteroffensive," discussed ways of combatting it, and proposed the "consolidation of the party through education," emphasizing the necessity for qualitative improvements in party activity.[61]

One measure undertaken was the revamping of study texts for all levels of membership. For several years, the party had deemphasized Marx, Engels, and other foreign communist classics and stressed indigenous JCP documents. The 14th Congress went one step further. Henceforth, the reading list for new members would be limited to JCP documents, with only the highest level containing a substantial number (about one-third) of non-Japanese materials.[62] Conspicuous by their absence were the writings of Mao Zedong, Stalin, Tito, Castro, and even Togliatti.

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[55] *Nikkyo no Tebiki*, passim, and Wallace Spaulding, "Communist International Fronts," *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1984, pp. 52–61.

[56] See *Shiso Undo Joho* (Tokyo—formerly *Zembo Tokubetsu Tsushin*), No. 843, June 13, 1984, pp. 19–20.

[57] For Communist penetration in key industrial districts and in broadcasting, banking, law, and other areas, see Mizushima, *Kore ga Kyosan To*.

[58] *Nikkyo no Tebiki*, pp. 417–37, and *Japan Press Weekly*, No. 1508, Aug. 2, 1986, pp. 23–25. In 1986, the Conference announced an immediate goal of 2 million members and united action by 3 million workers, with a longer range goal of 10 million workers, involving the underemployed and the unorganized.

[59] "Circumstances Surrounding the '1985 Special General Meeting' of the Conference of Trade Unions to Promote a United Front," *Koan Joho*, No. 389, February 1986, pp. 37–48.

[60] *Japan Press Weekly*, No. 1487, Mar. 8, 1986, p. 13.

[61] "Report of the Central Committee to the 14th Party Congress by Fuwa Tetsuzo, Director of the Secretariat, October 17, 1977," *Akahata*, Oct. 18, 1977; and *Bulletin*, No. 390, January 1978, p. 11.

[62] Of these, nine are by Marx and Engels, eight are by Lenin, and two are Comintern documents. See *Akahata*, Jan. 1, 1978; and *Bulletin*, No. 399, June 1978.

The 14th Congress also caused quite a stir among party members and the public at large by dropping several Presidium vice-chairmen, and particularly by stripping Vice-Chairman Hakamada Satomi of all party posts. This set the stage for another purge, which further damaged the party's image among the Japanese public. One of the oldest party leaders, Hakamada, aside from holding the post of vice-chairman of the Presidium, had epitomized JCP tenacity and virtue: he was one of the very few true proletarians among the JCP leadership (he was a metal worker) and one of the very few prewar Communists who upon arrest and interrogation did not perform the act of *tenko* (recantation or conversion) and who as a result remained in prison until liberation by the order of General Douglas MacArthur in October 1945. Moreover, shortly after his release from prison, he was one of only six selected for membership on the Politburo at the 5th Party Congress held in February 1946. Hakamada was also a comrade-in-arms of Miyamoto from the 1930's (he was present at the infamous interrogation, or "lynching"), and later worked closely with him in the postwar period.

Unable to present his case to the party membership—the JCP under Miyamoto tolerates neither dissent nor open criticism of its policies from within the ranks—Hakamada had the choice of either remaining silent and tolerating his demotion or going public in the "bourgeois press" and courting expulsion. A few months after the congress, he chose the latter, and was immediately expelled from the party.

Hakamada's revelations had an extremely negative impact on the JCP's public image and on Miyamoto personally. He characterized Miyamoto's rule in the party as "despotic," and he directly linked Miyamoto to the "lynching," to which he was, after all, a witness.[63] The charge of despotism was very damaging. Some newspaper commentators even took to referring to the JCP, which only the year before had published a "Manifesto of Freedom and Democracy," as "Mr. Miyaken's One-Man Show" (abbreviation for *Miya*moto *Ken*ji). Furthermore, Hakamada's corroboration of the "lynching" charge revived interest in challenging both Miyamoto's legal status and his suitability as a Councillor.[64] Hakamada's purge backfired, and the JCP was dealt a big blow in the press and in the Diet.

The 1978 local elections reversed the trend toward solid "progressive" control of the major Japanese metropolises: Kyoto and Yokohama reverted to conservative rule (albeit in coalition with the "centrist" parties), and in 1979 the two largest cities, Tokyo and Osaka, followed suit. On the positive side, Miyamoto led a JCP delegation to Yugoslavia and Romania, which resulted in a joint statement with Tito and a joint declaration with Ceauşescu, putting Miyamoto on the same level as these world statesmen. The following year, the JCP recouped its losses in the House of Representatives election in October 1979, and two months later a Brezhnev-Miyamoto summit normalized JCP-CPSU relations after 15 years of estrangement.

The atmosphere at the 15th congress held in February 1980 was upbeat because of the lower house election results; and, because of peace with the Soviets, it was well attended by foreign communist party delegations from 30 countries, including all East European satellites and many West European countries. In addition, some 50 congratulatory messages were received.[65]

Ironically, as the JCP was breaking out of isolation in the international communist movement, it was becoming more and more isolated at home. In January 1980, the Socialists signed an anti-JCP pact with the Komeito, and the Communists lost their last potential coalition partner. In the meantime, Soviet troops began their invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, a move that made a mockery of the freshly signed JCP-CPSU joint communiqué with its pious references to noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries. The JCP almost immediately criticized the Soviet action, but suffered humiliation and frustration nonetheless. Just how much this contributed to the JCP's defeat in the double elections in the summer of 1980 is difficult to tell. There were other complicating factors, such as the very high voter turnout and the sympathy vote for the LDP because of Prime Minister Ohira Masayoshi's recent death.

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[63] See Hakamada's articles in the weekly *Shukan Shincho* (Tokyo), Jan. 12 and Feb. 2, 1978. See also Hakamada, *Kinoo no Doshi Miyamoto Kenji e* (To Miyamoto Kenji, My Comrade of Yesterday), Tokyo, Shincho Sha, November 1978. For official and unofficial JCP statements on the expulsion of Hakamada, and Miyamoto's interview with a *Yomiuri Shimbun* reporter, see *Akahata*, Jan. 4 and 6, 1978, and *Yomiuri Shimbun*, Jan. 13, 1978. See also *Bulletin*, No. 391, January 1978, and No. 397, May 1978.

[64] The charge was resurrected by DSP Chairman Kasuga Ikko in the National Diet on January 27, 1976. If Miyamoto were guilty of murder, Kasuga argued, that would mean that he had actually been an ordinary criminal and not a political prisoner during his incarceration before and during World War II. Thus, he would have been ineligible for release by order of the American occupation. See the January 1976 issue of the popular mass circulation magazine *Bungei Shunju* (Tokyo). For JCP refutations, see Fuwa's statement and other documents in *Akahata*, Jan. 28–30, 1976; and *Bulletin*, No. 345, February 1976. On March 14, 1979, Councillor Tamaki Kazuo of the LDP reopened the case by lodging an official complaint to President Yasui Ken of the House of Councillors that Miyamoto was not qualified to serve as Councillor. See *K.D.K. Information*, No. 4/79 (Apr. 1, 1979), pp. 6–7.

[65] For documentation of the 15th Party Congress, see *Akahata*, Feb. 27 to Mar. 9, 1980; and *Bulletin*, Nos. 431–34, April 1980. For analysis, see Akiyama Jun'ichi, "Problems Surrounding the 15th Party Congress of the JCP," *Koan Joho*, No. 318, March 1980, pp. 1–44.

The 16th Party Congress was held in July 1982 to coincide with the celebration of the party's 60th anniversary. Despite strained relations with the CPSU because of the events in Afghanistan and Poland (the JCP held the Soviet Union responsible for the actions of the Polish authorities) and the worsening domestic isolation of the JCP, the party staged elaborate celebrations,[66] including an International Symposium on Theory attended by representatives from eight West European countries, Australia, and Mexico. The party tried to make the best of a bad situation by declaring, "Let us study history to create history," and by declaring itself "a glorious minority today and majority tomorrow." The congress also stressed the value of study and education, as well as of establishing a "proper party style"[67]—a phrase that denoted slack party discipline and low morale.

Matters did not get any better during the next year. The party suffered losses in the elections to both houses in June and December 1983, respectively, and the JCP leadership chose to postpone its 17th Party Congress, which had been scheduled for 1984. Instead, party leaders decided to tackle some of the problems at a National Conference that would bring together the Central Committee, chairmen of prefectural and district committees, the party's Diet members, prefectural and local assemblymen, and assorted central and provincial party apparatchiks and activists.[68] The 1st National Conference was held in April 1984, essentially to implement the decisions of the 7th Plenum of the 16th congress, to decentralize some party activity to lower-level organizations, and to engage in "mass struggles centering on the defeat of the [LDP] plot [to enact] a political party law" that was designed to establish "Japanese-style fascism."[69]

The 17th Congress and Its Aftermath

The 17th Party Congress was held, as rescheduled, in November 1985. It followed a specialized JCP-CPSU summit in Moscow in December 1984 devoted exclusively to nuclear problems, an international symposium for preventing nuclear war and eliminating nuclear weapons held in Tokyo in July 1985, and elections to the Tokyo Municipal Assembly (in which the JCP could at least boast of increasing its contingent, if not the total vote or percentage of the vote).

As is customary, drafts of the 17th congress resolution and proposed amendments to the Party Program and the Party Constitution (party rules) were published well in advance of the congress to allow for an all-party discussion. Changes in the program included eliminating "inappropriate definition of the 'general crisis' of capitalism," and a note about the revival and *strengthening* of imperialism. Curiously, the original 1961 statement that "although it is a highly-developed capitalist country, Japan is virtually a dependent state, semi-occupied by US imperialism" was not amended. More significant, a statement was added that "the hegemonist deviations committed by some socialist countries have become important international factors that help the anti-communist reactionary offensive," an unambiguous statement that the JCP wanted to dissociate itself from past and present domestic and international policies and behavior of most ruling communist parties. The proposed amendments to the party rules were cosmetic, but they were introduced because in "facing the second postwar reactionary offensive" the party must "overcome . . . weaknesses and shortcomings in party life" and build a party "filled with vitality in comradeship and solidarity arising from intellectual awareness" (whatever that means).[70]

The festive beginning of the Congress was marred by a demonstration outside the Central Party School in the resort city of Atami near Tokyo, where the congress was being held. Several party members from the Tokyo University Graduate School's second party cell attempted to distribute a proposed draft resolution calling upon the entire party to reconsider party policies and advising Miyamoto to retire voluntarily. The leader of this group, known by the pseudonym Iriichi (for Vladimir "Ilyich" Lenin), managed to get himself elected as a delegate to the congress, but his unsuccessful attempts to place a reconsideration of party policies and its leadership on the agenda led to a six-month suspension of his party membership and, hence, the revocation of his delegate credentials. (Following the fracas, duly reported in the national press, Iriichi was expelled from the party for "anti-party sectarian actvities.")[71]

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[66] In May 1982, at the annual *Akahata* Festival, Miyamoto cleverly linked the party's 60th anniversary with the 35th anniversary of the postwar constitution. *Akahata*, May 5, 1982; and *Bulletin*, No. 483, May 1982.

[67] *Akahata*, June 11 and Jul. 28–Aug. 5, 1982; *Bulletin*, Nos. 488–92, June-September 1982; Nishida Shin'ichiro, "Problems Surrounding the 16th Party Congress of the JCP," *Koan Joho*, No. 347, August 1982, pp. 1–47; and *Kenkyu Tsushin* (Tokyo—publication of Nihon Seiji Keizai Kenkyujo), No. 11, June 30, 1982.

[68] See *Akahata* coverage for mid-April 1984; and *Bulletin*, No. 522, May 1984.

[69] Introductory speech by Miyamoto at the 1st National Conference, *Akahata*, Apr. 14, 1984; and *Bulletin*, No. 522, May 1984, pp. 2, 11.

[70] "Draft Resolution of the 17th Congress of the Japan Communist Party," *Akahata*, Sept. 9, 1985; *Bulletin*, No. 552, October 1985; "Report on Amendments to Party Program," *Akahata*, Nov. 22, 1985; and *Bulletin*, No. 560, March 1986.

[71] Iriichi published his diary and his theses in the "bourgeois press" and

Miyamoto Kenji addresses the 17th Congress of the Japan Communist Party in November 1985.

—Kyodo News.

The week-long Congress itself went off rather smoothly. Over a thousand official delegates attended, plus 64 nonvoting councillors (party center apparatchiks). Although foreign communist and other representation was unimpressive—only 27 of approximately 100 parties worldwide sent delegations—it was an interesting collection, to say the least. Among those attending were the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the "Sahara Arab Democratic Republic" (the Polisario Front), Algeria's ruling Socialist Vanguard Party, and El Salvador's Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front, hardly bona fide members of the communist movement. More than one-third of the delegations came from Western Europe, about evenly divided between Eurocommunist and pro-Soviet parties. The Romanians and Yugoslavs were also there, as were delegations from the Soviet Union,[72] East Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, Vietnam, Cuba, and Nicaragua. Conspicuously absent among ruling parties were China, North Korea, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Albania, Afghanistan, and Mongolia. On the final day, it was announced that, in all, 354 congratulatory messages had been received from "progressive local governments," labor unions, and "democratic organizations."

Programmatically, the congress was notable for its uneventfulness.[73] The resolutions passed by the congress contained no significant innovative policies. Pre-

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eventually in book form by the publishing house of Nitchu Shuppan (Sino-Japanese Publishing House), operated by a group of former Communists who were themselves purged for publishing details about a split in the JCP front organization, the Japan Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs. The JCP launched a campaign criticizing Iriichi and his ideas. See *Akahata*, Jan. 18 and 19, 1986; and Nishida Shin'ichiro, "On the 'Rebellion' of the Tokyo University Graduate School [Party] Branch," *Koan Joho*, No. 390, March 1986, pp. 1–12.

[72] Unlike the Soviet delegation that attended the 15th Party Congress, numbering six people and headed by a member of the Secretariat, the delegation to the 17th congress was composed of only three persons and was headed by an ordinary member of the CPSU Central Committee.

[73] See coverage in *Akahata*, Nov. 20–25, 1985; *Bulletin*, No. 556, January 1986; *Japan Press Weekly*, Nos. 1473–74, Nov. 23 and 30, 1985; Nihon Seiji Keizai Kenkyujo, *Shiryo Tsushin—Research Bulletin* (Tokyo), No. 22-23, Dec. 15, 1985; Nishida Shin'ichiro, "On the JCP's 17th Congress," *Koan Joho*, No. 387, December 1985, pp. 1–18.

dictably, the party pushed the anti-nuclear campaign (see below for details) for all it was worth. A lot of noise was being made about the establishment of a "non-nuclear government" instead of the "pro-nuclear government" of the LDP and Prime Minister Nakasone in particular. Local governments were encouraged to declare themselves "non-nuclear areas," and the anti-nuclear campaign was given "five non-nuclear goals," which combined both international and domestic action:

1. Initiatives for the prevention of nuclear war and elimination of nuclear weapons as an urgent task;
2. Strict observance of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles;[74]
3. Opposition to any measure that could turn Japan into a nuclear battlefield;
4. Relief for atom-bomb victims, with state compensation; and
5. International solidarity to keep alive the positive tradition of the World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs.[75]

Although Miyamoto maintained his firm grip over the party, and hardly any changes in leadership took place at the congress, all was not well. According to knowledgeable Japanese observers, the noisy demonstration outside the congregation was a portent of dissatisfaction with Miyamoto's dictatorial methods and bureaucratic style. And there were rumors of a serious rift between Miyamoto and Fuwa's elder brother, Presidium Vice-Chairman Ueda Koichiro.[76]

International Relations

JCP leaders used the occasion of the 17th Party Congress to try to impress foreign delegates, honoring them throughout the country at elaborate welcoming public meetings "full of fevered atmosphere of solidarity." What can be said of JCP ties to other communist parties? Has the JCP managed to emerge from its isolation within the international communist movement (begun 20-odd years ago when it lost its ties to the Soviet and Chinese communist parties)?

It is important to note that the JCP considers itself an integral part of the "independent current in the world communist movement," dedicated to the proposition that recognized norms of relations between communist parties include independence, equality, noninterference in each other's internal affairs, and solidarity in solving common tasks. According to the JCP, this means not only that "each party has the right to decide independently its own policy, without outside interference on such questions as the ways of transition to socialism and the building of socialism and communism,"[77] but also that there can be no "vanguard" or "center" of the international communist movement or any "leading party."

China. Relations between the JCP and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have been strained ever since Mao Zedong severed ties with the JCP in 1966 after it had refused to join his anti-Soviet coalition. Hostility between the two parties continued unabated for the next decade and a half, as both sides exchanged insults and diplomatic snubs. JCP leaders apparently were hopeful that relations might improve amid the atmosphere of self-criticism surrounding the June 1981 Chinese reappraisal of CCP history,[78] but they did not. The Japanese were further disappointed when the Chinese made no mention of JCP-CCP relations in an authoritative article on CCP errors in dealings with other communist parties during the Cultural Revolution.[79]

JCP leaders are also displeased with China's new policy of accommodation with Washington and Tokyo. In a drastic switch in policy, China now supports a US military presence in Asia and, more disastrous for the JCP, advocates maintaining the US-Japan Security Treaty and even strengthening Japan's military potential. These policies, of course, directly contradict long-held JCP positions stressing the need to fight "US imperialism" and to work toward the dismantling of both the Security Treaty and the Japanese defense establishment.[80]

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[74] The Three Non-Nuclear Principles are: "not to manufacture, not to acquire, and not to allow nuclear weapons on Japan's soil." LDP Prime Minister Sato Eisaku received the Nobel Peace Prize for championing these non-nuclear principles.

[75] "Resolution of the 17th Congress of the Japan Communist Party," *Akahata*, Nov. 25, 1985; and *Bulletin*, No. 556, January 1986, p. 20.

[76] "JCP Congress: Secret Session Intelligence," *Zembo* (Tokyo), No. 8172, Jan. 10, 1986, pp. 8–11. Reportedly, out of 1,033 valid votes, Ueda came in third with 1,027 (Miyamoto was tenth with 1,012), ahead of both Kaneko and Fuwa.

[77] "The Japan Communist Party and the Brezhnev Era of the Soviet Union," *Akahata*, Jan. 7, 1983; and *Bulletin*, No. 497, January 1983, p. 10.

[78] "Review of Interventionism Called for—On the 'Resolution' of the 6th CC Plenum of the Communist Party of China," *Akahata*, Aug. 22, 1981; and *Bulletin*, No. 469, September 1981.

[79] See the article by Li Ji and Guo Pingshi in the second issue of 1983 of the CCP's theoretical journal *Hongqi* (Beijing), "Principles Governing Relations with Foreign Communist Parties." Also published in the *Beijing Review*, Apr. 25, 1983, pp. 15–19.

[80] See, e.g., the JCP criticism of China's appraisal of the latest Japanese government White Paper on defense as encouraging the rebirth of Japanese militarism, in *Akahata*, Aug. 17, 1978, and "Bar the Road to Military Fascism," *Akahata*, Sept. 9, 1978 (the latter also in *Bulletin*, No. 406,

(cont. p. 19)

The major stumbling block to the normalization of relations between the two parties as far as the JCP is concerned, however, is the CCP's unwillingness to cut its ties to "old friends," a reference to pro-Chinese members who were purged from the JCP following the party's break with the Chinese party, and who subsequently organized several pro-CCP splinter groups.[81] The JCP is adamant in its stand that there can only be one legitimate communist party in any given country, quoting Marx and especially Lenin on "one country, one vanguard party." So when the two "big socialist powers" (as the JCP calls them) support more than one communist party in a country, as they both have consistently done, the Japanese Communists accuse them of big power chauvinism and interference in the internal affairs of fraternal parties. They vehemently criticize the "parallel parties" argument.[82]

These problems notwithstanding, rumors have persisted that high-ranking members of the Chinese embassy in Tokyo have approached the JCP in an effort to reach some kind of accommodation. A good omen for the JCP was the Chinese permission for the JCP-led Japan Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (one of six Japanese organizations) to participate in the "Beijing Forum on Safeguarding World Peace," which was convened in June 1985. Finally, at the 17th Party Congress in November 1985, Miyamoto announced that "at the request of the Chinese party" negotiations were taking place.[83] It should perhaps come as no surprise if a formula is found to enable the JCP and the CCP to "normalize" their relations, although it will be interesting to see how the "parallel parties" problem is handled.

North Korea and Vietnam. During the 1960's, both North Korea and North Vietnam had close relations with the JCP. All three leaned toward Beijing (and away from the Soviet Union), and all three supported the establishment of a broad united front against "US imperialism" in Indochina. But JCP relations with both, especially with Pyongyang, have since cooled. The JCP does not support North Korea's plan for the reunification of the Korean peninsula, and it tries to distance itself from Kim Il-song, his Korean Workers Party (KWP), and his cult of personality. When study groups of Kim Il-song Thought and Chuche (self-reliance) ideology were formed in Japan in 1978, Fuwa personally criticized them in the party theoretical journal *Zen'ei* (Vanguard).[84] The JCP especially disapproves of "the cult of personality" and the "attitude of blindly following foreign leaders."[85] The JCP also condemned the October 1983 bombing incident in Rangoon, in which a number of high-ranking South Korean officials were assassinated by North Korean agents.[86]

Tensions rose in late July 1984 when a North Korean naval vessel fired on a Japanese fishing boat. The JCP characterized the incident as "an inhuman and outrageous act." North Korean authorities, in return, denounced the JCP reaction as an attempt "to drive a wedge between the [North] Korean and the Japanese peoples."[87] The KWP did not send a delegation to the 17th Party Congress held in November 1985, and it came in for some criticism in the resolution passed at the congress:

> *Hegemonism is not a deviation limited to big socialist countries. The attitude of the Workers' Party of Korea which disregards the theory of scientific socialism and international law in respect to the "military demarcation line," and the shooting at a Japanese fishing boat and the launching of an unjustifiable campaign against our party for not keeping in step with them, is a barbaric form of hegemonism. Our party also resolutely rejects hegemonist attitudes such as the claim that the "thought" of a state leader is lauded as the leading thought of the world, with "ism" added to his name, with this or that followers' group fostered and imposed on our country.*[88]

With this, and subsequent mutual denunciations, relations between the JCP and KWP hit a new low.[89]

November 1978). A recent controversy centered on the *Nihon Rodo To* (Japan Labor Party), a miniscule pro-Chinese group that enjoys Beijing's support and receives invitations to attend important celebrations in China. See the "Anti-JCP Foreign Power Followers" series in *Akahata*, April and May, 1986, and *Bulletin*, Nos. 565–67, June 1986.

[81] "What Hinders Restoration of Relations Between the Japan Communist Party and the Communist Party of China?" *Akahata*, Apr. 17, 1985; and *Bulletin*, No. 543, May 1985.

[82] See "One Country, One Vanguard Party—Fundamental to Scientific Socialism: Criticism of 'Parallel Parties' Argument," *Akahata*, Jul. 25, 1984; and *Bulletin*, No. 525, July 1984, p. 33.

[83] See Miyamoto's opening speech at the 17th Party Congress, Nov. 19, 1985, in *Akahata*, Nov. 20, 1985; and *Japan Press Weekly*, No. 1473, Nov. 23, 1985, pp. M11–M13.

[84] *Zen'ei* (Tokyo), September 1979 issue. The JCP's relations with the North Korean party are complicated by a third actor: the Chosen Soren, a fiercely pro-Pyongyang association of several hundred thousand Korean residents in Japan.

[85] See "Anti-Communist and Anti-Progressive Maneuvers by Followers of Kim Il-Songism," *Akahata*, Dec. 9, 1983; and *Bulletin*, No. 513, December 1983.

[86] See Miyamoto's 1984 New Year interview with the editor, *Akahata*, Jan. 1, 1984; and *Bulletin*, No. 515, January 1984, p. 8.

[87] *Rodong Shinmun* (Pyongyang), Aug. 6, 1984. Cited in *North Korea News* (Seoul), No. 233, Aug. 20, 1984, p. 3.

[88] "Resolution of the 17th Congress," *Bulletin*, No. 556, January 1986, p. 9.

[89] In March 1986, a North Korean journal of international affairs attacked the JCP, which in turn responded with an article entitled "Further Typical Proof of Barbaric Hegemonism." See *Japan Press Weekly*, No. 1504, July 5, 1986, p. 15.

The JCP's relations with Vietnam continued to be close throughout the 1960's and 1970's, and all three top JCP leaders—Chairman Emeritus Nosaka Sanzo, Miyamoto, and Fuwa—have made several trips to Vietnam and have attended all important state and party functions. A Vietnamese vice-premier attended the 15th JCP Congress, and high-ranking Vietnamese diplomats have stopped by the JCP headquarters on their official visits to Japan. The party took a distinctly pro-Vietnam position in assessing the events that led to China's January 1979 invasion of Vietnam. Yet, although the JCP condemned the Chinese invasion, in time it also criticized the continued Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia.[90] This, along with JCP attacks on the CPSU, and particularly on the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, which the Vietnamese have supported, has soured JCP-Vietnamese relations to the point where the Vietnamese have rescinded the diplomatic status of the Japanese Communist representatives in Hanoi. The Vietnamese also apparently did not invite the Japanese party to attend their 5th Party Congress in March 1982.[91] Nonetheless, a Vietnamese Communist delegation did attend the JCP's 17th congress last year.

Romania and Yugoslavia. JCP ties with so-called independent communist states in the Balkans are much better than those with neighboring ruling communist parties. The JCP openly lauds Romania's "independent road to socialism" and makes every effort to associate itself with the maverick communist state. In addition to routinely attending each other's party congresses, the two parties have taken special care to maintain warm relations: Miyamoto visited Romania in 1971 and 1978; Fuwa stopped off in 1984; and Nicolae Ceauşescu met with Miyamoto while on a state visit to Japan in 1975.

Although the JCP had denounced Yugoslav "revisionism" in the 1960's, relations between the two communist parties warmed considerably after the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, an action both parties condemned. In recent years, high-level contact between the two has been fairly frequent: Miyamoto visited Tito in 1978; delegations of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) have addressed JCP congresses; Fuwa attended the 12th LCY Congress in June 1982; and a JCP-LCY summit took place in Tokyo in May 1984 when an LCY delegation headed by Chairman Dragoslav Markovic held talks at JCP headquarters. While relations with Romania and Yugoslavia, as well as with other challengers to Moscow, are designed to enhance the image of JCP independence, one wonders if such a close association with Ceauşescu, a ruthless dictator and blatant nepotist, is going to help the JCP in the Japanese political arena.

Western Europe. The JCP's relations with the communist parties of Western Europe are made to order. For one thing, as noted at the outset of this article, economically Japan is part of the Western world; for another, politically it is a parliamentary democracy not unlike those in Western Europe. As soon as the Japanese party began to stress its commitment to parliamentary democracy, it gave priority to developing ties with the Eurocommunist parties, which had a similar task of convincing their own electorates of the sincerity of their commitment. In the 1970's and 1980's, delegations of Eurocommunist parties attended all JCP congresses, as well as the three International Conferences on Theory noted earlier. In recent years, the JCP has held talks and exchanged visits with the Italian, French, Spanish, British, Swiss, Swedish, Danish, Norwegian, Belgian, Dutch, and West German parties. French party chief Georges Marchais traveled to Japan in 1976, and Spanish party head Santiago Carrillo visited Japan in 1976 and again in 1983. These visits were reciprocated by Japanese leaders at the Presidium level, and have included visits to Europe by Miyamoto and Fuwa. A couple of years ago, in June 1984, Fuwa flew to Rome to attend the funeral of Italian party chief Enrico Berlinguer, whose death was doubly unfortunate from the JCP perspective, since he was scheduled to visit Japan in July. Aside from the obvious public relations value of being photographed with a leading European politician, Berlinguer's visit would have given JCP leaders an opportunity to get his insights on the JCP-CPSU summit scheduled for November. On his return home, Fuwa, in an interview with an *Asahi Shimbun* correspondent, took the opportunity to discuss Eurocommunism and the Japanese party:

> *The primary aim of Eurocommunism is to achieve a revolution by the majority and through democratic means, not taking established revolutions in the Soviet Union and other countries as a model. . . . It is a kind of law for the revolutionary movement in developed countries like Western Europe and Japan. . . . The most outstanding character of Eurocommunism is its independent and autonomous line, and it clearly emerges in the relationship with the Soviet Union. . . . There must be twists and turns and trials and errors in*

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[90] *Akahata*, Oct. 31, 1982.

[91] "The Japanese and Vietnamese Communist Parties Have Entered a Confrontation Stage," *Zembo Tokubetsu Tsushin* (Tokyo—now *Shiso Undo Joho*), No. 766, Apr. 9, 1982, special issue.

> *the future of Eurocommunism, but the current of history will not be changed. . . . Both Eurocommunism and the JCP are identical in the revolutionary direction.*

He ended his interview on a positive note, pointing out that in Europe "staunch anti-communism is gone" and that a communist party like that of Italy can enjoy the support of 30 percent of the population. Although on the surface the JCP looks isolated, he added, "brighter and broader perspectives lie ahead."[92]

JCP-Soviet Ties

In 1964, in response to the Soviets having signed the essentially anti-Chinese Limited Test Ban Treaty the year before, the Japan Communist Party severed its ties with the CPSU. Since then, relations between the two parties have gone through two stages. During the first stage, from 1964 to 1979, relations vacillated between none at all and mutual attempts at reconciliation, culminating in the Miyamoto-Brezhnev-Suslov summit in December 1979, at which the two parties normalized relations. During the second stage, from 1980 to the present,[93] the Japanese party has consistently criticized Soviet actions, first in the wake of the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, later in connection with the repression in Poland, and more recently for the shooting down of the Korean airliner.[94] There was also an acrimonious exchange, outlined below, over Soviet domination of the editorial policies of the communist journal *Problems of Peace and Socialism* (known better in the West as the *World Marxist Review*).

How did the two parties manage to restore relations after a hiatus of some 15 years? And what impact did it have on future JCP relations with the Soviet Union? Since I have extensively written elsewhere about this relationship, and particularly on the 1979 rapprochement between the two parties,[95] I will not dwell on this in any great detail here. Essentially, between 1968 and 1977, the Soviets made three unsuccessful attempts at reconciliation with their stubborn Japanese comrades. The major stumbling block was the CPSU's continuous support for a miniscule pro-Soviet splinter group, the so-called Japanese Communist Party—The Voice of Japan, and hence its concomitant refusal to recognize the JCP as the sole party representing the communist movement in Japan. But with the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1978, which the JCP had opposed on the grounds that it would damage Japan's relations with the Soviet Union, the CPSU decided to abandon its loyal dissident group and normalize relations with the JCP, hoping thereby to offset Chinese influence in Japan by strengthening the JCP's position on the Japanese political scene.[96]

Perhaps no issue has been more contentious, however, than the dispute over the "northern territories," which were first occupied by the Soviet Union during the closing days of World War II.[97] While all Japanese political parties, including the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, demand that the Soviet Union return the two southernmost Kurile islands and a few small islands off the coast of Hokkaido, only the JCP demands the eventual return of the entire Kurile chain, all the way to the Kamchatka peninsula. This ultra-nationalist stand is obvious grandstanding, as there is not the slightest chance that the Soviet Union will relinquish the entire Kurile archipelago. But such an appeal is necessary, in party leaders' eyes, if the JCP is ever to erase its prewar image as an alien group organized and manipulated by the Communist International in Moscow.

In 1981, after its 26th congress, the CPSU Central Committee asked the Japanese party to support the Soviet "Peace Program for the 1980's." Rather than use discreet party channels to reject the offer, the JCP

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[92] *Asahi Shimbun*, June 23, 1984, as cited in *K.D.K. Information*, No. 7/84 (July 1, 1984), pp. 5–6.

[93] See *Nisso ryo Kyosan To no Ofuku Shokan, 1980–1984* (Letters Exchanged Between the Two Communist Parties of Japan and the Soviet Union, 1980–1984), Tokyo, JCP Central Committee Publishing Bureau, May 1985.

[94] The day after the incident, Sept. 2, 1983, the JCP asked the CPSU and the Soviet government "to disclose the full facts and without delay take a fully responsible attitude." The Soviets responded 10 days later, and on September 21, the chief of the JCP International Affairs Department, Tachiki Hiroshi, visited the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo and handed Soviet Ambassador Vladimir Pavlov a letter from the Central Committee of the JCP to the Central Committee of the CPSU. "JCP Letter to CPSU on the Downing of the KAL Plane," *Akahata*, Sept. 22, 1983; and *Bulletin*, No. 508, September 1983.

A good summary of JCP-CPSU relations since 1964 from the JCP point of view can be found in "The Japan Communist Party and the Brezhnev Era of the Soviet Union," loc. cit.

[95] Berton, "The Japanese Communists," and idem, "Soviet and Japanese Communist Parties: Policies, Tactics, Negotiating Behavior," *Studies in Comparative Communism*, Autumn 1982, pp. 266–87.

[96] *Pravda*, Dec. 27, 1978.

[97] For the JCP position on the territorial issue, see Berton, "Japan: Euro-Nippo-Communism," p. 343; *Chishima Mondai to Nihon Kyosan To* (The Kuriles Problem and the JCP), published by the JCP Central Committee in May 1974; and Nishiguchi Hikaru et al., *Nisso Ryodo Mondai no Shinjitsu* (The Truth About the Japanese-Soviet Territorial Problem), Tokyo, Shin Nihon Shuppan Sha, 1981. Some of the JCP statements on the territorial issue are translated in *Bulletin*, No. 321, September 1974, and Nos. 371, 372, and 374, June and July 1977. For the benefit of Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, who was scheduled to make an official visit to Japan in mid-January 1986, *Akahata* printed "Territorial Problems and Points of Agreement Reached Between the JCP and the CPSU," *Akahata*, Dec. 27, 1985; see also *Japan Press Weekly*, No. 1479, Jan. 11, 1986, pp. 37–42.

Central Committee published a rather critical reply in *Akahata*.[98] The Soviet party responded, which led to another JCP letter that too was made public in *Akahata*.[99] The section headings of this pamphlet-size letter give a good indication of its content: "The Sequence of Polemics and Increasing International Tension"; "The Truth About 'The Afghanistan Incident' "; "Evading the Fundamental Tasks for World Peace"; "Problems Relating to Poland"; "The Territorial Issues Between Japan and the USSR"; and "The Question of Big-Powerism and Hegemonism."[100] The question of "Big-Powerism" was taken up at great length by Fuwa in a series of articles in *Akahata* in January and February 1982, entitled "Stalin and Big-Powerism." The articles have since been issued in book form (and even in an English-language edition entitled *Stalin and Great-Power Chauvinism* for the benefit of "foreign Communist parties," not to mention Western analysts of the JCP).[101]

If the JCP's differences with the CPSU over such issues as the Kurile Islands, Afghanistan, and Poland concern the Soviet Union's foreign policy, its attempts to restrain the Soviet-dominated editorial board of *Problems of Peace and Socialism* stress the JCP's commitment to "independence" within the communist movement. Indeed, the JCP's primary complaint is that the journal, "which had been founded [in 1958] as a common forum for exchanges of information, experiences, and opinions between communist parties," has been "made into a propaganda organ for absolutizing Soviet foreign policies."[102] The Japanese party particularly objected to the journal carrying in its April 1980 issue an interview with Babrak Karmal, "head of the puppet regime in Afghanistan, who could only speak in praise of the military intervention by the Soviet Union."[103]

The first signs that the dispute was serious surfaced in 1981, when the journal's 1981 publication plan was adopted. The JCP, in a letter dated December 27, 1980, protested the proposed inclusion of a series of articles criticizing the CCP, arguing that the journal was created to contribute to the development of the international communist movement, "on the basis of the publicly recognized principle that all parties are independent and equal." The JCP repeated its opinion, expressed at a conference of party representatives affiliated with the journal, that "special treatment accorded to one specific party in praise of its leadership and activities should be ended, as well as the campaign organized against a specific party."[104] The JCP also objected to the way the journal was being run, particularly the "undemocratic" way in which members of the Editorial Board were selected,[105] and the fact that the office of editor-in-chief had been always held by a high-ranking CPSU apparatchik.[106]

The Editorial Board did not address the points raised in the JCP letter, and the dispute between the board and the JCP intensified throughout 1981 and the first half of 1982. In May 1981, the JCP sent a delegation, headed by a member of the Standing Committee of the Presidium, to an International Theoretical Conference cosponsored by the Central Committee of the Hungarian Party and the Editorial Board of *Problems of Peace and Socialism*. The Japanese agreed to participate only after being given assurances that "equal rights of participants and full freedom of speech would be guaranteed in the conference, and that no keynote report would be delivered by any particular party, nor a specific conclusion or resolution be adopted."[107] The chief Japanese delegate spoke three times. He condemned the Soviet invasions of Czechoslovakia and of Afghanistan, and he reaffirmed the JCP's stance that "there is no such thing as a 'leading party'."[108] Apparently the sponsors' assurances did not extend to accurate reporting, however, as the August, September, and October issues of the journal carried summaries of the Hungarian conference that made no mention of the debate on Afghanistan and distorted Japanese statements through creative editing.[109]

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[98] *Akahata*, June 16–18, 1981; and *Bulletin*, No. 461, June 1981.

[99] JCP reply to the CPSU letter of July 30 in *Akahata*, Sept. 5, 1981; and *Bulletin*, No. 468, September 1981.

[100] In the meantime, *Akahata* also published in its commentary edition a lengthy document pointedly entitled "For a True Peace Program." See *Akahata*, Commentary Edition, July 6, 1981; and *Bulletin*, No. 464.

[101] *Akahata*, Jan. 12–Feb. 18, 1982; and *Bulletin*, No. 486, June 1982. Fuwa's thesis was reported in Yugoslav, Romanian, and Italian Communist party organs and in a limited-circulation information bulletin for CCP cadres.

[102] "The Japan Communist Party and the Brezhnev Era of the Soviet Union," loc. cit.

[103] Ibid.

[104] "Letter to the Editorial Board of 'Problems of Peace and Socialism' Sent by the Central Committee of the Japan Communist Party," *Akahata*, Jan. 12, 1981; and *Bulletin*, No. 452, January 1981, p. 3.

[105] The JCP wanted the Editorial Board to be appointed in a democratic way, "taking geographic equity into consideration" and making sure that "existing differences of opinion . . . should also be equitably reflected" (*Bulletin*, No. 452, January 1981, p. 4).

[106] For organizational structure and very useful lists of participating parties and of Soviet officials, see Wallace Spaulding, "New Head, Old 'Problems of Peace and Socialism'," *Problems of Communism*, November-December 1982, pp. 57–62.

[107] "International Theoretical Conference, Hungary, May 5–7, 1981—JCP Delegation Speeches and Discussions," *Akahata*, Commentary Edition, May 25, 1981; and *Bulletin*, No. 459, June 1981, p. 1.

[108] *Bulletin*, No. 459, June 1981, pp. 10–14.

[109] Okamoto Hiroyuki, "On Materials of the International Theoretical Conference Held in Hungary, as Published in 'Problems of Peace and Socialism'—Arbitrary Editing, Inconsistent with the Proceedings of the Conference," *Akahata*, Nov. 22 and 23, 1981; and *Bulletin*, No. 476, November 1981.

Such snubs, surprisingly, did not deter the JCP, as it continued to send high-ranking delegations to similar conferences held every three or four years. The JCP again made proposals concerning the journal's editorial work and the composition of the Editorial Board and the Secretariat. As usual, all proposals were rejected or disregarded by the Soviet editor-in-chief.[110] Stymied at every turn, the JCP made a formal proposal that the journal be dissolved. The proposal was repeated at the 1984 conference in Prague.[111] As happened with all previous Japanese suggestions and proposals, however, this one too was ignored.

Relations between the CPSU and the JCP took a turn for the better in April 1984, when a Soviet delegation headed by Pëtr Fedoseyev, Central Committee member and vice-president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, began preliminary talks at JCP Headquarters with a Japanese delegation headed by the late Russian-speaking Nishizawa Tomio.[112] The Soviet delegation also included the CPSU Central Committee Japanese expert Ivan Kovalenko, who perfected his Japanese when dealing with Japanese prisoners-of-war after World War II. These talks were followed by further negotiations in Moscow, and again in Tokyo, eventually leading to a Miyamoto-Chernenko summit in Moscow in December 1984, which, however, was restricted by the Soviets to a single issue—nuclear weapons (see below).

Fuwa and Kaneko attended Chernenko's funeral in March 1985 and met with the new General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachëv. (Fuwa recalled that he and Gorbachëv had met nine months before in Rome at Berlinguer's funeral.)[113] Kaneko attended and addressed the 27th CPSU Congress in February 1986, and Miyamoto and Fuwa paid a courtesy call on the Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, when he paid an official state visit to Japan in January 1986. In early August 1986, a JCP delegation headed by Fuwa traveled to Moscow for a meeting with Gorbachëv, a regular consultation stipulated in the December 1984 summit joint statement on the nuclear issue.

Fuwa Tetsuzo, chairman of the JCP Presidium, meets with CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachëv during an August 1986 visit to Moscow.

—Kyodo News.

The Nuclear Issue Campaign

The most recent focus of the JCP's international policy is "the struggle for preventing nuclear war and eliminating nuclear weapons" (see the party's 1986 May Day slogans on p. 24). This was, in fact, the topic of an international symposium organized by the party in July 1985.[114] In contrast to the three previous international symposia in 1972, 1979, and 1982, which had been devoted to theoretical problems of communist

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[110] *Akahata*, Nov. 28, 1981; and *Bulletin*, No. 475, November 1981, p. 22. For Soviet attacks on the JCP, see Boris Vesnin, "The Communists and Peace, Detente, Disarmament," *New Times* (Moscow), No. 49, December 1981, p. 10; and A. Kozlov and B. Likhachev, "The Prague Meeting of Communists," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 2, 1982, pp. 81-93, esp. pp. 85-86.

[111] See, e.g., Pavel Auersperg, executive secretary of *Problems of Peace and Socialism*, in *Zivot Strany* (Prague), No. 4, 1982, cited and responded to in " 'Fact and Logic' of Executive Assistant of Hegemonism—Reply to Auersperg's Criticism of the Japan Communist Party," *Akahata*, Apr. 30, 1982; and *Bulletin*, No. 485, May 1982; N.K. Krishnan in *Party Life*, organ of the pro-Soviet Communist Party of India, No. 3, 1982, and Bruno Furch in *Weg und Ziel*, organ of the Austrian Communist Party—both reprinted in *Information Bulletin* (Prague), No. 7, 1982, cited and responded to in "Ineffective Apologetics for Soviet-Centrism—JCP Answers Two Articles Reprinted in the Information Bulletin of *Peace and Socialism*," *Akahata*, May 25, 1982; *Bulletin*, No. 487, June 1982, and the statement of Murakami Hiromu, vice-chairman of the Presidium, in Prague on Dec. 5, 1984, *Akahata*, Dec. 7, 1984.

[112] "Preparatory Talks Between the Two Communist Parties of Japan and the Soviet Union," *Shiso Undo Joho*, No. 840, May 12, 1984, pp. 1–8; Nishida Shin'ichiro, "On Developments Surrounding the JCP-CPSU Summit Meeting," *Koan Joho*, No. 369, June 1984, pp. 1–15.

[113] *Akahata*, Mar. 16, 1985.

[114] *Zen'ei*, the entire September 1985 issue; and the 555-page *Struggle for Preventing Nuclear War and Eliminating Nuclear Weapons—International Symposium 1985 Sponsored by [the] Japanese Communist Party*, Tokyo, Japan Press Service, November 1985.

JCP 1986 May Day Slogans

Listed below are the JCP's 1986 May Day slogans as reproduced in the May 10 issue of *Japan Press Weekly*. They signal the party's priorities, concerns, and action agenda. Whereas in previous years, the slogans included criticisms of the USSR (for holding on to the northern territories, the invasion of Afghanistan, the quashing of Solidarity in Poland), or of China ("immediate, unconditional, and complete withdrawal from Vietnam"), the 1986 slogans are mainly directed against the United States and the LDP. To be sure, the JCP is an opposition party, but fully 12 of the 15 slogans oppose something, while only three are positive.

1. Liberate humankind from the danger of nuclear war. For conclusion of an international agreement for urgent elimination of nuclear weapons. "No" to SDI plan of the Reagan administration which turns its back on the elimination of nuclear weapons and extends the nuclear arms race into outer space. By world public opinion and actions let us isolate the forces clinging to nuclear weapons.

2. Let us achieve the goal of collection of signatures of the majority of the Japanese population for the Appeal from Hiroshima and Nagasaki. For consensus and cooperation of the people based on the five nonnuclear points. For realization of a nonnuclear government.[1]

3. "No" to US aggression against Libya and military interference in Nicaragua. Defend the right to national self-determination against all imperialism and hegemonism.

4. Do not allow any kind of terrorism that goes against social progress. Opposition to export of terrorism. "No" to the policy of Liberal Democratic Party government and the policy authorities leaving at large terrorist and wild acts of pseudo-left violent groups and using them for anti-communist propaganda.

5. Do not make the Tokyo Summit a place for justifying US hegemonism.

6. Do not allow construction of US military bases or housing at Miyakejima Island and Zushi City; oppose long-term seizure of land in Okinawa for US military use. Abrogate Japan-US Security Treaty and recover true independence and sovereignty of Japan.

7. Thorough investigation by the Diet into the "Marcos corruption" and "corruption of the National Federation of Thread-Plying Industry Cooperative Associations." Stop service to interests of big business and US world strategy in the name of foreign "aid."

8. Against division and privatization of the Japanese National Railways, and integration and abolition of national hospitals and sanatoriums. Against local "administrative reform" [involving] cutting down welfare and mal-revision of the Elders Health Insurance Law. Against introduction of a big indirect tax. For defense of living and improvement in welfare and education.

9. For substantial wage-hikes and establishment of national uniform minimum guaranteed wage system. For substantial reduction of working hours. Opposition to "rationalization" for reduction of workforce. Do not shift sacrifices from yen upsurge onto small and medium enterprises and agriculture. Improvement of self-supply rate of foodstuffs and stabilization of agricultural management. Expansion of true domestic demand, not for interest of big business but for boosting people's energy.

10. Opposition to support for the war of aggression and the dark politics of the pre- and mid-war era and beautification of the Tenno [Emperor] and the Tenno system, as well as the campaign for celebration of the Tenno's 60-year reign [as] incompatible with people's sovereignty in the post-war age. Opposition to the planned visit of the crown prince to the Republic of Korea, in violation of the constitutional provision forbidding the Tenno's involvement in government. Opposition to turning the Tenno into the head of state and mal-revision of the Constitution. For true people's sovereignty. For immediate correction of the unbalanced allocation of Diet seats to constituencies, and materialization of the "equality under the law" with differences in vote value not more than 1 to 2 (based on population in each constituency). Prevention of maneuvers to establish Japanese style fascism by enactment of the state secrets protection law and establishment of a Security Council, and for development of freedom and democracy.

11. Against the Ad Hoc Commission for education aiming at revival and strengthening of militarism and the building of character to suit financial circles. For educational reform based on national consensus for elimination of "bullying" and "drop-outs" of pupils.

12. Opposition to rightist reorganization of the labor front, which is a modern version of the prewar "Association for Service to the State through Industry." For advance in the movement of a United Front of the CTUPUF (Conference of Trade Unions for Promotion of a United Front) and development of united action for true unification of the labor front. For establishment of a class-based national center of trade unions.

13. Down with the Nakasone LDP government which defends US nuclear strategy, leading Japan to become a nuclear battlefield. Do not allow simultaneous elections of the Upper and Lower Houses aiming at arrangement of conditions for Nakasone's third term as LDP president.

14. For outstanding advance of the JCP, the party struggling against war and for peace, for establishing people's sovereignty and fundamental human rights; defender of the people's living both in prewar and postwar days, the party tested in its history of over sixty years.

15. Long live the May Day of 100 years, the 57th May Day. Working men of all countries and the oppressed nations, UNITE!

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[1] See p. 6, fn. 18 on JCP efforts to enact a relief law for atomic bomb victims; p. 18 on the five nonnuclear points.

parties in advanced industrial democracies and which had been attended by less than a dozen, largely Eurocommunist parties, the 1985 symposium attracted 26 parties, including the CPSU and several pro-Soviet ruling parties in Eastern Europe, Asia (Vietnam), and Latin America (Cuba and Nicaragua).

In calling for a total prohibition of nuclear weapons, the JCP draws a distinction between its position and that of the Soviet Union, which, according to the Japanese, changed after the 24th CPSU Congress in 1971 and of late has included a variety of half-measures, such as the nuclear freeze.[115] The JCP also criticizes Soviet foreign policy as having adopted the doctrine of "equilibrium of military strength" and as having moved away from advocating a simultaneous dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization.[116] This enables the JCP to advocate a maximum anti-nuclear program—politically astute in nuclear-allergic Japan—and at the same time to oppose "any manifestation of imperialism, hegemonism or interventionism," which allows the party to distance itself from the Soviet position and stress its own independence.

The party also tries to portray itself as a participant on the world scene. Thus, in June 1983, the Central Committee issued a statement entitled "We Denounce Nakasone's Remarks Fanning 'Globalization' of the Nuclear Arms Buildup, and Urgently Demand that the United States and the Soviet Union Should Achieve a True Nuclear Weapons Zero." Letters were then sent to US President Ronald Reagan and CPSU General Secretary Yuriy Andropov.[117] In January 1984, party leader Miyamoto announced that he had sent personal letters to the two leaders calling for a total abolition of nuclear weapons.[118]

The disastrous national election in December 1983, resulting from a near isolation of the JCP in the political arena, was probably responsible for the decision to step up the nuclear issue and on that basis try to build a broader coalition from below. One of the first actions was to manipulate the anti-nuclear movement into adopting, in August 1984, the so-called Tokyo Declaration, which called for the mobilization of public opinion. This declaration was used to start national and international campaigns to collect signatures, and was later formalized as "An Appeal from Hiroshima and Nagasaki to Abolish Nuclear Weapons." The "Appeal" set goals of 60 million signatures in Japan (half of the population) and an equal number of signatures outside Japan.[119] (In 1983, the JCP had engaged in a signature-collection campaign to have "Japan declared nuclear free.")[120] Another stratagem was to label the Nakasone government a pro–nuclear weapons government and argue that Japan desperately needed an "anti–nuclear weapons government."[121]

In the meantime, after three rounds of negotiations, the JCP and the CPSU agreed to a Miyamoto-Chernenko summit meeting to be devoted exclusively to the anti-nuclear issue. (The Soviets, surely, wanted to be spared Miyamoto's long speeches on Afghanistan, Poland, Japanese territorial claims, and various other complaints.) The meeting took place, as planned, in mid-December 1984, but it was not so much a Miyamoto-Chernenko summit as a series of meetings between lower-ranking officials on both sides trying to hammer out a joint communiqué, with the principals involved only in the first and last sessions, the latter apparently a 15-minute signing ceremony.[122] The joint statement mentioned "the need and possibility of the immediate prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons," declared 1985 to be the year of anti-nuclear and peace struggle, and appealed to the communist parties and peoples of the world in general to organize a kind of anti-nuclear international united front.[123]

A couple of months later, however, the Soviet-dominated World Peace Council continued to push the Soviet line about opposition to President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star Wars") and the great role the Soviet Union had played in the victory in World War II, all but ignoring Japanese proposals about the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the "Appeal from Hiroshima and Nagasaki" signature campaign.[124] There was also disagreement between the

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[115] See, e.g., the Oct. 3, 1983, letter from the JCP to the CPSU in *Akahata*, Oct. 4, 1983; and *Bulletin*, No. 509, October 1983.

[116] See " 'Military Equilibrium' Doctrine Incompatible with World Peace" and " 'Simultaneous Dissolution of Military Alliances' Disappears from Soviet Policy" in the letter from the JCP to the CPSU, *Akahata*, June 16–18, 1981; and *Bulletin*, No. 461, June 1981, pp. 12–14.

[117] For the statement and the two letters to the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union, see *Akahata*, June 19, 1983; and *Bulletin*, No. 504, June 1981.

[118] *Akahata*, Jan. 20, 1984; and *Bulletin*, No. 516, January 1984. Andropov replied to Miyamoto a day before he died. Miyamoto Kenji, "Our Aspiration: Advance for a Total Ban on Nuclear Weapons—On Publication of Letter from General Secretary Andropov," *Akahata*, Feb. 14, 1984; and *Bulletin*, No. 519, February 1984.

[119] "International Signature Campaign Demanding the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons: Recent Developments," *Koan Joho*, No. 377, February 1985, pp. 62–74.

[120] "On the Signature Collection Campaign for a 'Nuclear Free Japan Declaration'," speech by Miyamoto Kenji, May 7, 1983, *Akahata*, May 9, 1983; and *Bulletin*, No. 503, June 1983, pp. 18–20.

[121] Miyamoto Kenji, "Make the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons the Task of International Solidarity for Survival—Defeat the Pro–Nuclear Weapons Japanese Government, Set Up an Anti–Nuclear Weapons Government," *Akahata*, Oct. 18, 1984; and *Bulletin*, No. 530, November 1984, pp. 5–24.

[122] Nishida Shin'ichiro, "On the JCP-CPSU Summit Conference," *Koan Joho*, No. 376, January 1985, pp. 16–36.

[123] *Akahata*, Dec. 18, 1984.

[124] Nishida Shin'ichiro, "On the JCP 'International Symposium'," *Koan Joho*, No. 383, August 1985, p. 21.

Japanese and Soviet delegates (and their allies) at the international symposium mentioned above.[125]

A member of the JCP Standing Presidium participated in the International Scientific Conference sponsored by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Academy of Sciences, which was held in July 1985 on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the 7th Comintern Congress, at which the famous prewar international anti-fascist united front was initiated. The Japanese delegate's speech was significantly entitled, "Lessons of the 7th Comintern Congress and Anti-Nuclear International United Front."[126] This clearly underscored the JCP's desire to organize an international movement similar in scope to the prewar united front.

The JCP Tally Sheet

The JCP's current obsessive focus on the anti-nuclear campaign stems from three sources. The first is isolation at home; the second is isolation in the communist movement. In both cases the prescription is the same: find a cause that can galvanize the party faithful and attract potential supporters. The nuclear issue is tailor-made for Japan—the only atom-bombed country in the world—where anti-nuclear feelings run high. And it was particularly appropriate to stress the anti-nuclear issue in 1985, the 40th anniversary of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Raising the issue of the atomic bombing of these two cities also could not help but remind the Japanese public that it was American pilots who dropped the bombs—an obvious fact for the anti-American JCP to emphasize. Third, there is also a personal factor. Party leader Miyamoto is nearing 80, and he no doubt would like to crown his political career with international recognition as an "anti-nuclear statesman."[127] (Former Prime Minister Sato Eisaku had received the Nobel Peace Prize for his advocacy of non-nuclear principles for Japan.)

The JCP has cleverly played up the hawkish aspects of Prime Minister Nakasone's defense policies, branding his administration a "pro–nuclear weapons government." (During the 1986 election campaign, Fuwa called Nakasone a "fascist politician," and an *Akahata* editorial referred to him as a "Japanese Hitler.")[128] Communist assemblymen, for their part, have extended the campaign to the local level by encouraging local governments to adopt "non-nuclear peace declarations," and indeed the JCP claims that over half of the Japanese population now lives in such areas.[129] Also, over half of the heads of local governments (1,674 out of 3,324) have signed the "Appeal from Hiroshima and Nagasaki."[130] And Prime Minister Nakasone was personally embarrassed when his constituency, Takasaki City in Gumma Prefecture, unanimously adopted the "Declaration for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons for a Peace City."[131]

But if the anti-nuclear campaign strikes a sympathetic chord among the Japanese public, some of the JCP's policy stances do not. The party stridently opposes the Japanese-American security treaty, which a majority of the Japanese people support (increasingly so after China gave the alliance and the Japanese Self-Defense Forces its seal of approval). More difficult to understand is the party's vehement opposition to the celebrations marking Emperor Hirohito's 85th birthday and the diamond jubilee of his reign, unless it is Miyamoto's personal animus against the Emperor in whose prisons he was incarcerated for over a decade before and during World War II. (Actually, the 1947 constitution relegated the Emperor to being only the "symbol of the state and of the unity of the people.") Since over 70 percent of the Japanese public approve of the celebrations, and only about 5 percent disapprove, the JCP's campaign against the "beautification of the Emperor" is not likely to win friends and influence people.

Despite its recent electoral and political setbacks, the JCP remains a formidable organization. If the party is unable to grow in membership (including its youth and women's affiliates) or increase its share of the vote and the number of seats in the National Diet,[132] it has other assets that are quite important. These include the multitude of front organizations originally sponsored by the party or later infiltrated by party activists. (When the party cannot successfully manipulate these organizations, it tries to set up competing ones.) Especially influential are consumer and other grass-roots organizations in urban areas, which is the main reason why JCP candidates have a greater chance of success at the local rather than at the national level.

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[125] Ibid., and documents cited in n. 110.

[126] *Akahata*, Jul. 22, 1985; and "Theoretical Conference in Commemoration of the 50th Anniversary of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern," *Bulletin*, No. 550, August 1985.

[127] Miyamoto may also be thinking of the career of Georgi Dmitrov, an obscure Bulgarian Communist who became world-famous in the 1930's for his activities in the Communist International.

[128] *Japan Press Weekly*, No. 1502, June 21, 1986, p. 13; and *Akahata*, June 25, 1986.

[129] As of July 1986, 1,040 local governments representing 64.3 million people, that is, 53.1 percent of the total Japanese population, have so declared themselves. See Miyamoto's address at the 64th anniversary of the founding of the JCP, July 15, 1986, in *Japan Press Weekly*, No. 1506, July 19, 1986, p. M6.

[130] Ibid., No. 1488, Mar. 15, 1986, p. 3.

[131] Ibid., pp. 3–4.

[132] Just holding its own in the face of the LDP landslide victory in the July 1986 double elections was an achievement. In the House of Representatives, the LDP increased its contingent from 250 to 304, largely at the expense of the JSP (which dropped from 111 to 86 seats) and the DSP (37 to 26). The DSP, thus, dropped below the JCP (in both houses), making the Communists the third largest opposition party in Japan.

But beyond the visible legal party, there is the potential for secret infiltration of labor unions (particularly those composed of government employees, who are more radical than their counterparts in the private sector), industry, the educational network, and even Japanese security forces. Japanese government analysts are particularly concerned about the long-range effect of Communist teachers in the classrooms, of Communist bureaucrats in critical financial agencies, and of Communist lawyers who may one day sit on the Supreme Court.

Since violence, wherever it comes from, is counterproductive in contemporary Japanese society, and especially hurts the party because of its violent past, the JCP has sought to diffuse the violence of the extreme left and the anarchist fringe through party-led youth and student organizations. To this day, Lenin's pamphlet decrying excessive violence as "leftwing infantilism" is mandatory reading for JCP members. Party leaders immediately and forthrightly denounce what they call "pseudo-left" terrorist acts, such as the recent bombing of railroad stations, poisoning of chocolate bars, and the firing of home-made rockets. The JCP even accuses the government, the LDP, and the police of duplicity by nonaction—that is, the conscious decision of not acting preventively and promptly enough in the hope that leftwing violence will enable the government to strengthen police powers and push through repressive legislation.

Although the JCP's constant demands for the return of the northern territories from the Soviet Union have not been successful, the mere fact that the Japanese Communists have persisted in this matter must have shown Soviet leaders the depth of Japanese feeling on this thorny issue in Soviet-Japanese relations. The party has been more effective in pressing other Japanese grievances against the Soviets, such as Soviet obstacles to visits of gravesites in the occupied islands, and the detention of fishermen and various problems over fishing rights. In fact, whenever there is a stalemate in Soviet-Japanese fishery negotiations, JCP visitors to the Soviet capital call upon the Soviet minister of fisheries and draw his attention to the difficult situation of the Japanese working fishermen.

Succeeding Miyamoto? How will the JCP fare in the post-Miyamoto period? Since Miyamoto is almost 78 years old, and since he was instrumental in retiring or purging most leaders of his generation, the Japan Communist Party is bound to have both a leadership change and a generational change in the not too distant future. Miyamoto has not been well, although the nature and extent of his illnesses have been either suppressed or minimized. For many years, he had a nurse near him at all times (some Japanese journalists have intimated that this was not solely for medical reasons), and he took a physician along when he traveled to Moscow two years ago. Miyamoto's protégés are much younger, to be sure, but they have worked in his shadow for at least 20 years. What kind of policies can we expect from them?

In the rumored dispute between Miyamoto and Ueda, the former is portrayed as a hard-line ideologue who has been forced to adopt Eurocommunist tactics in pluralist Japan. Ueda, on the other hand, is seen more as a parliamentarian, anxious to open up the party and model it on the Italian party. But Ueda might not inherit the mantle, as the present top positions are held by his younger brother Fuwa and by Kaneko, who are more trusted by Miyamoto. Of course, adopting a Eurocommunist stance poses the danger that the communist party could become indistinguishable from the established democratic socialist parties. This could undermine the JCP's very raison d'être as a Leninist vanguard party, which, in turn, would likely alienate some of the party's hard-core Leninists, without a compensating growth on the right.

One thing is certain about the post-Miyamoto JCP: his passing will surely benefit the party's image. With his prewar "lynching" case, with his ruthless, dictatorial grip on the party, Miyamoto daily reminds the Japanese public of the prewar JCP: a violent group on orders from an alien power bent upon overthrowing the government. This image dies hard, despite all of the JCP's "Eurocommunist" efforts to present itself as a legal political party working within the Japanese political system and all the party's manifestoes on freedom and democracy. Miyamoto's "cult of personality" has contributed to the disillusionment among better-educated voters, and some party members lay the blame for the decade-long stagnation of the party on him personally and on the central bureaucratic party machine he has created. The distribution of anti-Miyamoto leaflets at the 17th congress certainly underscores this fact.

Future prospects. What are the reasons for the rather dismal record of the Japan Communist Party during the past decade and what are its prospects for the future? The first question can be answered with some certainty, although analysts, of course, differ on what factors should be given more weight. Answering the second question is much more difficult. This is not because of the complexities of the Japanese communist movement per se, but because Japan as a society and an economic system is in the process of fundamental change.

The reasons for the JCP's stagnation during the past decade must be analyzed from three perspectives: the party's actions, the impact of international developments, and the domestic environment. There is, of course, overlapping in many instances. Starting with party policy first, the main barrier to growth in my opinion is Miyamoto's dictatorial grip upon the party and bureaucratization of the party apparatus. To this must be added the residual negative image of the party (outlined above), which brings me to the second perspective.

Japanese public opinion links the Japan *Communist* Party to communism in general and to the actions of ruling communist parties in particular. As an overall proposition, communism and Marxism-Leninism have lost steadily in popularity among the more critical circles of the Japanese intelligentsia. This is not to say that Marxist-Leninist ideology has lost all of its attractiveness. But officially sanctioned revelations about the horrors of the so-called Cultural Revolution in China have had a devastating effect. So has the suppression of humanist socialism in Czechoslovakia and of the Solidarity movement in Poland, clearly a grass-roots working class phenomenon. And the failures of the economies of the Eastern bloc countries—especially when compared with the economic miracle of Japan and given the practical admission of failure implicit in the Chinese economic reforms—have given pause to many Japanese, quite a few of whom have seen for themselves when traveling abroad. Add to this list the gruesome stories of genocide in Communist Cambodia, North Korea's bombing of a South Korean presidential delegation in Burma, the shooting down of the Korean airliner by a Soviet fighter plane (many of the victims were Japanese), and so on.

Closer to home, the 180-degree turn in China's policies, especially with regard to the usefulness of the Japanese-American alliance and the desirability of building up Japanese defense forces, has undercut the major arguments of the so-called progressive camp in Japan. Then there is the Soviet occupation of the northern islands, considered by *all* Japanese to be an integral part of Japan (and not territories occupied by Japan through conquest) and deeply resented. And while a good many opinion leaders on the left have denied the existence of a northern threat from the Soviet Union, they can hardly deny Chinese accusations of Soviet aggressive behavior. The final confirmation came with the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, significant increases in the size and composition of the Soviet naval forces facing Japan, not to mention missiles and long-range bombers, and the militarization of the northern islands. All this has contributed to strong anti-Soviet feelings in Japan, best illustrated in frequently taken public opinion polls, which inevitably depict the Soviet Union as the least liked country in the world by a large margin.[133]

On the domestic front, the very success of the JCP at the polls in the early 1970's gave second thoughts to the floating and protest voters, as well as, more important, to the other opposition parties. The latter began pooling their resources in electoral districts, with the result that the JCP candidates began to lose to coalitions, notably joint DSP-Komeito electoral slates. Economic prosperity and political stability have been taken for granted in Japan, so that leftwing violence (the long struggle to prevent the construction of the second international airport facility at Narita and the most recent attempts to sabotage the Tokyo summit, to name just two) strengthened the hand of the government and contributed to the negative image of the Communists, in spite of the JCP's public denunciation of violence.

A word about the floating and protest vote. Generally speaking, on the national average, the party pulls in twice as many votes as the number of *Akahata* readers. In the past, however, in certain middle-class districts in Tokyo the JCP attracted three or even four times as many voters as readers of *Akahata*. But in more recent elections, the ratio in many of these districts is coming down to 3:1 and even 2:1. One conclusion is that the JCP is gradually losing the "progressive" floating and protest vote—a development that ironically may be in part due to the party's unexpected strong showing in the early 1970's. Some voters, however, may resume their protest voting for the Communists now that the JCP appears to be stagnating and isolated.

Internally, this stagnation and isolation have produced frantic attempts to strengthen the indoctrination of members and build up morale. All congresses and Central Committee plenums have been stressing education, self-study, compulsory reading of party organs,

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[133] The only exception was during the Cultural Revolution when "Communist China" was even more unpopular than the Soviet Union. See Peter Berton, Paul F. Langer, and George O. Totten, Trans. and Eds., *The Russian Impact on Japan: Literature and Social Thought—Two Essays by Nobori Shomu and Akamatsu Katsumaro*, Los Angeles, University of Southern California Press, 1981, pp. 125–29. Calculated from the *Jiji Seron Chosa Tokuho* (Jiji Public Opinion Survey: A Special Report), Tokyo, Jiji Tsushin Sha, 1960–1981. In the first half of the 1980's, especially after the Korean airliner incident in September 1983, the unpopularity of the Soviet Union increased.

A demonstration in Tokyo's Yoyogi park in July 1983 proclaims: "We are Against the 'Arms Race' " and "Down with the Japanese-American Security Treaty."

—TASS from Sovfoto.

and especially party decisions and resolutions. Party leaders also seem somewhat alarmed about the JCP's prospects in the next election (whether national, prefectural, or local), and they hope to improve party performance by increasing sales of *Akahata*, by distributing literally millions of pamphlets, and by attracting new members in the belief that greater membership translates into higher readership of party organs, which in turn pulls in more voters.

Future bases of support? What are the immediate prospects for the JCP? Not terribly promising. The party can expect a gradual erosion of its primary bases of support: the intellectual elite, student and other young activists, and workers (white-collar more than blue-collar).

In the past, the party has depended to a great extent on the intellectual elite (Miyamoto, Fuwa, and Ueda are all products of the prestigious Tokyo University, and the JCP contingent in the Diet is, along with that of the LDP, the best educated group).[134] Moreover, China's defection from the radical camp has been a very painful experience for Japanese intellectuals, and not only for the dedicated Maoist apologists for the Cultural Revolution.

A second group comprises students and young men and women in general. Former student activists like Fuwa and his brother Ueda, in particular, have been influential in the party hierarchy, outnumbering labor unionists seven to three. The party's future development obviously depends to a large extent on the recruitment of young men and women. And this, in turn, depends on the perceptions, ideology, and general outlook of the new generation.[135]

That outlook is not so favorable for the JCP, if the results of a recent survey of 277 freshmen entering Tokyo University is any indication. According to this April 1983 poll conducted by an assistant professor at this prestigious institution, 28.5 percent of these freshman supported the LDP, 10.5 percent the JSP, and 6.9 percent the JCP.[136] Although this survey is not as damning as was a 1978 poll conducted by the editorial board of the Tokyo University newspaper (entering freshman favored the LDP over the JCP 45 percent to 3.5 percent),[137] support for the JCP in the student population from 1981 to 1984 dropped from 4.3 percent to 3.1 percent.[138]

Even more ominous for the JCP is the coincidence of a lessening of the appeal of socialism and a growing satisfaction with the present system among many young people. An annual survey of some 9,000 trainees at a national youth center for new company employees and those who were employed for three to five years, sponsored by the Japanese Productivity Center from 1970 to 1981, indicates a diminishing number of respondents who favor a socialist system for Japan (rising from 7 percent in 1970 to 10 percent in 1973 and gradually falling to 3 percent in 1981). Those in the survey favoring the "present system" figured 24 percent in 1970, dropped to 17 percent in 1974, and then rose to 43 percent in 1981.[139] Perhaps the most devastating statistical trend for the JCP is the gradual aging of the party due to a significant drop in the percentage of young men and women. As noted above, between 1970 and 1985, the percentage of members under age 30 dropped from 55 to 15.[140] It has also been calculated that during the same period the percentage of JCP members among all Japanese students dropped from 1 percent to 0.6 percent.[141]

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[134] Among the JCP contingent in the Diet, there are many graduates from the elite Tokyo and Kyoto universities and the best private universities like Waseda, including a number of lawyers, two physicians, and two university professors.

[135] Government analysts estimate that among students' self-governing bodies, the JCP controls about 20 percent, extreme leftists about 10 percent, and the neutrals and others the remaining 70 percent. See "Significant Points of the 36th National Congress of the JCP-Led All-Japan Federation of Student Self-Governing Bodies," *Koan Joho*, No. 378, March 1985, pp. 52–69.

[136] Ibid., p. 56.

[137] Ibid.

[138] Ibid., p. 57.

All these polls seem to indicate that Japanese youth are getting more conservative and more supportive of the present political system. The complacent mood in the mid-1980's is a far cry from the defiant mood of the mid-1960's and the early 1970's. This does not bode well for a reformist (if not an openly revolutionary) political party, such as the JCP.

The third component of party support is white- and blue-collar workers, many of whom are members of trade unions. Space limitations preclude a discussion of the important distinctions between workers in government and private industry, between large-scale (big-business) firms and medium- and small-scale companies, and between blue- and white-collar workers. As mentioned earlier, unlike the French and Italian communist parties, the JCP does not enjoy the support of huge labor federations. Big labor in the Japanese context supports the JSP and the DSP. The JCP, despite being a party allegedly of and for the "proletarian" class, is not the first choice of the union rank-and-file. In fact, some polls indicate rather shallow working-class support for the JCP.[142]

The biggest problem for the JCP is that the Japanese public by and large considers itself "middle class." Poll after poll indicates that upwards of 90 percent of all Japanese opt for the "middle class" label. This shows that whatever inequalities may exist in the Japanese society, the perception of the vast majority is that it is neither downtrodden nor exploited. Of course, the party cannot accept this fact, and goes to great lengths to portray Japanese society quite differently. Supposedly using 1980 figures from the Bureau of Statistics of the Prime Minister's Office, the JCP in its introductory booklet for new members claims that the *working class* (*rodosha kaikyu*) constitutes 67.1 percent (including 2.5 percent unemployed) of the Japanese working population. The other 33 percent is composed of petty businessmen in commerce and industry, and other "working townsmen" (*kinro shiminso*), 17.4 percent; farmers and fishermen, 9.8 percent; capitalist class, 4.8 percent; and the Self-Defense Forces and the police ("armed guards of the ruling class"), 0.8 percent.[143]

However the JCP chooses to classify the Japanese population, a far more important development is taking place that will radically alter the present occupational and social patterns and have a profound impact on the mid-range future of the party. In the wake of the first oil shock of 1973–74, the Japanese government has made some long-range plans for restructuring the Japanese economy, away from the resource-dependent and environment polluting industries and toward high technology, knowledge-based industries, research and development, computer-based information and communications, genetic engineering, new materials, and the like. Japan also has more industrial robots than the rest of the major industrial powers combined.

Japan has already experienced a radical shrinkage in the rural, agricultural sector. The same will gradually happen with the blue-collar industrial labor force, partly because of the utilization of robots. Until now, the tertiary (service) sector has been growing largely at the expense of the primary (agricultural and mining) sector. In the future, the tertiary sector will grow at the expense of the secondary (manufacturing) sector, with profound consequences for the Japanese political parties, especially the so-called progressive parties, including the JCP.

Some of the same phenomena are taking place in Western Europe, but around the turn of the century Japan might be leading the way in economic and social transformation. Students of Eurocommunism might well profit from following the fortunes of the Japan Communist Party.

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[139] Ibid.

[140] Hirotsu, "The 17th Party Congress," p. 11.

[141] Ibid.

[142] A poll, conducted in May 1977 among 15,000 labor union members in the Kansai area, shows a lack of JCP support even among Japan's proletariat: JSP was favored by 28 percent, DSP by 11, LDP by 5.5, and the JCP by only 2.5 (a whopping 45 percent did not support any political party). See Tomita Nobuo et al., "Japanese Politics at a Crossroads: The 11th House of Councillors Election," *Bulletin of the Institute of Social Sciences, Meiji University* (Tokyo), Vol. 1, No. 3, 1978, p. 17. However, because many Japanese are reluctant to identify themselves publicly with the JCP, the validity of such polls is weakened.

[143] *Nihon Kyosan To Shokai*, 1983 ed., p. 97.

Social Policy under Gorbachëv

Walter D. Connor

In little more than a year since taking office as general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachëv has added a vigorous, comparatively youthful "face" to the Soviet leadership, reshaped the composition of the party Politburo and Secretariat, met Ronald Reagan in a summit that Gorbachëv's two short-term predecessors had avoided, and managed (rather well) the 27th CPSU Congress and (less well) the Chernobyl' nuclear disaster. Although journalistic and expert commentary has, understandably, tended to concentrate on the "high politics" of this period of transition to a post-Stalin leadership generation, the conclusion of the Congress and the adoption of the first new party program since Nikita Khrushchev's visionary document of 1961 raises a broader issue—the emergent policy of the Gorbachëv leadership in the *social* arena.

Social policy is a broad and vague term, definable only at the risk of drawing limits too narrow or, at the other extreme, of including everything that a strong state may do that has any impact at the grass-roots level. Focusing somewhere in the middle of these extremes, this article will first explore some aspects of economic policy as they affect the consumption aspirations and possibilities of the Soviet "man in the street," then examine some themes and policies in the areas of social discipline, educational reform, and work tenure and organization, and finally, touch on the issue of equity and "social justice" in Gorbachëv's USSR. It is surely too early to assume that rhetoric and enunciated policy are a clear guide to future Soviet developments, but not too early to explore some possible contingencies arising from the confrontation of new policies and a Soviet population that has become unaccustomed—through a long Brezhnev era and an extended transition to the age of Gorbachëv—to bold departures.

Walter D. Connor is Professor of Political Science, Boston University, and a Fellow of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University (Cambridge, MA). Author of numerous books and articles on Soviet and East European affairs, he is currently working on The Accidental Proletariat, *a study of workers and politics in post-Stalin Russia, with support from the John Simon Guggenheim Foundation and the National Council for Soviet and East European Research.*

Consumerism and Constraint

Soviet consumers will find little of great encouragement in the public communications emanating from the Kremlin since the autumn of 1985, and—if they read improbably closely—there are some clearly discouraging indications. The lengthy "Consumer Goods and Services Program" published on October 9, 1985, set goals for the period to 1990—that of the 12th Five-Year Plan—and to the year 2000, the current end-point of so many Gorbachëv projections.[1] Near-term goals, if not revolutionary in their promise, seem beyond the reach of the modest-to-minimal growth record of recent years. The program promised to increase production of nonfood commodities by 30 percent above 1985 levels by the year 1990, and 80 to 90 percent by 2000, to achieve better siting of retail outlets, and to arrange for more convenient store hours. Beyond predictable references to clothing and footwear, furniture, and refrigerators, the document revealed the continuing "overload" on a central planning apparatus that apparently found it necessary to refer to the production of new types of automatic potato peelers, to promise a 100 percent increase in the production of quartz wristwatches by 1990, and to raise production of videocassette recorders to 60,000 a year by 1990 and 120,000 by 2000.

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[1] *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Oct. 9, 1985, trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, OH—hereafter *CDSP*), Nov. 6, 1985, pp. 13–30.

The program predicted that "payments and benefits provided to the population from public consumption funds will receive further development," but it also set the goal of creating "an extensive and efficiently operating system" of *paid* services, the volume of which is to rise 30–40 percent by 1990 and 110–130 percent by 2000. The commitment to an expansion of paid services was accompanied by comments on improving the quality of services to urban and rural populations and on making services available to all population groups and to people "with different income levels."[2] Whether this bespeaks an aim to impose charges on services currently "free" to all, or to offer a better variety of paid services than is now available to those with the money to pay for them, seems unclear. But if, as seems likely, wage policies will aim at increasing the role of personal income (as opposed to public consumption provisions) in satisfying needs beyond the minimal/normal,[3] the commitment to increasing the proportion of paid services seems likely to benefit mainly higher-income strata.

Moreover, the economy may fall short of fulfilling these promises. There is a perplexing lack of correspondence between targeted 1986–90 investment in the "nonproductive" sector and the promised "delivery" from this sector, suggesting that consumption is likely to be an "orphan" in the second half of the present decade. Investment bulks large in the targets of the 12th Five-Year plan, including investment in the energy and agriculture sectors—indeed, Gorbachëv has apparently had to compromise on his public position of mid-1985, which foresaw no significant rises in investment for these sectors.[4] Total investment is targeted to increase by 18–21 percent over the 1986–90 period, but productive investment is to grow by fully 25 percent.[5] The adverse implication of this for investment in "nonproductive" sectors (health, education, housing, culture), which normally only accounts for about one-quarter of all investment anyway, is clear. This is not a "social budget."

Nor do resources seem to be moving toward the production of mass consumer goods in sufficient numbers to reduce the bottlenecks and pressures that have produced a spectacularly bribe-ridden Soviet economy. Both the Gorbachëv rhetoric emphasizing technological investment in leading sectors of the economy (notably machine-building) and the discrepancy between the overall investment growth target of some 20 percent and promises of growth in nonfood commodity production of 30 percent by 1990 would seem to tip the scales against any emerging abundance of consumer durables.

That "objective circumstances" do not favor the Soviet consumer over the next 5–10 years, then, seems obvious. This raises for Gorbachëv the necessity to mobilize energies, while disciplining expectations—to deliver the "stick," or its functional equivalent, in the absence of a credible and motivating promise of carrots in the near term. The prospective belt-tightening (on the basis, let it be noted, of the anything but dramatic growth of consumer welfare in the first half of the 1980's)[6] is not simply a matter of policy choice in a slow-growth Soviet economy. For various reasons, neither Eastern Europe nor the West is a likely source of the goods whose import might improve the consumer picture.

Eastern Europe is itself economically strapped, and so long as the Soviets understand that social peace there is maintained partially at the price of guaranteeing a living standard that, however threadbare, exceeds the Soviet norm, they will not be tempted to treat the region as an interim source of goods to buttress Soviet living standards. Beyond social peace, a modicum of consumerism is necessary to keep East European citizens motivated as producers, at a time when Soviet policies on integration within the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) lean harder on East European economies than hitherto. In a paper prepared for the UN Economic Commission on Eu-

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[2] Ibid.

[3] As the Soviet economist Oleg Bogomolov puts it in an interesting United Nations paper, "while the social guarantees of the receipt of benefits and services from the social consumption funds are also being reinforced, the role of wages in satisfying demands for 'goods' (e.g., housing) that exceed the sociallly guaranteed standards is increasing in most of the countries [member states of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance] under consideration." See UN Economic and Social Council, Economic Commission for Europe "Perspectives on the ECE Regions: Centrally-Planned Economies in the Period up to the Year 2000," Nov. 19, 1985 (for presentation at the Feb. 17-21, 1986, meeting of Senior Economic Advisors to ECE Governments), mimeo, p. 14.

[4] See, e.g., Gorbachëv's speech to a June 11, 1985, Central Committee meeting on accelerating scientific and technological progress, reported in *Pravda*, June 12, 1985.

[5] See the discussion in Keith Bush, "Ryzhkov's Speech to the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress: A Tone of Sobriety", Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty, *Radio Liberty Research* (Munich), RL 109/86 Mar. 3, 1986, p. 2.

[6] As Prime Minister Ryzhkov noted in his speech at the 27th Party Congress, in 1982 (the second year of the 11th Five-Year Plan) "the increase in the population's real income virtually stopped." *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*, Mar. 1, 1986, p. 2, trans. in *CDSP*, Apr. 23, 1986, pp. 2-3.

СлужбаБЫТА
ПОЧТА
ТОР

The director of a Soviet consumer service center discusses a product with two of his customers outside his complex in early 1986.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

rope, Soviet economist Oleg Bogomolov predicted that the CEMA market as a whole

> *will continue to suffer (at least for the next 5–10 years) from an excess of demand (principally from the USSR) for food and consumer goods. There is, however, relatively little potential for expanding exports of such products. . . .*[7]

Western sources will doubtless continue to supply an important component of Soviet consumption, making good shortfalls in grain production. But even in this area relating directly to diet (at the base of "living standards"), developments look anything but promising. Falling Soviet oil-export revenues reduce available hard currency, intensifying the dilemmas of what to import from the West: technology and capital, grain, or other consumer goods?

On the agricultural front, it is not clear that the USSR is "due" some good luck with weather; without it, grain shortfalls will be all the worse, and the claims on diminishing energy-export revenues all the greater. The yet-to-be clarified agricultural consequences of the Chernobyl' nuclear reactor disaster raise further questions about the quantity and utility of output from farming in the generally marginal producing areas near the plant and, more important, in the Ukrainian bread-basket lands to the south and southeast.

At the 27th Party Congress, Premier Nikolay Ryzhkov spoke of pay raises amounting to 25–30 percent for those in material production, plus allocations for raises for many in nonproduction branches, to be financed by "increased production and efficiency" of labor collectives. These, plus increases in public consumption funds, he predicted, would "lead to really appreciable changes in the living conditions and living standards of very broad strata of society" over the period 1986–90.[8] It is difficult to square this with Bogomolov's commentary on prospects for near-term rises in consumption in the CEMA states:

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[7] Bogomolov, op. cit., p. 26.

> *It is not impossible that until the end of the 1980's resources will be insufficient for the achievement of* ***socially perceptible*** *growth in consumption. . . . In these circumstances, there is likely to be development and satisfaction of aspects of demand that do not relate to increase in the supply of material goods but are important for the promotion of social contentment, namely, the improvement of working conditions and the multiplication of training and leisure options. That will help to augment workers' capacity for highly productive labour and promote their more active involvement in production and management.*[9]

The inference is clear: while officials of the Central Statistical Administration will doubtless report some quantitative growth in consumption over the 12th Five-Year Plan period, the dimensions of this growth will not be evident to the public. With stagnation in material conditions, Bogomolov's training and leisure options are unlikely to suffice as incentives for sharply improved work effort.

This brief review of the economic background to social policy in the Gorbachëv era reveals a predominance of constraints over opportunities, of tight spots rather than room for maneuver. The regime seems ready to live—or make its subjects live—within those constraints. Along the way, the social policy lines that are emerging, while not altogether clear, seem to promise a peculiar amalgam of activist state intervention in certain areas and the possibility of greater autonomy in others, in a "balance" as likely to frustrate as to please those at whom it is aimed.

Discipline

The broad Gorbachëv policy stresses discipline: work, sobriety, order, and honesty. In this, it reproduces the style of the Andropov interregnum, but not quite the "campaign" quality of the early months of 1983, when hapless Soviet citizens, shopping during working hours, were dragooned from queues and asked to account for their involvement in what was, after all, a mass-behavior phenomenon. Although Western commentary at the time tended to perceive enthusiastic mass support for Andropov's attack on the slackness of behavior, the dishonesty, and the corner-cutting that had become epidemic in the latter years of the Brezhnev period, one may doubt that such feelings went very deep. The Andropov campaign literally aimed at the "man in the street," long-starved of goods and convenient hours in which to purchase them. The stick of discipline was felt immediately; the "carrot" of more convenient store hours and better supplies was a matter of future hopes.

Gorbachëv, in contrast, in his first year concentrated more on dismissing, retiring, and otherwise separating from ill-discharged functions party and state leaders at various levels—from national to regional and local. In so doing, he has given Soviet citizens so inclined something to cheer about, as the incompetent, but especially the corrupt (who used elevated positions to enrich themselves), are laid low. The Soviet rank-and-file is, after all, used to taking orders, to waiting upon (or trying to subvert) cumbersome bureaucratic procedures to secure services and decisions. While in the latter half of the 1980's, citizens are surely sophisticated enough to expect no alteration of hierarchical structures out of this, it cannot be a matter of total indifference to them that many of the highly-placed are finally getting a comeuppance.

Less popular, one must assume, is the campaign Gorbachëv has made his own: the one against alcohol and the Soviet population's massive and frequent recourse to it.[10] Barely had Konstantin Chernenko been buried and Gorbachëv settled in the general secretary's chair when *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* announced that the Politburo had discussed means of "combatting drunkenness and alcoholism,"[11] setting the stage for further rhetoric, if not action. The first followed, with a Central Committee resolution and a Council of Ministers decree in mid-May.[12] Beyond familiar pieties about expanded programs of medical treatment, the encouragement of more "creative" (i.e., sober) use of leisure time, and improvement in the quality of anti-alcohol propaganda, the main substance was a set of restrictive police measures. Alcohol sales were barred to persons under 21; there were to be no sales of wine and vodka before 2:00 p.m. on workdays; and the number of retail outlets was to be reduced.

In contrast to the past, the Gorbachëv regime does

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[8] Ibid., p. 17.

[9] Ibid., p. 15, emphasis added.

[10] For a recent discussion, see David E. Powell, "The Soviet Alcohol Problem and Gorbachëv's 'Solution'," *The Washington Quarterly* (Washington, DC), Fall 1985, pp. 5–15.

[11] *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*, Apr. 5, 1985, p. 1.

[12] *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*, May 17, 1985, p. 1.



The adverse impact of alcoholism on work is depicted in this cartoon by Soviet artist L. Samoylova. The caption reads: A Graph of the Fulfillment of the Production Plan at Shop No. 13.

—*Krokodil* (Moscow).

seem intent on enforcing such restrictions. Muscovites and visitors report the novelty of "dry" lunches in restaurants, and changes in the previously bibulous pattern of Soviet official entertaining, including events on the Moscow diplomatic round. Soviet reports cite a reduction in retail sales outlets (those selling wine and vodka) of 50 percent during 1985 and a fall in sales amounting to 25 percent for the same year.[13] Restrictions on hours of sale, surely aimed at reducing workplace drunkenness, may—combined with a crackdown on labor-discipline violations in plants—have had some positive impact. It was claimed, for example, that the rise in industrial production figures in the fourth quarter of 1985 was attributable in part to more "discipline"—part of which must surely be a lessening of drunkenness, absences, accidents, and general slackness related to alcohol.[14]

Over the long term, however, there is ample reason to doubt that a behavior pattern so deeply rooted can be extirpated, especially habits that have put money in the state's pocket via its monopoly on alcohol production (even as they have taken it away in productivity) and have contributed, in some measure, to the relative political quiescence of a population deprived of liberties and consumer goods long common in the West. If the regime, under Gorbachëv, continues to "mean business," it may cut the production of liquor further, but only to see some of its market ceded to the producers of *samogon* (privately brewed alcohol). Illegal distillers, mainly rural, are targeted in Gorbachëv's campaign, but their numbers are large and rural law-enforcement notoriously difficult. Finally, without more goods and services to reward greater discipline and productivity, there will be no positive incentives for the Soviet masses to moderate their drinking.

Discipline at the social level, ultimately, is a matter of motivation—moral as well as self-interested (whether for gain or avoidance of penalty)—to behave within prescribed patterns (the "letter of the law," or something close to it). Moral motivation must be strong

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[13] *Pravda*, Jan. 26, 1985.

[14] See the discussion of 1985 performance in Keith Bush, "Soviet Plan Fulfillment in 1985," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 47/86, Jan. 27, 1986.

Table 1: Attitudes of a Sample of Moscow Industrial Workers Toward Legal Norms

(In percent)

	Attitude toward the given law			
Act punished by a given law	Actively positive	Neutral	Negative	No opinion
Theft from an apartment	92.6	–	–	7.4
Petty theft from an enterprise	16.6	78.6	3.3	1.5
Radio repair: repairman avoids filling out work order and pockets the fee personally	4.7	49.3	40.7	5.3
Swindling customers (charging for false weight, etc.)	76.7	20.7	–	2.6
Money bribe to salesperson to obtain a scarce item	12.0	30.0	54.7	3.3
Influencing criminal investigation to help a friend escape responsibility	44.0	17.3	33.3	5.4

SOURCE: Adapted from A.S. Grechin, "Experiment in the Sociological Study of Attitudes Toward the Law," *Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya* (Moscow), No. 2, 1983, p. 124.

indeed if the consequences for the individual are more negative in adhering to the rules than in learning to sidestep them. Here, Gorbachëv faces a dual burden. Under Brezhnev as never before, negative incentives to obey laws weakened, while positive incentives failed to grow apace with desires for goods and services. (A positive incentive against offering of bribes to salespeople and their asking for same is an adequate amount of the goods involved in the transaction.) Under these circumstances, the views of Soviet people about such issues of everyday morality drifted far from the prescriptions of the laws.

Interesting evidence of this emerges in a 1982 Soviet study of popular attitudes toward legal norms—based on a study of 2,000 workers in Moscow industrial enterprises. Respondents were asked about their attitudes ("actively positive," "neutral," "negative") toward the negative norms declaring certain acts illegal (see Table 1). Nothing about these figures should surprise any student of Soviet affairs—or anyone familiar to any degree with the strictures and opportunities of grass-roots Soviet life. Worth noting, however, is not only the very weak support for prohibitions of behavior that betokens participation in the "second economy," but also the clarity of the separation between public and private "spheres" of moral calculation. Stealing from the workplace is one thing; from an individual's apartment, something else. Bribing a salesperson is "normal"; being short-weighted by the same, reprehensible. If it is Gorbachëv's goal to upgrade public morality to the level of private morality, one can only say that at present the resources to do so, ranging from the coercive to the positively-motivating, are in less than adequate supply. Changing such public attitudes will require more than a campaign. Attempting at the outset to change them mainly by negative and punitive policies could produce, in lowered morale and more sophisticated patterns of avoidance, the opposite of the regime's objectives.

Education: Choice to "Tracking"

"Educational reform" is not a policy innovation of the Gorbachëv era proper—it dates back to 1984—but the new General Secretary has made it his own. At the 27th Congress he stated:

> *The reform of general education and vocational schools has started. It must be said that the tempo and depth of implementation of the measures envisaged by the reform cannot yet satisfy us.*[15]

If we are to take these words at face value (and there are reasons for doing so),[16] they signal commitment to a program with profound implications for social mobility, class composition, and inter-class relations, and for some redefinition of the broad notion of "social justice."

The critical elements of the reform aim at a threefold problem: an "excess" of Soviet teenagers electing to complete academic secondary education, most with an eye toward competing for scarce spaces in higher education; a "shortage" of job-relevant vocational training for those in the 16-to-17-year age bracket; and unreadiness," thus, of those completing academic secondary education to enter the working class, because of a lack of skills, because unattractive entry-level jobs "require" considerably less than 10 years of academic education, and because youths aspire to be something more than the workers that economics and demographics dictate they must become. All of these problems, of course, have in recent years been seen against the backdrop of an overall shortage of labor. This has added to the perceived urgency of finding some solutions.

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[15] See the text of his report in *Pravda*, Feb. 26, 1986, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Report, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-SOV*), Feb. 26, 1986, p. 22.

[16] Personnel appointments to relevant posts seem to indicate this. On Dec. 5, 1985, *Sovetskaya Rossiya* reported the appointment of Viktor Kaznacheyev as Chairman of the State Committee for Vocational-Technical Education of the Russian Republic; his previous post was party second secretary in Stavropol' Kray—Gorbachëv's home "turf" (see *Radio Libery Research*, RL 411/85, Dec. 6, 1985, p. 3). On Jan. 13, 1986, Radio Moscow announced the appointment of Leningrad City party first

The solution chosen involves a new form of "tracking" for schoolchildren, emphasizing a new kind of secondary educational institution. It promises to involve state authority at an earlier age than hitherto in educational and career planning for children. The reform proposes to increase "by approximately two times" the number of youths who, after completing "incomplete secondary" schooling (now the eighth grade, but when the reform's new age-six school commencement policy is in place, the ninth grade), go to "secondary vocational-technical schools." This institution (*srednoye professional'no-tekhnicheskoye uchilishche* in Russian—hereafter SPTU) has grown since the late 1960's out of granting to some upgraded "vocational-technical schools" (PTU) the right to grant secondary school diplomas. In the past, the PTU provided education of a narrowly vocational sort, usually lasting from 8–9 months to one-and-a-half years, and producing, by aim, "workers" for the economy, without granting the diploma of a secondary education.

Now, the SPTU will evidently absorb the majority of 17-year olds, providing a "comprehensive" education resulting in both vocational training and a secondary-education diploma. Given that Soviet surveys indicate mixed feelings—indeed a lack of enthusiasm—on the part of parents and children about such an "alternative" to the "academic" track most have selected in the past, many will be given no alternative. In a departure from the "spontaneity" that through the whole post-Stalin era has marked educational choice after the eighth year, admission to academic secondary training will become "selective." By one account, "The proportion of ninth-form leavers enrolling in different types of schools to complete their secondary education depends on the requirements of the national economy, with account taken of the abilities and inclinations of the pupils, the wishes of the parents, and recommendations of the schools' teacher councils."[17]

A cartoon by R. Yorsha in a Soviet humor magazine highlights concern with those who cheat the public. Observing the bejewelled hand of the salesperson, a customer exclaims: "Her hand gets ever heavier."

—*Krokodil* (Moscow).

What this means, in effect, is that completion of an academic secondary education—the current 9th and 10th, and the future 10th and 11th grades—will be a reality and option for only a minority of Soviet teenagers, as opposed to the majority today. Granted, those who complete academic secondary schooling in the main do not succeed in entering higher educational institutions (VUZy) today, and have not for some time.[18] But they have until now at least been free to remain in that academic track, and to enter the competition for full admission to VUZy; this will now change. Granted further, graduates of the "basic" vocational-technical schools (PTU) have not to this point been granted the secondary-school diplomas, which the new SPTU—into which all PTU's are slated for conversion—will be in a position to confer. But surely, they will

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secretary Anatoliy Dumachev as Chairman of the USSR State Committee on Vocational-Technical Education. See *Radio Libery Research*, RL 35/86, Jan. 17, 1986, p. 5.

[17] "Basic Directions of the Reform of General Education and Vocational Schools," in *O reforme obshcheobrazovatel'noy i professional'noy shkoly, sbornik dokumentov i materialov* (The Reform of General Education and Vocational Schools: A Collection of Documents and Materials), Moscow, Politizdat, 1984, p. 42.

[18] For a general discussion, see Murray Yanowitch, *Social and Economic Inequality in the Soviet Union*, White Plains, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 1977, pp. 58–59.

Students in a chemistry class at a secondary vocational school in Leningrad.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

be conferring diplomas without the education: one cannot "cram" both full academics and serious vocational training into what will be a three-year curriculum. Thus, though SPTU graduates will have their right-by-diploma to apply to VUZy (albeit only after completing an initial work assignment, it seems), their certification is not likely to be treated in the same manner as that of the minority of favored youth who will receive the traditional academic credentials.

Both numbers and social process are of interest here. Excluding the roughly 10 percent of eight-year-school graduates who opt for the para-professional "specialized secondary education" from ninth year on, and the now very small number who drop out of school after eight years, the bulk of 15-year olds (in 1979–80, about 52 percent) has, in the recent past, opted mainly for academic secondary education; only 19.6 percent in the same year opted for SPTU; and 17.7 percent, for PTU.[19] On the basis of these figures at least, a doubling in the numbers attending SPTU (including the "merged" PTU) would shift the proportions radically: about 61 percent would be attending the new institution, and only 28.6 percent would remain in the "academic" track. If we take as a basis for projections the enrollment figures of autumn 1983 (this being the last year for which figures could have been available for the 1984 reform), upward shifts in the SPTU/PTU "base" would leave less than one-quarter of youth attending purely academic secondary institutions.[20]

In social terms, the administrative/selection process outlined above promises to introduce forces at the secondary school level that currently show themselves mainly two years later, during the competition for VUZ entrance. Children of better-paid, better-educated professionals are vastly overrepresented in higher education in comparison to the offspring of workers and peasants. Parental value-inculcation, discipline, example, cultural/economic resources, and connections clearly all play a role. Is there any doubt that these factors will also operate at age 15 to determine that recruits to the SPTU will be largely of average-to-disadvantaged backgrounds, and that those who continue in academic education are likely to be children of already-successful parents?

Such a development will intensify the process of the hereditization of the Soviet working class, already well-advanced, as working-class children are "tracked" into the SPTU's, whose aim is to provide skilled workers for the economy. A "hereditized" working class would, from some perspectives, be judged a welcome development. Workers in such a class would possess better basic skills and be habituated to the urban-industrial environment (in contrast to the former peasants who swelled the ranks of the working class in the Stalin and Khrushchev eras). But from other perspectives, it has the potential of becoming a more "class-conscious" and combative social force, and a greater problem for political management.

This educational reform represents "interventionist" social policy—the intrusion of the Soviet state and its representatives into a process hitherto left largely alone. The evident rationale is, perhaps, not objectionable: if the economy needs "trained hands" and lacks them, and if spaces in higher education are few and most who seek them must fail and enter the world of work, then equipping such youths with the currently-scarce skills for that work is not illogical. But, at base, he manpower needs of the Soviet economy are in part a product of politics and not purely economics, and he low supply of places in higher education versus the demand is also the outcome of political decisions.

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[19] Figures are calculated from data in Felicity O'Dell, "Vocational Education in the USSR," in J.J. Tomiak, Ed., *Soviet Education in the 1980's*, London, Croom Helm, 1983, pp. 127–28; in F.R. Filippov, *Sotsiologiya obrazovaniya* (The Sociology of Education), Moscow, Nauka, 1980, Ch. 3; and in I. Bolotin and V. Chizhov, "Labor Resources and the System of Public Education," *Planovoye Khozyaystvo* (Moscow), No. 8, 1982, p. 103.

[20] However, in this area, "make haste slowly" may be the operating principle. The target for the autumn of 1985 involved the enrollment of fully 57.6 percent of all eighth-grade graduates into the ninth grade of academic schools—no great decline over previous years. See *Uchitel'skaya Gazeta* (Moscow), Aug. 22, 1985, pp. 1–2.

More important, the rise of the SPTU as the presumably "model" educational institution of the future reemphasizes the state's tendency to treat its human subects as "raw material"—to direct them where the state nas decided they are "needed," and to fit them not only with appropriate manual skills, but also with—for his is clearly a presumed benefit of the SPTU—attiudes appropriate for entrance into the working strata, ather than aspirations to enter into the intelligentsia. One may even sympathize with a desire to relieve the rustration youth feel from failure to gain VUZ admission, without—at the outset of the Gorbachëv leadership from which liberals seem to expect so much—agreeing that the appropriate path is educational/culural surgery to excise the aspirations themselves.

The World of Work

For all the costs—political, psychological, economc, and other—that the Soviet state as collective employer and paymaster, as well as pedagogue and policeman, has imposed on its subjects, it has provided rank-and-file workers guarantees against Western-tyle unemployment and ensured job security in curent jobs at the workplace. Indeed, that issues of the uality of Soviet work life have come into sharper focus n recent years in the writings of Soviet economists and ociologists[21] is a mark of a certain industrial maturity, f having solved in the main the basic problems of roviding work and sustenance. While not so critical to he ambitious or to the large number each year who do hange jobs in the USSR, this security has been, for nany, an essential component of a welfare package hat links regime and society in a social compact of orts. It is a benefit to be balanced against the boring, nonotonous, sometimes arduous, unmechanized jobs n an industrial economy well behind the West in its volution toward "post-industrial" or "service econony" characteristics.

There are now signs, however, that the Gorbachëv egime may take steps that will imperil this fundamental security without either enriching the nature of work or increasing the rewards for it. Should this prove to be the case, the adjustments required of society could be, collectively, quite remarkable. The reasons for this departure are a "labor shortage" reflecting both demographic realities (the low numbers of young entrants into the labor force and large numbers of workers reaching retirement age) and an abysmally low level of per capita labor productivity. The latter also reflects overmanning as enterprise policy and underemployment of this "stockpiled" labor.

Experiments of limited scope to deal with this problem are not new—for example, starting in 1967, the managers of the Shchekino chemical complex were allowed to dismiss redundant labor and reward those who remained with higher wages from a retained part of wage-fund savings. But the rhetoric confronting inefficient labor utilization—and, implicitly, the underlying job security—has escalated to a new level over the last year and a half. Early calls by Gorbachëv for harder work and greater efficiency have been accompanied by action, which although not massive, is certainly more than symbolic. In his 27th Party Congress speech Gorbachëv cited the dismissal of 12,000 workers of the Belorussian railway system and cuts in industry and construction personnel of Zaporozh'ye oblast, and he held out the prospect that new machinery in agricultural industry might save the labor of as many as 12 million workers by 1990.

The merger of five ministries and a state committee into a unified "State Agro-Industrial Committee" in November 1985 signalled, to much publicity, the release of several thousand bureaucrats from their jobs. Although it was noted that they would receive benefits equal to their old salaries for a maximum of three months while awaiting placement in (unspecified) new positions, there was no indication of an immediate transfer to other work.[22] Transition payments notwithstanding, they were, effectively, "unemployed."

While one can predict or imagine responses ranging all the way from mild concern to cheers that a set of ministerial bureaucracies had released a reported 47 percent of their apparat,[23] an article in *Sovetskaya Kul'tura* by labor economist Vladimir Kostakov at the beginning of the 1986 raised a more alarming specter. If growth targets for labor productivity for the year 2000

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[21] The best recent treatment of this discussion is found in Murray anowitch, *Work in the Soviet Union: Attitudes and Issues*, Armonk, NY, .E. Sharpe, 1985.

[22] *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*, Nov. 23, 1985, pp. 1–2.

[23] As reported by the chairman of the new State Agro-Industrial Committee, Vsevolod Murakhovskiy in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (Moscow), Jan. 22, 1986. However, the same source reported that as of late February (about three months after the redundancies were announced), "virtually all" of the 3,200 released had new jobs. See *Sel'skaya Zhizn'* (Moscow), Feb. 21, 1986.



Soviet schoolgirls are taught to be shop assistants at a vocational training center in Moscow.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

were met, he argued, this would allow a reduction by 13–19 million in jobs in manufacturing.[24] He predicted that the "sharpness" of this process would be "significantly moderated" by routine retirements and by the arrival on the labor scene of smaller cohorts to replace larger existing ones. More significantly, Kostakov wrote of a shift of employment to the service sector—long a low-pay, low-status, understaffed part of the economy—as manufacturing "destocked" especially in the area of non-, or minimally-mechanized labor. Indeed, he admitted, in the mid-1980's, "imperfections in the service sphere are harming material production most of all."

Although the image of a more modern economy, somewhat along the lines of "post-industrialism" (without using the term), was a benign one in Kostakov's depiction, the transition from industrial to service employment was cast in terms rather different than those that Soviet audiences are accustomed to hearing:

> *The need to look for a job, something that many people . . . will certainly face, may also be new and unaccustomed for us. After all, we are used to just the opposite—the job looking for the person. . . . Considerable psychological restructuring will also be required, apparently. We consider it natural and necessary that, if for objective reasons a job slot becomes unnecessary, the employee should immediately be given another job. Very often, that is precisely why staff reduction takes place more slowly than it could even now: the managers of enterprises and institutions . . . prefer not to burden themselves with concern for the job placement of people who have been let go—especially since their possibilities for doing so are very limited. Now we will have to accustom ourselves to the thought that finding employment is, to a considerable extent, the individual's own concern, and that this search may require a certain amount of time—a sufficient, but not unlimited, amount of time.*[25]

It was, perhaps, the tone of the commentary, rather than the rough demographic projections, that engen-

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[24] In *Sovetskaya Kul'tura* (Moscow), Jan. 4, 1986, trans. in *CDSP*, Feb. 19, 1986, pp. 1–4.

[25] Ibid.

At the Central Employment Bureau in Moscow.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

dered unease. Whatever the case, an interview with TASS later in the same month gave Kostakov the opportunity to deny that unemployment would result from technological progress and enhanced productivity,[26] and a later article by him in *Sovetskaya Kul'tura* provided a general discussion of economic progress and its conditions that was less pointed than the earlier one.[27]

Whether this follow-up reflects official Soviet concern with domestic uneasiness or with Western press coverage suggesting that Lenin's sixth lineal heir might preside over the reintroduction of joblessness, the problem is a sensitive one. Soviet labor waste does need correction. The service sector, woefully underdeveloped, is short of manpower by any reasonable international standard (though this is clearly not its only problem). At this point, Gorbachëv's policy, while aiming to avert alarmist reactions, has offered no guarantees that things will continue as usual for a largely "tenured" labor force.

Otherwise, the onset of the Gorbachëv era seems to have brought little new in labor policy. Predictably, the "brigade method" of shop-floor organization was endorsed at the 27th Congress, although the "reality" of its results remains unclear. Although a 1983 report indicated that more than 50 percent of all industrial workers were working under the brigade method,[28] a 1982 article judged that more than 50 percent of the brigades reported were really "paper" constructs.[29]

Of more interest was Gorbachëv's reference in his Congress address to the "brigade" or "team" system in agriculture. He held out the prospect that contracting might be "widely disseminated at the level of teams, links, and *families*."[30] This allusion to a possible return to "family farming" within an unspecified set of collective farm limitations was of particular interest in light of China's successful agricultural "de-communalization." But, despite publication since the Congress of a lengthy decree on agriculture,[31] there has been no major follow-through on this tantalizing Gorbachëv gesture toward private enterprise. It is precisely in this area—where desires to unleash people's capacity to work clash with fears of the social and political consequences of growing unequality and individual enrichment—that the tensions in Gorbachëv's social policy may emerge most clearly.

Enterprise, Equity, and Social Justice

What sort of Soviet society does Gorbachëv seek to shape? What combination of impulses toward achievement and enrichment, on the one hand, and quality and security, on the other, is seen as an "appropriate" public mood? What role will private enterprise—and all its more-than-marginal social effects—be allowed to play, if any? What distinctions will Gorbachëv regime policy draw between "honest" earning of material advantage, and "unjustified" enrichment of individuals, groups, or classes?

The uncertainties here are many, but not so total as to leave us with no clues. It is worth stating at the outset that there seems to be a distinct lack of readiness to countenance a social outcome of the "Hungarian" sort. This is more than to say that the USSR will not adopt a "modified" New Economic Mechanism (since such was never possible in any real sense); it is to suggest a distaste among Soviet leaders for the liberalized, decentralized, competitive, and self-exploiting style and content of Hungarian life as it has developed

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[26] Tass interview, Jan. 16, 1986 (see *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 35/86, Jan. 17, 1986, p. 11).

[27] *Sovetskaya Kul'tura*, Feb. 1, 1986, p. 3, trans. in *CDSP*, Feb. 19, 1986, pp. 4–5, 23.

[28] N. Safronov, Ya. Shagalov, and A. Shirov, "Reserves for Increasing Labor Productivity in USSR Industry," *Sotsialisticheskiy Trud* (Moscow), No. 7, 1983, p. 13.

[29] A.A. Gorel'skiy, "Defining Brigade Economic Accounting," *EKO* (Novosibirsk), No. 7, 1982, p. 122.

[30] *Pravda*, Feb. 26, 1986, emphasis added.

[31] *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*, Mar. 29, 1986, trans. in *CDSP*, May 7, 1986, pp. 10–15.

Vladimir Kobzev, leader of a team of machinists formed in 1985 at Moscow's Krasnyy Proletariy works; the team gets a "collective wage," which members divide according to their individual work contribution.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

since 1968, for the uncertainties of the mix of private/autonomous and public/dirigiste forces in Hungary. Moscow will tolerate it in Hungary, but will seek to avoid such a consequence in its mix of policies for Soviet society.

The real objectives beyond the immediate rhetoric and policy pronouncements are more difficult to discern, but a few things seem clear. First, within the general commitment to maintaining the Soviet welfare state, one can detect a trend toward the shifting of responsibility for certain matters away from the state, and toward the individual. Kostakov's words on workers seeking jobs rather than vice versa, bear this message, and this he was not forced to retract. Similarly, one of the thrusts of recent discussion on wage policy (within a general context of "anti-levelling") involves viewing wages and salaries as the main way of satisfying needs beyond those provided for in collective consumption—the implication being that more "needs" can be afforded, the more one earns. It is one's responsibility to earn the money.[32]

Second, this responsibility does not herald a new autonomy for the Soviet citizen in society and economy. Thus far, at least, the Gorbachëv regime has offered no large range of private-enterprise alternatives for those ready to opt out of the state economy. Though this does not close off all possibility of a future opening to marginal privatization, the current state of mind runs in a different direction. A CPSU Politburo session on March 27 of this year addressed the bugbear of "unearned income," and *Pravda*'s report of the meeting indicated that

> *. . . plans call for the implementation of legal and other measures aimed at eradicating unearned income from illegal operations, theft, bribery, speculation, and unauthorized use of state-owned transport, machines, and equipment for personal profit.*[33]

Considering the broad range of behavior that the Soviet mind has been inclined to view as "speculation" and the ubiquity of unauthorized use of state-owned automobiles and trucks, this meeting targeted a great deal of everyday behavior.

At the same time, Gorbachëv's Congress report suggested some ambivalence—or perhaps, balance—on this score. The General Secretary called for consideration of progressive inheritance taxes (one way of getting at "unjust enrichment"), but followed this proposal immediately with a defense of those who gain "additional earnings through honest labor." Could the latter comprise private-sector activity?

The Central Committee resolution on "Measures to Intensify the Struggle Against Unearned Income" and the decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Presidium on "Intensifying the Struggle Against the Deriving of Unearned Income"—both published on May 28, 1986—made this seem unlikely. Though the documents specify that work in "handicrafts" or "individual labor activity" must be of a specially "prohibited" type to be subject to a catalogue of penalties, they fail to indicate what *is* legal or what is to be encouraged in the area of private initiative.[34] Unauthorized use of state-owned means of transport is made a matter of administrative penalties (and of criminal prosecution for recidivists), but there is no reference to the possibility of using private automobiles to offer services as part-time taxi drivers in off hours—a modest "privatization" suggested by many economists in recent years.[35]

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[32] Bogomolov speaks of "making workers' levels of real consumption more closely dependent on their incomes." Op. cit., p. 14.

[33] *Pravda*, Mar. 28, 1986, p. 1.

[34] *Pravda*, May 28, 1986, pp 1–2.

These documents remind one of the Brezhnev-era "declarationism," which so often proved impotent in dealing with the targeted problems. One recalls that it was only a few years ago, in 1981, that two new articles were added to the Criminal Code of the Russian Republic specifically prohibiting sales under-the-counter or at places removed from retail shops and forbidding state employees to accept bribes for performance.[36]

Proscriptions and penalties for violation of laws will only make social (and ultimately, political and economic) sense if the production of goods and sale of spare parts are boosted and the populace's demand for services is satisfied in the briefest possible time—in other words, if the positive commitments of the Central Committee resolution are met.[37] As indicated above, this is not likely. In the meantime, tight enforcement could force a drying-up and a driving further underground of elements of the second economy and a rise in the prices patrons must pay, with no improvement in the net quality of life or social morale. Although USSR General Procurator A. Rekunkov suggested in an *Izvestiya* interview five days after the new decree that a law on individual labor activity currently being drafted was aimed not at prohibiting but at developing such activity, and that state registration and taxation (to keep charges from rising too high) would encourage such work,[38] one may doubt whether Soviet citizens will see things that way.

Finally, "social justice" remains an aim, an objective to be pursued so that Soviet citizens perceive as equitable the rules according to which opportunity and benefits are allocated. Here, matters are as interesting as they are complex. Equity and "equality" are not the same thing. However, there is a strong egalitarian bent among a significant segment of the Soviet population, and one may assume that the Brezhnev-era wage policy, which saw a "drift" toward minimization of the earning advantages of engineering and technical personnel over manual workers, and continuing advantages of the latter over people in rank-and-file positions in medicine, education and culture, and other services,[39] responded in some fashion to this bent. Gorbachëv seems to have something different in mind—a "shake-up" in favor of those "underpaid" (from the incumbents' point of view) nonmanual and service-sector occupations, which are expected to increase as a percentage of the labor force when manufacturing de-stocks unneeded workers. In the words of Bogomolov,

> *. . . fundamental changes may be expected in systems of wage rates and in the differentials between pay of particular categories of workers. For example, the Soviet Union . . . intend(s) to raise the salaries of engineers and technicians, scientists, designers, teachers, and medical staff . . . .*[40]

This appears to be a clear commitment to rectify the material disadvantage that those holding degrees have experienced in recent decades. The consequences of a shift in the patterns of inequality in the economic sphere may be all the more important if a new flexibility in prices, a concept frequently touched on during the Congress, means higher prices for many items in demand in retail trade, and if—which seems less likely, given construction material shortages and bottlenecks—cooperative housing construction increases markedly, which would allow a modicum of "custom" building and reflect purchasers' differential buying power.

Still, inequalities in result are one thing; inequalities in opportunity, another. For a system that has never identified justice with equality of outcomes, the critical issue may be opportunity. Tat'yana Zaslavskaya, the Novosibirsk sociologist reputed to have Gorbachëv's ear, made a strong argument in early 1986 for a concept of social justice embracing "equal opportunity." Her approach is meritocratic, focused on the conditions that will allow people to develop their own, different, abilities—"children born in families with different social positions must have if not equal, then sufficiently similar 'starting conditions' for the development of their abilities." She then cites a familiar litany of the origin factors that render starting conditions unequal:

> *The opportunities for the prompt discovery and development of the abilities of children and adolescents still depend to a substantial extent on their place of residence (town or countryside, center or province) and on the socioeconomic position of their parents (level of*

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[35] See, e.g., Abel Aganbegyan in *Trud* (Moscow), Dec. 12, 1982, p. 2.

[36] See *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR* (Moscow), No. 38, 1981, p. 763.

[37] Loc. cit.

[38] *Izvestiya*, June 2, 1986, p. 3.

[39] Whether such a pattern will be reversed is another question. The "inertial" drive away from the peak inequalities of the Stalin era is, after all, a matter of nearly three decades of policy and "drift"—a long time. At the Congress, Ryzhkov even noted that "elements of wage-levelling . . . have intensified recently." *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*, Mar. 4, 1986, trans. in *CDSP*, Apr. 23, 1986.

[40] Bogomolov, op. cit., p. 14.

income, position in the management structure, level of social ties).[41]

All very well. Yet it is hard to see how the social process of selection in education, now moving downward (under the above-discussed education reform) in the age structure to the decision point at 15 years of age, will advance these objectives. The assumptions that the selection will be clearly meritocratic, that those intellectually most qualified will continue academic education and pursue its broader career prospects, that the rest will be less talented (if, indeed, such talents can be measured in mid-adolescence) seem rather far-fetched. The Gorbachëv program, such as it is, would seem to leave in place, perhaps strengthen, a major mechanism of inequality.

That "justice" demands a linkage between the quality and quantity of work and its reward is a byword to which, one assumes, most Soviet citizens would subscribe. Current policy, as an official put it, aims

to more accurately and, therefore, more fairly calculate and reward the labor input of each worker and collective and create in them a consistent interest in the utilization of reserves and the increase of production efficiency.[42]

However, this merger of fairness and economic efficiency may result in inequity from the shop floor perspective, which stresses the effort expended rather than the economic result of these efforts. Since the size of material incentive funds is, under new conditions, supposed to be tied to the quality of output (positively through bonuses, and negatively through lower wholesale prices), and quality may depend on more than worker effort—e.g., on the adequacies or inadequacies of suppliers, managers, or designers—the workers' position is less secure. In the past, security has consisted, inter alia, in failure to apply tough standards to output. If policy breaks with this past practice, workers who benefit will doubtless see this as just, but those left behind will hardly feel the same.

Popular Expectations

Generally, the climate of expectations built into today's Soviet population by socialization and experience will not make Gorbachëv's tasks any easier. To assume that 1985 and the near-term future presented a combination of leader whose newness and vigor was welcome to the public with a public mood longing, or at least ready, for a house-cleaning to sweep away laziness and corruption and to "get Russia moving again" is to miss another dimension. The Soviet public, habituated to its own sort of welfare state, does expect much from it leaders. That their material expectations are not at Western levels is not the point; rather, it is the contradiction between those expectations, on the one hand, and the inability of the economy, as well as the refusal of current policy, to meet them, on the other hand, that may present a long-term problem. As Victor Zaslavsky puts it:

Judged from the viewpoint of those within the system, Soviet popular expectations are not modest at all. They are not modest by any standards when one considers what is taken for granted by every Soviet citizen: the stability of state-supported prices of food, basic consumer goods, and services. Thus the price of housing has remained at the level of 1928, which makes housing, heating, gas, telephone, and other utilities practically free. The burden of price subsidies is becoming heavier for the state budget every year.[43]

Further insight into the web of expectations and criteria of evaluation found in the Soviet citizenry is emerging from the results of the Soviet Interview Project—a large-scale survey research program conducted among nearly 2,800 Soviet émigrés of the 1970's and early 1980's. For a leadership that might for economic reasons contemplate price rises for a broad range of items, presumably including food, it must be sobering to ponder how those still in the USSR may resemble the émigrés who, in James Millar and Elizabeth Clayton's words

saw little relationship between the low price of subsidized meat in state stores and supply shortages. They seemed to want (below-cost-of-production) prices and a perfectly elastic supply at those prices.[44]

Even more disturbing to a General Secretary evidently committed to a tighter link between performance and (unequal) pay, and to what must be relative consumer austerity over the next few years, and yet who seeks to appeal to younger adults presumably tired of the rule of old men, are émigré survey findings at suggest it is precisely the post-Stalin "genera-n," born in 1941–60, that views the Brezhnev era as e "peak period" of inequality in Soviet history and is pecially attuned to economic issues in judging the gime.[45] The perceptions of Soviet economists, in-ed the policy premises of the Gorbachëv leader-ip, are much to the contrary. It would be a signal ccess if Gorbachëv could decouple inequality and egitimate" privilege, convincing Soviet citizens in eir forties and younger that his wage-differentiation licies are equitable and are an antidote to Brezhnev-a excesses which—however visible—existed in a alm of wage-salary inequality nowhere near so ex-me, as economists measure things, as under Stalin Khrushchev.

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[41] See *Sovetskaya Kul'tura*, Jan. 23, 1986, p. 3.

[42] *Izvestiya*, Feb. 8, 1986, p. 3, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 13, 1986, p. 53.

[43] Victor Zaslavsky, *The Neo-Stalinist State*, Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 1982, p. 159.

[44] James R. Millar and Elizabeth Clayton, *Quality of Life: Subjective Measures of Relative Satisfaction*, Soviet Interview Project (SIP) Working Paper No. 9, Urbana-Champaign, IL, February 1986, mimeo, p. 10.

More workplace discipline, less job security—these e remedies difficult to sell while simultaneously trying maintain or improve morale. Soviet Interview Project dings indicate that shop-floor personnel *do not* see emselves as the beneficiaries of an easy workpace emming from overmanning. Paul Gregory finds that orkers and employees performing the actual routine sks of the economy felt that there was less slack than d] their supervisors."[46] Redundancy and redeploy-ent are hardly likely to be welcome, especially nong blue-collar workers, who will be affected if such licies are pressed forward. In the émigré sample, 37 rcent of former workers cited security as a major urce of job satisfaction (compared to an average of .4 percent for the total sample, and only 21.1 per-nt for professional people).[47] Even if these figures m an émigré sample cannot be taken as infallible dicators of the feelings of the USSR's citizens in the d-1980's, they are not likely to be so far off the mark to vitiate their relevance.

The thrust of Gorbachëv's policy line is likely to be ntroversial. This in turn puts a premium on symbol-n and the management of impressions about the ection in which the regime is moving. In this respect, vilege at the top elite level may have symbolic, as ll as material import. Elite privileges have been as aracteristic of the Soviet welfare state as have fixed ces, low rents, and employment security at the ass roots. These arrangements constitute the world "special" stores, hospitals, and sanitoria, of the ertificate ruble" which is not a ruble but a wholly ferent form of currency guaranteeing its possessors cess to goods unavailable for any amount of regular viet currency.

On February 13, 1986, a *Pravda* review of readers' ters on the topic ventilated a virtually never-dis-ssed feature of Soviet life: the bureaucratic distribu-n and reservation of material privilege which figures in no reported wage/salary/income statistics. For whatever reason, the published comments were pointed, and while most rhetorically held up to condemnation "party members," "communists," who live high in rejection of classical Leninist modesty, and hinted at an element of corruption, one member of the party since 1940 from Kazan' went even further in the course of a comment that otherwise accepted the justification of large differences in material rewards:



A Soviet cartoon depicts the corrupt state of society: outside a shoe factory a worker offers stolen boots, stating, "To you, comrade director, I'll sell them at a discount. If it weren't for your leadership, we'd have long since been without any work."

—*Krokodil* (Moscow).

In discussing social justice, one cannot close one's eyes to the fact that party, soviet, trade-union, eco-

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[45] Donna Bahry, *Politics, Generations and Change in the USSR*, SIP Working Paper No. 20, April 1986, pp. 34–36.

[46] Paul R. Gregory, *Productivity, Slack and Time Theft in the Soviet Economy: Evidence from the Soviet Interview Project*, SIP Working Paper No. 15, February 1986, p. 23.

[47] Miller and Clayton, op. cit., Figs. 12A–12D.

> *nomic, and even Young Communist League officials sometimes objectively deepen social inequality, taking advantage of all sorts of special refreshment bars, special stores, special hospitals, etc. Yes, there is socialism in our country, and everyone should receive according to his work. Let it be so, without wage-levelling: An official has higher earnings in monetary terms. But in other respects, there should be no privileges. Let a director join everyone else in going to an ordinary store and standing in lines with everyone else—perhaps then the lines that everyone is sick of would be eliminated more quickly. But the "enjoyers of special benefits" will hardly give up their privileges—what is needed here is a law and a thoroughgoing purge of the administrative apparatus.*[48]

Yet one can assume that the lines will remain and that the ordinary citizen will not rub shoulders in them with the privileged members of various apparats. This was made clear at the 27th Congress when Yegor Ligachëv directly criticized *Pravda* for going beyond reasonable limits in its discusssion of high privilege.[49] The elite that makes, and presides over the execution of, social policy, will continue to inhabit a special preserve. The policy itself—judging by the early indications reviewed here—*may* bring a new discipline to Soviet society; it *may* create, under new conditions of work organization and reward, as many highly-motivated winners as disgruntled losers; it *may* even, by design or by accident, impart a new dynamism in certain areas of Soviet life. But, all things considered, it is a policy committed to conserving, indeed strengthening, the grip of the state on the critical levers of the social process, to maintaining the old dominant relationship of state over society.

Without arguing the dubious proposition that the Soviet system is today in crisis, or will be precipitated into one by Gorbachëv's social policies, it can be contended that the General Secretary's line of attack may prove more controversial than it seems, even among elements of the leadership that he has raised to power. Given the depth of the economic and social problems he faces at home, the complex maze of opportunities and risks to be negotiated abroad with a newish foreign policy team, and an activism not likely to be welcome in all quarters, it may be that Gorbachëv, however healthy, runs much greater risk of losing power and office than, in retrospect, did Brezhnev in his first five years or so at the helm. Despite the precedent of Brezhnev's 18-year reign, I would rate Gorbachëv's chances of being in power in the year 2000 as no better than even, and probably less. For now, however, he seems committed to an activist-interventionist policy, whose costs he is willing to bear and to impose as well on more than 270 million Soviet citizens.

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[48] *Pravda*, Feb. 13, 1986, p. 3, trans. in *CDSP*, Mar. 12, 1986, p. 2.

[49] See *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*, Feb. 28, 1986, trans. in *CDSP*, Apr. 9, 1986, p. 9.

Vorker Roots of Solidarity

nan Laba

oland's Solidarity movement, which erupted in August 1980, represents history's severe judgment on the Soviet-style workers' state. With its stituent base in the industrial working class, its nizational strength in interfactory strike commit- , its elaborate system of worker delegates and ker spokesmen, and its programmatic dedication rass-roots democracy, Solidarity can be seen as ltimate refutation of the Leninist model of the state. n also be perceived as a refutation of the operative lectual justification of the Leninist system—name- he belief that the working class, acting alone, is able only of serving its immediate material inter- and incapable of anything beyond limited trade nism. Indeed, Solidarity has shown that *ordinary* king people can rise above serving purely eco- ic interests and undertake coherent political activi- ithout being injected with ideology by intellectuals. ost contemporary opinion does not share this . The official Soviet and Polish interpretation, pre- ably, sees Solidarity's program—especially the nand for free trade unions—and its strategy, tac- , and organization as having originated among the cal intellectuals and then having been transmitted them to the workers. For example, on August 27, 1980, Stanisław Kania, who eight days later became the first secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR), remarked: "The demand for free trade unions did not originate among workers but among anti-socialist adventurers. One and a half or two years ago, it was to be found only in Warsaw in [Jacek] Kuroń's clique."[1] Later, in 1985, Vice Premier Mieczysław Rakowski stated: "It is impossible not to notice that KOR activists,[2] among them Jacek Kuroń, prepared the future leaders of Solidarity long before the July-August strikes. They nurtured them in the spirit of struggle with real existing socialism. They openly boasted of this in 1981, as did Wałęsa and many other union activists."[3]

Informed non-government opinion in Poland, surprisingly, generally agrees with the view that the workers' movement was the result of the intellectuals'

nan Laba is a Fellow of the Russian Research Center also a Research Associate of the Center for Europe- Affairs and the Program on Non-Violent Sanctions of Center on International Affairs, all at Harvard Univer- (Cambridge, MA). He is presently completing a k on Solidarity. The author wishes to thank IREX, the ckefeller Foundation, and the Russian Research nter for their support, as well as Lawrence Goodwyn encouragement and general editorial assistance, vard Friedman and Henry Norr for comments and icism, Mary Hyde for preparation of the computer gram, and Jolanta Strzelecka for assistance in cod- worker demands.

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[1] "Teleconference with the First Secretaries of the Provincial Committees of the Polish United Workers' Party on August 27, 1980, at 18:15," in *Sierpień 1980 w Szczecinie* (August 1980 in Szczecin), Szczecin, SZSP, 1981. At the time Kania made this statement he was a member of the Polish Politburo and responsible for security matters.

[2] KOR (The Committee for the Defense of Workers) was founded in September 1976 by 14 intellectuals, among them Jacek Kuroń, one of the most outstanding members of the Polish Opposition. The purpose of KOR was to defend workers persecuted by the state for participating in the protests against the food price increases announced in June 1976. After a year of materially and legally supporting Polish workers, the Committee reformulated its aims and adopted a new, more comprehensive title—The Committee for the Self-Defense of Society "KOR" or KSS-KOR. The number of its formal members rose to 25, but the number of activists working with the Committee rose to several hundred. Numerous social self-defense groups and peasant trade unions became associated with the Committee, as did The Free Trade Union of the Baltic, the various student solidarity support committees, and several dozen uncensored bulletins, journals, and book publishing ventures. KSS-KOR succeeded in creating a broad front among intellectuals against the state. Its platform was built on the issue of human rights. Yet, the extent to which KSS-KOR succeeded in creating a front of opposition throughout the entire country is more difficult to determine. For a passionate treatment of the history of KOR by one of its leading participants, see Jan Józef Lipski, *KOR*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1985. See also Leszek Kolakowski, "The Intelligentsia," in Abraham Brumberg, Ed., *Poland: Genesis of a Revolution*, New York, Random House, 1983.

[3] Cited from excerpts of Mieczysław F. Rakowski's "Times of Hope and Disappointment" published in *Polityka* (Warsaw), No. 32, Aug. 10, 1985.

movement. For example, in a June 1981 interview, an editor of the opposition journal *Respublica* noted that "Solidarity is the creation of KOR, and Wałęsa is the creation of Kuroń."[4]

Scholars in the West and Poland also tend to attribute a high degree of influence to intellectuals, but their arguments are often more subtle, taking into account other contributing factors. Alex Pravda, a British scholar, points out that by 1980, "the working class, previously pressing only for material security improvement [stood] . . . for the first time in its history at the forefront of the struggle for civil liberties." According to Pravda, the causes of this "unprecedented expansion and politization of workers' demands" in 1980 lay "in multiple factors—the weakness and incompetence of the state, religious and intellectual influences upon workers, and the lessons of previous worker defeats."[5]

Although Pravda assigns importance to all of these factors, the more prevalent interpretation sees the decisive factor behind the formation of the Solidarity movement to be the conscious-raising and organizing activities of the intellectual opposition. Thus, while Leszek Kołakowski admits that "the strikes occurring in the summer of 1980 were by no means caused by KOR's activity . . . were rooted in the economic and social disasters that the power system had produced, and . . . were organized on the spot by embryonic independent workers' unions," he concludes that "KOR's influence on the way the workers voiced their grievances and articulated their demands was certainly essential."[6] The noted Polish historian and founding member of KOR Jan Józef Lipski, argues more straightforwardly that "KOR was involved in the preparation of the workers' consciousness for the strikes . . . it familiarized workers with the idea of the strike . . . it indicated the possibility of strike demands that would go beyond economic issues."[7]

Jacek Kuroń (left) with Lech Wałęsa at a Solidarity meeting in November 1980.

—Gamma-Liaison.

An important alternative interpretation sets forth the importance of the Catholic Church for the workers' movement. A proponent of this interpretation is Zbigniew Pełczyński, who identifies a sea-change beginning in 1956 in the Catholic Church—the only alternative institution in Poland. In his opinion, the opposition of the Church to the system, originally based on narrowly religious grounds, took on "a wider and more political character: freedom of speech and publication, political participation, and membership in independent social organizations—including trade unions." Pełczyński maintains: "The rise of groups such as KOR which were secular in character and engaged in organized opposition activities, was, of course, significant, but it was rather an extension of the work of the Church than a pioneering venture."[8]

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[4] The quote is from the author's June 1981 interview in Warsaw with the editor, who shall remain anonymous. *Respublica* was one of the several dozen uncensored journals founded prior to 1980 by certain members of the Polish opposition, but it ceased publication once martial law was declared in Poland in December 1981. It was the most self-conscious representative of that political trend in Polish intellectual life in the early 1980's which advocated returning to liberal (i.e., Manchester Liberal) 19th-century tenets combined with a belief in elites and the need for their existence and a pessimism concerning the democratic potential of mass societies.

[5] Alex Pravda, "The Workers," in Brumberg, op. cit., pp. 68–91, esp. p. 90. Scholarly opinion on the narrow economism of the working class before the formation of KOR is nearly unanimous. For example, British sociologist David Lane points out that as late as 1970 "the chief thrust of the manual workers' grievances" was still "economic, not political, and was for an immediate improvement in conditions." See David Lane, "The Role of Social Groups," in David Lane and George Kolankiewicz, Eds., *Social Groups in Polish Society*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1973, pp. 302–26, 313. A similar statement can be found in, among others, Jadwiga Staniszkis's, *Poland's Self-Limiting Revolution*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 122.

[6] Leszek Kolakowski, loc. cit., pp. 54–67, esp. 65. Another example is Adam Bromke's statement that "the workers' demands were drawn largely from a report on the Polish economic crisis issued by some prominent Polish intellectuals." See *Poland*, Oakville, Ontario, Mosaic Press, 1981.

[7] Jan Józef Lipski, op.cit., p. 424.

[8] Cited from Zbigniew Pełczyński's review essay of Bogdan Szajkowski's book *Next to God . . . Poland: Politics and Religion in Contemporary Poland*, and Maciej Pomian-Średnicki's book *Religious Change in Contemporary Poland*. See "Holy Fatherland," *The Times Literary Supplement* (London), Mar. 2, 1984, p. 211.

There are, to be sure, exceptions to the near unanimous opinion that Polish worker radicalism was due to external factors. A. Ross Johnson, for one, argues: "It is true that [in 1970] the workers did not raise the question of the validity of 'socialism' or of Communist party rule itself. Yet, in fact, the workers'

A variation of this interpretation stresses the workers' dependence on the intellectuals due to the former's inguistic limitations and inability to generate symbols. Proponents of this view underline the workers' political ncompetence and their unstable commitment to democratic values, and they emphasize the leading role of the intellectuals' superior language skills and their broader political horizons and coherent political ideologies.

Polish scholar Jadwiga Staniszkis argues that workers are characterized by "utopian and anarchic forms of thought" and "very strong anti-hierarchical and egalitarian aspirations." According to her, the same working class "is profoundly authoritarian" and afflicted with a "semantic shame and incompetence" when faced with more semantically competent party or opposition intellectuals. Their aggression displayed during the 16 months of Solidarity "reveals the self-hatred of workers, rooted in a depth of frustration connected with their own limited semantic competence."[9]

For American scholar J.M. Montias, writing in 1980, the workers' incapacities are not necessarily permanent: "KOR may gradually supply the workers with elements of an ideology—a set of symbols to which they can relate their experience. This ideology is essentially patriotic, legalistic, socialist, and democratic. With its emphasis on legalism, KOR may enable workers to formulate more abstract system-related demands . . . ."[10] While offering the possibility of political development, this judgment also implies that workers have little or no ability to create an ideology, to abstract from their experience, or to generate symbols to express that experience.

According to such interpretation, workers, when provoked, may react with authoritarian methods. Not fully understanding the self-limiting strategy of the movement, they may also be excessively radical in their aims, setting out demands that are at once utopian and radical, such as free elections or the elimination of censorship.[11] With their "crude and brutal language"[12] and their "deeply rooted authoritarianism,"[13] workers gyrate between the most narrow economism and utopianism. Therefore, it is contended, the essential contribution of intellectuals is to politicize worker demands and at the same time moderate them by infusing workers with a sense of the limits of political action.

All these opinions reflect the explicit view of the Polish working class as a social formation with a sharply circumscribed capacity for coherent thought and action. Yet there is evidence that suggests otherwise, most notably, that revealed in the thousands of demands advanced by 403 Baltic seacoast workplaces during the years 1970-80. Such data, when subjected to a statistical analysis employing standard empirical methods (see below), support the following theses: that the program and organization of Solidarity was first created by the workers who initiated the little-known Baltic Seacoast strikes of December 1970;[14] that worker demands presented to the government during 1970-80 did not evolve from narrow economic to broad political concerns under the tutelage of the intellectuals, but that the workers were in fact continually politically conscious; and that the origins of Solidarity can be traced further back in history and are more widely and deeply rooted in Polish society than previously thought. This article questions the by now traditional formula that workers in Solidarity supplied the muscle while the intellectuals—especially the

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protestations represented a devastating critique of the whole post-1956 system." See "Polish Perspectives Past and Present," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), July-August 1971, pp. 59–72, esp. p. 70. Similarly, George Kolankiewicz suggests that the "qualitative change" in August 1980 "can only be explained in terms of the specific heritage of 1970–71, which had remained rooted in the consciousness of the populations on the northern seaboard, in Gdańsk, Szczecin, and Elbląg." See his "Poland 1980: The Working Class under Anomic Socialism," in Jan F. Triska and Charles Gati, Eds., *Blue-Collar Workers in Eastern Europe*, London, Allen and Unwin, 1981, pp. 136–56.

[9] Staniszkis, op. cit., pp. 51–52, 115–26, at p. 122. For a similar position, see Aleksander Smolar, "The Intellectual Opposition and the Popular Movement," in *Solidarité Résiste et Signe* (Solidarity Resists and Bears Witness), Paris, Nouvelle Cité, 1984, pp. 147–48.

[10] J.M. Montias, "Observation on Strikes, Riots, and Other Disturbances," in Triska and Gati, op. cit., pp. 173–86, esp. p. 184.

[11] Smolar, loc. cit., p. 148.

[12] Ibid., p. 147.

[13] Staniszkis, op. cit., p. 51.

[14] The 1970 strikes began on December 14, 1970, when a group of workers from the Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk marched on the provincial party headquarters to protest a sudden rise in food prices. Police attempts to supress the protest provoked street fighting which culminated in the burning of the party headquarters on the following day, December 15. That same day, large armored detachments entered Gdańsk. Despite the swift police action that left dozens of people dead and hundreds wounded, protests spread to other cities on the Coast, namely Elbląg, Słupsk, Gdynia, and Szczecin. By December 17, the military had occupied all these cities.

In Szczecin, city-wide streetfighting evolved into a general strike that spread throughout the province. Street demonstrations and strikes also occurred in Kraków, Wrocław, Katowice, Łódź, and Wałbrzych. On December 18, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party received a letter from the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union calling for a political resolution of the crisis. On December 19, the Polish Politburo met and replaced First Secretary Władysław Gomulka with Edward Gierek. This change in leadership was confirmed by a Plenum of the Central Committee and officially announced on the subsequent day. It failed, however, to resolve the crisis. In January, a second wave of strikes swept the Coast and led to the opening of direct negotiations between high-ranking officials (First Secretary Edward Gierek, Premier Piotr Jaroszewicz and Minister of Defense General Wojciech Jaruzelski) and the Warski Shipyard workers. In February 1971, the textile workers of Łódź struck, and the Gierek regime finally rescinded the price increases.

For the first time in the history of People's Poland, direct proletarian action forced a change in the policy and leadership of the country members of KOR—provided the brain power. It maintains, indeed, that Solidarity disproved Lenin's assessment that workers are incapable of functioning as an independent political force.

Sources

The materials that serve as a basis of analysis in this article come from three different sources that constitute a part of the Archives of the Gdańsk Solidarity Region.[15]

The first is made up of the demands advanced by enterprises registering with the Interfactory Strike Committee founded in August 1980 at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk. Many of the workplaces joining the committee chose not only to support the 21 demands of the Gdańsk Interfactory Strike Committee—the founding platform of Solidarity—but also to write their own demands. After the successful conclusion of the strike on August 31, 1980, these demands and other records of the strike committee were deposited in the Archives of the Gdańsk Solidarity Region.

The second source consists of demands written by workers during the strikes of December 1970. With the one exception of a list of demands presented by the Warski Shipyard in January of 1971, all the demands in this collection were written between the 15th and 22nd of December 1970. Among these is the one-page protocol of the agreement signed between the strike committee of the city of Gdynia and the city's President, Jan Mariański. Also preserved is a folder containing all demands written by factory members participating in the Szczecin general strike. This folder and three others, constituting the basic archive of the strike committee, had been locked in the safe of the director of the Warski Shipyard after the three-day strike ended, where they remained until a new wave of striking workers claimed them back in August 1980 and ultimately passed them on to the Gdańsk Region Archive.

The third source, also assembled in the archive, consists of materials originally gathered after the defeat of the December 1970 strikes as the new government of Edward Gierek fulfilled its promise to consult with the working class when making important decisions regarding them. A suggestion- and demand-gathering campaign was carried out in early 1971 by union, party, and enterprise directors.[16] Despite the fact that demands were collected from workers under circumstances of intensified police surveillance and arrests, they prove to be neither self-censored nor censored by the factory apparatus. Indeed, the 1971 demands strongly resemble the demands of 1970 in substance and tone, frequently even going into much more detail on specific aspects of the political and working situation. Often advanced by individual shops, they offer an extraordinary view of the internal political and social differences within the enterprises. (For example, the Lenin shipyard in February 1971 produced 85 pages of such demands, grouped according to shop.)

The three sources represent, in aggregate, no less than 403 separate bodies of worker demands, many produced by entire enterprises, others by shops and sections within enterprises. The precise breakdown is as follows: entire enterprises—39 sets of demands for 1970, 8 for 1971, and 261 for 1980; shops and section within enterprises—20 sets of demands for 1970, 31 for 1971 and 44 for 1980. The total of 403 sets of demands is the sum of 308 sets of enterprise demands plus 95 sets of shop and section demands.

Since all the documents identify the workplace originating the demands, we know that most came from manual workers, although a significant part came from other groups, such as teachers, nurses and doctors, shop clerks, truckers, administrative clerks, and artists. The data allows for a broad differential analysis of all state employees from the Baltic seacoast of Poland, or as it is better known, "the Coast."[17]

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[15] The Archives of the Gdańsk Solidarity Region were founded in 1980 as part of an effort to preserve the history of the Solidarity Movement on the Baltic seacoast and to safeguard important historical documents. Besides preserving documents pertaining to Solidarity, in fall of 1980, the Gdańsk and Szczecin regions began to collect historical materials for an exhibition commemorating the tenth anniversary of the events of 1970. Joanna Wojczechowicz and Antoni Wręga, both employees of the Gdańsk Solidarity, were particularly active at this time in gathering historical materials. By the end of the year, the Gdańsk Solidarity Region created a six-person historical team to continue investigating the December 1970 strikes. The members of this team were Janusz Krupski, Wiesława Kwiatkowska, Ewa Dering, Aleksander Klemp, Jan Stepek, and Krzysztof Żurawski. They worked for 11 months—until martial law was declared—gathering materials that later became part of the Gdańsk Solidarity Archives. Their efforts preserved a vital part of Poland's postwar history.

During my stay in Poland in 1980 I was granted permission by the Gdańsk Solidarity Region to photograph large portions of the archive's documents, including the entire August 1980 and December 1970 collections. The copies that I made of these documents are now in the Houghton Library at Harvard University. They are organized according to year (1970, 1971, 1980).

[16] The strike demands of 1970 and 1980 issued out of open meetings at which workers discussed what to include in their enterprise manifesto. In 1971, when the government did not allow the workers to assemble, demands were gathered anonymously.

[17] With the one exception of a group of private farmers from six villages who met and wrote their own demands, all other demands came from state employees. "State employees" also includes the workers of "cooperatives," which I first counted separately and then again according to their branch of industry. In addition to the group of peasants mentioned above, the category of rural workers includes those working on state farms, as well as those involved in such rural occupations as forestry and beekeeping.



A sign in Szczecin in 1971 proclaims: "We are in solidarity with the working class of the Coast."

—Photo from author.

As source materials, the demands of the workers from the Coast are strikingly unique in that they are self-produced. Given the fact that the demands were advanced by the same workplaces at different times and in different political contexts, they provide a useful comparative framework. The data from 1970, 1971, and 1980 thus offer a number of cases that lend themselves to generalization and make it possible to understand what had changed and what had remained the same in the political and social consciousness of the workers of the Coast.

Methodology

To ensure against bias and allow the values and priorities workers assigned to each demand to emerge from the material itself rather than be imputed to them, I recorded the demands advanced by every third workplace. These demands were then sorted according to frequency and place of origination in order to establish whether or not different workplaces repeated the same demands. This yielded 94 demands, each of which was coded according to the year and date of the demands, the branch of industry presenting them, the adressee on the list of demands (the Interfactory Strike Committee, party, government, enterprise director, or parliament), the location of the workplace (a large, medium, or small town, or the countryside), whether or not the demands were from an entire enterprise or a shop, and whether they came from blue- or white-collar workers. The final criterion concerned the size of the workplace. An enterprise of over 1000 workers was defined as "large," 100–1000 as "medium," and under 100 as "small."[18] The demands were then coded by workplace. These demands and the coding sheet of each workplace were reviewed and verified by two social science investigators and the results transferred onto computer punch cards. After being verified one more time, the results were fed into a computer for analysis.

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[18] These broad numerical categories are necessary because I do not have access to factory employee lists.

Rather than analyze all 94 demands, I focus here on two: the demand for trade unions that would be independent of party, state, and enterprise direction; and the demand for the elimination of the political and economic privileges of the state apparatus. I selected these two because of their systemic nature and the importance given them by the workers themselves.

Although the most narrow demands generated by the smallest shop had systemic implications for the highly centralized Polish state, which—except in the area of agriculture—is the sole employer of the working masses, the demands for free trade unions and the abolition of apparatus privileges were clearly the most systemic in character in all three years. The demand for free trade unions constituted the essential, irreducible core of the platform of Solidarity. The only nonnegotiable one of the Gdańsk 21 Demands presented in August of 1980,[19] it sought the formation of an independent organization that would represent Polish society. Questioning elite privileges and demanding that they be eliminated amounted to a questioning of the state's legitimacy. It concretely raised the issue of power in Poland and the new elite's illegitimate use of it. The weight the workers gave to these demands is evidenced by the fact that both ranked among the top ten (of the 94) demands in 1970, 1971, and 1980 (see Table 1).

Let us now place the two above-mentioned demands within a general context and analyze the development over time of worker consciousness.

Free Trade Unions

The first two of the Gdańsk 21 Demands of August 1980 were for free trade unions independent of the party and employers and for the guaranteed right to strike. Of course, both demands were irreconcilable with the theory and practice of trade unions in societies based on the Soviet model. According to Lenin, unions are "a school of administration, a school of economic management, a school of communism." They are meant to serve "as transmission belts from the Communist Party to the masses," while the party's leadership "is a guarantee of success in the work of our unions." For Lenin, "an independent trade union is a counterrevolutionary machination."[20]

More concretely, Soviet-style constitutions and labor and penal codes define work as an obligation to the state; rights are bestowed by the state as it deems fitting. Any attempts to strike or form work associations independent of the party are met with administrative, legal, police, or psychiatric measures. As a Polish joke notes ironically: "Under capitalism the unions are to protect workers from the capitalists; under socialism, they exist to protect the socialists from the workers." The joke captures the gist of an editorial published during martial law in the official paper of the Polish government, *Rzeczpospolita*, specifying that the new official trade unions would play the essential role of protecting the government from the working class: "Trade unions defend the working class against the bureaucratic abuses of their own state. But on the other hand, their task is to defend the workers' state from the anarchic, instinctive, or actual defense of their rights by workers."[21].

A review of the workers' demands suggests that official concern over workers' efforts to liberalize trade unions is not unfounded. Seven of the 94 significant demands specifically concerned the issue of trade unions. They called for: new elections to the existing trade unions; changes in the electoral procedure; the right to strike; payment for the period of the strike; personal safety for the strikers; support for the Strike Committee; and free trade unions independent of party, government, and enterprise direction.

Of these, the right to strike, the payment of wages for the period of the strike, and safety for strikers are complementary to the demand for free trade unions independent of the state. The demands for new union

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[19] The Gdańsk 21 Demands, which constitute the founding charter of Solidarity, were written during the night of August 16 and 17, 1980. They served as the basis for negotiations between the Gdańsk Interfactory Strike Committee and the State Commission. When negotiations concluded on August 31, 1980, the workers won their demand for free trade unions: the interfactory strike committees were allowed to take on the functions of free trade unions. At first, Polish state officials hoped to confine the validity of the August 31 Gdańsk Agreement to the Gdańsk region, but a wave of strikes in other regions dashed these hopes. On September 17, 1980, a meeting of interfactory strike committees from all over Poland met in Gdańsk and agreed to form one single union, NSZZ Solidarność. With its loose, federative form, the new trade union left most decision-making to the regions and factories.

For a valuable, edited translation of the transcript of the Gdańsk negotiations and an analysis of these negotiations written by a participant in them see: A. Kemp-Welch, *The Birth of Solidarity 1980*, London, St. Anthony's Macmillan Series, 1983.

[20] Quoted according to Joseph Godson, "The Role of the Trade Unions," in Leonard Schapiro and Joseph Godson, Eds., *The Soviet Worker*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1981, pp. 106–29. Also see Lenin's statement about the subordination of trade unions to the party and his denunciation of such "counter-revolutionary machinations as independent trade unions," in *Left-Wing Communism—an Infantile Disorder*, as cited in Robert C. Tucker, Ed., *The Lenin Anthology*, New York, Norton Press, 1975, pp. 572–73.

[21] *Rzeczpospolita* (Warsaw), Feb. 23, 1982.

Table 1: Polish Worker Demands, 1970, 1971, and 1980

(Top ten demands, in percent of workplaces making demand)

1970 (N=59)	Frequency of demand	1971 (N=47)	Frequency of demand	1980 (N=308)	Frequency of demand
1. Pay raise	68	1. Reform of pay system	59	1. Pay raise	65
2. Free trade unions	**61**	**2. Free trade unions**	**59**	2. Increase in family subsidies to equal those of the apparatus (party, gov't, police state, army)	63
3. No reprisals against striking workers	58	3. Pay raise	56	3. Non-working Saturdays	53
4. Freedom for arrested workers	44	4. Earlier retirement	54	**4. Free trade unions**	**52**
5. Pay for the strike period	4	5. Punish those guilty of shooting workers	51	5. Reform of pay system	51
6. Punish those guilty of shooting workers	39	6. New elections to existing unions	51	6. Additional housing	44
7. Full information on the December strikes in the mass media	32	7. Freedom for arrested workers	46	7. Support for Interfactory ,Strike Committee	42
8. Publish demands of Strike Committee	31	8. Protective work clothing	44	8. Improvement of working conditions	40
9. Punish those responsible for economic crisis	31 31	**9. Eliminate the privileges of apparatus (party, gov't, army, police)**	**36**	**9. Eliminate privileges of apparatus**	**39**
10. Eliminate privileges of apparatus (party, police, gov't, army)	**24**	10. Organizational reform of work	36	10. Earlier retirement	37

NOTE: These percentages reflect frequency with which a demand appeared among lists from workplaces (defined as enterprises, large parts of enterprises, or single shops).

elections and for a change in electoral statutes are demands for change in the existing state unions and hence are more reformist and less systemic than the demand for free trade unions. Of the seven demands, the demand for free trade unions led in each year.

In 1970, 61 percent (N = 59) of the workplaces demanded free trade unions. Only 9 percent wanted new elections to the existing unions, and none bothered to demand a change in the existing unions' statutes. In the December 1970 strike in the city of Szczecin, 55 striking workplaces were entered into the register kept by the strike committee of the Warski and Repair shipyards. Some sent no demands of their own but simply expressed support and registered their strike. In so doing, they implicitly approved the founding document, the 21 demands of the Warski and Repair shipyards. The first of these demanded "the dissolution of the Central Council of Trade Unions, which has never defended the working masses," and creation of "trade unions that will represent the working class."[22] Of 31 workplaces that sent a list of their own demands to the Warski Shipyard, 27 explicitly demanded free trade unions. The flavor of these assertions is perhaps best conveyed by direct quotation.

Post Office Number 5 in Szczecin: "We demand independent trade unions that will really represent workers' interest."

ZTSL Truckers in Szczecin: "We demand the independent operation of trade unions in the defense of working people and the return of the right to strike."

The ZPS Tool and Die Factory in Szczecin: "[We demand] freeing trade unions from the party and state administration and guarantee of the right to strike."

The Szczecin Provincial Printing Plant: "We demand fully self-governing union organizations which will truly express the will of workers."

The Selfa Electronics Factory in Szczecin: "We demand completely self-governing trade unions which will really represent the will of workers."

What kinds of reform were proposed to ensure that unions "really" represented the will of the workers? The agreement signed on December 15, 1970, between the city of Gdynia and the seven-person Gdynia Strike Committee includes as its ninth point a reform proposal for worker autonomy: "Workers will choose new

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[22] The demands are reprinted in Ewa Wacowska, Ed., *Poznań 1956–Grudzień 1970* (Poznan 1956–December 1970), Paris, Instytut Literacki, 1971, pp. 217–28.

The Szczecin Construction Enterprise (South) sent no demands but wrote to the Warski Shipyard, "We send you brotherly workers' greetings. We support your demands. We inform you that we recognize you as the workers' authority */wladza/* and will faithfully carry out your orders."

NIEZALEZNE SAMORZĄDN
ZWIĄZKI ZAW

A 1980 Solidarity demonstration in Warsaw demands "Independent, Self-Governing Trade Unions."

—SIPA/Special Features.

officers in the trade unions." On December 16, 1970, workers of the Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk demanded that "trade unions on all levels should be made up of non-party members," while workers from the Gdańsk Repair Shipyard wrote on the same day, "eliminate the interference of the party in the work of the trade unions." Gdańsk port workers demanded that "trade unions should be non-party and must support the working class."

Ten years later, the essential demand for unions independent of the party remained the same. Workers of the Wood Industry Enterprise at Gdynia said simply: "We demand free trade unions," while those at the PZPS "Alka" factory in Słupsk put it this way: "Create trade unions free and independent of the party and government and conditions for their independent activity." A Gdańsk construction worker called for the "creation of new, independent, uncontrolled trade unions."

The nature of the "free trade unions that would express the workers' will" was carefully considered in the demands. The documents are so specific that they anticipate the details of the Solidarity Union Statute, which was written by the lawyers Jan Olszewski, Wiesław Chrzaniawski, and Wladysław Siła-Nowicki and brought to the Gdańsk Shipyard during the August strike of 1980.[23] For example:

- In 1971 the Lenin Shipyard specified the need to abolish the holding of several positions simultaneously in the highest state, party, and union posts, and even more broadly, required "that union activists not be party members." The 1980 statute decreed that "union posts cannot be occupied by persons who have an executive function in a workplace . . . or executive post in a party organization"(Article 9, point 6).
- Control of the union's purse was considered a crucial ingredient in keeping locals strong and avoiding domination by central union or party authorities. The Lenin Shipyard in 1971 proposed that 9 percent of union dues should remain at the disposal of the locals.

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[23] The statute written during the strike for the Gdańsk region was later modified for the national union Solidarity after the meeting of 17 regions on September 17, 1980. After the Solidarity Congress, September-October 1981, further amendments were made, notably the one providing for a permanent executive resident in Gdańsk. My citations are from the pre-congress statute as published in the collection of texts, *Protokoły Porozumień Gdańsk, Szczecin, Jastrzębie—Statut Założenia Ustawy o Związkach Zawodowych NSZZ Solidarność* (The Texts of the Gdańsk, Szczecin, Jastrzębie Agreements—The Statute of the Founding of Trade Unions NSZZ Solidarity), Warsaw, Krajowa Agencja Wydawnicza, 1981.

A decade later the Solidarity Statute set membership dues at 1 percent of earnings and guaranteed control of revenues by the workplace locals. The latter were to decide what percentage to give to regional and national union bodies.[24]

- Under the system of multiple controls, the state's union officers had been paid not from union members' dues, but from the state. The Lenin Shipyard workers in 1971 demanded tersely that: "Union officials should be paid out of union dues," a phrase repeated 10 years later in the union statute.
- In 1971 the Lenin Shipyard asked for "the publication of an independent newspaper of the trade unions," while the statute simply stated that "the union [should] possess its own press and publications."

This attention to detail demonstrates the extraordinary influence of the negative lessons administered on a daily basis to Polish workers by the state-controlled unions, state-appointed factory managers, and party secretaries in their factories.

Clearly the most significant finding to emerge from a comparison of the demands of 1970–71 and 1980 is the continuity among Polish workers of the demand for independent trade unions free of the party. Indeed, the workers' devotion to this demand is so consistent that in reading the documents, it sometimes seems as if nothing had changed in Poland between 1970 and 1980. On this demand there is no evolution, no turning point. In fact, the overall support for this demand was slightly higher in 1970 (61 percent) and 1971 (59 percent) than in 1980 (52 percent).

Willingness to work for reform within existing government unions was as weak in 1970 (9 percent) as in 1980 (also 9 percent). Not surprisingly, this method of reform received considerably greater support (51 percent) during the government-sponsored suggestion-gathering campaign of 1971, but even under these conditions, the preference for a deferential or moderate approach was expressed less frequently than the demand for free trade unions. The lack of group consultation and the unpromising political situation after the December-January defeats seem to have had an effect on the results, as the same factories and shops demanded both free trade unions and reform of existing unions.[25]

We may conclude, therefore, that the heart of the Solidarity platform—free trade unions—was as present in 1970 and 1971 among Polish workers, without benefit of clergy or intellectuals, as it was in 1980. This demand for free trade unions independent of party, government, and factory direction, when examined within the context of the Leninist state, does not reflect "trade union consciousness," but rather signifies the emergence of political or systemic consciousness.

Political and Economic Equality

The second striking feature of the workers' demands was the large number that focused on what can only be described as elimination of systemic inequality. The range of workers' perceptions of systemic injustice was many-faceted—from economic issues and support for an egalitarianism worthy of English Levellers to questions of political power and privilege.

Political equality. Most significant, the workers addressed the issue of political privilege, as if in an ironic application of Lenin's tenet: "The primacy of politics is the ABC of Marxism." Since, in a Leninist state, power and privilege derive from offices bestowed by the state rather than from the control of capital, the workers displayed an understanding of the realities of the system in which they lived and worked.[26] Demands directly criticizing the privileges of the state's apparatus—the government administration and party, the uniformed police (Citizens' Militia or MO) and secret police (Security Service or SB), the People's Polish Army—are encompassed in two formulations: (1) eliminate the privileges of the apparatus; (2) raise family subsidies to the level of the subsidies received by the apparatus. Both demands are egalitarian, and both question illegitimate state privileges.

Growth in support for the equality issue from 1970 to 1980 is demonstrated in Table 2. The first demand, which asks for the elimination of illegitimate privileges, remained more or less a constant demand over the 10 years, occupying ninth and tenth place among the 94 demands. The second, which asks that privileges be extended to the whole society rose to second place in

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[24] This varied from 40 percent in regions such as Leszno, Płock, Radom, and Rzeszów, to 15 percent elsewhere. Most frequently it was in the range of 20–30 percent. See an unpublished article by Jacek Kurczewski, "Solidarity from Within," Warsaw, 1981, p. 15.

[25] Other examples of formulations that were classified as demands for reforming existing unions are those asking that "trade unions [be] closer to the working people" (Gazy Technicze—a technical gas firm, 1970) and "that trade unions be separated from the strong influence of the party" (ZPO DANA Garment Factory, 1970).

[26] For the most thorough scholarly study of privilege in the socialist system, see Merwyn Matthews, *Privilege in the Soviet Union*, London, Allen and Unwin, 1978. Matthews book contains an interesting comparison of Soviet and Polish communist elite privileges. On privilege in communist Poland, see also Jan Malanowski's chapter on anti-egalitarian tendencies in *Polscy Robotnicy* (The Polish Workers), Warsaw, Książka i Wiedza, 1981, pp. 111–58.

Table 2: Equality Issues, 1970-80

(Share of workplaces making demand, in percent)

	1970	1971	1980
Abolish apparatus privileges	24	36	39
Raise family subsidies to level of apparatus	9	5	63

1980 (63 percent), just behind the demand for a pay hike (65 percent).[27] The shifting weight of the two demands highlights a change in the workers' psychology, from the perception of sharing scarcity to that of sharing in the optimism of rising expectations.

Coastal workers striking in 1980 found the issue of equality to be a mobilizing one and included it as part of the 12th of the Gdańsk 21 Demands. The text of this demand read: "Abolish the privileges of the police security service and the party apparatus by leveling family subsidies and abolishing special supplies, etc." This demand went futher, questioning the very criteria employed by the state in selecting functionaries by demanding the introduction of "the principle of cadre selection on the basis of qualification, not on the basis of party membership."

The range of worker perceptions of systemic inequality was many-faceted during the years 1970–80. In December 1970, a message in chalk on a Szczecin factory wall read: "Level the pay of members of the Central Committee of the party to the average pay of a worker" (see photo on p. 57). The Szczecin Ship Repair Cooperative simply asked for the liquidation of all privileges of workers of the secret police, the militia, and the army. The Szczecin steel mills demanded "limiting and leveling the pay of workers of the government and party apparatuses to the average earnings in industry." Three more specific demands asked for the "elimination of lower taxes for the army, police, and party apparatus," the "abolition of low prices in cafeterias for the police and party apparatus," and a distribution of housing "without favor to privileged social groups."[28] Post Office No. 5 in Szczecin demanded reducing the swollen apparatus at all levels and sections—both in the party and the government—in order to reduce the state budget. In 1980, the Gdańsk Northern Shipyard called for the abolition of "commercial shops and special shops in city administrations, provincial party committees, commissariats of the citizens' militia, police, and army, for all working peoples should have equal access to food and other goods." The thought was echoed by the Elbląg brewery: "Abolish the privileges of the militia, party, and army, for all working peoples should eat the same bread . . . ."

Not surprisingly, the workers addressed the matter of retirement. In 1980, workers at the Kwidzyn Branch of the Gdańsk Industrial Construction Firm demanded: "Bring everyone up to the level of retirement and pension pay of the army and the militia." Gdańsk Naval Shipyard workers demanded: "Do not hire former workers of the army and political police who are receiving 100 percent of their pensions." And employees of the Printing Cooperative in Słupsk wrote: "We demand rights equal with those of the privileged (railway, militia, and army), such as years worked to [qualify for] retirement, pay raises, leveling of family subsidies, and health- and hospital-care and retirement benefits."

One of the more sensational revelations during Solidarity's 16 months was that, in 1972, the Polish Council of State had issued two decrees, one on pay and another on retirement benefits for high officials and their relatives. Only the bare outlines came to general attention in late 1980. The range and scale are still not known, but they were important theoretically because they exposed a strong tendency to pass on the benefits of state office to future generations. Even grandchildren, parents, and collateral relatives were included, and a short term in office sufficed to qualify for them. For this reason, they were popularly referred to as the "dynastic decrees," with Warsaw cynics (or possibly just clear-eyed observers) claiming they were the cause for the expansion of ministerial level posts in the 1970's. One workplace in 1980 attacked these unpublicized decrees directly: "Immediately abolish the Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers on special pensions for high dignitaries of the government, party, and the trade unions, for it is contrary to elementary sentiments of equality and social justice and to the decree on universal right to retirement. Introduce equal criteria for distributing pensions and abolish extraordinary pensions given to artists, singers, musicians, journalists, publicists, and radio and television journalists."[29]

On the subject of housing and housing allowances,

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[27] Only one workplace, the Gdańsk Construction Enterprise, demanded that family subsidies be made equal to those of the apparatus and then specified that, should this prove impossible, subsidies received by the apparatus should be lowered to that of the standard family.

[28] These came from the Szczecin Fertilizer Plant; from the Warski and Repair shipyards and the Szczecin Steel Works; and from the Warski and Repair shipyards, respectively.

[29] Film Distribution Enterprise, Gdańsk, 1980. The decrees were published in *Dziennik Ustaw* (Warsaw), Oct. 7, 1972. Also, see the discussion of these decrees by the distinguished jurist Andrzej Stelmachowski in *Kurier Polski* (Warsaw), Jan. 3, 1981, and the excerpts from it reprinted in *Solidarność Białystok* (Białystok), No. 14, Mar. 3, 1981. Professor Stelmachowski notably observes that, in the decrees, executive posts are classified higher than legislative posts, even though, according to the



Painted on a wall during the strikes on the Baltic seacoast of Poland in 1970-71 is the demand that pay of members of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party be equal to the average pay for workers.

—Photo from author.

truckers in Malbork called for "a just division of housing—that is, an equal waiting time for everyone, including the army and the militia." Słupsk printers added: "Abolish the housing grants given to the State Security Forces and the Militia."

The goal of egalitarian medical services was expressed in general terms. In a state-controlled economy, access to life-saving drugs is dependent on office, with many drugs not available in pharmacies and hospitals open to the general public. There are special apparatus clinics and hospitals open only to office holders and their families. Workers therefore demanded that the government "create conditions for obtaining drugs equal to those in the militia and army," and "bring medical care up to the level of other employees—railway, militia, and army."[30]

Workers of Hartwig International Transport in Gdynia focused in 1980 on inequalities in cultural facilities: "Scrupulously respect the bases of social justice and abolish unwritten privileges of the workers of the party and government organs regarding access to such material and cultural goods as vacation and recreation. Combat the enjoyment of these privileges by dint of holding high office." Gdańsk film workers creatively proposed: "All vacation centers of the Central Committee of the Central Council of Trade Unions, of the

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Constitution, they rank lower, and party posts are included even though they are not government or state offices. Stelmachowski notes: "The ruling cadre, which bases its legitimacy on its high qualifications, must have well-defined privileges. They cannot be something shameful, swept under a rug. I believe that their revision lies in the best interests of this cadre which today is under the not always well-founded suspicion of immorality and even common ordinary theft." I disagree with Professor Stelmachowski on this point. Because of socialist ideology, privileges in socialist states have to be shameful and kept secret. Professor Stelmachowski's proposal that they be openly defined and established is utopian. His claim that the Polish ruling elite "bases its legitimacy on its high qualifications" is ingenuous, considering that the PZPR bases its legitimacy on the tautology that they have the right to have power because they took power in 1944.

[30] From the PZPS "Alka" and the Printing Works Cooperative, both in Słupsk.

Bureau of Council of Ministers, and other state administrations should be obliged to make 50 percent of their vacation resources available to workplaces which do not have their own vacation facilities."

Demands extended to the general conception of law. Workers of the Słupsk Construction Firm asked for "equality before the law without regard to office or function." Workers of the Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives in Gdańsk demanded "elimination of corruption and bribery in administration and public institutions." The workers of another factory, the Słupsk Logging Machine Factory were even more forthright: "Begin actions for the open trials of those in the party and government apparatuses who are guilty of economic crimes."

Workers also demanded an equal obligation to work. One aspect of corruption and mismanagement in the factories has been the creation of sports teams paid for out of the enterprise wage fund, in part for the amusement of the apparatus, in part as a device to provide sinecures for favorites. At the Gdańsk Travel Production Enterprise, workers demanded "an examination of the financial records, and the liquidation of fictitious work positions," and at the Bydgoszcz Construction Firm "East," they asked that "the work positions of those who never work be eliminated." The latter also wrote: "Raise work discipline for all posts from the director to the night watchman," and added: "Reduce the number of positions at managerial level. Resolutely discipline all those employees who do not fulfill their agreed-upon tasks."

At points, the demands took on the character of an existential affirmation of the right to dignity: "Cease ignoring the co-op workers and start treating them as partners—let the managers finally cease treating the cooperative as private property," demanded workers at the Elblag Gardening Cooperative. Textile workers at the "Unity" Cooperative in Gdańsk asserted: "The time has finally come to knock these Oriental despots off their thrones and to teach them to work for the pennies they offer us working people, whom they treat as black slaves, as nothing."

All these demands for eliminating political privilege drive to the heart of the political system by attacking the Polish state's claim of maintaining socialist hegemony. They indicate that workers' hatred and fear of the apparatus that enjoys those privileges is patent throughout. Interestingly, while the police and party receive special attention, the army is also included as part of the privileged strata.[31]

Economic equality. If political privilege represented the illness and free trade unions the remedy, the workers placed both within the context of a broader criticism of systemic inequality throughout Polish society. While workers in the United States tend to define distributive justice as equality of opportunity and merit, Polish workers define justice as an egalitarianism under which everyone should get more or less the same because everyone has more or less the same needs. As Lech Wałesa has put it, "every one has just one stomach."[32] The more the socialist regime threatened basic needs of food and shelter, the more it stimulated a sense of justice of the most egalitarian kind.

One of the most dramatic manifestations of workers' attack on inequality was the accord of striking workers of Gdynia with City President Mariański and the City Presidium signed on December 15, 1970. Fundamentally an agreement to negotiate, the accord was broken the same day, when police assaulted and arrested the Strike Committee in their command post in the port's recreation club. Still, the agreement is an extraordinary document, only one of two such agreements to be signed by the representatives of the state with Polish workers until the Gdańsk Accords of 1980.[33] Its substance is dominated by the issue of equality. Point four of the document reads: "The earnings of manual unskilled workers should be about 100 zlotys per month below those of skilled workers." Point five: "The differences between the earnings of unskilled manual workers and those with higher education should be about 200 zlotys monthly" (this would include engineers and managers). Point six: "The director of the enterprise should earn no more than 1,000 zlotys more than an employee with higher education."

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[31] The naming of the army as a part of the privileged strata does not tally with studies claiming that the army had social prestige before martial law was declared on December 13, 1981. An example is the account based on government and Solidarity polls found in David S. Mason, "Solidarity, the Regime and the Public," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), No. 35, 1983, pp. 545–53. The reality is actually more complex. The army is hated, loved, and feared all at once. Ordinary Poles must serve in this dependent army with its Petainist symbols of national sovereignty (national in form, Soviet in content). Yet, as part of the state, its cadre participates in the system of secret privilege, not justified under socialist ideology.

[32] This saying is received wisdom among Polish workers, and numerous sociological studies confirm its importance. See, e.g., Bogusław Błachnicki, "Equality in the Consciousness of Industrial Workers," *Studia Socjologiczne* (Warsaw) 4 (67), 1977, pp. 135–53. For an introduction to the abundant literature on egalitarianism in postwar Poland, see H. Malewska-Peyre, "Research on Egalitarian Modes of Thought," *Sociologie du Travail* (Paris), No. 3, 1982, pp. 333–46; and H. Flakierski, "Solidarity and Egalitarianism," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* (Toronto), September 1983, pp. 380–91.

[33] On December 20, 1970, the Strike Committee of the City of Szczecin signed an agreement with provincial party, government, and union authorities. The text of the Szczecin agreement is published in Małgorzata Szejnert and Tomasz Zalewski, *Szczecin*, London, Aneks, 1986, pp. 55–58. The first edition of this volume was published in Warsaw in 1984 by the underground press Niezależna Oficyna Wydawnicza (NOWa).

On the night of August 31, 1980, Polish Deputy Premier Mieczysław Jagielski (left) and Solidarity leader Lech Wałęsa sign the historic agreement ending the August strike at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk.

—Photoreporters.

At that time the average wage of an unskilled manual worker was about 2,500 zlotys. If we adopt that as our ase figure, then skilled workers could earn 2,600 zlotys, engineers and managers would earn 2,700, and the director of the Paris Commune Shipyard, one of the largest factories in the country, with a workforce of 14,000, would earn 3,700 zlotys. The range of ewards in this workers' society would be less than 2:1, ar smaller than in capitalist or Leninist societies.

All the demands included in the enormous category of pay issues are saturated with implicit categories of ustice defined by equality as well as merit. Workers id not simply ask for a raise but explained how ewards should be divided. Elbląg construction workrs justified their strike "by the unjust division of the arnings of working people." Gdańsk garment workers sked 1000 zlotys for each worker from "the cleaning ady to the very top." Gdynia bus service workers roposed another way to achieve more egalitarian age rates: "In setting wage raises, follow the principle of lower raises for the higher-paid and higher aises for the lower-paid."

Workers and employees demanded certain changes in the basic nature of the system and offered reasons or justifications for them. For the purpose of this study, these justifications were grouped according to whether they expressed corporate reasons (asked for something by branch, for example, for all railway workers or shipbuilders); a notion of general equality; or a quest for justice on the basis of merit, using criteria such as age or qualification.

Ten percent of workplaces proposed merit criteria based on professional qualification; 31 percent, based on age. Twenty-three percent asked for corporate privileges, 8 percent asked that the least well-off be favored, and 66 percent made arguments on the basis of equality, demanding equal pay. The latter could have meant either raising or leveling pay, but it included a wide range of issues extending far beyond the economic realm.

Protests against inequality were the most dynamic element in the workers' demands over the 10-year period. The demand for the elimination of commercial shops which sold meat at one-and-a-half times the state's established price was specifically expressed by 8 percent of the workers in 1970, none in 1971, and 45.9 percent in 1980. The Gdańsk Yacht Shipyard in 1980 addressed the issue squarely: "Abolish the commercial prices since, in view of their low wages, the majority of the working class cannot patronize them."

A second issue to come to the fore was the demand to cease selling domestic production in internal export shops (for foreign currency). The percentage of workers behind this demand grew from none in 1970 and 1971 to 18.4 percent in 1980. Some workplaces simply demanded abolishing foreign currency shops entirely; one asked that "a foreign currency subsidy be included in the basic wage so that purchases could be made in these shops."[34]

A third issue was the demand for rationing of supplies, particularly food. The employees of CTO in Oliwa demanded: "Introduce a just division of goods for rationing cards. Cease dividing the society." This issue had an egalitarian constituency because it seemed to promise equal access in a supply crisis. Here the evolution was from none in 1970 and 1971 to 27 percent in 1980.

Differences by Branch of Industry

While the register of the members of the strike committee of Szczecin in December 1970 confirms the breadth of the strike and the importance of the basic industries, in particular metalworking and construction, there are not enough lists of demands to allow for a meaningful breakdown according to industry.[35] The data for 1980, however, permits an analysis of demands by branch, by size of workplace, and, to some extent, by the size of the town in which the workplace was located.[36]

In order to arrive at a branch breakdown of demands in 1980, I divided industry into ten branches. The statistics indicate the differing degree of support for Solidarity by branch: heavy industry, 55 workplaces; light industry, 45; transport, 59; service, 71; state administration, 9; education, 18; health, 12; rural industry, 8; construction, 30; and commerce, 10.[37] The heavy-industry category comprised large factories, some as huge as the Lenin Shipyard (at that time numbering around 24,000 workers, including the contracting firms located on its grounds) or the Paris Commune Shipyard (14,000 workers). Some light-industry and construction workplaces were also relatively large, numbering up to a 1,000 workers. All the other categories were Lilliputian by comparison—the staff of a vocational school, the clerks in a supermarket, a planning office in the local government, the clerical workers of a branch of the Polish National Bank. Even though there were many hundreds more of these white-collar workplaces, they were almost uniformly unable to summon up enough political resources to send in their own demands in August. As we shall see, those that did tended to express more economistic and less systemic demands than did blue-collar workplaces.

In 1980, support for free trade unions appeared on demand lists of 52 percent of the workplaces, but when broken down according to branch, two branches showed even greater support: heavy industry at 75 percent and construction at 67 percent. Compared to heavy industry, light industry expressed weaker support for free trade unions (49 percent). Trailing were the white-collar employees in education (33 percent) and services (39 percent). An apparent anomaly was the 56 percent level of support given by workers in administration, but, in addition to having some of the most economistic workplaces, such as the clerical staff of a branch of the Polish National Bank, this category also included several planning and computer bureaus. These had a demand profile not at all like that of low-echelon workers in state administration. The intellectual opposition may have had an impact here.

The degree of support for free trade unions was also closely related to the size of the workplace. A breakdown according to size indicates that 77 percent of

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[34] Gdańsk Przed. Robot. Mont. (a Gdańsk construction firm), 1980.

[35] There are only 24 lists from heavy industry, 11 from construction, 8 from light industry, 5 from transport, 6 from services, and 1 from state administration. Lists of demands advanced by enterprises in Gdańsk come from heavy industry.

[36] Since nearly all the 1970, 1971, and 1980 lists of demands in my possession were advanced by enterprises in large Baltic towns such as Gdańsk, Gdynia, Sopot, and Elbląg, there is insufficient material for a serious comparison of these demands and those sent by enterprises located in middle-size towns. Yet, even a comparison based on the few lists from middle-size towns yields surprising results. Middle-size towns (those with 50–100,000 inhabitants) showed a higher percentage of demands for free trade unions (70 percent) and against apparatus privileges (60 percent), including family subsidies (78 percent), than did the large towns of Gdańsk, Gdynia, Sopot, and Elbląg where the percentages for the same demands equalled 45, 36, and 61 respectively. The ratings for medium-size towns were skewed by Słupsk, a Pomeranian city of 83,000, with no heavy industry and few large factories, but extensive military garrisons, including Soviet troops. The demands from Słupsk included numerous demands against military privileges. The military presence overrode the strong correlation to branch of industry

[37] The number of cases totaled 317 rather than 305, because several workplaces were counted in two branches, for example, truckers were counted as part of both the transport branch and the health branch. Their demands had characteristics of both branches. The "advantages" of the greater information base outweigh the "disadvantages" of minor threats to interpretation.

STRAJK
OKUPACYJNY

Workers at a sit-in ("okupacyjny") strike in Szczecin in December 1970.

—SIPA/Special Features.

large workplaces (above 1000 workers) opted for free trade unions, 54 percent of medium workplaces (100–1000), and 48 percent of small workplaces (less than 100 workers).

In 1980, 39 percent of workplaces called for abolishing apparatus privileges. Here again, differences among branches of industry are considerable: heavy industry (53 percent), construction (47 percent), and transport (44 percent). Notably below the average are: the health sector (17 percent), education (28 percent), service (32 percent), and light industry (36 percent).

Overall, 63 percent of lists demanded family subsidies equal to those of the apparatus. The highest percent was in: construction (87 percent), heavy industry (76 percent), transport (70 percent), and light industry (67 percent). Below the average were educators (39 percent), health sector workers (39 percent), and commercial sales personnel (30 percent).

The same branches of industry led the way on equality issues. For the elimination of commercial shops, where the general percentage was 46 percent, the leading advocates were workers in construction (70 percent), heavy industry (62 percent), and transport (54 percent).

The demand to end sale of domestic goods in foreign currency shops appeared less frequently. Average support was 18 percent, the leading sectors being construction (24 percent), light industry (24 percent), and heavy industry (22 percent).

Because most of the demands have dates on them, it is possible to determine whether or not the August strike grew in its radicalism from August 14 to August 31. Generally, the demands became more limited, less political, and less systemic over time. The strongest workplaces were the first to strike and were progressively joined by small enterprises which had never before dared to lift their heads and whose demands were generally more economistic than those put forward by the large factories.

Evidence from the 1970 strikes strongly suggests that the politically active elements—those who struck, went out on the streets, elected strike committees—were almost exclusively blue-collar workers. The white-collar employees remained passive, often locked in their offices during the sit-in strikes at the shipyards and other workplaces. Although the impetus in August 1980 still remained with the industrial workers, they were joined—in contrast to 1970—by large numbers of white-collar employees.

This impression of the situation in 1970 is confirmed by the 1971 demands where, in some cases, notably at the Lenin Shipyard, it is possible to distinguish the political and economistic sectors. Demands reflecting a broad political consciousness emanate from the classical metalworking shops—hull-welding, fitting, and engines—while the more economistic of all is the highly feminized clerical bureau of the shipyard. Generally (there are exceptions), feminine workforces tend to be the least systemic and most economistic in their demands, but their political consciousness varies not by sex but by location in industry. Thus women's light industry has a profile like men's light industry, and women's administration is also like that of men. However, there are too few women in heavy industry to compare.

Debunking Myths

Worker demands in all three years contradict the thesis of worker utopianism or radicalism. In 1970 and 1971, there were no intellectuals on the scene to moderate demands. In 1980, the strikes occurred too rapidly and were too decentralized for intellectuals to have had a chance to affect the degree of radicalism. Although systemic and political, the demands place much more emphasis on the Solidarity program for a free trade union than on such demands as free elections or an end to censorship.

As an explanation for this realistic maturity, it seems fruitful to focus on the collective historical experiences of the Polish people. In addition to the historical memory of the uprisings of 1831, 1863, and 1944, there are the more recent events of 1956, 1968, 1970, and 1976. Given the character of Solidarity (which when first founded was not an organization capable of issuing hierarchical orders), this kind of collective learning through historical experience seems a more adequate explanation of the movement's self-discipline than does the concept of moderation imposed or provided by intellectuals.

Strong evidence against the thesis of utopian radicalism is provided by the almost total lack of mention of the USSR, as if by collective wisdom this were a taboo not worth taking on. Instead, the subject of imperial relations is approached indirectly, with demands for the elimination of Polish foreign aid to other socialist countries and for a review of the conditions of foreign trade generally or specifically with the Soviets. The USSR is mentioned sarcastically only twice, in the question raised by the Lenin Shipyard workers in 1971: "Why do our leaders fly to Moscow whenever there is a crisis?" and again in their demand: "Let us have Saturdays free from work as [is the case] in the most progressive country—the USSR."

Did workers' demands support the thesis of "workers' authoritarianism"[38] by demanding harsh repressive measures against "undesirable" or parasitic elements of society? I examined two issues as symptomatic of authoritarianism: anti-Semitism and the demand to punish "social parasites." Linking these issues together is empirically justified by the fact that the Polish state has continuously aimed mass media campaigns against both the Jews and so-called social parasites (the social stratum with no visible means of support), singling them out as the causes of social ills.

Besides being stimulated by the highly visible presence of communists of Jewish origin at the highest levels of the state immediately after World War II, anti-Semitism in Poland was fanned by three state-sponsored anti-Semitic campaigns (in 1956, 1968 and 1976–85). Although the state failed to mobilize anyone but its own apparatus, the attitude of the Polish population to these campaigns is still not very clear. Indeed, as Adam Michnik said at the March 1981 Warsaw commemoration of the events of March 1968, the attitude of the *pays profond,* in particular the workers, remains unknown.[39]

The state's linking of anti-Semitism with social parasitism in an authoritarian syndrome became most evident in 1968. It is best illustrated by the articles published that year in the weekly, *Prawo i Życie* (Law and Life)—one of the most active state anti-Semitic newspapers. Often written by the same authors, these articles alternately attacked Zionists and social parasites.

Despite government efforts, workers did not succumb to such state propaganda. While their demands are full of less than flattering references to the party, police, and army (a particularly cutting one in 1970 asks that the police be restrained from robbing and looting in the city of Gdańsk), not the slightest hint of anti-Semitism appears. On the contrary, several factories in 1970 and three in 1971 demanded that the victims of the state's anti-Semitic campaign of 1968 be released. One factory in Elbląg demanded that Jacek Kuroń and Karol Modzelewski (both leaders of Solidarity ten years later) be immediately freed.[40]

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[38] A thesis propounded by Staniszkis, op. cit., p. 51, and Neal Ascherson, *The Polish August*, New York, Viking Press, 1982, p. 275, citing the Polish sociologist Stefan Nowak who "has described the high incidence of authoritarian and punitive attitudes in Polish society."

[39] Cited according to the brochure, *Marzec 1968* (March of 1968) published in Warsaw by NOWa.

In 1970 and 1971, no workplaces demanded that "social parasites" be forced to work. However, in 1980, nine workplaces, or 3 percent, asked that "something be done about social parasites." Three workplaces (1 percent) demanded that "social parasites" be placed in forced labor camps. Clearly, few Polish workers accepted the scapegoats proffered to them by the Leninist state. The absence of support for state campaigns against these scapegoats seriously undermines any claim of workers' authoritarianism.

Regional vs. National Origins

Was the emergence of Solidarity the result of a nation-wide development, or was it in large part a regional one, which was subsequently taken up by the rest of the country?

The demands examined here clearly show that the fundamental plank of Solidarity—the demand for free trade unions—was as strong among coastal workers in 1970 and 1971 as it was in 1980. But the question remains: if we had demands from other regions of Poland, would they indicate Solidarity was the result of a nation-wide evolution of workers and society?

Two types of evidence support the hypothesis that popular attitudes embedded in the experience of 1970 were specific to the workers of the Coast: (1) the results of a comparison of workers' demands from the Baltic Coast and Lublin; (2) the results of a regional comparison of organizational forms employed by the workers against the party.

When the assertions from the Coast are compared to demands from another region of Poland—Lublin—there is a considerable difference in the level of political consciousness.[41] The Lublin demands are recognizably the creation of workers and employees, but the strongest demands among them generally attain the level only of the weaker workplaces on the Coast in 1970–71 and 1980. Lublin workers demand pay raises, guarantees for the strikers, and egalitarian aid for the less well-off through the raising of family subsidies to the level of the apparatus. They also attack commercial food prices and the selling of domestic products in foreign currency stores. But even the strongest factories only rarely call for free trade unions independent of the party, choosing instead to ask for new elections to the state's trade unions. They also avoid seeking the abolition of political privileges of the state apparatus, except for the demand for family subsidies equal to those of the apparatus (on the Coast this demand was mostly voiced by the weakest factories).[42]

These results are also significant because Lublin's two universities and propitious mix of intellectuals and workers later made it one of the strongest regions of Solidarity. It was a region well within the reach of KOR's influence, one in which *Robotnik* and other opposition journals found a certain audience in the factories. Yet the pattern of the July 1980 demands shows little or no effect of KOR's propagandizing efforts.

Examining the differences—if any—by region in the organizational forms utilized by workers against the party offers broader implications than those pertaining to the question of the regional development and origin of Solidarity. It also sheds light on what organizational forms undergirded the varying ideological assertions by Polish workers, and which forms were adequate to realize these assertions.

The oral tradition concerning the formation of Solidarity, prevalent in Poland and now part of the scholarly literature, is that it was Jacek Kuroń of KOR who told workers to cease burning party committee buildings and begin building their own trade union structures. But the little-known events of December 1970 indicate that Polish workers from the Coast at that time independently, even desperately, searched for an organization and a program adequate to their struggle. First, they gathered in orderly assemblages to protest before various enterprise administrations along the Baltic coast. Such assemblages escalated, in stages, to higher forms of protest: marches on government and party buildings in Gdańsk, Gdynia, Elbląg, and Szczecin; attacks on party and police buildings in Gdańsk and Szczecin; sit-in strikes directed against specific enterprises; even formation of conspirational political groups.[43] In this rapid evolution of political forms, the

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[40] I was informed of this demand by a historian of the Institute of History of the Polish Academy of Sciences in April 1982.

[41] The Lublin demands were extensively excerpted in the excellent Solidarity regional journal *Miesiące* (Lublin) No. 1, 1981. The entire first issue is devoted to the July strikes. Since the demands are not complete, I could not do a computer-based analysis.

[42] One exception in Lublin was the Fabryka Samochodów Ciężarowych FSC—a truck factory—where workers asked for "freeing the activities of trade unions from the state administration and party apparatus, permitting press coverage of everything that bears on economic and political life." Ibid., p. 23.

[43] On January 13, 1971, the members of the Interfactory Strike Committee of Gdynia who had been released from prison were arrested because they had founded a revolutionary workers' party which aimed at seizing power from the Polish communist party. A document concerning the founding of the revolutionary party was discovered by the Gdańsk 1970 Historical Research Team. A copy of the act of indictment is in my possession.

Workers of the Polish Baltic coast learning from experience: at left, workers attack a police vehicle during the December 1970 riots; at right, delegates to the Interfactory Strike Committee during deliberations in August 1980 at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk.

—Gamma-Liaison.

coastal workers discovered the interfactory strike committee uniting all factories and other workplaces against the central state.

In fact, in its 16 months of liberty Solidarity rested on the creative organizational lessons learned in 1970 on the Coast and not the reverse. The events of December 1970 taught the coastal workers that they had to stay in their factories in order to protest. Marches in the street and assaults on party buildings were hopeless as long as there was no chance for overthrowing the state. Such acts offered too inviting a target for the distortion of the strikers' aims by the state. By comparison, workers from other regions protesting during the more widespread strikes of 1976 left their factories. In Radom and Płock, they attacked the party headquarters. In Ursus, they blocked and tore up the international railway line. Not until Solidarity was founded in August 1980 were the organizational lessons learned in 1970 by workers from the Coast transmitted to workers across the country.

Even when individual strikes rippled across Poland after July 1, 1980, no region formed an interfactory strike committee until one was created August 16 at the Lenin Shipyard. Again the Coast demonstrated its more sophisticated organizational abilities. The closest attempt to found such a strike committee elsewhere was made in Lublin. But though workers from Lublin had been on strike for over two weeks in July 1980 and had elected strike committees, written demands, and negotiated with management and government, they did not create an interfactory strike committee. They, like workers from other factories outside the coastal area, negotiated with the state through individual factory committees. Only after the formation of the interfactory strike committees (or territorial councils) in Gdańsk, Szczecin, and Elbląg, was this organizational form adopted by work forces in other regions.

Given the evidence available, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that Solidarity's origins are rooted in the local experience of workers from the Baltic Coast. During the strikes of 1970–71, these workers developed both the main plank of the Solidarity program—free trade unions—and Solidarity's primary mechanism for organizational strategy, the interfactory strike committee.

Assessments

The massive evidence generated in the workers' written demands of 1970, 1971, and 1980 overwhelmingly contradicts widespread misconceptions regarding the impetus for Solidarity. The demands of 1970–71 are as political and systemic in their criticism of the Leninist system as the demands of 1980. Before the founding of KOR or the social activation of the Catholic Church, the workers clearly set forth the program that would be championed by Solidarity: free trade unions independent of party, government, and factory management. Their concerns extended beyond wage and working conditions within the factory to the Leninist state itself, and they contained a broad structural criticism of its power and privilege. Even more significant, they were not simply anti-state, destructive in their aim, but proposed alternatives which included the major postulates of Solidarity—in program and in organization. In their general thrust, they offered no support to interpretations which detect strong worker sentiment for utopian radicalism or authoritarianism.

The evidence also strongly suggests the importance of the local regional history of the Baltic coast. Various sociological factors may have influenced this local history: immigration from Poland's *Kresy* (or eastern borderlands), with their more exacerbated national pride and their keener sense of Soviet domination; the greater openness to the world (and hence the opportunity to make comparison) of a coastal region engaged in world-wide fishing, shipping, trading, and shipbuilding; or the special quality of a new territory—a frontier region settled by immigrants seeking a new life after 1945. Whatever these sociological factors may have contributed,[44] the decisive formative experience was December 1970. With the rise of Solidarity in August 1980, the rest of the country caught up very quickly but on the basis of the patterns of program and organization discovered in that one week ten years earlier in Gdańsk, Gdynia, and Szczecin.

In the intervening decade, many other factors contributed to make the heritage of December 1970 viable: the coming of age of a generation with no direct memory of the war and Stalinism, the further activization of the Church and secular intellectuals in the Constitution struggle in 1975, workers' protests in 1976, the founding of KOR and the development of a broad intellectual opposition. Probably the most important of all was the Gierek regime's economic incompetence and its unwillingness or inability to physically repress society.

In this light, 1970 takes on the character of a decisive moment for political consciousness and organization. The Church and KOR appear rather in the role of helpful and intermittently heroic auxiliaries rather than initiators of Solidarity. The years 1976 (the founding of KOR) and 1980 (the August Strike) became moments of confluence where opposition intellectuals and Polish workers from other regions joined the broader and deeper current with its sources in the Baltic workers.

The Historical Context

The Baltic workers called their 1970, 1971, and 1980 gatherings strike assemblies, but at any other moment in history such gatherings might have been called parliaments, and their actions perceived as the drawing-up of a social contract, or the founding of a new society. By striking, by holding these assemblies, by winning concessions from the state for the demand-gathering campaign in 1971, Polish workers created a political space for reflection on the state of their commonwealth. Under Leninist rule, nothing like it had ever been seen before, but this was not the first time in world history that it had occurred.

For the French Revolution, Alexis de Tocqueville points out the vast implications of a similar demand-gathering campaign—the Cahiers de doleánces: "In those countries, where political assemblies are elected by universal suffrage, every general election must deeply involve the people, unless their freedom of voting is a lie, but here not only a universal vote but a universal deliberation and inquest were to be taken. Every citizen of one of the greatest nations in the world was to be asked not what he thought of this or that particular problem but what he had to say against every law and every social and political institution in his country. I think that no such spectacle had ever been seen before."[45]

In Poland, the coastal workers impressed "the idea of a radical revolution"[46] on their own minds when they shifted from sporadic, anarchistic protest against Leninist power to a deliberation on that power. The sit-

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[44] This sociological explanation is bolstered by the fact that, of the five interfactory strike committees formed in August 1980, the leading three—Gdańsk, Szczecin, and Elbląg—were on the coast. They were joined somewhat later by Wrocław, also in the new territories. The last to join (on August 28) was Jastrzębie, geographically situated in prewar Poland but an area of new industrialization and new settlement with a work force composed of recent migrants from the countryside.

[45] Alexis de Tocqueville, *The European Revolution* and *Correspondence with Gobineau*, introduced and edited by John Lukacs (the projected second volume of *The Old Regime and the Revolution*), Gloucester, MA, Peter Smith, 1968, pp. 81–82.

[46] Today, thanks to the work of Barrington Moore, Marc Ferro, and Paul Avrich we are able to assess just how radical the Polish workers' movement was by comparing it to previous workers' movements in Germany (1848–1933) and Russia (1917).

German, Russian, and Polish workers all advanced industry-specific and factory-specific demands. All three asked for more decent and humane treatment—a rather ironic comment on Polish workers' conditions under mature socialism. All three also demanded better working conditions, work clothing, and supply of work tools by the factory management. However, neither the German nor Russian workers generated a systemic solution to the problems of industrial society. Moore concludes that this fact "fully in strikes and assemblies and their extension into unions of striking factories against the state deepened that deliberation. It was lent confirmation by the demand-gathering campaign in early 1971, when the new Gierek regime enlisted thousands of workers and cadres into enterprise committees to collect workers grievances. The campaign instigated a ferment and a hope that something could be changed. When the regime felt sufficiently secure—by April 1971—it buried the demands in its file drawers.[47] In so doing, Poland's rulers lit a delayed-action fuse under their own throne.

The Irony of the Leninist Legacy

The political controls of the Leninist state are so direct, so unmasked, that they generate a critique of state power within the workplace. Indeed, as Max Weber has suggested, such controls are transparent and "members of . . . subordinate groups are able to perceive an immediate connection between their personal situation and the overall structure of power and privilege."[48]

How did this perception arise, say, among workers of the Paris Commune Shipyard or the Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk? First, as is the case today, shipyards, like other Polish enterprises, were subject to a poorly functioning central plan. As a result, workers frequently suffered delays in the monthly production cycle due to the lack of parts and materials, as well as to poor management. As a consequence, they then had to "storm" to fulfill the monthly quotas and make semblance of keeping to the yearly plans. The lesson constantly driven home was as simple as it was stark: any other system had to be more rational and efficient.

Second, after 1970, the shipyards were included in Gierek's cooptive system of direct consultations between 131 leading factories and the Central Committee in Warsaw. The visibility of the state's responsibility for the poor conditions of daily life and work was thus further increased.

Third, the connection of political power to daily conditions was already patently clear to the most benighted worker because of the presence of the state's hierarchical command structure within the shipyards: the industrial police, the management, the cadre and employment section (loosely cooperating with and partly staifed by the political police), the government trade unions, and the party organizations. Even the nomination of the lowest foremen had to be cleared by the party. It was evident that not only complex, but even the most elementary matters within the shipyard were subject to the state.

And fourth, since a considerable portion of shipyard production was destined for the Soviet Union, and Soviet contract-fulfillment supervisors were present in the shipyards, the focus of the grievances of the already politicized workers naturally expanded beyond the Council of Ministers and Central Committee

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supports the Leninist thesis that industrial workers on their own do not create anything except pure trade unionism." But he also points out that there is no evidence to indicate that radical intellectuals were able to infuse industrial workers with a program for radical change as Lenin had hoped.

Polish workers from the Baltic seacoast differed markedly from the German and Russian workers, most notably in their conception of economic justice. By comparison, Polish workers were radical levellers. While the Germans and Russians focused on working conditions and wages (factory- and industry-specific demands), Polish workers demanded systemic changes, going far beyond the limits of the workplace and the horizons shrouded by so-called bread-and-butter issues. Bypassing many cultural issues that touch on religion, education, and historical legacy, and avoiding the subject of Poland's geopolitical relation to the USSR, Polish workers focused with sustained intensity upon the state.

In their demands Polish workers criticized the state's incompetent, unreliable, and excessive control of industry. They proposed introducing competent management and economic egalitarianism. They advocated the widest possible democratic associations and proposed abolishing the privileges of the state apparatuses. If their demands were not revolutionary in the sense of calling for a violent overthrow of the political and social system (most probably a result of political prudence), they were nonetheless incompatible with the prevailing order. See Barrington Moore, Jr., *Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt*, White Plains, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 1978, pp. 368–70, 475–83; Marc Ferro, *The Revolution of February 1917*, translated from the French by J.L. Richards, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice Hall, 1972, pp. 113–45; Paul H. Avrich, "Russian Factory Committees in 1917," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* (Yearbooks for East European Affairs), Vol. 11, Book 2, 1963, pp. 61–182.

[47] The experience of the Paris Commune shipyard in 1971 is instructive. At Warsaw's orders, the shipyard's cadres gathered demands from their workers in December 1970 and January 1971. The Shipyard Committee for the Fulfillment of Employee Suggestions and Demands registered a total of 825 such demands, suggestions, and questions. Of these the Committee classified 447 as external to the shipyard and not within its competence. Of the matters within the shipyard's competence, a relatively high number—150 out of 378 demands—were in fact related to the December strikes, that is, they were highly political.

Of the 447 demands that concerned the wider system beyond the shipyard, 60 related to pay, 16 to housing, 13 to social conditions, 2 to occupational safety and health, 83 to national economic affairs, and 283 to national political affairs. As the Committee diplomatically noted, these demands (the most numerous and the most important) were handed over to the shipyard's party authorities "which sent them on to the appropriate higher authority." No further mention of them was made in the document. The overall point seems evident. By their own criteria the shipyard directors acknowledged their incompetence in the face of the systemic political demands made by their workforce. *Biuletyn Informacyjny o stanie realizacji wniosków i postulatów zgłoszonych w stoczni w miesiącach: Grudniu 1970 r, oraz styczniu 1971 r.* (Information Bulletin on the Realization of the Demands and Suggestions Submitted at the [Paris Commune] Shipyard in December 1970 and January 1971), Stocznia im. Komuny Paryskiej w Gdyni, Zakładowy Zespół Do Realizacji Wniosków.

[48] Frank Parkin, *Class Inequality and Political Order*, New York, 1971, p. 161, citing H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, *From Max Weber*, Oxford, England, Oxford University Press, 1946, p. 184.



A poster and badge popular with Polish workers in June 1981 ironically reproduces a Stalinist-era picture idealizing the socialist worker, with more recent official epithets—dating from 1956, 1968, 1970 1976, and 1980—of "anarchist," "antisocialist element," and "provocateur."

—Photo from author.

in Warsaw, even if this perception did not find its way into specific demands.

When socialism is transformed into Leninism, there is an inherent contradiction in the Leninist state between the socialist theory of worker control and equality and the Leninist practice of elitist power and privilege. This contradiction confers a prima facie validity on worker grievances against their rulers. Recognizing the gap between theory and practice, workers exploit it to fight the injustices they endure, at times appropriating socialist arguments and terminology.[49] Indeed, for their part, Polish workers seem to have taken seriously the state's official ideology, its cant about democracy, equality, and workers' management. As a result, the demands they have advanced and the organizations they have developed in their struggle reflect the clear influence of the Leninist state: they stand in a negative dialectical relationship to it. Instead of the *nomenklatura* and privilege, workers are striving for equality. Instead of hierarchical pillars of control, they ask for a highly decentralized democracy and far-reaching safeguards for the new democratic forms. It is as if the Leninist state were a very incompetent teacher trying to impart learning, and the workers, its recalcitrant and unruly students, who absorbed their lessons only in reverse. Ironically, the demands and the organization generated by workers in 1970–71 and 1980 are so connected to the Leninist state and its control of political and social life that this state—and not the Catholic Church or opposition intellectuals—gave workers the language and structure of their demands, defined their concerns, and lent them the forms of organization to realize them. The Leninist state has thereby generated its own nemesis.

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[49] I am indebted to Professor James C. Scott for this observation.

Notes

Soviets on Nuclear-War-Fighting

Tsuyoshi Hasegawa

WHEN Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov was dismissed on September 6, 1984, from his post as Chief of the Soviet General Staff, some Western analysts speculated that his dismissal was due to a conflict between the party and the military leaderships over Soviet military doctrine. In this view, the conflict surfaced openly in a protracted debate between Minister of Defense Marshal Dmitriy Ustinov and Ogarkov, in which the Defense Minister represented the party's view and the Chief of the General Staff became spokesman for the professional military. The central issue of contention was whether victory in nuclear war is possible. Ustinov and the party leadership basically came to accept the concept of mutual assured destruction (MAD) as the basis of Soviet military policy and advanced the argument that in a situation where both the Soviet Union and the United States had acquired a second-strike retaliatory capability, victory in nuclear war is not possible. Ogarkov was opposed to this assumption, and emphasized instead capabilities for waging protracted nuclear war and insisted on the possibility of victory in nuclear war. A strong proponent of this explanation has been George Weickhardt, who saw Ogarkov's dismissal as a victory of the party over the military that in turn ended the debate.[1]

Even before Ogarkov's dismissal, some analysts had discerned a debate between the party and the military over military doctrine. Dan and Rebecca Strode viewed the debate as an internal struggle between "diplomacists," who believed that "in the nuclear age, the USSR cannot secure its national security and foreign policy objectives without some degree of cooperation with the West," and "unilateralists," who had concluded that "in the face of determined Western opposition . . . only redoubled defense efforts can secure the strategic gains which the USSR made in the 1970's."[2] David Holloway also recognized two contradictory tendencies in Soviet military writings, that is, emphases on both parity and nuclear-war-fighting, but unlike the Strodes, argued that "in terms of the structure of Soviet military thought, the first principle is more important than the latter because it has been articulated by the party leadership and expressed as a doctrinal position that takes account of the realities of the strategic nuclear balance." Although acknowledging that the combination of defensive doctrine enunciated by the party and offensive strategy planned by the military was ambiguous and threatening, Holloway argued that in the Soviet setting these two aspects of military thinking do not conflict but complement each other.[3]

In the hierarchy of Soviet military theory, of course, military doctrine is determined by the political leadership and always has supremacy over military science, which lies in the domain of the General Staff (see box). Soviet literature assumes that the two complement each other and that contradictions between them do not arise. But in actuality, there is a possibility of friction between the party and the military over the formulation of military doctrine for several reasons.

Tsuyoshi Hasegawa is Professor of Soviet Politics at the Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University. He is the author of The February Revolution: Petrograd 1917 *(1980). Currently, Professor Hasegawa is focusing on Soviet military issues.*

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[1] George G. Weickhardt, "Ustinov versus Ogarkov," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January-February 1985, pp. 77–82.

[2] Dan L. Strode and Rebecca V. Strode, "Diplomacy and Defense in Soviet National Security Policy," *International Security* (Cambridge, MA), Fall 1983, pp. 91–116. The quote comes from pp. 107–08.

[3] David Holloway, *The Soviet Union and the Arms Race*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1984, pp. 48–55.

First, in the structure of Soviet military theory there is no built-in guarantee that the sociopolitical and the military-technical factors will always be complementary. Military science provides an input into the formulation of military doctrine, but its parameters are simultaneously determined by military doctrine. This structure makes friction possible between the military (which insists that military science should influence military doctrine) and the party leadership (which imposes limits on the scope of military science).[4]

Second, although in the party-military relationship, the party's superiority is firmly established, the factor of

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[4] Ibid., pp. 30–31. In the Ustinov-Ogarkov debate this difference was clearly expressed. According to Ustinov, "in accordance with changes in military-political situations in the world and taking into account the constantly increasing economic potential of the USSR, [the party] determines the content and basic direction of development of Soviet military doctrine." D.F. Ustinov, *Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i* (Collected Speeches and Articles), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literatury, 1979, p. 498. In contrast, Ogarkov stressed the input side of military science in the formulation of military doctrine: "The sociopolitical and military-technical aspects of doctrine are in close dialectical mutual relations and mutual dependency. They are inseparable from each other, and exist together only in the correct mutual relationship. Political objectives of war must completely correspond to the military potential of the state, the military capability of the armed forces, and the methods of conducting military actions by them." N.V. Ogarkov, *Istoriya uchit bditel'nost'* (History Teaches Vigilance), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1985, pp. 58–59.

Structure of Soviet Military Doctrine

There is a clear distinction among various components of Soviet military theory. Military doctrine (voyennaya doktrina) occupies the highest place in the hierarchy of Soviet military theory. Military science (voyennaya nauka), next in the hierarchy, constitutes an important element in formulating military doctrine and comprises the theory of military construction, of military education, and of military economy, military history, and most important, military art. Military art (voyennoye iskusstvo) is composed of strategy, operations, and tactics.[1]

Soviet military doctrine is defined as "the system of views that a state holds at a given time on the purposes and character of a possible war, on the preparation of the country and the armed forces for it, and also on the methods of waging it." It includes both political-social factors and military-technical factors. According to Ogarkov,[2] military doctrine answers the following questions:

(1) What is the possibility of war in the future? If a war is to occur, what country or countries should be considered the potential enemy or enemies?

(2) If a war is to occur, what sort of war should the nation and the military expect to fight?

(3) If such a war is to occur, what objectives and tasks should be assigned to the military? In order to achieve such objectives and to fulfill such tasks, what level of military power should the nation maintain?

(4) In order to prepare the nation and the military for war, what military organizations should the state create?

(5) If a war is to occur, what fighting methods should be used?

Obviously, answers to the first three questions from a purely military-technical point of view would be inadequate since they require a broader political-social perspective. This is not the task of professional soldiers but of the highest party leadership—the Politburo—which formulates military doctrine after a careful analysis of the "correlation of forces" in international politics and of domestic economic, ideological, and political considerations. Professional soldiers in the Soviet Union do not dispute the party's supremacy in formulating military doctrine.

But the military-technical factor also plays an important if not primary role in the formulation of Soviet military doctrine. A doctrinal decision based on a broad sociopolitical perspective could be wrong if it ignores military factors. Moreover, a decision on military doctrine by the political leadership must be translated into military language in order to be implemented. In other words, the military-technical factor becomes essential for answering the last two questions posed by Ogarkov. This factor is called "military science" in the Soviet Union, and is defined as "the system of knowledge about the character and laws of war, the preparation of the armed forces and the country for war, and the methods of waging it."

Military science is monopolized by professional soldiers. It is specifically concerned with the following questions: what military organizations should be created and what importance should be assigned to each organization (theory of military construction); what sort of military education should be conducted to educate the soldiers as well as the citizens (theory of military education); how should the national economy be mobilized in peacetime as well as in time of war (theory of military economy); what lessons can be drawn from past experiences of war (military history); and what methods of war, or more specifically, what strategies, operations, and tactics should be employed in waging war (military art). Thus, military science takes as its starting point the assumption that war can break out, and plans accordingly.

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[1] See "Military Science," in *Sovetskaya voyennaya entsiklopediya* (Soviet Military Encyclopedia), Vol. 2, Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1976, pp. 183-89; "Military Art," in ibid., pp. 211-18; "Military Doctrine," in ibid., Vol. 3, 1977, pp. 225-28; "Military Strategy," in ibid., Vol. 7, 1979, pp. 555-65.

[2] N.V. Ogarkov, *Vsegda v gotovnosti k zashchite otechestva* (Always in Readiness to Defend the Fatherland), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1982, p. 53; idem, *Istoriya uchit bditel'nost'* (History Teaches Vigilance), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1985, p. 75.

bureaucratic politics cannot be ignored. The Soviet military, like any other military, has the mission to prepare its country and armed forces for war and, should war occur, to fight it as best it can. It tends to view international as well as domestic politics from this specific point of view. When the military believes that a decision made by the political leadership is likely to make the preparation for war more difficult, there is the possibility of military opposition to the decision.

Third, the Soviet military has a monopoly on the knowledge and information required for making military decisions. Although it has been argued that in recent years the number of specialists on military affairs has been widened to include academics and journalists, this group is still too small to influence significantly the formulation of Soviet military doctrine or to provide a real alternative to the military's input.

The Ustinov-Ogarkov debate should be understood in this context.

Brezhnev's Military Doctrine

The impetus to the Ustinov-Ogarkov debate was an attempt by the party, under General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev's personal leadership, to rewrite military doctrine to fit the new age of strategic parity achieved in the 1970's.

Under Brezhnev's predecessor, Nikita Khrushchev (1953–64), Soviet military doctrine had become predicated on the following assumptions:

(1) War between the imperialist and the socialist systems was no longer inevitable.

(2) But if a major war between East and West were to erupt, it would develop into an all-out nuclear war, and the outcome of such a war would be determined in a short period of time.

(3) Nuclear weapons would be decisive in such a war. (For this reason the Strategic Rocket Forces were established in 1959, and Khrushchev proposed a reduction by one-third in the ground forces, which he saw as obsolete.)

(4) The only safeguard against war was the military superiority of the Soviet Union.

(5) If the imperialists decided to unleash a war against the Soviet Union, capitalism would perish and socialism would triumph.

In the first half of the Brezhnev period (1964–72), two partial revisions were made in Khrushchev's military doctrine. First, in response to the military's dissatisfaction with Khrushchev's predilection for nuclear forces at the expense of other services, Brezhnev introduced a balanced development of all services. Second, the assumption that nuclear war would be short was revised to take account of the possibility that there could be a limited war as well as a protracted nuclear war. However, military doctrine in the early Brezhnev years still rejected MAD. The doctrine retained the goal of military superiority and maintained that victory in nuclear war was possible.[5]

It was not until after 1972 that significant changes were introduced in Soviet military doctrine. The Soviet Union concluded the SALT I Agreement with the United States in 1972, and so gained, at least numerically, strategic parity with the United States. By the mid-1970's, the Soviet Union reached strategic parity not merely quantitatively but also qualitatively by developing a fourth generation of intercontinental ballistic missiles as well as submarine-launched ballistic missiles as strategic reserves. This meant that for the first time the question whether the Soviet Union should pursue military superiority or whether it should be content with parity arose as a real policy choice. Second, the conclusion of the ABM Treaty together with the SALT I Agreement restricted the deployment of a comprehensive antiballistic missile defense. These agreements were the first step toward accepting MAD in the sense that the Soviet Union now accepted the concept of mutual vulnerability.

It was in this environment of strategic parity that Brezhnev delivered his noted 1977 speech in Tula which stated:

> *Of course, we are perfecting our defense. It cannot be otherwise. We have not made, nor will we ever make any concessions regarding the security of our country and the security of our allies.*
>
> *But it is nonsense and completely baseless to argue that the Soviet Union is doing more than what is necessary for defense or that we are striving to gain military superiority, to acquire "a first-strike" capability. . . . The Soviet Union has been and will be a firm opponent of such an idea.*
>
> *The purpose of our military power is directed to avoid not only a first strike but also a second strike, and to prevent a nuclear war itself. We can sum up our idea on this problem in the following way. The defense potential of the Soviet Union must be sufficient so that no one should risk threatening our peaceful life. No aspect of our policy aims at superiority in armaments. Our policy aims to reduce military power and lower the possibility of military confrontation.*[6]

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[5] On the evolution of Soviet military doctrine, see Robbin F. Laird and Dale R. Herspring, *The Soviet Union and Strategic Arms*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1984, pp. 9–28.

[6] *Pravda* (Moscow), Jan. 19, 1977.

This speech was the first major step toward rejecting a principal pillar of existing Soviet military doctrine—the pursuit of military superiority. Only when the Soviets reached parity did they confront the question of what the outcome of striving for military superiority would be. Holloway puts it as follows: "The choice that the Soviet leaders faced was not one between parity and superiority (for superiority is clearly desirable), but between parity and a dangerous competition for superiority, the outcome of which was by no means certain."[7]

But the rejection of military superiority had broader implications. Military planners needed to adjust the force posture and strategic planning that had hitherto been aimed at a first-strike, counterforce capability. At the operational level, the rejection of superiority led to Brezhnev's declaration that the Soviet Union would not use nuclear weapons first. However, the rejection of military superiority was bound to precipitate also a debate on victory in nuclear war, since achieving victory in nuclear war clearly implied possessing superior military power.

It seems certain that this revision of military doctrine provoked resistance from the military. The military seems to have raised objections both to the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons as well as to the rejection of a preemptive strike. Yet, ultimately the military leaders accepted both policies, or so their open statements indicate. But the military did not give way on the aim of victory in nuclear war. This was not merely an abstract question, but also an issue of practical military policy—for example, should the military plan a strategy aimed at fighting a nuclear war to achieve victory, or should it develop a strategy and force posture based on MAD, which posits that in a nuclear war the concept of victory has no meaning?

It should be noted that the rejection of superiority did not immediately lead to a rejection of victory in a nuclear war. It took at least four years for this issue to be publicly raised by the political leaders. In his report to the 26th Party Congress in 1981, Brezhnev declared: "The military strategic parity that exists between the Soviet Union and the United States and that exists between the NATO nations and the Warsaw Pact nations is an objective guarantee of world peace. We never intended in the past and do not intend now to seek military superiority against our adversary." While this statement clearly rejected superiority, Brezhnev also added: "To try to prevail over the other in the arms race or to count on victory in a nuclear war is dangerous madness."[8] This was the first instance when a political leader publicly raised questions regarding victory in nuclear war.

As Dan and Rebecca Strode have perceptively noted, however, this statement was not a direct rejection of victory in nuclear war. That one cannot "prevail over the other" in the arms race was a foregone conclusion because Soviet leaders, both political and military, renounced military superiority. But Brezhnev did not say that to prevail over the other in nuclear war is dangerous madness. What is dangerous is to "count on victory in nuclear war." It might be dangerous, but once deterrence failed and a nuclear war began, one might seek victory.[9] It is possible to hypothesize that the ambiguity was purposely intended by the political leadership, which decided to raise the issue gingerly in the face of expected, or already ongoing, resistance from the military.

By October, however, Brezhnev and his supporters may have decided to ride out the military opposition. In an interview in *Pravda* on October 21, 1981, Brezhnev made the following remark:

> *Among ourselves we say the same thing that I said for everyone to hear from the rostrum of the 26th Party Congress: that is, it is dangerous madness to try to defeat each other in an arms race, to count on victory in nuclear war.*[10]

We learn from this statement that Brezhnev's report at the 26th Party Congress represented a consensus of the Politburo.[11] Brezhnev went on to say:

> *I will add that only he who has decided to commit suicide can start a nuclear war in the hope of emerging victorious from it. Whatever strength the attacker may have and whatever means of starting a nuclear war he may choose, he will not achieve his aims. Retaliation [vozmezdiye] is unavoidable. That is our essential point of view.*[12]

As Dan and Rebecca Strode have noted, this was an important departure from the previous view.[13] According to Brezhnev, not only would it be dangerous madness to count on victory in a nuclear war, but to start a nuclear war would be an act of suicide. Clearly this conclusion was based on the reality that both the Soviet Union and the United States had attained second strike retaliatory capability. One should note that Brezhnev used the expression "the attacker" rather than "the enemy," thus depicting a rather neutral scenario in which neither the United States nor the Soviet Union could achieve its objectives by a first strike. Also, as I will explain below, the term "retaliation" as used by Brezhnev seems closer to "countervalue," or at least has a broader meaning than "counterforce mission." If so interpreted, what Brezhnev was saying was a textbook copy of the concept of MAD. It can therefore be argued that by October 1981 at the latest, Brezhnev and his supporters had come to fully accept MAD as the basis of Soviet military doctrine.[14]

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[7] David Holloway, "Military Power and Political Purpose in Soviet Policy," *Daedalus* (Cambridge, MA), Fall 1980, p. 20.

[8] *Pravda*, Feb. 24, 1981.

[9] Strode and Strode, loc. cit., p. 98.

[10] *Pravda*, Oct. 21, 1981.

[11] Strode and Strode, loc. cit., p. 96.

[12] *Pravda*, Oct. 21, 1981.

[13] Strode and Strode, loc. cit., p. 96.

Immediately after Brezhnev's Tula speech, the military appeared to serve notice on the political leadership of its intentions to resist a drastic rewriting of military doctrine. The *Soviet Military Encyclopedia* published in 1976 had stated that "the strengthening of the defense capability of the Soviet Union and all the socialist allies requires the guarantee of military-technical superiority over the armed forces of imperialist, aggressive blocs," and that Soviet military doctrine "provides the program of action to insure military-technical superiority over the armed forces of probable enemies."[15] Volume three of the *Encyclopedia*, published in 1977, under the entry "Military Doctrine" quoted Brezhnev's Tula speech, thus endorsing the rejection of military superiority. However, it defined "military doctrine" as "the system of guiding principles and scientifically based views of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet government on the essence, character, and methods of conduct of war, which the imperialists might unleash against the Soviet Union, and also on military construction, preparation of the Armed Forces and the country for the destruction [razgrom] of the aggressor."[16] To destroy the enemy is of course to defeat the enemy and to achieve victory. While it is possible to argue that this description in a transitional period of military doctrine both adopted the new direction enunciated by Brezhnev and retained remnants of the old doctrine, it is also possible to speculate that the military, recognizing the implications of the new direction, preempted it by insisting on victory and so endorsed the rejection of military superiority in words only. In any case, in 1977 the issue of victory in a nuclear war was clearly becoming the focal point in a debate over the rewriting of military doctrine.

The Ustinov-Ogarkov Debate

It was not as though Brezhnev had neglected to lay the groundwork for his revisions of military doctrine. Dmitriy Ustinov was appointed Minister of Defense in April 1976. Ustinov was not a professional military man but an expert in defense industry. Since there had been only three ministers of defense in Soviet history who were not professional soldiers (Trotsky in the 1920's, Stalin during World War II, and Nikolay Bulganin from 1947 to 1949), Ustinov's appointment was unusual. From 1957 to 1961, at a time when Brezhnev was the secretary in the Secretariat of the Central Committee overseeing the defense industry, Ustinov had served on a commission to develop Soviet missile and space industries. The personal connection between the two men was close. One may speculate that after the death of Defense Minister Marshal Andrey Grechko, who was believed to be a staunch supporter of the existing military doctrine, Brezhnev appointed his close ally Ustinov in order to overcome the expected resistance from the military to Brezhnev's attempts to rewrite the doctrine.

Moreover, in January 1977 Marshal Viktor Kulikov, who was believed to be also a supporter of the old doctrine, was relieved of the post of Chief of General Staff and General Nikolay Ogarkov (later promoted to Marshal) was appointed to this post. Ogarkov had been the military's representative at the SALT I negotiations, and had published an article supporting the SALT Agreement. He was expected to advocate the Brezhnev line.[17] Contrary to expectations, however, Ogarkov turned out to be a formidable opponent of Brezhnev's revision of military doctrine.

Ogarkov's first salvo against the Brezhnev line was made under the entry on "Military Strategy" in Volume 7 of the *Soviet Military Encyclopedia*, published in 1979. This entry stated that Soviet military doctrine expects a world war in the future to be "a decisive confrontation between the opposing socioeconomic systems, socialism and capitalism." Such a conflict would inevitably involve not only the Soviet Union and the United States, but also other states, and would develop into a decisive military confrontation of unprecedented scope and destructiveness. Such a war might begin with conventional weapons, but would develop into an all-out nuclear war, in which nuclear weapons, particularly strategic nuclear weapons, would become the decisive factor. Although the Soviet Union's policy was not to be the first country to use nuclear weapons, Ogarkov warned that "any aggressor must remember that in the case of a nuclear attack against the Soviet Union and its socialist allies he will receive a crushing [unichtozhayushchiy] second strike [otvetnyy udar]." Such a nuclear war might end in a short time, but it could also be protracted. In that case, the Soviet people and armed forces would undergo a severe test, but compared to imperialists, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries had the advantages of just-war objectives and of progressive social and state systems. Such advantages "will guarantee the objective possibility to achieve victory."[18]

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[14] The same expressions reoccurred in Brezhnev's speech on the anniversary of the October Revolution. See *Pravda*, Nov. 7, 1981.

[15] *Sovetskaya voyennaya entsiklopediya* (Soviet Military Encyclopedia—hereafter *SVE*), Vol 2., Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1976, p. 253.

[16] Ibid., Vol. 3, 1977, p. 229.

[17] Weickhardt, loc. cit., p. 79.

In this article, the emphasis is clearly placed on a nuclear-war-fighting strategy. Moreover, Ogarkov mentioned the possibility of victory in an all-out nuclear world war. This article indicates that by 1979 the lines were clearly drawn between the military and the supporters of Brezhnev; and that a debate was going on within the Soviet leadership. Brezhnev's speech to the 26th Party Congress should be interpreted in this context. His comment that "to count on victory in nuclear war is dangerous madness" can thus be viewed as aimed not only at the United States but also at the Soviet military, which was planning a strategy for winning a nuclear war.

Brezhnev's position was defended by Defense Minister Ustinov. In an article published in *Pravda* on June 22, 1981, Ustinov quoted Brezhnev four times, and argued that there was no alternative to détente for ensuring peace. He also stated: "At present the Armed Forces possess everything necessary to give a timely and decisive rebuff to any aggression, no matter from where it might come. The enormous striking power of the nuclear-missile weapons available to our army and fleet has been and will be a serious factor deterring any military adventure."[19] Ustinov did not raise the issue of victory in nuclear war in this article, but by stressing that the second retaliatory strike was sufficient for deterrence—and he was specific in using the term deterrence (sderzhivaniye)—Ustinov was clarifying the point made by Brezhnev at the 26th Party Congress.

An Ogarkov article appearing in July 1981 in *Kommunist* was a curious mixture of concessions to the Brezhnev-Ustinov line and of insistence on a war-fighting strategy. On the one hand, Ogarkov dropped all references to victory in nuclear war and to destruction of the enemy. He further mentioned that the Soviet strategic forces "serve as a basic factor deterring [sderzhivayushchiy] an aggressor, and possessing the capability to inflict immediately a crushing [sokrushitel'nyy] retaliatory strike in case of enemy attack with strategic weapons against the Soviet Union and its socialist allies."[20] This statement is similar to Ustinov's statement quoted above.

On the other hand, Ogarkov's article contained parts criticizing the Brezhnev-Ustinov line. He commented that the young generation in the Soviet Union had grown up without the experience of war and, therefore, to argue simplistically that war was evil and peace was good without looking at the issue from a Marxist-Leninist point of view could lead to an underestimation of the dangers of war in the contemporary world. This could be taken as a tacit criticism directed at Brezhnev and Ustinov.[21] Although Ogarkov cited Brezhnev at least seven times, his references skillfully ignored the essential thrust of Brezhnev's policy toward accepting MAD. Instead, he quoted Brezhnev selectively to stress the necessity of maintaining Soviet military power.[22] Ogarkov built his argument by paraphrasing Lenin's famous thesis that as long as imperialism exists, the danger of war also exists. Ogarkov warned: "As long as world imperialism exists, those who forget the danger that ceaselessly threatens us, forget the workers' republic that we have created."[23]

The most important aspect of this article was Ogarkov's continued emphasis on the necessity for a nuclear-war-fighting strategy. The characterization of a future nuclear world war between capitalism and socialism as described in Volume 7 of the *Soviet Military Encyclopedia* was repeated here. In order to prepare for such a war, "the party demands that everything regarding defense be accomplished well, accurately, and in a timely fashion."[24] But, unlike in the *Soviet Military Encyclopedia*, the reference to the "destruction" of the enemy was omitted in this article.

Can these two contradictory tendencies in the *Kommunist* article be reconciled? It is plausible to argue that under pressure from the party leadership, Ogarkov dropped his insistence on the possibility of victory in a nuclear war and paraphrased Ustinov's statements. However, he skillfully avoided repudiating his own views entirely, and he even managed to include criticism of the position he was being asked to endorse. This was a tactic to which Ogarkov was also going to resort later.

The debate intensified in the latter part of 1981. As mentioned earlier, Brezhnev himself rejected the concept of victory in nuclear war in his October *Pravda* interview. In an article commemorating the October Revolution, Ustinov wrote:

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[18] *SVE*, Vol. 7, 1979, p. 564.

[19] *Pravda*, June 22, 1981.

[20] N. Ogarkov, "Guarding Peaceful Endeavor," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 10, 1981, p. 87.

[21] Ibid., p. 90.

[22] Ibid., pp. 80, 84–86, 88, 90–91.

[23] Ibid., pp. 80, 85.

[24] Ibid., pp. 85–89.

> *In order to explain Soviet military doctrine, politicians and strategists in the West persistently argue that the Soviet Union is planning a "first counterforce nuclear strike" [pervyy obezoruzhivayushchiy yadernyy udar] in order to survive and win a victory in a nuclear war. . . . But it is completely baseless nonsense to attribute to us the concept of a "first strike."*[25]

He quoted then from Brezhnev's *Pravda* interview and declared that Brezhnev's position corresponded fully to Soviet military doctrine.[26] While appearing to criticize strategists in the West, Ustinov's criticism was also directed at the Soviet military planners' first-strike counterforce strategy, the core of the nuclear-war-fighting strategy.

In January 1982, Ogarkov published a pamphlet, *Always in Readiness for Defense of the Fatherland,* that closely followed the line he had advocated since 1979. The major emphasis was on the necessity to have a nuclear-war-fighting strategy. Nuclear weapons were not set apart from other weapons; both would have to be integrated into operational planning.[27]

Regarding nuclear weapons and war, Ogarkov stated: "Strategic nuclear weapons have a deterrent [sderzhivayushchiy] role on the aggressor, and are intended to inflict on the aggressor a timely crushing [sokrushitel'nyy] second strike, should an aggression by nuclear attack be unleashed against the Soviet Union and its allies."[28] This statement seems at first glance quite similar to Ustinov's. But Ogarkov did not neglect to add that such an attack would be an offensive retaliatory strike and aim "to destroy [gromit'] the enemy under any circumstances." In this pamphlet there was no explicit reference to victory in nuclear war, although "destruction of the enemy" carried that implication.

As though in response to Ogarkov's challenge, Ustinov in May 1982 published his own pamphlet, entitled *Serving the Country and the Communist Cause.* In it Ustinov repeated Brezhnev's position as given in the *Pravda* interview, and declared: "To count on victory in the arms race and especially in nuclear war is madness. And this madness is dangerous. We do not need military superiority over the West. We only need reliable security, and to ensure this, it is enough to have a rough balance and parity."[29] This was both a reaffirmation of MAD, and a tacit criticism of Ogarkov and the military. Ustinov chided those who adopted a narrow military-technical viewpoint on future wars: "If the major developmental trends in the military sphere, the level achieved and the prospects for growth of the economy, the sociopolitical and spiritual development of Soviet society, and the achievements of scientific and technological progress were not taken into account, the effective administration of the structuring and improvement of the armed forces would be impossible."[30]

But Ustinov's sharpest criticism of Ogarkov appeared in *Pravda* on July 12. In an article entitled "To Remove the Danger of Nuclear War," Ustinov admitted that "we have no illusion that the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons will be immediately accepted by other countries," and further stated:

> *It is completely natural that the Soviet people, our friends, and progressive people in the world are raising a question: Is the moment for such a step wisely chosen? Wouldn't we subject our people, our countries and the cause of socialism and progress in the world to an extreme danger by such a one-sided obligation? Don't we have weighty historical experience, when an aggressor made a surprise attack on us and unleashed the machine of destruction? Is it possible to ignore all this?*[31]

This was a candid admission that Brezhnev's declaration of no first use of nuclear weapons had provoked resistance from various quarters. But it is possible to infer that criticisms were raised not merely against the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, but also against a whole host of issues advocated by Brezhnev and Ustinov, including the issue of victory in nuclear war and the rejection of a nuclear-war-fighting strategy, particularly the counterforce targeting policy.

Ustinov argued that the rejection of military superiority was based on the realization that the existence of enough nuclear weapons to eliminate all biological life on the earth made striving for military superiority senseless. He declared: "The Soviet Union does not count on victory in nuclear war. Understanding the impossibility of prevailing in such a conflict is the rationale for refusing to use nuclear weapons first."[32]

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[25] *Pravda*, Nov. 7, 1981.

[26] Ibid.

[27] N.V. Ogarkov, *Vsegda v gotovnosti k zashchite otechestva*, Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1982, pp. 32–34.

[28] Ibid., p. 49.

[29] D.F. Ustinov, *Serving the Country and the Communist Cause*, tr. by Penny Dole, Oxford, Pergamon Press, 1983, p. 42.

[30] Ibid.

[31] *Pravda*, July 12, 1982.

[32] Ibid.

Defending MAD, Ustinov further explained:

> *If the aggressor unleashes a nuclear attack, he will inflict upon our people incalculable calamity. But the aggressor must also know that the advantage gained from the preemptive nuclear strike will not bring him victory. Committing a crime against humanity, he will not gain the expected result. Under contemporary conditions of available weapon systems and alertness of the strategic nuclear means of the Soviet Union, the United States will not be able to carry out a counterforce attack [obezoruzhivayushchiy udar] against the socialist countries. The aggressor will not escape an all-crushing, retaliatory strike [vsesokrushayushchiy otvetnyy udar]. Those who imagine a "perfect prescription" for waging a victorious nuclear war, and who, more figuratively speaking, count on one knockout strike to "decapitate" the enemy, are issuing a death sentence against themselves. . . . The conditions of military potential and military-technical possibilities that exist on both sides are such that either in the stage of preparations for a nuclear war or at the moment when they attempt to start this war, the imperialist forces cannot attain military superiority.*[33]

This article is probably the strongest defense of MAD ever to be published in the Soviet Union, as well as the harshest critique of Ogarkov's position. Nevertheless, it did not silence the military opposition. For one thing, Brezhnev's failing health exacerbated the political near-paralysis in the last months of his regime. In this regard, Brezhnev's appearance at a meeting of 500 generals and officials of the Ministry of Defense on October 27, 1982, was a curious episode. In his speech at this meeting Brezhnev said nothing that touched on military doctrine. His explanation that he had come to the conference at the invitation of Ustinov indicates that there was sufficient friction between the party and the military to warrant bringing in the ailing General Secretary.[34]

Did Ogarkov Recant?

George Weickhardt made the argument that Andropov's accession in November 1982 changed the nature of the debate over military doctrine. Presumably under pressure from Andropov and Ustinov, "Ogarkov began to moderate his line." Weickhardt offers four pieces of evidence to support his view: (1) A *New York Times* interview in which Ogarkov "publicly rejected the concept of limited nuclear war, disavowed Soviet adherence to a launch-on-warning doctrine, and endorsed Andropov's arms control initiatives."[35] (2) In the aftermath of the Korean airliner incident, the Politburo and Ustinov tried to "clamp down on Ogarkov's insubordinate views on strategic doctrine," and forced Ogarkov to "recant." In an *Izvestiya* article, Ogarkov fully recanted, acknowledging "that starting a nuclear war would be suicide and that, even after sustaining a first strike, each side would still be able to inflict 'unacceptable damage' on the other side." Ogarkov's reference to former US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to explain the concept of "unacceptable damage" is taken by Weickhardt as evidence of Ogarkov's complete acceptance of MAD.[36] (3) In an interview given in *Krasnaya Zvezda* on May 9, 1984, Ogarkov "reconfirmed and extended . . . [his] previous recantation of his war-fighting theories." He not only acknowledged "unacceptable damage," but also "explicitly renounced the concept of a limited 'decapitating' first strike."[37] (4) Ogarkov's demotion can be explained by the attempts of the Politburo and Ustinov "to show the outspoken Ogarkov who is the boss on the key issues of strategic doctrine." By removing Ogarkov, the party once and for all ended the debate on nuclear war, and "one can anticipate that no further open nuclear-war-fighting talk will appear in the Soviet military press."[38]

It seems certain that during Andropov's tenure pressure was put on the military to end the debate.[39] Furthermore, Ogarkov's *Izvestiya* article on September 23, 1983, at first glance appears to confirm Weickhardt's conclusion that Ogarkov recanted. This article includes the following passage:

> *The United States is building up strategic nuclear forces in earnest in order to acquire the capability to inflict a "counterforce" [razoruzhayushchiy] nuclear strike against the USSR. This is a senseless policy. About twenty years ago the United States could have still in some ways counted on the possibility of achieving such a result. Today this is pure illusion. In the contemporary development and proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world, a sufficient quantity of nuclear*

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[33] Ibid.

[34] Strode and Strode, loc. cit., pp. 109–10.

[35] Weickhardt, loc. cit., p. 80.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid., p. 81.

[38] Ibid, pp. 80–81.

[39] This can be seen from the description of "Military Doctrine" in the *Encyclopedic Military Dictionary*. In this description, the expression "to destroy [razgromit'] the enemy," which appeared in the like-named entry in Volume 3 of *Soviet Military Encyclopedia* published in 1977, was omitted. See *Voyennyy entsiklopedicheskiy slovar'* (Encyclopedic Military Dictionary), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1983, p. 240.

> *means will remain with the defender to enable him to inflict with a second strike upon the aggressor "unacceptable damage," as defined by former minister of defense R. McNamara in his time. In other words, the quantitative changes in recent years change the qualitative aspect of the phenomenon. Such is the dialectic. Therefore, under contemporary conditions, only those who decide to commit suicide would count on a first nuclear strike.*[40]

As Weickhardt noted, this article was studded with references to key words used by Brezhnev and Ustinov in support of MAD, such as "only those who decide to commit suicide," "unacceptable damage," and "retaliatory strike." Even an additional gratuitous reference to US Secretary of Defense McNamara was included to render the theory of Ogarkov's complete capitulation to MAD plausible.

Ogarkov similarly seemed to embrace MAD in the interview given in *Krasnaya Zvezda* in May 1984, when he stated:

> *We have a paradox. On the one hand, it seems that there is a process of continuous heightening of the possibility for the nuclear states to eliminate their opponent, but on the other hand, the possibility of the aggressor to achieve a so-called "counterforce strike" against the chief enemy is equally continuously, and, I would say, even more sharply decreasing. The fact is that with the existing quantity and diversity of nuclear-missile means, it is already becoming impossible for the aggressor to eliminate those of the opponent with one strike. It has become inevitable under present conditions that even with the limited number of nuclear warheads that remain with the defender, a crushing second strike could inflict upon the aggressor "unacceptable damage."*[41]

It seems plausible to argue, as Weickhardt does, that Ogarkov in this interview accepted MAD by rejecting a first strike and by admitting that both countries now possess a second-strike capability to inflict "unacceptable damage" upon the other side.

However, a careful reading of Ogarkov's statements suggests that a different interpretation is possible. First, the *New York Times* article, which is based on Leslie Gelb's interview with Ogarkov, contains nothing to indicate that Ogarkov had changed his previous point of view. According to Gelb, Ogarkov "struck a moderate posture . . . by modifying his previous position and saying that once nuclear war began it could not be limited and controlled." In Gelb's view, the interview was intended to "curtail speculation about civilian-military rifts over nuclear doctrine." Since Ogarkov had previously written in the *Soviet Military Encyclopedia* about the possibility of protracted nuclear war, Gelb concluded that the rejection of a limited war was a departure from his previous position and put Ogarkov's position more in line with that of the civilian leaders.[42] But denying that nuclear war can be limited does not mean excluding the possibility of protracted nuclear war. Moreover, Ogarkov had repeatedly made similar statements in his previous writings.[43] The issue that separated the party leaders from the military in the debate on nuclear war was not the issue of limited war but the issue of *victory* in nuclear war. Gelb's interview with Ogarkov added nothing on this. As for Ogarkov's denial of launch-on-warning and his support for Andropov's position opposing Western deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), which Weickhardt cites as evidence for Ogarkov's moderating position, they have little to do with the central issue of the debate. The *New York Times* interview, therefore, cannot serve as evidence that Ogarkov had experienced a change of heart.

Regarding the *Izvestiya* article, an interpretation that differs from Weickhardt's is also possible. As he states, this article was probably written under pressure from the party leaders, possibly from Ustinov personally. Not only did Ogarkov avoid any reference to "victory in nuclear war," or "destruction of the enemy," but he also borrowed expressions used by Brezhnev and Ustinov to defend MAD. But one could also conclude that in seeming to accept his opponents' position by using their very language, Ogarkov skillfully continued to defend his own position. According to Brezhnev and Ustinov, "only those who decide to commit suicide can start a nuclear war expecting to emerge as victor." Ogarkov merely stated: "only those who decide to commit suicide can count on the first nuclear strike." What Ogarkov discounted was not victory in nuclear war, but the decisiveness of a first nuclear strike. Ogarkov stated that under contemporary conditions the defender can inflict on the aggressor "unacceptable damage." But Ogarkov was careful not to conclude that, therefore, there cannot be victory in nuclear war. Thus, the *Izvestiya* article cannot be taken as proof of Ogarkov's "complete recantation."

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[40] *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Sept. 23, 1983.

[41] *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Moscow), May 9, 1984.

[42] Leslie Gelb, "Soviet Marshal Warns the US on its Missiles," *The New York Times*, Mar. 17, 1983.

[43] See Ogarkov, *Vsegda v gotovnosti . . .*, p. 16; *SVE*, Vol 7, p. 564.

Ogarkov's reference to Robert McNamara is indeed curious. In espousing MAD, neither Brezhnev nor Ustinov had ever explained that this was actually a US strategic policy developed by McNamara in the 1960's and that they were therefore borrowing a strategic concept from their adversary—a concept previously denounced by Soviet party ideologues. One could say that Ogarkov's reference to McNamara and "unacceptable damage" constituted a real tour de force: while seemingly accepting Ustinov's position, Ogarkov was revealing that the Defense Minister of the Soviet Union was actually copying a strategic concept of the enemy.

In the *Krasnaya Zvezda* interview, Ogarkov rejected the possibility that either side could take out the nuclear weapons of the other side with a first strike, in other words, achieve a first-strike counterforce capability. With the remaining nuclear warheads, the defender would be able to inflict on the attacker "unacceptable damage." But here, too, Ogarkov did not reject victory in a nuclear war. In line with the argument presented in the *Izvestiya* article, it is possible to surmise that victory would be possible after the defender inflicted upon the attacker "unacceptable damage."

Moreover, this part in the interview should be viewed in conjunction with the rest of what Ogarkov said. He also referred to the progress in military technology, particularly as a result of advances in high technology. He advocated that military planners take this change into consideration in carrying out the modernization of weapons systems and methods of waging war. What was implied here was the necessity to revise the war-fighting strategy to correspond to the new technological means. The emphasis remained on war-fighting strategy in modern conditions, in which nuclear weapons were only one variable. Therefore, the *Krasnaya Zvezda* interview, too, cannot be taken as evidence of Ogarkov's change of opinion.

With regard to Ogarkov's dismissal from the post of Chief of the General Staff, here I am in partial agreement with Weickhardt. There may have been other reasons for the dismissal, but in the context of the important debate over military doctrine Ustinov might have wanted to show "who is boss." It is possible, as Weickhardt argues, that Ustinov decided to fire Ogarkov regardless of the latter's complete recantation. But if Ogarkov stubbornly continued to adhere to his own opinion, as I have argued, Ogarkov's sudden dismissal becomes more understandable.

Moreover, the debate over victory in nuclear war certainly did not end with Ogarkov's dismissal. Two subsequent publications by Ogarkov have appeared. One was an article in *Kommunist Vooruzhënnykh Sil* in November 1984, the other, a 96-page pamphlet entitled *History Teaches Vigilance* which appeared in April 1985.[44]

According to Weickhardt, the *Kommunist Vooruzhënnykh Sil* article can be interpreted as an extension of the *Izvestiya* article and the *Krasnaya Zvezda* interview: Ogarkov accepted the view that nuclear war would extinguish human civilization, thereby no longer serving any political and strategic aims, and that "it would be impossible for either side to launch a disarming first strike."[45] Ogarkov's new pamphlet, however, defied such ready classification. On the one hand, Ogarkov reiterated that nuclear war could result in the extinction of the human race, thus continuing to voice the party line he had accepted since the *Izvestiya* article. On the other hand, he returned to the previous position that the Soviet Union could win in a nuclear war. This baffled Weickhardt, who concluded that Ogarkov was "neither clear nor consistent on some major strategic issues."[46]

In a sense, it is true that the *Kommunist Vooruzhënnykh Sil* article was an extension of the *Izvestiya* article and *Krasnaya Zvezda* interview. In this article Ogarkov stated: "Only by completely abandoning common sense can one attempt to find such arguments and to realize such an aim as to justify the unleashing of a world nuclear war, which would bring human civilization itself under threat of complete elimination." Then he quoted the incumbent General Secretary Konstantin Chernenko: "It is criminal to regard thermonuclear war as a rational and as it were 'legal' continuation of politics."[47]

Subscribing to Chernenko's statement was the closest that Ogarkov came to capitulation. Nevertheless, this article cannot be considered as a complete surrender. For one thing, Ogarkov never acknowledged that there could be no victory in nuclear war, as Ustinov and Brezhnev had done. Second, he used curiously different phrases in referring to the impact of a first strike. The *Kommunist Vooruzhënnykh Sil* article contained a phrase almost identical to that which appeared in the *Krasnaya Zvezda* interview. After noting the paradox of increasing destructive power available to both sides and the diminishing possibility of a successful counterforce strike, Ogarkov stated:

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[44] See N. Ogarkov, "The Unfading Glory of Soviet Arms," *Kommunist Vooruzhënnykh Sil* (Moscow), No. 21, November 1984, pp. 16–26; and idem, *Istoriya uchit bditel'nost'*.

[45] George R. Weickhardt, "Ogarkov's Latest Fulminations on Vigilance," Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty, *Radio Liberty Research* (Munich), RL 325/85, Sept. 27, 1985, p. 2.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Ogarkov, "The Unfading Glory . . . ," loc. cit.

> *The fact is that with the existing quantity and diversity of nuclear missile means it is simply impossible for the aggressor to eliminate the analogous means from the opponent with one strike. Even with a limited quantity of nuclear weapons remaining with the defender, an immediate, crushing answer is inevitable under contemporary conditions—an answer that deprives the aggressor subsequently of the possibility not only to conduct the war but any serious operations.*[48]

In the *Krasnaya Zvezda* article, Ogarkov had stated that with the remaining quantity of nuclear weapons, "a crushing second strike will inflict unacceptable damage upon the aggressor."

For Brezhnev and Ustinov, the second strike was associated with the expression "crushing" (sokrushitel'nyy) or "all-crushing" (vsesokrushitel'nyy) strike. These terms had an apocalyptic meaning for Brezhnev and Ustinov—signaling an event so catastrophic that it would be impossible to even conceive of a continuation of normal life, not to speak of a continuation of war. In this sense, they were close to what Robert McNamara had defined as "unacceptable damage." But the *Kommunist Vooruzhënnykh Sil* article makes it clear that Ogarkov was seeing the concept of a second strike in totally different terms from Brezhnev and Ustinov. Ogarkov judged second strike in the context of war-fighting in nuclear war. The second strike would make it impossible for the aggressor to conduct war and mount serious operations. It was this that was defined as "unacceptable damage."

It is curious that Ogarkov appears to list the impossibility of continuing war as a less serious consequence of a second strike, and the impossibility of conducting operations as a more serious consequence. The first seems to indicate the state of powerlessness after a second strike, and the second the impossibility by the other side to organize military operations out of the remaining forces after a second strike, either because such military forces would be effectively dismembered and/or because the C^3I system would be rendered inoperative. In any case, Ogarkov's statements indicate that he continued to think of the second strike in the context of war-fighting in nuclear war.

It should be stressed that Ogarkov never repudiated victory in nuclear war in the 1984 article. Nuclear war could be so catastrophic as to put human civilization at risk, and the first strike would not give victory to the attacker. Nevertheless, if the imperialists unleashed such a war, the Soviet Union would do its best to fight it to ensure victory. Despite the pressure from the party and despite his concessions to this pressure, Ogarkov continued to adhere to the position that he had consistently held all along.

His pamphlet *History Teaches Vigilance* was published five months after Ustinov's death in December 1984, and a few weeks after Mikhail Gorbachëv's accession, although the manuscript itself had surely been sent to press before Gorbachëv came to power. Ustinov's death and Chernenko's withdrawal from the political scene due to illness seemed to have weakened the pressures on Ogarkov.

As Weickhardt points out, Ogarkov certainly mentioned the dangers arising from a world thermonuclear war.[49] But the line of argument he pursued in this pamphlet—far from being confused or ambiguous, as Weickhardt argues—decidedly advocated war-fighting in nuclear war, that is, repudiated MAD. Returning to the formulations he had used at the climax of the debate, Ogarkov repeated his vision of future nuclear war as a decisive confrontation between capitalism and socialism. In *History Teaches Vigilance*, he even went one step further than in previous writings when he stated that war "will continue until complete victory against the enemy" is achieved.[50] Furthermore, Ogarkov declared: "Soviet military doctrine demands gaining the capability of carrying out a crushing second strike and destroying the enemy under any conditions that might unfold in the situation." In addition, he stated that "the military-technical content of Soviet military doctrine . . . envisages the conduct of active, decisive military actions with the use of military power of the state and its Armed Forces until the complete destruction of the aggressor."[51]

History Teaches Vigilance can be taken as the clearest expression of Ogarkov's idea on nuclear-war-fighting. It also allows one to argue that Ogarkov adhered consistently to a war-fighting strategy in nuclear war and to the necessity of seeking victory in nuclear war. Ogarkov's position was clearly at variance with the party line advocated by Brezhnev and Ustinov. But despite pressure, Ogarkov made no concession on these two cardinal points. Furthermore, the publication of *History Teaches Vigilance* indicates that Ogarkov's position was not without supporters—among the professional military and possibly among the political leaders as well.

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[48] Ibid.

[49] Ogarkov, *Istoriya uchit bditel'nost'*, p. 68.

[50] Ibid., p. 77.

[51] Ibid., p. 89.

Conclusion

The focal point of the Ustinov-Ogarkov debate—the possibility of victory in nuclear war—concerned a core part of Soviet military doctrine. The debate extended to the related issues of whether nuclear weapons should be considered as a magnification of conventional weapons or as something qualitatively different from conventional weapons; whether the level of military power should be sufficient to ensure a second-strike retaliatory capability; what was meant by the second strike and "unacceptable damage"; and whether or not the military should prepare a nuclear-war-fighting strategy. Furthermore, although it did not surface explicitly in the open debate, there may have been behind-the-scenes arguments over the characteristics of weapons systems.

The debate was due partly to differing perceptions of threat and security, as the Strodes argue, and partly to the different tasks assigned to the party leadership and the military leadership, as Holloway stresses. But neither the Strodes nor Holloway diagnose the debate fully. The Strodes put the "diplomacists" and "the unilateralists" on the same plane, as if they are equal parties with equal rights to determine national security policy. Within the structure of Soviet military theory, the party leaders and the military leaders cannot be equal partners, and this stratification of elite functions in formulating military doctrine must be taken into consideration. Yet, Holloway's argument that the division of tasks between the party and the military is invariably complementary also cannot be sustained. There was a genuine debate and genuine frictions that led to Ogarkov's dismissal.

The Ustinov-Ogarkov debate showed an inherent contradiction in the way Soviet military doctrine is formulated. Although the party's supremacy was not questioned even by Ogarkov, there are areas where the political-social requirements cannot mesh with military-technical requirements. The relationship between deterrence and nuclear strategy is one such area. This is by no means peculiar to the Soviet Union. The inherent contradiction in this relationship, in which effective deterrence depends on a more credible nuclear strategy, while a credible strategy makes a nuclear war more likely, is a dilemma that neither superpower can escape.

Two conclusions can be drawn from this debate. First, no matter how sincere Brezhnev and Ustinov were in accepting MAD, the Soviet military has resisted this concept. The political leadership has so far failed to persuade the military to accept MAD completely at the operational and force-posture level. Second, insofar as the conflict between Ustinov and Ogarkov was rooted in basic contradictions in the structure of military doctrine, the conflict is not likely to disappear in the foreseeable future. The party leadership can fire a recalcitrant polemicist who voices his dissatisfaction too openly. It can muzzle dissension in open literature. It is presumed that under Gorbachëv the party's control over the military has become more effective than it was under his ailing predecessors. The rejection of victory in nuclear war has even been written into the party program adopted at the 27th Party Congress. Yet, it seems to me that as long as the military functions as it does and has a monopoly on military expertise, the party leadership cannot expect to suppress the military's resistance completely. Old soldiers never die, and—since Ogarkov was reelected as a member of the Central Committee at the 1986 party congress—they apparently also did not fade away.

Shifts in CPSU ID

Wallace Spaulding

AS OF JUNE 1986, Anatoliy Dobrynin, long-time Soviet ambassador to the United States, had emerged as chief of the International Department (ID) of the CPSU Central Committee.[1] Unlike his predecessor, Boris Ponomarëv, Dobrynin is not an alternate member of the party Politburo, but he has been named a party secretary for foreign affairs. Two other top-level appointments have also occurred recently in the ID leadership. The first is Georgiy Korniyenko, a former first deputy minister of foreign affairs, who has been named a first deputy chief of the ID.[2] The other is Lt. Gen. Viktor Starodubov, formerly the Soviet commissioner at the Standing Consultative Commission (for US-Soviet arms control discussions),[3] who has been brought into the International Department presumably as chief of a sector dealing with arms control matters, a topic of great importance in Gorbachëv's current foreign policy orientation.

Korniyenko has a background amazingly similar to that of the existing ID first deputy chief, Vadim Zagladin—both were made full CC members in 1981 and both have had experience in US affairs and disarmament matters.[4] It is not clear whether the long-term intent of the Gorbachëv leadership is to retain two first deputies in the ID (i.e., to divide major responsibilities) or perhaps to ease Zagladin out. Starodubov's appointment may be yet another indication of reduction in Zagladin's responsibilities in the disarmament area.

The appointments of Dobrynin, Korniyenko, and Starodubov suggest that the ID will see to it that the CPSU's relations with the "Free World" political parties and its control of the international front organizations—the two main ID functions—will more than ever be undertaken in the context of the USSR-US relationship (conceivably to the detriment of Third World concerns). This seems all the more certain since the next-ranking ID official, Deputy Chief Karen Brutents, was reportedly "named to head the USA Desk,"[5] apparently signifying that the USA-Canada Sector will come under his supervision. If so, Brutents—who replaces Anatoliy Chernyayev as the sole ID deputy chief having candidate membership on the party Central Committee and hence holds the next highest party rank behind the ID's chief and two first deputy chiefs—also appears to have whittled away some of Zagladin's prerogatives (the latter was formerly presumed to have supervised the US relationship).[6]

To date there is no clear evidence of a major change in the functions of the ID. At the same time, there has been a fair amount of shuffling in the lineup of sector and desk chiefs and responsibilities since our mid-1984 enumeration. Fully a third of the citations below are new since that date, although it cannot be deter-

Colonel Wallace Spaulding, USAR (ret.) is a Washington-based observer of international communist affairs. The present Note is a comprehensive update of the materials presented in an Addendum to Robert W. Kitrinos's article "International Department of the CPSU," which appeared in the September-October 1984 issue of Problems of Communism.

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[1] The precise date of his appointment is not known. The first reference to him as ID chief came in Moscow TASS, June 9, 1986, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-SOV*), June 10, 1986, p. G/3.

[2] Moscow TASS, June 23, 1986, transcribed in *FBIS-SOV*, June 24, 1986, D/1.

[3] *Kansan Uutiset* (Helsinki), July 17, 1986.

[4] See Wallace Spaulding, "Addenda on the International Department," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September-October 1984, p. 68; and *The Washington Post*, May 24, 1986.

[5] *The Washington Post*, May 24, 1986. It is assumed that this report signaled "supervisory" functions rather than direct leadership, since Dmitriy Lisovolik was identified as chief of the department only in March (see *Pravda* [Moscow], Mar. 14, 1986). There has been no indication whether Brutents has relinquished his supervision of Middle Eastern affairs (see Spaulding, loc. cit., fn. 4).

[6] Chernyayev is now a "foreign policy assistant" to CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachëv. See *The Washington Post*, Feb. 23, 1986.

mined whether this reflects increased ID activity, increased openness, or better tracking of data. The information is ordered geographically in conformity with the Checklist of Communist Parties, published in the March-April 1986 issue of *Problems of Communism*, although the major geographic groupings indicated in parentheses do not necessarily reflect the way in which the ID operationally divides up the world. Question marks indicate responsibilities, sector names, or geographic areas within a sector or desk that are inferred but for which there is no clear current evidence.

The following division of supervisory responsibilities by sector among the top ID officials is suggested but not conclusively established: First Deputy Chief Zagladin–the "Latin Europe," "Germanic Europe," and "Southeast Europe" sectors[7]; First Deputy Chief Korniyenko—the "UK-Ireland," "Australia/New Zealand," and "Arms Control" sectors[8]; Deputy Chief Brutents—the Latin America, USA-Canada, and the Middle East and North Africa sectors[9]; Deputy Chief Rostislav Ulyanovskiy—the "Black Africa" and "South Asia" sectors, plus the sector dealing with "Afro-Asian/Trade Union" and possibly other front activities[10]; and Deputy Chief Vitaliy Shaposhnikov—the "Nordic Sector," and the sector dealing with the "Peace Movement" and possible other fronts[11]; and Ivan Kovalenko—the Japan, Southeast Asian, and "Friendship Associations" sectors.[12]

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[7] See Moscow TASS, June 9, 1986, tr. in *FBIS-SOV*, June 10, 1986

[8] Moscow TASS, June 23, 1986, tr. in *FBIS-SOV*, June 24, 1986, p. D/1; and *The Washington Post*, May 24, 1986.

[9] *Izvestiya*, Apr. 2, 1986.

[10] *Pravda*, Dec. 1, 1985; and *Bakinskiy Rabochiy*, May 15, 1976 (identifying him as a vice-president of the Soviet Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity.

[11] Radio Moscow, Apr. 19, 1986, tr. in *FBIS-SOV*, Apr. 21, 1986, p. G/4; and *New Perspectives*, No. 2, 1986, p. 2 (identifying him as a member of the Presidential Committee of the World Peace Council).

[12] *Mainichi Shimbun* (Tokyo), May 13, 1986; and *Pravda*, Dec. 20, 1973 (identifying him as deputy chairman of the USSR-Japan Society).

Leaders of International Department Sectors and Desks

Chief (or deputy)	**Sector**/desk	Parties having relations with the CPSU
	GEOGRAPHIC SECTOR	
	(Africa and the Middle East)	
Andrey Urnov (head)[13] Yevgeniy Denisov (dep.)[14]	**"Black Africa Sector"**	
Boris Petruk[15]	Angolan/Ethiopian/Ghanian Desk	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola/Party of Labor Workers' Party of Ethiopia Provisional National Defense Council (Ghana)
Yevgeniy Korendyasov[16]	Congolese/Malian/Senegalese Desk	Congolese Labor Party Democratic Union of the Malian People Independence and Labor Party (Senegal)
Eduard Kapskiy[17]	Mozambique Desk[11]	Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo)
B. V. Yegorov[18]	Guinean/Sao Tome and Principean Desk	Military Council of National Redressment (Guinea) Movement for the Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe
Vladimir Sharayev[19]	Tanzanian Desk	Revolutionary Party of Tanzania
	Other desks (?)	Benin People's Revolutionary Party National Revolutionary Council (Burkina Faso) Unity for National Progress (Burundi) African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde

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[13] *Pravda* (Moscow), Aug. 8, 1984.

[14] Radio Bamako, Feb. 8, 1985, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Middle East & Africa* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-MEA*), Feb. 11, 1985, p. T/4.

[15] On respective areas of responsibility, *Pravda*, Aug. 10, 1982; *Sovetskaya Moldaviya* (Kishinev), May 14, 1983; and Accra, GNA, Apr. 27, 1973, *FBIS-MEA*, May 2, 1973, p. W/2.

[16] On respective areas of responsibility, *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Aug. 13, 1983; *L'Essor* (Bamako), Mar. 30, 1979; and *Pravda*, Sept. 30, 1984.

[17] *Pravda*, Apr. 26, 1985.

[18] On respective areas of responsibility, ibid., Dec. 1, 1984; *Sovetskaya Kirgiziya* (Frunze), Oct. 24, 1978; and *Kommunist Tadzhikistana* (Dushanbe), Mar. 15, 1984.

[19] *Daily News* (Dar-es-Salaam), Aug. 7, 1982. This identification is tentative, for Sharayev was not specifically named as being associated with the ID.

Chief (or deputy)	Sector/desk	Parties having relations with the CPSU
	(Africa and the Middle East, continued)	
	Other desks (?)	Communist Party of Lesotho (?) Congress Party for Madagascan Independence (AKFM) Party of the Vanguard of the Malagasy Revolution (AREMA) Southwest African People's Organization (Namibia) Socialist Working People's Party (Nigeria) Seychelles People's Progressive Front All People's Congress of Sierra Leone African National Congress (South Africa) South African Communist Party United National Independence Party (Zambia) Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front
Yuriy Gryadunov (head)[20] Sergey Kuzmin (dep., N.Af.)[21]	**Middle East and North Africa Sector**	
Gregoriy Nechkin[22]	Egyptian/Iraqi/ Jordanian (?)/ Sudanese (?) Desk	Egyptian Communist Party National Progressive Unionist Party of Egypt Iraqi Communist Party Communist Party of Jordan Sudanese Communist Party
Nikolay Slepov[23]	Israeli Desk	Communist Party of Israel
Vyacheslav Matuzov[24]	Lebanese/Palestinian (?)/ Syrian (?) Desk	Lebanese Communist Party Progressive Socialist Party (Lebanon) Democratic Front for the Liberationn of Palestine Palestinian Communist Party Palestine Liberation Organization Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine Arab Socialist Renaissance (Ba'ath) Party of Syria Syrian Communist Party
Aleksandr Guskov[25]	South Yemeni/Saudi (?)/ Bahraini (?) Desk	Yemeni Socialist Party Communist Party of Saudi Arabia Bahrain National Liberation Front
Andrey Kuzmin[26]	Morrocan Desk	Independence Party (Istiqlal) Party of Progress and Socialism Socialist Union of Popular Forces
	Other desks (?)	Algerian National Liberation Front General People's Congress of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah Social Destourian Party (Tunisia) Tunisian Communist Party
	(The Americas)	
Mikhail Kudachkin (head)[27] Igor Rybalkin (dep.)[28]	**Latin America Sector**	
Aleksey Mineyev[29]	Argentinian/Colombian/ Panamanian Desk	Communist Party of Argentina Communist Party of Colombia People's Party of Panama

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[20] *El Moudjahid* (Algiers), Mar. 15–16, 1985; Radio Aden, July 21, 1986, in *FBIS-MEA*, July 21, 1986, p. C/3.
[21] *Al Nida* (Beirut), Mar 30, 1984; *El Moudjahid*, Mar. 15–16, 1985.
[22] Elizabeth Teague, "The Foreign Departments of the Central Committee of the CPSU," Radio Free Europe–Radio Liberty, *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin* (Munich), Oct. 27, 1980, Supplement, p. 36. Tentative (Nechkin is identified with Egypt and Iraq only, and that as of October 1972).
[23] *Pravda*, Feb. 10, 1981.
[24] *Al Nida*, Mar. 30, 1984. Tentative—Matuzov was identified with Lebanon only.
[25] *Rabochiy klass i sovremenny mir* (Moscow), No. 1, 1979, p. 91. Tentative—Guskov identified with South Yemen only.
[26] *Al Bayane* (Casablanca), Mar. 25, 1983.
[27] *Asi Es* (Mexico City), Aug 12–18, 1983.
[28] *Hoy* (La Paz), May 28, 1985.
[29] On respective areas of responsibility, *Leningradskaya Pravda*, June 28, 1979; *Pravda*, Nov. 4, 1984; and *Sovetskaya Latviya* (Riga), Jan. 4, 1983.

Chief (or deputy)	**Sector**/desk	Parties having relations with the CPSU
	(The Americas, continued)	
Aleksandr Ignat'yev[30]	Bolivian/Chilean Desk	Communist Party of Bolivia
		Chilean Socialist Party
		Communist Party of Chile
		MAPU Worker-Peasant Party of Chile
		Radical Party of Chile
Dmitriy Pastukov[31]	Brazilian Desk	Brazilian Communist Party
Konstantin Kurin[32]	Costa Rican/Dominican/ Mexican/Nicaraguan Desk	Costa Rican People's Party
Vladimir Travkin (?)[33]		People's Vanguard Party (Costa Rica)
		Dominican Communist Party
		Unified Socialist Party of Mexico
		Sandinista National Liberation Front (Nicaragua)
Pëtr Nikolayev[34]	Ecuadoran Desk	Communist Party of Ecuador
Yuriy Kozlov[35]	Honduran/Venezuelan/ Uruguayan Desk	Communist Party of Honduras
		Communist Party of Venezuela
		Communist Party of Uruguay
		Socialist Party of Uruguay
	Other desks (?)	Communist Party of El Salvador
		Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (El Salvador)
		Guatemalan Party of Labor
		Unified Party of Haitian Communist
		Paraguayan Communist Party
		American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (Peru)
		Peruvian Communist Party
Dmitriy Lisovolik (head)[36]	**USA-Canada Sector**	
Vladimir Ulasovich[37]	Canadian Desk	Communist Party of Canada
Sergey Semivolos[38]	English Caribbean Desk	Maurice Bishop Patriotic Movement (Grenada)
		People's National Congress (Guyana)
		People's Progressive Party (Guyana)
		People's National Party of Jamaica
		Workers' Party of Jamaica
		Puerto Rican Communist Party (?)
Igor Mikhaylov[39]	USA Desk	Communist Party, USA
	(Asia and the Pacific)	
Aleksey Senatorov (head)[40]	**"Japan Sector"**	
Yuriy Kuznetsov[41]	Japanese Desk	Japan Communist Party
Vasiliy Saplin[42]	Japanese Desk	Japan Socialist Party

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[30] On respective areas of responsibility *Hoy* (La Paz), May 28, 1985; and Radio Moscow, Jan. 4, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 7, 1985, K/3.

[31] *Sovetskaya Litva* (Vilnius), Aug. 6, 1982.

[32] On respective areas of responsibility, *Pravda Vostoka* (Tashkent), Nov. 27, 1975; *Sovetskaya Litva*, Mar 5, 1983; *Asi Es*, June 21, 1985; and *Barricada* (Managua), July 19, 1984.

[33] *Asi Es*, June 1, 1984 (possibly Kurin's assistant for Mexico).

[34] *Pravda*, Nov. 27, 1983.

[35] On respective areas of responsibility, Elizabeth Teague, loc. cit., p. 32; *Tribuna Popular* (Caracas), Aug. 1–7, 1980; and *La Hora Frentista* (Montevideo), Dec. 19, 1985.

[36] *Pravda*, Mar. 14, 1986.

[37] *Sovetskaya Litva*, Aug. 10, 1983.

[38] Undated Grenadian Soviet Embassy document, "Year of Political and Academic Education," US National Archives Collection of Grenada Documents, Washington, DC.

[39] *Kommunist* (Yerevan), Sept. 9, 1978.

[40] *Pravda*, Nov. 17, 1982.

[41] Moscow, TASS, Sept. 19, 1984, *FBIS-SOV*, Sept. 20, 1984, p. C/1.

[42] *Akahata* (Tokyo), July 11, 1985 (Saplin may have replaced Kuznetzov).

Shifts in CPSU ID

Chief (or deputy)	**Sector**/desk	Parties having relations with the CPSU
	(Asia and Pacific, continued)	
Pëtr Kutsobin (head)[43]	**"South Asia Sector"**	
Gebrich Alekov[44]	Afghan (?)/Iranian/ Pakistani (?) Desk	People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan Fedayeen-e-Khalq (Majority) (Iran) People's Party of Iran (Tudeh) Communist Party of Pakistan
Vladimir Vykhukholev[45]	Indian Desk	Communist Party of India Communist Party of India (Marxist) Indian National Congress
Unknown	Bangladeshi (?)/ Sri Lankan (?)/ Nepalese Desk	Communist Party of Bangladesh National People's Party of Bangladesh Communist Party of Sri Lanka Communist Party of Nepal
Vladimir Tolstikov (?)[46]	**"Southeast Asia Sector"**	
Aleksandr Malov[47]	Burmese/Filipino Desk	Burmese Socialist Program Party Philippine Communist Party (PKP)
Unknown	Indonesian/Kampuchean Desk (?)	Communist Party of Indonesia Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party
	(Western Europe)	
Viktor Rykin (head)[48]	**"Germanic Europe Sector"**	
Yuriy Koshelev[49]	Austrian/Luxembourg/ Netherlands (?) Desk	Communist Party of Austria Communist Party of Luxembourg Communist Party of the Netherlands Netherlands Labor Party
Viktor Tyutonov[50]	West Berlin Desk	Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin
Vsevolod Yezhov[51]	West German Desk	German Communist Party Social Democratic Party of Germany
Yuriy Zuyev (head)[52]	**"Latin Europe Sector"**	
Dmitriy Moisenko-Yelikiy (head)[53]	Belgian/Swiss Desk	Communist Party of Belgium Socialist Party of Belgium Swiss Party of Labor
Vitaliy Gusenkov[54]	French Desk	French Communist Party Socialist Party of France

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[43] *Pravda*, Mar. 21, 1982. Kutsobin is also identified as a vice-president of the Soviet-Indian Friendship Society; see *Narody Azii i Afriki* (Moscow), No. 4, 1985, p. 217.

[44] Radio Kabul, June 24, 1986, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: South Asia* (Washington, DC), June 25, 1986. Tentative—Alekov is not specifically identified as representative of the ID, nor is he linked publicly with Iran or Pakistan.

[45] *The Statesman* (Calcutta), Dec. 23, 1985.

[46] Radio Manila, Dec. 19, 1981, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan 13, 1982, p. E/1. *Leninskoye Znamya* (Moscow), July 7, 1984, referred to Tolstikov as a sector chief dealing with the Congo at a time when Urnov was noted as sector chief for Black Africa (see fn. 7).

[47] On respective areas of responsibility, *Leningradskaya Pravda*,
Oct. 19, 1974 (noted as Central Committee official dealing with Burma); *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Moscow), Mar. 25, 1978 (tentative, noted only as a vice-president of USSR-Philippine Friendship Society).

[48] *Izvestiya*, May 23, 1986.

[49] On responsibility for Austria and Luxembourg, *Pravda*, May 8, 1980, and Oct. 28, 1980.

[50] *Die Wahrheit* (West Berlin), May 16, 1981.

[51] *Pravda*, Jan. 19, 1982.

[52] Moscow, TASS, Oct. 8, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Oct. 10, 1985, p. G/2.

[53] *Le Drapeau Rouge* (Brussels), Apr. 22, 1986; *Voix Ouvrite* (Geneva), Mar. 26–June 1, 1983.

[54] *Pravda Vostoka*, July 23, 1980.

Chief (or deputy)	**Sector**/desk	Parties having relations with the CPSU
	(Western Europe, continued)	
Nikolay Komin[55]	French Overseas Departments Desk (?)[56]	Guadeloupe Communist Party Martinique Communist Party Réunion Communist Party
A. A. Krylov[57]	Italian (?)/ San Marino Desk	Italian Communist Party Socialist Party of Italy Communist Party of San Marino
Viktor Krasnykh[58]	Portuguese Desk	Portuguese Communist Party
Vladimir Pertsov[59]	Spanish Desk	Communist People's Party of Spain Communist Party of Spain Spanish Socialist Workers' Party
Boris Pyshkov (head?)[60]	**"Southeast Europe Sector"**	
L. V. Khlebnikov[61]	Cypriot Desk	Progressive Party of the Working People
Karl Shemenkov[62]	Greek Desk	Communist Party of Greece Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK)
Unknown	Turkish Desk	Turkish Communist Party
Ivan Rozdorozhnyy (head)[63]	**"Nordic Sector"**	
Vladimir Savko[64]	Danish Desk	Communist Party of Denmark
Vladimir Fedorov[65]	Finnish Desk	Communist Party of Finland
Stepan Smirnov[66]	Finnish Desk	Finnish Center Party Finnish Social Democratic Party
Unknown	Norwegian Desk	Communist Party of Norway
Yevgeniy Vorozheykin[67]	Swedish Desk	Communist Workers' Party Party of the Left-Communists Social Democratic Labor Party
Dzavad Sharif (head)[68]	**"UK/Ireland Sector"**	
Yevgeniy Lagutin[69]	UK/Irish/Maltese (?) Desk	Communist Party of Great Britain Labor Party (United Kingdom) Communist Party of Ireland Communist Party of Malta Malta Labor Party
Unknown	**"Australia/New Zealand Sector" (?)**	Association for the Unity of Communists (Australia) Socialist Party of Australia Socialist Unity Party (New Zealand)

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[55] *Justice* (Fort de France, Martinique?), Apr. 17, 1980.
[56] Existence of desk tentative; Komin was noted only as dealing with Martinique. See ibid.
[57] Moscow, TASS, Jan. 23, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 24, 1986, p. G/4.
[58] *Sovetskaya Litva*, Oct. 18, 1980.
[59] *Mundo Obrero* (Madrid), Dec. 23–29, 1983.
[60] *Pravda*, June 2, 1981.
[61] Moscow, TASS, May 6, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, May 7, 1985, p. G/3.
[62] Moscow, TASS, June 23, 1986, trans in *FBIS-SOV*, June 24, 1986, p. G/1.
[63] *Pravda*, Nov. 28, 1984.
[64] *Bakinskiy Rabochiy*, Sept. 5, 1980.
[65] *Hufvudstadsbladet* (Helsinki), Mar. 1, 1986.
[66] *Leninskoye Znamya*, June 26, 1981, and *Bakinskiy Rabochiy*, Oct. 29, 1982. (Smirnov may have been replaced by Fedorov.)
[67] *Sovetskaya Estoniya* (Tallinn), Feb. 20, 1982.
[68] *Pravda*, Oct. 6, 1981.
[69] Ibid., Nov. 4, 1985; and Moscow, TASS, Jan. 28, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 29, 1986, p. G/9.

Chief (or deputy)	**Sector**/desk	Parties having relations with the CPSU
	FUNCTIONAL SECTORS	
Grigoriy Shumeyko[70]	**"Afro-Asian/Trade Union" (and other fronts?) Sector**	
Viktor Starodubov[71]	**"Arms Control" Sector (?)**	
Aleksey Legasov[72]	**"Friendship Associations" Sector**	
Yuliy Kharlamov[73]	**"Peace Movement" (and other fronts?) Sector**	
Unknown	**"Travel" Sector[74]**	
	Other sectors (?)[75]	
	MISCELLANEOUS UNITS	
	Consultants Group	**Specialty**
Yuriy Zhilin, chief of group[76]		Spain and Portugal[75]
Vadim Sobakin		France[77]
Oleg Ivanitskiy		Italy[78]
Genrikh Smirnov		Italy[79]
Vsevolod Rybakov		Latin America[80]
Stanislav Menshikov		USA and economics[81]
I.A. Skolov		English Caribbean[82]
Venyamin Midtsev		Africa[83]
Yuriy Krasin[84]		Ideology
Aleksey Kozlov		Ideology[85]
Nikolay Koval'skiy		Ideology (?)[86]
M.I. Kovalev[87]	**Secretariat**	

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[70] *Moskovskaya Pravda*, Jan. 16, 1982, identifies Shumeyko as a sector chief; AAPSO, *Tenth Meeting of the AAPSO Presidium*, Cairo, 1982, p. 149, demonstrates his Afro-Asian involvement; on trade union responsibilities, see Tenth World Trade Union Congress (February 1982), *List of Participants*, p. 60.

[71] *Kansan Uutiset*, July 17, 1986.

[72] *Pravda Ukrainy* (Kiev), Dec. 9, 1973, identified Legasov as an ID sector chief dealing with friendship associations; *Leningradskaya Pravda*, Jan. 22, 1982, said he was sector chief of an unidentified department dealing with friendship associations.

[73] *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR* (Moscow), No. 22, Dec. 3, 1982, p. 447, identifies Kharmalov as a sector chief; World Assembly for Peace and Life, Against Nuclear War (June 1983), *List of Participants*, p. 170, for involvement in peace movement. Vitaliy Shaposhnikov, an ID deputy chief who also is identified as a member of the World Peace Council Presidential Committee (see *New Perspectives* [Helsinki], No. 2, 1986, p. 2), possibly oversees Kharlamov's sector.

[74] Escorts foreign party delegations around the USSR. Grant Akopov was deputy chief of such a sector prior to his 1974 appointment as undersecretary for the League of Red Cross Societies in Geneva. See *Leningradskaya Pravda*, June 5, 1973.

[75] V.G. Kostikov deals with veterans affairs, and Georgiy Danilov deals with youth affairs, although the sectors they serve under are not known. See Radio Rangoon, Dec. 25, 1985, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Asia & Pacific* (Washington, DC), Jan. 9, 1986, p. G/1; and *Leningradskaya Pravda*, July 6, 1982.

[76] *Pravda*, July 27, 1981, and June 21, 1983.

[77] Ibid., June 28, 1979; *Leninskoye Znamya*, May 30, 1980.

[78] *Moskovskaya Pravda*, Sept. 11, 1980; *Sovetskaya Estoniya*, Mar. 5, 1982.

[79] *Pravda*, May 4, 1981.

[80] *Voz* (Bogota), Nov. 8, 1984.

[81] Moscow, APN, Jan. 14, 1982, trans. in Joint Publications Research Service, (Washington, DC), JPRS No. 80146, Feb. 22, 1982, p. 17; Radio Moscow, June 17, 1983, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, June 20 ,1983, p. AA/3; unclassified US Department of State cable: Moscow 1557, Feb. 8, 1984.

[82] Moscow, TASS, Dec. 12, 1984; trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Dec. 13, 1984, p. K/1.

[83] *Leninskoye Znamya*, Sept. 28, 1979; *Izvestiya*, A[illegible], 14, 1981.

[84] *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya* (Moscow), No. 4, 1980, p. 31. Krasin is also pro-rector of the CPSU Academy of Social Sciences. See *Pravda*, Feb. 8, 1985.

[85] *Leninskoye Znamya*, Oct. 28, 1982.

[86] *Bakinskiy Rabochiy*, Feb. 26, 1982.

[87] *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR*, No. 52, Dec. 28, 1978, p. 1070.

Soviet Third World Policy

Mark N. Katz

JERRY F. HOUGH. *The Struggle for the Third World: Soviet Debates and American Options.* Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, 1986.

BRUCE D. PORTER. *The USSR in Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local Wars 1945–1980.* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984.

S. NEIL MACFARLANE. *Superpower Rivalry and Third World Radicalism: The Idea of National Liberation.* Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, and London, Croom Helm, 1985.

THE THIRD WORLD has gradually emerged as a major arena of Soviet-US competition. At any moment, it is the scene of numerous local conflicts in which the superpowers—each to varying degrees—involve themselves and which consequently have the potential for drawing the two into a wider conflict. In this respect, competition in the dynamic and instable Third World has replaced the struggle to shape postwar Europe or to achieve nuclear superiority as the most likely flashpoint in superpower relations.

The competition between the Soviet Union and the United States in the Third World was slow to evolve in the postwar period. This was due to the continued predominance of the European colonial powers in Asia and Africa and of the United States in Latin America, as well as to Stalin's lack of interest or optimism regarding Soviet prospects in the Third World. With the coming to power of Nikita Khrushchev, Soviet interest in the region increased. But though the Soviets became influential in some important Third World countries (most notably Egypt), the superpower competition in the region appeared to be of secondary importance.

Soviet involvement in the Third World became progressively greater, however, especially in the 1970's, when all of Indochina fell to the communists and Marxist revolutions occurred in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and elsewhere. Moreover, following the American withdrawal from Southeast Asia, the USSR and its allies became more heavily involved in Third World conflicts than ever before. The intervention of large numbers of Cubans in Angola and Ethiopia, of Vietnamese in Cambodia, and of Soviet forces themselves in Afghanistan heralded an expanded Soviet presence in the Third World. Not only did the coming to power of Marxist regimes in several Third World countries constitute a setback for the West, but it raised the added possibility that from these countries the Marxists could more easily threaten other, more important Western allies in the Third World.

The United States, though, was not alone in suffering setbacks in the Third World. The Soviet Union also experienced some reversals. Several pro-Soviet radical civilian leaders were overthrown in the mid-1960's. In the mid-1970's, both Egypt and Somalia dramatically expelled their Soviet advisers and abrogated their treaties of friendship and cooperation with Moscow. And in the mid-1980's, the new Marxist regimes in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Nicaragua have been unable to defeat their armed internal opponents even though in some cases (e.g., Angola and Afghanistan), the

Mark N. Katz is a Research Associate at the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, The Wilson Center (Washington, DC). He is the author of The Third World in Soviet Military Thought *(1982),* Russia and Arabia: Soviet Foreign Policy Toward the Arabian Peninsula *(1986), and articles on various aspects of Soviet–Third World relations.*

ruling socialist states have intervened militarily on their behalf. Thus, the Third World has proven volatile for both players, with rapid gains and rapid losses following in quick succession.

The stakes in the Third World are considerable. From the Western perspective, the Third World contains areas such as the Middle East and southern Africa, which possess vital petroleum and mineral resources. The West would not want to see the USSR dominate these regions and be in a position to deny access to these resources. Third World countries also control sea lanes of vital importance to the West both economically and militarily. And while some might argue that a number of the Third World nations that have become Marxist are unimportant in themselves, they border countries that are important both to the West and to their regional neighbors.

From the Soviet perspective, Third World countries are important for security reasons and as points of further penetration. Perhaps more important, the Soviets have a strong interest—both ideological and practical—in seeing that once a Third World nation becomes Marxist, it remains so. For a Marxist regime to be overthrown by its own people not only would mean the loss of an ally for the Soviets, but also would set a dangerous precedent for other beleaguered Marxist regimes in the Third World.

THE INCREASED involvement of the USSR in the Third World and the resulting potential for superpower confrontation has generated a need for more serious study of Soviet foreign, military, and economic policies in this arena. But this is by no means an easy task. The Third World spans most of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, encompassing countries with widely differing histories, geographic locations, economic situations, ethnic and social problems, political structures, and international relationships. Also, Soviet interests and policies with regard to various Third World regions and countries differ widely. Finally, information about Soviet–Third World relations is often scarce and unreliable. Many Third World governments are even more secretive than the Soviet Union, releasing very little information about their foreign policy intentions and relations. Making generalizations about Soviet policy toward the Third World, then, is extremely difficult.

In the West, there have been two main approaches to studying Soviet foreign policy toward the Third World: what one might call the "micro" and the "macro" approaches. Each has its advantages and disadvantages.

The micro approach has concentrated on studying Soviet foreign policy toward a particular region or country. Studies of this type have the advantage of analyzing Soviet policy in great detail, revealing how Moscow often pursues conflicting goals, faces unforeseen events, sometimes hesitates over how to respond to difficult situations, at other times positions itself to benefit no matter what the outcome may be, and in general makes good, bad, and outright foolish moves. The disadvantage of these studies, however, is that because the analysis is specific to one region or country, one cannot draw reliable generalizations regarding Soviet perceptions, intentions, and strategy with respect to the Third World as a whole. There is also a tendency in many of these studies to see Soviet policy toward a given region or country as of priority concern to Moscow, and not to examine how particular Soviet moves fit into Soviet foreign policy as a whole.

The macro approach, by contrast, directly addresses the larger questions of Soviet intentions and strategy toward the Third World. It is this approach that each of the three books being considered here generally takes.

Within the macro approach, there are two means by which scholars seek to learn about Soviet intentions and strategy: (1) by examining what the Soviets write about the Third World; and (2) by examining what the Soviets actually do there, particularly in the military realm. Scholars, of course, do not focus on one of these means to the complete exclusion of the other; some indeed try to integrate the two.[1] Nonetheless, there is a trend to give one factor or the other—actions or statements—greater weight in analyzing what Soviet motives are.

Some believe that the debates over the Third World carried on by academicians and others in the Soviet Union have little relationship to actual foreign policy; the way to understand what the Soviets are likely to do in the future, it is maintained, is to examine the evolution of Soviet policy over time. Others feel that Soviet actions alone are ambiguous; they do not reveal *why* the Soviets undertook them or whether they were offensive or defensive moves. A careful reading of Soviet commentary, it is argued, is crucial for understanding what Soviet expectations are from specific situations and why the USSR responds to given cases as it does. As shall be seen below, what one examines in attempting to understand Moscow's intentions and strategy—Soviet actions or Soviet statements—can lead to very different conclusions.

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[1] In the micro approach some of the best studies examine what the Soviets both say and do about a particular region or country, but this is much easier to do for a specific country or region than for the Third World as a whole.

ERRY HOUGH's *The Struggle for he Third World: Soviet Debates and American Options* focuses on Soviet civilian academic writings. According to Hough, the problem with basing an analysis of Soviet intentions in the Third World on Soviet actions is that these actions can be explained in alternative ways. By focusing on the debates about the Third World in the academic literature, he maintains, one can see how the Soviets view their foreign policy options.

This book is one of the more thought-provoking works on the Soviets and the Third World. In it, Hough provides a useful chapter on the difficulties in deciphering the meaning of Soviet writings. In addition, he makes a good counterargument to those who claim that Soviet academic writing has no relationship to Soviet foreign policy-making. Though Hough concedes that the Soviet academics do not make foreign policy decisions, he argues that they can have an indirect influence in shaping the views of the community concerned with international relations.

The scholars of the international institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences often do classified studies and participate in the work of ad hoc interagency committees. Especially in the latter case, they have the opportunity to persuade policymakers (or those who advise policymakers). What these scholars propound in journal articles may reflect what they prescribe in these meetings. Similarly, differences regarding foreign policy issues observed in these journals reflect different policy positions within not just the academic community, but the foreign policy community as a whole. The bulk of Hough's book is taken up with a painstaking review of this literature in an effort to identify what issues regarding the Third World have been debated and what the policy implications have been of the various positions in these debates.

But if Soviet actions in the Third World can be interpreted differently—as Hough points out—the meaning of these debates can also be interpreted differently. And some of Hough's interpretations of these debates are themselves highly debatable.

This is especially the case with Hough's interpretation of the work of Nodari Simoniya—a scholar at the Oriental Institute—who is cited more than anyone else in the book. Hough correctly notes that Simoniya has discussed how young socialist states in the Third World have not been as successful as many young capitalist states in building their economies. Simoniya also has observed that leftwing dictatorships in the Third World cannot be regarded as the most reliable of Soviet allies. But Hough concludes that those statements about the success of capitalism in the Third World are really a call for capitalism in the USSR, and that by criticizing Third World leftwing dictatorships, Simoniya "surely is trying to stimulate thought about the possibility of evolution within the Soviet one-party system" (p. 141).

If Hough is right that certain scholars are actually arguing for change in the USSR when they discuss the Third World, this raises serious questions. If these authors really are calling for capitalism and even some form of democratization in the USSR, why have they been able to express such anti-party views for so long? It is, of course, possible that the party leadership does not really know (or at least did not know before Hough's book was published) that this was what these scholars actually meant. But if this is the case, then these scholars can hardly be said to be influential, especially in the realm of political reform. Nor does what they write have much relevance for our understanding of Soviet policy in the Third World if the actual subject of their discussion is the USSR itself. One might offer a more prosaic—and perhaps more likely—alternative explanation to Hough's: when Simoniya and other Soviet scholars talk about the Third World, they really mean the Third World.

Hough finds that many Soviet academicians are pessimistic about the prospects for socialism in the Third World, and he argues that Moscow will focus its attention more on trying to make friends with nonsocialist states. He seems to feel that the Soviets do not wish to undertake the burden of defending socialist regimes faced with armed internal opponents. If Hough had paid more attention to Soviet military literature on the Third World, though, he would have learned that the Soviet military is very much concerned with the question of defending socialism in the Third World.

Since 1983, there have been a number of articles in *Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal* discussing local wars.[2] All of these ostensibly discuss Western actions in Third World conflicts, but the lesson from almost all of them is that intervention against insurgents can succeed. How Hough may have interpreted this literature I do not know, but since the military is charged with implementing an important aspect of Soviet policy toward the Third World, he should have examined it. If Soviet academicians have a voice in shaping Soviet foreign policy, surely the Soviet military has an even greater one.

Hough emphasizes the many difficult problems that Soviet academicians see in Moscow's effort to promote and maintain Marxist regimes in the Third World. This trend in the Soviet debates suggests to him that "the Soviet leaders would find it in their interest to pull back from their commitment to radical movements" (p. 272). Yet, merely because the Soviets recognize that they face problems with Third World Marxists, both before and after the latter come to power, does not mean that Moscow is going to stop supporting such movements and regimes altogether. After all, the Soviets have learned that the Marxist-Leninists, are Moscow's closest allies in the Third World; no other group has an interest in becoming and remaining so close to the USSR.

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[2] See, for example, Col. Gen. G. Dol'nikov, "Development of Air Tactics in Local Wars," *Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal* (Moscow) No. 12, 1983, pp. 34–43, and Col. V. Odintsov, "Rear Servicing of Troops Using Aviation from the Experience of Local Wars," ibid., No. 2, 1985, pp. 81–86.

In sum, to focus on Soviet academic writing to explain Soviet behavior, as Hough has done, can lead to an underestimation of Soviet interest in the Third World.

BRUCE PORTER focuses on actions rather than writings in trying to explain Soviet behavior. *The USSR in Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local Wars 1945–1980* also demonstrates that the macro and micro approaches to studying the Soviets in the Third World do not have to be mutually exclusive. Porter seeks to answer macro questions about Soviet involvement in local wars by a micro examination of five case studies (the North Yemeni civil war, the Nigerian civil war, the October 1973 Middle East war, the 1975–76 Angolan civil war, and the Ogaden conflict).[3] Unlike Hough, Porter sees the Soviets as becoming more active in the Third World. The postwar years have seen the USSR increase its involvement in the Third World, beginning with arms shipments to Egypt in 1955 and the appearance of Soviets or Soviet allies in combat roles, as with: Soviet pilots in Yemen (in 1967), large numbers of Cuban troops in Angola (1975), Soviet commanders directing combat operations in the Ogaden (1977–78), and Soviet ground troops in combat in Afghanistan (1979–). According to Porter, "a precedent, once set, has tended to become the norm in future conflicts . . . . What the USSR achieved in the Third World between 1973 and 1980 would have been totally unacceptable to the United States only a few years earlier; two decades earlier it might have led to war" (p. 242).

Though the Soviets have certainly increased their military involvement in the Third World over the years, Porter's selection of cases of conflict overemphasizes Soviet successes and underemphasizes Soviet problems. One of the criteria of selection he employs is that the contenders were noncommunist. On this basis, he excludes the war in Afghanistan, but includes the civil war in Angola and the Ogaden conflict, claiming that the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and Ethiopia's Dergue were not recognized by the Soviets as communist regimes. However, Soviet writers put these movements in the same category as the Afghan regime—i.e., view them as "states of socialist orientation."[4] In this perspective, the governments in Luanda and Addis Ababa are no less and no more Marxist than the one in Kabul.

Further, while Soviet-backed forces were winning the civil war in Angola in 1975, they were losing the civil war in Oman. Why was the Omani insurgency excluded? Surely Porter would not claim that the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) was more communist than the MPLA.

Porter also uses another criterion for selecting conflicts to study: "Soviet arms played a significant role in determining the course of hostilities" (p. 61). Yet, he chooses not to discuss the PFLO, which despite Soviet arms aid, was defeated; could it be that Porter saw the defeat as evidence that Soviet arms did not play a *significant role* in determining the course of hostilities? Porter also ignores the National Democratic Front insurgents, also aided by Moscow, which were defeated in North Yemen.

Porter's analysis stops with the year 1980. Yet, even by this time there was another type of conflict observable in which the Soviets were heavily involved, but which Porter does not discuss. This is the category of conflicts in which pro-Soviet regimes were on the defensive against guerrilla forces. Such conflicts were taking place before 1980 in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Cambodia, and Afghanistan. Porter may exclude the last two because he considers one or more of the parties involved to be communist, but he can hardly exclude Angola and Ethiopia on this basis when he includes the 1975–76 Angolan civil war and the Ogaden war.

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[3] There are dangers in trying to cope with a number of case studies at once: scholars are not always sufficiently knowledgeable of the intricacies of each individual case. In the case discussed by Porter with which I am most familiar—North Yemen—the author makes several errors. On p. 76, he refers to Hassan al-Amri as "the new Republican president" in 1965; al-Amri was the prime minister in 1965 and was *not* president then or at any other time. On p. 77, Porter states that in November 1967, Abdallah as-Sallal was replaced as president of North Yemen by al-Amri; he was actually replaced by Abdul Rahman al-Iryani, and al-Amri became prime minister again shortly after this. On p. 88, Porter states that the British withdrew from South Yemen in August 1967; they withdrew in November 1967. Also, Soviet advisers were not expelled from North Yemen in 1976 as Porter claims on p. 89; the North Yemenis threatened to expel them and the USSR did reduce the number of its advisers there, but they were never removed completely. And finally, the Saudis did not succeed in convincing the North Yemeni leaders to curtail their relations with Moscow after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as Porter claims on p. 89. The Soviet–North Yemeni military relationship has remained strong since the end of 1979. In fact, North Yemen used Soviet weapons to defeat Marxist insurgents supported by South Yemen in a struggle that lasted from 1979 until 1982. The USSR also signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with North Yemen in 1984.

None of these or other such errors may be judged to be particularly serious, but they do not increase the persuasiveness of the author's arguments. For more on the Soviet–North Yemeni relationship, see Mark N. Katz, *Russia and Arabia: Soviet Foreign Policy toward the Arabian Peninsula*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, Ch. 1; and idem, "Sanaa and the Soviets," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January-February 1984, pp. 21–34.

[4] On this point, see Francis Fukuyama, *Moscow's Post-Brezhnev Reassessment of the Third World*, R-3337-USDP, Santa Monica, CA, Rand Corporation, February 1986, pp. 83–85.

It is true that these conflicts are not yet over, but by not considering them, Porter portrays Soviet military involvement in the Third World as being the power that is on the offensive in changing the established order in the Third World for its purposes while the United States and the West are ineffectually defending that order. This may be the situation the Soviets would like, but the truth is that since the late 1970's, Moscow has had to devote a considerable amount of effort to the military defense of the socialist order in the Third World. Thus, Porter's selective examination of Soviet actions tends to overstate the Soviet capability to expand its influence in the Third World.

LIKE Jerry Hough's book, Neil MacFarlane's *Superpower Rivalry and Third World Radicalism* concentrates on ideas rather than actions. What is refreshing about MacFarlane's book is that it discusses not only Soviet but also Third World, and to a lesser extent American, writing on national liberation movements. Moreover, the Third World emerges in this study as an actor rather than just the stage on which the superpowers act.

MacFarlane's painstaking study of writings by the leaders and theoreticians of several Third World national liberation movements finds that many of them emphasize several factors: the need for violent revolution, nationalism, and state control of the economy for the benefit of all citizens. He notes that though Soviet writers support the first and third factors, they are not happy with the second: nationalism. Movements that are too nationalist are often not amenable to Soviet influence over the long term.

It is less easy to speak of an "American view" of national liberation in the Third World, but MacFarlane concludes that, in general, American opinion and American foreign policy have been much more comfortable than the USSR with nationalism, but—unlike the Soviets—have not favored violent revolution or state control of the economy. As a result, even when the United States has not opposed the activities of a given revolutionary group, Washington has been much less likely than Moscow to actively assist it.

Conversely, though the Soviet Union might not actually give much economic assistance to such a group once it achieves power, Moscow would, unlike the United States, be supportive of attempts to create a socialist economy. Thus, although there might be differences between a Third World revolutionary group and the USSR both before and after such a group comes to power, these differences are often less significant than those between the revolutionary group and the US.

This view of the triangular relationship involving the United States, the Soviet Union, and revolutionary groups in the Third World is, of course, a generalization that does not apply to all cases. Each revolution has its own peculiar circumstances, which may well outweigh these general considerations. The revolutionaries of North Yemen relied on the USSR, but proved to be politically conservative once their civil war ended. In Zimbabwe, the victorious Robert Mugabe was cool toward the Soviets for several years, partly because Moscow had supported his rival, Joshua Nkomo. And, the Marxist revolutionaries who came to power in Cambodia in 1975 were anti-American, but also anti-Soviet and pro-Chinese because they feared that the Soviet Union supported Vietnamese efforts to dominate them.

It would have been useful if MacFarlane could have extended his study of revolutionary regimes past the period immediately preceding and following their seizure of power, i.e., explored the evolution of a revolutionary regime's perceptions of the superpowers over time. However, that would involve another book-length study.

HOWEVER DIFFICULT the study of Soviet–Third World relations, the strong probability that the Soviet-American competition for influence in the Third World will go on there and that instability will continue to plague many countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America underlines the importance of the endeavor. There are a number of approaches that might be employed to improve and expand our knowledge. One would be an attempt to integrate the macro and micro approaches to study specific aspects of Soviet–Third World relations. For example, an examination of how the Soviets approach inter-state conflicts in the Third World—cases like India vs. Pakistan, the Arabs vs. Israel, Ethiopia vs. Somalia, Vietnam vs. Cambodia, and Iran vs. Iraq—might help us know under what circumstances the Soviets might intervene in, attempt to mediate, or remain aloof from such types of conflict. Similar studies could be made to discern under what conditions the USSR gives substantial, moderate, or only token assistance to Marxist revolutionaries in the Third World.

Another useful approach would be to study the relations of a particular Third World country or region with the two superpowers from the perspective of the Third World actors. This could prove useful in understanding just how Third World governments attempt to achieve their goals through their relations with Moscow and Washington, as well as why some rely mainly on one superpower while others attempt to gain something from both. This sort of study would require expertise on American and Soviet foreign policy as well as on the Third World country or region involved—a rare combination. This may, however, be a type of study in which Western and Third World scholars can effectively cooperate.

Yet another approach that ought to be explored is analysis of the relationship between Soviet writings about the Third World and Soviet actions there. In the military field, for example, a study examining whether the Western tactics in local conflicts that Soviet military writers discuss are in fact employed by the Soviets and their allies in Third World conflicts could be extremely important.

Finally, if a study could identify some of the high-level Soviet officers involved in conflicts both in Ethiopia and Afghanistan and track their careers after these combat posts, we could see if this group of officers is being promoted to the top-level military leadership or is being shunted off into career dead-ends. This could tell us something about just how much importance the Soviet military attaches to these Third World conflicts and whether there is evidence that the Soviet military is becoming more interested in them as one of its central missions, or sees involvement in such conflicts as being less important than preparations for a European or nuclear war.

There are undoubtedly other fruitful approaches to studying Soviet–Third World relations. But one thing is certain: the West is going to be confronted for the indefinite future with the problem of how to respond to Soviet involvement in the Third World. The more sophisticated Western understanding of Soviet involvement, the more sophisticated can be the West's response.

Dissent and Soviet Society

Harvey Fireside

MARSHALL S. SHATZ. *Soviet Dissent in Historical Perspective.* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1980.

LUDMILLA ALEXEYEVA. *Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious, and Human Rights.* Middletown, CT, Wesleyan University Press, 1985.

JOSHUA RUBENSTEIN. *Soviet Dissidents: Their Struggle for Human Rights.* 2nd ed. Boston, Beacon Press, 1985.

ROY MEDVEDEV, ED. *Samizdat Register 2: Voices of the Socialist Opposition in the Soviet Union.* New York, W. W. Norton, 1981.

DINA SPECHLER. *Permitted Dissent in the USSR: "Novyy Mir" and the Soviet Regime.* New York, Praeger, 1982.

BOOKS on Soviet affairs generally devote scant attention to the subject of dissent, thereby inadvertently mirroring the perspective of Soviet law and institutions, which holds that the dissidents represent a minuscule fraction of the population out of step with the orderly march of the masses to the tunes piped from the Kremlin. Certainly, in the logic of elementary Marxism-Leninism last enunciated by Khrushchev, those individuals—featured in Western media as protesters—do not indicate any basic contradiction in the harmonious evolution of Soviet society. Hence, they, like other criminals, might be certified as insane.[1] The psychiatric establishment, taking its cue from the erratic Premier, multiplied the number of "special psychiatric hospitals," in which unrepentant critics of the regime could be "cured" of their delusions.

With the advent of the Brezhnev era, the KGB moved even more decisively to chill the atmosphere of relative tolerance for dissenting views that had followed Stalin's death in 1953. The first of several increasingly severe waves of repression began in 1965, with the arrests of Andrey Sinyavskiy and Yuliy Daniel, as much for having their works published abroad as for putting anti-Soviet dialogue into the mouths of their fictional characters. A spirit of xenophobia marked these renewed freezes, with government prosecutors contending that dissidents, in their writings and interviews, were allowing their words to become weapons in the hands of the capitalist enemy.

The current crop of books focusing on Soviet dissidents mostly reflects a feeling on the part of their authors that this subject is somewhat of an anomaly in a controlled society. Given the rituals of public conformity that nearly 70 years of Soviet rule have etched, it does come as a shock to learn that hundreds, perhaps thousands, of free spirits in the Soviet Union continue to march to the music of a different drummer. Their actions, however, have typically been more symbolic than effective. For example, a gallant few gather each December 5 –Constitution Day on the Soviet calendar—in Pushkin Square before their unauthorized assembly is broken up by the police as an "anti-Soviet demonstration."[2]

The message conveyed by such quixotic gestures is that of guerrilla theater. They furnish living proof that the right of free speech, as of all other means of public expression, is granted only to those who sing the praises of the system in authorized fashion. These actions can also be seen as the feeble shoots of a counterculture, celebrating its own ideals with a fervor absent from the forced rites of the conformists.

IN THE FIRST of the books reviewed here, Marshall Shatz attempts to place Soviet dissent within a histori-

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[1] *Pravda* (Moscow), May 24, 1959.

[2] Hedrick Smith, *The Russians*, New York, Quadrangle, 1976, p. 462.

Harvey Fireside is a Professor of Politics at Ithaca College (Ithaca, NY). He has written widely on human rights, his latest volume being Soviet Psychoprisons, *(1979).*

cal Russian tradition going back to the late 18th century. At that time, a nobility that had been freed of obligatory service to the state gave birth to the peculiar group labeled the intelligentsia. Under West European influence, this coterie of self-styled thinkers established the obligation of improving the lives of the lower classes that is still upheld by their modern epigones.

Professor Shatz skillfully traces the links between the social reflexes of the early *"intelligenty"* and contemporary dissidents. Both groups derived from university-educated youth, with family trauma predisposing them to transmute their personal frustrations into confrontations with authority at large. Like their spiritual ancestors, intellectuals in the USSR agonize over social injustice in a language unintelligible to the masses whom they propose to benefit. Inevitably, they collide with an insensitive bureaucracy and are crushed.

Although such pyschohistorical theories point up remarkable resemblances between activists who, though separated by centuries, respond similarly to family histories, Western political ideas, and a romantic quest for liberation, they underestimate the social gulf dividing old Tsarist realities from today's collectivist system. Newly educated citizens have lost the cliquishness that characterized former thinkers. They perform the myriad special functions of an industrial society instead of the generalized role of social critic played by the old intelligentsia.

Yesterday's aristocrats could toss barbs at unenlightened despots, who in turn dismissed them as irrelevant to the prevailing orthodox order. Contemporary professionals, though still in a minority, are a much more substantial group, more deeply rooted in the society, and more closely yoked to the regime, which regards its writers, in Stalin's phrase, as "engineers of the soul."[3] They may occasionally be tempted to indulge in forbidden thoughts and scribbles after hours, but as creative intellectuals, their output is judged both qualitatively and quantitatively against production plans administered by officials who are their educational equals.

After identifying the present foci of dissent and the reservoirs of religious and ethnic grievances that might feed future protests, Shatz, writing in 1980, was forced to conclude that he had been discussing small circles of urban intellectuals totaling 2,000 at best. If so few restive souls can be said to defy stringent criminal and psychiatric punishments, as well as social sanctions (including denial of education, loss of employment and of other necessities and perquisites) meted out by the authorities, how justified is the author's attempt to accord this embattled band a place in the broad sweep of Russian history?

THE LANDSCAPE of heterodox beliefs is examined in microscopic detail by Ludmilla Alexeyeva, a 15-year veteran of disseminating samizdat (underground literature) in Moscow and reviewing human rights violations as a "Helsinki watcher," before her exile in 1977. In her devotion to detail, Alexeyeva displays the kind of survivor's passion that Solzhenitsyn breathed into his monumental *GULag Archipelago*. Hers is an encyclopedic endeavor likely to daunt some Western readers, but it is a labor of love, the ultimate reference work on the subject, including in its coverage many minor characters omitted from more popular surveys.

Alexeyeva's gallery of dissenters is replete with national and religious protesters, plus a goodly sprinkling of nonintellectual types from among the Tatars and Meskhi, the Pentacostals, and the Evangelical Baptists. The latter part of the book is devoted to the constituent streams of what she terms the "movement for human rights," whose members she has known first-hand and can, therefore, depict most convincingly.

It is perhaps her spiritual ambassadorship that causes Alexeyeva to lend this movement greater concreteness than its oscillating fortunes would seem to warrant. The contacts among its components have been, perforce, sporadic, and the movement has had greater moral than political impact. Yet, in justification of her upbeat account one might recall that where old Russian radicals remained generally mired in their ethnocentrism, many of the 1970's breed welcomed on equal terms colleagues from Ukraine, the Baltic states, and Central Asia.

It is regrettable that proper editing did not excise numerous errors from Alexeyeva's tome: a sentence on page 84 essentially repeated on the next page; US Congressman Robert Dornan (the book says "Dornen") has been made a "Senator" (p. 229); Telford Taylor is called a "judge" and former "chief prosecutor" at the Nuremberg Trials (p. 185) instead of law professor and associate trial counsel. The text is also replete with farfetched claims: for example, that there was a "striking" similarity in "conception and spirit" between the movements for civil rights in the United States and for human rights in the Soviet Union (p. 262). In refutation of this last point, one need merely recall the background of the US struggle, its ethical issues and techniques evolving from the preceding century, to understand how it could merge with mainstream politics and leave an enduring stamp on its society, whereas the Soviet dissenters remained marginal figures, unable to attract a mass following, and thus could be finally repressed by the authorities with relative ease.

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[3] Alec Nove, *Stalinism and After*, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1975, p. 64

To say this is in no way meant to detract from the nobility of aim and spirit of self-sacrifice that characterize many of the figures whom Alexeyeva portrays. It is, rather, to balance her retrospective adulation of the movement, which goes so far that she claims to be unable to find a single case "of a KGB agent successfully infiltrating human rights groups" (p. 283). In fact, Sanya Lipavskiy's role in framing Anatoly Shcharanskiy on "espionage" charges has been fully documented,[4] while other shadowy characters, such as Aleksey Dobrovol'skiy in the Ginzburg-Galanskov trial of 1968, have been tied by circumstantial evidence to the secret police.[5]

Too often, the thrust of Alexeyeva's narrative has the resourceful band of activists outwitting its pursuers, revealing nothing except under torture. As with resistance fighters elsewhere, the Soviet reality falls short of such myths. Alongside an extraordinary number of heroes and heroines, we find a few corruptible self-serving types, the most notorious being Pëtr Yakir and Viktor Krasin, who turned state's witness in 1972 against hundreds of their former comrades.

Alexeyeva also identifies only a couple of members of the "Russian National Movement" as being intolerant. However, as Alexander Yanov points out in *The Russian New Right*,[6] racism and anti-Semitism are scarcely confined to one fringe group. One may also question her conclusion that in view of several phoenix-like rebirths, the "movement" can boast of being "indestructible when under attack" (p.372). Indeed, it is possible to argue that after the KGB's last concerted assault on dissidents, in 1979–82, the "movement" was effectively destroyed.

IN THE SECOND edition of his history of Soviet dissent, Joshua Rubenstein focuses on the post-1980 period, when the fortunes of the protesters dropped to their lowest point so far. After tracing the movement's genesis and development in the same seven fast-paced chapters that comprised his first edition, Rubenstein describes the "prolonged crisis" of 1979–82, precipitated by such measures as the "pre-Olympics purges" that scoured the streets of Moscow of potentially discordant voices, to the sadistic treatment inflicted upon Andrey Sakharov in his Gorky exile. One by one, the tiny associations that had circulated petitions and staged "press conferences" (really, receptions for Western correspondents in tiny flats) found themselves shut down: the Working Commission To Investigate the Use of Psychiatry for Political Purposes, the Christian Committee for the Defense of Believers' Rights, the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group, and others.

A concerted drive by the KGB rounded up scores of dissenters, who must have been under surveillance for years. Most were shunted by a prearranged judicial process to labor camps, some to psychiatric prisons, a few to internal exile or forced emigration. The movement's communications were disrupted, as threats of further arrests silenced such samizdat journals as *Chronicle of Current Events*.[7]

Why did the crackdown come at this juncture? Rubenstein examines the standard reasons, including reduced US leverage in the post-Afghanistan chill in superpower relations, but in his final chapter he fastens on more convincing Soviet domestic factors. In his declining years, Brezhnev had relinquished effective power to colleagues who were determined to reverse both his "relaxed attitude toward official corruption" and "his equivocal policy on dissent" (p. 328). Yuriy Andropov became the leader in this drive, which touched Brezhnev's own family, particularly his daughter Galina and her associates, and drove two close members of the clique, Interior Minister Nikolay Shchëlokov and deputy head of the KGB Semen Tsvigun, to suicide.[8]

The new Andropov appointees to these offices, Vitaliy Fedorchuk (Interior Ministry), and Viktor Chebrikov (KGB), tightened ideological controls, work discipline, and strictures against the "underground economy." Their new approach made itself felt among dissenters through the roundup of not only all remaining activists, but even mere readers of samizdat. In the labor camps, the Ministry of Interior's tough line visited physical brutality upon prisoners, including the courageous psychiatrist Anatoliy Koryagin, in order to break their spirit. If they remained obdurate, they were re-arrested for political crimes instead of being released at the end of their sentences. Others, like the Ukrainian activists Yuriy Lytvyn, Valeriy Marchenko, and Oleksiy Tykhyi, were allowed to die of untreated illnesses and injuries.

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[4] On Lipavskiy's actions, see David Shipler, *Russia: Broken Idols, Solemn Dreams*, New York, Times Books, 1983, pp. 37–38.

[5] On Dobrovol'skiy, see Pavel Litvinov, *Trial of the Four*, New York, Viking, 1972, p. 11.

[6] *The Russian New Right: Right-Wing Ideologies in the Contemporary USSR*, tr. by Stephen Dunn, Berkeley, University of California Press, International Studies, 1978.

[7] The fate of the *Chronicle* is recounted in Mark Hopkins's fine study, *Russia's Underground Press: The Chronicle of Current Events*, New York, Praeger, 1983. This volume was among the books reviewed in Louise I. Shelley, "Soviet Justice," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), July-August 1985, pp. 69-73.

[8] Zhores A. Medvedev, *Andropov*, New York, Norton, p. 96.

In Rubenstein's persuasive analysis, the outlook for liberalization under Mikhail Gorbachëv remains rather gloomy. The godfathers of the new leader were Andropov and the hard-line ideologue Mikhail Suslov, and Gorbachëv echoes their call for increased discipline as the panacea for Soviet economic and political malaise. Moreover, the "tough cop" types appear more ubiquitous than ever in the upper reaches of the regime.

ALTHOUGH the regime generally considers the dissidents to be its enemies, in fact many of them continue to volunteer suggestions for change that would make the system run more efficiently. For example, the Moscow historian Roy Medvedev and his twin brother, the biologist Zhores, who lives in exile in England, are known for contending that Soviet mechanisms of repression were neither foreordained by Lenin's theory and practices nor justified in terms of rational socialist development. They argue from an idealized Marxist perspective that the centralization of power by Stalin pushed healthy Soviet evolution into abnormal channels, and that the legacy of despotic controls hangs like a millstone around the neck of the present leadership. This leftwing critique has cost Roy his party membership and Zhores his citizenship, but evidently enough highly placed friends have shielded Roy to safeguard his recent independent literary endeavors.

Since 1977, Roy has edited the samizdat review *XX Century*, a journal that circulates unofficially in the USSR and is designed to serve as a forum for neo-Marxist critics of the Stalin era, to analyze social problems swept under the rug in official journals, and to carry on a debate with moderate and rightwing dissidents whom he finds lacking in historical accuracy and theoretical sophistication. The sampling from this publication presented in *Samizdat Register 2* contains selections by Old Bolsheviks and Mensheviks such as Mikhail Yakubovich, whose reminiscences of Lenin are meant to show how tolerantly that leader had treated opponents like Lev Kamenev and Grigoriy Zinoviev. The twofold moral of such essays is to swipe at party members nostalgic for Stalin by indicting his "unprincipled struggle for power" (p. 62) and to expose Alexander Solzhenitsyn's "distorted version" of revolutionary history glorifying the ancien régime (p. xi).

This anthology also features dissections of contemporary problems, for example, M. B. Davydov's proposal to promote small-scale mechanical equipment for the highly productive, privately farmed "garden plots." Then the late Mikhail Baitalski (Baytalskiy) offers a tongue-in-cheek exposé of "Commodity Number One," vodka production, on which the state has a monopoly and from which it derives major revenues although "drinking has become a national calamity in the USSR" (p. 172), causing crime, disease, accidents, and divorce.

While such iconoclastic commentaries had perhaps the greatest impact of any of the forays by the leftwing dissidents–at least serving to make formerly taboo topics legitimate objects of discussion, and, in the case of alcohol, perhaps helping buttress the regime's own anti-alcohol campaign—the most fascinating to a Western observer are Roy Medvedev's tilts against Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn. Although prefacing his comments with a tribute to Sakharov's "courageous and unrelenting struggle for man's freedom," Medvedev attacks the dissenting physicist's "one-sided, tendentious and plainly erroneous statements" (pp. 277–78). He faults Sakharov for having grown increasingly disenchanted with Soviet life, and tending to exaggerate the virtues of Western societies, which, Medvedev argues, are dominated by corporate-military capitalism, and to short-change such Soviet achievements as a marked expansion in affordable urban housing. Medvedev also finds Sakharov fundamentally lacking in theoretical finesse—e.g., when accusing the party elite of a "virtually inalienable" hold on power, whereas, according to Medvedev, it is "merely a temporary holder of state property" (p. 285). In short, Medvedev deems the current stage of Soviet society to constitute not "state capitalism," as Sakharov claimed, but "state-bureaucratic socialism." It may seem hair-splitting, but for Medvedev it is the difference between a disease that is fatal and one that is curable with a dose of Leninist democracy.

In his review of Solzhenitsyn's *GULag Archipelago*, Medvedev removes any remaining checks on his polemical fury. After a perfunctory bow to the opus as "one of the greatest books in the twentieth century," he goes on to portray it as riddled with distortions and untruths. Where Solzhenitsyn has excused those who collaborated with the Nazis, Medvedev is aghast at "a vicious ideological mishmash" (p. 308) that turns treachery into heroism. An even more bitter disagreement has Solzhenitsyn, in Medvedev's eyes, slandering communists in Stalin's camps as opportunists and apologists, instead of seeing them suffering as painfully as others, occasionally leading uprisings of the desperate inmates. Finally, it seems incredible to Medvedev for Solzhenitsyn to blame the West for not having saved the Tsar and, more recently, for not "starting a new world war against the USSR and China" with atomic weapons after the outbreak of the Korean war (p. 316).

No matter how solidly constructed his arguments, Medvedev emerges as the most waspish participant in this triangular debate with Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov. By the end of the 1970s, Medvedev also seems to have become the most isolated of the three, as he disdained engaging in political confrontations with the authorities, preferring his self-appointed role of armchair strategist among would-be reformers. Indeed, he distanced himself from the mainstream of dissidents, blaming official repression on their provocative actions, scarcely a stance to endear himself to them. Later, his protective mantle slipped, as new, rigid KGB types took command and the Eurocommunism that Medvedev had espoused went into eclipse.

THE ATTEMPT to work within the parameters of socialist legality seen in Medvedev had already been pioneered by another editor, the redoubtable Aleksandr Tvardovskiy, in the years 1958–70, before Brezhnev's ideological guardians drove him and his assistants from the executive offices of the Moscow literary review *Novyy Mir*. The dramatic highpoint of that period occurred in early 1962, when an unknown ex-convict from Stalin's camps named Solzhenitsyn brought the handwritten manuscript of a novella, *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*, to Tvardovskiy. The editor recognized a work of genius and passed it to Khrushchev's assistant for cultural affairs, Vladimir Lebedev, who read it aloud to the Premier at his dacha. Khrushchev appreciated the explosive force of this work and saw its utility as a tool for blasting his Stalinist opponents within the party leadership. On his second try, he browbeat the Presidium of the party, as the Politburo was then called, into approving publication of the work. By a curious conjunction not likely to have transpired anywhere else in world, the rulers of a major state drew battle lines around this and other works of fiction and poetry that recaptured segments of the nation's past for which no one was willing to take responsibility. Khrushchev, Tvardovskiy, and Solzhenitsyn were briefly joined in some risky ventures, with the party watchdogs at their heels.

This fascinating story has been told by some of the participants: Khrushchev, Solzhenitsyn, and a former senior editor with *Novyy Mir*, Vladimir Lakshin.[9] Now, political scientist Dina Spechler relates the entire saga of *Novyy Mir* during the years that it was the bellwether of reformers. She has combed each issue of the journal for diverse themes of what she terms "permitted dissent" and links them to concomitant political events.

Spechler's enterprise verges on the monumental, yet it does not quite come off. There are too many plot summaries for the reader to absorb, plus an excess of social science jargon to detract from the narrative. Spechler assumes that the authors of these plots spoke through the characters in their fiction, albeit by indirection, in an attempt to effect basic changes in the way the Soviet system works. She even implies that they formed a cohesive counterelite, leading "an embittered, disillusioned generation" to reject the ethical compromises of its fathers" and to "[refuse] to take its place in the ranks of the builders of communism" (p. 123). Yet one can ask: Were these authors among the activists of the 1960's? Did they, as a literary avant garde, palpably influence behavior, or merely arouse discussion? How did they magically appear just when the editors were about to launch one of the journal's critical campaigns? Finally, are there contemporary cases showing that reading fiction actually motivates people to become dissidents?

By equating the dialogue of characters with the politics of their authors, as Spechler does in a "methodological note," she is doing essentially what the prosecutors of Sinyavskiy and Daniel did when they held those two accountable for their literary creations. Yet, while trying to bridge the gulf between fiction and reality, between intent and interpretation, she confronts some basic problems of proving her case. She may be correct about a deliberate escalation of dissent that the *Novyy Mir* staff assembled and dispensed until the constellation of forces favorable to reform fell apart, with Khrushchev retired in disgrace, Tvardovskiy personally broken, and Solzhenitsyn driven into exile. But she may have overstated the orchestration of these episodes, since the literary scene was only a sideshow of political events that occupied center stage. For example, Tvardovskiy might have fancied himself the adroit impresario depicted here, but as Solzhenitsyn suggested, the editor was hamstrung by alcoholism, as well as by his expressed need to always show that he had "the party's interests at heart" (p. 253).

Despite its topheavy freight of methodology, however, *Permitted Dissent in the USSR* does highlight some central questions of ethics. For example, could these writers and editors set out to change closed institutions from the inside without succumbing to the pressures of self-interest and peer groups to rationalize loyal behavior accompanying verbal resistance? From the regime's perspective, their griping could be forgiven as long as they did not challenge the basic controls of a one-party state. Spechler even suggests that the party bosses used the storms brewing in the pages of *Novyy Mir* as a test for their trial balloons of economic reform. Can one, then, classify the balloon men among genuine dissidents in the underground? For an unsuccessful contributor to the literary journal the greatest danger was generally a rejection slip or a lesson read by his overseers at the Writers' Union; for samizdat authors, the sanctions were professional oblivion, imprisonment, or exile. No matter how much the audience of *Novyy Mir* might have overshadowed the minuscule readership of underground pamphlets, is the author correct in stressing the clout of the former against the impotence of the latter? One needs to recall in this connection that when the Brezhnev freeze followed upon Khrushchev's cultural thaw, all the journals fell into line, whereas the scattered purveyors of samizdat continued to air their ethnic, religious, and political grievances, at considerable personal risk.

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[9] See *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament*, tr. by Strobe Talbott, Boston, Little, Brown, 1974, pp. 73–76; Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, *The Oak and the Calf: A Memoir*, tr. by Harry Willetts, New York, Harper & Row, 1980; and Vladimir Lakshin, *Solzhenitsyn, Tvardovsky & Novy Mir*, tr. by Michael Glenny, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1980.

Spechler's most telling point, at least to this reviewer, concerns the fact that even in what she terms an "authoritarian, single-party mobilization regime," one does not find the conformity of the graveyard, but flocks of critics, from "a kind of loyal opposition" (p. 246) to more trenchant dissidents. Periods in which the regime actually "legitimized" dissent, as Khrushchev is said to have done in 1960-63, were quite rare, but their memory continues to inspire and sustain nonconformists. In other words, her analysis echoes Medvedev's observations that while "open societies" are never as unfettered as they claim, neither are "closed societies" entirely lacking in elbow room for critics to take a swing at the system.

IF ONE JOINS these authors in a retrospective of the Soviet scene, from the initial ebullience of the Khrushchev era to the drab decades of Brezhnev, one cannot take Gorbachëv's agenda of reform seriously. The Western media reinforce a negative appraisal. Their reports underscore the power of the old bureaucrats, the self-serving nature of the Kremlin's disarmament proposals, and the moribundity of a system that seems to be beyond a single leader's power to energize. Most scholars, while making finer distinctions than journalists, have also sifted through too much evidence of corruption and stagnation to give credibility to new promises of change and vitality.

Yet, there are reasons why Gorbachëv might ease pressure on dissenting opinion. For one thing, appetites for forbidden goods or thoughts cannot be prohibited; their partial satisfaction serves as a safety valve for popular grievances, letting the system keep creaking along. For another, the bloated system of police agents and informers needs the "criminals" to justify its existence. Soviet ideologists have found it counterproductive in the past to crack down on black markets or to trim the private garden plots, because much initiative goes into the provision of goods and services through these channels that cannot be obtained through official outlets. All-out war on dissenters involves a similar squandering of scarce resources—in the costly apparatus of surveillance and punishment, as well as in the lost skills of intellectuals driven out of professional jobs, not to mention the host of creative individuals who have been lost through emigration.

Indeed, there are recent straws in the wind that might augur a shift in cultural policy: the December 1985 plea of Yevgeniy Yevtushenko for greater freedom from censorship and more honesty in historical writing; CPSU Second Secretary Yegor Ligachëv's echoing of the same themes; and the recent resignation of hard-liner Georgiy Markov as head of the USSR Union of Writers after a stormy session of that organization's Congress. Gorbachëv himself sounded the themes of "glasnost'," and of honest confrontation of problems at the 27th Party Congress, which he concluded on March 6, 1986, with a call for "radical transformation in all spheres of life."[10] He lent credence to this slogan by replacing a dozen old-timers at the top of the party and government with such anti-Stalinist types as Aleksandr Yakovlev, party secretary in charge of propaganda.

The skeptics will point to the remaining fixtures, including Pëtr Demichev, who still is Culture Minister and a candidate member of the Politburo. They can also rightly conclude that little has improved in the world of the dissidents, except for token releases of Yelena Bonner, Aleksandr Shcharanskiy, and most recently, the latter's family. The annual totals of Jewish emigration, widely regarded as a barometer of the regime's openmindedness, hover below 2 percent of their crest in 1979, and the KGB continues to persecute religious and political activists.

However, if one places the subject of dissent in its broader cultural context, it appears that a new cycle of officially sanctioned criticism and change is in full swing. As happened with previous cycles, this one may lead to ferment among the intellectuals. When that happens, a new generation of dissidents may be expected to batter away at the inevitable obstacles to reform in those critical areas highlighted by an earlier generation of dissenters.

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[10] *The New York Times*, Mar. 7, 1986.

Correspondence

NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to:
The Editors,
Problems of Communism
US Information Agency,
301 4th Street, SW,
Washington, DC 20547, USA

CUBA IN CONTEXT

TO THE EDITORS: "Cuba's Charismatic Communism" by Jorge Domínguez (in the Sept.Oct. 1985 issue of this journal) is a model of your "essay-review" genre. It skillfully incorporates cogent discussion of the books under review within the larger framework of a critical and convincing evaluation of the Cuban phenomenon, viewed from a current perspective.

On a few matters of detail, however, some questions may be raised. On p. 102, column 1, Professor Domínguez refers to Cuba as "still economically underdeveloped." For the general reader, the connotation of "underdeveloped" could be misleading. It places Cuba in the same category as, e.g., Bolivia, Zambia, or Burma—and lends credence to Castro's recurrent claim that Cuba's poor economic performance since 1959 is largely due to its "underdevelopment" rather than to socialist bureaucracy compounded by his own mismanagement. Some other term, such as "limited development" or "with limited resources" might avoid Castro's semantic booby trap.

On p. 104, Professor Domínguez writes that Castro "saved the revolution in 1980." The use of the term "revolution" in this context, unfortunately, conforms with Cuban demagogic practice, suggesting a continuing, and perhaps permanent, revolution. All previous revolutions have admittedly come to an end, including the American Revolution, the French Revolution, the Russian Revolution, the Mexican Revolution, etc. In Mexico, a memory of the revolution is suggested in the designation of the permanent ruling party as the Institutional Revolutionary Party, but nobody is deceived. Only in Cuba does the government continue to be known officially as the Revolutionary Government of Cuba.

I would suggest that the Cuban Revolution, properly speaking, was over shortly after the economic debacle of 1970. For more than a decade now, Cuban institutions, closely modeled on those of the Soviet Union, have been stable—no more revolutionary than those of Havana's Soviet patron. What tinkering has taken place is marginal; it has had no revolutionary implications. Nor does Castro's recent, more drastic shifting of personnel indicate that revolutionary changes are in the offing. Castro's dominance of the Cuban state notwithstanding, he is more likely than not locked into the Soviet institutional mold for the foreseeable future.

Professor Domínguez explains Castro's quarter-century control of Cuba by his "mixture of vision, ruthlessness, and practicality" (p. 105). Another, perhaps decisive, element could be added: his charisma. It is almost a magic quality of personal, hypnotic dynamism, which he projects with a masterly rhetoric and a superb sense of theater. In this respect, he has no living peers. Among recent authoritarian leaders, the only other ones with charisma, ironically, would be Mussolini, Hitler, and possibly Perón.

Finally, concerning Professor Domínguez's remark that Cuban foreign policy "is not just an appendix of Soviet policy" (p. 105), it may be noted that ever since Cuba broke diplomatic relations with Israel in September 1973, the record shows a remarkable convergence between Soviet and Cuban foreign policies, particularly conspicuous in their voting behavior in the United Nations.

MAURICE HALPERIN
Professor Emeritus
Simon Fraser Univesity
Burnaby, BC

MR. DOMÍNGUEZ RESPONDS: Professor Maurice Halperin's letter is characteristically lively and wise. He is correct that Cuba's economic underdevelopment is quite different from that of some much poorer countries. His letter and my essay both make the point that a major, though not the only, reason for Cuba's economic troubles is mismanagement by Castro and his government. Moreover, his letter, and my essay's title, both emphasize Castro's use of charisma to serve his ends.

I believe that the Cuban political system can still be described as "revolutionary," a circumstance that is quite unusual, as Prof. Halperin aptly points out. We agree that much about this regime has become bureaucratized, and both of us have written about these trends elsewhere. One area that continues to show the Cuban government's "revolutionary" zeal is foreign policy. Precisely because the Cuban government is more self-consciously revolutionary in foreign policy than is the government of the USSR, it can be argued that Cuba is no mere Soviet appendage.

To say that Cuba has a margin of autonomy within the boundaries of Soviet hegemony (to which both Prof. Halperin and my essay referred) does not mean that Cuba opposes Soviet policy. The point is quite different. Beginning in the mid-1970's, Cuba led the Soviets into heightened engagement in Angola and in Central America. Far from being passive or simply reactive and responsive to Soviet policy—as would be the case with an "appendage," "proxy," or "puppet"—Cuba has used its relative autonomy in the direction of radicalizing Soviet foreign policy.

Jorge I. Domínguez
Professor of Government
Harvard University
Cambridge, MA

SOLZHENITSYN

TO THE EDITORS: In his review of my biography of Alexander Solzhenitsyn, in the September-October 1985 issue of *Problems of Communism*, John Dunlop seems to be more concerned with speculating about my motives and assassinating my character than with analyzing my work. I would like to set the record straight concerning some of his more outrageous insinuations and allegations.

1. Dunlop claims that I deceived Solzhenitsyn about the sort of biography I intended to write. "The Solzhenitsyns are emphatic," according to Dunlop, "that a 'life and works' (with the stress on the latter) was always discussed, never an intimate biography." Leaving aside the question of whether what I wrote is an "intimate biography" (I would say that it is not), let us suppose that Dunlop has understood the Solzhenitsyns correctly. Why, then, did Solzhenitsyn invite me to Zurich in September 1974 to discuss in some detail the contents of *Sanya* (the memoirs of his first wife, Natalya Reshetovskaya), to point out its many mistakes and distortions, and to make available to me his own annotated copy of the book? This was before he had agreed to cooperate with me on a biography. Why did Solzhenitsyn later allow his trusted cousin Veronika Stein to give me pages and pages of notes on Natalya Reshetovskaya and his stormy relations with her, including over a dozen pages on the detailed circumstances of Reshetovskaya's attempted suicide? Why did Solzhenitsyn allow his second wife to talk to me on the same subject (albeit at much shorter length)? And why did Solzhenitsyn make available to me a lengthy letter he had written to Reshetovskaya's mother detailing the miseries he had endured at Reshetovskaya's hands? I did not ask for any of this "intimate" material; it was offered to me voluntarily. Odd as it may seem, I had not heard of Reshetovskaya's suicide attempt until Mrs. Stein told me about it. More important, with the exception of the notes on *Sanya*, all of this material came to me well after my December 28, 1974, letter to Solzhenitsyn about my intentions, which Dunlop quotes with such apparent authority. It is disingenuous, to say the least, to cite this letter totally out of context, and absolute nonsense for Solzhenitsyn and other interviewees to claim that they would not have cooperated with me if they had understood my "change of emphasis," for they were the authors of that change.

2. Dunlop states that I "broke the agreement" with Solzhenitsyn not to ask any more questions of him after the 1977 interview in Vermont. As evidence for this assertion Dunlop cites a letter from Irina Alberti to Edward Ericson, Jr., evidently designed to help the latter with the Vermont-inspired attack on my book that appeared in the February 1985 issue of *Catholicism in Crisis* (quoted with such approval by Dunlop). I did not respond to that review, because of its intemperate tone; but the fact is that Alberti knows nothing about the case, since she was not present at my discussions with Solzhenitsyn. If Dunlop is in possession, as he says he is, of my correspondence with the Solzhenitsyns, how could he possibly have overlooked my letter to Natalya Solzhenitsyn of July 1, 1977? In it, I wrote that I still had questions for Solzhenitsyn, asked whether I should save them up, send them, or forget about them, and added: "I will rely on you and do whatever you advise." On October 3, 1977, Natalya Solzhenitsyn replied as follows: "Of course you may send your questions. We will answer them to the best of our abilities. You probably have a 'couple of dozen' already, don't you?" What agreement, *pace* Dunlop, was I supposed to have broken?

3. It is suggested that my resentment of Solzhenitsyn's cessation of cooperation with me in 1979 represents the "hidden agenda" of my book. To back this up, Dunlop relies almost exclusively on my preface. In it I went to great lengths to spell out the exact nature of my relations with Solzhenitsyn—not, as Dunlop seems to imagine, to protect myself, but to protect Solzhenitsyn from suggestions that my book enjoyed his endorsement or approval. Dunlop, following Ericson, twists my neutral account to insinuate that I "obviously believed it was unfair of Solzhenitsyn" to withdraw cooperation from me, and in front of my neutral phrase "one and only visit" places the words "he laments," whereas what I wrote was "In 1977, when I paid my one and only visit . . ." (after which I offered a sympathetic account of Solzhenitsyn's Vermont household). Dunlop also misrepresents me as Solzhenitsyn's "official translator" (an office that has never existed) in order to have me "resent deeply" my abandonment of work on the translation of *The Oak and the Calf*, and he asserts that it was at "about the same time" as the withdrawal of cooperation in 1979. My decision to abandon the translation was taken in 1975, four years earlier, and was inspired by a desire to get on with the biography. Furthermore, it was I who had put Solzhenitsyn in touch with my successor, Harry Willetts, and I was entirely satisfied that he should do the job instead of me.

4. I am accused of relying excessively on Solzhenitsyn's first wife, Natalya Reshetovskaya, as a source of information about him. To support this argument, Dunlop reproduces some extraordinary "Alice in Wonderland" arithmetic from the

Ericson review. According to Ericson, I have 54 footnotes referring to letters that Reshetovskaya sent me, and 157 referring to her book *Sanya*, making a total of 211, against which Ericson sets 134 footnotes drawn from my interviews with Solzhenitsyn and 8 from Solzhenitsyn's present wife, making a total of 142. Ergo, I am biased against Solzhenitsyn. While not accepting for a moment that this is a legitimate method of proving anything (what if each Solzhenitsyn footnote were to refer to pages of information, as is often the case, and each Reshetovskaya footnote to only a phrase, as is also often the case?), let us agree to play this game according to the Ericson-Dunlop rules. We would then be obliged to place on the Solzhenitsyn side of the scales the hundreds and hundreds of footnotes referring to Solzhenitsyn's autobiographical poem *The Way*, to the autobiographical passages in *The Gulag Archipelago*, to the autobiographical references in the literary works—above all Solzhenitsyn's own autobiography *The Oak and the Calf*. I will leave it to Ericson and Dunlop to pore over my notes and tote up the score, but I can assure them that it will come out at many, many times the number of notes referring to Reshetovskaya. How could Dunlop fail to realize such an elementary fact?

5. Dunlop states that I am "recklessly uncritical" of Reshetovskaya's version of her divorce from Solzhenitsyn. In support of this charge, Dunlop cites the *samizdat* notes of Veronika Stein, instancing my failure to take account of the KGB-manipulated young lawyer Alexeyeva, whose role in the Solzhenitsyns' divorce case is described by Galina Vishnevskaya in her book *Galina*. Dunlop also comments that although "it would seem to have been incumbent on Scammell" to interview the Rostropoviches, their names are "strangely absent" from my list of sources. Curiously enough, although Dunlop claims to have read Norman Podhoretz's review of my book in the February 1985 *Commentary*, as well as Veronika Stein's response to that review and a similar letter of mine in the June 1985 *Commentary*, he has unaccountably "overlooked" my reply to Veronika Stein which appeared in the July 1985 *Commentary* and in which I dealt with this charge. I hope I may be forgiven for simply quoting the relevant passage here: "I was in close touch with Mrs. Stein over a period of many years and interviewed her 'extensively,' as she admits in her letter. On many occasions I questioned her closely on Solzhenitsyn's divorce . . . and never once were 'the stormy events of 1972' or the name of Alexeyeva mentioned to me by Mrs. Stein. Yet now she accuses me of suppressing vital facts. If these particular facts were so vital, why did she never mention them at the time? As for the events described by Vishnevskaya, I would like to point out that over a period of three years, I sought an interview with her husband, Mstislav Rostropovich (I must confess that it never occurred to me to approach Vishnevskaya separately), and his secretary gave me his final answer on May 6, 1982: 'After many vacillations and uncertainties . . . Mr. Rostropovich has decided that he cannot participate in the interview you suggest.' I should add that of the hundreds of individuals I approached with a request to interview them on the subject of Solzhenitsyn, Rostropovich was the only one who refused." Presumably, Mr. Dunlop is aware of the fact that *Galina* appeared after my own book had been published.

6. Finally, I am charged with being unsympathetic to Solzhenitsyn's religious convictions and "unremittingly snide" about them. Since Dunlop is fond of quoting (and misrepresenting) my words to bolster his case, let me offer him another bonbon. I accept that my treatment of Solzhenitsyn's religious faith is sketchy and unsatisfactory. I was aware of it at the time of writing and have freely admitted it elsewhere. However, it is time to put an end to one particular mystery that seems to have provoked Dunlop and his friends beyond endurance, to wit, that of the identity of the "unnamed priest" who knew Solzhenitsyn well and on whose testimony I "rather slavishly" rely. Ericson, indeed, in a paroxysm of righteous indignation, challenges me to name the priest, for he and Mrs. Alberti believe that there was no such person and that my footnote referring to "private information" was a deliberate obfuscation. Very well, then. My source was Father Alexander Schmemann, Solzhenitsyn's one-time spiritual father and the priest whom Mrs. Alberti, Mrs. Stein, and other friends of Solzhenitsyn strenuously recommended that I see. I did not give his name, because at the time I interviewed him (and wrote my final chapters) he was dying of cancer, and I wished to protect him from the sort of self-righteous outbursts of the kind we are seeing now. Of course, it is open to zealous critics to concoct a theory whereby Father Schmemann was already so ill when he saw me that he was raving mad, or that I wrote down his words wrongly. The date of our meeting, however, would show that he was fully compos mentis and still able to conduct the business of St. Vladimir's Seminary, and I am confident I understood him correctly. Indeed, because he knew he was not long for this world, he almost certainly weighed his words more, rather than less, carefully than usual.

I will not bore your readers with a detailed rebuttal of Dunlop's other allegations, but I would like to make one general point. While reading his and Ericson's accusatory articles I had an inexplicable sense of *déja vu*. The jeering tone, the selective quotations, the snide (to use a revealingly favorite word of Dunlop's) insinuations, the heavy reliance on specially chosen negative reviews by other writers, the denying of almost any virtue to the book under attack, and the ad hominem imputations of dishonesty and malice, all combined with an evident disinclination to read the book under attack honestly and to engage with its arguments—where had I seen it all before? In the Soviet press, of course, when it was dealing with just about any book by Solzhenitsyn after *Ivan Denisovich* (and with that work too in later years). The difference is that for Solzhenitsyn, faced with a monolithic, government-controlled press, these attacks were highly dangerous, whereas in a free society they are but a flea bite. How ironic, however, that these methods should have migrated from the pages of *Literaturnaya Gazeta* via Solzhenitsyn's coterie to the columns of *Problems of Communism*.

MICHAEL SCAMMELL
Visiting Fellow
Russian Research Center
Harvard University
Cambridge, MA

MR. DUNLOP RESPONDS: In his evident anger at my review of his book, Michael Scammell overlooks the pains I took to emphasize the positive features of his biography even while criticizing its very substantial flaws.

Scammell's letter also reveals, no doubt inadvertently, his real attitude toward Solzhenitsyn. Scammell suggests that Edward Ericson and I represent a shadowy *Literaturnaya Gazeta*–style "Solzhenitsyn coterie" (presumably coordinated from Vermont). The curious thing is that Scammell, who has ridiculed Solzhenitsyn for his alleged paranoid fantasies about the KGB (for example, on p. 825), is here quick to ascribe disagreement with his own views to a conspiracy. What this implies about Scammell's attitude toward Solzhenitsyn is only too clear. I should add for the record that I have never met Mr. Solzhenitsyn. (I did exchange two letters with his wife, Natalya Svetlova, when I was gathering information for my review, which is certainly far fewer than Scammell has exchanged with her.)

Now for Scammell's specific points.

1. A life and works obviously requires a substantial amount of biographical material, and Solzhenitsyn generously cooperated with Scammell in this regard. But he and a number of other interviewees were led by Scammell to believe that he was writing a "life and works" and that the emphasis would be on the *works*. My criticism is that Scammell changed the rules in midstream.

2. Any fair-minded reader of Scammell's preface to *Solzhenitsyn: A Biography* will agree that it portrays Solzhenitsyn as niggardly in regard to his cooperation with Scammell. In fact, Solzhenitsyn was most generous. Scammell simply ducks my point that he made poor use of his time at Cavendish.

3. Whether *Solzhenitsyn: A Biography* is fair or not is, of course, for each reader to determine to his own satisfaction. I would argue that Scammell can hardly claim to be evenhanded, and in my review I adduce several examples of unfairness. Others have made the same criticism.

4. Scammell *did* rely very substantially on the testimony of Solzhenitsyn's estranged first wife. This is clear to anyone who reads the book attentively.

5. It would be best to let Veronika Stein and the Rostropoviches respond to this, if they so desire.

6. Scammell cavalierly admits that his treatment of Solzhenitsyn's religious faith is "sketchy and unsatisfactory." But this issue cannot be so blithely dismissed. After all, Solzhenitsyn is a religious man, one whose views in this regard have profoundly influenced his writing. A serious biographer is surely called upon to come to grips with this aspect of his subject's personality.

Scammell tries to brush off my review as a "flea bite," but this will not deflect careful readers from the defects of his volume.

JOHN B. DUNLOP
Associate Director
and Senior Fellow
The Hoover Institution
Stanford, CA

ERITREANS AND MOSCOW

TO THE EDITORS: Commenting on differences within the Eritrean nationalist movement in his review essay, "Soviet Designs on Africa" (*Problems of Communism*, January-February 1986), Barry M. Schutz writes: "Whereas from its inception, the ELF [Eritrean Liberation Front] attracted Arab support, the EPLF [Eritrean People's Liberation Front] turned to the Soviet Union and *eventually obtained support from the Soviet bloc*" (p. 81, emphasis added by this correspondent).

From my understanding of the Eritrean situation, gained from reading Eritrean material (including that of the EPLF) and discussions with Eritrean and Australian students who have visited areas of Eritrea under EPLF control, this is rather simplistic and, in the case of "Soviet-bloc support" for the EPLF, inaccurate. Perhaps Professor Schutz has made the mistake of thinking that merely because the ELF is "nationalist" it received Arab nationalist support and that because the EPLF is led by "Marxist-Leninists" they must have, of necessity, received support from the Soviet bloc.

Before the ELF split into two separate groups in 1970, it received political and military support from both radical Arab Ba'athist and conservative Arab regimes. It also received Cuban support in the form of military training for some of its guerrilla fighters. After the split, which saw the formation of the Marxist-Leninist-led EPLF, both groups continued to receive support from Arab governments, particularly Iraq and Syria. Cuba, however, suspended its aid in an unsuccessful attempt to force the groups to reunify (see Fred Halliday and Maxine Molyneux, *The Ethiopian Revolution*, London, Verso-New Left Books, 1981).

After the early 1970's, no state from the Soviet bloc assisted either the ELF or the EPLF. Certainly, the weapons the Eritreans received from Syria and Iraq included ones manufactured in the Soviet bloc, but it appears that these were given as a result of independent policy decisions on the part of the two Ba'athist regimes, and not at the request of the Soviets.

Other than arguing for Eritrean independence at the United Nations in the 1950's, the Soviets did nothing to directly support the Eritrean national liberation movement. They preferred instead to attempt to utilize the historical and religious links between Russia and Ethiopia to try to gain a foothold in Ethiopia and woo Haile Selassie away from his US benefactors. The last thing the Soviets wanted to do was support Selassie's opponents. "When we were fighting the US-backed Haile Selassie regime, we received no help from the Soviets, nor did we ask for it," EPLF spokesman Tsegai Dinish told West European journalists in May 1978 (cited in *Arab Liberation News* [Melbourne], No. 10, May 1978).

Soviet opposition to the EPLF was a fact long before the 1974 Ethiopian revolution that toppled Selassie and brought to power the military regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam. The Soviets characterized the EPLF as "Maoist." Indeed, Ramadan Nur and Isais Afeworki, the two leading figures of the EPLF's clandestine core party organization—the Popular Revolution Party—received political and military training in China in the late 1960's (Halliday and Molyneux). As recently as 1976, the EPLF began work on Eritrean translations of Mao Zedong's major writings (*Liberation* [magazine of Eritreans for Liberation in North America—New York], April 1977). When it became evident that the Soviets supported the new Ethiopian regime and thoroughly opposed Eritrean independence, the EPLF contrasted this "betrayal" with Stalin's "correct" line on Eritrea in the 1950's. None of this endeared the EPLF to the Soviet bloc.

As for Cuba's earlier support for the ELF, this was during Fidel Castro's and Che Guevara's "Tricontinental period," when Cuba was making a pitch for leadership of the "world revolutionary movement." This stance often led to foreign policy differences between Cuba and the Soviet Union. (Whether these differences were genuine contradictions or a clever "dual tactic" is now academic, since the mid-1970's saw Castro willing to put his revolution and its soldiers at the disposal of Soviet foreign policy objectives.)

Once the Soviet Union and its allies intervened militarily on Addis Ababa's behalf against the EPLF, there were even fewer possibilities for an EPLF-Soviet alliance. After 1977, when the EPLF found itself struggling militarily against Ethiopian and Soviet-bloc forces, its policy toward the Soviets followed a complicated, zig-zag course.

One might have thought the Soviet attack would have strengthened the Maoist, "anti-Soviet revisionist" component of the EPLF's ideological leadership. Indeed, in 1978, the group announced: "The war in Eritrea is no longer a war against the Ethiopian fascist junta, but a war between the Eritrean people and the Soviet Union" (statement issued by the Rome office of EPLF on November 30, 1978). However, by this time, China had forsaken the EPLF and many other "Maoist" and Marxist-Leninist-led Third World movements in order to improve its relations with Third World governments. There were reports that "ultra-leftists" in the EPLF were being purged (read "Maoist" for "ultra-leftist").

Although still fulminating publicly against the Soviet-backed military intervention against them, the EPLF sent instructions to its overseas support groups to halt their often strident anti-Soviet polemics, saying, "We have never for any reason considered the Soviet Union as our enemy, as an imperialist force, a counter-revolutionary force" ("EPLF's Message to Italian and North American Eritrean Student Organizations!" cited in *Eritrea: Revolution or Capitulation?* New York, EFLNA, 1978). The EPLF even held discussions with Soviet officials in East Germany concerning a possible peace agreement, although these talks ended in failure (Halliday and Molyneux).

In view of China's non-support, the tendency of radical and leftist regimes in the area to look favorably upon the new pro-Soviet Ethiopian regime, and the EPLF's dogmatic policy of "opposition to US imperialism as the main enemy" (stubbornly clung to, even though the United States had lost any foothold in Ethiopia after 1976, and even though the actual "main enemy" had become the Soviet-backed forces), it appeared that by 1978, the EPLF was preparing for some kind of compromise.

After putting the EPLF forces on the defensive, causing them to withdraw to the Western Sahel region and relinquish control of the main towns and ports in central Eritrea, the Soviets and Ethiopians were no longer interested in any compromises, however. The war bogged down to a positional standoff, with the EPLF (the ELF no longer controls any significant areas of Eritrea) fiercely defending its "liberated territory" against periodic and savage Soviet-Ethiopian offensives.

By 1982, the EPLF was again condemning the Soviet Union in no uncertain terms, resorting to the appellation of "hegemonist" to describe Soviet policies (Halliday and Molyneux). This term, in Chinese and Maoist phraseology, usually indicates a characterization of Soviet policy as expansionist and empire-building, while still differentiating it from the classical Leninist concept of capitalist "imperialism."

Thus, the EPLF has never had a "fraternal" relationship with the Soviet bloc. On a number of occasions, it has sought discussions with the Soviets on peace proposals, but these have failed to produce any results, due to Eritrean insistence on total independence from Ethiopia. While the EPLF has wavered over the question of how to appraise the USSR and the Soviet bloc, it has nevertheless continued to confront Soviet-bloc forces on the battlefield. Far from extending any significant support to the EPLF, Moscow has sought, initially, to discourage that group's struggle, and after 1976 and the conclusion of an alliance with Mengistu's Ethiopian regime, to crush the EPLF militarily, enlisting the support of Soviet allies—Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Cuba. To the best of my knowledge, this remains the situation in 1986.

RAYMOND WATSON
South Yarra
Australia

MANAGERS AND MOTIVATION IN USSR

TO THE EDITORS: Vladimir Kontorovich's article "Discipline and Growth in the Soviet Economy" (*Problems of Communism*, November-December 1985) mentions the relaxation of discipline attendant to a policy of "trust in cadres." This is described solely in terms of a lessening of pressure from above. However, as all relationships are bidirectional, it can be seen that "trust in cadres" also reduced dependency upward, i.e., it took away carrots as well as sticks.

The purges and the rapid rise of the Brezhnev generation led to a demographic synchronization of elites, so

CORRECTIONS

In the article "Gorbachev's First Year: Building Power and Authority" by Thane Gustafson and Dawn Mann (*Problems of Communism*, May-June 1986) Nikolay Kruchina was incorrectly identified as head of the CPSU Central Committee's Administrative Organs Department (p. 7, fn. 42). His correct position is Administrator of Affairs in the CPSU CC. Also, in the first line of fn. 48, p. 8, the name should have been Vladimir Brezhnev, not Yuriy Brezhnev.

that retirement and death rates among upper and middle management were relatively low over an extended period of time. This, along with "trust in cadres," meant few openings for promotion. As I argue in an article entitled "The Psychology of Soviet Corruption, Indiscipline, and Resistance to Reform," (*Political Psychology* [New York], Vol. 7, No. 1: "Cut off from the chain of dependency up and control down, office holders are cast adrift." Discipline is centralizing, while lack of it is conducive to local leaders' pursuing of local or private interests.

Studies of Western organizations show certain regularities in the behavior of the "stuck"—those with low opportunities for promotion (See R. M. Kanter, *Men and Women of the Corporation*, New York, Basic Books, 1977). Low-opportunity personnel characteristically have a low-risk, security-minded orientation toward their jobs. Also, career mobility is directly related to commitment to the organization. Finally, belief in the fairness of the organization is proportional to one's chances for promotion. In the light of these findings, the likely indirect demoralizing effects of a "trust in cadres" policy are readily seen.

Kontorovich points to the gains made in the Soviet railroad industry from a tightening of discipline, and to the importance of several well-publicized firings to this discipline campaign. But for the long haul, carrots are needed, as well as sticks. The removal of a few managers for abuses or incompetence will not produce enough career mobility (i.e., enough job openings) to truly motivate managers at all levels. What is needed is a retirement policy that will provide a continuous flow of job openings, yet Gorbachëv has appointed no one younger than himself to the Politburo.

JEFFRY KLUGMAN, MD
Yale University,
New Haven

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COVER: A transaction at a rural fair in Luanzian County of China's Hebei Province. Photo by Eastfoto.

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Problems of Communism

Articles

Commercializing China's Rural Cadres

Jean C. Oi

Rural China is changing rapidly. Collective work is giving way to individual farming, and state quotas are being replaced by contractual arrangements between peasants and the state. Accompanying this commercialization of agriculture is a significant change in the tasks of rural government. Once primarily implementers of government policy and managers of agricultural production, village governments now perform functions akin to those of general contractor, trustee, and franchising company, as well as of salesman and broker.

Cuban Economy in the 1980's

Jorge Pérez-López

At the Third Congress of the Cuban Communist Party, Fidel Castro expressed considerable displeasure with the Cuban economy in the first half of the 1980's, whose performance is itself probably overstated owing to price inflation. Falling prices for oil and sugar on the international market have aggravated the nation's balance of payments and debt problems. Castro's response—to tinker with the planning bureaucracy and to launch a new "revolutionary counteroffensive"—appears to threaten Cuba's modest progress toward rationalization and marketization of its economy, a program that has been under way since the mid-1970's. Should Havana proceed in the indicated direction, one can expect bad times ahead for the Cuban economy.

The Soviet-Syrian Relationship

Pedro Ramet

The relationship between the Soviet Union and Syria over the last decade provides a good example of the limits of a superpower's influence on a regional client state. Despite massive Soviet assistance—especially military assistance—the USSR was unable to deter Syria's involvement or shape its course of action with respect to the Palestinian Liberation Organization in Lebanon. Yet, in both 1976 and 1983, Syria appeared to the Soviets to be too important an ally to abandon. Thus, the Soviet Union acquiesced in Syrian actions, even as it tried to limit the damage to its relations with the PLO and other regional actors.

Essay-reviews

Sources of Soviet Foreign Conduct

William Taubman

Western scholars and statesmen agree that the USSR has been plagued by serious internal decline even as it achieved unprecedented military power and made vigorous efforts to expand externally. There is less agreement about the implications of these seemingly contradictory trends. Do Soviet domestic difficulties afford the West an opportunity to check Soviet expansionism, or do they actually fuel the expansionist drive? On this question, the debate in the West goes on.

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Europe's Defense Today

John C. Reppert

Recent events have again focused US attention on the issue of West European security. Effective security in this vital area depends not so much on new weapons systems or arms control agreements as on an adequate defense and deterrence based on an understanding of Soviet intentions and inclinations. A lack of appreciation of the peculiarities of Soviet thought has often resulted in the past in costly programs that have unnecessarily threatened or confused the Soviets and have degraded Western security.

Grenada's "Revo"

Timothy Ashby

The vast collection of documents seized by US military personnel during the joint US-OECS action in Grenada provides unique insight into the inner workings of a Third World Marxist-Leninist regime. This review of the first spate of studies on the revolutionary period in Grenada shows a tendency on the part of most authors to make selective use of the documents and to downplay both Soviet strategic interest in Grenada and Maurice Bishop's Marxist-Leninist ideological tendencies.

Chinese Socialism's Record on Food and Agriculture

Bruce Stone

Despite the considerable emphasis given to China's agrarian revolution both in China and in the West, two recent but quite different studies agree that Chinese socialism has been no panacea for the problems of farm production development and food economy in this largest of peasant societies. At best, they say, Chinese leaders have bartered for modest advantages in solving one set of problems by accepting serious disadvantages of a more intractable and far-reaching nature; at worst, they have stultified development, exacerbated rural poverty, and courted catastrophe.

Commercializing China's Rural Cadres

Jean C. Oi

Rural China is changing rapidly. Collective work is giving way to individual farming, and state quotas are being replaced by contractual arrangements between peasants and the state. Chinese agriculture is becoming increasingly commercialized, and there is a shift under way from production for subsistence to production for the market. This is being accompanied by greater crop specialization, a shift to cash crops, and the development of local small-scale industry.

The extent of commercialization is evident in published government figures on agricultural production. From 1979 to 1985, the acreage sown in grain decreased by 6.6 percent, while that sown in cash crops increased by 31.8 percent.[1] Between 1984 and 1985 alone, the acreage set aside for grain production decreased by some 2.7 percent, from 78.3 to 75.6 percent of total land under cultivation.[2] The value of economic cash crops, in terms of percentage of monetary value of total agricultural output, rose steadily from 23.3 percent in 1978, to 29.4 percent in 1983, to 31.8 percent in 1984;[3] and the commodity production rate reached 53.3 percent of total production in 1985.[4] Furthermore, the number of goods covered by state quota and procurement guidelines decreased from a high of 180 to 39 (24 of which are medicinal items),[5] and unified procurement of grain and cotton was abolished in favor of contractual agreements with the state. By the end of 1984, specialized households (*zhuanye hu*)—those that specialize on producing one item or crop[6]—numbered approximately 22.5 million, or 14 percent of the rural population. Based on available figures, their numbers could grow by as much as 63.9 percent over the 1983 total of 16 million.[7]

Jean C. Oi is Assistant Professor of Government at Lehigh University (Bethlehem, PA) and Research Associate of the East Asian Institute, Columbia University (New York). Among her numerous writings on Chinese peasant politics and agricultural reforms is State and Peasant in Contemporary China *(forthcoming). The author would like to thank participants of the workshop on "Economic Reform and Emerging Patterns of Rural Change in China" and Andrew Walder for their comments on an earlier draft of this essay. This work was supported by Lehigh University and by the Joint Committee on Chinese Studies of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council, with funds provided by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation.*

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[1] The area sown in grain decreased from 1,810 million *mu* to 1,690 million *mu*; the area sown in cash crops increased from 220 million *mu* to 290 million *mu*. See *Renmin Ribao* (Beijing, Overseas ed.), Jul. 21, 1985, p. 1. A *mu* is 0.1647 acres.

[2] "Brief Look at the 1985 Economy," *Beijing Review*, Jan. 13, 1986, p. 6.

[3] *Renmin Ribao*, Mar. 11, 1985, p. 2.

[4] Peng Baoquan, "Development and Reform in Commerce," *Beijing Review*, Jul. 29, 1985, pp. 25–27.

[5] Duan Yingbi, "The Reform of the System of Unified Procurement of Agricultural Goods Further Enlivens the Village Economy," *Nongye Jingji Wenti* (Beijing), No. 3, 1985, p. 42. There are some indications that there may be a degree of recentralization of control over the price and supply of vegetables. This is in response to skyrocketing prices for these items in the urban areas. The government has demanded that suburban areas guarantee certain acreage to vegetables and that state-owned grocers control most of the sources of ordinary vegetables. A ceiling price has also been imposed for certain vegetables. Tian Jiyun, "On the Present Economic Situation and Restructuring the Economy," *Beijing Review*, Feb. 10, 1986, p. x.

[6] Specialized households are peasant households that produce one item or crop, either cash crops or grain, often under contract with collective or state companies. Within the category of *zhuanye hu* are *zhongdian hu*, "keypoint households," who were singled out for special assistance. Beginning in 1984, the designation "keypoint households" seemed to go out of use (although it is still used on occasion); they became known simply as *zhuanye hu*. There are also *keji hu*, "scientific households," that use the latest agricultural techniques and equipment. See *Zhongguo Nongmin Bao* (Beijing), Apr. 24, 1983, p. 3.

[7] A more detailed statistical breakdown shows some types (cont. p. 2)

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Not surprisingly, the shift in agricultural production and procurement patterns has affected circulation of commodities and the growth of rural industry. For example, between 1978 and 1983 the number of urban and rural free markets increased by 30 percent, from 33,302 to some 48,000; rural markets alone increased from 33,302 to 43,500 during the same period (there were no urban free markets in 1978). Volume of sales in these rural free markets increased even more rapidly, as total turnover of trade registered a 162 percent increase.[8] As for the industrial output value of rural factories, which in 1985 employed about 20 percent of the rural work force, the 1985 total was 230 billion yuan, or nearly 30 percent of the national total; this constituted two-thirds of the total value of the nation's agricultural output.[9]

The commercialization of agriculture has been accompanied by significant change in the tasks of rural government. Prior to the reforms, "the state set the plan, and the peasant fulfilled the plan." The primary work of local-level cadres was to ensure that peasants filled their assigned quotas and that the state plan was correctly implemented. Little initiative was required. What, when, and how to plant, as well as what, when, and how much to sell, were all decided at the upper levels.[10]

Much of this has changed in recent years. With the advent of the production responsibility system,[11] cadres now must oversee commercial transactions, be good managers, and most important, have the skill and ingenuity to help peasants prosper in China's new, market-oriented environment. The abolition in 1985 of the unified procurement system, the mechanism by which the government monopolized the purchase and distribution of agricultural commodities, has thrust a new responsibility upon local cadres to find markets for the peasants' crops. As a result, cadres have been appointed by the state to be the vanguard and "lead the masses to consolidate and develop the rural production system, to diversify the economy, [and] to develop commodity production, education, science, and culture."[12]

What has been slower to change is the hold cadres have on power. To be sure, the decollectivization of agricultural production has eroded much of the cadres' former power, which was based on their position within the bureaucratic hierarchy and exercised through control of resources that determined peasants' economic well-being.[13] Moreover, the centralized plan is no longer all-encompassing, and peasants have the right to engage in entrepreneurial activity, participate in the market, even leave their villages. But cadres have not so much lost power as refocused it. The personalized authority of cadres and clientelistic politics characteristic of the pre-reform period have not been eliminated; they have merely taken on a different form. Although cadres no longer can act as "local emperors"—allocating work assignments, administering work points, and regulating private plots—they are expected to take more initiative, be middlemen brokering business deals, act as entrepreneurs.

Power is now much more contingent on the skill of the cadres themselves, on their ability to manipulate local forces within the context of the reforms. Markets have mushroomed; but the markets are not impersonal. Access to opportunities or information is unequal and dispensed by cadres as a favor. Contracts are

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of activity growing faster than others. Between 1983 and 1984 the number of specialized households engaged in agricultural production increased from 34.2 to 35.9 percent; those engaged in animal husbandry decreased from 32.5 to 24.6 percent; those engaged in rural industry (*wugong*) increased from 11.7 to 14.4 percent; while those engaged in transport, construction, commerce, and service trades increased from a total of 13.6 to 19.2 percent. See ibid., Dec. 11, 1984, p. 2.

[8] G. William Skinner, "Rural Marketing in China: Repression and Revival," *The China Quarterly* (London), September 1985, pp. 393–413.

[9] Dai Yannian, "Reform Logs Sound Results," *Beijing Review*, Feb. 10, 1986, p. 4; and "Rural Industries Take on Technology," ibid., p. 5.

[10] For a classic description of the "ways to get ahead and along" in China up to the mid-1960's, prior to the Cultural Revolution, see Michel Oksenberg, "Getting Ahead and Along in Communist China: The Ladder of Success on the Eve of the Cultural Revolution," in John Wilson Lewis, Ed., *Party Leadership and Revolutionary Power in China*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970, pp. 304–47.

[11] The production responsibility system is the keystone of the post-1978 agricultural reforms that decentralized responsibility for agricultural production to small work groups, households, and individuals. A bewildering number of variations exists, but they may be summarized as systems in which contractual agreements with differential compensation according to work are made between work groups, households, or individuals for the completion of agricultural production. The two major variants of the system are the "contracting production to the household" (*baochan daohu*) and the "contracting tasks to the household" (*baogan daohu*). The former retains collective unified management and distribution of income. The household or group still works for the collective and is provided with the necessary agricultural inputs and is paid a wage for that work. The peasant household's responsibility is to manage the day-to-day production and care of the fields. The household must turn in minimum harvest at the end of the year to receive compensation in the form of work points. Bonuses are given for overproduction. The *baogan daohu* system is much closer to the system of private farming. The field is contracted to the household, and it has total responsibility for the planning and production of the harvest, with no provision of inputs by the collective. The household must sell a set amount to the state, pay set fees to the collective, but then has exclusive authority over the surplus, the sale of which is its profit. For a concise summary of the different forms of the responsibility system, see Kathleen Hartford, "Socialist Agriculture is Dead; Long Live Socialist Agriculture! Organizational Transformations in Rural China," in Elizabeth J. Perry and Christine Wong, Eds., *The Political Economy of Reform in Post-Mao China*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1985, pp. 31–61.

[12] Ai Zhiguo, "Party Shifts Consolidation to Countryside," *Beijing Review*, Dec. 30, 1985, p. 5; also *Nongmin Ribao* (Beijing), Feb. 5, 1985, p. 1, Feb. 7, 1985, p. 1, Apr. 9, 1985, p. 1, and Apr. 19, 1985, p. 1.

[13] For a detailed discussion of the basis of team leader power, see Jean C. Oi, "Communism and Clientelism: Rural Politics in China," *World Politics* (Princeton), January 1985, pp. 238–66.

commonplace, but they do not necessarily protect the rights of peasants.

This essay examines the new role of local rural government[14] and its effects on cadre power and behavior. The first section describes the increasingly commercialized duties that village governments have had to undertake as a consequence of the agricultural reforms. Because rural governments perform functions akin to that of general contractor, trustee, and franchising company, as well as that of salesman and broker, for the sake of convenience and familiarity, I have chosen to use such terms throughout this essay. No other purpose is intended. The second section analyzes how the commercialization of the economy and the new tasks of rural government have affected local-level cadres, their image, skills, and road to success.[15]

New Duties of Village Government

General Contractor. The responsibility system has transformed the primary function of village government from that of implementer of government policy and manager of agricultural production to that of general contractor of collective property. While individual households have become the basic unit of production, the means of production—most important the land—remains collectively owned. The task of rural government is to oversee the allocation of contracts to individuals or groups of peasant households who thereby gain the right to work this property.

Under the initial terms of the responsibility system, village cadres evaluated each piece of land and distributed the land on an equitable basis. Once the land was divided, they managed the contracts and saw to it that village members paid their various fees and taxes to both the state and the collective. As the reforms took root, however, local governments had to contend with a complex and somewhat contradictory set of circumstances with regard to land. In some areas, particularly where sideline production and small-scale local enterprises had developed rapidly, there was a significant movement away from agricultural production to nonagricultural enterprises and sidelines. Indeed, according to official statistics, by the end of 1985, township enterprises had absorbed some 60 million surplus farmhands.[16]

This trend is expected to grow. According to leading economist Xue Muqiao, in highly developed areas such as Wuxi, in Jiangsu Province, 40 percent of the rural labor power is engaged in industrial production, with almost every family in the area having at least one member working in a factory.[17] And Du Runsheng, director of the Rural Development Research Center of the State Council, has announced that the state plans to have transferred over 50 percent of the surplus labor from agricultural production to nonagricultural departments by the end of the century.[18]

The lure of nonagricultural jobs is higher income. Statistics from different areas show varying degrees of disparity between fieldworker and rural factory worker. In one village, notes a March 1985 *Nongmin Ribao* (Peasant's Daily) report, those who worked in the fields earned 240 yuan per year, while those who worked in a village paper factory earned 600 yuan.[19] Another, more recent report, presumably more general in scope, states that a peasant earns less than 1,000 yuan from work in the fields, while one who works in the local factories earns 3,000 yuan a year.[20] Regardless of the precise numbers, the difference is substantial.

The possibility of higher incomes combined with the low profits and the high costs of farming, particularly grain production, have resulted in a surplus of land in parts of China.[21] In areas where sidelines and nonagri-

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[14] The reforms resulted in the break up of the commune system and the abolition of the administrative units known as commune, brigade, and production team. The new system often consists of these same units, but with different names and somewhat different functions. The commune system had served as the locus of local power, integrating politics, administration, and economics into one unit. The new system divides these functions among several institutions. Party committees handle party affairs; townships handle administrative and government functions. Economic affairs are usually managed by collective economic entities. For the most part, the commune is now known as the township (*xiang*) and the brigade is called the village (*cun*). Some areas still call the groupings below the village "production teams," other areas call them production groups or village small groups. For a discussion of the reorganization of local government in the countryside, see Frederick W. Crook, "The Reform of the Commune System and the Rise of the Township-Collective-Household System," in US Congress Joint Economic Committee, *China's Economy Looks Toward the Year 2000, Vol. 1: The Four Modernizations*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1986, pp. 354–75.

[15] The research on which this paper is based consists of published material and interviews that I conducted with peasants and cadres. Some interviews I conducted in Hong Kong in the summer of 1984 with recent émigrés from China; other interviews I conducted in China while on visits to rural areas during the summers of 1984, 1985, and 1986.

[16] "1985, 1986 and Beyond . . . ," *Beijing Review*, Jan. 6, 1986, p. 4. At the end of 1984, 50 million peasants were employed in rural factories. See "Rural Industries Take on Technology," in ibid., Feb. 10, 1986, p. 5.

[17] Xue Muqiao, "Rural Industry Advances Amidst Problems," ibid., Dec. 16, 1985, p. 18.

[18] Ibid., June 24, 1985, p. 17.

[19] *Nongmin Ribao*, Mar. 23, 1985, p. 2.

[20] "Rural Industries Take on Technology," *Beijing Review*, Feb. 10, 1986, p. 5. It is unclear whether these are national averages or when these figures apply. Working in local factories has always been a coveted position in the Chinese countryside. See Jean C. Oi, "State and Peasant in Contemporary China: The Politics of Grain Procurement," Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1983.

[21] On the high costs and low profit of grain farming see Jean C. Oi, *State and Peasant in Contemporary China*, forthcoming, Ch. 8.



A township cement plant in Huairou County, near Beijing.

—*Beijing Review*, May 13, 1985, p. 2

cultural jobs are booming, peasants want to dispose of or at least decrease the amount of land they had originally contracted for under the responsibility system. A survey of one county in Jiangsu, for example, found that 475 households out of 1,266 said that they wanted to reduce the amount of land they had contracted—a request that if granted would reduce the land under contract by 11.7 percent. Only 81 households said that they wanted to contract more land, and only for an extra 116 *mu* at that.[22]

In response, some local village and township governments have set up "land transfer companies" (*tudi zhuanbao gongsi*, literally "land contract transfer company"). These companies take over farm land that has been returned to the collective by peasants who no longer wish to cultivate it. Peasants who return their land still must pay monthly their assigned share of the collective public-welfare fund.[23] In return, the company allows them to buy a set amount of grain rations at the state price. The company then contracts the land to a third party, known as "expert cultivators." These cultivators work the land, receive a parity price for their crop, and receive a subsidy from the company for working the land. The head of the village peasants committee doubles as the manager of these land transfer companies and supervises the execution of the contracts.[24]

Some village governments have allowed, and in some cases promoted, the concentration of landholdings by specialized households. A few households, or in some cases even only one peasant or household, have been granted contracts to farm all of a village's arable land, particularly for the cultivation of grain.[25] A survey conducted in 1984 in two villages just outside Beijing, for example, found that 16 expert tillers, constituting 11 percent of the villages' total labor power, contracted to farm 94 percent (1,030 *mu*) of all the grain land.[26] In a village in Liaoning, 18 households contracted to farm 5,000 *mu* of land; one household alone contracted 600 *mu*.

Such large grain specialized households bring to mind the managerial farmers of pre-1949 China.[27] The households farm the land themselves and hire laborers during the busy season to help them work the fields. Most of these hired hands are fellow villagers.[28] The difference is that today the land remains the property of the collective, and the specialized household that runs the farm must pay an annual fixed levy to the collective as well as tax to the state.

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[22] Jiangsu Province Jintan County Agricultural Works Department, "New Problems and New Measures," *Nongcun Gongzuo Tongxun* (Beijing), No. 11, 1984, p. 30.

[23] In an example from Hebei, the monthly cost was 3 yuan.

[24] See, e.g., "Methods to Concentrate Land in the Hands of Expert Tillers," *Nongcun Gongzuo Tongxun*, No. 8, 1984, pp. 14–15.

[25] In one case, four women contracted all of the village's land. *Shanxi Nongmin* (Taiyuan), Nov. 20, 1984, p. 2. In another case, one household contracted all 167 *mu* of a village's land. See *Zhejiang Ribao* (Hangzhou), Mar. 29, 1985, p. 2. Also see *Zhongguo Nongmin Bao*, Dec. 6, 1984, p. 1, which reports a case where only 31 out of 220 households (14 percent) had contracted any of the village's 571 *mu* of land.

[26] "Land Concentration in Various Localities," *Nongcun Gongzuo Tongxun*, No. 12, 1984, p. 33.

[27] See Philip C. C. Huang, *The Peasant Economy and Social Change in North China*, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1985, Ch. 4.

[28] In one village I visited, the hired hands received 200 yuan a month. This village was large, with over 900 households, and extremely rich. It had 27 different village enterprises, which employed one-third of the village population (1,100 out of 3,300). The land was never divided equally. When the land was first divided in 1979, it was contracted to work groups, not to individual households. It then went directly from contracting to groups to contracting to large grain specialized households. Interview in China in summer 1985.

A variation (which appears still to be in the experimental stage) allows individual households to run family farms. From available descriptions, it appears that peasants, regardless of their native region, may contract land from any of the experimental state agricultural stations located throughout the country. The contract binds the peasant to turn over to the state a specific amount of grain and at a specific yield per *mu*. Any surplus produced on the land is the property of the peasant. Under this type of arrangement, in return for a set fee, the agricultural teams from which the land is rented provide the family farmers with access to fertilizer, insecticide, and other agricultural inputs, as well as technical and investment support. Such an arrangement is doubly attractive to enterprising peasants, since it enables them to take on potentially lucrative contracts outside their own villages. In Jiangsu, for example, a peasant from Hebei Province contracted with an agricultural station to produce a total of 27,500 *jin* of grain, with a minimum of 450 *jin* per *mu*. The peasant sold his newly built house in his home village and built another home on the land contracted from the agricultural technical team. He then was able to concentrate on grain production. He produced 100,000 *jin* of grain, which yielded a net profit of over 10,000 yuan in one year.[29]

Where industries and sidelines are well developed, some villages have turned farming into a division ("workshop," or *chejian*) within their industrial enterprises to ensure that grain cultivation is successfully undertaken. In this system, the agricultural and industrial sectors are merged (*nonggong yitihua*). The industrial enterprise manages agricultural production and hires peasants to work the crop land. Those hired are then given the title "peasant-workers." In practice, they are grain specialized households that work as subcontractors for the factory. Unlike grain specialized households in standard arrangements, however, their agricultural expenses are the responsibility of the factory, similar to the *baochan daohu* form of the responsibility system.[30] A set production target is established for each *mu* of land; any production above that level is the individual peasant-worker's to keep. Receipts from the sale of the fixed output of grain belongs to the collective enterprise. Not all peasants are eligible to participate in this arrangement, however. To become a member of the collective enterprise as a peasant-worker, the peasant household must already have attained the status of a commercial grain specialized household, that is, one that has contracted for more than 3 *mu* of land from its village.

An example from Jiangsu provides a detailed picture of how the factory-farm system works. Nineteen villages in one township incorporated 286 grain specialized households into its industrial enterprises to work 946 *mu* of land. In one of the villages, 16 grain specialized households, each of which had previously sold more than 3,000 *jin* of grain annually, became part of the village enterprise system as its specialized agricultural workers.[31] The local factory set minimum production at 1,300 *jin* of grain per *mu*. The collective enterprise paid each peasant-worker 80 yuan per *mu* to cover costs for inputs and 160 yuan per *mu* for wages. The peasant was liable for any extra expenses and was solely responsible for meeting production targets. The receipts from the sale of the 1,300 *jin* of grain, as well as any subsidy the peasant-worker may have received from the commune, went to the collective enterprise; all surplus grain was the property of the peasant-worker. The enterprise paid the collective 12 yuan per *mu* for the agricultural tax, and 8 yuan per *mu* to the team for the collective's public-welfare and accumulation funds.[32]

A similar system pays peasant-workers a salary equal to the average wage of local factory workers and provides a set bonus for every 100 *jin* increase of output per *mu* of land. To encourage local peasants to continue to work the land, one village supplemented fieldworkers' earnings by assuming the costs of water, electricity, the agricultural tax, as well as such other expenses as family planning and education fees. In addition, its factories paid peasant-workers a supplement of 81 yuan for each *mu* of cultivated land.[33]

Regardless of which of these methods is used, the trend indicates a desire on the part of the state to concentrate landholdings (usage) and increase the number of specialized households.[34] Specialization is seen as a healthy and efficient use of land. For one thing, it enables local governments to merge the many scattered plots that resulted when the land was divided equally among villagers under the initial terms of the responsibility system.[35] For another, argue some Chinese economists, it is the only way to achieve diversification of the rural economy.[36] In its efforts to develop commodity production, the government, while concerned about the potential for disparities in income, has supported this position by initiating regulations that give the various types of special-status households privileged access to larger amounts of state-priced inputs, including chemical fertilizer, animal feed, and loans for enterprise expansion.[37] Moreover, the government has linked access to particular inputs to different types of commodity production. Specialized households engaged in secondary food production, for example, are provided with grain ration coupons so that they will be free to concentrate on their specialty production. And those who raise geese are given ration coupons to buy state-priced grain, which frees them from having to grow their own. Grain specialized households, on the other hand, are provided bonuses of such inputs as low-priced high-quality fertilizer.

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[29] "Methods to Concentrate Land in the Hands of Expert Tillers," loc. cit., pp. 14–15. For a discussion of the different types of contracting in Xinjiang of state farm land to former farm workers, see Keith Griffin, "Rural Development in an Arid Region: The Case of Xinjiang, China," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association of Asian Studies, Chicago, March 21–23, 1986. The method described in this essay is not mentioned by Griffin. A *jin* (catty) is 1.1023 pounds.

[30] See fn 11.

[31] In addition to this specialized workshop within the enterprise, there were four other specialized workshops dealing with agriculture: mechanized plowing; plant protection; irrigation; and agricultural technology. These four service workshops employed over 40 peasants who worked on a responsibility system based on quotas and bonuses.

[32] "Methods to Concentrate Land in the Hands of Expert Tillers," loc. cit., pp. 14–15.

[33] *Nongmin Ribao*, Mar. 23, 1985, p. 2.

[34] Another method is for peasants to enter into voluntary cooperative farming (*lianhu lianpian, jizhong gengzhong*). They jointly farm adjacent plots of land or jointly contract a large piece of land. In a county outside of Tianjin, 2,368 peasants formed 582 small groups to farm 21,585 *mu* of land. See "Methods to Concentrate Land in the Hands of Expert Tillers," loc. cit., pp. 14–15.

At the same time, a counter current exists. In more than a few cases, peasants have complained that they have not been given enough land to contract and farm. Reports of such a problem became especially evident after the promulgation of Central Document No. 1 (January 1984), which among other things extended the length of contracts, and hence a peasant's right to lease land, to at least 15 years and generally encouraged specialized farming.[38] In response, some cadres created large specialized households, such as 10,000 *jin* producing specialized households, by arbitrarily reducing the already meager holdings of other peasants in the village.[39] One particularly poignant story told of a woman who was given so little land that her family did not even have enough to eat. Her family of six, five of whom were legally eligible for land, should have been allowed to contract 12 *mu* of land. But they were allowed to contract only 4.5 *mu*—poor and out of the way pieces of land at that. She pled her case up the bureaucratic hierarchy—from the commune to the township to the district and finally to the county, 28 times in all—but was turned away at each level, even in the cold and rain of night, without so much as the loan of a flashlight to help her back to her village.[40]

Franchising Company. Decollectivization of agricultural production has given rise to other innovative uses of collectively owned property, in particular the contracting out of entire enterprises and various pieces of equipment, as well as of forest land, orchards, and fishponds. Under many such arrangements, the village acts like a franchise company that sells a certain individual or individuals the right to operate the company's property or business. The village retains ownership and has the right to conduct periodic inspections. If the original terms of the agreement are not met or if the quality of the performance of the franchisee does not meet the agreed-upon standards, the contract can be taken away. However, so long as the terms of the contract are met, the franchisee maintains autonomy in running the business, has access to whatever help the village may wish to give, and retains rights to the profits.

Specifics vary, but generally two types of methods for payment to the collective dominate. In one type of arrangement, the village sets a fixed rent for the term of the contract for the use of the piece of equipment, orchard, or fishpond. The contracting peasant household is obligated to pay the agreed-upon fee. After the rental to the collective is paid, all profits accrue to the household contractor. In the other type of arrangement, the village uses a floating rental fee, which is usually calculated as a percentage of profit. For example, a village may set the fee at 2 percent of whatever profit a peasant household may earn from the goods produced at the factory under franchise. Once the 2 percent fee is paid, the household is entitled to keep the remainder. The floating rate is more common for those enterprises or pieces of property whose potential profitability is uncertain. According to cadres in one village, which used both systems, peasants under contract preferred the fixed rate to the floating rate.[41]

The terms of business may vary, but village governments are finding themselves in the position of rental or sales agents. They have in essence become "socialist landlords" and franchise companies, dictating the terms of land contracts and selecting tenants who can have the privilege of running the former collective property. In the case of land, numerous examples culled from the Chinese press and from official pronouncements point to the increasing specialization of production and concentration of holdings. They also suggest that equality of distribution is no longer the prime objective of agrarian reform in China; in fact, land allocation is becoming increasingly commercialized. What is significant in the contemporary Chinese case is that this commercialization is not necessarily accompanied by the usual de-personalization associated with land distribution in pre-1949 China.[42] In some regards, the allocation of land has become increasingly a power resource of village cadres who, because of the move toward specialized production, have greater leeway to lease land based on such objective criteria as demand, profitability, and efficiency of use. But the arbitrariness with which some cadres have taken land away from some peasants and given it to others, supposedly in the name of efficiency, suggests that cadres also invoke subjective criteria such as particularistic relationships and personal profit.

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[35] Cang District Party Committee, Kaiping County, Guangdong Province, "To Rationally Reapportion Land, It Is Advantageous to Consolidate Plots," *Nongcun Gongzuo Tongxun*, No. 12, 1984, pp. 32–34.

[36] See, e.g., Xu Dejun and Men Gaoyu, "Some Unresolved Problems in the Implementation of Contract Grain Procurements," ibid., No. 4, 1985, pp. 33–34.

[37] For a description of the distribution of agricultural inputs, see Jean C. Oi, "Peasant Households Between Plan and Market: Cadre Control over Agricultural Inputs," *Modern China* (Berkeley), April 1986, pp. 230–51.

[38] For a translation of Central Document No. 1, see "Circular of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Rural Work During 1984" (trans. by R.F. Ash), *The China Quarterly*, March 1985, pp. 132–42. The political and economic implications of the document are explored in four commentaries that accompany the translation, in ibid., pp. 104–31.

[39] See *Zhongguo Nongmin Bao*, Mar. 6, 1984, p. 3. Also see "Uphold the Mass Line in the Reapportionment of Land," *Nongcun Gongzuo Tongxun*, No. 11, 1984, p. 29.

[40] "One Peasant Woman's Tearful Complaints," *Nongcun Gongzuo Tongxun*, No. 11, 1984, p. 40. There are also reports that some villages systematically discriminate against women on the amount of land they may contract. See *Nongmin Ribao*, June 26, 1985, p. 1.

[41] Interview in China, 1985.

A barrage of articles in the Chinese press on cadres afflicted with envy (*yenhong*—"red eye disease"), who demand profits or even shares in lucrative enterprises and arbitrarily break contracts, is a further indication of the personal control many cadres have come to wield.[43] According to numerous accounts, some local cadres try to take as much of the profit as possible, regardless of the terms of the original contract. They break contracts when they see that the contractor is making large profits, and in some cases, as when the father of the household dies, they may invalidate contracts because the "original" contractor is no longer present.[44] Some cadres upon coming to office have even declared that contracts made under their predecessors are no longer valid.[45] Specialized households engaged in lucrative endeavors such as fruit growing or fish raising, or those operating a once collectively owned enterprise, are favorite victims.[46]

Brokers and Middlemen. Loosening centralized planning and abolishing unified procurements in favor of price and market mechanisms are perhaps the most far-reaching of the reforms. The government's shift in policy for the circulation of goods in the economy has fundamentally altered the relationship between state and peasant. The state no longer simply relies on coercive or administrative means to secure needed supplies of commodities. But the state has not abandoned procurement targets or centralized planning; it has merely changed tactics. To entice peasants to sell their goods to the state, prices have been raised and consumer goods have been made more available for purchase.[47] This has produced a hybrid economy of semi-planned production along with participation in

A peasant family on a commune in Linqing County of Shandong Province buys three sewing machines after selling cotton to the state.

—Eastfoto.

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[42] See, e.g., Huang, op. cit., Ch. 12, for a description of how commercialization was paralleled by the impersonalization of land transactions in the pre-1949 period.

[43] See, e.g., *Renmin Ribao*, Jul. 19, 1984, p. 3; *Zhongguo Nongmin Bao*, Feb. 22, 1983, p. 2; Apr. 14, 1983, p. 2; Mar. 11, 1984, p. 3; and Jan. 19, 1984, p. 1.

[44] "Are Responsibility Contracts Inheritable," *Nongcun Gongzuo Tongxun*, No. 11, 1984, p. 32.

[45] *Nongmin Ribao*, Mar. 30, 1985, p. 3.

[46] Ibid., June 14, 1985, p. 3; *Guangdong Nongmin Bao* (Guangzhou), Sept. 9, 1984, p. 1.

[47] See Oi, *State and Peasant in Contemporary China*, op. cit., Ch. 8, for a detailed discussion of the changing nature of peasant-state relations with regard to the sale of grain.

the free market, a system officially referred to as a "socialist planned commodity production economy."

Village governments are at the center of this system. Local-level cadres allocate opportunities offered by the state and to a significant degree channel those on the open market. Village governments are responsible for overseeing the implementation of the state's contracting system for top priority items, such as grain and cotton, and for helping peasants find buyers for their surplus on the open market. The end result is that village cadres have been thrust into the position of economic middlemen and sales brokers. They find themselves in the position to decide who will get what contracts and therefore who will have access to plum sales opportunities. The evolving role of local governments as middlemen and brokers in the state contract system is nowhere more evident than in the allocation of grain contracts and in the brokering of business deals on the open market.

State grain contracts. Under the present system (which was instituted in 1985), on April 1, at the beginning of each grain year, state contracts (*hetong dinggou*) take effect for the purchase of fixed amounts of grain. Each year, the state decides how much grain it will purchase and then signs contractual agreements with peasants for the purchase of that amount. The peasant receives guaranteed prices for his crop and access to fixed amounts of low state-priced inputs. The contracts cover the procurement of rice, wheat, and corn, as well as soybeans (from the six designated primary production regions—Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Nei Menggu, Anhui, and Henan). (If cereal crops other than those listed are the major staple crop of a particular area, similar contracts also can apply to them.)[48] The remaining grains and cereals (some 20 percent of total grain production in 1983 and 1984), although formerly procured by the state, must now be sold by peasants on the open market.[49] The favorable terms of state contracts and the security they offer in the face of increased production—which has increased competition and made it more difficult to sell crops—have made state contracts coveted opportunities. In sharp contrast to the previous period when peasants resisted grain procurements by the state, in the last few years peasants have vied with one another to sell their surplus to the state.[50]

The term "contract procurement" should not, however, be read as a voluntary, open, and direct market agreement between the peasant and the state. State quotas still have to be met, and cadres from local and higher levels have been organized into work teams and sent to villages to oversee operation of the new system. In Heilongjiang, for example, some 27,000 cadres, including those from the county, district, and township level, went to promulgate Document No. 1 (1985) and sign contracts with the peasants.[51] In Shanxi's Yanbei region, 1,000 cadres were organized into special work teams for half a month before spring planting in order to negotiate contracts with the peasant households. The cadres' work was guided by the party organization and corresponding government bodies at each level.[52]

Each village is allotted a certain procurement target, or what is now officially called a recommendation. This "proposed figure" is based on the county's and the township's estimate of an area's ability to adjust and diversify production. In Jiangsu, a survey was taken of the previous year's grain production conditions in each township, village, and household. Village cadres discussed these recommendations and worked out how to divvy up the target; the parcelled targets were then sent to individual households, who in turn signed individual contracts directly with the grain bureau.[53]

Here, too, the village government acts as a general contractor. It takes the recommended target sent from the township and subcontracts out specific quotas to individual peasant households. The total of the individual peasant contracts have to tally generally with the targets sent down from the upper levels. How large of a contract each peasant should get is determined by official evaluation of a peasant's past performance and future potential.

In one area, cadres used statistics from the past three years to help peasants decide on an appropriate contract amount.[54] Elsewhere, in Sichuan, officials took 1984 grain sales as the base year. Those who had been able to diversify production (and produce other types of crops) were allowed to sell less. Those who had not been able to diversify had to sell the same amount as in 1984; those who had surplus grain could sell more. Those who planted less than 5 fen of land did not need to sell any grain at all.[55] Elsewhere, county, district, and township government organs and grain departments organized work teams to carefully examine available current statistics and village account books before peasants were allowed to make contracts. The township cadres then assessed contract pledges and tried to achieve an overall balance between what the peasants wanted to sell and the recommended target.[56]

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[48] *Nongmin Ribao*, Mar. 30, 1985, p. 2. A similar contracting system exists for oil groups, including cotton, rapeseed, humazi, peanuts, sesame, and yellow mustard seed. See *Shanxi Nongmin*, Feb. 12, 1985, p. 1.

[49] *Nongmin Ribao*, Jan. 30, 1985, p. 2. The state still provides peasants with a safety net. If the free market price of grain falls below the basic procurement price, the state will buy the peasants' grain at the base price. For details of the grain contracting system, see Jean C. Oi, "Peasant Grain Marketing and State Procurement: China's Grain Contracting System," *The China Quarterly*, June 1986, pp. 270–90.

[50] At least this was the case until recently, when a significant drop in grain production occurred. Interviews I conducted in China in the summer of 1986 indicate that in some areas the state is again having difficulties fulfilling its quotas.

[51] *Jingji Ribao* (Beijing), Apr. 4, 1985, p. 1.

[52] "Various Methods for Grain and Cotton Contract Procurements," *Nongcun Gongzuo Tongxun*, No. 5, 1985, pp. 38–39.

[53] The township economic management station (*jingguanzhan*) is directly responsible for the contracts, while the township government supervises and notarizes the transactions. The township grain station and economic management station also have a contract. The grain bureau pays the station .15 yuan in handling fees for each household contract. Ibid.

[54] *Zhejiang Ribao*, Mar. 17, 1985, p. 1.

In Hunan, a meeting of the village (production) group heads was called to discuss the planned procurement target, which had been sent down by the township government to the village.[57] A proposed target was given to each production group, according to its production conditions. Each production group then called a meeting of its household heads to announce the proposed targets. It then let each household pledge the amount and crop it would sell. The village contracts had to total the proposed target for the group, but households could decide among themselves who would sell what and how much.[58]

The contract system was instituted to invigorate the circulation of grain in the economy, promote the diversified use of grain, and rationally adjust the organization of agriculture. In theory, peasants were to decide what to plant based on price and sales targets and contracts.[59] But peasants, authorities say, are confused and uncertain about how much to contract,[60] and it is unclear what happens if a peasant wants to sell more or less than the cadres think appropriate. There is even debate as to whether they should take part in direct negotiations with the state for their contracts or whether representatives should be appointed to negotiate on their behalf.[61] What appears on the surface as a straightforward, voluntary business arrangement is in fact open to cadre manipulation. Indeed, the spirit of the contract system is being undercut in many areas by the "commandism" and particularism still practiced by those charged with implementing the program. Some local cadres ignore the spirit of negotiation in the reforms and simply continue to use the old quota system, telling peasants how much they must sell to the state. Others use the notification slip, which informs each household of the quota it owes the state, as the peasant's "contract."[62] Finally, some cadres distribute the contract procurement target equitably according to acreage or to population, without consultation with the peasants.[63]

Opportunities on the open market. For much of the period since 1949, participation in the free market has been something that peasants could do only illegally. Yet, now that the state has reversed itself and has encouraged peasants to participate in the market, peasants are finding it less than an ideal situation. A major problem is their lack of information about market demand and prices.[64] "Trade/exchange bulletin boards" with news of opportunities, supplies, and other information useful for sellers and buyers have appeared in the last few years.[65] These, at least in theory, promise wider public access to information and market opportunities. At present, however, many peasants depend almost exclusively on their local cadres for information and sales opportunities.

Collectives and sometimes large specialized households employ sales and procuring agents. These people function like purchasing agents (*caigouyuan*) in factories, who scout the country for needed parts and supplies. In the countryside, the agents buy supplies, make contacts, and find buyers. These people, who may number more than 10 for a village, specialize in finding *menlu* (opportunities). They are paid on something like a commission basis, their total wage being dependent on how much business they can bring in for the village. (In one village their base salaries ranged from 200–300 yuan to 400–500 yuan.)[66] The business and opportunities they bring back for the village is then managed by the village economic entities, the economic side of the village leadership.[67]

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[55] "Various Methods for Grain and Cotton Contract Procurements," loc. cit., pp. 38–39.

[56] Ibid.

[57] The (production) group (*zu*) is the division below the village.

[58] In Zhejiang, a similar type of meeting was called of the household heads to help them decide on the amount they would contract to sell. Again village cadres were organized, including the team accountant, to review each household's production situation, before the contracts were signed. "Various Methods for Grain and Cotton Contract Procurements," loc. cit., pp. 38–39.

[59] See, e.g., *Nongmin Ribao*, Mar. 30, 1985, p. 2.

[60] Ibid., May 6, 1985, p. 2. Also see "Various Methods for Grain and Cotton Contract Procurements," loc. cit., pp. 38–39.

[61] For details of this debate, see Oi, "Peasant Grain Marketing and State Procurement," loc. cit.

[62] See, e.g., *Nongmin Ribao*, Feb. 12, 1985, p. 1; and Village Work Committee of the Weifang Party Committee, "Treat the Signing of Procurement Contracts as an Important Matter," *Nongcun Gongzuo Tongxun*, No. 4, 1985, p. 37.

[63] See, e.g., *Shanxi Nongmin*, Apr. 12, 1985, p. 1.

[64] Of the 14 percent of the country's peasants who still live in poverty and depend on social welfare and state loans, one of the major problems hindering the development of their rural economy was "lack of timely and accurate market information for farmers." See "PRC State Statistical Bureau Survey Shows Peasants' Improved Lot," trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *China Report: Political, Sociological and Military Affairs* (Washington, DC—hereafter *JPRS-CPS*), No. 85-110, Oct. 28, 1985, p. 40.

[65] See, e.g., *Renmin Ribao*, Jan. 30, 1985, p. 5; *Guangming Ribao* (Beijing), Oct. 29, 1984, p. 1. Banks have even begun to provide this service. See *Renmin Ribao*, Jan. 14, 1985, p. 2.

[66] Hong Kong interview and China interviews 1985.

Although peasants are now free to participate directly in the free market, the unpredictability of prices as well as the limited amounts that can usually be sold on local markets makes contract sales of various types preferable. Some of the most lucrative contracts are those with agricultural production sales centers, where products are grown, processed, and sold. This type of arrangement is particularly attractive because it provides all supplies and inputs needed for production. For example, peasants who have a contract through a production sales center to raise *sanhuangji*, a type of chicken popular on the Hong Kong market, are given a cash loan and all necessary production materials. The state, in essence, makes the investment and contracts out the production.[68]

The problem for most peasants is that purchasing cooperatives and state companies seldom deal with small individual producers. Large specialized households are in a much better position, but ordinary peasants usually must go through their village cadres. Before the reorganization, communes and brigades would apportion contracts to their production teams, which in turn assigned quotas to individual households. Now the economic companies in the village and township do the brokering. Some teams and peasants are denied opportunities because of technical considerations or apparent lack of ability; other times it is simply a matter of cadre discretion. Villages themselves at times also sign contracts with specialized households for certain items at a set state price. In return, the village allows the households to buy a set amount of production materials at the state price.[69] As in land leases and state grain contracts, specialized households are the prime recipients of the best opportunities.

From Cadres to Middlemen

The current tasks of rural government beckon a new breed of cadres. A successful cadre in today's new market-oriented rural economy is one who can find markets, procure low-priced high-quality agricultural inputs, arrange transport, know what to produce, have the expertise to produce high-demand items, and negotiate contracts and have the contracts remain valid. To do all these things effectively, a cadre must have the "connections" (*guanxi*) to find the opportunities (*menlu*) so that the village goods will have outlets (*chulu*). He must also have expertise and technological know-how, sources of information, access to funds, and economic management skills.

But are these skills necessarily commensurate with youth and higher education, the ideal cadre attributes currently promoted by the party? To be sure, education and technical skill are important for prospering in the new economic environment, but experience and connections are equally, if not more, crucial. For example, a survey done in Shanxi of 20,989 successful specialized households found that former team and brigade cadres or those who had been cadres at some time constituted 43 percent of those who prospered. Their success was attributed to their experience, economic management skills, and ability to absorb party policy and take quick action; no mention was made of their age or educational level. Another group who knew how to plan, how to manage, and who had a large circle of friends (read "connections") made up another 5 percent of the prosperous specialized households. Together this group of not particularly highly educated or young people made up close to one half of those who prospered in the new economic system. Those with both youth and higher education, the returned intellectuals and demobilized soldiers, made up only 42 percent of the successful households. Only if one adds those who had a specific skill or were craftsmen do they make up 51 percent of the sample.[70]

China is still an undeveloped market, with poor transportation and inadequate communication channels. In such an environment, proper *guanxi*, *menlu*, and *chulu*, as well as market information, may be more the preserve of the older, established cadres. They have the large networks of personal connections, which have been developed through many years of attendance at meetings and dealings with different units. One example is the sales agents, the people on whom the success of a collective enterprise or individual peasant households depends. Those who are able to find supplies, make contracts, and find buyers are often older, particularly cadres with extensive connections.[71] Contacts and enterprise are the distinguishing characteristics, not youth and education.

A recent survey in Wuqiang County, in Hebei, identi-

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[67] See fns. 14 and 53.

[68] Hong Kong interview.

[69] Hong Kong interview.

[70] According to the survey, those who succeeded through illegal means made up less than 1 percent of the households. *Guangdong Nongmin Bao*, Jan. 27, 1984, p. 4.

[71] Hong Kong interview and China interviews 1985. On the importance of these people in the economic success of a village, see *Guangming Ribao*, Oct. 29, 1984, p. 2.

He Huaiqin winnowing some of the 130,000 jin *of wheat he harvested in the summer of 1985 from the 162* mu *of land that he had contracted from his brigade in Henan Province.*

—Beijing Review, Oct. 1, 1985, p. 2.

fied six different types of problems prevalent among local-level cadres. As might be expected, cadres' advanced age and low education level, which were seen as closely related, headed the list. But the overriding concern was cadres' unwillingness or inability to be entrepreneurial, to compete in today's market environment. For example, some local cadres were said to have a "small peasant mentality," which was defined as the reluctance to break with traditional agricultural pursuits, such as grain production, and seek diversification of production to take advantage of the need for commodity production. Others were said to be "closed-minded"—they did not understand the market, nor did they have either information or expertise. Some were called shortsighted, literally as having a "mender mentality"—for they only did what they had to, fixed only what was needed and no more. This type of cadre lacked a long-range view. Then there were the cadres who wanted to maintain the status quo, and not rock the boat, not want to take responsibility.[72]

New Measures of Cadre Success

The bias toward entrepreneurial success is further reflected in the way that cadres are rewarded. The current road to economic and political success for local cadres is closely tied to their ability to foster business activity and make profits. Salaries of cadres consist of both a base pay and a bonus wage. In the model Aiguo Brigade in Shandong, under the *baogan daohu* form of the responsibility system,[73] the party branch secretary, brigade head, and accountant each receive the same base salary (360 yuan in 1982). Their total annual wage, however, is calculated according to bonuses earned and penalties assessed for the fiscal year. (In 1982, they overfulfilled their grain quota and met their other responsibilities, and each received a total of 443 yuan.)[74]

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[72] There was also the problem of cadres being out for themselves. *Nongmin Ribao*, Jan. 15, 1985, p. 3.

[73] See fn 11.

More recently, in areas where sideline occupations and rural industry are flourishing, the base salary of the economic head of the collective company or the head of the village may be doubled or tripled by bonuses depending on profits of the collective. In one relatively rich village in Liaoning, where only 5 percent of the village was engaged in agriculture production, the base salary of the village head and economic manager of the collective enterprises was set at 700 yuan by the township government. In 1984, the total salary of each was 3,500 yuan.[75] The difference between their base and total salaries came from bonuses received for overquota performance and profits for the village.

The bonus system applies to political as well as to economic work. A village head can be fined, for instance, if certain party policies, such as birth control, are not implemented correctly.[76] Accurate accounting, as well as compliance, are ensured by investigation work teams, which are sent quarterly to check on implementation and decide how much the cadre should be paid.[77]

Praise from superiors likewise comes with successful development of specialized households, scientific households, and special-status households of various types. Cadres strive to be models, to earn the title of head of "the village with the most specialized households," the "best . . . village," "the village to make the most advancement in commodity production," and so forth. The village gets recognition and special allotments of inputs as a reward, and the cadres get praise and bonuses.

Not surprisingly, some cadres have falsified statistics in order to receive rewards and bonuses. For example, in Hunyuan County, in Shanxi, an investigation work team uncovered a number of such falsification schemes. The problem began when it was decided that a village party branch head would receive a bonus of 100 yuan if his village qualified for the title "the best in the township." A number of villages claimed such status, but when the work teams were sent to verify the statistics, numerous irregularities were discovered. One so-called *"fanfan"* village (i.e., one that has doubled its income) reported that the average income of its peasants had doubled, from 380 to 760 yuan. In fact, the average income of peasants in that village had already reached 508 yuan the previous year. Moreover, among the village's 12 so-called "commercial grain specialized households" (i.e., those with large grain production capable of selling large surplus to state), there were six households whose production did not even equal the minimum set for the district. There were also two households who over-reported their income by 27 percent and by 14.4 percent in order to qualify as "the best in the township."[78] And in Hubei, a manager of a tile and brick factory altered his books, changing a 170,000 yuan loss into a 40,000 yuan profit in order to receive his share of the profit from the collective's capital funds.[79]

Just as cadres under collectivization often over-reported grain production and made unrealistic sales pledges, cadres now feel pressure to report successes in the development of commodity production. Regardless of whether this is done because of the cadre's personal greed or because of pressure to demonstrate compliance with directives from upper levels, peasants are once again paying the price. Cadres have reportedly forced undeveloped areas to become commodity producers, sometimes using questionable administrative measures. The example cited earlier of cadres arbitrarily creating large grain specialized households is but one example. Other reports reminiscent of the Great Leap Forward period (1958–59) show that some cadres still report good harvests when in fact the area has suffered disaster. In one such case, which occurred before the unified procurement system was abolished, peasants even had to buy grain on the open market in order to fulfill their minimum grain responsibilities to the state.[80]

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[74] Penalties were limited to 25 percent of the base pay in order to guarantee the livelihood of the cadres. "Specialized Contracts, Distribution According to Tasks Contracted: An Investigation of Aiguo Brigade," *Gongshe Caiwu* (Beijing), No. 2, 1983, pp. 9–12.

[75] This was a relatively rich village. The estimated average total income of peasants in that village for 1985 was expected to be 1,200 yuan, which was an eight-fold increase over 1977.

[76] In an interview with a village head, I was told that a cadre would be fined if one of the peasants did not follow policy and had a second child. The fine was a hefty 300 yuan. He was quickly silenced and contradicted, however, by the village economic manager, who interrupted and denied that there was any such penalty for violating the birth control policy. My sense was that in fact the village head knew very well what he was talking about. Whether the 300 yuan figure is correct or not, the point is that a bonus system has been instituted in administration of party policies as well as in economics. This gives cadres added incentive to enforce state policies strictly.

[77] Interview in China 1985.

[78] *Nongmin Ribao*, Feb. 26, 1985, p. 2. Another report of bogus commercial grain producing households describes how peasants and cadres can falsify their status. In a village in Shanxi, Wuxiang County, two out of the three reported 10,000 *jin* grain sales households were fakes. One of the households actually did sell 12,376 *jin* of grain to the state, but it only had produced 9,270 *jin*. What it did was illegally buy grain from the state and then re-sell that same grain back to the state at premium prices. The household used the grain it bought at the low state price to pad its production and then benefit from the new price structure, which gives peasants a premium overquota price for 70 percent of their sales. Ibid., Apr. 13, 1985, p. 1.

[79] *JPRS-CPS*, No. 85-105, Oct. 15, 1985, p. 62.

As in the past, the guilty include not only the lower level cadres, but those at higher levels as well. A leading cadre at the district level was honored and given a bonus for his efforts in making his district into an "advanced agricultural district." Later, however, it was discovered that he had falsified grain production statistics and inflated the number of deaths in his district in order to show a low birth rate for his area.[81] The severity and prevalence of these crimes is reflected in the various circulars that have come out on the importance of keeping and reporting accurate statistics. They warn that "no leader may influence, persuade, or compel the statistician to change or falsify the numbers."[82]

The Cadre Network

Cadres are obviously not the only ones benefiting from the reforms. But the other beneficiaries, most notably specialized households, who have the state's blessing to lead on the road to commodity production and prosperity, are likely to have close relationships with cadres. They receive preferential treatment in the contracting of land and enterprises, and in the allocation of sales contracts. The results of this special treatment are evident in a national survey of 851 specialized households which reported their average annual income at 2,571 yuan. This is 82.2 percent higher than the average peasant income of 1,411 yuan.[83] And, of course, it is the specialized households that become the coveted "10,000 yuan households." This is not to say that others cannot become rich, but as one peasant said, "it is more difficult."[84] While regular peasants are short on supplies, specialized households, such as "scientific farming households," receive needed inputs, often at cheaper prices, sometimes paying only half the regular price.[85]

Until recently, confusion existed about who should or should not be considered "specialized households" (and therefore given the privileges due them). Only in 1984 did central authorities issue four criteria based on measurable levels of business and income to define what types of peasant households qualify as "*zhuanye hu*."[86] In spite of the new rulings, cadres can still influence who receives special status through their allocation of contracts for land and collective property as well as sales contracts. Moreover, regardless of the definition, the success of specialized households depends to a significant degree on whether local cadres provide them both their allotted inputs for production and outlets for their goods. Government regulations allowing special access mean nothing if local cadres say that the items are "out of stock."[87]

Not surprisingly, specialized households try to maintain good relations with local-level cadres, a relationship that is both give and take. Peasants, even those who have prospered, realize that alienating their local cadres may cost them more than it is worth. Indeed, envious cadres have the ability to "milk" 10,000 yuan households for considerable sums of money. Local cadres can arbitrarily assess fines on peasants for everything from being late to meetings to not correctly studying a directive.[88] They can also give peasants "small glass slippers to wear [that don't fit]"—in other words, make things extremely difficult through indirect and subtle but nonetheless effective means. Consequently, peasants say that it is better to give a little to save themselves from losing a lot. Even those peasants who have left the village must be wary, for they realize that cadres can make life difficult for their family members who still live in the village.

But the cadres' relationship with specialized households should not be interpreted as purely exploitative or coercive. Aside from the land and contracts that they can give these peasants, cadres do facilitate various bureaucratic processes, such as gaining approval for loans and getting licenses.[89] Cadres can also aid certain households by not enforcing specific policies that may be detrimental to efficient production. Nonetheless, they do monitor the activities of specialized households and have the power to decide whose goods will be confiscated or which businesses closed when there are infractions of the rules.[90]

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[80] *Guangdong Nongmin Bao*, Apr. 7, 1985, p. 4.

[81] *Jingji Ribao*, Apr. 21, 1985, p. 1.

[82] See, e.g., *JPRS-CPS*, No. 85-100, Sept. 26, 1985, p. 29.

[83] *Zhongguo Nongmin Bao*, Dec. 11, 1984, p. 2.

[84] Hong Kong interview.

[85] *Zhongguo Nongmin Bao*, Apr. 24, 1983, p. 3.

[86] The four criteria are: the majority of the household's labor power must be engaged in specialized production or more than 60 percent of its time spent in conducting the business of specialized production; income from the specialized production must make up more than 60 percent of the household income; the commodity production rate of the specialized product produced must be over 80 percent (60 percent if grain); and the income from the sale of the specialized commodity must be double the average income from sales earned by other peasants in the village. Ibid., Dec. 2, 1984, p. 1. This action, no doubt, also was in response to the exaggerated number of "specialized households" reported by cadres who were looking for recognition and special rewards. See the article entitled "Seek Truth From Facts in Annual Statistical Investigations," in ibid., p. 1.

[87] On the problems of access to key agricultural inputs, see Oi, "Peasant Households Between Plan and Market."

[88] See, e.g., *Jingji Cankao* (Beijing), Apr. 23, 1985, p. 2; *Zhongguo Nongmin Bao*, Apr. 1, 1984, p. 1, and Aug. 14, 1984, p. 1.

[89] A survey of peasant entrepreneurs said that they faced problems in the following areas: applying for license or permits, stocking goods, having legal guarantee of their rights and interests, coping with irrational collection of fees and management. See *Zhongguo Nongmin Bao*, Apr. 15, 1984, p. 1.

It should not be overlooked, however, that it is often cadres themselves or their relatives who have gained special status and enjoy the benefits that accrue to such households. As the survey cited earlier shows, a large percentage of those who have prospered are former cadres. In a visit to a village in Liaoning, it was not surprising to find that the head of the village economic committee was also one of the most successful entrepreneurs in the area. It is clear that his position gave him privileged access to information about the sales opportunities for different products. This enabled him to run a very successful chicken farm, among other businesses, in addition to managing the collective's enterprises. His total household income for the year was 40,000 yuan.[91]

The importance of cadre support and their network of contacts is further evident in the success of heretofore poor peasant households that are taken under the wing of a cadre. It is acknowledged fact that cadres have the advantage in opportunity, information, and skill. Consequently, some township party committees and governments have decided that each township, village, and team cadre should sign a contract with at least one poor household in order to help that household develop production.[92]

An interesting question is who in the future will be the power elite in the countryside as more peasants succeed and work outside of the village and are able to provide contacts and jobs for friends and relatives. Already, kinship appears to be a strong determinant of who gets hired for jobs in private, small-scale enterprises. For example, in Liaoning, the majority of the 100 jobs in a privately run village factory were obtained through friendship or kinship ties.[93] The reforms may have diluted the power of cadres to assign positions in rural enterprises, but the labor market is still far from free.

Whether they be cadres or specialized households, those who have contacts and jobs to offer will draw a following from among those peasants who have much more limited experience of the market and its opportunities. Something that will be interesting to watch is whether a hierarchy of power will develop among local cadres. Especially important is whether a gap will develop between the power of those cadres who are in charge of more purely political matters, the so-called administrative side of government, and the economic managers of the village enterprises and companies. Beginning in 1985, some village heads and the economic managers were being judged by different standards. One can only wonder at the disparity in pay since the income brought in by the economic manager is so high. In one village, when asked what would happen, the village head and the economic manager both laughed nervously and agreed that there would be a difference.[94]

The Market and Cadre Power

The commercialization of agriculture has been equated with the penetration of markets into the peasant village and the disruption of village relations. The assumption of some is that this penetration brings more hardship for peasants and makes them more vulnerable to the state by violating the norms of traditional village life.[95] Others maintain that the emergence of markets provides increased opportunity for peasants to get out from under the hold of the village elite. They argue that village elites in fact try to keep the village a closed environment and prevent peasants from making outside contacts that might provide them with the necessary resources to resist the traditional village order. Only when it becomes clear that the market can no longer be kept out, they argue, does the elite take an active role and try to place themselves between the market and the peasants and gain power as middlemen.[96] This latter picture comes closest to the current Chinese reality.

Markets have on the whole brought positive opportunities for peasants in China. The problem for peasants has not been the disruption of the village political order. If anything that was a welcomed emancipation from the confines of a strictly planned and collectivized economy that kept them dependent on their local cadres. Peasant concern has been how best to take

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[90] For an excellent discussion of the use of this type of power in the clientelistic politics of southern Italy, see Judith Chubb, *Patronage, Power, and Poverty in Southern Italy*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982.

[91] Interview in China 1985.

[92] *Zhongguo Nongmin Bao*, Oct. 28, 1984, p. 2. This program is also stressed in Ren Jie, "Party Members Establish Ties With Household; a Good Form for Political and Ideological Work in Rural Areas," *Xuexi Yu Yanjiu* (Beijing), May 1985, No. 5, pp. 28–29, trans. in *JPRS-CPS*, No. 85-103, Oct. 4, 1985, pp. 60–64.

[93] In this case, the owners (contractors) of the factory were also former cadres, both at the brigade and team levels. Interview in China 1985.

[94] Interview in China 1985.

[95] This view is best developed by James Scott. See his *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1976.

[96] See Samuel Popkin, *The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1979. Also see Joel S. Migdal, *Peasants, Politics, and Revolution: Pressures toward Political and Social Change in the Third World*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1974.

Leaders of the Huanan County Fruit Company (Heilongjiang Province) study how to carry out economic reforms in their winery.

—Beijing Review, Apr. 29, 1985, p. 2.

advantage of the new opportunities. It is the cadres who have been concerned about the disruptive effects the decollectivization and the reemergence of the market would have on village relations. Not surprisingly, there are reports that cadres initially resisted the reforms.[97] They thought the changes would end their monopolistic power over the economic and political well-being of the peasants in the village. However, once it became clear that the reforms were here to stay, the cadres quickly and easily moved into positions as the new middlemen in the system, ready and able to broker available opportunities and gain control over as many resources as possible.

It is clear that cadres still act as a buffer between the state and the peasants. But, for peasants, that may be more of a problem than a blessing. In the current Chinese case, the state has not been particularly extractive and exploitative. In fact, in its attempts to reform the system, the government has enacted numerous programs designed to serve peasants' interests. It has provided peasants with higher prices and more opportunities for disposing their goods, and it has encouraged the use of contracts and the protection of law. At the same time, the government has not completely opened the gates and let in the full force of the market; it has not thrown out centralized planning and control. As a result, as has been shown throughout this essay, cadres have successfully appropriated the new administrative opportunities they have been assigned in order to bolster their own power. They have securely entrenched themselves as the middlemen in this transitional system that is somewhere between plan and market.

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[97] See, e.g., David Zweig, "Opposition to Change in Rural China: The System of Responsibility and People's Communes," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley), July 1983, pp. 879–900; and Richard Latham, "The Implications of Rural Reform for Grass Roots Cadres," in Perry and Wong, op. cit., pp. 157–73.

Cuban Economy in the 1980's

Jorge Pérez-López

In a series of truly remarkable speeches, beginning with his address to the Third Congress of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) in February 1986, Cuban President Fidel Castro has expressed severe dissatisfaction with the way the Cuban economy has performed during the first half of the 1980's. At the Congress, Castro complained of organizational weaknesses, economic mismanagement, poor coordination among economic units, and lack of concern about the quality of output, and accused managers of corruption and of pursuing profits at the expense of the common good.[1] At a June national meeting on enterprise management, Castro seemed to intensify his criticisms by calling for a "revolutionary counteroffensive" aimed at rooting out the evils of incipient capitalism and consumerism and at directing the Cuban economy back to the pursuit of communist goals.[2] As we shall see below, the first shots have already been fired in this campaign: the free peasant markets have been closed, productivity bonuses have been suspended, and the private sale of houses and apartments has been prohibited. The very future of the market socialist model that has been gradually implemented in Cuba since the mid-1970's could be at risk.

If one looks only at official figures for the growth of Cuba's gross social product (GSP), Castro's critique might seem surprising. However, other economic indicators strongly suggest that the Cuban economy did experience serious dislocations in the first half of the 1980's. Even the reported high rate of GSP growth is misleading, perhaps reflecting more the impact of a sharp upward revision of Cuba's wholesale and retail prices in 1981 than real expansion in the production of goods and services. Close analysis of incomplete data reveals that output targets for 1985 were underfulfilled in the case of a broad range of agricultural and industrial products, including some key export commodities such as sugar, nickel, and citrus products. Indeed, the underlying ills of the economy were particularly evident in the external sector, where imports grew at a faster rate than anticipated and outstripped export growth, leading to a further deterioration in the country's balance-of-payments and foreign debt situations.

The Third Congress was presented a draft of a five-year plan for 1986–90 containing nothing very new or revolutionary and projecting growth of GSP comparable to that originally planned for (and hence less than that reportedly accomplished in) 1981–85.[3] However, surprisingly, the congress did not formally approve a 1986–90 economic plan, apparently reserving that action for a subsequent meeting of congress delegates to be held at the end of 1986 (by which time the "five-year" plan will have become a "four-year" plan). This unusual occurrence is symptomatic of a dynamic process of review of economic institutions and policies apparently spearheaded by President Castro himself. Indeed, the draft plan itself was prepared under the aegis of a new "Central Group" recently superimposed on Cuba's Central Planning Board (Junta Central de Planificación—JUCEPLAN).

What precisely these developments portend for future economic institutions and policies in Cuba will not

Jorge Pérez-López is an international economist with the Bureau of International Labor Affairs, US Department of Labor. Among his many writings on the Cuban economy is Measuring Cuban Economic Performance *(forthcoming). The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the US government.*

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[1] The entire text of Castro's report appears in *Bohemia* (Havana), Feb. 14, 1986, pp. 51–83. Cited hereafter as "Castro's Central Report."

[2] For a translation of the June 28 Cuban broadcast of Castro's June 26 speech, see Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Latin America* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-LAM*), July 1, 1986, p. Q/25.

[3] *Lineamientos Económicos y Sociales para el quinquenio 1986–1990 (Proyecto)* (Economic and Social Guidelines for the 1986–90 Five-Year Period [Draft]), Havana, mimeo, 1986.



Fidel Castro addresses the Third Congress of the Cuban Communist Party in February 1986.

—Boyd/Gamma-Liaison.

be known until the Party Congress reconvenes, if then. As a prelude to that event, however, it is useful to examine the current state of the Cuban economy as suggested by its performance in 1981–85, to evaluate briefly the (draft) plan for 1986–90, and to review various recent institutional changes and policy initiatives of the Castro regime that seem to reflect the "revolutionary counteroffensive." Analysis of performance in 1981–85 is based primarily on fragmentary evidence in Castro's central report to the Third Congress and on data for the industrial sector contained in a recent report by the Cuban National Bank (Banco Nacional de Cuba).[4] Data regarding the evolving 1986–90 plan come from the draft of the plan circulated before the Congress and from Castro's report to the Third Congress.

1981–85: Achievements and Problems

On the surface of things, the Cuban economy performed remarkably well in the period 1981–85 (see Table 1). Global social product (GSP) reportedly grew at a brisk 7.3 percent a year, against a target of 5 percent. In fact, growth might have been even brisker had Cuba's planners not taken steps in late 1984 to cool down the economy by sharply slashing imports and redirecting production to goods and services capable of generating hard-currency exports.[5] Investment, labor productivity, and exports too all rose faster than anticipated, although imports exceeded desired levels.

However, caution must be exercised when dealing with these generally favorable official statistics. For one thing, GSP differs from gross national product (GNP) and gross domestic product (GDP)—macroeconomic indicators commonly used in Western economies to measure economic growth. The differences go beyond which sectors of the economy are covered (GSP excludes so-called nonproductive services sectors, such as education and housing, which are included in both GNP and GDP) to the very concept of the economic activity being measured (GSP includes the value of intermediate outputs, while GNP and GDP measure value added).[6] More important, there is reason to believe that a significant portion of the reported GSP growth in 1981–85 may be attributable to inflation, in particular, to the wholesale and retail price reforms of 1981 (see box). Independent estimates of Cuban real economic growth arrived at by evaluating changes in non-monetary measures of activity (i.e., changes in physical output) in a large number of economic categories through the use of relative prices and value-added data consistently suggest slower growth rates than those implied by official Cuban data. The measure which approximates constant-price GSP suggests rates of real growth equal to roughly one-half those obtained from the official data. Constant-price GSP growth is estimated at about 5.1 percent for 1981 and 1.6 percent for 1982, compared with official growth estimates of 15.3 percent (25.9 percent if computed from data "at current prices") and 4.2 percent—1981 and 1982 being the most recent years for which the constructed indexes are available.[7] A comparison of data on physical output with global output figures also puts in question whether during 1981–85 Cuba's GSP grew *in real terms* at close to, let alone in excess of, the targeted 5 percent annual rate.

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[4] Banco Nacional de Cuba, *Economic Report* (Havana), March 1986. A more thorough assessment of economic performance over this period will have to wait until the publication of the 1985 Cuban statistical yearbook, probably toward the end of 1986.

[5] This shift is discussed below on p. 28.

As can be seen in Table 1, reported investment growth during the period 1981–85 also exceeded planned levels. However, investment figures, too, are reported only at current prices, and hence reflect the inflationary effects noted above. In 1981, for instance, investment is reported to have amounted to 3,386 million pesos, a 23.6 percent increase over the 1980 investment of 2,739 million pesos.[8] After this one-time jump, annual investment stayed in the 3,500-million-peso range.

Among the investment projects completed during 1981–85 were several new sugar mills, the second stage of expansion of a steel plant, and a nickel plant; plants to produce glass containers, yarn, textiles, cement, prefabricated concrete products, agricultural equipment, and paper; agricultural projects (barns, drainage and irrigation works, storage facilities, refrigerated warehouses); railroads; paved and dirt roads;

Table 1: Macroeconomic Indicators: Plan and Actual

(Average annual growth, in percent)

	1976–80		1981–85		1986–90
	Plan	Actual	Plan	Actual	Plan
Global social product (GSP)	6.0	4.0	5.0	7.3	5.0
Labor productivity	na	3.4	3.0	5.2	3.5
Exports	na	15.7	7.0	9.6	5.0
Imports	na	14.6	6.5[1]	11.5	1.5
Investment[2]	15.0	13.2	15.2–15.8	17.9	23.1
Share of investment in industry[3]	25+	35	37	36	45

[1] Estimated.

[2] Total for period, in thousand million pesos, at current prices.

[3] Percentage of total investment for the period, at current prices.

SOURCES: For the 1976–80 plan—*Proyecto de Directivas para el Desarrollo Económico y Social en el Quinquenio 1976–80* (Draft Directives for Economic and Social Development in 1976-1980), Havana, Departamento de Orientación Revolucionaria, Comité Central del Partido Comunista de Cuba, 1985. For 1976–80 actual results—Castro's Central Report to the Second Communist Party Congress, *Bohemia* (Havana), Dec. 26, 1980. For the 1981–85 plan—*Lineamientos Económicos y Sociales para el Quinquenio 1981–85* (Economic and Social Guidelines for 1981–85), Havana, Editora Política, 1981; Banco Nacional de Cuba, *Highlights of Cuban Economic Development 1976–80 and Main Targets for 1981–85*, Havana, 1981; Castro's Central Report to the Second Communist Party Congress, loc. cit.; and Humberto Pérez, "The Programatic Platform and Economic Development in Cuba," *Cuba Socialista* (Havana), June 1982. For 1981–85 actual results—Castro's Central Report to the Third Communist Party Congress, *Bohemia*, Feb. 14, 1986. For the 1986–90 plan—*Lineamientos Económicos y Sociales para el Quinquenio 1986-90 (Proyecto)* (Economic and Social Guidelines for 1981–85 [Draft]), Havana, mimeo, 1986, and Castro's Central Report to the Third Communist Party Congress, loc. cit.

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[6] On the differences between the Cuban and Western national income accounting systems see Carmelo Mesa-Lago and Jorge Pérez-López, *A Study of Cuba's Material Product System, Its Conversion to the System of National Accounts, and Estimation of Gross Domestic Product per Capita and Growth Rates*, World Bank Staff Paper No. 770, Washington, DC, 1985.

[7] Jorge F. Pérez-López, "Real Economic Growth in Cuba, 1965–82," *Journal of Developing Areas* (Macomb, IL), January 1986. The detailed methodology used in constructing the measures is given in Jorge F. Pérez-López, *Measuring Cuban Real Economic Growth*, Austin, The University of Texas Press, forthcoming.

[8] See Comité Estatal de Estadísticas, *Anuario Estadístico de Cuba 1984* (Cuban Statistical Yearbook, 1984), Havana, 1985, p. 119. Official peso-US dollar exchange rates for some recent years, in terms of US dollars per peso, are: 1980, $1.41; 1981, $1.28; 1982, $1.20; 1983, $1.16; 1984, $1.13; and 1985, $1.07.

and education and public health buildings. Progress was also made on several major projects which will probably be completed during the period 1986–90: the first stage of a nuclear power plant and an oil refinery in Cienfuegos, and nickel production facilities at Punta Gorda and Las Camariocas.

Despite these achievements, there is evidence of ongoing serious problems in the investment sector related to (1) the absorption of investment and (2) efforts to enlist external financing. At the Third Party Congress, Castro complained of:

> *. . . new industrial and agricultural facilities built in unpopulated areas, without housing facilities for the work force; very important agricultural programs—such as for citrus—where there are still sown areas without irrigation; irrigation projects which cannot be put into operation because they lack pumping facilities or electric power; work shops and other facilities built without electrical hook-ups; housing developments built without urban amenities [i.e., roads and commercial and recreational facilities]. Port loading and unloading investments have not kept up with the growth*

The Inflation Factor in Cuban Growth Figures

Except for the period 1962–66, Cuba has usually reported macroeconomic data only at current prices and has failed to publish any measures of domestic inflation, such as wholesale price indexes, consumer price indexes, or cost of living indexes. Cuban statisticians have argued that because "official" prices in the agriculture, industry, construction, and communications sectors have been frozen since 1965, the reported value of output data for these four sectors are also at constant prices, with trade and transportation being the only sectors where inflation could have had an effect. Following this line of reasoning, they conclude that although the official data are reported at current prices, they also approximate constant-price data.

However, US scholar Carmelo Mesa-Lago, using the concept of the monetary surplus, i.e., the excess money in circulation for which there are no goods or services to be purchased, has shown that there has been inflation in Cuba.[1] Based on his calculations, and other data, it has been estimated that inflation amounted to approximately 5–6 percent in 1963–66; was somewhat higher in 1967–70; was much lower in 1971–76, and increased significantly in 1981–82.[2]

That there has been inflation in Cuba is confirmed by statements from Cuban officials. For example, a visitor to Cuba has reported that a JUCEPLAN official told him in May 1985 that in Cuba, "inflation, which can not be calculated on the basis of capitalist methods because there is no financial speculation, and [which] is controlled by the government so that it does not burden the real value of worker salaries, is around 3 percent per annum."[3]

In January 1981, a wholesale price reform was implemented, followed in December 1981 by the first stage of a retail price reform. The retail price reform increased prices of over 469 food products—including staple foodstuffs—and of 1,041 industrial consumer products, e.g., tobacco products, textiles and apparel, household items, toiletries, hardware products, and gasoline.[4] Price increases ranged from 7 to 525 percent, with the (unweighted) average price increase being about 65 percent.[5] Average percentage price increases for certain frequently purchased consumer goods were: beef, 31; chicken, 8; fish, 42; milk, 36; rice, 20; beans, 50; tubers, 66; vegetables, 105; fruits, 75; sugar, 72; fats, 23; coffee, 67; soft drinks, 100; tobacco products, 56; toiletries, 70; fabric, 38; and gasoline, 74. Price increases were also imposed on hotel lodging (11 to 84 percent), restaurant meals (11 to 30 percent), and postage (67 percent). The retail price reform reduced but did not totally eliminate cumulative state subsidies, which were expected to average about 671 million pesos during 1982–85 (or 168 million pesos a year) compared to the roughly 1.9 billion pesos incurred during 1976–81 (315 million pesos a year).[6]

Although figures are not available to estimate with precision the impact of the 1981 price reforms on Cuban macroeconomic data, former JUCEPLAN President Humberto Pérez has stated that the economic growth target for 1981, initially set at 4 percent, was raised to 8 percent to account for the wholesale price reform.[7] For 1980, the only year for which Cuba has released GSP data at both 1980 and 1981 prices, the use of 1981 prices to value 1980 output leads to an increase in GSP of 9.9 percent.[8] Further, considering that the retail price reform did not become effective until December 14, 1981, it is reasonable to posit that its impact on the value of output was not fully reflected until 1982 or subsequent years. Consequently, GSP growth for 1982 at constant prices was probably below the 4.2 percent reported in current prices.[9]

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[1] Carmelo Mesa-Lago, *The Economy of Socialist Cuba: A Two Decade Appraisal*, Albuquerque, NM, University of New Mexico Press, 1981, pp. 47–50.

[2] See Carmelo Mesa-Lago and Jorge Pérez-López, *A Study of Cuba's Material Product System, Its Conversion to the System of National Acounts, and Estimation of Gross Domestic Product per Capita and Growth Rates*, World Bank Staff Paper No. 770, Washington, DC, 1985.

[3] Frei Betto, *Fidel y la Religión* (Fidel and Religion), Havana, Oficina de Publicaciones del Consejo de Estado, 1985, p. 33, reporting on a conversation with JUCEPLAN official Alfredo Ham.

[4] See *Granma* (Havana), Dec. 14, 1981, pp. 2–3.

[5] See Mesa-Lago and Pérez-López, op. cit., pp. 59–60.

[6] *Granma*, Dec. 14, 1981, p. 3.

[7] *Granma*, Dec. 30, 1981, p. 2.

[8] Comité Estatal de Estadísticas, *Anuario Estadístico de Cuba 1981* (1981 Statistical Yearbook of Cuba), Havana, 1982, p. 66.

[9] *Anuario Estadístico de Cuba 1984*, p. 85.

in foreign trade, and the other links in the port-distribution-domestic economy chain have not grown at the necessary rate. We have the case of the central railroad, in which we have invested hundreds of millions of pesos without being able to exploit it efficiently since signals, loading and unloading areas, stations, etc., have not been completed.[9]

With regard to foreign investment, the Council of State in February 1982 approved legislation that for the first time would permit capitalist investment in socialist Cuba, in the form of joint ventures with domestic enterprises.[10] This approach was designed to help Cuba (1) add important new external sources to help finance investment projects, (2) minimize its hard-currency outlays on investment projects, (3) attract Western capital and marketing skills to promote tourism, (4) acquire needed foreign inputs and technological support for existing manufacturing facilities, and (5) improve the overall hard-currency situation by requiring joint ventures to export for hard currency and/or sell output to Cuba for domestic currency (thereby furthering import substitution). However, for a number of reasons—on the one hand, foreign concern about investment security, lack of access to the domestic market, export requirements, unattractive fiscal and financial incentives, and on the other hand, US legal prohibitions on such investment—Western businessmen reacted very coolly to the Cuban legislation. I know of only one such project a Spanish-Cuban joint venture to recycle (and export) scrap metal.[11]

For 1981–85, labor productivity reportedly grew at 5.2 percent a year, outstripping the projected 3 percent rate. However, according to Cuban statistics, labor productivity is the ratio (or rate of growth of the ratio) of the gross value of output (at current prices) to the average annual number of workers. Since the gross value of output is subject to the same inflationary bias as GSP, real labor productivity gains may also be presumed to be overstated. Thus, in 1981, labor productivity in the "productive sphere" rose by an astonishing 24.5 percent (gross value of output grew by 26.8 percent and labor input rose by an estimated 1.8 percent); in subsequent years, productivity increases were more moderate—1.6 percent in 1982, 2.4 percent 1983, and 7.2 percent in 1984.[12]

Foreign Trade Problems

Although Cuba reached its targets for export expansion in 1981–85, imports grew much more rapidly than planned (see Table 1). As a result, Cuba experienced a sharp deterioration in its merchandise trade balance—the nation registered an average annual trade deficit of 1,168.8 million pesos in 1981–85 compared to 402.6 million in 1976–80. The downward trend was reversed briefly in 1982 and 1983, but resumed thereafter, amounting to a record deficit of 1,923 million pesos in 1985 (see Table 2). This pattern was repeated in trade with socialist countries and with capitalist countries, whereas trade balances with the developing countries deteriorated relentlessly during the entire first half of the 1980's.

Throughout the period, the share of Cuba's trade that was conducted with socialist countries continued to rise, from 70 percent of exports and 78 percent of imports in 1980 to 90 percent of exports and 84 percent of imports in 1985. Cuba's trade deficits with the socialist countries averaged 960 million pesos a year in 1981–85, and would have been substantially higher had not the Soviet Union and other members of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) accorded Cuban exports and imports preferential price treatment.

Since the mid-1970's, the Soviet Union and East European nations have purchased Cuban sugar at prices far above prevailing world market prices. Reportedly, the Soviet Union agreed in 1976 to purchase Cuban sugar at a very high price and to adjust the price annually based on the movement of prices of a basket of commodities that Cuba imports from the Soviet Union, including oil.[13] As a result of this price indexing scheme, Cuba has been insulated from the

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[9] Castro's Central Report, loc. cit., p. 59.

[10] See Jorge F. Pérez-López, *The 1982 Cuban Joint Venture Law: Context, Assessment and Prospects*, Miami, Institute of Interamerican Studies, University of Miami, 1985; and idem, "The Economics of Cuban Joint Ventures," forthcoming in *Cuban Studies/Estudios Cubanos*.

[11] Jorge I. Domínguez, *To Make a World Safe for Revolution: Cuban Foreign Policy*, manuscript, Chapter 9. However, another source has indicated that, as of mid-1985, not a single joint venture had been registered pursuant to the law. See Jeremy Main, "Castro Tightens Cuba's Belt," *Fortune* (New York), Sept. 16, 1985, p. 128. As far as we can determine, the reported arrangements between Cuban and Argentinian enterprises regarding construction of tourist hotels and other facilities have not taken the form of joint ventures. On these arrangements, see Banco Nacional de Cuba, *Economic Report*, February 1985, p. 15.

[12] *Anuario Estadístico de Cuba 1984*, p. 108.

[13] This arrangement was part of a long-term economic and scientific-technical cooperation agreement for the period 1976–80 signed with the Soviet Union on April 14, 1976. See *Granma* (Havana), Apr. 15, 1976, p. 8; and José Luis Rodriguez Garcia, "The Cuban Economy Between 1976 and 1980: Results and Prospects," *Economía y Desarrollo* (Havana), January-February 1982, p. 121. However, there is evidence that the indexing arrangement was in effect prior to 1976. For example, a September 1975 publication of the Banco Nacional de Cuba refers to an arrangement whereby the price of Cuban sugar exports to the Soviet Union had been set at 30 cents per pound, with the possibility of adjusting the price according to the price of imports from the Soviet Union. See Banco Nacional de Cuba, *Development and Prospects of the Cuban Economy*, Havana, 1975, p. 32.

Table 2. Cuban Merchandise Trade by Groups of Countries

(in millions of pesos)[1]

	1975	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
World							
Exports	2,952	3,967	4,224	4,933	5,535	5,462	5,983
Imports	3,113	4,627	5,114	5,531	6,222	7,207	7,905
Balance	-161	-660	-890	-598	-687	-1,745	-1,922
Socialist countries							
Exports	2,002	2,786	3,179	4,172	4,765	4,893	5,310
Imports	1,605	3,613	4,114	4,908	5,414	6,058	6,640
Balance	397	-827	-935	-736	-649	-1,165	-1,330
Capitalist countries							
Exports	771	553	557	459	470	377	672[2]
Imports	1,299	904	922	556	631	868	1,265[2]
Balance	-528	-351	-365	-97	-161	-491	-593[2]
Developing countries							
Exports	179	628	488	302	300	192	na[3]
Imports	209	110	78	67	177	281	na[3]
Balance	-30	518	410	235	123	-89	na[3]

[1] Official peso-dollar exchange rates were one peso equals US$1.21 in 1975; US$1.41 in 1980, US$1.28 in 1981; US$1.20 in 1982; US$1.16 in 1983; US$1.13 in 1984; and US$1.07 in 1985.

[2] Includes data for developing countries.

[3] Included with data for capitalist countries.

SOURCES: Comité Estatal de Estadísticas, *Anuario Estadístico de Cuba 1984* (Statistical Yearbook of Cuba, 1984), Havana, p. 289; and Banco Nacional de Cuba, *Economic Report* (Havana), March 1986, p. 9.

generally depressed sugar world market prices that have prevailed since the mid-1970s, and its sugar export revenues have been more stable than would have been the case otherwise. For instance, Cuban official statistics report that the contract price for Cuban sugar exports to the Soviet Union in 1982, the most recent year for which these data are available, was 29.9 centavos per pound; the price to CEMA members was 28.9 centavos, while to capitalist nations it averaged 7.7 centavos.[14] Similarly, in a December 1972 agreement, the Soviet Union undertook to purchase Cuban nickel at prices exceeding world market prices.[15]

The Soviet Union has also aided Cuba's merchandise trade balance by selling oil to the island at prices below those prevailing in the world market. In the aftermath of the 1973 world oil crisis and the ensuing quadrupling of world oil prices, the Soviet Union did not immediately increase oil prices to Cuba and other CEMA members. When the USSR did raise oil prices, in 1975, it was through a pricing formula that took into account changes in world market prices for oil according to a five-year moving average, thereby passing on price increases with a significant time lag.[16] A Western estimate puts total Soviet subsidies for Cuba's exports (sugar and nickel) and imports (oil) at US$3,100 million and $3,700 million in 1981 and 1982 respectively.[17]

While the share of trade with capitalist nations in Cuba's total trade is small and declining, this commerce is critical to the Cuban economy because it provides goods and technology either not available or available only in limited quantitities from socialist nations. Exports to capitalist nations are an important source of hard currency to finance imports from these nations and to service the hard-currency debt owed to Western banks.

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[14] *Anuario Estadístico de Cuba 1984*, p. 374. The reported contract prices paid by capitalist countries for Cuban sugar in 1982 were: Japan, 6.6 centavos per pound; Finland, 8.3 centavos; Iraq, 6.9 centavos; Malaysia, 10.6 centavos; and Canada, 9.3 centavos.

[15] *Granma*, Jan. 3, 1973, p. 2.

[16] For a discussion of the Soviet oil-pricing formula see, Jorge F. Pérez-López, "Sugar and Petroleum in Cuban-Soviet Terms of Trade," in Carmelo Mesa-Lago and Cole Blasier, Eds., *Cuba in the World*, Pittsburgh, PA, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979.

[17] US Central Intelligence Agency, *The Cuban Economy: A Statistical Review*, ALA 84-10052, Washington, DC, June 1984, p. 40.

As for the developing countries, Cuba had in the late 1970's begun to record sizable merchandise trade surpluses, an outcome most likely associated with Cuba's internationalist policies and the link between the presence of Cubans abroad (soldiers, doctors, and technicians) and Cuban merchandise exports. This merchandise trade surplus with developing countries grew rapidly—from 36 million pesos in 1978, to 104 million pesos in 1979, to 518 million in 1980—and had a positive impact on the overall trade balance. In the 1980's, however, exports to these countries declined steadily, converting the surplus to a deficit of 89 million pesos in 1984.

Cuba's trade patterns, although distorted to some degree by Soviet export and import subsidies, are very similar to those of other oil-importing developing countries in Latin America and elsewhere, with a heavy concentration on the exporting of basic commodities and importing of fuels, semifinished products, and capital goods (see Table 3). In the 1980's, four-fifths of Cuba's exports were food and live animal products (primarily sugar). The most significant exception to this rule has been the emergence of oil (reexports of Soviet oil)—from 0.1 percent of the value of exports in 1975 to more than 4 percent in 1980 and 1981, 7 percent in 1982, and more than 10 percent in 1983 and 1984. The dominance of machinery and transportation equipment in Cuba's import basket has slipped below the one-third level in the 1980's, largely due to increasing import of fuels (reflecting rising domestic consumption, increasing reexport, and a rise in oil prices). By 1984, fuels had become Cuba's largest import category, accounting for 30.8 percent of the total.

Cuba's foreign accounts are segmented: there are soft-currency accounts reflecting bilateral trading relations with other socialist states and denominated in the currency of one of the two trading partners or else "transferable rubles"; and hard-currency trade, mostly with capitalist or developing countries, which is denominated in dollars, Swiss francs, or German marks. Socialist nations have routinely financed Cuba's trade deficits with low-interest loans; these have been rolled over at least twice (in 1972 and 1986), and there is a low probability that they will ever be repaid in full. Western governments, financial institutions and suppliers, too have provided credits to finance exports to Cuba. These interest-bearing credits are subject to repayment, in hard currency, according to a predetermined schedule.

In the mid- and late 1970's, thanks to a relatively strong Cuban domestic economic performance, high

Table 3. Composition of Cuban Exports and Imports

(percent of total, by peso value)

	1975	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
Exports	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Food & live animals	92.7	88.1	84.4	82.5	79.3	80.1
Beverages & tobacco	2.3	2.2	1.7	2.6	2.4	1.7
Raw materials, excluding fuels	4.7	5.0	8.0	6.7	5.6	6.0
Fuels	0.1	4.2	4.2	6.9	10.6	10.1
Chemicals	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1
Manufactured products, classified chiefly by material	0.0	0.4	0.4	1.0	0.5	0.4
Other	0.2	0.1	1.2	0.2	1.4	1.6
Imports	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Food & live animals	19.1	16.1	15.0	14.7	12.6	11.2
Beverages & tobacco	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1
Raw materials, excluding fuels	5.9	4.1	4.2	3.3	3.2	3.5
Fuels	10.3	19.7	22.8	27.1	29.9	30.8
Oils & fats	1.3	1.2	1.1	0.9	1.0	1.1
Chemicals	8.0	6.3	6.1	6.5	6.8	5.9
Manufactured products, classified chiefly by material	18.4	14.7	14.8	13.0	12.3	13.3
Machinery and transportation equipment	31.1	35.4	33.6	31.0	30.6	30.5
Other manufactured products	5.8	2.2	2.2	3.3	3.4	3.6

SOURCE: *Anuario Estadístico de Cuba 1984*, pp. 302-03.

world market prices for sugar, and the easy availability of international credit stemming from the recycling of "petro-dollars," Havana was able to obtain significant Western credits to finance investment largely in the productive sectors. The hope was to use output either to replace hard-currency imports or to generate hard currency through export—in either case permitting adequate servicing of the debt.

However, in 1981 and 1982, Cuba's hard-currency balance of payments deteriorated severely. This reflected a precipitous decline in sugar prices on the world market, plagues and bad weather affecting major crops, delays in completion of projects, low production efficiency, problems with product quality and difficulties in penetrating Western markets, and a sharp rise in international interest rates (affecting debt service).

In August 1982, the Banco Nacional de Cuba asked Western creditors (public and private) for a renegotiation of the terms of part of its debt, which as of June 1982 reportedly amounted to US$2,900 million, $1,650 million of it owed to private-sector lenders, primarily in the form of short-term loans. Cuba proposed stretching out over a 10-year period the repayment of over $1,000 million in principal coming due from mid-1982 through 1985, and requested a three-year grace period—to 1986—on payment of that principal, while announcing its "intention" to continue to pay interest on the rescheduled amounts. Cuba undertook to cut back hard-currency imports, aggressively pursue hard-currency exports, restrict investment more tightly to productive (rather than social) purposes, encourage joint ventures and other economic relations with market economies, earn hard currency through the export of services (e.g., construction workers), and cooperate in international efforts to stabilize sugar prices.[18]

On March 1, 1983, a group of creditor countries (West Germany, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Spain, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, England, Sweden, and Switzerland) agreed to reschedule Cuba's principal payments due in 1982 and 1983 over a five-year period, with a grace period of three and one-half years.[19] In the case of the debt held by private banks in the West, renegotiation proved more difficult. An agreement rescheduling $140 million in repayments due in 1982 and 1983 on the medium-term debt was reportedly concluded in April 1983,[20] but agreement on rescheduling of the short-term debt was not reached until early 1984.[21] Cuba subsequently succeeded in rescheduling public and private debt repayments due in 1984 and 1985.[22] These last reschedulings occurred despite a further deterioration in Cuba's financial situation after 1982–83, when the country briefly put a lid on expansion of hard-currency imports. However, a resumed climb in such imports and declining hard-currency exports had by 1985 generated a 119-million-peso hard-currency annual deficit (see Table 4).

A Cuban journalist candidly described the paradox of rapid economic growth and deteriorating financial condition experienced by Cuba:

> *In 1984, in fact, GSP registered the high growth rate of 7.4 percent; for the period 1981–84, this indicator averaged a rate of growth of 8 percent per annum, well above the 5 percent foreseen in the guidelines of the five-year plan. At first sight, these figures would suggest that the country's economy was moving at full speed ("viento en popa"). Without disparaging the real successes and important accomplishments reached globally and in specific sectors of the economy, it is fair to say that not everything was rose-colored, and that some problems were deepening. . . .*
>
> *What was happening? The economy as a whole had a very high rate of growth. However, basic sectors responsible for generating exports, investments for export, and other key sectors lagged behind. Thus, imports increased, but not so exports. Growth under these circumstances was a false and dangerous path. This situation made it clear that, in an economy such as ours, highly dependent on foreign trade, it is more important where and how to grow than how much to grow.*[23]

Physical Output Figures

Data on physical output of selected agricultural and industrial products for the years 1981–85 (see Table 5) give a clearer picture of Cuba's economic problems

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[18] Banco Nacional de Cuba, *Economic Report*, August 1982, esp. pp. 56–57; also, "Why and How Cuba is Partially Negotiating Its Foreign Debt," *Granma Weekly Review* (Havana, in English), Sept. 19, 1982, p. 7. Subsequent reports by the national bank show the 1982 debt at US$2,669 million, indicating a somewhat less serious situation for Cuba, but bringing into question the reliability of Cuban data. See Banco Nacional de Cuba, *Economic Report*, February 1985, Annex 8.

[19] Alfredo G. Pierrat, "Accord Signed for Refinancing Cuba's External Debt," *Granma*, Mar. 2, 1983, pp. 1 and 5.

[20] See, e.g., "Western Banks Agree to Reschedule Payments," AFP newswire, in *FBIS-LAM*, Apr. 13, 1983, p. Q/1.

[21] "Cuba: Tasting Its Own Medicine," *The Latin American Times* (Coral Gables, FL), No. 58, 1984, p. 29.

[22] See, e.g., "Cuba—Debt," *Direct from Cuba* (Havana), No. 329, July 1984; Francisco Forteza, "Cuba Continually Reduces Its Foreign Debt Service Ratio," *Granma*, May 20, 1985, p. 8.

[23] Julio García Luis, "The Principal Matter—The Future. The First Thing—Efficiency," *Bohemia*, Dec. 27, 1985, p. 45.

Table 4: Cuban Merchandise Trade in Soft and Hard Currency

(in millions of pesos)

	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Total							
Exports	3,499	3,967	4,224	4,933	5,535	5,462	5,983
Imports	3,688	4,627	5,114	5,531	6,222	7,207	7,905
Balance	-189	-660	-890	-598	-687	-1,745	-1,922
Soft currency							
Exports	2,759	2,683	2,881	3,551	4,248	4,366	4,800
Imports	3,047	2,956	4,126	4,899	5,390	6,042	6,603
Balance	-288	-923	-1,245	-1,348	-1,142	-1,676	-1,803
Hard currency							
Exports	740	1,284	1,343	1,382	1,287	1,096	1,183
Imports	641	1,011	988	632	832	1,165	1,302
Balance	99	273	355	750	455	-69	-119

SOURCES: Banco Nacional de Cuba, *Memorandum to the Group of Experts on the Scheduling of the Cuban Debt*, Havana, 1982; idem, *Cuba: Informe Económico Trimestral* (Cuba: Quarterly Economic Report), December 1982; idem, *Economic Report*, February 1985 and March 1986.

and lend weight to the impression that reported global growth figures for the period may be bloated. The data are presented against 1976–80 annual-average output figures and the planned output levels for 1985 and 1990—to the extent that they are known.[24] Since data for 1985 are largely preliminary reports or estimates,[25] they may be revised in subsequent official reports. Included in the table are all agricultural and industrial products for which a quantitative output target for 1985 and/or 1990 was available.

In agriculture, it appears that only pork and rice reached targeted 1985 production levels. Production of citrus—an important export commodity—expanded markedly, but fell 27 percent short of the 1985 target. Despite these data and the somber accounts of agricultural underinvestment and mismanagement given by Castro at the Third Congress, the leader still reported an average annual growth of 3.8 percent in agricultural output during 1981–85.

In the industrial sector, performance was also mixed. For a limited number of products—steel (using the low range of the target), refractory chromium, batteries, industrial gases, tires, and probably caustic soda[26]—output targets for 1985 were met or exceeded. Moreover, although we have no target figure, oil production increased sharply, reaching an all-time high of 868,000 tons in 1985. For the bulk of the industrial products listed in Table 5, however, 1985 production targets were not attained. For key commodities, including important export product lines, the shortfalls were significant:

- Raw sugar output in 1985 was 7.6 million metric tons compared to a target of 8.2–8.5 million tons. Although Castro claimed "stable production levels of about 8 million tons per annum" for 1981–85,[27] the actual average was just below 7.6 million tons.
- Generation of electricity was about 23 percent

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[24] For the 1985 targets, see *Lineamientos económicos y sociales para el quinquenio 1981–85* (Economic and Social Guidelines for 1981–1985), Havana, Editora Política, 1981; Castro's Central Report to the Second Cuban Communist Party Congress in December 1980, *Bohemia*, Dec. 26, 1980, pp. 35–67; Banco Nacional de Cuba, *Highlights of Cuban Economic Development 1976–1980 and Targets for 1981–1985*, Havana, 1981; and Humberto Pérez, "The Programatic Platform and the Economic Development of Cuba," *Cuba Socialista* (Havana), June 1982.

In some cases, targets are reported either as an average annual rate of growth or as the percentage by which production in the forthcoming five-year period will exceed production in an earlier five-year period. In these instances, annual production in each of the years in the future period was calculated by: 1) applying the percentage growth rate to the average annual production in the earlier period; and 2) multiplying the average by the following distributed lag factors: year 1—0.9; year 2—0.95; year 3—1.0; year 4—1.05; year 5—1.10.

[25] In addition to Castro's Central Report, loc. cit., see, Banco Nacional de Cuba, *Economic Report*, March 1986; and *Cuba: Indicadores Económico-Sociales y Políticos (1981–1985)* (Cuba: Socioeconomic and Political Indicators, 1981–1985), Havana, Editora Política, 1986.

Typically, Castro only reported the percentage growth of output in 1981–85 as compared to 1976–80. In many such instances, I estimated 1985 production by applying the reported percentage growth to cumulative production during 1976–80 and subtracting total output for 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1984 as reported in official sources.

[26] However, in his Central Report, loc. cit., p. 59, Castro states that production of caustic soda in 1985 did *not* meet the target.

[27] Castro's Central Report, loc. cit., p. 51.

Table 5: Targeted and Reported Annual Production of Selected Items

(in thousand tons, unless otherwise noted)

	Average, 1976-80	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	Plan	
							1985	1990
Agriculture								
Milk	773	926	929	948	943	931	1,005	1,250
Eggs[1]	1,765	2,066	2,013	2,231	2,274	2,270	2,300	2,610
Beef	301	304	300	303	302	na	330–340	324
Poultry	56	81	57	72	85	69	80–85	86
Pork	58	68	71	76	86	85	80	120
Honey	6.8	8.9	10.1	10.2	8.5	9.6	10.0	na
Citrus	285	471	530	632	600	732	1,000	1,400
Rice	453	461	520	518	555	528	520	620
Tobacco	35	55	45	30	45	na	50	70
Coffee	20	22	29	18	23	24	29	36
Industry								
Sugar	6,824	7,647	7,778	7,232	7,514	7,604	8,200–8,500	9,560
Electricity[2]	8,535	10,559	11,070	11,551	12,292	12,199	15,840	15,660
Oil	268	253	541	742	770	868	na	2,000
Manufactured gas[3]	124	139	133	136	146	na	na	190
Steel	307	328	301	364	338	413	400–440	600
Refractory chromium	25	21	27	34	38	38	29	na
Nickel-cobalt[4]	35,820	40,260	37,603	39,257	33,327	33,400	48,000	77,600
Copper concentrate[4]	2,889	2,908	2,645	2,667	2,701	3,100	3,740	4,010
Radios[5]	135	256	239	273	253	236	300	na
Television sets[5]	41	78	50	91	92	94	130	na
Batteries[5]	163	237	222	302	336	393	360	na
Fertilizers	908	1,059	1,067	1,026	1,036	1,160	1,300	1,530
Caustic soda[4]	4,308	8,029	11,187	13,511	14,832	na	9,500	na
Industrial gases[6]	11,456	14,468	15,058	16,178	17,869	19,800	17,640	na
Table salt	79	90	112	93	81	na	110	na
Industrial salt	54	71	86	87	103	na	130	na
Tires[5]	284	327	218	354	450	472	470	550
Inner tubes[5]	222	359	185	268	313	322	365	400
Household detergent	20	27	21	24	24	25	na	49
Hand soap	16.7	17.2	16.1	17.4	15.2	14.8	na	32.7
Cement	2,663	3,292	3,163	3,231	3,347	3,200	4,500–4,900	na
Glass containers[1]	278	266	325	283	330	na	550	420
Textiles[7]	151,364	171,926	153,337	170,340	172,140	205,400	300,000	335,000
Apparel-outerwear[1]	48	52	51	52	51	52	63–66	na
Apparel-underwear[1]	63	70	70	65	72	75	84–87	na
Leather footwear[8]	13.8	15.5	13.5	13.2	12.5	12.4	17.5–18.2	24.8
Canned fruit & vegetables	106	143	131	148	162	na	233	na
Fish catch	186	165	195	198	200	220	320	248
Alcoholic beverages[9]	337	385	570	586	656	432	na	650
Beer[9]	2,276	2,243	2,421	2,582	2,607	2,733	3,400–3,950	4,150
Soft drinks[9]	1,414	1,308	2,056	2,203	2,128	na	4,250–4,670	na
Fodder	1,225	1,510	1,364	1,489	1,609	1,564	1,700	na

[1] Million units
[2] Gigawatt-hours
[3] Million cubic meters
[4] Tons
[5] Thousand units
[6] Thousand cubic meters
[7] Thousand square meters
[8] Million pairs
[9] Thousand hectoliters

SOURCES: for 1976–80—*Anuario Estadístico de Cuba 1982*. For 1981–84—*Anuario Estadístico de Cuba 1984*. For 1985 results—reported or estimated from Castro's Central Report to the Third Communist Party Congress, loc. cit.; *Cuba: Indicadores Económico-Sociales y Políticos (1981–1985)* (Cuba: Socioeconomic and Political Indicators [1981–1985]), Havana, Editora Política, 1986; and Banco Nacional de Cuba, *Economic Report*, March 1986, Annex 3. For 1985 plan—*Lineamientos Económicos y Sociales para el Quinquenio 1981–1985;* Banco Nacional de Cuba, *Highlights of Cuban Economic Development 1976–80 and Main Targets for 1981–1985;* Castro's Central Report to the Second Communist Party Congress, loc. cit.; and Humberto Peréz, "The Programatic Platform and the Economic Development of Cuba," *Cuba Socialista* (Havana), June 1982. For 1990 plan—*Lineamientos Económicos y Sociales para el Quinquenio 1986-90 (Proyecto);* and Castro's Central Report to the Third Communist Party Congress, loc. cit.

below the target. This decline was doubtless intentional, in connection with a nation-wide energy-conservation campaign, an effort that also resulted in increased numbers of brownouts and blackouts.

- Nickel production fell 30 percent short of the target after peaking at 40,000 tons in 1981; this occurred despite substantial investments to modernize the plants at Nicaro and Moa.
- Fertilizer production fell short of the 1985 target by 10.8 percent, and the impact on agriculture was doubtless aggravated by reported supply bottlenecks.
- Sizable investments raised cement output to the range of 3.2–3.3 million tons a year, still far short of the target of 4.5–4.9 million tons. Exports, which reached nearly 420,000 tons in 1981, fell to under 300,000 tons in 1982, 213,000 tons in 1983, and under 225,000 tons in 1984.[28]
- The output of textiles increased, but still fell far short of targets, and production of leather footwear actually declined.

In the case of yet other products—e.g., salt (industrial and table), glass containers, canned fruits and vegetables, and soft drinks—for which 1985 production data are not available (or production estimates cannot be easily made), 1981–84 results make it likely that output fell short of targets. The 8.8 percent annual growth rate in industrial output reported by Castro at the Third Congress seems inconsistent with this lackluster performance of many key industrial sectors and the litany of weaknesses highlighted in the same speech.

Social Indicators

Performance in the health services area—a nonproductive sector, not included in GSP—was quite strong during the period 1981–85, as can be seen in Table 6. The figures for physicians and dentists may overestimate services available to the Cuban population itself, inasmuch as health professionals working abroad may be included in the ratios,[29] but even adjusted for this, health service ratios would likely have improved on targeted levels. Although infant mortality of 16.5 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1985 was considerably below the figure of 19.6 in 1980, it marked an upturn from the 15.0 reported for 1984.[30]

In the area of education, Castro reported very high rates of enrollment in elementary and intermediate schools: 80 percent for 5-year-olds, almost 100 percent for those 6 to 12, and over 87 percent for those 13 to 16. Similarly, enrollments in special education and in adult education programs were very high. Castro even indicated that there was a "reserve" (i.e., surplus) of 10,000 primary school teachers, which permitted significant numbers of primary school teachers to return to school on a full-time basis, with full pay, for further training in their field or to be retrained as mid-level science teachers. Regarding higher education—the only segment for which explicit performance targets have been made public—the targeted enrollment ratio was not met.

Rationing of staple food commodities and consumer goods, which began in 1960, still continues in Cuba, although the number of products subject to restriction has declined. According to Castro's Central Report to the Third Congress, the list of 150 non-food items subject to rationing in 1980 had shrunk to 68 by the end of 1985. Instrumental in this process was the establishment by the government of a "parallel market," in which consumer products could be purchased freely at prices significantly higher than official prices. Also contributing was the 1980 decision (reversed in 1986) to permit farmers to sell their surplus agricultural output (beyond the procurement quotas that had to be sold to the state) directly to consumers at "free farmers' markets"—at whatever prices consumers were willing to pay. Over the period 1981–85, average

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[28] *Anuario Estadístico de Cuba 1984*, pp. 308–09.

[29] Official Cuban data on the number of physicians and dentists correspond to counts on the "Register of Professionals," without specifying whether such personnel are actually in Cuba or abroad. Our presumption is that they refer to the total number of professionals regardless of where they are performing services. See *Anuario Estadistico de Cuba 1984*, Table XV.1, p. 428. Table XV.2 in the same source shows the distribution (for 1984) of health professionals by provinces. Again, this table does not definitively answer the question of whether the professionals are in Cuba or abroad. Ratios of persons per physician or persons per dentist calculated using the data on number of physicians and official population data yield results relatively close, but not identical, to those given in my Table 6.

[30] Address by JUCEPLAN President José López Móreno, reproduced as "Plan of Economic and Social Development: Results in 1985, Objectives for 1986," *Granma*, Dec. 31, 1985, p. 2. López Móreno actually reports the infant mortality rate in 1985 as 16.6; presumably the 16.5 rate reported by Castro (and included in Table 6) is a more current estimate and may reflect some revisions to the data.

Sergio Díaz-Briquets argues in "How to Figure Out Cuba: Development, Ideology and Mortality," (*Caribbean Review* [Miami, FL], Spring 1986, esp. pp. 9–10) that improvement in infant mortality over the last 25 years is but a continuation of a favorable trend under way since about the beginning of the century. He suggests that increases in infant mortality rates during the first few years of the revolution probably were not the result of a deterioration in health services but rather of more complete registration of infant deaths. Thus, the jump in infant mortality in 1985 of about 10 percent is a significant event.

For a different view on the quality of Cuban health statistics, and particularly of infant mortality data, see Nicholas Eberstadt, "Did Fidel Fudge the Figures? Literacy and Health: The Cuban Model," ibid., Spring 1986, esp. pp. 6–7.

Table 6: Social Indicators, Planned and Actual

	1980		1985		1990
	Plan	Actual	Plan	Actual	Plan
Health					
Hospital beds/1,000 inhabitants	na	4.9	5.2	5.4	6.2
Persons/physician	750–790	626	500–550	443	284
Persons/dentist	3,150–3,250	2,667	2,050–2,100	1,864	1,509
Infant mortality[1]	23–25	19.6	na	16.5	<15[2]
Education					
Enrollment in higher education per 1,000 inhabitants over age 17	na	34	39	35	35
Nutrition					
Daily food intake, calories	na	2,866	3,154	2,900	3,100
Daily food intake, protein[3]	na	75	82	78	83
Housing					
Housing units built[4]	na	83,000	200,000	126,000	185,000

[1] Deaths per 1,000 live births.

[2] Estimated.

[3] Grams per capita.

[4] Cumulative building during the five-year period ending with the specified year

SOURCES: For 1980 plan—*Proyecto de Directivas para el Desarrollo Económico y Social en el Quinquenio l976-80*. For 1980 actual results—Castro's Central Report to the Second Communist Party Congress, loc. cit. For 1985 plan—*Lineamientos Económicos y Sociales para el Quinquenio 1981-1985;* Castro's Central Report to the Second Communist Party Congress, loc. cit. For 1985 actual results—Castro's Central Report to the Third Communist Party Congress, loc. cit. For 1990 plan—Ibid.; and *Lineamientos Económicos y Sociales para el Quinquenio 1986-90 (Proyecto)*.

food availability showed some modest improvement, but failed to attain 1985 targets.[31]

The inability of the state to provide sufficient housing facilities to meet demand, coupled with the deterioration of the housing stock, constitutes one of the most significant challenges facing the regime. According to Cuban official data, cumulative housing construction by the state during the period 1959–80 amounted to less than 320,000 units.[32] Carmelo Mesa-Lago has estimated that by the end of the 1970's, the housing deficit created since the revolutionary takeover in 1959 was approximately 700,000 units.[33]

State construction of housing fell 37 percent below the ambitious 200,000 unit target for 1981–85. Interestingly, Castro reported total construction of 335,000 units for the period,[34] suggesting that more than 200,000 units (upwards of 60 percent of total units) were built by cooperatives and individuals. Using the total of new marriages (380,000) and divorces (145,000) as a rough indicator of demand for new housing,[35] one finds that the supply of new housing was insufficient even if the plan targets had been met. In December 1984, the National Assembly of the People's Government passed new housing legislation which, inter alia, would convert tenants of housing stock owned by the state into owners, thereby transferring to the new owners the maintenance responsibilities that had previously fallen to the state.[36] (One can only guess at the impact on this rather odd reliance on market forces of Castro's recent prohibition of the private sale of houses and apartments.)

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[31] Annual data on "average consumption per capita of calories and proteins" appears, e.g., in *Anuario Estadístico de Cuba 1984*, op. cit., p. 96. For different views on nutrition issues in Cuba see Antonio M. Gordon, "The Nutriture of Cubans: Historical Perspective and Nutritional Analysis," *Cuban Studies/Estudios Cubanos* (Pittsburgh, PA), Summer 1983; "Comment" by Howard Handelman and "Reply" by Gordon in the same issue of that journal; "Comment" by Nelson P. Valdes in ibid., Winter 1985; and Medea Benjamin, Joseph Collins and Michael Scott, *No Free Lunch: Food and Revolution in Cuba Today*, San Francisco, Institute for Food and Development Studies, 1984, esp. Chap. 7.

[32] Calculated on the basis of data in Mesa-Lago, *The Economy of Socialist Cuba: A Two-Decade Appraisal*, Albuquerque, NM, University of New Mexico Press, 1981, p. 173, supplemented by the figure for Cuban state housing construction in 1980 from *Anuario Estadístico de Cuba 1984*, p. 174. It should be noted that in addition to housing construction by the state, there was also housing construction by cooperatives and by the population, particularly in rural areas. There are no systematic data on these other types of construction, however. The 1984 issue of the statistical yearbook also reports annual series for housing construction by enterprises other than construction enterprises, by cooperatives, and by the public, beginning with 1980.

[33] Mesa-Lago, *The Economy of Socialist Cuba*, pp. 173 and 228.

[34] Castro's Central Report, loc. cit., p. 53. To our knowledge, this is the first time that a figure on overall housing construction has been given. The total reported by Castro (335,000 units) is in line with Castro's statement to Frei Betto that "at present, more than 70,000 housing units per annum are being built." See Frei Betto, *Fidel y la Religión* (Fidel and Relgion), Havana, Oficina de Publicaciones del Consejo de Estado, 1985, p. 43.

[35] Data for marriages and divorces during 1981–84 is from *Anuario Estadístico de Cuba 1984*, p. 64. Estimates for 1985 are based on the actual figures for 1984. Refinement of these estimates of housing demand would require taking into account the impact of deaths and emigration.

Uncertain Blueprint for 1986–90

Where the Cuban economy heads from here is an open question. The draft plan *not* approved at the Third Congress is presumably still being "adjusted" by the technicians to take into account the serious deterioration in the hard-currency balance of payments experienced in 1984–85. Moreover, the draft could conceivably become devoid of operational significance if the "counteroffensive" already under way were to continue to gain momentum and evolve into a full-blown shift in economic strategy toward a "moral" economy.[37] Nevertheless, the plan plus Castro's comments at the Congress are the best indications we have about the Cuban leadership's current thinking on where the economy is heading.

Like its two predecessors, the plan for 1986–90 as drafted sought rapid economic growth, expansion of exports at a faster rate than imports, conservation of energy and raw materials, full utilization of the labor force, and improved economic efficiency. Emphasis on exports and on energy conservation was, however, somewhat greater than in the previous plans.

The draft plan projected average annual growth of GSP for 1986–90 at 5 percent. Total investment for the five years was projected at 23.1 billion pesos, a 30 percent increase over the previous five-year period. Some 45 percent of this investment was to be devoted to industry, up from 36 percent in the previous plan (see Table 1). At the Third Congress, Castro listed investment priorities that reflected those established for the Cuban economy in late 1984: (1) investment aimed at guaranteeing a sustained growth of capacities for producing export goods and/or replacing imports; (2) investments of strategic importance for Cuba's economic development being carried out with the technical and financial cooperation of the Soviet Union and other CEMA member-countries (including projects ensuring exports to those countries), and (3) social investments with the greatest influence on the population's well-being.[38] If these priorities still pertain, there is likely to be a reduction in investment in such sectors as agriculture, construction, transportation and communications.

A young Cuban worker (left) is trained in operation of a twisting machine at a textile mill in Leipzig, East Germany, prior to returning to Cuba for work.

—ADN Zentralbild from Eastfoto.

The draft plan targeted 3.5 percent annual growth in labor productivity. Judging from the demographics of the Cuban labor force, this will not be easily attained. Cuba can expect the "baby boom" of the 1960's to continue to swell the ranks of the economically active at about the rates of recent years (150,800 in 1982, 188,600 in 1983, and 170,000 in 1984).[39] This increase in labor supply will place an additional burden on an economy already falling behind in generating new jobs. Thus, in 1982, 1983, and 1984, respectively, the state sector generated only 57,000, 118,000, and 115,000 new jobs.[40]

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[36] The text of the law appears in *Revista Cubana de Derecho* (Havana), No. 24, 1985, pp. 37–78.

[37] This term has been used by Sergio Roca to describe an economic model espoused by Che Guevara, which had as its basis the belief that wealth created solely through "moral sense" (*conciencia*) would be the only strategy to yield both abundance and a new socialist man. See Roca, "Cuban Economic Policy in the 1970's: The Trodden Paths," *Studies in Comparative International Development* (New Brunswick, NJ), Spring 1977. Roca's moral economy is equivalent to what Mesa-Lago refers to as the Mao-Guevarist model. See his *The Economy of Socialist Cuba*, esp. Chap. 2.

[38] On the 1984 priorities, see Banco Nacional de Cuba, *Economic Report*, February 1985, pp. 10–11.

[39] On the "baby boom" of the 1960's, see Sergio Díaz-Briquets and Lisandro Pérez, *Cuba: The Demography of Revolution*, Washington, DC, Population Reference Bureau, 1981, p. 22.

A population pyramid for the Cuban population in 1984 shows a bulge for the cohort aged 15 to 19—it accounts for 11.8 percent of the total population compared to 11.0 percent for those aged 20 to 24 and 10.4 percent for those aged 10 to 14. See *Anuario Estadístico de Cuba 1984*, p. 60.

[40] *Anuario Estadístico de Cuba 1984*, p. 102.

While a targeted 5 percent growth in total exports should be easily attained, the picture is more gloomy when one focuses on *hard-currency* exports. Here Cuba faces continued depression in world sugar prices, the plunge in oil prices, a lack of success in attracting Western joint ventures, and difficulty in penetrating the markets of developed countries. Banco Nacional de Cuba reports that efforts to obtain tariff and non-tariff concessions, and financial support for export marketing studies from Western creditors have been to little avail.[41]

In May 1986, Cuba reportedly announced to Western creditors its intention to suspend payment of interest on the medium-term debt for 90 days and seek additional financing (to the tune of $500 million) in order to confront a serious shortfall of hard-currency revenue.[42] Three exceptional circumstances were cited as being responsible for the worsening in Cuba's financial situation: the drastic change in world oil prices;[43] a poor sugar harvest, primarily the result of serious damage to sugar cane fields inflicted by Hurricane Kate in November 1985, at the very beginning of the 1985–86 *zafra* (sugar harvest); and the weakening of the dollar vis-à-vis other Western currencies.[44] Although more recent reports suggest that Cuba reversed its position and made the interest payments due in May,[45] it is clear that the hard-currency situation remains critical.

The attempt to limit annual growth of imports to 1.5 percent may be even more challenging. Imports rose at an average annual rate of 11.5 percent in 1981–85, and at 8.9 percent in 1985. Cuban industries, particularly some of the ones established or expanded in recent years (e.g., steel, metal products, machinery, electronics, electrical equipment, paper products, and pharmaceuticals), require sizable imports. This is reflected in the high—and rising—share of intermediate products in Cuba's import basket: in 1981–84 they accounted for nearly 65 percent of all imports, compared to 59 percent in 1976–80.[46] Although the inclusion in these statistics of oil—part of which is reexported—clouds the picture somewhat, severe restrictions on the growth of imports of intermediate products will probably result in near-term declines in output, including output for export. Moreover, unless the USSR again revises its oil-pricing formula (with its lagged reflection of world prices)—and there is no evidence that it will—Cuba will find itself paying *above-world-market* prices for Soviet oil for some time.

The 1986–90 plan calls for renewed efforts to conserve energy, including a program to reduce consumption of liquid fuels by 10 percent between 1985 and 1990. Such a program reportedly brought a 20 percent reduction in consumption of liquid fuels in 1981–85.[47] Comparable savings will likely be required of many existing plants in the current five-year period because of new energy-intensive investments expected to come on line in the next five years—a new oil refinery, and plants in nonferrous metallurgy and textiles.[48] The largest potential source of oil savings in the medium term appears to be the nuclear reactors under construction at Juraguá.[49] However, operational status for the first of the reactors, originally set for 1987, now appears to have been set back until 1990.[50] (It remains to be seen what effect, if any, the Chernobyl' accident—which involved different reactor technology—will have on the Cuban nuclear power program.)

Because the plan for 1986–90 has not yet been approved, there is no definitive information on production targets in the agricultural and industrial sectors. The draft plan contained quantitative production targets for 1990 for a very limited number of products. For

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[41] On Cuba's trade situation, see Banco Nacional de Cuba, "Estimated Execution of the Main Economic Indicators for 1985," mimeo, 1985, p. 1. For the program of external measures, including the request for over 60 tariff concessions, elimination of over 30 quantitative restrictions applicable to Cuban exports, and for $30 million to co-finance "the implementation of a program of pre-feasibility studies during 1985 and 1986 to promote the maximum use of existing capacities or their partial reorientation toward foreign markets and the identification of opportunities for investment over the next five years and thereafter," see Banco Nacional de Cuba, *Economic Report*, February 1985, pp. 47–63.

[42] Robert Graham, "Cuba Seeks Formula to Renegotiate Debt," *Financial Times* (London), May 1, 1986, p. 4; "Cuba to Suspend Payments," *The Washington Post*, May 1, 1986, p. A30; José de Cordoba, "The Foreign Debt: Castro Suspends Payments," *El Miami Herald*, May 1, 1986, pp. 1, 8; and "Cuba Postpones Payments on Its Foreign Debt," *Diario las Americas* (Miami), May 1, 1986, p. 3A.

[43] See Jorge F. Pérez-López, "Cuba as an Oil Trader: Petroleum Deals in a Falling Market," *Caribbean Review*, Spring 1986.

[44] This last development is ironic given that Cuba does not have trade or financial relations with the United States. It comes about because Cuba's Western debt is denominated in hard currencies other than the US dollar, while the world market prices of its key hard-currency export earners—sugar and oil—are quoted in US dollars. Consequently, as other hard currencies (e.g., West European or Japanese) have appreciated against the US dollar, Cuba has seen a significant increase in its debt service relative to earnings from exports. See Banco Nacional de Cuba, *Balance of Payments Highlights for 1986–1987*, Havana, April 1986, p. 9.

[45] "Havana Reverses Itself, Will Make Debt Payment," *The Wall Street Journal* (New York), May 13, 1986, p. 35.

[46] *Anuario Estadístico de Cuba 1984*, p. 301.

[47] Report on economic performance during 1985 and the plan for 1986 by José A. López Móreno, President of the Junta Central de Planificación, *Granma*, Dec. 31, 1985, p. 2.

[48] As much was admitted by the National Energy Commission, which has outlined a plan to reduce oil consumption from 0.370 kilograms per peso of output to 0.327 kilograms by 1990. "A Warning About Increases in the Demand For and Consumption of Electricity," *Granma*, Feb. 17, 1986, p. 3.

[49] Each of the four 440-megawatt reactors will reportedly displace consumption of 600,000 metric tons of oil products a year. Address by Fidel Castro at the 1st National Energy Forum, *Bohemia*, Dec. 14, 1984, p. 55.

[50] Joaquín Oramas, "The First VVER-440 Reactor at the Nuclear Power Plant Will Be Commissioned in 1990," *Granma*, Mar. 1, 1986, pp. 1, 2.



Construction work in October 1985 at Cuba's nuclear power plant in Juraguá.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

yet other products, Castro gave tentative growth rate targets in his Central Report, but since data for 1985 are not available, it is generally not possible to use these growth rates to derive quantitative estimates of output for 1990. For those products for which a 1990 production target has been reported or can be estimated, the figures are given in Table 5 above.

In agriculture, production targets for 1990 are consistent with rapid growth. However, in at least a few instances—e.g., beef and poultry—targets for 1990 are close to, or below, the unfulfilled target for 1985, suggesting that the 1985 targets were unrealistically high. The 1990 target for citrus (1.4 million tons) is very ambitious (40 percent higher than the 1985 target and double the actual production in that year).

Available 1990 targets for industrial products show a mixed picture. Steel and tire manufacturing, stellar performers in 1981–85, are expected to continue to expand. The 1990 production target of 2 million metric tons for oil is extremely ambitious (it averaged 268,000 tons in 1976–80 and 635,000 tons in 1981–85).[51] Impressive growth is also targeted for sugar, nickel, copper concentrate, fertilizers, textiles, leather footwear, and beer—even though these are sectors where production fell short of targets in 1981–85.

Sugar output is expected to reach 9.6 million metric tons by 1990. Hurricane Kate clearly got the endeavor off to a bad start, causing a 1,000 million pesos of damage to sugar cane, rice, and other crops. Cuba now estimates the 1985–86 sugar harvest at 7.1 million tons against an earlier projection of 8.1 million.[52] However, the effects of such a storm are short-term, and production can be expected to recover in subsequent years.

Large increases in nickel production are doubtless contingent upon the anticipated commissioning of new processing facilities, particularly a new plant at Punta Gorda, with an annual capacity of 30,000 tons. However, that project has been beset by construction delays and technical problems, and may not be brought to full capacity until 1990.[53]

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[51] Cuban Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez is more circumspect, indicating that "by the year 2000 there are possibilities of increasing oil production to 2 million metric tons." See interview with Rodriguez, "The Cuban Economy: A Realistic View," *Cuba Internacional* (Havana), February 1985, p. 40.

[52] Banco Nacional de Cuba, *Balance of Payments Highlights for 1986–1987*, p. 6.

Turning to social consumption, we see from Table 5 that the 1986–90 plan foresees steady improvements in the area of health services.[54] Castro placed special emphasis on a "family doctor" program—involving some 8,000 physicians and like number of nurses—aimed a bringing health care closer to the users, including those in rural areas. In his closing address to the Third Congress, Castro boldly stated that by 1990, Cuba expects to have surpassed the United States with regard to the health of its population as measured by the infant mortality rate, life expectancy at birth, and similar indicators.[55]

Regarding education, the rate of enrollment in higher education by persons over 17 years of age is expected to remain unchanged over the period 1986–90. Although this represents a backing-off from the original rates targeted for 1985 (39 per thousand), attainment of the goal against a rapidly expanding over-17 population would be a significant achievement.

In the area of nutrition, the 1990 targets project some improvement with regard to actual consumption levels attained in 1985, but no significant improvement over levels which had been proejcted for 1985. It is unclear what effect the recent abolition of the free peasants' markets will have on the availability of food—and nutrition levels of the population—during the second half of the 1980's.

The state is slated to construct 185,000 housing units in 1986–90 (up from 126,000 in 1981–85, but below the original 200,000-unit target for that period). Castro has indicated that the recently reinstituted microbrigades, groups of workers on enterprise rolls assigned to work in the construction industry, will be concentrated on housing construction and are expected to build 10,000 housing units annually.[56] Because of organizational start-up problems, the microbrigades are likely to have only a marginal impact on housing construction during 1986, although they might make a significant contribution in subsequent years.

Shaking Up Planning and Policy

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the 1986–90 plan besides its failure to gain formal adoption at the Third Congress (and possibly even a factor contributing to that failure) was the organizational shuffle in late 1984 that evidently reduced the role of JUCEPLAN in the whole process of national economic planning and control. Until then, JUCEPLAN had had full responsibility for preparing annual, five-year, and long-term social and economic development plans. Cuba's first two five-year plans (for 1975–80 and 1981–85) were prepared under the leadership of Humberto Pérez, who had been president (with rank of minister) of JUCEPLAN since the early 1970's.

However, in December 1984, in the course of reporting Cuba's economic results for I984 and the plan for 1985, Pérez revealed that since late November, a new "Central Group" had been established to review the plans prepared by JUCEPLAN for 1985 and for 1986–90.[57] The Central Group, which was established at the conclusion of a three-day meeting called by Castro to conduct an in-depth review of economic performance, hard-currency balance-of-payments difficulties, and general management problems in relation to plans for 1985 and subsequent periods, was composed of the vice-presidents of the Council of Ministers, ministers with responsibilities in the economic area, and party representatives. Chairmanship of the Central Group was given not to Pérez, but to Osmani Cienfuegos, a vice-president in charge of the State Committee on Finance, the State Committee on Labor and Social Security, the State Committee on Material-Technical Supply, and the National Tourism Institute. It was subsequently revealed that the Central Group had developed the basic guidelines and control parameters for the new plan and evaluated the economic feasibility of more than 30 investment projects. In a triumph of Cuban bureaucratism, the Central Group reportedly had drafted 291 highly qualified technicians from government agencies to staff out these studies.[58]

In mid-1985, Pérez was relieved of his duties as minister-president of JUCEPLAN and a vice-president of the Council of Ministers. He was replaced by José López Móreno, at the time minister of construction. Pérez also lost his position as an alternate member of the Cuban Communist Party's ruling Political Bureau.

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[53] See, e.g., Ciro Bianchi Ross, "Punta Gorda Revealed," *Cuba Internacional*, October 1984; and Canute James, "Cuban Nickel Plant on Hold," *The Journal of Commerce* (Phillipsburg, NJ), June 19, 1986, p. 5A. The latter source also suggested that low nickel prices may be a factor in the delay.

[54] Castro's speech indicated an even higher target for hospital beds per capita (6.2) than that given in the draft plan (5.8). Cf. Castro's Central Report, loc. cit., p. 63, and *Lineamientos económicos y sociales para el quinquenio 1986–90*, Directive Number 302.

[55] *FBIS-LAM*, Feb. 10, 1986, pp. Q/28–29.

[56] On the restoration of microbrigades, see Castro's June 1986 speech, loc. cit., p. Q/14.

[57] "Speech of Humberto Pérez On the Draft Law for the Economic and Social Development Plan for 1985," *Granma*, Dec. 29, 1984, p. 2.

[58] *Granma*, Dec. 31, 1985, p. 2.

His personal travails appear to reflect the fall from favor of JUCEPLAN—and, more important, of the market socialism model it had espoused—in the eyes of Castro and possibly of other Cuban leaders.

Pérez is a Soviet-trained technocrat versed in economics and Marxism-Leninism, who had taught in a variety of Cuban party and government institutions and had served on the economic studies commission of the Organization Department of the Secretariat of the Cuban Communist Party. He served as Executive Secretary of the National Committee for Implementation of the Economic Management and Planning System (Sistema de Dirección y Planificación de la Economía—SDPE), a Soviet-style system of measures, embraced in 1976, aiming at introducing rationality into the economy through the granting of more autonomy to enterprises and the selective use of market instruments (e.g., budgets, prices, interest, and wages tied to productivity).[59] In 1979, he became one of 12 vice-presidents of the Council of Ministers, with responsibility for overseeing JUCEPLAN, the state committees for prices and for statistics, and the National Institute for Automated Systems and Computation Techniques,[60] and in 1980 was named an alternate member of the party Political Bureau.

The nature of the changes being pursued under the SDPE was evident from a report by Pérez to an October 1982 national plenary session reviewing the system's implementation. He reported:

- Significant advances in standardizing accounting methods in enterprises and in establishing an auditing program;
- Improvement in the national statistical system and progress in developing a new input-output table;
- Headway in introducing a system of financial controls, operated by the Banco Nacional, and in using credit as an instrument to promote enterprise autonomy and efficiency;
- The reform of wholesale prices in 1981;
- Progress in utilizing the State Arbitration System to settle disputes among enterprises;
- Establishment of work norms for 72.3 percent of workers, and tying of pay to performance in the case of 1.2 million out of a total of 2.9 million workers in the state sector;
- Important advances in product standards and quality control;
- Improvement in financial controls over units (productive and non-productive) financed from the state budget;
- Significant strides in training technicians and cadres to implement SDPE.

While asserting that "no mechanism [of SDPE], no structure, no organization" was "immovable," Pérez stressed the importance that "[SDPE] remain . . . as a system and not as a loose group of mechanisms, uncoordinated or at odds with each other, or not related to our real possibilities."[61]

Fidel, too, once spoke as fervently of SDPE. At the Second PCC Congress, in December 1980, he had termed it "a revolutionary duty, a political duty" of everyone in the state, party, and mass organizations "to work coherently and do their utmost so that we can meet the objectives of implementing the [SDPE]. . . ."[62] However, by the Third PCC Congress, he was in a mood to ignore the SDPE when speaking of the economic accomplishments of the preceding five years, and to reserve his comments about it for the section of his report dealing with "deficiencies and faults":

> *After an initial push to implement the SDPE, coherent work to make it work better was not done. The drive to do so was lost, and there was a lack of creativity in adapting to our specific conditions a system which, to a considerable extent, had been taken from foreign experiences. . . .*
>
> *The [SDPE], insofar as profitability of enterprises is concerned, can be a complete fraud if we pretend to resolve the problem of lack of profitability by increasing the prices of goods, construction, and productive services.*
>
> *Prices of some maintenance services, construction and transportation services—just to mention a few—are scandalously high. This serves the purpose of hiding inefficiencies, unnecessary workers, and excessive expenses. I believe we have much to learn regarding efficiency, and we should not behave as sorcerers' apprentices, that is, as capitalists' apprentices. If these deficiencies are not overcome, the SDPE will cease to be an engine in our development.*[63]

Regarding the future of the SDPE, Castro was quite circumspect, offering yet another bureaucratic solution. He announced that responsibility for "revitalizing" the SDPE would be entrusted to a new organization, the National Commission for the System of Economic Management, a ministerial-rank commission reporting to the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers.[64] However, since the Congress, Castro has hardened his rhetoric in criticizing the management of the economy and has excoriated individualist tendencies in the population and the corruption, the drive for personal enrichment, and misuse of resources that he associates with incipient capitalism and consumerism. In an address in April commemorating the 25th anniversary of the Bay of Pigs victory, he equated the fight to eradicate inefficiency and corruption with that against the Bay of Pigs invaders:

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[59] For an interesting comparison of management of Cuban enterprises under the SDPE and in the Soviet Union see Sergio Roca, "Management of State Enterprises: A Comparison of the Soviet Union and Cuba," forthcoming in *Journal of Comparative Economics*.

[60] *Granma*, Jan. 11, 1980, p. 1

[61] Ibid., Oct. 5, 1982, p. 2.

[62] See *Bohemia*, Dec. 26, 1980, p. 42.

[63] Castro's Central Report, loc. cit., p. 59.

> *. . . now we are not fighting against the mercenaries. We do not have mercenary invasions. But we have mercenaries. They are people who play the role of mercenaries. Sometimes they are even good people, people whom we call good. They are people who are willing to fight for the revolution but who do things that go against the interests of the revolution. . . . [We] have people who are apathetic and negligent. These are the people . . . who do not want to participate in the struggle. They are irresponsible people. They are people who are not too demanding within the sphere of their responsibilities. They are tolerant people. We have people who seek privileges. We see people who want to make easy money not from their work, but from crooked deals, speculation, and illegal businesses.*[65]

Examples cited by Castro included artists who sold paintings privately to the public and to state institutions, earning more than 200,000 pesos a year compared to salaries of 5,000–6,000 for physicians; abuses in peasant free markets where high prices were charged and where peasants sometimes sold goods that under existing production quotas should have been turned over to the state; state organizations that overcharged for special jobs such as sheet metal work or maintenance; and misappropriation of state resources (such as building materials) or use of state vehicles and equipment for personal gain.

But Castro's remarks had a more fundamental agenda. He stated:

> *The first thing that a revolutionary cadre, a socialist cadre, a communist cadre must ask himself is not if his enterprise profits more, but how the country profits more. From the moment that we have so-called businessmen who worry more about the enterprise than the interests of the country, we have out-and-out capitalism. The SDPE was not made for that, not to begin playing at capitalism.*[66]

He drove this point home again in his June speech at the conference on enterprise management:

> *All enterprises, regardless of how important the profitability factor is, must think about the country's interests, about the interests of society. When an enterprise begins to think like a profit-oriented enterprise only, we are talking about a capitalist enterprise, an inferior-quality enterprise. . . . Protecting the moral sense [conciencia] of the workers is more important than meeting a certain goal. If I were at an enterprise and had to choose between protecting the moral sense of the workers by acting honestly, and meeting the enterprise's goal, you can be sure that I would protect the moral sense of the workers and act honestly. This is more important. We cannot go and meet goals at any cost.*[67]

In his June speech, Castro spoke with nostalgia of the idealistic and moralistic economic policies of the early 1960's. He acknowledged that the current system had been copied from the experience of other countries to cope with the resulting economic problems. But he added:

> *I think these experiences, the one from the past and the current one, must teach us that each revolution must strengthen and develop its own style and methods. We made mistakes when we all but rejected the experience of others, and we made mistakes when we copied the experience of others under different historical circumstances, with different developments, in different geographical conditions, and with a different state of mind and psychology.*[68]

Although Castro was quick to point out that he was not suggesting doing away with the current economic model and the SDPE, that having a management system was essential, and that it made sense to "fix up" the one already in place, he nevertheless proclaimed his "revolutionary counteroffensive" so as to root out incipient capitalism and consumerism and restore moral values to the economy.

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[64] Ibid., p. 64. In June 1986, it was reported that the Commission had been formally established and that Joaquin Benavides Rodriguez, at the time minister-president of the State Committee on Labor and Social Security, had been selected to head it. See Lourdes Meluza, "The Decline of the Cuban Economy Provokes a Change," *El Miami Herald*, July 2, 1986, p. 1.

[65] For an English translation of the April 20 address as broadcast nationally in Cuba, see *FBIS-LAM*, Apr. 22, 1986, at p. Q/19.

[66] Ibid., p. Q/20.

[67] Loc. cit., p. Q/22.

[68] Ibid., p. Q/10.

LA FUERZA DEL
PARTIDO RADICA EN
SU VINCULACION
ESTRECHA CON LAS
MASAS"

Housing units erected at Alamar in 1981 with the help of construction microbrigades. The sign reads "The Force of the Radical Party in Close Linkage with the Masses."

—Roberto Martinez/Photoresearchers.

And the leader's words were not empty. Already in May, at a national convention of members of agricultural cooperatives, Castro had announced that free peasant markets were to be eliminated—they were closed down overnight.[69] The reinstitution of the microbrigades to work on housing construction was another assault on the principles of SPDE—the microbrigades had been phased out earlier precisely because they inflated the payroll of enterprises and clashed with the accountability standards of the reform system.[70] "Suspension" of pay bonuses based on productivity gains was announced in May.[71] In compliance with new regulations prohibiting direct sales of houses and apartments by one private party to another, the monthly tabloid *Opina,* organ of the Internal Demand Institute (Instituto de la Demanda Interna), discontinued in mid-1986 its very popular classified listings of housing exchanges. Intention to modify the system of copyright payments, presumably to reduce payments to authors who were perceived as becoming too rich, was also announced.[72]

It is uncertain what further steps along these lines will be taken by the Cuban government, and if so, when. Two areas that appear ripe for action, however, are self-employment and worker indiscipline. A move to tighten discipline would complement the recently issued standards delineating accountability by managers, cadres, and workers for losses and damages which result from negligence and carelessness in the work place.[73] Central to the current uncertainty is the fact that Castro has placed himself squarely in charge of the counteroffensive and has chosen to announce one move at a time, magnifying the drama of each action and recreating the imagery of victorious guerrilla strikes from different directions at the weak spots of a strong enemy.

There is little doubt that the 1986 counteroffensive and the organizational changes of 1984 and 1985—which brought the responsibilities for the preparation of the plan under the purview of the Political Bureau of the Cuban Communist Party—have enhanced Castro's personal influence on economic policy-making and on the planning and management of the economy, while reducing that of institutions such as JUCEPLAN and of those who favor a limited operation of market forces (e.g., Humberto Pérez and even Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodríguez.)[74]

Despite the intervention of the Central Group in the planning process, it is reasonable to assume that the economic growth targets in the draft 1986–90 economic plan basically presupposed a continuation of the market socialism model that had been followed since the mid-1970's. How Castro's campaign progresses during the remainder of the year and what changes will appear in the plan presented at the extraordinary December reconvening of Third Congress delegates will give a clearer view of how far he is prepared and/or able to go in moving away from that model toward the model of a moral economy.

The potential impact of such a policy shift on the ability of the Cuban nation to deal with the serious economic challenges facing it in the years ahead should not be underestimated. Cuba's experimentation with moral incentives in the mid-1960's proved to be disastrous from an economic standpoint. Two decades later, if Castro moves Cuba again in that direction, there is every reason to believe that the outcome will be the same.

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[69] Alberto Pozo and Magda Martínez, "The Beginning of the End for the Weeds," *Bohemia*, May 23, 1986; and "We Have Held A Meeting That Was Really Fruitful, an Historic Meeting," *Granma*, May 19, 1986, pp. 1–3.

[70] On the thinking behind the earlier phasing out of the microbrigades, see Castro's June 1986 speech, loc. cit., p. Q/14.

[71] *Granma*, May 30, 1986, pp. 1–3.

[72] Castro's June 1986 speech, loc. cit., p. Q/15.

[73] The decree issued by the Council of State on 22 May 1986 appears in *Trabajadores* (Havana), May 26, 1986, p. 2.

[74] This assessment is given in Clifford Krauss, "Fearing a Surge of Cuban 'Speculators,' Castro Reimposes Rigid Central Control," *The Wall Street Journal*, July 24, 1986, p. 27. Elsewhere, Rodriguez is quoted as saying that Cuba needs "managers of a new type. We don't want managers with capitalist ideas, but we need people with initiative and responsibility. We have to produce socialist [Lee] Iacoccas." See *The Journal of Commerce*, June 9, 1986, p. 5A.

The Soviet-Syrian Relationship

Pedro Ramet

Soviet relations with states in the developing world are typically characterized by Soviet efforts to institutionalize the relationship, client efforts to obtain the maximum possible assistance from the USSR at the lowest possible cost, and a general tendency for the Soviets to defer to the client where the latter's core interests are concerned. In the resulting relationship, the client typically enjoys greater influence over Soviet behavior, within the regional subsystem, than vice versa.

In this article, I shall argue that these conditions also obtain in the Soviet-Syrian relationship. The Soviet Union's concern to maintain its links with Syria has led, on the one hand, to efforts to expose Syrian elites to Soviet organizational and institutional procedures, in the hope that growing institutional cooperation may reinforce the relationship by creating a natural compatibility between parallel institutions of the two countries. On the other hand, it has led to a situation in which the Soviets find themselves letting the Syrians call the shots in the Middle East environment. Far from having acquired tangible influence over Syrian foreign policy, the Kremlin often finds that within the constraints of the relationship, it is the Syrians who enjoy influence over Soviet actions. The limits of Soviet influence over Syria are most evident in times of crisis, when Soviet-Syrian policy "coordination" (prescribed by the friendship treaty of 1980) vis-à-vis the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Lebanon, or Iraq turns out to be minimal, and the Syrians retain the initiative.

Soviet-Syrian Ties

The Soviet-Syrian relationship is an extensive one. In terms of credits, military cooperation, and economic-technical assistance, Syria is clearly favored among Soviet client states in the Third World. In many ways, Syria has become the centerpiece of the Soviet presence in the Middle East in the 1980's, just as Soviet assistance has long been the mainstay of Syrian military strength, offensive and defensive.

For over 20 years, Syria has obtained the bulk of its military hardware from the USSR. The purchase of Soviet arms has been accompanied by a sizable Soviet military presence in Syria, as first weapons instructors, and then military personnel and missile battery operators were dispatched.[1] By mid-1984, there were 13,000 advisers from the Soviet bloc in Syria, of whom at least 7,000 were from the Soviet Union itself.[2] Since some of these personnel were withdrawn during 1985,

Pedro Ramet is Assistant Professor in the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington (Seattle). Author of Sadat and the Kremlin *(1980) and* Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1963-1983 *(1984), he is currently at the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies (Washington, DC), where he is working on a book about Soviet-Syrian relations. The author wishes to thank both the Jackson School and the Kennan Institute for research support and Robert O. Freedman for his detailed comments on an earlier draft of this article.*

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[1] Trond Gilberg, "Eastern European Military Assistance to the Third World," in John F. Copper and Daniel S. Papp Eds., *Communist Nations' Military Assistance*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1983, p. 78.

[2] This figure included 4,000 economic advisers (about 1,000 from the USSR, the rest, mostly from Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Romania, although a small number were from Bulgaria and Poland); about 7,000 Soviet and Bulgarian military advisers and troops, and about 500 Cuban soldiers, and 1,500 Soviet and East European advisers linked to the KGB and other security services, of whom about 500 were East Germans. The numbers were derived from the following sources: "The Russians Move into Syria," *Foreign Report* (London), July 9, 1980, p. 1; Thomas Ammer, "Honecker's Near East Trip in October 1982," *Deutschland Archiv* (Cologne), December 1982, p. 1316; *World Affairs Report* (Stanford, CA), October 1982-February 1983, p. 65; *The New York Times*, Oct. 16, 1983; Richard Bernstein, "The UN versus the US," *The New York Times Magazine*, Jan. 22, 1984, p. 22; *Ekonomicheskoye sotrudnichestvo stran-chlenov SEV* (Economic Collaboration of CEMA Member States), February 1984, trans in Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS), *USSR Report* (Washington, DC), UIE-84-013, June 7, 1984, p. 58; D. L. Price, "Arab Detente and Iranian

Soviet specialist V. Vorb'yëv with Syrian construction workers at a hydroelectric project in Syria.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

the number of Soviet military advisers present in 1986 was estimated at 2,000–2,500.[3] The Soviet military appears to be particularly conscious of the advantages of having a military presence in Syria and, in their writings, some Soviet military officials have indicated a linkage between a forward presence in the eastern Mediterranean and the defense of the USSR.[4]

The Soviet-Syrian relationship, now some 30 years old, has developed into a multifaceted and on the whole mutually beneficial connection. Syria's utility to Moscow is neither economic nor necessarily a matter of Syrian susceptibility to influence. It derives above all from the fact that the Syrian connection assures the USSR a role in Middle East politics. The Soviet bloc's military and intelligence presence has on occasion led to frictions. At times, the Soviets have refused to release the fuses for surface-to-air missile systems to Syrian officers. They have guarded their operations from the Syrians in other ways as well, so that in 1975 the Syrian foreign minister at the time, Abd al-Halim Khaddam, complained that Soviet advisers behaved like "a state within a state."[5]

Syria has proved also useful to the Kremlin in ways other than giving the Soviet Union a presence in the area. For example, there are a variety of guerrilla and terrorist camps in Syria, where Turks, Armenians, Palestinians and others receive training, in part under the tutelage of Soviet and Bulgarian trainers and supervisors.[6] Syria has transferred weaponry to the PLO, and there are reports that Moscow has also transferred arms to Africa and distant parts of Asia through Syrian and Palestinian channels.[7]

Some analysts consider it very likely that the Soviets have penetrated Syrian security services.[8] Certainly, the Soviet intelligence presence in Syria and Lebanon was tangibly strengthened in the spring of 1980.[9] In its penetration efforts, Moscow also has not neglected the Syrian armed forces.[10] In the summer of 1983, there were reports that the Soviets were trying to recruit agents in the Syrian air force. These rumors seemed to be confirmed when President Hafiz al-Assad ordered a number of Soviet officers to return to the USSR.[11] Yet, ties between the Soviet and Syrian military establishments are close, extending even to cooperation between the political directorates of the two armies in the sphere of political education.[12]

The Soviets have been debating, ever since the days of Nikita Khrushchev, which criteria to use in favoring one Third World client over another, and the means whereby a cooperative linkage with Third World states could best be institutionalized and solidified.[13]

Chill," *Soviet Analyst* (London), June 27, 1984, p. 5; and interview with Paul B. Henze, Resident Consultant, Rand Corporation, Washington, DC, Sept. 5, 1984. These calculations are separately confirmed in *Le Monde* (Paris), May 26, 1983.

[3] *The New York Times*, Dec. 16, 1985, and Jan. 26, 1986; and Kati Marton, "Peril or Possibility: America and Syria at the Crossroads," *Middle East Insight* (Cleveland, OH), No. 6, 1986, p. 19.

[4] The Soviet military seems to have been the first institutional actor in the Soviet policy-making establishment to shift its emphasis from Egypt to Syria in the early 1970's. See Ilana Kass, *Soviet Involvement in the Middle East: Policy Formulation, 1966–1973*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1978, pp. 102, and 209–10.

[5] Quoted in John K. Cooley, "The Shifting Sands of Arab Communism," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March-April 1975, p. 33.

[6] Paul B. Henze, *Drugs, Arms, Terrorism and Destabilization—the Kremlin's Formula for Undermining the West*, Statement for the Senate Subcommittee on Alcoholism and Drug Abuse, Aug. 2, 1984; Paul B. Henze, "The Long Effort to Destabilize Turkey," *The Atlantic Community Quarterly* (Lexington, MA), Winter 1981-1982, pp. 469–70; Michael M. Gunter, "The Armenian Terrorist Campaign against Turkey," *Orbis* (Philadelphia), Summer 1983, pp. 472–73; and Michael M. Gunter, *Contemporary Aspects of Armenian Terrorism, International Terrorism and the Drug Connection*, Ankara, Ankara University Press, 1984, pp. 131–32.

[7] George Kurian, *Encyclopedia of the Third World*, New York, Facts on File, 1981, Vol. 3, p. 1704, and Henze, *Drugs, Arms and Terrorism*, loc. cit., p. 6.

[8] Interview with Paul B. Henze, Washington, DC, Sept. 5, 1984.

[9] "The Russians Move into Syria," *Foreign Report*, July 9, 1980, p. 4.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Cited in Carol R. Saivetz and Sylvia Woodby, *Soviet–Third World Relations*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1985, p. 131.

[12] *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Moscow), Oct. 5, 1983, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-SOV*), Oct. 13, 1983, p. H/3.

[13] See Francis Fukuyama, "The Rise and Fall of the Marxist-Leninist Vanguard Party," *Survey* (London), Summer 1985; Jerry F. Hough, *The*

As Francis Fukuyama has noted, the Soviets, after a series of setbacks in the developing world in the mid-1960's, began to place emphasis on the "necessity" of encouraging the development of vanguard parties.[14] Parallel with this, the Soviets also showed interest during the Brezhnev era in institutionalizing relationships and in using institutional frameworks to create "natural" channels of cooperation.

In Syria, one can see examples of this approach quite early when, in 1965, the German Democratic Republic helped Syria reorganize its ministry of finance "so that it may conform to the present phase of [Syria's] socialist evolution."[15] This was followed by another agreement providing for East German assistance in reorganizing various other Syrian ministries. Soviet credits to Syria have invariably been extended to the state sector, and the Soviets have periodically commended Syria for "progressive" and "positive" economic and social developments. By contrast, when a 1973 Syrian legislative decree eased restrictions on foreign trade and investment, giving a sudden spur to the private sector, the Soviets denounced it as a "negative" trend, despite the boost it gave to the Syrian economy.[16] Why? Most likely because the Soviets appreciated that private investments originating in Saudi Arabia and the Arab sheikdoms and private entrepreneurs interested in quality imports and dynamic markets would not provide a stable basis for economic relations with the Soviet bloc. Therefore, for pragmatic reasons, the Soviets have preferred to encourage the development of Syria's state sector rather than have the private sector grow. They seem aware that the state sector would be a natural customer for East bloc administrative and economic skills, while the private sector would be apt to develop ties in the West. Even so, the bulk of Syrian trade is still with the West.

The Soviets set up model collective farms for Syria, and with Soviet encouragement, the share of the private sector in agricultural production declined from 82 per cent in 1972 to 66 per cent by 1982.[17] As of 1986, the state owns all "strategic industries" in Syria, including sugar refining and wool spinning.

The CPSU and Syria's ruling Baath party have established routine party-to-party consultations and exchanges, along with cooperation between the political directorates of Soviet and Syrian armed forces, youth organizations, and so forth. The Soviets believe that similar institutional patterns make for similar political practices, common experiences, and compatible channels for cooperation.

Thus, when Soviet writers speak of Syria or other Third World nations as having embarked on a "non-capitalist path"—or when they speak of the principles of the Soviet New Economic Policy of the early 1920's as being better suited to Third World conditions than the orthodox Leninist-Stalinist model or a pluralist system of the Western mold[18]—this attitude does not signify an indifference to institutional forms and therefore to inter-institutional contacts. Advisory, administrative, support, and training contacts are dimensions of institutional forms and instruments of policy to which the Soviets are anything but indifferent.[19]

Syria's 1976 Intervention in Lebanon

As Carl W. Backman noted in 1970, crises in relationships—whether interpersonal or international—frequently provide an impetus to redefine the relationship, often through "formalized codes" or agreements.[20] Syria's intervention in Lebanon in 1976 seriously shook the Moscow-Damascus relationship by showing Moscow the limits of its influence on Damascus. It led directly to Soviet demands for greater military coordination and for consultations prior to Syria's undertaking such actions in the future.

By early 1976, Lebanon had collapsed into civil war, in which Syria was the major regional power involved. The Soviet Politburo, wishing to prevent an escalation of Syrian involvement, dispatched Premier Aleksey Kosygin to Damascus to dissuade President Assad from sending Syrian troops into Lebanon. Just before Kosygin's arrival on June 1, Assad (who had already

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Struggle for the Third World: Soviet Debates and American Options, Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1986; and Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier, "Development Issues in Recent Soviet Scholarship," *World Politics* (Princeton), July 1980.

[14] Fukuyama, loc. cit., p. 122.

[15] Quoted in George Lenczowski, *Soviet Advances in the Middle East*, Washington, DC, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1972, p. 113.

[16] See, for example, Y. Glukhov, "Syria Today: Work and Struggle," in *International Affairs* (Moscow), December 1978, p. 115.

[17] Daniel Pipes, "Syria: The Cuba of the Middle East," in *Commentary* (New York), July 1986, p. 20.

[18] A.P. Butenko, "Some Theoretical Problems in the Transition to Socialism by Countries with an Underdeveloped Economy," in *Narody Azii i Afriki* (Moscow), No. 5, 1982, pp. 70, 72; Yuri S. Novopashin, "The Impact of Real Socialism on the World Revolutionary Process: Methodological Aspects," *Voprosy Filosofii* (Moscow), No. 8, 1982, pp. 6–13; and A.M. Zakharov, "The Situation and Struggle of the Working Class of Syria," *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 3, 1968, p. 13. For a general discussion of this reassessment, see Thomas J. Zamostny, "Moscow and the Third World: Recent Trends in Soviet Thinking," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), April 1984.

[19] Yevgeniy Primakov explicitly links pursuit of the "non-capitalist path" to broad support from the Soviet bloc. See his "Countries of Socialist Orientation: A Difficult but Real Transition to Socialism," *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya* (Moscow), July 1981, p. 4.

[20] Carl W. Backman, "Role Theory and International Relations," *International Studies Quarterly* (Columbia, SC), September 1970, p. 316.

intervened earlier with Syrian-controlled forces on the side of Lebanon's President Sulayman Franjiyah against defiant units of the Lebanese army and his Palestinian Liberation Organization opponents) sent 4,000 regular Syrian troops and 250 tanks into Lebanon. This intervention presented Moscow with a fait accompli and created a dilemma for the USSR insofar as Syrian troops were now fighting their former Palestinian allies who were also clients of Moscow. Thus, the intervention overtly pitted one Soviet client against another.

Although Moscow's reaction was not immediate, once the Soviet press began to write about the situation, the Syrian action was denounced quite unequivocally.[21] On June 9, TASS issued a statement declaring that Syria's intervention was contributing to the bloodshed in Lebanon. On July 5, Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam went to Moscow for talks—possibly at Soviet insistence—with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko. By this time, there were 15,000 Syrian troops in Lebanon. The views of Moscow and Damascus were so divergent that no joint communiqué was issued at the conclusion of the visit. Instead, TASS reported briefly on July 7: "There was an exchange of views on the situation in the Middle East as well as on other international problems of mutual concern."[22] Two days later, the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee declared that "the involvement of Syrian military units in Lebanon has further aggravated the situation."[23] On July 11, Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev sent a letter to Assad containing the following passage:

> *The Soviet Union feels disquiet over the position taken by Syria [in Lebanon] . . . . We insist that the Syrian leadership should take all possible measures to end its military operations against the [Palestinian] Resistance and the Lebanese National Movement. There must be an immediate cease-fire in Lebanon. You can contribute to this by withdrawing your troops from Lebanon. . . . We are convinced that such moves correspond with Syria's own interests . . . [because otherwise] the imperialists and their collaborators will be able to bring the Arab people and the area's progressive movements under their control.*[24]

On July 16, *Pravda* wrote that Syria was plunging "a knife into the back" of the Palestinian movement.[25] Finally, as a material sign of its displeasure, the Soviet Union suspended deliveries of military equipment and spare parts to Syria and delayed the signing of new arms contracts.[26]

Brezhnev's position was reflected in the Soviet ss, whose reports on the situation in Lebanon were by July quite uniform. For example, *Krasnaya Zvezda* ran TASS dispatches on the Lebanese crisis verbatim. The general line was low-key but decidedly pro-PLO. The fighting between Syrian and Palestinian forces was described as "real 'manna from heaven' for all those interested in prolonging the Lebanese crisis."[27] When Syria and the PLO made an (unsuccessful) attempt to negotiate in late July, *Pravda* optimistically speculated that "the natural state of affairs is being restored and that recognition of the lasting importance of relations between Syria and the Palestinian movement has proven stronger than all the artificial, extraneous matters and complications that have arisen during the events in Lebanon."[28]

But as the Syrian forces started to best their Lebanese and Palestinian opponents, Moscow's coverage of Syrian actions softened. *Pravda*, without comment, quoted Assad as saying:

> *We went into Lebanon in order to restore peace and order in that country and also to thwart conspiracies against our people and the Arab nation. Unfortunately, some Palestinian leaders fell into a trap. However, guided by confidence in the purity and justice of our aims, we shall restore a normal situation.*[29]

In a statement issued at the end of September, even the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee restricted itself to the rather bland comment that it was "particularly alarming" that Syrian troops in Lebanon were still being used against the PLO.[30]

It is therefore not surprising that the Soviet Union came to be resented by both sides to the conflict, and that it proved marginal in its resolution. PLO leader Yasir Arafat believed that Moscow's stance had been too cautious. His forces were routed by the Syrian army, and Moscow did nothing to save the situation. Indeed, it was through the mediation of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait that a ceasefire and stabilization of the situation finally came about.[31] Assad, too, resented Soviet obstruction of arms deliveries and retaliated by reducing the number of Soviet military personnel. In the space of a few months, several thousand Soviet military advisers were sent home. Syria also halted the program of sending its own military to the USSR for training, and is said to have considered terminating Soviet naval privileges at Al Ladhiqiyah (Latakia) and Baniyas.[32] In January 1977, Syria did, in fact, ask the Soviet Union to remove its submarines and support craft from Tartus.[33]

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[21] Galia Golan speculates that the Soviets might have especially wanted to oppose the Syrians in this specific case since Damascus had openly rebuffed Kosygin and obviously was not particularly interested in Soviet views on the Lebanon situation. See her *The Soviet Union and the Palestine Liberation Organization: An Uneasy Alliance*, New York, Praeger, 1980, pp. 186–87.

[22] *Pravda*, July 7, 1976.

[23] Quoted in Morris Rothenberg, "Recent Soviet Relations with Syria," *Middle East Review* (New Brunswick, NJ), Summer 1978, p. 6.

[24] Quoted in Adeed I. Dawisha, *Syria and the Lebanese Crisis*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1980, p. 137.

[25] *Pravda* (Moscow), July 16, 1976, as quoted in Robert O. Freedman, *Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East Since 1970*, 3rd ed., New York, Praeger, 1982, p. 250.

[26] Roger F. Pajak, "Soviet Arms Aid in the Middle East Since the October War," in *The Political Economy of the Middle East: 1973–78*, A Compendium of Papers Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, April 21, 1980, p. 480.

[27] *Pravda*, July 16, 1976.

[28] Ibid., Aug. 4, 1976.

[29] Ibid., Sept. 27, 1976.

[30] Ibid., Oct. 1, 1976.

Thus, while Syria was unable to obtain Soviet backing, it also was not deterred from its course of action by Soviet recriminations and appeals. In September 1976, Assad commented: "We have a different point of view [from the Soviets], which is not subject to compromise, because it is based on our firm national principles and interest."[34]

The period from mid-1976 to mid-1977 represented a low point in Soviet-Syrian relations. As mentioned earlier, the temporary settlement in Lebanon was arranged at the initiative of Saudi Arabia and other moderate Arab states. In this period of strain between Moscow and Damascus, Washington and Damascus found themselves drawn closer together, and US-Syrian diplomatic ties were renewed. But by the end of 1977, after several exchanges of visits, the Soviets and Syrians had effected a rapprochement.[35] A sign of this improved climate was Moscow's agreement in January 1978 to increase deliveries of military hardware to Syria. The Syrian army's chief-of-staff, Major General Hikmat al-Shihabi, was in Moscow at the end of February as head of a military delegation whose obvious purpose was to spell out Syria's arms needs and to work out the details of the arms transfer. Syria received 12 MiG–27's from the Soviet Union during 1978, which were paid for by Libya in hard currency.[36]

The Syrian intervention in Lebanon had prompted some soul-searching in Moscow with regard to its relationship with Syria. Moscow began to omit Syria from among the countries that it defined as having a "socialist orientation," and it joined the Syrian Communist Party in criticizing "unprogressive" developments in Syrian domestic policy.[37] More important, the Politburo felt that Soviet-Syrian relations had to be redefined, preferably through some formal mechanism, and it began to press Damascus to conclude a treaty of friendship and cooperation. For example, when Foreign Minister Gromyko visited Damascus in March 1979, he stressed the importance of strengthening bilateral cooperation, especially in the political sphere. The joint communiqué that was issued on this occasion adopted this terminology by underlining the importance of "political relations."[38]

The Kremlin had also tried to ensure that Syria engage in more military coordination. The occasion came in November 1978, when General al-Shihabi again led a delegation to Moscow. The Kremlin apparently wanted to exploit what turned out to be a short-lived rapprochement between Syria and Iraq (with whom Moscow had concluded a friendship treaty in 1972) by trying to push its two clients into a relationship of greater military coordination. At a meeting convened on November 23 in the Soviet Ministry of Defense and attended by Soviet Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov, Soviet Chief of the General Staff Nikolay Ogarkov, Iraqi Defense Minister Adnan Khayrallah, and General Shihabi, the Soviets proposed "trilateral coordination" of the three countries on political positions and on arms placements. The Soviets cited the "national covenant for joint work" that Syria and Iraq had signed on October 26, 1978 (in response to the Camp David accords), and said they were "convinced" that arms shipments to the two countries should be coordinated along lines adopted for the Warsaw Pact. Finally, the Soviets expressed concern that the placement of additional MiG–27's in Syria would expose the aircraft to surprise Israeli raids, and suggested that they should be based in Iraq instead.[39] This was completely unacceptable to Syria, and Shihabi left Moscow two days ahead of schedule.

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[31] See Itamar Rabinovich, *The War for Lebanon, 1970–1983*, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1984, pp. 54–56.

[32] Pajak, loc. cit., p. 480.

[33] Aurel Braun, "Soviet Naval Policy in the Mediterranean: Yugoslavia and the Sonnenfeldt Doctrine," *Orbis* (Philadelphia), Spring 1978, p. 115.

[34] Quoted in Adeed Dawisha, "The Soviet Union in the Arab World: The Limits to Superpower Influence," in Adeed Dawisha and Karen Dawisha, Eds., *The Soviet Union in the Middle East: Policies and Perspectives*, New York, Holmes and Meier, 1982, p. 18.

[35] The Soviet-Syrian reconciliation was speeded up by the breakdown of attempts at a multilateral Middle East settlement and Anwar al-Sadat's unilateral visit to Jerusalem in November 1977. Partly for these reasons, the Syrian-American rapprochement also petered out. For background see A.I. Dawisha, "Syria and the Sadat Initiative," *World Today* (London), May 1978; and Jonathan Farley, "The Middle East: the View from Washington," in ibid., November 1985, pp. 200-02.

[36] Radio Damascus, Feb. 27, 1978, summarized in *USSR & Third World* (London), Nos. 3-4, Feb. 1–June 30, 1978, p. 43; *Archiv der Gegenwart* (Bonn), Apr. 17–20, 1978, p. 21718; and Roger E. Kanet, "Soviet Military Assistance to the Third World," in Cooper and Papp, op. cit., p. 69, fn.

[37] Rothenberg, loc. cit., p. 7.

[38] TASS, Mar. 26, 1979, in *FBIS-SOV*, Mar. 27, 1979, p. H/11.

[39] The basic outlines of this story are confirmed in *Al-Hawadith* (London), Dec. 8, 1978, trans. in JPRS, *Near East and North Africa* (Washington, DC), JPRS No. 72681, Jan. 23, 1979; and *Le Soir* (Brussels), Nov. 30, 1978, trans. in JPRS, *Near East and North Africa*, JPRS No. 72477, Dec. 19, 1978.

Toward a Friendship Pact

The joint coordination proposed by Moscow might well have been designed as a substitute for a friendship and cooperation treaty with Syria, although it clearly involved more coordination than normally arises within the framework of a friendship treaty. Syrian reluctance to engage in coordination with Iraq—with whom Syria's relations soured further after Saddam Hussein assumed full power in Baghdad in July 1979—did not stop it from drawing closer to the Soviet Union, since both were opposed to the March 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. Moreover, President Assad was facing unprecedented domestic opposition as a result of his policies in Lebanon.[40] In January 1979, Syrian Defense Minister General Mustafa Talas was in Moscow to discuss Syria's arms requirements. Western observers reported seeing at least 50 modern T–72 tanks unloaded at Tartus in early August.[41] Moscow agreed to ship more MiG–27's, a squadron of Sukhoi–22 ground attack aircraft, surface-to-surface missiles, long-range Frog missiles, and anti-aircraft jamming equipment. During Assad's visit in October 1979, Moscow wrote off 25 percent of Syria's estimated $2 billion military debt.[42]

With Egypt effectively neutralized, Iraq alienated, and Lebanon disintegrating, Assad was coming to the conclusion that a treaty with the Soviet Union might be useful as an insurance policy against Israel. Thus, Syria had come around to wanting a formal pact. In August 1980, the 75-member Central Committee of Syria's ruling Baath party resolved to make a "qualitative" change in Syria's relations with its "loyal friend," the USSR. Assad went to Moscow on October 8, 1980, and signed there a formal Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. The treaty's duration is 20 years, with automatic five-year extensions unless one of the signatory parties terminates the agreement. It provides for regular consultations on bilateral and international issues of mutual interest, coordination of responses in the event of a crisis, and military cooperation.[43]

The Soviet-Syrian friendship treaty, although modeled on other Soviet friendship treaties, has several unusual features. On the one hand, it is the only such treaty to omit the adjective "inviolable" in describing Moscow's friendship; on the other hand, it mentions military cooperation twice (Articles 1 and 10). Moreover, it calls for actual cooperation to counter threats to peace (Article 6). Before the conclusion of a new friendship treaty between the USSR and the Yemen Arab Republic in 1984, only the Soviet-Syrian treaty referred to the need to struggle against Zionism. Whether or not a secret protocol to the treaty exists that spells out the terms of military cooperation cannot be established. However, in the September 26, 1980, issue of *Al-Moustaqbal*, an Arab newspaper published in Paris, Syrian Minister of Information Ahmad Iskandar Ahmad said that the friendship treaty would provide for the dispatch of Soviet troops to Syria if needed.[44]

In the wake of the treaty came high-level Soviet-Syrian exchanges and consultations, more weapons deliveries, and even joint military exercises (in 1981). It also stimulated the promotion of ties between the Syrian Baath party and the CPSU.[45] This increased cooperation, however, did not mean that all Soviet-Syrian disagreements were resolved once and for all, especially with regard to Syrian actions in Lebanon.

As Syria became more involved there, it tended to interpret the terms of the friendship treaty rather broadly. In May 1981, for example, the Syrian journal *Al-Baath* asserted that any Israeli attack on Syrian surface-to-air missile batteries in Lebanon would have to reckon with Soviet-Syrian friendship. The Soviet ambassador to Lebanon, Aleksandr Soldatov, promptly distanced his country from the Syrian claim, declaring that developments in Lebanon were "unrelated to the Soviet-Syrian treaty."[46] Yet, the Soviet helicopter carrier *Moskva* was brought close to the coast of Lebanon, and in early July the Soviets and Syrians conducted joint naval maneuvers off the Syrian coast in what was unmistakably a demonstration of a Soviet commitment to Syria's defense.[47]

On June 6, 1982, Israel sent its army into southern Lebanon, ostensibly to eliminate the Palestinian guerrilla presence there. Yet, as early as June 8, *Izvestiya*'s commentator Aleksandr Bovin accurately prophesied that Israel would subsequently seek a separate agreement with Lebanon "along the lines of the Camp David set-up."[48] Soviet verbal criticism of the Israeli invasion was sharp, with the most pointed criticism coming from Soviet Central Asia, where the invasion was termed "a veritable premeditated genocide," and where Israel was accused of "war crimes" in Lebanon.[49] Meanwhile, a Soviet military delegation, led by General Yevgeniy Yurasov, a first deputy commander of the Soviet Air Defense Forces, hurried to Syria for consultations with Syrian military commanders.[50]

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[40] See Adeed Dawisha, *Syria and the Lebanese Crisis*.

[41] *Archiv der Gegenwart*, Aug. 29, 1979, p. 22845; confirmed in *The New York Times*, Aug. 29, 1979; summarized in *World Affairs Report* 9, No. 4, December 1979, p. 458.

[42] David Lynn Price, "Soviet Moves in the Gulf," *Soviet Analyst*, Nov. 23, 1979, p. 3; MENA (Cairo), Jan. 7, 1979, trans. in JPRS, *Near East and North Africa*, JPRS No. 72681, Jan. 23, 1979; and *Valeurs Actuelles* (Paris), Mar. 5–11, 1979, trans. in JPRS, *Near East and North Africa*, JPRS No. 73080, Mar. 26, 1979.

[43] *Pravda*, Oct. 9, 1980; an English translation of the treaty can be found in *Middle East Review*, Fall/Winter 1981–82, pp. 74–75.

[44] Cited in Karen Dawisha, "The Correlation of Forces and Soviet Policy in the Middle East," Adeed Dawisha and Karen Dawisha, *The Soviet Union in the Middle East*, p. 163.

[45] See, for example, *Pravda*, Jan. 15 and Aug. 16, 1983.

[46] Quoted in Robert O. Freedman, "The Soviet Union, Syria and the Crisis in Lebanon," in David H. Partington, Ed., *The Middle East Annual—1983*, Boston, G.K. Hall, 1984, Vol. 3, p. 115.

[47] *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), July 6, 1981.

Despite the friendship treaty, the Soviets were loathe for several reasons to become involved in what had become, as of June 9, a limited war in Lebanon between Syria and Israel. Given their quite limited coordination with Syria and the suddenness of the Israeli attack, direct Soviet military assistance would have been logistically difficult. Second, in Soviet thinking, Syrian-Israeli skirmishing *in Lebanon* did not threaten Soviet interests. Third, by 1982, the struggle for succession to Brezhnev was under way, and had created a degree of disarray in Soviet policy-making. Hence, the Soviet response was passive.

Soviet inaction fed Syrian frustration, and in this context, the Soviets felt obliged belatedly to make good Syria's weapons losses. Hence, in the following months, Moscow sent to Syria some 800 T–72 tanks, 200 armored personnel carriers, 600 to 800 trucks, 160 fighter aircraft, as well as SAM–5, SAM–6, SAM–9, and SS–21 missile systems.[51]

Struggle for the PLO

Syrian Defense Minister Mustafa Talas, right, greets the commander of the Syrian Palestine Liberation Army on the latter's arrival in Sotar, Lebanon from West Beirut in 1982.

—UPI.

The intra-PLO struggle of 1983, in which Syria backed the rebels opposed to Arafat within Al-Fatah, was disconcerting to the Soviets in general, and damaging in particular to the preservation of the useful fiction of the "unity of progressive forces," the maintenance of good relations with both the PLO and Syria, and the conservation the Soviet military resources in Syria. The Palestine Liberation Organization is by its very nature vulnerable to external manipulation and pressure since it is a federation of about 10 guerrilla organizations with different loyalties and strategies. Some are Marxist; some are dominated by countries such as Iraq, Libya, or Syria. Yasir Arafat's organization, Al-Fatah, was long preeminent in the PLO by virtue of the fact that it commanded 80 percent of the PLO's total membership.[52] Within such a structure, differences of political opinion inevitably flare up, and the potential for these differences to trigger organizational infighting has always existed. At least a partial reason why the PLO has never been clear-cut about its goals is that there is wide disagreement within the organization over what those goals should be.

When Arafat started to mend fences with King Hussein of Jordan in late 1982 and began to entertain the prospect of achieving a "Palestinian homeland" linked with Jordan—a plan favored by the Reagan administration—radicals within the PLO became discontented. After a meeting in Libya in January 1983, five PLO factions came out against the Reagan initiative as well as an Arab peace plan proposed in Fez, Morocco, in September 1982. They denounced both plans as "capitulationist schemes," and stressed that "armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine."[53] In February 1983, the Palestine National Council met in its 16th session, this time in Algiers. The leader of one pro-Syrian faction, Ahmad Jabril, denounced Arafat for being too ready to compromise. The deputy chairman of Al-Fatah, Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), in turn exclaimed: "When Ahmad Jabril was speaking, my body trembled."[54] Georges Habash, leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, claimed that it was pointless to discuss the possibility of confederation with Jordan,[55] but the PNC's final resolution kept this option open.[56] Also, while the Reagan plan was rejected in the resolution, the Jordanian newspaper *Al Ra'i* suggested that the PNC remained open to the initiative.[57] Thus the differences between the factions were only superficially covered over. Despite occasional reversals, Arafat basically continued to think in terms of a diplomatic path to a West Bank–Gaza Strip state, while radicals within the PLO continued to think in terms of armed struggle to wipe Israel off the map.

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[48] *Izvestiya* (Moscow), June 8, 1982, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, June 10, 1982, p. H/3.

[49] Reported by TASS in English, June 23, 1982, in *FBIS-SOV*, June 24, 1982, p. H/3; and Tashkent International Service in Uzbek, June 19, 1982, summarized in *FBIS-SOV*, June 23, 1982, p. H/4. For a report on protest meetings in various Uzbek cities and towns, see Tashkent International Service in Uzbek, June 27, 1982, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, June 29, 1982, p. H/3.

[50] QNA in Arabic (Doha), June 15, 1982, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, June 16, 1982, p. H/1.

[51] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, June 16, 1982; *The Christian Science Monitor*, June 17, 1982, and April 26, 1983; *Los Angeles Times*, June 21, 1982.

[52] *The Christian Science Monitor*, May 18, 1983. On Fatah's dominance in the PLO, see Helena Cobban, *The Palestinian Liberation Organization:People, Power and Politics*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984.

The Soviet press at first avoided coverage of differences within Al-Fatah or between it and Syria.[58] The first hint of problems came in February, but *Pravda*'s oblique reference to attempts by "the Palestinian people's enemies . . . to use the imperialists' old 'divide and conquer' principle to undermine the Palestinians' own struggle" seemed to suggest that the problems were created solely by the United States and Israel.[59] Meanwhile, Soviet General Secretary Yuriy Andropov privately urged Arafat to mend his relations with Assad.[60] The Soviet leadership preferred to take a passive attitude toward the discord and hoped it would just fade away of its own accord.

In May 1983, however, the Soviet leadership had to assume a more active posture when pro-Syrian elements within Al-Fatah, which came to be called the "intifada" and which were led by Abu Nimr Saleh and Abu Musa, openly revolted against Arafat. Since Saleh has the reputation of being the leading pro-Soviet leftist within Al-Fatah,[61] this only further complicated the Kremlin's position vis-à-vis Arafat. The catalyst for the rebellion was ostensibly provided by disputes over certain Arafat command appointments and by the existence of corruption within the PLO. The real issues underlying the revolt, however, were whether the PLO should pursue Arafat's diplomatic strategy or revert to an armed strategy, and whether the PLO could remain an independent political actor or become entirely dominated by Syria.

Some scholars have argued that Syria engineered the revolt against Arafat[62]—a revolt that was viewed with grave misgivings in Moscow. Whatever the case, Syria was quick to support the rebels and sent tanks and other equipment to Abu Musa.[63] Libya also endorsed the rebels. The Syrian-controlled organization al-Sa'iqa joined the rebels. In addition, Damascus put heavy pressure on Nayif Hawatmeh's Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine and Georges Habash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine to support the rebels.[64]

As late as June 15, TASS issued a statement quoting Arafat to the effect that "the differences on separate questions in the Al-Fatah organization had been overcome."[65] However, with Abu Musa's revolt showing tenacity, a shift in the Soviet Union's handling of the issue took place. On June 26, *Pravda* published a reasonably candid account of Abu Musa's rebellion, appending a short report noting that Arafat had been thrown out of Syria because his continued presence was considered "undesirable."[66] Yet, a Moscow television broadcast the same evening affirmed the Kremlin's sympathy for Arafat.[67]

The Soviet approach of admitting to the existence of conflict in the PLO and trying to maintain good relations with both Arafat and Assad while working for their reconciliation, was reflected in *Pravda, Izvestiya*, and TASS dispatches. By contrast, the newspapers *Krasnaya Zvezda* (organ of the Soviet armed forces) and *Sovetskaya Rossiya* gave divergent coverage, with *Sovetskaya Rossiya* presenting the 16th PNC session as though it had demonstrated PLO cohesion rather than the opposite.[68]

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[53] Quoted in *The Wall Street Journal* (New York), Feb. 9, 1983.

[54] Voice of Palestine (Algiers), Feb. 20, 1983, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Middle East and Africa* (Washington, DC—*hereafter FBIS-MEA*), Feb. 23, 1983, p. A/10.

[55] Radio Monte Carlo in Arabic, Feb. 17, 1983, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 18, 1983, p. A/3.

[56] *FBIS-MEA*, Feb. 23, 1983, p. A/16.

[57] Ibid.

[58] See, for example, the bland reports in *Izvestiya*, Jan. 15, 1983, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 3, 1983, p. H/7; and in *Pravda*, Jan. 20, 1983, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 1 1983, p. H/6.

[59] *Pravda*, Feb. 20, 1983, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 25, 1983, p. H/6.

[60] Radio Monte Carlo in Arabic, Jan. 21, 1983, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 24, 1983, p. H/2.

[61] *The Christian Science Monitor*, June 9, 1983; and *The Seattle Times*, Nov. 10, 1983.

[62] Adeed Dawisha, "The Motives of Syria's Involvement in Lebanon," *Middle East Journal* (Washington, DC), Spring 1984, p. 235, and Robert O. Freedman, "Moscow, Damascus, and the Lebanese Crisis of 1982–1984," in Paul Marantz and Blema S. Steinberg, Eds., *Superpower Involvement in the Middle East*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1985.

[63] At least so Arafat charged in June 1983. See *The Los Angeles Times*, June 23, 1983.

[64] *The Seattle Times*, Nov. 10, 1983

[65] TASS, June 15, 1983, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, June 15, 1983, p. H/1.

[66] *Pravda*, June 26, 1983, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, June 27, 1983, pp. H/2–3.

[67] Moscow Television, June 26, 1983, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, June 27, 1983, p. H/3.

As Malcolm Mackintosh observed several years ago, the Soviet military tends to be conservative in the sense that it eschews policies it considers "risky" and regularly argues for "a full evaluation of all the risks involved" in policy choices.[69] It is probably also conservative in that it places more stress on relations with established governments than on relations with guerrilla movements. *Krasnaya Zvezda*'s reportage seems to confirm these general observations. First, compared to other Soviet newspapers, this newspaper devoted more space to Syria than to the PLO. Second, its reportage seemed to reflect concern about maintaining the Syrian connection.[70] Although it mentioned the search for new tactics on the part of the PLO, *Krasnaya Zvezda* underlined that the PLO continued to aim at a fully independent state,[71] that is, it presented the position of the anti-Arafat forces and of Syria.

Yasir Arafat, center, confers with Abu Jahid, left, outside Palestine Liberation Organization offices in Tripoli in November 1983 shortly after PLO expulsion from two Palestinian refugee camps and just prior to expulsion from Lebanon altogether by Syrian-backed rebels within the movement.

—Eli Reed/Magnum.

Coverage by *Sovetskaya Rossiya* differed from both the *Pravda-Izvestiya*-TASS and the *Krasnaya Zvezda* coverage in its heavier emphasis on the PLO. Between 1983 and 1984, *Sovetskaya Rossiya* ran several interviews with the PLO representative in Moscow.[72] There was no comparable series of articles featuring Syrian spokesmen. Moreover, two months after most of the Soviet media openly began to report on the discord within Al-Fatah, *Sovetskaya Rossiya* published an article adhering to the pre-June line. As noted, it presented the 16th Session of the Palestine National Council, which had taken place in February 1983, as having laid to rest notions of a split within the PLO, and it spoke of the Palestinians' "complete rejection of the so-called Reagan initiative."[73] This was a month after the rather surprising admission by commentator Igor Belyayev in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* that some elements in the PLO had favored the Reagan plan.[74] The *Literaturnaya Gazeta* article also acknowledged that Al-Fatah was "going through an almost irreversible political crisis unprecedented in its history," and did not blame the discord on either Western "lies" or Western manipulation.[75] TASS also conceded that Al-Fatah's differences sprang from within its own ranks. By contrast, *Izvestiya* struck a more confrontational note in arguing:

> *Israel and its transatlantic patrons also need to undermine pan-Arab unity in order to isolate the PLO politically, to demolish that organization by exploiting the differences which have been exacerbated in its ranks, and then to eliminate the Palestinian problem altogether.*[76]

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[68] *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, Aug. 16, 1983, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 19, 1983, pp. H/1–2.

[69] Malcolm Mackintosh, "The Soviet Military: Influence on Foreign Policy," *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1973, pp. 6 and 10.

[70] *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Aug. 23, 1983, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 25, 1983, p. H/4.

[71] *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Mar. 22,1983, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Mar. 24, 1983, pp. H/7–8. Contrast this with Karen Brutents's comment in February: "Those talks (between Jordan and the PLO) are the affair of Jordan and the PLO first and foremost, and it is up to them to decide. Our policy is one of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries and peoples." Quoted in *Monday Morning* (Beirut), Feb. 7–13, 1983, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 17, 1983, p. H/6.

[72] See, for instance, *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, Dec. 31, 1983, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 5, 1984, pp. H/4–6.

[73] *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, Aug. 16, 1983, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 19, 1983.

[74] *Literaturnaya Gazeta* ([illegible]osocw), July 6, 1983, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, July 6, 1983, pp. H/2–3.

[75] Ibid., pp. H/1–2.

[76] *Izvestiya*, July 1, 1983, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, July 6, 1983, p. H/5.

On the diplomatic level, the Soviet Union tried to avoid the appearance of preferring one party over the other. The Soviet ambassador in Damascus let senior Syrian officials know that Moscow was displeased with the infighting in the PLO.[77] In a message to President Assad, Andropov wrote:

> *Safeguarding the unity of the PLO is a basic and inalienable policy of the Soviet Union. A continuation of fighting threatens both Syrian interests and the accomplishments of the Palestinian people.*[78]

Abu Iyad, Arafat's second-in-command, traveled to Moscow in the first week of June, and was assured of Soviet support for Arafat's leadership of the PLO.

Since Arafat's position regarding a future Palestinian state limited to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is basically closer to the Soviet view than the position of the more radical rebels, and since the Soviets do not wish the PLO to be entirely dominated by Syria, they tried hard to heal the rifts between Arafat and Assad and within Al-Fatah by sending a high-level delegation to Damascus in August 1983. The delegation had discussions with Abu Musa and his aides in the presence of Arafat's representative, Diyab al-Atrash.[79] When Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam went to Moscow in November 1983, Gromyko told him it was "extremely important and urgent" that Syria do its part to bring an end to the fighting and patch up its feud with Arafat.[80] Instead, Syrian-supported insurgents drove Arafat's forces out of two Palestinian camps shortly thereafter.

As Soviet mediation efforts had little effect, a message to President Assad from the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet in April 1984 seemed to indicate the Kremlin's gradual acquiescence in Syrian actions. In this message, Syrian "anti-imperialism" was praised, US advocacy of "separate deals" was condemned, and Syria was promised Soviet support for continued efforts to pursue "progressive social and economic development."[81] There have been reports that General Secretary Andropov himself had been Syria's advocate. Convinced of Syria's strategic importance, Andropov is said to have given Assad firm assurance of Soviet military support.[82] He also wanted to be certain "that Soviet arms could be rushed to Syria in time," in the event of a Syrian-Israeli war.[83]

But after Andropov's death and his replacement by Konstantin Chernenko in February 1984, a less forthcoming attitude toward Syria seemed to develop in the Kremlin. Despite the shipment of SS-21 missiles to Syria in early 1984,[84] when Assad's brother, Rif'at, visited Moscow in May 1984, his host, candidate Politburo member Vasiliy Kuznetsov, stressed at a formal gathering that "the Arabs possess all necessary means for foiling the schemes of US imperialism and its Israeli partners,"[85] thereby implying that more Soviet aid was unnecessary.

Syria seemed dissatisfied with this attitude. When President Assad visited Moscow in October 1984, he again raised the question of further Soviet military assistance. The joint communiqué noted vaguely that "in the course of the talks, questions of the Soviet Union's granting further assistance to Syria in strengthening its defense capability were discussed, and corresponding decisions adopted."[86] Later, there were reports that Assad was trying to obtain an agreement on "strategic cooperation" with the USSR.[87] It was probably with this in mind that he supported Chernenko's proposal on a Middle East settlement, at least declaratively, despite its inclusion of a guarantee of Israel's independence.[88] Assad also conceded "the need to preserve the unity of the Palestinian Resistance Movement,"[89] which he had done so much to undermine.

Limits of Influence

In March 1985, Chernenko died, and the new Soviet general secretary, Mikhail Gorbachëv, began to organize a new policy-making team. He transformed the composition of the Politburo, replaced secretaries dealing with foreign affairs on the Central Committee's Secretariat, selected Eduard Shevardnadze as foreign minister and changed many senior officials in the foreign ministry, and appointed more than 30 new

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[77] Voice of Lebanon (Beirut), May 31, 1983, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, June 1, 1983.

[78] Quoted in *The Christian Science Monitor*, Nov. 17, 1983.

[79] Voice of Lebanon (Beirut), Aug. 7, 1983, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 8, 1983, p. H/2.

[80] TASS in English, Nov. 11, 1983, in *FBIS-SOV*, Nov. 15, 1983, p. H/2. See also *The New York Times*, Nov. 12, 1983.

[81] *Pravda*, Apr. 17, 1984, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, May 21, 1984, p. H/1.

[82] AFP (Paris), May 19, 1984, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, May 25, 1984, p. H/5. On Andropov's relationship with Assad, see Vladimir Solovyov and Elena Klepikova, *Behind the High Kremlin Walls*, New York, Dodd, Mead, and Co., 1986.

[83] Ibid.

[84] Wolf Blitzer, *Between Washington and Jerusalem: A Reporter's Notebook*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1985, p. 68.

[85] SANA (Damascus), May 29, 1984, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, May 30, 1984, p. H/2.

[86] *Pravda*, Oct. 19, 1984, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Oct. 19, 1984, p. H/2.

[87] *Politika* (Belgrade), Feb. 4, 1985.

[88] Irit Abramski-Bligh, "Soviet-Syrian Relations (1982–1985)," *The Jerusalem Quarterly*, No. 37, 1986, p. 49.

[89] *Pravda*, Oct. 19, 1984.

Hafiz al-Assad, center, with Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachëv, right, and Soviet President Nikolay Tikhonov, left, during a June 19, 1985, visit to the USSR.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

ambassadors around the world.[90]

The emergent Gorbachëv leadership also made some reassessments of Soviet foreign policies. With regard to the Third World, Gorbachëv's address to the 27th CPSU Congress in February 1986 differed markedly from that of his predecessors in paying so little attention to Soviet clients there. It also did not extol "countries of socialist orientation"—a once-favored category."[91]

With respect to Syria, the Gorbachëv leadership appeared frustrated with Damascus's continued support of Iran in the Iran-Iraq war, and Moscow's inability to bring about improved relations between Syria and Iraq.[92] The Kremlin allegedly was also disturbed at Syria's close linkage with Shiite groups in Lebanon,[93] and disappointed that Soviet efforts to mediate the Syrian-PLO dispute had failed.

In the spring of 1985, the Gorbachëv leadership renewed pressure on Syria to negotiate with Arafat's Al-Fatah. Assad's brief visit to Moscow on May 28, 1985, did not yield any tangible results in this area. Shortly thereafter the Soviets withdrew a number of their SAM–5 technicians and turned the missiles over to Syrian control.[94] While there are different explanations as to who ordered the withdrawal and why, the fact that several thousand Soviet personnel left suggests at least some strains. On June 9, 1985, a TASS release reprimanded Arab governments who "turned their backs on the Palestinians and upon the other forces threatened by Israeli expansionism." A meeting between Assad and Gorbachëv later the same month failed to reconcile their respective approaches to the PLO.[95] The Soviets tried again to mediate Syrian-PLO differences in early 1986.[96] But the most that the Kremlin can claim for its efforts is that it has remained on good terms with both sides, a not inconsequential achievement. Nevertheless, by May 1986, Syrian Vice President Khaddam was describing Soviet-Syrian relations as "superb."[97]

During the summer of 1986, the Kremlin maintained contact with Hawatmeh and Habash, urging them to refrain from actions injurious to PLO unity, and in August dispatched Yuliy Vorontsov, first deputy minister of foreign affairs, for separate consultations with Assad and Arafat. Vorontsov conveyed Moscow's message that the Syrian leadership should patch things up with Arafat.[98] But only two weeks prior, Assad had received Abu Musa and underlined Syrian support for the "intifada" and Syrian readiness to provide Musa with "all necessary assistance."[99]

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[90] *The New York Times*, May 24, 1986.

[91] Francis Fukuyama, "Gorbachëv and the Third World," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), Spring 1986, pp. 715–16.

[92] For example, this appears to have been a major purpose of Geydar Aliyev's visit to the Near East. See Robert O. Freedman, "Moscow, Damascus, and the Lebanese Crisis," loc. cit., p. 119.

[93] *Arabia* (London), August 1985, p. 34.

[94] *Africasia* (Paris), July 1985, p. 17; and Pipes, "Syria: The Cuba of the Middle East," loc. cit., p. 16.

[95] See TASS in English, June 19, 1985, in *FBIS-SOV*, June 20, 1985, pp. H/1–2.

[96] *Il Messaggero* (Rome), Jan. 22, 1986.

[97] Moscow Television, May 17, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, May 19, 1986, p. H/2.

Moscow has a multifaceted presence in Syria—and institutionalized channels of communication. Yet, despite the abundance of aid that the Soviet bloc has provided to Syria in many areas, the Soviets have not been able to change Assad's mind about a single foreign policy question of central interest to him. In short, Soviet "influence" in Syria seems to consist chiefly of Soviet ability to provide Syria with the means necessary to carry out operations that may or may not promote the Soviet Union's interests. Indeed, as Alvin Z. Rubinstein once remarked, "What seems to be influence often turns out instead to be the joint interests of the two parties."[100] As a by-product of bilateral relations, influence in fact tends to be issue-specific or situation-specific, short-lived, and without clear limits on its costs.

Soviet influence was insufficient to dissuade Syria from intervening in Lebanon in 1976, to prevent Syrian-Palestinian feuding in 1983 and 1984, or to persuade Damascus in the spring of 1984 to improve its relations with Baghdad and reopen the pipeline that pumps Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean.[101] The Soviets also could not prevent Syrian authorities from confiscating Soviet weaponry sent to the PLO through Syria in 1983.[102]

The terms of the Soviet-Syrian relationship are typical of such patron-client relationships. The Soviets provide Syria with assistance necessary for it to be effective in regional policy, and in exchange the Soviets obtain a presence in Syria as well as Syrian support for Soviet actions in areas outside Syria's core interest, such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.[103] As a superpower with global concerns, the Soviet Union is interested in having stable regional alliances. But the price of such "stability" is high.

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[98] *Al-Ittihad* (Abu Dhabi), Aug. 26, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Aug. 28, 1986, p. H/1.

[99] Damascus Domestic Service, Aug. 9, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-MEA*, Aug. 11, 1986, p. H/2.

[100] Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Red Star on the Nile*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1977, p. xv.

[101] As Aliyev tried to persuade the Syrians during his March 1984 visit to Damascus. See *The Washington Post*, May 18, 1984.

[102] So Arafat charged in an interview with the Kuwait newspaper, *Al-Anbaa*. It is unlikely that he stood to gain anything from concocting such a complaint. See KUNA (Kuwait), Nov. 29, 1983, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Nov. 29, 1983, p. H/1.

[103] Hence, when the Soviet army moved into Afghanistan in force in late December 1979, Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam commented: "The question of the defense of Islam is being decided not in Afghanistan but in Palestine, Jerusalem and Lebanon, where they are destroying Muslims with U.S. arms and U.S. aircraft." See *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), Apr. 28, 1980, p. 163. Accordingly, when the United Nations considered a resolution to condemn the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Syria abstained from the vote.

Books

Sources of Soviet Foreign Conduct

William Taubman

EDWARD N. LUTTWAK. *The Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union*. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1983.

RICHARD PIPES. *Survival Is Not Enough: Soviet Realities and America's Future*. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1984.

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI. *Game Plan: How to Conduct the U.S.-Soviet Contest*. Boston, MA, Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986.

SEWERYN BIALER. *The Soviet Paradox: External Expansion, Internal Decline*. New York, Knopf, 1986.

LEON SLOSS and M. SCOTT DAVIS, Eds. *A Game For High Stakes: Lessons Learned in Negotiating with the Soviet Union*. Cambridge, MA, Ballinger, 1986.

THE IRONIC COMBINATION of external expansion and internal decline has been the most striking feature of Soviet politics in recent years. Seweryn Bialer calls this situation "the Soviet paradox." These two trends have produced an unusual degree of agreement among usually differing US observers of the Soviet Union. All but the most complacent of them admit that in the 1970's the USSR had achieved a massive military buildup and had also made vigorous expansionist efforts, especially in the Third World. At the same time, even those most alarmed by Soviet expansionism concede that the Soviet system has suffered a series of debilitating economic, social, and political setbacks at home. But if the five books under review here (written by some of the leading American Sovietologists) are any indication, there is still plenty of disagreement about the meaning of the two trends, and especially about the connection between them. Why, how, and with what success has the Soviet Union been expanding? How serious are its domestic problems? Are internal troubles likely to constrain external expansion or provoke it? Might Soviet domestic troubles be turned to the West's advantage?

Edward Luttwak, Richard Pipes, and Zbigniew Brzezinski are alarmed about Moscow's expansionism and call for Western resistance that goes not only beyond the late and (by them) unlamented détente but beyond containment as well. Brzezinski probably speaks for all three when he urges that the United States seek to "prevail historically" over the Soviet Union (p. 239). Seweryn Bialer, on the other hand, is more willing to meet Moscow halfway in arms control and other negotiations, and more resigned to an endless process of "competitive coexistence" (p. 369). The fifth book, *A Game for High Stakes*, is a collection of short essays by Americans who have negotiated with the Soviets on issues ranging from arms control to trade. Although these essayists take no overall position on the meaning of the Soviet paradox, their experiences do bear on the debate.

Luttwak, Pipes, and Brzezinski find different roots of the current danger from the Soviet Union and offer different prescriptions for how to cope with it. Bialer is less pessimistic about that danger, but also less optimistic than they about finding any enduring solution, because he believes that "winning" is as unlikely as a settlement of US differ-

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William Taubman is Bertrand Snell Professor of Political Science at Amherst College. His most recent book is Stalin's American Policy: From Entente To Detente to Cold War *(1982).*

ences with Moscow. This contrast is especially ironic because Pipes and Brzezinski revel in an unblinking realism that rejects as utopian any hope for an early end to the East-West conflict. Brzezinski insists on "the historical depth of the American-Soviet antagonism, the degree of conflict between the geopolitical interests of the two powers, and the intensity of regional turbulence that by itself generates conflicting superpower responses" (p. 246). The central proposition of his book, Brzezinski writes, is that "the American-Soviet contest is not some temporary aberration but an historical rivalry that will long endure" (p. xiii). Pipes would not disagree. And yet, each recommends in the end a plan for "prevailing" over the Soviet Union that seems highly unrealistic to this reviewer, who tends to share Bialer's perspective. At the same time, although certain key conclusions of Luttwak, Pipes, and Brzezinski strike me as questionable, many of their arguments are all too convincing.

LET US BEGIN a more detailed consideration of the Soviet paradox with a closer look at its expansionist aspect. All four authors agree that Russia always was, and the Soviet Union still is, an expansionist power. Thus, they stress the indigenous roots of recent Soviet expansionism. Luttwak and Pipes are particularly keen to trace the Russian roots of Soviet imperialism. In previous works, Pipes has stressed the resemblance between Tsarist and Soviet police-states, thus bringing down on himself the wrath of Russophiles like Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn.[1] *Survival Is Not Enough* further debunks Russia's allegedly golden age, pointing out, for example, that "between the middle of the sixteenth century and the end of the seventeenth, [Russia] acquired every year the territorial equivalent of modern Holland for 150 years running" (p. 37). Besides insisting on the Tsarist-Soviet continuity, Pipes helpfully suggests how it came to be: "The violence of 1917–1920 resulted in the wholesale destruction of the upper and middle classes, which happened to have been the principal Westernized groups in Russia . . . it permitted the unregenerate Muscovite Russia, which had survived intact underneath the veneer of European influences, to float to the surface" (p. 23).

Along with traditional Russian factors, Marxist-Leninist ideology was usually seen in the West as a key determinant of Soviet foreign policy. Yet, increasingly in recent years, that ideology has been perceived as eroding in the USSR. A sign of that perception is that none of the four authors emphasizes the ideological roots of Soviet expansionism. Indeed, Pipes claims that "the Soviet official is a cynic who ascribes to human beings only the basest of motives. He views people as driven exclusively by self-interest. Any other motive he dismisses as humbug" (p. 45). Bialer is more willing to credit Marxism-Leninism (not so much its fine points of doctrine, as its broad analytical categories) with motivating Soviet leaders, because "if they were simply cynics they could be bought off by their wealthier adversaries" (p. 349).

A third "internal" source of Soviet expansionism is seen in the nature of the Soviet system itself. Drawing on the writings of Michael Voslensky,[2] a former Soviet official now living in emigration, Pipes zeroes in on the link between repression and expansion. Expansion, he argues, legitimizes the regime in general and its political leaders in particular. The absence of democratic participation both requires Soviet leaders to seek such legitimation and allows them to do so free from domestic contraints. The converse of these two propositions—that a more open and pluralistic society would have less need to expand and less ability to do so—is the key to Pipes's recommendation that the West encourage reform in the Soviet system as a way of altering Soviet international behavior.

Soviet fear of threats from the West—a favorite explanation of more dovish Western analysts—is conspicuously missing from the sources of Soviet aggressiveness noted by Luttwak, Pipes, and Brzezinski. At an abstract level, all three authors recognize this phenomenon. All would agree, I think, with Hudson Institute analyst Max Singer, whom Brzezinski quotes as calling the Soviets "insatiably defensive," that is, so wedded to the notion that the best defense is a good offense that, as Brzezinski puts it, "the defensive and offensive elements of the strategy are thus inseparable" (p. 65). But when it comes to concrete East-West interactions, Luttwak, Pipes, and Brzezinski have trouble pinpointing any US action that might have given Moscow legitimate cause for alarm. Pipes goes farthest, insisting not only that "the contingency plans of NATO have always been defensive," but also that "whatever they say in public . . . the Soviets are well aware of these facts" (p. 225). Luttwak contends not just that the Soviets are now clearly and unambiguously the world's number one military power, but that they see themselves as superior to the Americans (p. 55). Brzezinski's depiction of the nuclear balance as "a situation of ambiguous strategic equivalence" is more balanced and judicious. But only Bialer can really imagine how Moscow can still consider itself the world's second military power, partly because in many ways it still is "number two." It also falls to Bialer to issue the warning that "it is wrong to . . . demonize the Soviet leaders, denying any validity to their fear of war, their legitimate security concerns, and their recognition of the imperative need to create some sort of *modus vivendi* with the other nuclear powers" (p. 352–53).

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[1] See Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, *The Mortal Danger: How Misconceptions about Russia Imperil America*, New York, Harper and Row, 1980.

[2] Michael Voslensky, *Nomenklatura: The Soviet Ruling Class*, New York, Doubleday, 1984.

IF THE ABOVE are among the motives for Soviet external expansion, what are Moscow's long-term goals and shorter-term strategy and tactics? Regarding aims, Pipes writes: "As concerns the objective, no one familiar with Communist theory can entertain much doubt. It is the elimination, worldwide, of private ownership of the means of production and the 'bourgeois' order which rests upon it, and its replacement with what Lenin called a worldwide republic of soviets" (p. 49). Pipes accuses those who dismiss these terms as mere rhetoric of misconceiving the kind of world domination the Soviets seek. Not physical control of the world, but global hegemony is Moscow's goal, he insists, adding that the goal is all too likely to be achieved. "In a world from which the United States has been eliminated as a power of the first rank, the Soviet Union would enjoy such overwhelming economic and military preponderance that opposition to its wishes on the part of any other 'socialist republic'—which is all that would remain—would be inconceivable" (p. 50).

But is not such a Soviet-dominated globe itself inconceivable? How could a country with so many domestic problems lord it over the whole world? Brzezinski's geopolitical analysis warns how the worst could happen. According to him, the United States and the Soviet Union are engaged in a duel over Eurasia, even though the United States does not always seem to be aware of this. For its part, Moscow is intent on evicting Washington from its positions on the eastern, western and southern fringes of that immense territory. In Brzezinski's geostrategic universe, if the Soviet Union captured "the peripheries of this landmass . . . it would not only win control of the vast human, economic, and military resources, but also gain access to the geostrategic approaches to the Western Hemisphere—the Atlantic and Pacific oceans." From this it follows that "the United States must view its transoceanic positions as the forward lines of defense that spare it from having to mount a defense of North America" (p. 23). By the end of the century, if things go badly in Central America, "it is quite possible," according to Brzezinski, "that a fourth central strategic front may be opening up on the Rio Grande" (p. 98). To avoid being kept on the "geopolitical defensive," Washington must succeed in projects such as "protectively sealing off the Persian Gulf and the Middle East from a contiguous Soviet military-political presence" (p. 53).

Brzezinski's book is replete with terms like "earth control," "political and military breakout," and "linchpin states," and with maps illustrating such concepts. But even such a formidable theoretical apparatus may leave the reader unconvinced. For example, what exactly would it mean for the USSR to achieve "domination" over fiercely anti-Soviet Iran? How likely is such an eventuality, even if the United States does not adopt the countervailing strategy that Brzezinski recommends?

Bialer is more skeptical about Soviet plans for world domination. He writes that although the Soviet elites expect an ultimate victory of communism, "the goal of worldwide communization has not been the operating principle of Soviet foreign policy" even in Stalin's time, and that Soviet "formulation of short- and middle-range foreign policy is not so different from that of any nation-state" (p. 348), including, presumably, the United States itself.

TURNING from goals to strategy and tactics, Luttwak, Brzezinski, and Pipes agree that Moscow pursues a "grand strategy" combining military intimidation, the sowing of political divisions in the West, and vigorous attempts to subvert and destabilize the Third World. Bialer sees the Soviets more as opportunists than grand strategists, but he too emphasizes the crucial importance to them of their long-sought, hard-earned, military power. All four authors contend convincingly that although the United States was first with the atomic bomb, and has led the way in many strategic technologies, nuclear weapons have taken on a special value for the Soviet Union. Bialer puts it as follows: "Nuclear weaponry acts as a great equalizer of the actual, conventional military potential of the Western and Soviet alliances and therefore as a guarantor of the security of the Soviet Union" (p. 272). Pipes points out how the old Soviet technique of mixing war scares with peace campaigns has been raised to new heights in the nuclear era, and how, free from democratic political constraints, Moscow is able to play on the nuclear nerves of the Western democracies.

In contrast to its growing military power, the economic and ideological appeal of the USSR has diminished in recent years. Whereas in the 1950's, Nikita Khrushchev counted on the example of Soviet-style socialism to win converts around the world, his successors have turned to more Machiavellian means. According to Brzezinski, who was President Jimmy Carter's

National Security Adviser, and to Pipes, who served as Soviet specialist on President Ronald Reagan's National Security Council Staff, the Soviets have encouraged terrorism as a means of destabilizing both Western Europe and the Third World. The evidence cited, including Soviet training camps for terrorists, is disquieting. But one can ask whether it is adequate to justify Brzezinski's conclusion—after listing groups as diverse as the Italian Red Brigades, the West German Red Army Faction, the Basque separatists, the Irish Republican Army Provisionals, and others—that "the Soviet objective in all this is the attrition of the global order. It is essentially a long-term diversionary strategy designed to promote erosion on the flanks, while Soviet military-political pressure is applied on the central front" (p. 140).

THE OTHER SIDE of the Soviet paradox is the economic, social, and political deterioration that deepened in the later Brezhnev years and now has become the target of Mikhail Gorbachëv's reform efforts. The broad outlines of the problem are widely known in the West; equally widespread is the Western view that its root cause is the Soviet system itself. There is, therefore, no disagreement among the four authors on what has gone wrong, and why, in the USSR. Instead, they in effect divide the labor of summarizing the symptoms and, more important, of estimating the foreign policy implications. Luttwak and Brzezinski stress socioeconomic stagnation. Pipes focuses on political disarray as well, particularly on the widespread corruption that has been draining the system of morale as well as money. Bialer's approach is more historical and wide-ranging. He traces both the deepening decline and the efforts and non-efforts to do something about it. Particularly incisive is his chapter on the politics of reform—including the powerful resistance to change observable at middle and lower levels of the Soviet party/state machine.

The rising costs of the Soviet empire is yet another point on which the four authors are in general agreement. Pipes cites Rand Corporation estimates that the annual cost to the Soviet Union of controlling its "colonies and dependencies" has grown from about US$18 billion in 1971 to $41 billion in 1980 (p. 187). Bialer spotlights seemingly unresolvable Soviet problems in Eastern Europe, especially in post-Solidarity Poland. For Luttwak, the clash between Russian and non-Russian nationalism within the USSR itself is the most threatening development facing the Soviet leaders. Brzezinski, who is refreshingly candid in viewing the United States, too, as an imperial power, offers some typically brilliant insights on the different characteristics of the two imperial domains.

WHERE THE AUTHORS part company again is in gauging the linkage between Soviet internal decline and external expansion. On this issue, Luttwak's assessment is the most somber: rather than constraining Soviet expansion, Moscow's domestic problems may encourage it. In Luttwak's scenario, which he presents as a theoretical possibility rather than a geopolitical likelihood, Soviet pessimism about long-term domestic improvement combines with a temporary military superiority to tempt Moscow to use force. "It is not a question," Luttwak writes, "of using uncommitted divisions (and all that goes with them) to expand the empire further, but rather of employing a transient military advantage before it is too late, to gain a permanent enhancement in the security of the empire" (p. 82).

Most analysts of the Soviet Union, including the other authors under review, think it unlikely that the Russians would risk war when other less dangerous tactics promise favorable results. Furthermore, Luttwak's search for a spot in the world where the benefits of aggression would exceed its costs and dangers strains credibility. It leads him in the end to western China, to the notion of a limited Soviet attack designed to lop off sparsely populated sections of the Chinese provinces of Xinjiang and Qinghai. Nonetheless, if one sets aside Luttwak's specific scenario and focuses instead on his Schumpeterian conception of how empires grow, his conclusions are cause for concern. For the point is not, he insists, whether a particular act of aggression really makes sense, that is, whether it addresses some pressing external or internal need. The point, as Joseph Schumpeter pointed out in his classic study of imperialism,[3] is that once a military machine whose job it is to make war is established, it is only a matter of time until a war gets made. As Luttwak puts it: "But in truth all motives and all justifications are of small import: once the internal condition of society is in a state of disequilibrium, once its leaders acquire the physical capacity for conquest, once military institutions are created which have no sufficient role in self-defence strictly defined, all manner of reasons and all sorts of rationalizations will emerge to make expansion seem attractive and to make its costs and risks seem worthwhile" (p. 74). Add to that, which Luttwak does not, that similar sorts of pressures are at work in the West and in volatile areas of the Third World, and there is reason for concern that goes far beyond the specter of a new "Turkestan People's Republic" grafted by force onto the USSR.

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[3] See Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Imperialism and Social Classes: Two Essays*, New York, Meridian Books, 1955, pp. 64–65.

Pipes and Brzezinski are less concerned than Luttwak about the danger of Soviet military aggression. Brzezinski, in particular, seems wedded to the assumption that nuclear weapons have prevented a Soviet-American war since 1945 and that they can deter war between the two superpowers into the indefinite future. For Pipes and Brzezinski, the main significance of Soviet internal decline is that it somewhat reduces the Soviet threat, at least for the time being, and, more important, that it offers the United States new leverage over the Soviet Union. Pipes and Brzezinski both call on the United States to match the Kremlin militarily, to resist it politically, and to take advantage of Moscow's troubles to influence it internally.

Brzezinski, in keeping with his geostrategic orientation, emphasizes the military and political aspects of Soviet-American relations. Militarily, he recommends a mix of offensive and defensive forces that would provide "greater flexibility in war-fighting options." Specifically, he would build counterforce weapons of the sort that could be used in a first strike, but deploy them "in numbers deliberately contrived not to pose a threat of a disarming first strike to Soviet strategic forces." He would also move toward deployment of a "limited strategic defense," not in order to achieve President Reagan's dream of a strategic shield for the nation, but rather to "inject a degree of randomness into any Soviet planning of a first-strike nuclear attack" (p. 261). Undergirding these recommendations is an odd sort of confidence in the Soviet Union. As little as Brzezinski trusts the Russians, he trusts them not to adopt a "worst case" view of the American deployments he recommends; he trusts them not to conclude, in other words, that such US deployments are but steps toward an American capacity if not to attack the Soviet Union without risking retaliation, then at least to blackmail it as Washington tried to do in an earlier era of US strategic superiority. The fact that the United States itself has reached just such worst-case conclusions about the Soviet Union on the basis of equally ambiguous Soviet deployments does not give one confidence that this aspect of Brzezinski's "game plan" will work out as intended.

Brzezinski's strategic recommendations also rest on a conception of nuclear war that merits more reflection than is offered in his book. Brzezinski claims partial credit for injecting the notion into Carter Administration thinking that "a nuclear war might not be simply a short, spasmodic apocalypse that could best be deterred by a posture relying on the doctrine of MAD [mutual assured destruction], but that it might entail engagements at varying levels of intensity and over an extended period of time. It followed that to wage such a conflict effectively and, more important, to deter it, the United States needed a mix of offensive and *defensive* capabilities" (p. 161, emphasis in original). What is missing from this passage is an acknowledgment that the notion of waging a nuclear war "effectively" has been powerfully challenged in recent years both as a possibility in itself, and as an approach to deterrence. One hardly expects Brzezinski to embrace Jonathan Schell's apocalyptic vision of the fate of the earth, or even the US Conference of Catholic Bishops' injunction against any except the most narrow conception of deterrence.[4] But Brzezinski's failure even to note such views bespeaks a too easy confidence that ever-new generations of nuclear weapons can be deployed without increasing the risk of a nuclear war.

Politically, Brzezinski's most controversial proposal (a version of which Pipes also endorses) is that Washington encourage West European self-reliance by gradually redeploying troops from Europe "to meet other geopolitical priorities and to prompt European leaders to address the issue of their own defense" (p. 263). The danger in this is that European leaders will address no such thing, but will instead scale back, or even abandon, their efforts to stand up to the Soviets. Why European governments should do more, not less, to defend themselves if the Americans begin to pull out is no clearer than why Europeans should respond to a no-first-use of nuclear weapons declaration by the United States by building up European conventional weapons. Yet, Brzezinski, who points convincingly to that flaw in no-first-use, sees no such inconsistency in "gradual redeployment." Nor does he make clear how the United States could effectively "reinforce the anti-Soviet resilience" of a militantly anti-American Iran, or how a "renewed push to advance the Arab-Israeli peace process" can be expected to be any more successful than previous efforts to foster that obviously desirable but infernally elusive goal (pp. 222, 227).

In addition to military might, European self-reliance, and containment of Soviet power to the south of Soviet borders, Brzezinski's game plan also includes Chinese-Japanese-American solidarity. Moreover, Brzezinski calls for an effort "to transform the essence of Eastern Europe's relationship with Moscow without necessarily disrupting its formal framework" (p. 232), and for mobilizing within the Soviet Union "the forces for genuine political participation, for greater national codetermination, for the dispersal of central power, and for the termination of heavy-handed central domination that breeds the expansionist impulse" (pp. 236–37). Just how the last feat is to be accomplished is not clear. Brzezinski's main concrete suggestion—that the United States "take the initiative by an intensified program of multilanguage radio broadcasts, the inflow of audiovisual cassettes, and an effort to provide technical support for independent domestic political literature" (p. 237)—seems puny when compared to the purpose it is supposed to promote.

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[4] See Jonathan Schell, *The Fate of the Earth*, New York, Knopf, 1982.

In *Survival Is Not Enough*, the means Pipes recommends for "prevailing" (a term the author implies but does not, himself, use) seem more proportionate to the end, but no more likely to achieve it. Pipes begins from the premise (shared by all the other authors) that the Soviet system badly needs greater legality, wider scope for private enterprise, and administrative decentralization. He also assumes that such reforms will restrain Soviet expansion by allowing citizens preoccupied with domestic concerns to increase their influence over foreign policy. (Brzezinski, by the way, fears that economic reforms, without reforms in other areas, might "enhance the Soviet capacity to compete with the United States.") Pipes admits that, left to its own devices and short of the most painful kind of crisis, the Soviet Communist Party establishment will resist radical changes. Hence the task of the West is to aggravate the Soviet situation by denying Moscow badly needed goods and credits. The purpose of such economic restrictions, Pipes emphasizes, should not be to bring down the Soviet system but rather to stop propping it up, to force it to face a day of reckoning that is primarily of its own making. But as in the case of Brzezinski's strategic nuclear prescriptions, this distinction may be lost on the suspicious Soviets. Moreover, apart from Soviet perceptions of American intentions, the further issue is whether the medicine is likely to produce the desired cure.

The central thesis of Pipes's book is that "the Soviet regime will become less aggressive only as a result of failures and worries about its ability to govern effectively and not from a sense of enhanced security and confidence" (p. 140). This premise is anathema to liberal observers of the Soviet Union who believe the exact opposite. But the more sobering possibility is that neither Pipes nor his liberal critics are right, that neither enhanced security and confidence nor more failures and worries (especially of the sort the United States is in a position to create) are likely to alter the general direction of Soviet foreign policy. It is precisely this important truth that Bialer's book emphasizes and reinforces. His central theme is that the USSR faces not a "crisis of survival" but only a "crisis of effectiveness." Whether we like it or not, the Soviet system has a reservoir of what the Kremlin calls "reserves," that is, of strength and support that equip it to ride out the efforts at economic embargo that the West (invariably divided on the issue of economic sanctions) is likely to be able to mount. Not the least of these reserves is an authoritarian political culture, of which Pipes himself makes a great deal in another context,[5] which disposes so many Soviet citizens to deem their regime legitimate even though it denies them genuine political participation.

BIALER'S PROPOSALS for American foreign policy are more modest and conventional than those of the other authors reviewed here. Unlike Pipes and Brzezinski, who regard arms control as a weak reed at best, Bialer has retained faith in such negotiations. His is not the naive hope that arms control agreements can transform US-Soviet relations and remove the threat of war from the world. Bialer's point is merely that such negotiations, combined with continued efforts to contain Soviet power and even with occasional confrontations when they are warranted, constitute the best way to hold the world together during the long, dangerous years that lie ahead.

No one who reads the first-hand accounts of negotiations with the Soviets in *A Game for High Stakes* can be under any illusion that such talks will be easily or quickly successful. Rather, negotiations will be plagued in the future, as they have been in the past, by differences in approach and technique, by persistent misperceptions rooted in the two sides' divergent political cultures, and by deep-seated political and ideological antagonisms. Nonetheless, ambitious grand strategies designed to "prevail" over the USSR may end up delivering less than may more modest attempts to coexist with the Soviets. This ironic prospect should perhaps be called "the Soviet-American paradox."

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[5] Richard Pipes, *Russia Under the Old Regime*, New York, Scribner, 1975.

Europe's Defense Today

John C. Reppert

ROBERT KENNEDY and JOHN M. WEINSTEIN, Eds. *The Defense of the West.* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1984.

JONATHAN ALFORD, Ed. *Arms Control and European Security.* New York, St. Martin's Press, 1984.

ANDREW J. GOODPASTER, FRANZ-JOSEPH SCHULZE, ALASDAIR STEEDMAN, and WILLIAM S. PERRY. *Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe.* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1985.

EDWINA MORETON AND GERALD SEGAL, Eds. *Soviet Strategy Toward Western Europe.* London, Allen & Unwin, 1984.

WILLIAM P. BAXTER. *Soviet Airland Battle Tactics.* Novato, CA, Presidio Press, 1985.

THE CASUAL OBSERVER of Soviet-US military relations may be distracted by the extensive publicity given to a wide range of current issues affecting US defense policy. These include terrorism, nonconventional warfare in Latin America, the Middle East, Asia, and Africa, aid to various political struggles in the Third World, and the sophisticated weapons system of the Strategic Defense Initiative. Yet, the specialist knows that the fundamental long-term defense interest of the United States remains bound, not to the jungles of the Third World or to outer space, but to the security of Western Europe, as has been the case since 1945.

The importance of this interest stems from certain permanent factors, such as the long-standing adversary relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, the special relationship that America has historically had with Europe, and finally, since the advent of the atomic age, a recognition of the extremely high cost to be paid by all for a mistake in superpower relations in Europe. However, several recent factors have acted to focus attention on this vital area. For one, measures introduced in the US Congress to limit defense budgets have forced the United States to reexamine its defense priorities. (Interestingly, these measures, notably the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings balanced budget bills, coincide with the efforts of the new administration in Moscow to focus its own energies on economic issues and to rebuild key industries perceived to be stagnating.) For another, the recent renewal of comprehensive arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union and the proliferation of arms control proposals have once again made Western Europe the subject of Soviet-US discussions.[1]

In an era of financial constraints and renewed emphasis on arms control, the United States will be making some hard choices affecting West European security, choices that should be based on an understanding of the differences between deterrence and defense and the relationship of both to US capabilities. Fortunately, there already exist serious studies that can help the United States assess the various alternatives available to it. While far from unanimous in their conclusions, these studies shed light on the issues at the heart of the discussion on Western security.

Lt. Col. John C. Reppert is the Commander of the Sixth Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Battalion, Special Operations Command (SOCOM), Ft. Bragg, NC. He has served as an attaché with the American Embassy in Moscow and has taught Soviet affairs at the US Military Academy (West Point). The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the US Government.

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[1] *The New York Times*, June 1, 1986

Ironically, earlier studies on the same subject failed to draw much attention in the past years precisely because of the large flow of US investments into the defense sector; the need to choose priorities and introduce efficiency was less immediate then.

THE EDITORS of *The Defense of the West*, Robert Kennedy and John Weinstein, have made an important contribution to understanding the issues at hand. In the preface to this collection of essays by current and former members of the US Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute, Weinstein notes that deterrence is not a mechanical balance of inanimate objects, but "a state of mind" (p. 2), and both he and Kennedy insist that the United States and its Western allies "must go beyond static and sterile weapons counts" (p. xii).

The authors contributing to this volume explore the difficult question of why Soviet and American defense force postures have evolved so differently. While many interesting answers are discussed, all the authors seem ultimately most comfortable with what Dennis Ross has to say. According to Ross, the factor behind the different evolution of postures is the fact that Americans believe deterrence to be maintained by the assurance that any aggressor would be severely punished in a retaliatory strike, while the Soviets work to assure deterrence by building forces so powerful that no aggressor could hope for victory against them (p. 10). Ross dismisses Richard Pipes's well-known argument that the Soviets reject the concept of deterrence, on the basis that Pipes fails to appreciate the unique Soviet approach to this concept (p. 10).

Each author, in his own context, reminds the reader that true deterrence is determined solely by Soviet perceptions of Western strength and commitment, and that to insure continued deterrence the United States and its allies must concentrate as deliberately on affecting those perceptions as it does on countering weapons systems. Though no one can say with certainty what factors have prevented direct East-West military confrontation in Europe for the past four decades, the authors argue that in the West it has certainly been a function of a careful balancing of measures of physical capability with politically feasible doctrines.

TWO OTHER BOOKS develop the central issue of different postures along separate but related lines. Jonathan Alford, Deputy Director of the International Institute of Strategic Studies, has edited an excellent work on *Arms Control and European Security*. Although obviously somewhat dated by the rapid proliferation of proposals during the past year, Alford's study provides two insights essential for understanding the Soviet defense posture. He identifies Europe as the most important element in Soviet political and military concerns and offers a list of six key continuing Soviet objectives on the continent. They are: (1) preserving the Soviet strategic glacis established in Eastern Europe in the immediate postwar period; (2) preventing resurgence of a German military threat to the Soviet Union; (3) gaining Western, particularly West German, recognition of the existing status quo in Europe, both in order to consolidate the Soviet position in Eastern Europe and to free Soviet energies to meet the Chinese challenge; (4) gradually reducing the US military presence and political influence in Western Europe, provided such a reduction can be obtained without provoking a significant increase in West European, particularly West German, power; (5) preventing the political and military integration of Western Europe; (6) establishing selective bilateral ties with countries of Western Europe in order to gain political leverage both within Western Europe and in West European–American relations (pp. 14). Although the Soviets have reinterpreted these goals in light of other considerations, such as the role of China, and the relative importance of these goals has varied over time, Alford's list is an excellent starting point for appreciating Soviet perspectives, which differ so from those of the West.

Perhaps the unique strength of Alford's book is its appreciation of the military relationship between East and West as but one important element in a much more complex political, ideological, and economic confrontation. The author also points out the basic persistence of such Soviet objectives as opposition to the political and military integration of Western Europe (p. 14). Without these historical perspectives, the rapid response to the current arms control proposals appearing at the negotiations and in the press seem at best confusing and often contradictory.

Alford also examines the relative strengths and weaknesses of East and West in confrontation and in arms control in particular. Few who have negotiated with the Soviets would challenge his highlighting of persistence as one of the Soviets' greatest strengths. Though not optimistic about the prospects for arms control, Alford does provide a succinct analysis of how it can fit into the general context of national security.

EVEN MORE IMPRESSIVE is the volume produced by the European Security Special Panel, headed by former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (NATO) General Andrew Goodpaster, former Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces in Central Europe General Franz-Joseph

Schulze, retired British Air Chief Marshal Sir Alasdair Steedman, and former US Undersecretary for Defense, Dr. William Perry. Under the rubric of *Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe*, these highly qualified experts define the measures NATO would need to take to engage and counter Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces in Europe. They show a sophisticated understanding of Soviet doctrine pertaining to defense and deterrence, as well as of the means for opposing this doctrine bearing in mind the political and economic bounds of the Western democracies. This work is a valuable extension of an earlier study of the same title written by this group, which argued for the need to improve NATO's conventional capabilities.

Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe is remarkable on several counts. The first is its understanding of the close relationship between deterrence and credible defense against a Soviet attack. The work correctly discerns that no new doctrine nor weapons system, however impressive, can be useful in deterring the Soviets if it is unable to contribute to a successful defense of Europe per se. It is those plans and systems that would deny the Soviets a quick or certain victory on the European continent that contribute most significantly to deterrence.

Specificity is the book's second strong point. While certainly not intended to be all-encompassing, the volume does discuss in some detail a wide number of aspects of warfare, ranging from the armored ground attack to air superiority and questions of command and control. For each of these areas, it offers a perceptive analysis of Soviet strengths and vulnerabilities and a critical assessment of the most reliable, cost-effective means for countering the Soviets. These measures would be designed not only to frustrate the physical resources of the Warsaw Pact, but to prevent the realization of such important Soviet strategic goals as surprise, combined arms operations, and the maintainance of rapid movement and momentum. The countermeasures are further specified in a special section discussing the timeframes in which such new systems could be made available and their projected cost. A final note in each section explores possible or probable Soviet responses to each change and the ultimate benefits of the realignment.

THE LAST TWO BOOKS under review here draw attention back to the central theme of the Soviet Union's perception of Western actions and its likely response to them. In a study ambitiously entitled *Soviet Strategy Toward Western Europe*, Edwina Moreton and Gerald Segal assemble a collection of views on European security. The book is flawed in certain fundamental respects, primarily due to a mismatch of promise and performance. For instance, the book claims to offer a "distinctively European view" of security issues (p. 2), yet of the eight contributors only Hannes Adomeit comes from outside the Anglo-American camp. Moreover, R.A. Mason's chapter on "Military Strategy" offers a markedly less profound examination of Soviet military strengths and weaknesses than the other works reviewed here.

Still, there is much to recommend this volume. Mason's article has the plus of reminding the reader that Soviet inhibitions may be a function not only of how they view the West, but also of how they view themselves, particularly in the areas of civil defense, reliability, and any post-conflict scenario. The author acknowledges that the Soviets have the world's most extensive civil defense program, yet they must retain considerable skepticism concerning its ability to protect lives, much less property. He argues that a range of opinions exists among Western specialists as to the reliability of the national components of the Warsaw Pact forces and even of nationality groupings within the Soviet military. He suggests that Soviet actions since 1983 indicate that the Soviets too are less than confident on this point. Finally, Mason raises the question of what would be the nature of the Soviet Union after a conflict in which its military had been either defeated or severely depleted and what would be its residual political and economic influence on the developing world.

The strength of *Soviet Strategy Toward Western Europe* lies in its broader perspective. Mason points out that the often overlooked change in the Western perception of the Soviet threat from uncertainty about Soviet capabilities to uncertainty about Soviet intent is largely a function of the increasing sophistication of "national technical means" of surveillance (pp. 165–66). He also notes that the very real lack of any Soviet economic or ideological leverage in Europe could serve as an alternative to Soviet military power. The chapter by Jane Sharp on "Arms Control Strategies" is an excellent companion piece since it addresses arms control within the context of a broader strategy, rather than simply as an isolated policy. Sharp outlines some basic elements of Soviet strategy, including efforts to limit the military potential and undermine the political cohesion of NATO (p. 239). She also evaluates the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), and the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force (INF) negotiations in light of a common strategy. Although her data do not go beyond 1982, they clearly indicate that Soviet strategy is far more permanent than Soviet negotiating tactics might suggest.

WILLIAM BAXTER'S *Soviet Airland Battle Tactics* also suffers from incongruity between title and content. While heavily utilizing Soviet sources, this work is in no way a companion piece to the elaborate expositions of US doctrine produced in recent years. Nonetheless, it is perhaps the most comprehensive discussion available in Western literature of how the Soviets would prosecute a war in Europe. The author, a longtime observer of the Soviets in Europe, combines his personal expertise with information from nonclassified Soviet literature to outline the unique Soviet approach to a conflict in Europe. For example, despite Soviet protestations about the defensive nature of their armed forces, the Soviet devotion to offensive operations is fundamental. As Baxter notes, any student of Soviet military literature must recognize that Soviet doctrine and exercises for Europe anticipate a war fought on the enemy's territory and aimed at annihilating enemy forces and occupying the defeated nations (pp. 104–05).

More specifically, Baxter defines Soviet views on a host of combat operations, ranging from air defense to river crossings. His interpretation of these approaches to specific problems in light of the psychological and sociological aspects of the Soviet military and of the relations between the military and the society he describes in the initial chapters is instructive.

For all those attempting to develop expertise on the topic through use of Soviet sources, Baxter's study is invaluable, thanks to its use and explanation of Soviet terminology. For example, Baxter lists and analyzes the Soviets' six "laws of war" and eleven "military principles"—terms basic to an understanding of Soviet military decision-making (pp. 8, 30–33). He, like Harriet and Bill Scott, two of our preeminent scholars in the field of Soviet military affairs impresses on us that Soviet military theory has its own vocabulary and meanings, which one ignores at one's own peril.[2] He also notes that literal translation of Soviet terms often obscures rather than clarifies real understanding of them (p. 25).

THE RICHNESS of the literature on the subject having been revealed, let us now return to the question of how, under present circumstances, can the West maintain and improve West European security. All the authors of the volumes reviewed here note foremost that Western preoccupation with technology and quantification often fails to serve the quest for improved security. According to them, technological innovations have given the West considerable insight into the numbers, types, and capabilities of weapons systems in the Warsaw Pact arsenal; what is now needed is to achieve a fuller understanding of Soviet intentions and inclinations, hopes and fears. They argue that it is too easy to forget, when examining the range of options available to the West on issues ranging from arms control to force modernization, that the basic issue at stake for both sides is not one of weapons, but of security. Indeed, new weapons systems on either side may detract from the security of that side rather than add to it, they point out, depending on the perceptions and responses of the other side. Likewise, proposals for arms control which are perceived by one's opponent as an acknowledgment of weakness can decrease the likelihood of an equitable agreement, rather than making it more likely.

Two authorities cited in the Kennedy and Weinstein book note the further pitfalls of focusing solely on the material aspects of one's opponent and suggest a solution. Quoting Richard Betts, Weinstein notes:

> *Much of what passes for net assessment, however, is a narrow focus on static orders of battle—the observable and quantifiable constituents such as manpower and equipment —or dynamic simulations of combat engagement. The numerous subjective or intangible factors such as campaign strategy, operational doctrine, training morale, or command competence receive shorter shrift, yet these factors (unless material imbalance is overwhelming) almost always do more to determine the outcome of battle than the numbers of troops and distribution of weapons.* (p. 41)

In the same chapter, Weinstein cites Benjamin Lambeth's call for more effective "vulnerability analysis" of the Soviet Union (p. 63), which could easily include those aspects of vulnerabilities in combat performance mentioned above.

All the authors also maintain that Soviet decision-making concerning defense is simply different from that of the Western alliance. While some find gratification in pointing out the fallacies in the Soviet conceptual approach to these issues, most suggest that it would be far more useful for the West to recognize the differences that do exist and seek to deal with them intelligently. Indeed, they argue that Western energies and resources should be expended on those programs that have an impact upon Soviet perceptions. As Mason implies in his chapter in *Soviet Strategy toward Western Europe*, for the

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[2] Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, *The Soviet Art of War*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1982, p. 4.

West the task of reducing its uncertainties regarding Soviet intent should replace that of gauging Soviet capabilities.

Clearly the most unanimous and valuable argument put forth by all the authors of the volumes reviewed here is that effective security depends on wise choices made on the basis of an understanding of the way the Soviets think. If Clausewitz's dictum about concentrating one's effort's on the opponent's "center of gravity" holds, then it suggests that today, in an area such as Western Europe where deterrence is paramount, the West would do well to direct efforts toward discerning how the Soviets think, act, and react in order to maintain peace and security. While, as Baxter notes, it is not easy to think like a Russian, or a member of any foreign nationality for that matter, the difficulty of the task should not serve as an excuse for not rising to the challenge.

The lessons and insights in the works reviewed here are rich and plentiful. Combining historical experience, current public Soviet statements, and Marxist-Leninist tenets, the authors of these books have laid out some elements of the basic framework by means of which the peculiarities of Soviet thought can be appreciated. This knowledge should help in crafting an adequate defense and effective deterrent with more limited resources. It can point the way to programs that will combine appeal to the Soviets and improved security for the West and spotlight those that unduly threaten or confuse the Soviets and/or degrade Western security.

Grenada's "Revo"

Timothy Ashby

PAUL SEABURY and WALTER McDOUGALL, Eds. *The Grenada Papers.* San Francisco, CA, ICS Press, 1984.

HUGH O'SHAUGHNESSY, *Grenada: An Eyewitness Account of the US Invasion and the Caribbean History that Provoked It.* New York, Dodd, Meade and Company, 1985.

TONY THORNDIKE. *Grenada: Politics, Economics, and Society.* Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner, 1985.

GREGORY SANDFORD. *The New Jewel Movement.* Washington, DC, US Department of State Foreign Service Institute, 1985.

GREGORY SANDFORD and RICHARD VIGILANTE. *Grenada: The Untold Story.* Lanham, MD, New York, London, University Press of America, 1984.

JIRI VALENTA and HERBERT J. ELLISON, Eds. *Grenada and Soviet Cuban Policy.* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1986.

PETER DUNN and BRUCE WATSON, *American Intervention in Grenada: The Implications of Project "Urgent Fury."* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1985.

ON MARCH 13, 1979, Maurice Bishop, Bernard Coard, and some 40 other members of the New Jewel Movement (NJM) overthrew the government of Grenada with an ease that surprised even the young revolutionaries. Grenada's "Revo" was welcomed by a majority of the island's population—from conservative business and church leaders to the peasantry and Rastafarians—who were weary of the venality and eccentricity of the deposed prime minister, Sir Eric Gairy. Grenadians and foreign observers alike tended to believe Maurice Bishop's promises of early elections, a mixed economy, and a nonaligned foreign policy.

Such promises soon proved false, however. Within days of taking power, Grenada's new People's Revolutionary Government (PRG) began strengthening the clandestine ties it had forged with Cuba and the Soviet bloc in the years preceding the coup.[1] Between March 13, 1979, and October 25, 1983, Grenada was the setting for a Marxist-Leninist tragi-comedy unprecedented in the Commonwealth Caribbean. Using what Maurice Bishop referred to as "the land of Lenin" as a model, PRG officials attempted to emulate the Soviet Union as earnestly as their colonial ancestors had copied the manners of mother Britannia. The NJM Central Committee and Political Bureau suspended press and political freedoms, imprisoned dissidents, and edged tentatively toward the Soviet economic model. "Internationalist workers" from the USSR, Cuba, East Germany, Bulgaria, and North Korea arrived—many self-invited—to arm and train the People's Revolutionary Army (PRA), organize a state security apparatus, and infiltrate government ministries. As admitted by Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov, chief of the Soviet General Staff, "specialists" were also sent to Grenada to conduct studies and oversee the completion of "military construction projects."[2]

Timothy Ashby is Policy Analyst for Latin American Affairs at the Heritage Foundation (Washington, DC). He is author of The Bear in the Backyard: Soviet Strategic Policy Toward the Caribbean 1920 to 1986, *to be published by Lexington Books in January of 1987. Dr. Ashby lived and worked intermittently in Grenada in the years between 1967 and 1980.*

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[1] See also Gregory Sandford and Richard Vigilante, *Grenada: The Untold Story,* p. 54. During my year-long stay in Grenada (1977–78), I was told by some NJM members of their visits to Cuba, using Jamaica and Guyana as transit points, and their training there.

[2] "Meeting Between Chiefs of General Staff," in *Grenada Documents: An Overview and Selection* (hereafter cited as *Grenada Documents*), No. 24, Washington, DC, US Department of State and Department of Defense, September 1984, p. 4.

But the NJM's experiment in Caribbean-style Marxism-Leninism collapsed four-and-half years later, as a result of a power struggle between the party's two wings: the Bishop, or Castroite wing; and the Coard, or Stalinist faction. The latter proposed that leadership of the party be shared by Bishop and Coard, with Bishop's specific responsibilities largely reduced to ceremonial functions. By this time, Coard controlled the Political Bureau (the NJM's chief policy-making element) and the Organizing Committee (the party's administrative organ), thereby negating Bishop's power as chairman of the NJM Central Committee.

The final split in the PRG occurred at a Central Committee meeting on October 12, 1983, when Bishop refused to share power. Calling for "Bolshevik staunchness," the Coard faction expelled Bishop from the NJM and placed him under house arrest. On October 19, a large crowd of supporters freed Bishop and carried him to Fort Rupert, a PRA base, capturing it with minimal resistance. A PRA unit equipped with Soviet BTR-60 armored personnel carriers counterattacked, killing and wounding nearly 200 civilians before capturing Bishop and six of his senior colleagues. The former Grenadian leader and the others were summarily executed by PRA troops chanting "Long Live the Central Committee!" and "Forward Ever, Backward Never!"(Thorndike, p. 163). Later that day, the PRA's main Political Department issued a communiqué that announced the "crushing" of "Maurice Bishop and his other petty bourgeois and upper bourgeois friends" (O'Shaughnessy, p. 140).

That night, General Hudson Austin, commander-in-chief of the "People's Revolutionary Armed Forces," announced over Grenadian radio that a 16-man Revolutionary Military Council (RMC) had been formed to rule the island, and that a round-the-clock, shoot-on-sight curfew was in effect. The RMC sent patrols into all districts to hunt down suspected opponents. Friends and relatives of Maurice Bishop were imprisoned, as were Grenadian journalists and businessmen. The only operational commercial airport was closed, and foreign journalists were expelled. The nearly 1,000 American residents on the island—primarily medical students at St. George's University School of Medicine—were confined to their quarters and many later expressed fear that they might have become victims of a hostage crisis as had happened in Iran. The RMC's actions were condemned by Grenada's Caribbean neighbors, including Bishop's mentor Fidel Castro, who decried the "atrocious acts" and called for the "exemplary punishment" of those guilty of them.[3]

The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), joined by nonmembers Jamaica and Barbados, unanimously resolved to intervene by force in Grenada if the United States would assist them. This led to the joint US-OECS intervention on October 25, 1983, and Grenada's Marxist interlude became but another chapter in the island's long and bloody history.

A DEFINITIVE HISTORY of Grenada under the People's Revolutionary Government has yet to be written. As the climactic events of October 1983 recede into the past, more material will inevitably become available to fill the blank spaces left by the authors and compilers reviewed here. The final chapter on Grenada's revolutionary period and its aftermath awaits conclusion of the trials of Bernard Coard and members of the RMC for murder and conspiracy, the declassification of US intelligence files, and years of scholarly analysis of the vast collection of captured PRG documents.[4]

A selection of these documents is contained in *The Grenada Papers*, edited by Paul Seabury and Walter McDougall. Essentially a cleaned up and more readable version of the "Blue Book" of Grenada documents released by the US government shortly after the invasion, the Seabury and McDougall volume should be put on the required reading lists of graduate school courses in World Communist Movements because of the unique insight it provides into the inner workings of a Third World Marxist-Leninist regime.

Such source material, however, can lead to credible analysis only when it is used objectively and comprehensively. Hugh O'Shaughnessy's *Grenada: An Eyewitness Account*, a journalistic *tour de force* rather than the history it purports to be, is a case in point. By making selective use of the captured documents O'Shaughnessy downplays the Soviet Union's strategic interest in Grenada and attempts to perpetuate the view that Bishop was a moderate whose ideological inclinations were more social democratic than Marxist-Leninist. Such interpretation is in direct variance with Bishop's own views, as put forth in his September 13, 1982 "Line of March for the Party" speech, in which he referred to himself as both a Communist and a Marxist-Leninist whose goal was to "build rapidly our links with the Socialist World, especially with the Soviet Union."[5] Moreover, Bishop, as minister of national security, was solely responsible for the detention and imprisonment of hundreds of his political opponents. As he told NJM "comrades" in a secret speech: ". . . consider how people get detained in this country. We don't go and call for no votes. You get detained when I sign an order . . . ."[6]

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[3] Havana Television Service, Oct. 21, 1983, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Latin America* (Washington, DC), Oct. 21, 1983, p. Q/1.

[4] The extensive collection of PRG secret documents, official correspondence, diaries, newspapers, and other papers from the Bishop regime are housed in the National Archives, Washington, DC.

[5] "Maurice Bishop's 'Line of March' Speech, September 13, 1982," in *Grenada Occasional Papers*, No. 1, Washington, DC, US Department of State, August 1984, p. 9.

Far from being closet social democrats, Bishop and his NJM comrades appear to have joined the Socialist International in part to serve as the proxy of Cuba in that country's efforts to undermine social democracy in the region. One of the captured documents states that "the projection of Social Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean . . . does represent a permanent enemy of the essential objectives of the communist and left movements in that this trend intends to prevent the triumph of socialist revolutions and the materialization of the communist ideal."[7] NJM Central Committee member Chris De Riggs's report on a Secret Regional Caucus held in Managua in January 1983 concluded that the NJM's "principal enemies are to be found among the parties of Soares and Horgo in Portugal and Italy respectively—the Social Democrats of the USA are also our sworn enemies."[8]

It is unfortunate that O'Shaughnessy relies so heavily on dubious sources to bolster his arguments. The statements of Cuban diplomats and soldiers cannot be accepted as unbiased accounts, nor can the author's interviews with Kenrick Radix, Einstein Louison, and other former NJM members, who now comprise the leadership of the Maurice Bishop Patriotic Movement (MBPM), Grenada's small communist party. O'Shaughnessy also waxes fulsome in his praise of the PRG's spurious economic achievements, yet neglects to mention the NJM's August 1983 Political/Economic Bureau discussion on International Monetary Fund assistance, during which Bishop suggested using "the Surinamese and Cuban experience in keeping two sets of books" (Sandford and Vigilante, p. 87).

TONY THORNDIKE'S *Grenada* is far superior in scholarship, although, like O'Shaughnessy, he writes from a leftist British perspective that portrays US relations with Grenada in an unflattering light and casts Maurice Bishop in the hackneyed role of revolutionary martyr. Thorndike makes extensive and—with a few notable exceptions—intellectually honest use of the Grenada documents. Given evidence to the contrary, one wonders how he can uncritically accept the Bishop regime's contention that the Port Salines Airport project was solely intended to revive Grenada's moribund tourist trade, and ridicule the Reagan administration's concern over the strategic potential of the project. Although the Cuban-built "International Airport" was not specifically designed as a military airfield, the PRG obviously intended it to serve a dual purpose. In a December 1981 speech to Jamaica's official communist party, the Workers' Party of Jamaica, Grenadian Minister of National Mobilization Selwyn Strachan stated that Cuba would eventually use the new airport to supply troops to Africa, and that the USSR would also find it useful because of its "strategic location" astride vital sea lanes.[9] Liam James, the PRG's Soviet-trained deputy defense secretary, recorded in his notebook during an NJM meeting on March 22, 1980, that one of the agenda items was that the "Airport will be used for Cubans and Soviets."[10] Another NJM member who had received training in Moscow wrote in his diary in October 1983 that rumors were being spread that "the Party wanted Bishop to sign for the airport to be a military base and he did do that."[11] Bishop himself, in his *Newsweek* interview of March 31, 1980, said that his new airport might be used for Soviet and Cuban airlifts to trouble spots.

The documents also indicate that the Soviet Union was planning to provide the PRG with its own air force—possibly as a basis for the eventual stationing of Soviet-bloc aircraft and pilots on the island. In May 1983, Soviet Ambassador Gennadiy Sazhenev told Bishop that an AN–26 capable of carrying "39 paratroopers" would be supplied to Grenada, although it was preferred that Cuban pilots fly the aircraft.[12] One of the agenda items (unfortunately not discussed) for a Political Bureau meeting on June 22, 1983, was "Soviet pilots and planes," while two months earlier the NJM's Organizing Committee had discussed a Soviet offer to send four "physically fit" Grenadians to the Soviet Union to be trained as pilots.[13] Finally, Marshal Ogarkov's clearly stated interest in sending Soviet engineers to Grenada to study the possible construction of military projects is evidence that Moscow was cognizant of Grenada's strategic potential.[14]

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[6] Ibid., p. 6.

[7] "Analysis of Social Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean," in *Grenada Documents*, No. 36, p. 14.

[8] "Report on Meeting of Secret Regional Caucus Held in Managua From 6th–7th January, 1983," in ibid., No. 39, p. 3.

[9] *Grenada: A Preliminary Report*, Washington, DC, US Department of State and Department of Defense, Dec 16, 1983, p. 30.

[10] "Page from Liam James' Notebook," in *Grenada Documents*, No. 23.

[11] *Grenada: A Preliminary Report*, p. 30.

[12] "Summary of Prime Minister's Meeting With Soviet Ambassador, 24th May, 1983," in *Grenada Documents*, No. 21, p. 3.

[13] "Minutes of the Political Bureau Dated 22nd June 1983," and "Minutes of Organizing Committee, 18-4-83," in *Grenada Documents* (unbound version).

Both Thorndike and O'Shaughnessy also neglect Cuba's role in bringing the NJM to power. The NJM's overt relations with Cuba antedated the 1979 coup by at least three years. In 1976, a Grenada-Cuba Association was founded, and Bishop and other NJM members openly traveled to conferences in Havana. Prior to the "Revo," General Hudson Austin received military training in Cuba and Guyana with half a dozen other Grenadians. Oswaldo Cardenas, a senior Americas Department (DA) intelligence officer who later became Cuban ambassador to Suriname, was assigned to work with the NJM reportedly to prepare them to take power. This was accomplished with the aid of a team of Cuban commandos from the Directorate of Special Operations (DOE), who supervised the NJM assaults on True Blue Barracks and Radio Grenada.[15]

GREGORY SANDFORD'S two works, *The New Jewel Movement* and *Grenada: The Untold Story* (the latter co-written with Richard Vigilante), deal more objectively with both Grenadian-US relations and the NJM's alliances with the Soviet bloc. Sandford, who served as consular officer at the US embassy in Barbados during 1980–81, made use of declassified US documents and captured papers, as well as interviews with Grenadians representing a broad spectrum of political viewpoints.

Sandford's most valuable US source is "US-Grenada Relations Since the Coup: A Background Paper," written by Foreign Service Officer Lawrence Rossin during a tour of duty at the US embassy in Barbados at the time the PRG regime was in power. The "Rossin Report" systematically debunks the argument that the Bishop government was "forced" to turn to Cuba for military aid because the United States and other Western nations had turned it down. The PRG had indeed made a very ambiguous request for arms to US diplomatic officers on April 7, 1979. However, the next day, before a formal response could come from Washington, Bishop told a rally that he "planned" to ask Cuba for arms (a quantity of which were already enroute), and that Grenada would soon receive Cuban diplomatic recognition followed by technical and material assistance.[16]

On April 13, exactly one month after the coup, Bishop made a speech that seems to have been deliberately designed to distance his regime from the United States. Accusing US Ambassador to the Eastern Caribbean, Frank Ortiz, of making "veiled threats" and ignoring his pleas for aid, Bishop angrily proclaimed that "we are not in anybody's backyard, and we are definitely not for sale."[17] This speech was picked up by a variety of international news agencies and, according to Rossin, became the basis for the widely disseminated disinformation that Grenada had been pushed into the Soviet camp by US insensitivity. This speech set the stage for the next day's official announcement that Cuba had established formal diplomatic relations with Grenada and had assigned Julian Enrique Torres Rizo, a senior DA intelligence officer and formerly the head of the Cuban mission to the United Nations, to be its representative.

THE FINAL TWO works reviewed here are collections of essays on the policy implications of the Grenada drama. Of the two, *Grenada and Soviet Cuban Policy* is the superior work, containing highly objective studies by prominent scholars and specialists of differing ideological perspectives, including Margaret Daly Hayes, Jiri and Virginia Valenta, and Jorge Domínguez. The Valenta's essay, "Leninism in Grenada," is a classic piece of scholarship, concisely illustrating the complicated and often ambiguous relations among the NJM, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), and the Cuban Communist Party (PCC). The Valentas correctly point out that Moscow did not consider Bishop to be either a reliable Caribbean ally or a potential proxy. Soviet officials appear to have had doubts about Bishop for some time, manifested by their evident displeasure over Grenada's membership in the Socialist International and over Bishop's having ordered the PRG ambassador in Moscow not to relate details of his meeting with senior Reagan administration officials in Washington, DC, just a few months before he was deposed.[18] Bishop's Leninist credentials were also poor, as indicated by his unwillingness to abide by the NJM Central Committee decision to impose collective leadership. While no evidence has surfaced to directly implicate the Soviets in Bishop's overthrow, there can be little doubt that the Kremlin would have preferred Bernard Coard as de facto or de jure leader of the PRG.

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[14] "Meeting Between Chiefs of General Staff, March 10, 1983," in *Grenada Documents*, No. 24, p. 4.

[15] For Cardenas's role in preparing the NJM and the role of Cuban commandos, see Timothy Ashby, *The Bear in the Back Yard: Moscow's Caribbean Strategy*, Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, to be published January 1987.

[16] Lawrence G. Rossin, "US-Grenada Relations Since the Coup: A Background Paper," Washington, DC, US Department of State, Case Control No. 8402598, Jan. 17, 1983, p. 18.

[17] Maurice Bishop, *Forward Ever!*, Sydney, Pathfinder Press, 1982, p. 12.

[18] "Grenada's Relations With the USSR, 11th July, 1983," in *Grenada Documents*, No. 26, p. 4.

Mark Falcoff's chapter on Grenada's impact on Cuban foreign policy sheds new light on the Soviet Union's use of Cuba as a type of "revolutionary search service" to identify, nurture, and promote leftist groups and governments that might eventually serve Soviet strategic interests. The comments of W. Bruce Weinrod on the US-OECS intervention in Grenada are also insightful, particularly his refutation of George Liska's contention that there exists a moral asymmetry between the United States and the Soviet Union. Moreover, Weinrod's analysis points out the pitfalls of attributing Soviet foreign and strategic policy solely to traditional great-power motivations. Although leaders of the Russian empire have maintained great-power aspirations for centuries, he notes, there can be little doubt that the Soviet Union's Marxist-Leninists have significantly shifted the emphasis and rationale for their country's role in world politics.

THE VOLUME *American Intervention in Grenada*, edited by Peter Dunn and Bruce Watson, impresses one as having been hurriedly thrown together to capitalize on the international interest in Grenada generated by Operation "Urgent Fury," the allied intervention in the island. This is reflected in the uneven quality of both the scholarship and the credentials of the contributors, some of whom can hardly be considered specialists on Caribbean regional affairs or US foreign policy.

One essay, contributed by "a career military intelligence officer," betrays a woeful ignorance of the Cuban intelligence agencies. For example, Cuban Ambassador Torres Rizo is called "a senior American Department Intelligence officer," while the reference to "the Cuban intelligence service's Directorate of Special Operations" is followed by the incorrect acronym "DGI" (pp. 47).

There are actually four Cuban intelligence agencies—the *Dirección General de Inteligencia* (DGI), *Dirección de Operaciones Especiales* (DOE), *Departamento América* (DA), and *Departamento General de Relaciones Exteriores* (DGRE). The DGI, established in 1961, now effectively functions as a branch of the Soviet KGB and, together with the DOE and an internal security branch, comes under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior, now headed by KGB-trained General Jose Abrahantes. The DOE is an elite special forces detachment used for highly sophisticated services such as the tactical and logistical support of guerrilla operations and for coups d'état like the March 13, 1979, Grenada "Revo." The DA and DGRE function as the intelligence branches of the Cuban Communist Party; the DA (of which Torres Rizo was a member) is responsible for the Western Hemisphere, while the DGRE conducts operations in the rest of the world.

Unlike the scholarly *Grenada and Soviet Cuban Policy*, Dunn and Watson's collection of essays contains no new perspectives on the PRG or implications for future US regional policy. G.F. Illingworth's contribution, for example, falls into the common trap of simplistically portraying Bishop as the martyred hero of the Revolution. While acknowledging that Bishop's prisons "held political prisoners, and many prisoners were tortured," Illingworth lamely says that Bishop "was the lesser of evils on Grenada," and betrays his ignorance of the island by asserting that "there is considerable feeling among Grenadians that the Point Salines airfield when completed should be named the Maurice Bishop International Airport in recognition of the monumental project pulled off virtually through the efforts of this leader of a very small and poor state" (p. 137). On the contrary, Bishop and the NJM campaigned vigorously *against* the Point Salines airport prior to coming to power, while the only Grenadians publicly calling for naming the airport in Bishop's memory are the faithful handful comprising his namesake political party, the MBPM. Polls taken over the past three years indicate that a majority of Grenadians favor naming the airport in honor of the US president who presided over the allied intervention of October 1983.

Grenada offers some important lessons. The parallels between Soviet and Cuban activities in Grenada and those in Nicaragua are striking. The Grenada Documents contain irrefutable evidence of a well-organized network of regional revolutionaries dedicated to the spread of Marxism-Leninism in Grenada. Regardless of the island's small size, the PRG records indicate that Grenada may have been destined for a significant role in Moscow's Caribbean strategy.

Chinese Socialism's Record on Food and Agriculture

Bruce Stone

NICHOLAS R. LARDY.
Agriculture in China's Modern Economic Development.
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983.

KENNETH R. WALKER.
Food Grain Procurement and Consumption in China.
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984.

FEW ECONOMIC TOPICS have invited as much curiosity, enamorment, skepticism, hostility, and continued controversy as the efforts of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its associated government to wrestle with China's immense problems of social welfare and economic development. Popular opinions have been especially divergent over the record of China's often described rural-based revolution and the policy performance of its successive post-1949 leaderships in the areas related to agriculture, rural life, and basic needs of the population at large.

Two recent books, one by Nicholas Lardy, the other by Kenneth Walker, are arguably the best that Western economists have produced on the political economy of China's food and agricultural sectors in at least two decades and possibly longer. Both works are based on a meticulous and thoughtful examination of primary source materials, and both are exceedingly well presented. The statements of problems to be addressed and the analytic frameworks postulated are clear and concise; the argumentation and development of themes are unambiguous, persuasive, and succinct. These attributes are especially noteworthy in Walker's study, but this is partially a function of the substantial difference in scope of the two books, despite the complementarity of their central topics.

WALKER'S BOOK focuses intensively on the dynamic path of interprovincial transfers of grain and its geographically and materially shifting end uses. With the patience of a careful anatomist, Walker microscopically scrutinizes each detail of a confusing, poorly illuminated, and heterogeneous collection of historical materials to formulate a skeleton of quantification with which to position and comprehend further lacunae. Walker's decade of research in this style is a thoroughly warping experience in the positive sense; as a result, he sees many of the larger issues of political economy and rural policy through the prism of the struggle to procure, transfer, and redistribute grain. His conclusions then flow naturally from this understanding and from the organized body of material supported by his statistical framework.

Lardy, by contrast, seems to take on the broad questions right from the start: (1) Why was agricultural growth in China so slow despite ample evidence of technical progress, and why did it appear to *decelerate* and per unit of output costs *accelerate* with the acceleration of technical change? (2) What explains the persistence of widespread malnutrition in a socialist society whose per capita income had doubled from the 1950's to the 1970's? (3) And how can we differentiate the real Mao Zedong from the rhetoric on two fundamental issues of political economy?

Bruce Stone is Senior Research Fellow and Coordinator for China Research at the International Food Policy Research Institute (Washington, DC). He is coauthor with Anthony Tang of Food Production in the People's Republic of China *(1980), and contributor of an article on fertilizer application in China to the US Joint Economic Committee's* China's Economy Looks Toward the Year 2000 *(1986). He is currently engaged in several collaborative research projects with Chinese and international organizations.*

Was he bureaucratist or anti-bureaucratist, centralizer or decentralizer? Did he promote rural prosperity and emphasize agriculture, or can he be broadly grouped in the more familiar category of urban- and industrially-oriented central planner?

Although Lardy tantalizes the reader with these questions in his preface, and continues to refer to them thematically as the chapters unfold, one has the distinct impression that his research effort was organized along rather different lines, emanating from a basis in Western economic theory and political thought: (1) There must be considerable costs associated with control of product, labor, and financial markets and the geographic and sectoral restriction of trade under Chinese socialism. What are they? Who bears them? Can they be quantified? (2) How can a quantitative basis be established for refuting the principal myths of success about Chinese socialism: that it is socially pro-rural and oriented toward rural development in terms of economic dynamism; that it embodies a strategy of economic development that focuses on the development of the agricultural sector; that it has succeeded in providing basic needs for China's poor.

THESE DIFFERING *modi operandi* lead to two distinctly different types of products, although a relatively similar overall message may be discerned in each: Chinese socialism has been no panacea for the problems of farm production development and the food economy of this largest of peasant societies. At best, it has traded for modest advantages in solving one set of problems by accepting serious disadvantages of a more intractable and far-reaching nature; at worst, it has stultified development and exacerbated rural poverty and rural catastrophe.

Walker's task is more straightforward if not easier: to quantify provincial production, transfer, and distribution of foodgrains and to track the policy shifts and underlying issues and crises that engendered them. His creative effort is predominantly engaged in finding plausible explanations for the numerous patterns he uncovers. The resultant tone is essentially nonpolemical. Lardy's creative effort, on the other hand, often appears primarily addressed to the issue of formulating methodology and quantification to present the academic case against socialist development. Though both scholars are unmistakably economists, Walker appears to be part historian by temperament, while Lardy could pass for barrister reincarnated as economist.

The reader is well-advised in both cases to work through the entire books and not rely on summaries or concluding sections. This is first and foremost because the works are richly textured and filled with thoughtful observations from two of the very best Western minds specializing in the subject area. But it is also because in each case, though for quite different reasons, the relationship between the individual sections and the work as a whole leaves something to be desired.

In Walker's case, the value of his effort can be gleaned only by following the tortuous historical path he lays out, thereby culling both his periodic reflections on the emerging quantification and his occasional conclusions, which are relatively original and owe little to a brief list of antecedents.[1] There are no handy concluding paragraphs at the end of each chapter, and only a few pages in the 33-page final chapter can be described as summary or conclusion, the remainder being a kind of epilogue on the 1970's. One is tempted to coax Walker to venture a perspective on a variety of larger issues, most notably the relationship between China's struggle with procurement and distribution of grains and the direction and scope of CCP policies in general during the period.

By contrast, Lardy's conclusions are numerous and clear, relate to the specific as well as larger issues, and are easily located in a separate section at the end of each chapter. But few are original, and several are poorly supported by the nevertheless engaging analysis and quantitative presentation in the text.

IN HIS FIRST chapter, Lardy provides a thin sketch of agricultural development in pre-1949 China. This gives readers an impression of where he comes out in the debate over why China, which was at the pinnacle of the world's civilizations in technological and economic terms during the Ming Dynasty (1368–1643), was so late entering modern economic growth and the industrial revolution. Lardy rejects the view that by the end of the 19th or early 20th century, population pressure had eliminated sufficient investible surplus above rural subsistence to provide investment necessary for technical and industrial transformation.[2] He emphasizes that while there appeared to be little advancement in mechanical technology after the 14th century, "increased complexity was evident in patterns of cropping and marketing and in the introduction of new fertilizer that allowed greater intensity of cultivation" (p. 7). Although he accepts Dwight Perkins's analysis[3] that "the long-run trend of farm consumption and income was unchanged," Lardy stresses that "peasants responded positively to opportunities created by the availability of improved seed varieties, new crops, new fertilizers, improved transport, and rising urban demand." Noting Carl Riskin's calculations of substantial investible surplus available in China's 1930's economy,[4] Lardy concludes that deficiencies in the country's "modern economic growth prior to 1949 are not easily attributable to a stagnant agriculture producing at or just above subsistence. The explanation must address the issue of why the large pool of resources was not mobilized for investment purposes" (pp. 11–12).[5]

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[1] See, e.g., Ronald Hsia, "Government Acquisition of Agricultural Output in Mainland China, 1953–56," ASTIA Document No. AD–211940, Santa Monica, CA, Rand Corporation, Sept. 3, 1958; Audrey Donnithorne, "China's Grain: Output, Procurement, Transfers and Trade," Economic Research Centre Monograph, Hong Kong, Chinese University, 1970; David L. Denny, "Rural Policies and the Distribution of Agricultural Products in China: 1950–1959," Ph.D diss., Ann Arbor, University of Michigan, 1971; and Elizabeth Croll, *The Family Rice Bowl: Food and Domestic Economy in China*, Geneva, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1983.

[2] This argument is most closely associated with Mark Elvin, but also with Robert Dernberger and to a lesser extent Dwight Perkins and Anthony Tang. See Mark Elvin, "The High-Level Equilibrium Trap: The Causes of the Decline of Invention in the Traditional Chinese Textile Industries," in William E. Wilmott, Ed., *Economic Organization in Chinese Society*,

There is nothing new in this treatment, nor is it particularly complete or current, but it does provide readers with some sense of historical process rather than the usual snapshot of a static "traditional China." It also furnishes a modest feel for one of the central debates over Chinese development before 1949, without bogging the reader down in the intricacies of competing arguments.

MOST BOOKS on agricultural development in the People's Republic of China (PRC) are confined exclusively to China, incorporating neither reference to mainstream development theory nor an appreciable international comparative perspective. Lardy's work is an improvement in this regard. In his first chapter, for example, he attempts to embed agriculture's perceived role in Chinese development strategy within the international literature on economic development theory. Lardy further provides a brief theoretical discussion at the beginning of several of the later chapters. But here his concessions to space limitations and readability for a general audience prove costly. The author's theoretical treatment of agriculture in the development process relies heavily on (1) the "contributions to growth" notions of Kuznets and Myint,[6] which provide a relatively static picture of agriculture's role as a supplier of labor, food, and financial savings to nonagricultural development; and (2) the early "balanced growth" models,[7] which, though precise in their specification of balance, miss some critical dynamic interactions between the overall growth of an industrializing economy and agriculture under the special conditions of technical transformation. The elements of an agriculture-based strategy of economic development are now well-articulated and are complemented by an impressive comparative literature. W. Arthur Lewis defined the critical role of food as a wages good. Bruce Johnston and John Mellor delineated the need for productivity increase in agriculture and the role of technology. The path of resource transfers from agriculture that have facilitated nonagricultural growth were tracked for Japan by Bruce Johnston, Ohkawa Kazushi, and Teranishi Juro; for Taiwan by T.H. Lee; and for India, Japan, Taiwan, and China by Ishikawa Shigeru. The critical role of agriculture in stimulating growth in the nonagricultural sector was explored via consumption goods by John Mellor and Uma Lele and via producer goods by Bruce Johnston and Peter Kilby.[8]

Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1972, pp. 137–72; idem, *Pattern of the Chinese Past: A Social and Economic Interpretation*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1973; Robert F. Dernberger, "The Role of the Foreigner in China's Economic Development," in Dwight H. Perkins, Ed., *China's Modern Economy in Historical Perspective*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1975, pp. 19–47; Dwight H. Perkins, "Growth and Changing Structure of China's Twentieth Century Economy," in Perkins, *China's Modern Economy in Historical Perspective*, pp. 115–65; and Anthony M. Tang, *An Analytical and Empirical Investigation of Agriculture in Mainland China, 1952–1980*, Taipei, Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research, December 1984.

[3] Dwight H. Perkins, *Agricultural Development in China, 1368–1968*, Chicago, Aldine, 1969.

[4] Carl Riskin, "Surplus or Stagnation in Modern China," in Perkins, *China's Modern Economy in Historical Perspective*, pp. 49–84.

[5] This position is essentially the same as that published by Riskin in 1975 (ibid.). Ramon Myers is also associated with refutation of the "technologists" view that agriculture was stagnant and rural economic mobility had ground to a halt in the 19th and 20th centuries (e.g. *The Chinese Peasant Economy: Agricultural Development in Hopei and Shantung, 1800–1949*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1970). Riskin, however, also finds fault with the opposing "distributionist" view—the view that there was sufficient surplus during the period but that it was expropriated and squandered by landlords, warlords, and corrupt officials.

[6] See, e.g., Simon Kuznets, "Economic Growth and the Contribution of Agriculture: Notes on Measurements," *International Journal of Agrarian Affairs* (London), Vol. 3, No. 2, 1961; and Hla Myint, "Agriculture and Economic Development in the Open Economy," in Lloyd G. Reynolds, Ed., *Agriculture in Development Theory*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1975.

[7] See, e.g., John C.H. Fei and Gustav Ranis, *Development of the Labor Surplus Economy: Theory and Policy*, Homewood, IL, Richard D. Irwin, 1964.

[8] See, e.g., W. Arthur Lewis, "Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies," *The Manchester School* (UK), May 1954; Bruce F. Johnston and John W. Mellor, "The Role of Agriculture in Economic Development," *American Economic Review* (Nashville, TN), September 1961, pp. 566–93; John W. Mellor, *The Economics of Agricultural Development*, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1966; Bruce F. Johnston, "Agricultural Productivity and Economic Development in Japan," *Journal of Political Economy* (Chicago), December 1951, pp. 498–513; Ohkawa Kazushi, *Differential Structure and Agriculture: Essays on Dualistic Growth*, Tokyo, Institute of Economic Growth, Hitotsubashi University, 1972; Teranishi Juro, *Nihon no Keizai Hatten to Kinyuu* (Japan's Economic Development and Finance), Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten, 1982; Lee Teng-hui, *Intersectoral Capital Flows in the Economic*

(cont. p. 66)

By glossing over this sophistication, the book falls short of its potential in a number of important ways. The remainder of the work leaves the impression of providing piecemeal criticisms of specific Chinese administrative tendencies (to restrict interregional trade and, consequently, gains from specialization; to engage in quantitative and command planning rather than operating through factor and product markets; to overemphasize investment in heavy industry) without a strong theory linking and prioritizing them relative to other strengths and deficiencies. Second, some explanatory potential for illuminating why such practices evolved in China is lost. Finally, important possibilities of comparison of China's development effort with performance elsewhere remain underexploited.

One of Lardy's principal criticisms, for example, is that of China's sectoral investment imbalance, and he struggles throughout a good share of the book with the difficult task of demonstrating quantitatively that heavy industry received too much emphasis. While several consequences of this imbalance are noted, little space is devoted to showing why such a policy was adopted and how it resulted in jeopardizing the very goals it was supposed to serve. As an illustration, perhaps some supplementary comments are in order.

The idea that a sectoral investment overemphasis on heavy industry for predominantly peasant-based economies consequently embodies a slow-growth strategy in terms of both employment and overall economic development, with implications for rural immiserization, is associated with a number of earlier economists commenting critically on India's Second Five-Year Plan (1956–61).[9] The theoretical basis for that plan (developed by P.C. Mahalanobis), as well as for the Soviet long-range plan of the late 1920's (developed by Evsey Domar) and the First Five-Year Plan (1953–57) of the People's Republic of China, was clearly the works of the Soviet economist G.A. Fel'dman. Although Fel'dman's original conceptualizations were refined by others over time, a common theme even among subsequent writers was an implicit equation of industrialization with modernization: industry was seen to exhibit scale and external economies, while agriculture was subject to diminishing returns. Industries' "externalities" included promotion of new modes of economic behavior and social organization. Capital and labor were thus seen to be more productive in industry than in agriculture. As shown in the better-known works of Roy Harrod and Domar, increase in the capital stock was the source of growth. It followed from these authors' reasoning that the capital stock should be directly allocated to the capital goods sector to the extent possible, and not to consumer goods, including agricultural production.[10]

In practice, although employed by many capital-poor countries, this development is exceedingly capital intensive, leaving little room for growth in employment. The inevitable result of applying the largest share of capital resources to a limited labor force and little to the majority of workers is low productivity of both capital and labor. Moreover, with frequent work stoppages (in these relatively complex capital-intensive industries) related to typically poor infrastructural capacity in developing countries, scarce physical capital resources are often underutilized, thereby limiting even further the net increase in economic value provided by these resources. And because capital-intensive industries are so costly, remaining financial capital available to the government is insufficient for the necessary infrastructural development effort, most notably for roads, railroads, electric power, telecommunications, and so forth.

No understanding is incorporated into this industry-oriented strategy of the potential for technical change in crop production which could grant periodic reprieve from agriculture's assumed fate of diminishing returns, nor of the magnitude of investment requirements needed to achieve this technical change. The consequence of underinvestment in agriculture has been described by Ishikawa[11] in terms of a

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Development of Taiwan, 1890–1960, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1971; Ishikawa Shigeru, *Conditions for Agricultural Development in Developing Asian Countries*, Tokyo, Committee for Translation of Economic Studies, 1964; Ishikawa Shigeru, *Economic Development in Asian Perspective*, Tokyo, Kinokuniya Book Store, Ltd., 1967; John W. Mellor and Uma Lele, "Growth Linkages of the New Foodgrain Technologies," *Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics* (Bombay), January-March 1973, pp. 35–55; and Bruce F. Johnston and Peter Kilby, *Agriculture and Structural Transformation: Economic Strategies in Late Developing Countries*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1975. Among these, Lardy's principal reference is to Johnston and Kilby's *Agriculture and Structural Transformation* and to some extent Ishikawa's work on China.

[9] Notable among these efforts has been the continuing work by John Mellor. See, e.g., John W. Mellor, "Models of Economic Growth and Land Augmenting Technological Change in Foodgrain Production" (hereafter cited as "Models of Economic Growth"), in Nurul Islam, Ed., *Agricultural Policy in Developing Countries*, London, MacMillan, 1974, pp. 3–30; idem, *The New Economics of Growth*, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1976; and idem, "Agriculture on the Road to Industrialization," in John P. Lewis and Valeriana Kallab, Eds., *Development Strategies Reconsidered*, New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction Books, 1986, pp. 67–89.

[10] For some discussion of this theoretical development, see P.C. Mahalanobis, "Some Observations on the Process of Growth of National Income," *Sankhya* (Calcutta), September 1953, pp. 307–12; Ishikawa, *Economic Development in Asian Perspective*, and Mellor, "Models of Economic Growth"; and idem "Agriculture on the Road to Industrialization."

[11] Ishikawa Shigeru, "Medium and Long-Term Prospects for the Chinese Economy—

Ricardian Growth Trap Model in which any emerging dynamism in industrialization is constrained by slower progress in agriculture subject to diminishing returns in the absence of sufficient technical change. This happens in market economies because high prices for scarce food and agricultural inputs for industry imply high wage bills and material costs that choke off savings in industry. When food and farm prices are kept artificially low as in China, productivity, farm investment, and incentives are further constrained and procurement becomes increasingly difficult. In Ishikawa's view,[12] inevitable official response to these crises explains China's tendency toward net resource inflow into the agricultural sector over time, confounding planners' aspirations for agriculture as a source of funds to finance industrial development. Despite its long-term inconsistencies, this ultimately slow-growth low-employment strategy embodied in the early plans of the Soviet Union, India, and China have spawned a whole generation of closed-economy growth models focusing on the capital-goods sector that have been applied especially to socialist countries, but also to a wide variety of developing nations.

That China's First Five-Year Plan and succeeding plans have been extreme examples of this sectoral imbalance was emphasized by several economists specializing on economic development in China since the 1950's,[13] particularly by those focusing on the agricultural sector.[14] Anthony Tang and I found that although underinvestment in agriculture has been chronic throughout the history of the PRC, agricultural growth accelerated during periods in which, relative to other periods, there was a concentration on agriculture in terms of both sectoral allocations and supporting policies.[15] Lardy ascribes these accelerations to the relative importance accorded price planning in such periods (versus the heavier reliance at other times on quantitative output targets and quotas), to intermittent increases in typically insufficient agricultural investments, and to concurrent loosening of restrictions on trade.

Lardy's treatment of trading restrictions and price versus quantity planning in the Chinese context are logical extensions of earlier work by Dwight Perkins,[16] although he clearly deals more comprehensively with those subjects than any work covering the 1950's through the 1970's. But Lardy's work does not show the relative contribution of these individual policy shifts to accelerations in farm productivity. Were each important? Were particular categories of policy especially influential in stifling or releasing and encouraging the dynamic forces of growth? Or were there other considerations collinear with the shifts mentioned above that were even more important? Tang and I have suggested several other factors, in addition to those discussed by Lardy, contributing to China's agricultural growth cycles, including: the influence of input growth cycles; policies affecting resource allocation *within* (as well as among) localities; periodic concentration on construction project *completions* and realizing associated *returns* rather than on construction starts; and technological considerations related to constraining factors in yield growth.[17] Unfortunately, we also fail to assess rigorously the *relative* importance of these factors.

IN HIS second chapter, Lardy focuses on demonstrating the efficiency costs of various production and marketing controls typical of Chinese central planning. It is here that he postulates the theoretical superiority of price planning over quantity planning. While his model provides a handy simplification of this dichotomy for *long-term* evaluative purposes, he does not attempt to demonstrate either the theoretical advantages or superiority in effectiveness over time of administrative price adjustments as policy tools for influencing *short-term* output in the Chinese context, relative to a wide variety of other instruments used throughout the PRC period, including preferential allocation of fertilizers and credit, guaranteed and advance purchase agreements during periods of market uncertainty or (usually chronic) credit scarcity, and so forth.

Much of the chapter focuses on the 1965–77 period and empha-

Preliminary Explorations," *Tyuugoku Keizai no Tyuuchoki Tembo* (Medium and Long-Term Prospects for the Chinese Economy), Tokyo, Nityuu Keizai Kyokai (Sino-Japanese Economic Association), 1984.

[12] Ishikawa Shigeru, "Patterns and Processes of Intersectoral Resource Flows: Comparison of Cases in Asia," a paper prepared for the Symposium Celebrating the 25th Anniversary of the Economic Growth Center, Yale University, on the Current State of Development Economics: Progress and Perspectives, New Haven, April 1986.

[13] See, e.g., Liu Ta-chung and Yeh Kung-chia, *The Economy of the Chinese Mainland: National Income and Economic Development 1933–1959*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1965; Chen Nai-Ruenn and Walter Galenson, *The Chinese Economy Under Communism*, Chicago, Aldine, 1969; Ishikawa, *Economic Development in Asian Perspective*; Chao Kang, *Capital Formation in Mainland China, 1952–65*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1974.

[14] Chao Kang, *Agricultural Production in Communist China, 1949–65*, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1970; Anthony M. Tang and Bruce Stone, *Food Production in the People's Republic of China*, IFPRI Research Report No. 15, Washington, DC, International Food Policy Research Institute, 1980; and Tang, *An Analytical and Empirical Investigation*.

[15] Tang and Stone, op. cit., pp. 13, 117–45, and 166–70; see also Tang, *An Analytical and Empirical Investigation*.

[16] Dwight H. Perkins, *Market Control and Planning in Communist China*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1966.

[17] Tang and Stone, op. cit., pp. 117–62 and 166–70.

sizes the economic and human costs of the government's policy of local self-sufficiency in grain production. The central proposition is quite simple: there *are* gains to be had from specialization and interprovincial trade; so retreat to local autarchy involves losses. The theory of comparative advantage[18] is one of the oldest and most widely recognized concepts in Western economics, yet Lardy shows that it was not fully appreciated by many Chinese leaders, and actually rejected by Mao. Mao's promotion of local self-sufficiency may have arisen, as Lardy suggests, as a theoretical outgrowth of his views on *national* self-sufficiency. On the other hand, it may have reflected instead a failure to adjust emotionally and conceptually from the successful military/economic strategy of self-reliance that had evolved over several decades of civil and anti-colonial war and been nurtured during the subsequent period of almost continual uncertainty in the international political arena. In any event, Walker's work implies that Mao's views *prevailed* during the 1960's primarily because the administrative burden and geographic political tensions of interprovincial grain transfers had proven increasingly unmanageable during the 1950's.

The most dramatic cases of productivity loss and personal suffering engendered by Mao's grain self-sufficiency campaign are inevitably to be found in areas that (1) were relatively unsuitable for grain cultivation and (2) had enjoyed higher living standards by specializing in other commodities for which their environments or locations were more hospitable. Lardy reviews a number of the more dramatic instances: sugar cane areas of Fujian, rubber plantations on Hainan Island, herding areas of Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang, cotton areas of northwest Shandong, vegetable communes within major municipal areas, the soybean region of the northeast, and various prefectures throughout China specializing in other oilseeds. The overemphasis on grain production in the years 1965-77 also led to China's triple-cropping experiment which not only reduced incomes and returns to labor in the lower Yangzi Valley but even reduced the annual production of rice in parts of Sichuan because of losses on mid-season rice crops sustained with adjusted planting dates. Although a number of writers have previously discussed the net economic losses involved in the government's policy of the period,[19] Lardy usefully strings together a large variety of cases, segregated by theme, and fills in the story with additional information from primary references from appropriate periods.

At the end of the chapter, Lardy offers a sketchy review of rural policy reform since 1977 emphasizing the revival of price adjustments, including price increases for most farm output; the relaxation of regional self-sufficiency for areas specializing in economic (cash) crops backed up by guaranteed delivery of foodgrains; and some progress in the development of private markets. He seems to ascribe the rapid increase in production in all agricultural categories during the 1978–81 period to these measures (p. 92). In my view, they are unquestionably important for several of the nongrain crops, but do little to explain the rapid growth in foodgrain production. For the latter, I would stress the importance of the rapid progress in quality and quantity of manufactured fertilizer supply, dearth of which had previously constrained the approximation of yield potential available with existing seed technology.[20] A shift in fertilizer allocations was even highly contributory to the yield increases in economic crops. The most popular explanation for yield growth both inside and outside China, however, emphasizes labor incentives that owed their existence to the initiation of the production responsibility system.[21]

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[18] The theory can be summarized in brief as follows: a society's welfare and that of each region is maximized when regions specialize in producing commodities for which they are most suited—in terms of natural conditions and the relative availability of factors of production—trading with other regions for what they do not produce, rather than attempting to produce everything they plan to consume.

[19] Chao, *Agricultural Production in Communist China*; Ishikawa Shigeru, "China's Food and Agriculture: A Turning Point," *Food Policy* (Guildford, Surrey, UK), May 1977, pp. 90–100, 102; Thomas B. Wiens, "The Evolution of Policy and Capabilities in China's Agricultural Technology," in US Congress Joint Economic Committee, *Chinese Economy Post-Mao*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1978, pp. 671–703; Tang and Stone, op. cit., Thomas B. Wiens, "The Limits to Agricultural Intensification: The Suzhou Experience," in US Congress Joint Economic Committee, *China Under the Four Modernizations*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1982, pp. 462–74.

[20] See Tang and Stone, op. cit., pp. 120–45 and 166–70; Bruce Stone, "The Basis for Chinese Agricultural Growth in the 1980's and 1990's: A Comment on Document No. 1, 1984," *The China Quarterly* (London), March 1985, pp. 114–21; and idem, "Chinese Fertilizer Application in the 1980's and 1990's: Issues of Growth, Balance, Allocation, Efficiency and Response," in US Congress Joint Economic Committee, *China's Economy Looks Toward the Year 2000, Volume 1: The Four Modernizations*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1986, pp. 453–96.

[21] See, e.g., Justin Lin, "Supervision, Incentives, and the Optimal Scale of a Farm in a Socialist Economy," Agricultural Economics Paper No. 85:16, Chicago, University of Chicago, 1985; idem, "The Household Responsibility System in China's Agricultural Reform: A Theoretical and Empirical Study," a paper presented at the International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC, August 1986; Economic Research Center, State Council of the People's Republic of China, *Zhongguo Jingji Nianjian 1982* (Almanac of China's Economy 1982), Beijing, Jingji Guanli Zazhi Shechuban, 1982, pp. iii–4; Chen Yizi, "Why Rich Communes Also Adopt the Household Responsibility System," in Rural Development Research Center, *Nongcun Jingji Shehui* (Rural Areas, Economics, and Society), Beijing, Rural Development Research Center, 1981; see also Tang and Stone, op. cit.; and Stone, "The Basis for Chinese Agricultural Growth."

On intersectoral transfers (Chapter 3), Lardy's contention that agriculture was successfully squeezed (albeit at great cost) to finance industrial development persuades some analysts, but not others.[22] Unfortunately, few of us base our position on comprehensive quantification of resource flows among sectors, each relying instead on partial quantitative indicators. The most authoritative efforts along these lines have been those conducted by Ishikawa Shigeru, one for the 1950's focusing on flows of physical goods among sectors,[23] and one for the entire 1953–82 period focusing on savings and investment flows.[24] Ishikawa's work suggests that net resource transfers out of agriculture were small and declining during the 1950's, ending in a minor net inflow by 1957. After that period, his quantification shows a continuous and increasing net inflow, a finding that conflicts with Lardy's position.

Most Western and Japanese economists researching the issue seem to agree, however, that the effort to limit these net resource flows into agriculture (or to achieve an outflow) led the Chinese leadership to undertake a wide variety of measures, many of which were detrimental to economic development broadly defined, as well as to agricultural growth and the welfare of the poorest and most vulnerable rural groups.[25] Where Walker's book makes its contribution to the discussion is to detail the excruciating difficulties faced by the Chinese leadership in managing food supplies in the context of under-investment in agriculture *even in the 1950's*. This led to successive crises and increasing capitulation in the direction of larger net flows of resources into agriculture documented by Ishikawa. Many would also probably agree that this piecemeal capitulation has embodied a significantly slower overall rate of agricultural and economic growth than a strategy that would have matched Mao's rhetoric of "agriculture first" and "agriculture as the basis of economic development."

LIVING STANDARDS in the Chinese countryside decreased during the 1965–77 period (Lardy, Chapter 4), and per capita food consumption and incomes in many areas were no higher in 1977 than they had been in 1957. Although 1957 was an average weather year and 1977 was one of the worst since 1960–61,[26] and although Lardy's micro-level support draws heavily on worst-case material, his above-mentioned conclusions are essentially similar to those expressed in a large number of previous studies by other economists specializing on China, whether based on food balance sheet approaches or micro-surveys and case studies.[27] Of course, the most authoritative development of this comparison is Walker's book, which shows that average per capita grain consumption in 1978–79 (average and excellent weather years subsequent to the initiation of several reforms and reduced procurement pressure) was only slightly higher than the 1953–57 mean, and lower than the peak years of the 1950's (p. 182). With most nongrain food intake at lower per capita levels, the likelihood of a positive long-term trend in per capita caloric consumption is slight.

Other recent studies have been more charitable to the PRC's performance on food consumption, notably work by Elizabeth Croll and by Alan Piazza.[28] But Croll's work is heavily influenced by her detailed examination of *urban* consumption and distribution. The "rural" categories for both Croll's and Piazza's studies are actually suburban, and thus are atypical of the countryside further from major municipalities. Upon close scrutiny, Piazza's work, which incorporates anthropometric data as well as food consumption survey results and calculations of age-based requirements, supports the no-growth contentions of Walker and Lardy on the two-decade period. He estimates that as a percentage of caloric requirements, energy availability during the 1959–77 period reached the average for 1952–58 in only one year; in terms of protein availability relative to requirements, the 1952–58 average was reached only in 1979 and in each year since 1981. All per capita figures fall in the range of 74.6 to 103.9 percent of requirements for the 1959–77 period, suggesting bottom quintiles of seriously malnourished citizens.[29] Piazza's anthropometric data document clear progress in urban and suburban areas, however, and he emphasizes progress even in rural areas, including chronically impoverished ones, since 1977.

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[22] James E. Nickum, for example, seems to accept Lardy's view in his review of *Agriculture in China's Modern Economic Development*, in the *Journal of Asian Studies* (Berkeley), August 1985, pp. 813–15. For different interpretations emphasizing lack of governmental success in squeezing agriculture in the long run, see Bruce Stone, "Long-term Intersectoral Resource Flows Among Countries Undergoing Technical Transformation of Agriculture: With Special Reference to the People's Republic of China," a paper presented for the 31st International Congress of Human Sciences in Asia and North Africa, Tokyo, Sept. 1–3, 1983 [abstract appears in *Proceedings* volume edited by Tatsuro Yamamoto, Tokyo, Toho Gakkai (Institute of Eastern Culture)], 1984; Stone, "Relative Foodgrain Prices in the People's Republic of China: Rural Taxation Through Public Monopoly," paper prepared for IFPRI Workshop on Food and Agricultural Price Policy, April 29–May 2, Elkridge, MD (will be published in *Food and Agricultural Price Policy-Development Context* edited by John W. Mellor and Raisuddin Ahmed, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press); and Nakagane Katsuji, Review of *Agriculture in China's Modern Economic Development* by Nicholas Lardy, *The Developing Economies* (Tokyo), No. 1, 1986, pp. 86–88.

[23] Ishikawa, *Economic Development in Asian Perspective*; and idem, "Resource Flows Between Agriculture and Industry—The Chinese Experience," *The Developing Economies*, March 1967, pp. 3–49.

[24] Ishikawa, "Patterns and Processes of Intersectoral Resource Flows."

[25] The most explicit statement of this position is Stone, "Relative Foodgrain Prices in the PRC."

[26] Y.Y. Kueh, "A Weather Index for Analyzing Grain Yield Instability in China, 1952–81," *The China Quarterly*, March 1984, pp. 68–83; see also Stone, "China's 1985 Foodgrain Production Target: Issues and Prospects," in Tang and Stone, op. cit., p. 88.

[27] For example, Ishikawa, "China's Food and Agriculture: A Turning Point"; Tang and Stone, op. cit.; Thomas B. Wiens, "Agricultural Statistics in the People's Republic of China," in Alexander Eckstein, Ed., *Quantitative Measures of China's Economic Output*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1980, pp. 44–107 and 275–339; Vaclav Smil, "Food Energy in PRC," *Current Scene* (Hong Kong), Nos. 6 and 7, 1980, pp. 1–11; Smil, "China's Food: Availability, Requirements, Composition, Prospects," *Food Policy*, May 1981, pp. 67–77; James A. Kilpatrick, "China: The Drive for Dietary Improvement," in US Congress Joint Economic Committee, *China Under the Four Modernizations*, pp. 449–61.

[28] Croll, op. cit.; Alan Piazza, *Food Consumption and Nutritional Status in the PRC*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1986; Alan L. Piazza, "Trends in Food and Nutrient Availability in China, 1950–81," *World Bank Staff Working Paper* No. 607, Washington, DC, 1983; see also Stone, Review of *The Family Rice Bowl* by Elizabeth Croll, *The China Quarterly*, December 1984, pp. 876–78.

Although a glance at trends in the average wage of state employees and in rural collectively distributed income would suggest some narrowing of the rural-urban income gap during the two decades, Lardy shows this differential actually increased, owing to climbing laborforce participation rates. In another work, Lardy also documents the growing host of subsidies for urban residents unavailable for most inhabitants in the countryside.[30] Dwight Perkins and Shahid Yusuf go a step further to compare total per capita food and nonfood consumption levels in rural and urban areas in constant 1979 prices. Their results show a 1.9 to 1 urban-rural ratio in 1957 growing to 3.2 to 1 in 1975, slipping only to 3.1 to 1 in 1979.[31]

In addition, Lardy makes it clear that many elements of Chinese government policy have actually exacerbated poverty in the very poorest of Chinese rural areas. He points to the localized foodgrain self-sufficiency drive and restrictions on trade, and restrictions on migration, as well as tax and procurement policies. Again, this is consistent with my own view and that of a few other specialists,[32] although unlike the long-term absence of growth in per capita consumption (1957-77), it cannot be considered a mainstream position even among economists. Lardy and especially Walker also detail how government activities accentuated the 1959–61 famine.[33] In fact, Walker's material suggests that an agricultural depression in the 1960's was more or less inevitable and followed upon conditions and policies of pre-1958 China. Bad weather and the administrative mistakes of the Great Leap Forward (1958–59) merely served to bring it on sooner and with thoroughly catastrophic severity.

Going further than Lardy, it has been noted that restrictions on factor and input markets have also operated regressively within rural areas in many instances,[34] although the record is somewhat more mixed on the whole. But restrictions on economic activities in poor areas coupled with migration controls have been the most harmful to the very poorest rural areas, which require substantial diversification from dependence on especially risky and impoverished farming.

IT IS INTERESTING to note that Peter Timmer, a knowledgeable and able development economist familiar with China, though not a Sinologist, finds Lardy's conclusions on rural poverty in "conflict with much of the standard literature."[35] Yet, as demonstrated throughout this essay, much of Lardy's criticism of government policy can be considered mainstream among the most respected Western and Japanese economists specializing on Chinese agriculture, and little of the remainder can be considered revolutionary. Timmer's reaction may be partly because Lardy's book is so unrelentingly critical, and this may be viewed as a major weakness.

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[29] Piazza, *Food Consumption*, pp. 92.

[30] Nicholas Lardy, "Agricultural Prices in China," *World Bank Staff Working Paper* No. 606, Washington, DC, 1984.

[31] Dwight Perkins and Shahid Yusuf, *Rural Development in China*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984.

[32] Stone, "China's 1985 Foodgrain Production Target"; Perkins and Yusuf, op. cit.

[33] During the Great Leap Forward, party pressure on statistical units to report production successes resulted in grossly inflated 1958 output statistics, including those for grain. This misinformation caused the government to reallocate acreage to nongrain crops in 1959, while simultaneously intensifying procurement from rural areas. The year 1958 had been a good crop year though not a magnificent one, and in 1959 weather was poor. By the time the mistakes were realized, it was too late to adjust 1959 spring planting, and stock depletion in 1959 became inevitable. When the worst farming weather in 20th-century China struck in 1960 and 1961, the disaster took on truly catastrophic proportions resulting in massive famine and a gross population decline of 13.5 million. In addition, technical mismanagement on the part of overzealous and poorly qualified cadres and officials brought about serious damage to farmlands from deep plowing, close planting, and water control construction errors. Various elements of this catastrophe have been discussed in a variety of earlier work, including Chao, *Agricultural Production in Communist China*; Li Choh-ming, *The Statistical System of Communist China*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1962; E.B. Vermeer, *Water Conservancy and Irrigation in China*, Leiden, Leiden University Press, 1977. Lardy and Walker, however, have treated this period most comprehensively.

[34] Stone, "China's 1985 Foodgrain Production Target"; idem, "Chinese Fertilizer Application in the 1980's and 1990's"; idem, "Fertilizer Marketing and Allocation in China," a paper prepared for the World Bank, Washington, DC, June 1984; and idem, "Systemic and Policy Change in the Administration of Chinese Fertilizer Sector Development," a paper prepared for the World Bank, Washington, DC, June 1986.

[35] C. Peter Timmer, Review of *Agriculture in China's Modern Economic Development* by Nicholas Lardy, *Journal of Economic Literature* (Nashville, TN), December 1984, p. 1675.

The Chinese government, despite all of the above arguments, and even during the 1965–77 period, enjoyed some successes and strengths when viewed in the context of other developing countries.[36] Timmer regards the book's principal flaw to be its "failure to draw several important *comparative* policy lessons from Chinese experience for a wide range of other developing countries."[37] Yet, Lardy's book embodies *some* effort to do so—more, in fact, than have those of most economists specializing on China, with the principal exception of Ishikawa (and to some extent Tang) whose works are less accessible and less available to the average Western reader.

Herein lies the key to the paradox of Timmer's reaction: economists specializing on China have failed to get their message across to the nonspecialist public, even including development economists. Timmer is right when he suggests that Lardy's work conflicts with the standard view in the West (among non-Sinologists), where perceptions have been influenced far more by publications, proliferating during the 1970's, extolling the virtues of Chinese socialism relative to the regimes of other developing countries, although such works are not regarded for the most part as serious analyses by most economists specializing on China.

Many works relating to the Chinese economy published in the 1950's and 1960's were critical. To some extent, they were subsequently dismissed in the general view as products of the strong anticommunist stance of much Western writing of the period, or even of anticommunist Chinese emigrants, although several such as Liu Tachung were exceedingly competent economists. By the late 1960's and 1970's, with criticism of the United States's position in Vietnam reaching a crescendo in America and Europe, there was impetus to arrive at a more balanced and updated view. Yet, young economists specializing in China could not easily find jobs in their field or gain the respect of their departments owing to the particular unavailability of hard data allowing cross-country comparison and sophisticated analyses. Those that persevered were often personally attracted to China or to the Chinese, or were interested in socialism; many of the more senior scholars were historians or political scientists writing on economic topics, and many of the economists were young and tended to be less critical than their older colleagues who were no longer active in the field. Among the writings of these academicians, it was not surprising at the time to find a lack of theoretical or quantitative rigor, and an effort to present a more sympathetic view. This tendency was furthered by the necessity to rely for research material on especially biased propaganda and very selective release of statistics among Chinese internal and international publications.

Among nonacademic material produced on the Chinese economy, a large share was put out by the US Department of Agriculture (USDA), the US Central Intelligence Agency, or by the United Nations or other international organizations. Although the USDA seems to have been guilty of publishing consistently pessimistic estimates of future Chinese production for certain periods, some of the best work was done by the two American organizations, despite the limitations of time and publication style placed upon civil servants. The UN organizations, on the other hand, were careful not to be critical of China, and some leaned over backwards to court the exotic contact with the PRC. As other professional delegations began to receive permission to visit China, the courtliness continued, especially by would-be China specialists: it was still easy to be designated *persona non grata*. The delegations typically visited showcase locations and were treated well; few were composed of economists.

Change from this situation accelerated considerably during the decade from 1977 to 1986 with proliferation of delegations and exchanges, business activities, tourism, and even the potential for informal contact with Chinese citizens. Among Japanese and Western scholars of Chinese agriculture, in addition to Ishikawa, Perkins, Tang, Walker, and a few other still active but more senior researchers who continued to strive for quantitative rigor throughout the statistical blackout, a host of younger Chinese and non-Chinese economists have potential to upgrade the level of scholarship on the subject. This effort is aided immeasurably by the reestablishment of the State Statistical Bureau in China, the publication of statistical material by the Bureau and hundreds of other organizations, the recent Chinese eagerness to collaborate (though not unattended by difficulties) on joint research projects, the climate of criticism, reflected in Chinese published articles, of policies associated with previous periods, and even some degree of acceptance of debate and criticism of existing policies.

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[36] For example, the state effort to sponsor technical change in agriculture, though grossly undercapitalized and not without flaws, was managed with a relatively high degree of efficiency for a developing country: resources were expended in the right categories. Urban areas, at least, were substantially insulated against year-to-year foodgrain production variability, and its distribution within cities was handled on a reasonably equitable basis. The commune organization and workpoint system provided a limited safety net for each locality's poorest inhabitants, albeit dependent on that locality's aggregate performance, and not without costs to efficiency and incentives.

[37] See Timmer's review, loc. cit., p. 1674.

Among the younger group, those that began producing at the end of the previous era have a lead on the field, including Lardy and Thomas Wiens. They may well retain it, since the number of permanent job opportunities for doing long-term analytic research on the Chinese economy have increased surprisingly little in the West, unlike short-term or temporary posts or those emphasizing descriptive work. But the World Bank has emerged as a major serious institutional contributor to the analysis of Chinese agriculture. This is in some part through the outstanding efforts of Wiens and a few others at the Bank and in part because the Bank has financial leverage to bargain for studies and research materials to do important analytical work in areas where inertia and conservatism would otherwise still withhold data. Other less financially imposing research institutions are even meeting with a certain degree of success in organizing useful studies within China.

So the future is promising for progressing beyond Lardy's and Walker's recent efforts. Even now, statistical material made available since the publication of their books allows for more intensive study. As admirable as the accomplishments of these two authors are, their books are remarkable in part because of the massive detective job required to produce and substantiate rudimentary research results for China during the pre-1979 period—results that would be less impressive among the scholarship on more open societies. In my view, Lardy's initial questions about the causes of acceleration in agricultural growth as they apply to foodgrain production still lack satisfactory answers. But even more important than the pre-1977 period (although such work is indispensable to understanding the present), rigorous analysis of the determinants of China's impressive post-1977 progress and attendant difficulties remains to be done. Myths about the causes of this recent spurt of growth are already proliferating.

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NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1986

CHERNOBYL' CONSEQUENCES

Judith Thornton **David R. Marples** **Ellen Jones & Benjamin L. Woodbury, II** **John M. Kramer**

China's Opening to the World

Huan Guocang

Note

Special Economic Zones of the PRC

Joseph Fewsmith

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NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1986 VOL XXXV

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COVER: The Chernobyl' Nuclear Power Station; in the foreground construction proceeds on the entombment of destroyed reactor unit No. 4. Photo from TASS via Sovfoto.

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IN THIS ISSUE OF

Problems of Communism

Articles

THE CONSEQUENCES OF CHERNOBYL'

Chernobyl' and Soviet Energy

Judith Thornton

Although the Soviet economy seems to have weathered the short-run consequences of the April 1986 disaster at the Chernobyl' Nuclear Power Station, the accident casts a long shadow over the Soviet power sector in the intermediate term. Graphite-moderated reactors of the sort that exploded at Chernobyl' figure strongly in the highly ambitious Soviet plans to expand the output of nuclear power in the medium term. Extensive refitting of such reactors to improve safety, or abandonment of the reactor design, could jeopardize output targets of the energy sector and of the whole Soviet economy.

Chernobyl' and Ukraine

David R. Marples

The Soviet population in the area around Chernobyl' bore the brunt of the accident and the subsequent clean-up efforts. Over 200,000 people were exposed to dangerous levels of radiation and over 135,000 were displaced through evacuation. Workers engaged in the difficult task of entombing the exploded reactor and decontaminating the affected 30-square-kilometer area have had to cope with very poor sanitary and living conditions.

Chernobyl' and *Glasnost'*

Ellen Jones and Benjamin L. Woodbury, II

Since coming to power, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachëv has attempted to make "openness" *(glasnost')* a hallmark of his régime. Yet, when the accident at Chernobyl' occurred, the Soviets initially repressed news about it. When this reticence proved counter-productive both at home and abroad, the Soviets launched a relatively informative—and quite effective—public relations campaign. The success of *glasnost'* in containing the negative repercussions created by Chernobyl' apparently strengthened the position of those Soviet leaders who believe that qualified openness molds foreign and domestic public opinion more effectively than secrecy.

Chernobyl' and Eastern Europe

John M. Kramer

The recent accident at Chernobyl' only adds to the long list of problems East European governments face in implementing their nuclear power plans that foresee 40,000 megawatts of new nuclear capacity in the region by the end of the century. Although Chernobyl' has fostered reservations about nuclear power among political elites and populations of the region, there are no readily available alternative sources of power. Thus, nuclear power is likely to remain an important, though not decisive, component of the energy balance in Eastern Europe.

(Abstracts continued on reverse side)

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China's Opening to the World

Huan Guocang

By "opening" China "to the outside world" in 1979, Chinese leaders hoped to expand foreign trade, introduce foreign technology into Chinese industry, and gradually integrate the Chinese economy into the world economy. By the last quarter of 1985, however, the experiment was floundering. The rapid increase in imports of both production and consumer goods produced a large trade deficit, and the nation's foreign exchange reserves dropped drastically. Alarmed by such reverses, and stung by criticisms from party conservatives, China's reformers took measures to tighten government control over the conduct of foreign trade, especially import volume and foreign exchange expenditures.

Note

Special Economic Zones in the PRC

Joseph Fewsmith

The Special Economic Zones have been a pivotal and controversial feature of China's opening to the world. Conceived as a window through which foreign capital, technology, and know-how could be introduced in order to spur the PRC's modernization, they were attacked by conservative forces as throw-backs to the treaty concessions of the 19th and early 20th centuries and as a source of corruption and the squandering of scarce foreign exchange. The SEZ's appear to have weathered the storm of criticism and to be progressing on a somewhat more modest and controlled course of development.

Essay Reviews

Indochina's Continuing Tragedy

Robert S. Ross

Vietnamese-Cambodian hostilities and the Sino-Vietnamese War now appear to have been the inevitable next stage of the Indochina conflict after the US withdrawal from Vietnam. Recent studies reveal that the tragedy in these events lies in the fact that the two major protagonists, Vietnam and China, initially preferred to avoid war. Armed conflict erupted mainly because Phnom Penh could not be persuaded to pursue peaceful solutions, and because the United States and the Soviet Union favored options promoting Sino-Vietnamese hostilities.

Vietnam War Reviewed

Allan E. Goodman

Access to new materials, opportunities to interview North Vietnamese officials, and the advantages (as well as disadvantages) of hindsight have brought some new perspective to the handful of scholars who continue to dominate the study of Vietnam, and have helped to correct some prevalent misimpressions about the war. Although some earlier reportorial works are more successful in conveying the analytical fog, media hype, and misconceptions that affected both the conduct of the war and the expectations about its outcome in Washington, Saigon, and Hanoi, some of the new scholarship will be useful to those seeking to understand today's limited wars and revolutionary struggles.

The Consequences of Chernobyl'

EDITORS' NOTE: The April 1986 explosion at the Chernobyl' Nuclear Power Station in Soviet Ukraine captured world headlines and engaged the concern of individuals, governments, and international organizations. Much was written about the accident in its immediate aftermath, and analysis of it and its consequences continues. The four articles that follow discuss implications of Chernobyl' for the Soviet economy in general, for the future of nuclear power in the USSR and Eastern Europe, for regional politics, and for Mikhail Gorbachëv's policy of *glasnost'*.

Chernobyl' and Soviet Energy

Judith Thornton

On April 26, 1986, unit No. 4 at the Chernobyl' Nuclear Power Plant in Soviet Ukraine exploded, raining radioactive particles on adjacent units, on nearby towns and farmlands, and—in lesser, but measurable amounts—on places as far afield as Poland and Sweden. The disaster also had short- and longer-term fallout for the economy of the Soviet Union, since the success of its 12th Five-Year Plan (for 1986–90) was predicated to a large measure on an extraordinary increase in nuclear power generation.

The USSR has needed to pursue its nuclear option because of a continuing inability of its economy to increase the efficiency of energy use. In 1981–85, total energy use per unit of national income remained unchanged, and the use of electricity actually increased.[1] The tightness of the energy sector in that period was evidenced by the practice of load shedding at peak hours, even in the summer months. To meet the unabating demands for power, and simultaneously to reduce domestic consumption of fossil fuels, particularly oil,[2] Soviet planners have targeted an increase of nuclear power from 28,358 megawatts (Mw) in 1985 to 69,300 Mw in 1990. Output of the nuclear sector has been slated to grow from 167 billion kilowatt hours (kwh) to 390 billion kwh in the same period. If achieved—an outcome that was most unlikely even before the Chernobyl' accident—this would increase the share of nuclear power in total electric power from 10.8 percent to 21.2 percent (see Table 1).

It is in this economic context that the Chernobyl' disaster unfolded. This article will describe the power plant and the April accident, explore the factors contributing to the tragedy, assess its economic consequences, and weigh the options facing Soviet energy planners.

Judith Thornton, Professor of Economics at the University of Washington (Seattle), has written widely on Soviet economics and energy. Some of the research on which this paper is based was completed while the author was a fellow at the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, The Wilson Center (Washington, DC).

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[1] In 1985, for example, energy use was still 3.55 tons of standard fuel per 1,000 rubles of national income (compared with 3.57 tons in 1980), and electricity consumption was 3 kwh per ruble of national income (compared with 2.92 kwh per ruble in 1980). See P. S. Neporozhnyy, Ed., *Tekhnicheskiy progress energetiki SSSR* (Technological Progress in USSR Power), Moscow, Energoatomizdat, 1986, p. 13.

[2] As revenues from oil sales came to provide three-quarters of Soviet hard-currency income in the early 1980's, domestic consumption of oil as a boiler fuel for power plants has come to seem less and less cost-effective. At the same time, the deteriorating quality of available coal supplies has begun to call into question the expansion of coal-fired thermal electric plants, at least in the European part of the USSR. Using the average heat rate (rate of fuel consumption) in a condensing power station for comparison, a nuclear plant the size of that at Chernobyl', which produced an average of 28 billion kwh of power a year, could save about 9.9 million tons of standard fuel a year.

Table 1: Structure of Soviet Electric Power Output, 1965-1990

Year	All, bil. kwh	Percent	Hydro-electric, bil. kwh	Percent	Nuclear, bil. kwh	Percent	Non-nuclear thermal, bil. kwh	Percent
1965	506.672	100	81.434	16.1	1.400	0.3	425.238	83.9
1970	740.926	100	124.377	16.8	3.696	0.5	612.853	82.7
1975	1,038.607	100	125.987	12.1	20.205	1.9	892.415	85.9
1980	1,293.878	100	183.889	14.2	72.900	5.6	1,037.100	80.2
1985	1,544.000	100	215.000	13.9	167.000	10.8	1,162.000	75.3
1990 (planned)	1,840.000	100	245.000	13.3	390.000	21.2	1,205.000	65.5

SOURCES: Summary output statistics are from *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR* (The National Economy of the USSR), Moscow, Finansy i Statistika. For various years, see *Elektroenergetika i energeticheskoye stroitel'stvo SSSR* (Electric Power and Power Construction of the USSR), Moscow, Informenergo, 1977, pp. 42–44, and 1980, pp. 42–44. Output by type of capacity is from *Elektroenergetika* . . . , 1977, pp. 45–49, and 1980, pp. 45–49; A. M. Nekrasov and M. G. Pervukhin, Eds., *Energetika SSSR v 1976–1980 godakh* (Power of the USSR in 1976–1980), Moscow, Energoizdat, 1977, pp. 11, 61; A. M. Nekrasov and A. A. Troitskiy, *Energetika SSSR v 1981-1985 godakh* (Power in the USSR in 1981-1985), Moscow, Energoizdat, 1981, pp. 11,13, 29, 129; and Robert W. Campbell, *Basic Data on Soviet Energy Branches*, Santa Monica, CA, Rand, December 1979. (Soviet data for 1965 and 1980 were internally inconsistent.)

The Chernobyl' Plant

Located on the Prypyat' River 150 kilometers north of Kiev in the eastern part of a region known as the Belorussian-Ukrainian Woodlands, the Chernobyl' plant is one of the largest in the Soviet Union. Originally planned for a capacity of 6,000 Mw, the plant had at the time of the accident four 1,000-Mw units installed and operating and an additional two units under construction. The four operational units, completed in 1977, 1978, 1981, and 1983, are housed in a single large structure adjacent to a machine room housing turbines and generators, and close to other equipment buildings on the site. The two reactors under construction are located 1.5 kilometers to the southeast, and further to the southeast is a 22-square-kilometer pond built to provide cooling water for the heat exchangers of the four reactors.

The town of Prypyat', three kilometers to the west, grew as the plant grew. Among its 49,000 inhabitants were more than 4,000 engineers and technicians operating the plant and manning its fuel cycle, and a share of the 2,250-odd construction workers installing reactor units 5 and 6.

The RBMK-1000 reactors installed at Chernobyl' are graphite-moderated, boiling-water-cooled units produced by the Izhora factory near Leningrad. The initials stand for "reactor, large capacity, channel type," because the nuclear fuel rods are in almost 1,700 individual channels encased in a stack of graphite blocks. Bundles of 18 zirconium-clad rods containing uranium oxide fuel are lowered into each channel from above. Cooling water is pumped from below into each tube between the fuel rods and the outer wall of the tube. Steam produced in the reactor is piped to steam separators and, from there, to two 500-Mw turbogenerator units. Control of the reactor is based on movement of 211 solid absorber rods in specially separated channels in the graphite. In addition, reactor units 3 and 4 (the latter, the one that exploded) are fitted with a large number of other monitoring and control systems intended to assure safety in operation and to shut the reactor down in emergencies.[3] There is a stout metal housing around the core and a reactor building with metal-reinforced concrete walls 700 millimeters (about 2 feet) thick. The core is covered by an inert nitrogen gas, and a pressure-suppression pool lies below the reactor.

The RBMK reactor has distinct advantages and disadvantages. Its modular design allows it to be mass-produced and assembled on site, and the absence of a pressure vessel means that it can be expanded simply by increasing the flow of coolant through the core or by adding more fuel elements and control rods. Fuel elements can be replaced without shutting down the reactor.[4] It uses slightly enriched uranium, can operate with wide variations in power levels, and is capable of producing approximately 2.6 kilograms of plutonium–239, 1.8 kilograms of plutonium–240, and 0.5 kilograms of plutonium–241 per ton of uranium.[5]

On the debit side, the design has a very complex water circulation system; the graphite core operates at

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[3] See USSR State Committee for Utilization of Atomic Energy, *The Accident at the Chernobyl' Nuclear Power Plant and Its Consequences*, Information Compiled for the IAEA Experts' Meeting, 25–29 August 1986, Vienna, Part 1, General Material, pp. 6–7. This source will be cited hereafter as *Information Report*.

[4] N. A. Dollezhal' and Yu. I. Koryakin, "Nuclear Power in the USSR," in D. G. Zhimerin et al., Eds., *Sovremennyye problemy energetiki* (Current Problems in the Power Industry), Moscow, Energoatomizdat, 1984, pp. 157–59.

[5] *Information Report*, p. 7.


1. Reactor
2. Working channel routes
3. Steam-to-water pipes
4. Drum separator
5. Steam headers
6. Downcomers
7. Main circulation pumps (MCP)
8. Group dispensing headers (GDH)
9. Water pipelines
10. Fuel element cladding control system
11. Upper biological shield
12. Lateral biological shield
13. Lower biological shield
14. Cooling pond
15. Unloading-loading machine (ULM)
16. Bridge crane
16
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14
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A sectional view of the RBMK-1000 reactor.

—*IAEA Bulletin* (Vienna), Vol. 25, No. 2, June 1983, p. 51.

a very high temperature; and, perhaps most important, there is a tendency for the fission reaction to increase, generating a power surge, should cooling water be lost or excessive boiling occur. (In most Western commercial reactors, loss of coolant has the opposite effect of reducing power output.)

Disaster Strikes

The following picture of the nuclear accident at Chernobyl' and its immediate aftermath is drawn from the official report of the USSR State Committee on the Utilization of Atomic Energy that was presented at a meeting of experts at the International Atomic Energy Agency on August 25–29, 1986,[6] and from press accounts. According to the report, all four units of the Chernobyl' nuclear plant were in operation on April 25, when unit No. 4 was to be shut down for routine maintenance. At this point, the plant management decided to conduct an experiment that involved disconnecting the generators from the grid to see how long mechanical inertia would allow them to power the unit's auxiliary equipment if a power failure and steam cut-off were to occur. Similar tests had, according to the report, been conducted in the past.

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[6] Ibid., pp. 15–25.

The test procedures were inherently risky because they called for a shut-down of the reactor's emergency core cooling system for the duration of the test. The events that followed made the situation still more dangerous. During the time the reactor's emergency cooling system was cut off, the plant personnel interrupted the test to respond to a request for delivery of power by the power supply authority, and the reactor was operated for almost 10 hours without its emergency cooling system.

The test was resumed at 1:00 a.m. on April 26, when the operators began, once again, to reduce power in the reactor. From this point on, the report notes, the reactor was operating unstably, and the operators were continually introducing new perturbations into the control system in unsuccessful attempts to stabilize it. Part of the problem was that one automatic control system was disengaged by mistake. Another problem was a buildup of xenon in the reactor. Xenon, a by-product of the decay of iodine–131, slows down the nuclear chain reaction, causing the power output to drop. To compensate for this, the operators withdrew many of the control rods,[7] impairing the ability to dampen promptly any power surge or to shut down the reactor immediately.

Under normal conditions, the Chernobyl' reactor had safety systems to guard against power bursts, but conditions were far from normal as the experiment continued. Two more pumps were connected to the reactor shortly after 1:00 a.m. to provide steam for the experiment. However, this resulted in too much cooling water flowing through the core. To prevent the reactor from shutting down automatically, as it is designed to do in such circumstances, the operators blocked signals from pressure and water-level sensors, disabling still another part of the emergency safety system. The decrease in steam generation caused by the excess cooling water prompted the operators to continue withdrawing the automatic control rods, until virtually all of them had been removed. This further reduced the operators' ability to respond to an emergency.

About a minute before the generator turn-off was to be tested, the operator reduced the flow of feedwater to the plant. Then, because some of the pumps were powered by the generator being shut down, the amount of cooling water to the reactor was reduced still more, triggering the fatal power surge. Within three seconds, the power level in the reactor shot up from 7 to more that 50 percent of capacity. The operator pressed an emergency button to drop the control rods into the reactor, but noted a number of physical jolts and saw that the absorber rods had stopped before reaching bottom.

By now, the situation was out of control. The formation of steam and overheating of the fuel led to a thermal explosion that breached the building. Then, there appears to have been a hydrogen explosion that propelled radioactive fragments high into the air and started more than 30 fires around the reactor site. One of these was on the roof of a turbine room adjoining the No. 3 reactor, which was still operating. The heat also started a fire in the graphite of the core of No. 4.

Judging from the initial response, no contingency plans existed to deal with a nuclear catastrophe. It was a fire, so they called the fire department, which took 90 minutes to get there! Thus, the brunt of the initial response to the reactor fire was borne by local and oblast conventional firefighting units administratively under the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). As one account put it:

> *We should note that the message alerting the Directorate of Internal Affairs duty unit indicated only that there was a fire at the nuclear power plant. Only a fire! Not until later was it known that damage had occurred to the reactor core . . . . But a nuclear power plant is a nuclear power plant, and within minutes—as prescribed by the emergency situation coordination plan in effect—crews from the Firefighting Directorate of the Kiev City Executive Committee Directorate of Internal Affairs were en route to Chernobyl'. Fire trucks from Ivankov and Polis'ke were already on their way . . . . Within a few hours an operations headquarters had been set up at the accident site, headed by Colonel V. M. Buvsunovskiy, Deputy Chief of the Kiev Oblast Executive Committee Directorate of Internal Affairs.*[8]

Apparently, higher officials were notified shortly after the accident. Major General Gennadiy Berdov, deputy internal affairs minister of the Ukrainian SSR, arrived at the Chernobyl' plant early on the morning of April 26.[9]

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[7] Colin Norman, "Chernobyl: Errors and Design Flaws," *Science* (Washington, DC), Sept. 5, 1986, pp. 1029–31.

[8] *Literaturna Ukraina* (Kiev), May 22, 1986.

[9] *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (Moscow), May 9, 1986.

A working group from the Atomic Energy Institute in Moscow, headed by Deputy Director Valeriy Legasov, arrived later in the day, and they were followed later by members of a Soviet government commission that had been constituted under the leadership of Nikolay Ryzhkov, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, to investigate the accident.[10] This commission was assigned to oversee damage control and evacuation activities. Headquartered in Chernobyl', it was originally headed by Boris Shcherbina, Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. On-site direction of the commission was subsequently rotated to several other of its members—I. S. Silayev, Y. P. Batalin, L. A. Voronin, V. K. Gusev, and G. G. Vedernikov—possibly out of concern for the health of the officials involved.

According to the Soviet official report, units 1 and 2 at the Chernobyl' plant were, surprisingly, kept in operation throughout the fire and the first day of the crisis. This occurred in spite of the fact that there was significant radioactive contamination of the equipment and buildings from radioactive materials coming through the ventilation system and through the damaged roof of the third unit (which had been shut down at 5:00 a.m. on the 26th).

On Sunday, April 27, military helicopters began to drop boron, dolomite, sand, clay, and lead on the damaged reactor to absorb air-borne radioactivity. At the same time, nitrogen was pumped from the compressor station under the reactor to lower the temperature of the fuel. Komsomol members were mobilized to assist, as a *Komsomol'skaya Pravda* account of May 11 reveals in laudatory tones:

> *A joyless dawn broke, and with it came very difficult problems. The party gorkom [city committee] had issued a request: Komsomol members must go and cover the reactor. Sand will be needed. Find volunteers. . . . It would take a lot of sand. Great mountains of sand. A boundless sea of sand. No one needed persuading. Well, hardly anyone. They called on Komsomol members at home and at work. As in wartime, many had grabbed their Komsomol cards and turned up at the raykom [district committee] of their own accord. Send us, they said, we are ready. Quickly targets were set. Twenty tons of sand were loaded into sacks, then another 40 tons. Impossible goals were set only to be overfulfilled immediately.*

As the world gradually came to find out, the accident had released large amounts of radioactive materials into the air. Much of the radioactivity fell on the plant site, on the nearby town of Prypyat', and on the surrounding countryside. However, the Chernobyl' fallout was also blown westward, and traces were soon detected in parts of Eastern and Western Europe. The Soviet report on the accident estimates that about 50 million curies of fission products (or some 30 to 40 times the radioactive emissions from the atomic bombs dropped over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945) were released into the atmosphere between April 26 and May 6. Researchers at the United States Department of Energy's Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory estimate that most of a core inventory of 80 million curies of iodine–131 and 6 million curies of cesium–137 were released by the Chernobyl' explosion (compared to a release of a mere 15 curies of iodine–131 released in the Three Mile Island accident in 1979 in the United States).[11]

Some of the firemen who were the first to fight the blaze at unit No. 4 of the Chernobyl' Nuclear Power Station undergo dietary and physical therapy at a branch of the Central Hospital of the USSR Ministry of the Interior in July 1986.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

The radiation reached potentially lethal levels in the area around the plant, with personnel at the site receiving approximately 400 rem almost immediately after the accident. The largest release of radioactivity occurred during the initial explosion. Then radioactive emissions gradually declined over the next five days. However, radioactive emissions rose again sharply on

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[10] From a May 14 address by M.S. Gorbachëv, quoted in *Pravda* (Moscow), May 15, 1986.

[11] Warren Donnelly, Carl Behrens, and Mark Martel, "The Chernobyl' Nuclear Accident: Causes, Initital Effects, and Congressional Response," *Issue Brief* (Washington, DC), Aug. 19, 1986, p. 3.

May 2 as decay heat in the remaining fuel drove the temperature up. Almost half of the release of emissions occurred between May 2 and May 5, before dropping again on May 6.

Two people were killed at the time of the explosion. By October, the death toll—which included many firefighters—was 31, and another 300 had been hospitalized. Most of the 49,000 people in Prypyat' were exposed to radioactive emission for about 36 hours before evacuation, which began at 2:00 p.m. on Sunday, April 27. Originally, people were moved out of the Ukrainian part of a 10-kilometer zone around the plant, children being taken directly to summer camps, and adults being evacuated to rural areas in Kiev Oblast, mainly to Polis'ke district. Evacuation of a wider, 30-kilometer-radius zone, including the town of Chernobyl' and parts of Belorussia, occurred after Nikolay Ryzhkov and Yegor Ligachëv arrived in Chernobyl' on May 3 with Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi, secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party. In all, some 135,000 persons were evacuated as a result of the disaster.

The later evacuation involved moving collective farmers, together with their livestock, by truck to other collective farms in Kiev Oblast. The evacuation put a tremendous burden on the surrounding area, with evacuees camped in public buildings and families doubled up in rural homes. In addition to providing for those evacuated, the region had to accommodate health, administrative, and military personnel who had been rushed in to contain the accident and rehabilitate the affected area.

Contributing Factors

The Soviet official report placed primary responsibility for the disaster on operator error and spoke of plans for "organizational steps to reinforce technological discipline and to improve the quality of operations." Indeed, reviewing the number of human errors contributing to the explosions (see Table 2), one could understand why one Western observer at the August IAEA meeting in Vienna likened the sequence of events to a "Marx Brothers comedy."[12] However, as we shall see, the human factor was not the only one contributing to the disaster.

Considering the rapid growth of the Soviet nuclear power sector, it would not be that surprising to find that the majority of operators and engineers were relatively inexperienced or that the Ministry of Energy and Electrification (Minenergo) was having difficulty meeting its needs for trained personnel. The ministry (subsequently split) had a large and growing force of skilled labor. Between 1980 and 1983, the number of energy specialists with higher and technical high school educations increased from 536,000 to 600,000. In 1980 alone, 44,691 technical personnel and 17,719 engineers and power specialists graduated from technical high schools and higher educational institutions in the energy field. Another 36,739 technical personnel graduated from technical high schools with training in electrical machine-building and related skills.[13]

Data on training specifically geared for work in nuclear power are less comprehensive. While it was reported that the number of engineers being prepared for construction of nuclear plants tripled in 1981, and increased another 80 percent in 1985, no base figure is provided. About half of the country's nuclear engineers study at the Obninsk affiliate of the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute, which since 1982 has offered a special training program for more than 100 trainees preparing to manage nuclear power plants. This program provides a two- to four-month internship at a nuclear power station. In addition, the nuclear power industry has active in-service training programs for its personnel.[14]

In the aftermath of Chernobyl', retraining of staff and recruitment of skilled and responsible personnel must be a matter of urgent concern. But this is only part of the solution. The RBMK reactor is poorly designed and difficult to operate, even for skilled personnel. As Lord Walter Marshall, Chairman of the British Central Electricity Generating Board, put it: "You can make any design safe by having clever enough operators, but the designers of Chernobyl' gave the operators too difficult a task."[15]

There is some indication that decision-makers in the nuclear power industry are aware of the difficulties facing Soviet nuclear plant managers. Sources discussing the training of nuclear plant personnel refer to a special program of psychological testing designed to identify individuals who are well suited to employment in the nuclear industry.[16] The fact that Soviet nuclear plants are less automated than Western plants involves workers more directly in plant operations and maintenance, which increases workers' risk of exposure to radiation and doubtless contributes to higher levels of stress.

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[12] "Moscow Now Sees Chernobyl's Peril Lasting For Years," *The New York Times*, Aug. 22, 1986.

[13] *Vestnik Statistiki* (Moscow), No. 7, 1981, pp. 69–79.

[14] Neporozhnyy, op. cit., pp. 214–15.

[15] Quoted in Stuart Diamond, "Design Flaws, Known to Moscow, Called Major Factor at Chernobyl," *The New York Times*, Aug. 26, 1986.

[16] Neporozhnyy, op. cit., p. 215.

Table 2: Operator Errors in the Chernobyl' Disaster

Violations of the Rules	Motivation	Consequences
1. Withdrew control rods available to shut down reactor.	To prevent the reactor from shutting down at low power.	Lost ability to shut down reactor quickly.
2. Disengaged power regulator.	To prevent shutdown while operating at below normal power.	Loss of reactor control.
3. Ran all circulating pumps above maximum flow rates.	To produce steam for test.	Loss of cooling capacity.
4. Blocked automatic reactor shutdown.	To repeat experiment.	Loss of automatic emergency shutdown.
5. Blocked system to protect against low water level.	To conduct test in spite of unstable condition of reactor.	Loss of automatic overheating shutdown.
6. Switched off emergency core cooling system.	To prevent spurious triggering of emergency system during test.	Inability to reduce effects of overheating.

SOURCE: USSR State Committee on the Utilization of Atomic Energy, *The Accident at the Chernobyl' Nuclear Power Plant and Its Consequences*, Information Compiled for the IAEA Experts' Meeting, 25–29 August, 1986, Vienna, Part 1, General Material, pp. 22-23.

The Soviet official report also hints at possible problems in quality control—e.g., the failure of the control and absorber rods to insert themselves fully into the core when the emergency button was pressed. Besides calling for improved training, the report's section entitled "Recommendations for Improving Nuclear Power Safety" noted that "the design and construction staff must verify more carefully the quality of plant components during manufacture, assembly, and adjustment during commissioning . . . ."[17]

However careful the design of a reactor may be, its safety in operation depends on how well the design is, in fact, implemented. An article on the construction of the Chernobyl' plant in *Energeticheskoye Stroitel'stvo* permits the inference that problems in the construction stage may have contributed to the nuclear accident.[18] The article refers to the rapid pace of construction of the "second set" of Chernobyl' reactors—that is, units 3 and 4—and the substantial savings in materials and labor costs that were achieved by substituting prefabricated for poured-in-place concrete panels and by using contract brigades for a substantial portion of the construction work.

The same article goes on to detail the rapid pace at which unit 4 was completed, in order to achieve start-up within the planned deadline. A later account of failures of supply, delivery of defective materials, and deductions for "spoilage" and "shoddy structures" associated with the ongoing construction of unit 5 at the Chernobyl' plant tends to reinforce suspicions regarding construction of the earlier units.[19]

Cost-conscious design decisions (aimed at justifying the use of particular nuclear power technologies) tend to lower safety engineering and also put enormous pressures on those assigned to carry out the construction of nuclear power plants in the Soviet Union. As one Soviet commentator observed in a recent article, designers are interested in low capital and material costs, but have no incentives to reduce labor costs of construction.[20]

When considering future investments, designers base cost comparisons on calculations of projected (*privedënnyye zatraty*) or full costs of power (measured as current costs plus a percentage charge on fixed capital). Since these calculations assign an interest charge to the estimate cost of the new power plant, design changes raising such costs reduce the attractiveness of the technology in question. This discourages the inclusion of design features that do anything more than assure minimum safety standards, particularly if the safety features do not at the same time render the equipment more cost-effective. Builders, on the other hand, would prefer that the design be high-budget, making it easier to meet design specifications without cost overruns and—incidentally—helping them to fulfill targets for gross value of construction completed.

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[17] *Information Report*, p. 42.

[18] V. M. Chernyshenko, "Basic Results of the Construction of the Chernobyl' Nuclear Power Plant," *Energeticheskoye Stroitel'stvo* (Moscow), November 1984, pp. 2–6.

[19] See *Literaturna Ukraina*, Mar. 27, 1986.

[20] G. A. Denisov, "Problems in the Nuclear Power Station Economic Investment Process," *Energeticheskoye Stroitel'stvo*, February 1986, pp. 13–19, trans. in Joint Publications Research Service, *USSR Report: Energy* (Washington, DC), June 5, 1986. One discussion suggested that nuclear plant construction costs are underestimated by 20–42 percent, compared to underestimates of only 13–29 percent for thermal power plants. See S. Ya. Chernavskiy, "The Promising Role of Nuclear Power in a Fossil Fuel Economy," *Atomnaya Energiya* (Moscow), November 1984, pp. 328–36.

Table 3: Comparison of Costs of Electric Power

(in millions of rubles)

	Estimate cost of investment	1976-80 cost of investment	+20 percent investment	At standard fuel cost of 45 r/kwh	At nuclear plant cost +40 percent
COSTS OF 2,000-Mw NUCLEAR PLANT					
Capital investment	360.0	1,037.4			
Working capital	60.0	60.0			
Total fixed and working capital (Kt)	420.0	1,097.4	1,316.9	1,316.9	1,536.4
Capital cost w/interest of 8 percent	484.4	1,265.3	1,518.4	1,518.4	1,771.4
Annual capital charge at 12 percent	58.1	151.8	182.2	182.2	212.6
Annual operating costs	62.6	62.6	62.6	62.6	62.6
Total annual costs	120.7	214.4	244.8	244.8	275.2
COSTS OF 1,950-Mw THERMAL PLANT					
Capital investment	266.6	448.6	448.6	448.6	448.6
Discounted capital cost at 8 percent	251.4	403.7	403.7	403.7	403.7
Annual capital charge at 12 percent	30.2	48.4	48.4	48.4	48.4
Annual fuel cost	92.6	92.6	92.6	208.4	208.4
Other costs	28.6	28.6	28.6	28.6	28.6
Total operating costs	121.2	121.2	121.2	237.0	237.0
Discounted operating costs	114.4	114.4	114.4	223.7	223.7
Annual full cost (cap. chg. plus disc. op. costs)	146.6	162.8	162.8	272.1	272.1
ANNUAL SAVINGS FROM NUCLEAR PLANT	25.9	-51.6	-82.0	27.3	-3.1

SOURCE: A.S. Gorshkov, *Tekhniko-ekonomicheskiye pokazateli teplovykh elektrostantsiy* (Technical-Economic Indicators of Thermal Power Stations), Moscow, Energoatomizdat, 1984, p. 225.

Table 3 offers some comparisons of the cost-effectiveness of nuclear and fossil-fired thermal electric plants made by Soviet engineers and by me. Column 1 in the table presents a cost comparison based on Soviet 1983 estimate costs of construction. These calculations use a discount rate of 8 percent to adjust for the longer construction time of nuclear plants, and then apply an annual interest charge of 12 percent on fixed and working capital. Annualized capital costs plus operating costs yield a full cost of l20.7 million rubles for 2,000 Mw of nuclear capacity compared with 146.6 million rubles for 1,950 Mw of fossil-fired thermal capacity—an apparent annual cost saving of 25.9 million rubles for nuclear power.

In Columns 2–5 of the same table, I have provided alternative cost estimates, which allow for differing assumptions about cost factors. Column 2 presents the cost comparison when capital costs are measured by the actual unit investment costs for 1976–80. In this case, the nuclear plant costs 51.6 million rubles more a year than the equivalent thermal electric plant. Calculations in column 3 are based on the assumption that improved safety systems increase the investment costs per unit by an additional 20 percent over 1976–80 actual unit costs. This assumption makes the annual costs of the nuclear plant 82 million rubles more than the thermal electric plant. Column 4 presents the cost comparison on the assumption that higher capital costs of nuclear plant are off-set by an increase in the price of nonnuclear fuel from 20 rubles/ton to 45 rubles/ton (equal to the marginal value of natural gas in Ukraine in 1979). This once again gives the nuclear plant the cost advantage. However, this advantage would disappear if the cost of the nuclear plant were to rise by 40 percent (see column 5). Clearly, these important long-run investment choices are very sensitive to small changes in underlying assumptions.

After the fact, we can see that low cost estimates put the construction administrations under some pressure. From the upward revision of the estimate costs of nuclear plants between the 1979 and 1985 editions of the Minenergo construction manual,[21] we can guess that the costs of building nuclear plants were rising substantially and that the industry was experiencing difficulty keeping within its construction budget. A close reading of an article by V. M. Chernyshenko reveals that, indeed, the actual costs of construction and assembly of units 3 and 4 at Chernobyl', finished in 1981 and 1983 respectively, were well above the estimate costs for these units published in the industry construction manual in 1985.[22] At 1979 cost estimates, construction cost 190 rubles per kw of capacity; at 1985 cost estimates, construction cost 325 rubles per kw of capacity. To the degree that these rising costs were not reflected in actual construction budgets, there was pressure on those actually doing the construction to cut corners.

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[21] Cf. P. S. Neporozhnyy, *Stroitel'stvo teplovykh i atomnykh elektrostantsiy* (Construction of Thermal and Nuclear Power Stations), 2 vols., Moscow, Stroizdat, 1979, and ibid., 1985.

The Soviet approach to nuclear safety relies on design that can be periodically monitored with ease, but this does not guarantee that the monitoring will be performed. A new State Committee for Safety of Nuclear Power (Gosatomenergonadzor) was established in 1983, with provisions for the stationing of a representative at each Soviet nuclear plant. The organization has the authority to inspect plant construction and determine if the plant meets safety standards, but there are strong pressures on safety inspectors to approve completed projects regardless of whether they meet or fail to meet standards. For example, a recent article in *Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya* describes the unsuccessful attempt of A. Romanishina, technical inspector at the Rostov nuclear power plant's construction administration, to refuse defective work.[23] In this account, the administration's chief engineer signed the acceptance documents in place of the technical inspector.

Such relative disregard for safety seems to persist even after the accident at Chernobyl'. To be sure, following the disaster, immediate design changes were proposed to control power levels in RBMK reactors more closely even though some reduction in power output would ensue. These include increasing the number of absorber rods and changing control of them, as well as further monitoring of cooling systems and power levels. However, indications are that most existing RBMK reactors did not receive the proposed design changes before being pressed into full service to meet peak winter demand. Many of these reactors, like Chernobyl' units 1 and 2 (which were placed back in operation in October and November), were built earlier than the damaged unit No. 4 and hence even lack some of the safety features of that unit.

Costs of the Accident

The Chernobyl' disaster was costly.[24] According to *Pravda* of September 1, 1986, the direct costs of the accident were approximately 2 billion rubles, of which 400 million represented Chernobyl' unit No. 4 itself. This estimate included losses of enterprises, farms, and dwellings in the affected area; of crops and land; and of electric power and other output.[25]

These estimates by Finance Minister Boris Gostev do appear to cover such costs as the immediate evacuation as well as relocation and reemployment of 135,000 persons from 61 villages and towns; the cost of rehabilitating the Chernobyl' plant—entombing the damaged reactor, decontaminating the remaining reactors and plant environment, and relocating operating personnel; and the cost of measures to reduce danger to health and damage to agricultural and water resources.

Also included are direct costs of compensating evacuees, in terms of providing both housing and short-term subsidies. As of late October, the government had reportedly completed construction of some 8,000 dwellings (including "7,000 good brick houses") and was reported to be working on an additional 6,000 to house evacuees.[26] Moreover, evacuated families received compensation—4,000 rubles for individuals, 7,000 for a family of two, and 1,500 for each additional family member. Families were also to receive monthly payments of 30 rubles to compensate for the loss of private-plot food supplies, and some were to receive interest-free, 15-year loans.

The region around Chernobyl' will bear further economic costs over the long run from damage to the health of persons exposed to the initial release of radiation, involved in the clean-up efforts, or exposed to radioactivity through food and water supplies. Assuming that a worker in the region has a current annual income of 2,400 rubles and a work-life expectancy of approximately 30 years, the loss either immediately or in the near future of the 300 workers reported hospitalized as of October would add up to some 21.6 million rubles.

The permanent and temporary loss of power generation caused by the damage to various Chernobyl' units and the short-term shutdowns of other RBMK units during the summer was disruptive but manageable in the short term, as fossil-fuel plants were operated more intensively. Total output of electricity for the first 11 months of 1986 was 1,443 billion kwh, or some

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[22] Chernyshenko, loc. cit.; and Neporozhnyy, *Stroitel'stvo* . . . , 1985.

[23] *Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya* (Moscow), Apr. 8, 1986.

[24] For a detailed discussion, see my article "Soviet Electric Power after Chernobyl': Economic Consequences and Options," *Soviet Economy* (Washington, DC), Vol. 2, No. 2, Spring 1986.

[25] The *Pravda* account reported donations of 488.7 million rubles from Soviet citizens and another 1.36 million from abroad to a special account to help Chernobyl' victims.

[26] *Pravda Ukrainy* (Kiev), Oct. 31, 1986; and *Pravda*, Sept. 1, 1986.

4 percent more than in the comparable period of 1985. Thermal power stations alone generated 22 billion kwh of electricity above plan. Although shortages are likely to be felt more seriously in the winter, if October output levels are sustained through the end of 1986, the totals will still be ahead of 1985 by 2.5 percent, no small achievement considering that reserves of water for production of hydroelectric power were well below average this year.[27]

Although fossil-fuel production seems to be running ahead of plan in Ukraine, expansion of energy output from this sector is constrained by lack of generating capacity. Therefore, primary reliance for meeting the deficit caused by the shutdowns of the Chernobyl' reactors is likely to be placed on nuclear capacity at the Khmel'nytskyi, Rivne, South Ukraine, and Zaporizhya plants (see Table 4). Unfortunately, emergency work at Chernobyl' drew construction personnel from the Khmel'nytskyi project, delaying that project's completion. Start-up of new 1,000-Mw units at Kalinin, Rivne, and Zaporizhya in December and the momentarily expected start-up of a new unit at Balakovo more than make up for the loss of capacity at Chernobyl',[28] but clearly leave the USSR far short of the increase of 7,500 Mw in nuclear capacity targeted for 1986.

As winter approached, a number of measures were announced in Ukraine aimed at more efficient use of available capacity and conservation of power at peak times. Maintenance and repairs of power generating equipment are to be done at night and other off-peak periods. Factories are to stagger work shifts and to expand production to weekends and second shifts.[29] Newspaper reports tell of brown-outs (turning-off of lights) in cities, and there are frequent references to load shedding (cutting off users) at peak periods as well as to reductions in the frequency and voltage of power. The latter phenomena, not unprecedented, can cause serious problems: reduced frequency can slow machinery and damage computers, and reduced voltage can cause machines to burn out.

Reevaluating the Power Mix

According to official pronouncements, nuclear power is here to stay in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Power sector spokesmen Valeriy Legasov and A. M. Petros'yants have reiterated the Soviet Union's commitment to nuclear power, and a new Ministry of Nuclear Power was split off from Minenergo to supervise the sector.[30] In November, the 42nd meeting of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance in Bucharest reaffirmed Eastern Europe's ambitious goals for nuclear power (see the article by John Kramer). Yet, Soviet planners will unquestionably have to reevaluate plans and reconsider the technological structure of future power capacity even if the projected dependence on nuclear energy is not scaled down. Such changes will not come quickly in an industry that takes an average of eight years to design and five years to construct a nuclear reactor, but, at minimum, the Soviets are likely to phase out further construction of the current model of graphite-moderated reactor and reconsider current ambitious plans to site nuclear cogenerating and heating plants near large cities.

The USSR uses three different types of reactors in commercial power production—graphite-moderated (mostly the RBMK-1000) reactors, pressurized-water (VVER) reactors, and liquid-metal fast-breeder (BN) reactors. At the time of the Chernobyl' accident, there were 17 graphite-moderated units with capacities over 100 Mw, accounting for 56 percent of capacity; 19 VVER units, accounting for 42 percent; and one large breeder reactor, accounting for 2 percent of capacity. Because they are run at a higher percentage of capacity, the share of graphite-moderated units in power output was still higher.

Doubts about the RBMK technology have not yet brought to the surface similar doubts about the design of the VVER-1000. Production of this unit, which has been in widespread use for almost two decades, will doubtless continue even if the RBMK model were to be phased out. On the other hand, it will be hard to shift investment away from the RBMK units and into VVER units because the two technologies are engineered separately and hence have required different production facilities and components.

In the VVER-1000, light water serves as both moderator and coolant. The fuel and control rods are housed in a large cylindrical steel pressure vessel 4.5 meters in diameter and 22.6 meters high (roughly 15 x 73 feet). Two systems—borated water to absorb neu-

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[27] *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta* (Moscow), No. 47, November 1986, p. 7.

[28] *The New York Times*, Dec. 21, 1986; *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Dec. 21, 1986.

[29] Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-SOV*), June 26, 1986, p. S/7.

[30] The *Information Report* states: "In accordance with the 'Main Lines of Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1986–1990 and Up Until the Year 2000,' it is expected that nuclear power will be developed extremely rapidly in the European part of the country and in the Urals" (p. 45). See also, Petrosyants's statement broadcast by Moscow TASS International Service in Russian, 0625 GMT, June 24, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, June 25, 1986, p. S/6. Creation of the new ministry was announced in *Izvestiya* (Moscow), July 16, 1986.

Table 4: Soviet Nuclear Capacity, January 1, 1987

Plant / unit	Type	Location	Capacity, megawatts	Year on-line	Capacity, Jan. 1, '86	Planned by Jan. 1, '87	Total by Jan. 1, '87	Planned for 1987-90
Reactors in Operation								
Leningrad		Sosnovyy Bor,			4,000		4,000	
Number 1	RBMK-1000	45 miles west of	1,000	1973				
Number 2	RBMK-1000	Leningrad,	1,000	1975				
Number 3	RBMK-1000	NW RSFSR	1,000	1979				
Number 4	RBMK-1000		1,000	1981				
Chernobyl'		Prypyat', 60 miles			4,000		2,000	
Number 1	RBMK-1000	north of Kiev, Ukraine	1,000	1977				
Number 2	RBMK-1000		1,000	1978				
Number 3	RBMK-1000		1,000	1981				
Number 4	RBMK-1000		1,000	1983				
Number 5	RBMK-1000					1,000		
Number 6	RBMK-1000							1,000
Kursk		Kurchatov, in Central			4,000		4,000	
Number 1	RBMK-1000	Black Earth Zone,	1,000	1976				
Number 2	RBMK-1000	RSFSR	1,000	1979				
Number 3	RBMK-1000		1,000	1983				
Number 4	RBMK-1000		1,000	1985				
Number 5	??							1,000
Smolensk		Desnogorsk, 70 miles			2,000		2,000	
Number 1	RBMK-1000	SE of Smolensk,	1,000	1982				
Number 2	RBMK-1000	Central RSFSR	1,000	1985				
Number 3	??							1,000
Number 4	??							1,000
Ignalina		Sniečkus, Lithuania			1,500		1,500	
Number 1	RBMK-1500		1,500	1983[1]				
Number 2	RBMK-1500					1,500		
Beloyarskiy		Zarechnyy, 30 miles			900		900	
Number 1	AMB-100	east of Sverdlovsk,	100	1964				
Number2	AMB-200	Urals	200	1967				
Number 3	BN-600		600	1980				
Number 4	BN-800							800
Bilibino ATETs		Bilibino, Chukchi ASSR,			48		48	
Number 1	VK-12	Siberia	12	1973				
Number 2	VK-12		12	1974				
Number 3	VK-12		12	1975				
Number 4	VK-12		12	1976				
Armenia		Metsamor, 25 miles			800		800	
Number 1	VVER-440	west of Yerevan	407	1976				
Number 2	VVER-440		408	1979				
Balakovo		Balakovo			1,000		1,000	
Number 1	VVER-1000		1,000	1985				
Number 2	VVER-1000					1,000		
Number 3	VVER-1000							1,000
Kalinin		Udomlya,			1,000		2,000	
Number 1	VVER-1000	Kalinin Oblast	1,000	1984				
Number 2	VVER-1000	Central RSFSR				1,000[2]		
Number 3	VVER-1000							1,000
Number 4	VVER-1000							1,000

(Table continued on p.12)

[1] Start-up of the first Ignalina RBMK-1500 is dated 1963, although only one 750 MW turbogenerator was installed at that time.
[2] Start-up reported in *The New York Times*, Dec. 21, 1986.

Table 4: Soviet Nuclear Capacity, January 1, 1987 (continued)

Plant/unit	Type	Location	Capacity, megawatts	Year on-line	Capacity, Jan. 1, '86	Planned by Jan. 1, '87	Total by Jan. 1, '87	Planned for 1987-90
			Reactors in Operation					
Kola		Polyarnyye Zori, Kola Peninsula, NW RSFSR			1,760		1,760	
Number 1	VVER-440		440	1973				
Number 2	VVER-440		440	1974				
Number 3	VVER-440		440	1981				
Number 4	VVER-440		440	1984				
Novovoronezhkiy		Novovoronezhskiy, 30 miles south of Voronezh, Central Black Earth Zone, RSFSR			2,455		2,455	
Number 1	VVER-210		210	1964				
Number 2	VVER-365		365	1970				
Number 3	VVER-440		440	1971				
Number 4	VVER-440		440	1972				
Number 5	VVER-1000		1,000	1980				
Rivne		Kuznetsovsk, in western Ukraine			880		1,880	
Number 1	VVER-440		440	1980				
Number 2	VVER-440		440	1981				
Number 3	VVER-1000					1,000[3]		
South Ukraine		Konstantinovka, Nikolayev Oblast, Ukraine			2,000		2,000	
Number 1	VVER-1000		1,000	1982				
Number 2	VVER-1000		1,000	1984				
Number 3	VVER-1000							1,000
Number 4	??							??
Zaporizhya		Energodar, Kakhivka Reservoir, Ukraine			2,000		3,000	
Number 1	VVER-1000		1,000	1984				
Number 2	VVER-1000		1,000	1985				
Number 3	VVER-1000					1,000[2]		
Number 4	??							1,000
Number 5	??							1,000
Number 6	??							1,000
Khmel'nytskyi		Neteshin, Ukraine						
Number 1	VVER-1000					1,000		
TOTAL					28,343	7,500	29,343	—

[3] Start-up reported in *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Dec. 21, 1986.

trons, and control rods—are used to control reactivity in the 151 fuel elements. There is a two-loop water circulation system in which pipes carrying the water outflow from the reactor pass through cooler water from the second loop in the multiple channels of a heat exchanger to produce steam for the generator. Water in the second loop serves both to transfer power to the turbines and to cool the reactor vessel, so its supply is crucial to the safety of the system.

Like the RBMK, the VVER reactor has roughly 10 times as many valves (approximately 30,000) as its fossil-fuel equivalent—a design feature that complicates emergency procedures and heightens the risk of loss of coolant. A recent Western model, the advanced pressurized-water reactor designed jointly by Westinghouse and Mitsubishi, places the core well below the cold-leg pipe and loop seal so that a rupture of a pipe will not uncover the core, but in the current Soviet design, loss of coolant can leave the core uncovered. The main disadvantage of the Soviet VVER is the need to manufacture and test the pressure vessel and its components on-site.

Although the future of the pressurized-water reactor seems secure at the moment, plans for rapid expansion of nuclear heat supply must be undergoing serious reevaluation in light of the Chernobyl' events. The 1986–90 plan for nuclear power calls for completion of large heat supply plants (each with two 500-Mw reac-

Table 4: Soviet Nuclear Capacity, January 1, 1987 (concluded)

Plant / unit	Type	Location	Capacity, in Mw	Plant/unit	Type	Location	Capacity, in Mw
Additional Reactors Planned, 1987-90							
Bashkir		Agidel'		Odessa ATETs		Teplodar	
Number 1	VVER-1000		1,000	Number 1	VVER-1000		1,000
Gorkiy AST				Number 2	??		1,000
Number 1	VVER-500		500	Rostov		Volgodonsk	
Number 2	??		500	Number 1	VVER-1000		1,000
Krymsk		Shchelkino		South Urals			
Number 1	VVER-1000		1,000	Number 1	??		1,000
Kharkiv ATETs				Tatar		Kamskiye Pol'ya	
Number 1	VVER-1000		1,000	Number 1	??		1,000
Number 2	??		??	Voronezh AST			
Kostroma				Number 1	VVER-500		500
Number 1	RBMK-1500		1,500	Number 2	??		500
Minsk ATETs		Dukora					
Number 1	VVER-1000		1,000				
Number 2	??		1,000				

SOURCES: Reactor start-up dates are from *Elektroenergetika i energeticheskoye stroitel'stvo SSSR* (Power Engineering and Energy Construction in the USSR), Moscow, Informenergo, 1977, p. 105; ibid, 1980, pp 105–06; P.S. Neporozhnyy, *Stroitel'stvo teplovykh i atomnykh elektrostantsii* (Construction of Thermal and Atomic Electric Power Stations), Moscow, Stroyizdat, 1979, p. 894; ibid., 1985, p. 576; Philip Pryde, "Nuclear Power," in Leslie Dienes and Theodore Shabad, *The Soviet Energy System*, Washington, DC, V.H. Winston and Sons, 1979, p. 156; Theodore Shabad, "News Notes," in various issues of *Soviet Geography* (Washigton, DC) for 1978-86; US Central Intelligence Agency, *USSR Energy Atlas*, Washington, DC, 1985, p. 67; and the author's individual plant files drawn largely from Soviet publications *Atomnaya energiya*, *Elektricheskiye stantsii*, *Energeticheskoye stroitel'stvo*, and *Teploenergetika*. Plant locations are based on Pryde, Shabad, and the author's individual plant files. This table excludes reactors at these plants: Siberian, Shevchenko, Dimitrovgrad (Melekess), and Obninsk.

tors), at Gorkiy and Voronezh, as well as nuclear cogenerating plants at Odessa and Minsk, which would use two VVER-1000 units each to produce both power and heat. As stipulated in official plans, the Odessa plant is situated 25 kilometers from the city; the Gorkiy plant is located 2 kilometers from the city limits, or 10 kilometers from the center of population.[31]

Ministry officials have assured the public that the design of these units includes a whole series of special features and components to assure reliability and to prevent transfer of radioactivity through the thermal delivery system. Among the safety features they mention are: low pressure in the primary circuit and moderate power density in the core to enhance core cooling; natural (as opposed to pumped) circulation of primary-circuit coolant; location of all primary equipment in a single containment structure; two-vessel design that places the pressure vessel inside a containment vessel; and use of a three-loop heat delivery system.

Despite such assurances, the ambitious programs to heat whole urban districts by siting nuclear plants near population centers in both the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe must certainly be open to serious question after Chernobyl'. Nonetheless, it will be difficult and disruptive to reverse plans that are already well along. The Gorkiy nuclear heating plant has received its first reactor vessel, and assembly of the first VVER reactor has begun. Most of the investment already in place would have to be written off if the planners were to decide to shift to conventional cogenerating plants or to fossil-fuel heating plants for these sites.

Along with the continued production of conventional slow-neutron reactors, the Soviet Union plans to put additional resources into commercial-sized prototypes of the liquid-metal fast-breeder reactor. A commercial-scale prototype breeder reactor, the BN-600 is in use at Beloyarskiy, where a still larger BN-800 is being constructed. The 1986–90 FYP calls for development of a new generation breeder, the BN-1600, with a reactor volume and thermal capacity twice that of the BN-800.[32] These reactors use a pool arrangement that

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[31] A. Pasenkov et al., "Nuclear Heat Supply Systems in CMEA Countries," *IAEA Bulletin* (Vienna), Vol. 26, April 1984.

[32] E. I. Chukardin, "Technological Progress in Nuclear Power of the USSR in the 12th FYP," *Teploenergetika* (Moscow), January 1986, pp. 9–12.



Generator tubing at the case-equipment shop of the Atommash nuclear power engineering plant in Volgodonsk in July 1985.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

places the core, pumps, intermediate heat exchangers, and biological shielding inside the reactor vessel.[33] In the reactor, the fuel—a mixture of plutonium and uranium–238—is contained in stainless-steel rods. The outer rods and the top and bottom of the inner rods consist mostly of depleted uranium, which is transmuted to plutonium by neutron capture. There are three separate coolant loops. Sodium is circulated around the fuel rods in the primary loop and in the secondary loop, where it interfaces with a steam generator containing circulating water and steam. The steam produced drives steam turbine generators.

The liquid-metal fast breeders involve complex technologies requiring high-grade steels, sodium-to-water steam generators, highly processed nuclear fuels, and large turbines. They do not use a moderator to slow down neutrons, but utilize neutrons at high energy levels to induce fission. Safe design requires that the fuel in the core, the liquid-metal coolant, and the feed water do not come into direct contact. The design complexities, high temperatures, and high energy levels of the breeder technology present more risks than conventional slow-neutron reactors, but their ability to transmute uranium–238 into fissionable plutonium makes them a potentially inexhaustible energy source.

It may be this latter consideration that has led Soviet engineers to bring the liquid-metal breeder to the brink of commercial use at a point when the underlying engineering and materials base is not well developed, for the Soviets appear to have a strong desire for self-sufficiency in fuel supply. (This may be less critical now that slowing growth of nuclear power in the West has depressed the price of uranium on the world market and eased concerns, at least in the West, that the demand for fuel in light-water reactors might outstrip the availability of uranium reserves.) Given the difficulties that the Soviet nuclear industry has had in implementing safe conventional reactors, their decision to forge ahead with the breeder reactor seems risky to say the least.

A more cautious approach would involve turning to the Western market to make up the difference between desired increments to power capacity and available domestic supply. A rational shopping list for the industry would include gas turbines for peak loads, efficient West German boilers to burn Ekibastuz coal at low temperatures, and, if the Soviets are set on pursuing the nuclear option, any of 23 small reactors (400–600 megawatts) that are available from 17 different Western companies.[34] Soviet engineers are expressing interest in a new generation of small nuclear plants that are designed to provide automatic passive cooling of the reactor core without need to rely on back-up systems. Examples of such "inherently safe" reactor designs are the West German high-temperature gas-cooled reactor, the Swedish PIUS (process inherent ultimately safe), and a small (140-Mw) liquid-metal breeder reactor designed by General Electric. Each of these Western designs has something to offer the Soviet industry, but it will take a substantial shift of an industry afflicted with gigantomania to take advantage of these new technologies conceived for small size, passive safety, and modular fabrication.

There are competing plans for investment in nonnuclear power facilities that might be given higher priority now for a number of reasons, including probable lags in commissioning nuclear plants, changed perception of risk, the fall in the world price of oil, and increases in

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[33] The discussion that follows is drawn from Paul Josephson, "The LMFBP and the Breeder Reactor Program of the Soviet Union," Cambridge, MA, working paper, June 27, 1980; and Dollezhal' and Koryakin, op. cit.

[34] *The Economist* (London), Mar. 29, 1986, p. 73.

A technician checks radiation levels at the rod heads of reactor unit No. 1 at the Chernobyl' station in September 1986.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

the capital costs of nuclear plants once they are redesigned to incorporate safety features. Unfortunately for Soviet planners, with the exception of some urban cogenerating capacity such as the Volgograd TETs-3 and some pumped-storage hydro capacity, the largest of which is the 1,200-Mw Zagorsk project, there are relatively few conventional thermal units under construction in the European USSR that can be brought on-line quickly. Plans call for the acquisition of small (150-Mw) gas turbine units to meet peaking needs in the South and Central regions—a development that could be supplemented by importing gas turbine units—and for experimental work on design of compressed-air energy-storage gas turbines, an effort that will not ease bottlenecks in the current five-year plan.

Major Soviet efforts to construct new thermal power capacity have centered on mine-mouth power plants in the Ekibastuz Basin in northern Kazakhstan and in the Kansk-Achinsk lignite basin in Eastern Siberia.[35] The first plant at Ekibastuz reached design capacity of 4,000 Mw in 1984, and a second large plant is under construction. A 1,150-kilovolt AC line capable of transmitting 3,400 Mw of the plant's power has been completed to deliver power as far away as the Urals.[36] A 2,414-kilometer, 1,500-kilovolt DC line capable of transmitting 6,000 Mw of power to central European Russia was eliminated from draft versions of the 12th Five-Year Plan but might be reconsidered in the wake of the Chernobyl' accident.

The future of these mine-site complexes hinges as much on refinements in Soviet technology for burning low-calorific, high-ash coal as on advances in long-distance transmission technology. So far, the Soviets have had difficulty designing boilers to burn such coal at a sufficiently low temperature to avoid slagging and fouling of the boiler. One solution would be to purchase high-grade equipment from the West—notably from West Germany. Until some of the technical problems are solved, however, these large new thermal power complexes are unlikely to produce at the levels projected in the current plans.

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[35] Jan Vanous, *PlanEcon Report* (Washington, DC), July 24, 1986. The Ekibastuz coal production association supplied the country with 85.7 million tons of coal in 1986, according the *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta*, No. 52, December 1986, p. 3.

[36] Pasenkov, loc. cit., p. 24.

Conclusion

If the late Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev benefited from some unanticipated windfalls during his tenure in power (e.g., the post-1973 surge in oil prices), Gorbachëv has had to weather significant unanticipated costs—notably the recent fall in the price of oil and the Chernobyl' accident. Even before the Chernobyl' disaster cast its cloud over the extravagant Soviet plans for nuclear power, Western economists argued that the economic targets of the 12th Five-Year Plan were overly optimistic. In the power sector, capacity was to be increased by 69,000 Mw, the same amount as targeted for 1981-85. Actual additions in that earlier period amounted to only 49,000 Mw, and there is good reason to expect even smaller increases in 1986-90. In 1981-85, the nuclear sector expanded capacity by 15,820 Mw. However, only eight of 10 RBMK reactors and six of nine VVER-1000 reactors planned for start-up in that period actually came on line. The need to divert resources to repair the damage in Ukraine and the delays that are likely to result from a reevaluation of energy plans suggest strongly that electric power capacity will be the most serious bottleneck in the current five-year plan—although the Soviet Union seems to have managed the bottleneck well during 1986.

Unless the Soviet Union is willing to spend a portion of its increasingly scarce foreign exchange on equipment for the power industry, electricity supply will constrain even modest rates of industrial growth. Beyond its not insignificant immediate impact on the Soviet economy, the Chernobyl' disaster and the policy choices following from it have thus brought disruption to a particularly vulnerable sector of Soviet medium-term plans, creating a bottleneck in electric power that is likely to impair Gorbachëv's drive to accelerate growth and productivity.

This circumstance only increases the pressures on Soviet planners and officials to assign higher priority to production than to safety in the nuclear power sector, as evidenced by the rapid restarting of units 1 and 2 at Chernobyl' and the all-out operation of other RBMK units without incorporation of most of the post-Chernobyl' recommendations for improvements in safety systems. The handling of these difficult trade-offs by Soviet decision-makers since Chernobyl' is hardly reassuring.

Chernobyl' and Ukraine

David R. Marples

Over eight months have passed since the explosion at the fourth reactor unit of the Chernobyl' nuclear power plant in Ukraine. During this period, our knowledge of the events of April 26, 1986, and the aftermath of the accident has increased considerably. Concerning the technical aspects of the disaster, the USSR State Committee for Utilization of Atomic Energy presented a detailed 300-page report to a Vienna meeting of the 112-member International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This report was well received by Western scientists, many of whom have commented publicly on what appeared to them a remarkable display of *glasnost'* (openness) by the Soviet authorities, which they felt helped to atone for the Soviets' original failure to report the accident until prompted by Swedish protests.

However, the extensive Soviet report to the IAEA seems more a sign that the Chernobyl' explosion had acquired truly international significance than it is a manifestation of any new openness on the part of the Soviet leadership under General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachëv. Moreover, the Chernobyl' accident has had little effect on the workings of the political and economic system of the Soviet Union. Blame for the accident was placed on a few, relatively low-level, functionaries while Soviet nuclear energy policies remained on the whole untouched.

The Soviet party leadership also went largely unscathed. In fact, Gorbachëv has carefully incorporated the Chernobyl' accident into a campaign whose declared goal is the removal of all nuclear weapons from the face of the earth by the year 2000. In his first public statement about Chernobyl' on Soviet television on May 14, the Soviet leader emphasized that the accident had demonstrated the futility of a nuclear weapons buildup because it illustrated what would happen if even one small nuclear warhead were detonated. Soviet propagandists have pursued this line vigorously, but always with the proviso that nuclear weapons and the civilian usage of nuclear power are not the same thing. Indeed they are not. I would also make the sequential deduction that the Chernobyl' accident concerns the operation of Soviet nuclear power plants rather than international arms control.

Gorbachëv has also used the IAEA in this political strategy. Before Chernobyl' occurred, the IAEA's main role, in practice if not in theory, was to ensure that civilian nuclear power plants were not being used to produce plutonium, tritium, and other elements for nuclear weapons programs. Soviet cooperation with the IAEA has given the impression that the Soviets are interested in broadening the IAEA's role.[1] In August 1985, for example, the USSR for the first time permitted an IAEA inspection of its nuclear facilities. But the sites in question, an experimental station near Moscow and the Novovoronezh "model" nuclear plant, which has containment domes over its reactors, made for a relatively innocuous inspection.

The political future of Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi, the 68-year-old Ukrainian party leader, has so far not been affected. There has been speculation that he was on the way out since March 1985, when Gorbachëv took over the Soviet leadership.[2] Chernobyl' appeared to be an ideal excuse to get rid of him. Such speculation was fueled by Shcherbytskyi's marked absence from the Chernobyl' region in the days immediately after the accident. On May 2, he accompanied Politburo members Yegor Ligachëv and Nikolay Ryzhkov

David R. Marples is a Research Associate at the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta. A specialist on Soviet Ukraine, he is author of Chernobyl' & Nuclear Power in the USSR *(1986).*

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[1] For example, on July 7, 1986, TASS reported that the USSR had asked the IAEA to supervise the construction of a "safe reactor."

[2] See, e.g., *The New York Times*, May 8, 1986.

The Chernobyl' Setting


Oslo
NORWAY
FINLAND
700 Miles
Helsinki
Stockholm
600
Leningrad
Vologda
SWEDEN
Tallinn
500 Miles
DENMARK
Copenhagen
Baltic Sea
Riga
400
SOVIET UNION
300
Moscow
Kaliningrad
Vilnius
200
Minsk
Berlin
EAST GERMANY
100
Gomel
Warsaw
POLAND
Pripyat
Chernobyl
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Lvov
Kharkov
Enlarged Area
AUST.
Donetsk
100 Miles
Gomel
Kishinev
Odessa
Mozyr
Pripyat River
Dnieper River
ROMANIA
Pripyat
Chernobyl
Black Sea
BULGARIA
Kiev
Zhitomir
Vinnitsa
Flows to the Black Sea
Market gardening, vegetables, fruit, dairy cattle
Sugar beets, grain, livestock for dairy and meat
Livestock for dairy and meat, potatoes, vegetables

—Adapted from map by David Cook in *The Washington Post*, Apr. 30, 1986.

to the area, but only in a passive role. He then disappeared from public view. (In contrast, his Belorussian counterpart, Nikolay Slyunkov, was highly visible during the evacuation of citizens from the Gomel' oblast's southern regions, several kilometers north of the Chernobyl' nuclear power plant.)

In July, however, Shcherbytskyi showed up at Chernobyl' and has since visited the area several times, most recently on August 29, with Ukrainian Premier Oleksander Lyashko; and he attended a meeting of the Prypyat' city party committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine. While the active role in the cleanup of the Chernobyl' district of Kiev oblast has been left to the government commission created for this purpose (headed by a succession of deputy premiers of the USSR government, namely, Boris Shcherbina, Vladimir Gusev, Gennadiy Vedernikov), Shcherbytskyi has remained in firm control of the Ukrainian party apparatus. The same can be said of Oleksander Revenko, who took over the leadership of Kiev oblast as first secretary only in November 1985. He has not been publicly reprimanded or even warned as a result of the disaster.

So who has taken the blame? In the first place, two all-Union ministries have been purged of personnel: Power and Electrification, and Medium Machine Building (the ministry in charge of nuclear weapons production). In addition, the State Committee for Safety in the Atomic Power Industry, established in 1983 after a crisis at a reactor-manufacturing plant in Rostov oblast of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, has also been heavily criticized.

On July 19, a meeting of the CPSU Politburo in Moscow declared:

> *The Ministry of Power and Electrification of the USSR and the State Committee for Safety in the Atomic Power Industry were guilty of lack of control over the situation at the Chernobyl' AES [Nuclear Power Station] and did not take the necessary measures to secure compliance with safety regulations and to prevent breaches of discipline and operating regulations at the station. Irresponsibility, negligence, and indiscipline led to grave consequences.*[3]

The chairman of the Atomic Power Safety Committee, Yevgeniy Kulov, a first deputy minister of Power and Electrification, Gennadiy Shasharin, and the first deputy minister of Medium Machine Building, Aleksandr Meshkov, were all relieved of their duties. The announcement was followed by an odd statement that Anatoliy Mayorets, the minister of Power and Electrification, also "deserved" to be dismissed but was spared because of his brief time in office.[4]

Another series of reprimands and firings occurred in mid-August, after a meeting of the Party Control Committee of the CPSU Central Committee. The dismissed included Aleksey Makukhin, a first deputy minister of Power and Electrification, V. Ya. Sydorenko, the first deputy chairman of the USSR State Committee for Safety in the Atomic Power Industry, as well as another official from the Ministry of Medium Machine Building.[5] The director and the chief engineer of the Chernobyl' station, V. Bryukhanov and N. Fomin, were also dismissed from their posts and thrown out of the party. Tens of party members have been expelled from the Prypyat' party committee, including 27 at the start of September alone, allegedly for "cowardice and panicking."[6] Those plant officials who had run away from the scene of the disaster were described in scornful terms by the press. But by October, according to the new director of the Chernobyl' station, Erik Pozdyshev, some of them had been reinstated, against his will, in their jobs by the courts.[7]

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[3] *Pravda*, (Moscow) July 20, 1986.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid., Aug. 14, 1986.
[6] Ibid., Sept. 2, 1986.

The conclusion to be drawn from these reports is that the dismissals and reproofs were essentially low level, and often ritualistic. Nothing was done that might compromise the higher party echelons or the Soviet nuclear energy policy. The Ministry of Power and Electrification has been cut quite severely, but most of its functions in the nuclear sphere may have been transferred to a newly created Ministry of Nuclear Energy.[8] The retribution visited on Medium Machine Building officials is curious because obviously the reactor that exploded was not for military purposes.[9] But this does not mean that, at some point, the other Chernobyl' reactors may not have been used for the production of elements for military use, such as tritium.

Those officials who have survived the crisis—the names of Andronik Petrosyants, chairman of the State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy, Valeriy Legasov of the same committee, and Yevgeniy Velikhov, vice-president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, spring to mind—have acquired enhanced status. The main reason for this is that while low-level errors at the Chernobyl' plant have been acknowledged, the viability of the nuclear plants themselves and the future of the industry are being reemphasized.

Health Repercussions

How has the population in the area been affected by the radioactive fallout? The draft version of the Soviet report to the IAEA stated that the radiological effects "will be insignificant against the natural background of cancerous and genetic diseases." On the other hand, John Gofman, a University of California professor emeritus, has postulated that approximately one million persons will contract cancer over the next several decades as a result of the accident at Chernobyl', and that about half of this number will die from cancer.[10] Given the extreme disparity between these two claims, however, it seems safe to say that neither statement can stand as a viable estimate of the aftereffects of the disaster.

In Vienna, the Soviets maintained that approximately 3.5 percent of the contents of the reactor core had been emitted as a result of the explosion. Earlier, however, fairly reliable Soviet sources had spoken of 10 percent.[11] Which statement is more reliable? The difference is of the utmost significance. The Soviets also indicated four stages in the release of radioisotopes from the damaged reactor:

Members of the staff of a Kiev hygiene research institute check the radioactive background level in the capital city of Ukraine.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

1. A release of dispersed fuel on April 26, the composition of which corresponded to that of the irradiated fuel enriched by iodine, cesium, and tellurium isotopes.
2. A decrease in the rate of radiation release from April 26 to May 2, because of the efforts to put out the reactor fire with sand, boron, and lead pellets.
3. A rapid rise in the release of fission products, especially iodine, because of heating at the core of the reactor between May 2 and May 6. (It was after this stage that health warnings were issued to the residents of Kiev, and presumably to other cities such as Chernihiv and Gomel'.)
4. A rapid fall in releases from May 6 onward.[12]

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[7] Ibid., Oct. 10, 1986.

[8] The new ministry's task is to raise "responsibility for the development of nuclear power." It is headed by Nikolay Lukonin, formerly director of the RBMK-1500 nuclear power plant in Lithuania. See TASS, July 21, 1986.

[9] On Feb. 10, 1986, Radio Kiev confirmed that the Chernobyl' plant had been integrated into the so-called Mir system of cooperation in nuclear energy between the USSR and the other CEMA countries. Electricity from the fourth reactor was exported to Hungary.

[10] Cited by Reuters (London) Sept. 10, 1986.

[11] See, e.g., David R. Marples, *Chernobyl & Nuclear Power in the USSR*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1986, p. 125.

[12] USSR State Committee for Utilization of Atomic Energy, *The Accident at the Chernobyl' Nuclear Power Plant and Its Consequences*, Information Compiled for the IAEA Experts' Meeting, 25–29 August 1986, Vienna, Part 1, General Material, p. 34.

ЗАПРЕТНАЯ
ЗОНА

Vehicles are checked for radiation upon leaving the 30-kilometer zone around Chernobyl' in May 1986; the sign reads, "Prohibited Zone."

—TASS from Sovfoto.

According to Sweden's Radiation Protection Agency, people exposed to high levels of radiation experience damage to tissue at a dose of 1 rem (roentgen equivalent in man); the minimum lethal dose is 200 rem; half of the people exposed to 450 rem would die within 60 days; and all those exposed to over 600 rem would die within 30 days.[13] All of the above figures relate to the rem intensity on immediate exposure. Over the course of a year, exposure to a cumulative dose of 450 rem would not necessarily cause a person serious harm.

The figures used by Gofman and others to estimate the final tally of deaths from the accident are based on the Soviet report to the IAEA in Vienna. They refer to those in the vicinity at the time of the accident. In the reactor area, firemen and plant operators reportedly received over 400 rem, while at a distance of 5 to 10 kilometers from the accident site, the rates were said to be over 1 rem per hour. Even 15 days after the accident, at a distance of 50 to 60 kilometers, levels were said to be 5 to 6 millirem per hour—hardly fatal, but very high nevertheless.[14]

But speculation on the eventual or even immediate fatality figures is unwise for two reasons. First, the effects of low-level radiation are still a matter of conjecture for scientists (in contrast to the effects of high-level radiation, which are well-known). Second, the figures do not take into account other factors, the most important of which is the gigantic clean-up operation undertaken in Chernobyl'.

Concerning the first point, the Soviets have stated that there is still some way to go in assessing the effects of given levels of radiation and determining the level of radiation to which workers in the nuclear industry can be exposed. On October 2, 1986, a new all-Union Center of Radiology was opened in Kiev, consisting of three institutes: Experimental Radiology;

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[13] Cited in *The New York Times*, May 3, 1986.

[14] *The Accident at the Chernobyl' Plant*, op. cit., p. 37.

Clinical Radiology; and Epidemiology and the Prevention of Radiation Diseases. According to the Ukrainian Minister of Health, Anatoliy Romanenko, one of the goals of this new Center is to find the "maximum permissible radiation dose" for both sick and healthy people, and then to put forward "scientifically substantiated norms" for workers at nuclear power plants and operations linked to ionizing radiation.[15]

Clean-up Operation

It is because of earlier Soviet confusion over how to set norms that the clean-up operation after Chernobyl' has become such a dangerous undertaking, perhaps exceeding in its dimensions the immediate impact of the explosion and fire that left 31 people dead. First, let us look at the dimensions of this operation. Following the disaster, about 135,000 people were evacuated from Kiev oblast in Ukraine, Gomel' oblast in Belorussia, and Bryansk oblast in Russia. Three zones were demarcated around the ruined unit: a special zone, a 10-kilometer zone, and a 30-kilometer zone. About 90,000 residents were taken from their homes on the Ukrainian side of the border between April 27 and May 6, of whom about 23,000 were moved to the town of Polis'ke (located 40 miles west of Chernobyl') and the remainder to farmsteads in neighboring districts. On the Belorussian side, the evacuation was a longer process because hotspots of radiation continued to be detected several weeks after the accident. About 18,000 were evacuated, and Bragin, a town with a population of 7,000, was decontaminated without moving the residents out. Subsequently, the 30-kilometer zone had to be decontaminated. Old wartime watchtowers were placed around the 108-kilometer rim of the zone to prevent illegal entries. At the same time, not every village within the zone was evacuated because the radiation had not dispersed evenly. And in two villages on the Ukrainian side, the inhabitants were



Damaged reactor No. 4 at Chernobyl' is encased in a concrete "sarcophagus" to prevent radiation leakage.

—TASS via Wide World.

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[15] *News From Ukraine* (Kiev), No. 39, 1986.

returned to their homes as early as June. Uncertainty, a shortage of geiger counters to measure radiation, and ignorance of the region, all played a part in such decisions.[16]

There were two main tasks, both of which were declared to have been "virtually" completed by the beginning of October. First, the damaged reactor had to be encased in a huge concrete tomb, which the Soviets have termed a "sarcophagus." This concrete shell was built both above and below ground level. It required about 3 million cubic meters of concrete, and has a width of 74 meters.[17] The sarcophagus could not simply be a closed shell, however; it needed passageways for ventilation so that the reactor core could not catch fire or explode again. It is essentially a temporary solution—despite initial Soviet claims that it might last for thousands of years. Some Soviet scientists have stated that the containment will depend on future generations, who may discover better means of dealing with the damaged and still highly dangerous fourth Chernobyl' reactor. Moreover, the building of the structure was delayed because of a lack of good-quality cement.[18]

Second, the entire 30-kilometer zone has been (or is being) decontaminated by a variety of methods. These have included the digging of a trench to hold the runoff water from the reactor, the removal of contaminated topsoil from large areas of agricultural land, and the spraying of contaminated surfaces with a special solution—the so-called dry treatment—in which the solution used to spray the surface hardens into a film that holds the contaminated particles. This can then be removed, rolled, and dumped. The use of dump trucks complicated the situation immeasurably because the trucks carried radioactive particles on their wheels and churned up dust, which also bore traces of radioactive elements.[19]

That the entire process of decontamination would encounter major obstacles was never in doubt. What can be questioned, however, are the conditions in the danger zone and the way in which workers have been employed there. In the first days after the accident, it appears that the brunt of the clean-up work around the reactor was borne by coal miners, metrorail builders, employees of the USSR Ministry of Transport Construction, the police, and the army. Work around the reactor was measured in minutes rather than hours, and a strict limit on exposure to 10 rem of radiation was imposed, after which the worker in question was removed from the zone. This limit was soon raised to 25 rem.[20]

By May 6, military reservists had been brought into the zone, predominantly from the Baltic countries. Approximately 4,000 Estonians were "conscripted," often at night and with apparently little regard for their domestic situation—some were ill, others had wives who were about to give birth. Moreover, although the initial period of work in the zone was set at 30 days, with two days vacation during the month, this was extended first to two and then to six months, according to a series of articles in the Estonian Komsomol newspaper. Reportedly, the Estonians reacted violently. The reservists downed tools and went on strike for an undetermined period.[21] Soviet authorities have tried to cast doubt on the reports from Estonia, but the use of the same workers throughout the cleanup, and the resulting accumulation of high doses of radiation has been confirmed by various Soviet sources.

Thus, on September 2, 1986, *Pravda* revealed that the government commission entrusted with supervising the cleanup decided that the duration of the term of work should be extended and that "it is better if [decontamination] work continues to be done by the same staff. It is in a sensitive stage." The implication was that the lengthy period of work had enabled these workers to acquire the necessary experience to finish the job. New workers would take longer.

On October 24, 1986, the Ukrainian newspaper *Robitnycha hazeta* published a frank article about the cleanup and the housing that was being provided for the workers. It referred to the case of a concreter, Volodymyr Pryvydenko, who had been working in "hot spots"—an apparent reference to high-radiation zones—"from the very first days after the accident." The point of the article was that Pryvydenko, unlike some of his colleagues, did not have a place to live. His wife and four-month-old daughter were staying with relatives. It appears that Pryvydenko and others (presumably blue-collar workers or military reservists) have been in a high-radiation zone from the outset. But it is difficult to judge to how much danger they have been exposed unless one knows the level of radiation in that zone. Even in late August, single-figure amounts of rem per hour were being absorbed close to the

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[16] Marples, op. cit., pp. 141–46.

[17] Radio Moscow, Oct. 6, 1986.

[18] *Pravda*, Aug. 6, 1986.

[19] *New Times* (Moscow), No. 29, July 28, 1986.

[20] TASS, June 6, 1986. A "volunteer" from Sakhalin reported that when he spent 30 days in Zone 1, "the most dangerous zone," the time limit for work was 30–60 minutes, after which he and his colleagues were sent immediately for medical attention. See *Lesnaya promyshlennost'* (Moscow) Aug. 30, 1986.

[21] Toomas Ilves, "Estonians Help at Chernobyl," *Radio Free Europe/RAD Background Report* (Munich), Sept. 10, 1986.

Clean-up work at the Chernobyl' plant on May 28, 1986: in the foreground, a bulldozer covers piping; at the rear, two armored personnel carriers.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

damaged reactor. Moreover, the working day is long, lasting from 10 to 12 hours. Since the object is to decontaminate highly irradiated areas, lives are clearly at risk, especially in view of the workers' lengthy spells in the 30-kilometer zone.

It is worth reiterating that the clean-up crew, which according to Soviet sources numbers in the thousands, has been exposed to high doses of radiation. According to an Estonian source, one Estonian worker has already died from radiation poisoning and others have been hospitalized.[22] Thus, calculations about future cancer rates attributable to the disaster are rendered meaningless. All that can be said is that additional casualties will certainly be incurred as a consequence of the cleanup.

Working conditions in the clean-up area are deplorable. According to *Robitnycha hazeta,* the collective's trade-union committee was complaining that it did not have the funds to provide protective clothing for the workers. "It is not because funds are meager," chided the newspaper's correspondent, "but rather it is a result of the lack of responsibility of the trade union concerned with their distribution."[23] But identifying organizational responsibility for the conditions is largely irrelevant in the context of cleaning up after the world's worst civilian nuclear disaster without protective clothing.

Two workers complained that they had no place to take a shower at the end of the working day. The showers were located at a sanatorium, which required a two-hour walk to be reached. The article emphasized that with winter imminent, it was time that mobile shower units were organized for the clean-up crews.[24] These workers had already been there for six months, however, and one wonders why the situation was not corrected earlier.

Housing is also a problem—as noted above in the case of Pryvydenko. Most of the workers were still living in summer accommodations in late October when cold weather had already set in. Various decrees about the need to transfer them to "warm lodgings" had been adopted over the summer, but were not carried out. One worker voiced another common complaint when he stated:

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[22] Toomas Ilves, "Additional Information on Estonians at Chernobyl'," *Radio Free Europe/RAD Background Report,* Oct. 14, 1986.

[23] *Robitnycha hazeta* (Kiev), Oct. 24, 1986.

[24] Ibid.

> *We have received good quarters...but a new complication has arisen. We have nothing to put in them. The setting up of furniture stores has been approved, but it is not known how long we have to wait for them.*[25]

Doctors at the medical-sanitation unit in the area—No. 126—had initially tended to the needs of nuclear plant workers and residents of Prypyat'. Almost 1,000 specialists were in the area at the height of the crisis but most had left by late summer. The remaining doctors were living in the village of Teteriv, in cramped conditions, with limited facilities.

The only solution proposed to these problems was to impose better discipline. One brigadier stated: "In our collective we do not forgive one another the smallest violation."

Reconstruction

What has happened to the people who were evacuated from the contaminated regions? A substantial number have been transferred for work elsewhere in the USSR. Occasionally, appropriate jobs have been found in the same oblast. The northern part of Gomel' oblast in Belorussia, for example, has a labor shortage. Consequently, workers evacuated from the southern districts have simply been transferred to the north. For the most part, however, the people have been dispersed, often very far away—to Kazakhstan, the western borderlands, the Baltic republics, Siberia.

Early in September, *Pravda* revealed that people had been allowed to return to the 30-kilometer zone to collect their belongings. Residents of the villages of Cheremoshne and Nivetskye had been allowed to return permanently.[26] But empty villages abound. In mid-September, the newspaper *Pravda Ukrainy* discussed cases of theft and burglary in the 30-kilometer zone. The Ukrainian Ministry of the Interior had received complaints about poor police work. One evacuee had returned to the Chernobyl' area, ostensibly to check that his property was safe. He was later apprehended breaking the locks on his neighbors' doors. Some maintenance workers from the Chernobyl' nuclear plant were caught stealing goods from an abandoned Prypyat' restaurant.[27]

Over the summer, a decision was made to restart Chernobyl' units 1 and 2 in October 1986. This is not the place to discuss the wisdom of such a decision. For the plant workers, however, it entailed further sacrifices. Many are housed in tents or on boats on the Prypyat' River. Others have spent months at a Pioneer camp near Chernobyl'.[28]

Since the summer, however, an enormous construction program has been under way employing some 50,000 workers, including construction squads from Ukraine, Belorussia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tadjikistan, Georgia, Armenia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The squads were given two main tasks. First, they were to build housing in various districts of Kiev oblast, particularly in Makariv, that could accommodate, on a more or less permanent basis, 33,000 of the people who had been evacuated in May, and who were to be moved back into the area either to their state or collective farms, or to enterprises formerly functioning in the now-deserted town of Prypyat'. By August 17, according to the newspaper *Sel'skaya zhizn,* the first of 52 new villages to house evacuees had been completed. Called Ternopil'ske, the village is located in Makariv district, west of Kiev. Some 7,250 three-room houses had also been built in Kiev oblast and approximately 4,000 in Gomel' oblast by October 1.

Second, they were to build by October 1 a new town called Zelenyi Mys on the banks of the Dnieper River approximately 30 kilometers from the nuclear plant for the shift workers of the nuclear plant. Plant personnel work 15-day shifts at the station, followed by 15 days of rest with their families in Kiev or Chernihiv. Initially, Zelenyi Mys was to house 10,000 workers.[29]

Various high-level delegations visited the site of the new town in August: party secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, Borys Kachura, on August 7; Soviet Premier Nikolay Ryzhkov and KGB chief Viktor Chebrikov, on August 8–9;[30] Ukrainian party chief Shcherbytskyi and Ukrainian Premier Lyashko, on August 29.[31] All conveyed the same message: the builders must work harder to complete their work by the October 1 deadline. But in late August, a Soviet source complained about the slow progress of construction at Zelenyi Mys, where the "enthusiasm of the builders is not always backed up with sound organization" and "manufacturers sometimes supply goods that have to be rejected."[32]

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[25] Ibid.

[26] *Pravda*, Sept. 2, 1986.

[27] *Pravda Ukrainy* (Kiev), Sept. 16, 1986.

[28] See, e.g., *Radyanska Ukraina* (Kiev), Oct. 3, 1986.

[29] *Pravda*, July 23, 1986.

[30] *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Aug. 10, 1986.

[31] Radio Moscow, Aug. 29, 1986.

[32] *Sovetskiy Patriot* (Moscow), Aug .24, 1986.

Chernobyl' Nuclear Power Station central control room operator V. Kryvenko, left, and a shift director at the No. 1 reactor D. Ovcharenko rest at the "Fairy Tale" summer camp after a work shift on May 10, 1986; at right, a view of the Pioneer camp, which housed plant personnel and those involved in the massive clean-up effort.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

In late October, the Soviet Ukrainian press revealed that a more permanent abode for the nuclear plant staff was under construction. Whereas Zelenyi Mys is a hastily improvised, low-quality housing project, more care is being taken with the new town of Slavutych, located in the woodlands of Chernihiv oblast. The location was chosen by the all-Union and Ukrainian institutes of engineering-technical research, and the town is being planned by a Moscow urban design institute. The main thoroughfare out of Slavutych will lead directly to the Chernobyl' nuclear power plant 30 miles to the west.[33] Slavutych is to be built over the next two years and will house 30,000 people when completed.[34]

The construction of Slavutych may have been a response to public pressure. In an interview in *Pravda*, Chernobyl' station director, Erik Pozdyshev, said:

> *There is one problem that keeps cropping up. People ask: why is our accommodation allocated on a temporary basis? After all, we are permanent workers, why are our apartments and residence permits temporary? These questions have been raised at all meetings and in party groups and, quite honestly, I cannot come up with a logical response to this question. The point is that the housing for personnel is located in Kiev and Chernihiv and the temporary residence permits are also issued there. It is true that we will build a new city. A decision to this effect has been taken, but it is a matter for the future.*[35]

Ten days later, the construction of Slavutych was announced.[36] The future, for once, came quickly for the residents of the northern Ukraine.

By mid-November, more information had been made available about the future of the area. Zelenyi Mys, it was revealed, would accommodate 5,000, not 10,000, shiftworkers or "energetics" of the nuclear plant. By November 13, about 1,000 workers were actually living there. However, the Ministry of Power, it was noted in the Ukrainian press, was not paying sufficient attention to the building work there. Some houses were heated, others were not.[37] Zelenyi Mys and Slavutych are to house the workers employed at the on-line units. But what of those workers building the fifth and sixth power units at Chernobyl'?

On November 6, the newspaper *Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya* revealed that the abandoned reactor town of Prypyat' is to have a future. This was confirmed in the Ukrainian press one week later. Prypyat' is to house the workers building the fifth and sixth units at Chernobyl'. Thus, the builders are to be separated from the power workers. Again, "shift-lodgings" will accommodate the men, but not their families.[38] There has been no indication about the future size of Pry-

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[33] *Rabochaya gazeta* (Moscow), Oct. 26, 1986.

[34] Radio Moscow, Oct. 20, 1986.

[35] *Pravda*, Oct. 10, 1986.

[36] Radio Moscow, Oct. 20, 1986.

[37] *Robitnycha hazeta*, Nov. 18, 1986.

[38] Ibid.

Housing for Chernobyl' plant workers nearing completion at Zelenyi Mys.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

pyat', the town built in the 1970's which was intended to house 200,000 at its peak, but which had a population of about 40,000 at the time of the nuclear accident. It is reported that Prypyat' "will be totally cleansed." In Chernobyl', on the other hand, 22 kilometers to the south, people no longer wear respirators outdoors because of the drop in the radiation level.

Energy Policy Repercussions

Finally, what has been the impact of the disaster on the Soviet nuclear industry and overall energy program? The rapid start-up of the first two Chernobyl' reactors in October suggests that the USSR faces an almost desperate situation in its energy sector, particularly with the onset of winter. But on the surface, there seems little reason for this. Nuclear power made up only about 11 percent of the Soviet Union's total electricity generation in 1985. Graphite-moderated stations like that of Chernobyl' constituted only 6 percent, while the Chernobyl' station itself—the largest in Ukraine, and along with Leningrad and Kursk, the largest in the USSR—approximately 1.5 percent. New 1,000-megawatt, VVER (pressurized-water) reactors were scheduled to come on-line in 1986 at Rivne (Rovno in Russian), Zaporizhya, Khmel'nytskyi and Kalinin. So why have so many recent editorials in newspapers such as *Pravda, Izvestiya*, and *Komsomolskaya Pravda* focused on the energy situation?

In the first place, one should emphasize that there are factors other than Chernobyl' that come into play, such as poor performances at thermal power plants and the low water levels in rivers after a dry 1986 summer. These have had an adverse effect on output at Soviet hydroelectric stations. In Vienna, the Soviets revealed that their plants with graphite-moderated reactors (RBMK's) had been shut down for technical improvements. An article in *Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya* in late September suggested that many were still out of operation.[39] Engineers and technical personnel of the nuclear energy industry had been transferred to Chernobyl' and to other RBMK's (Leningrad, Ignalina, Kursk, etc.) to ensure that improved safety features are installed. Skilled engineers had also been sent en masse to Chernobyl' to assist with the starting-up of reactors 1 and 2 there. In turn, this has slowed down work on existing pressurized-water reactors. Of the new reactors scheduled to come on line in 1986 only three did so (see the article by Judith Thornton).

In October, Candidate Member of the Politburo Vladimir Dolgikh visited Zaporizhya station in Ukraine. He enumerated a host of problems encountered there with supply and construction work on the new 1,000-megawatt reactor, which was supposed to be operating by June 1986.[40] The problems outlined by Dolgikh are only too familiar at Soviet nuclear plants: what is different is that after Chernobyl' such problems are being taken much more seriously by the authorities. Understandably, the approach of the past, in which the main criterion was the rapidity of construction, has come into question.

Soviet nuclear installations, however, still suffer from a lack of skilled personnel, shoddy construction materials, chronic supply problems, and an outdated central planning system that has in fact been discarded at some enterprises—at the Sumy Machine-Tool Works, for example—in favor of a partly decentralized system based on local self-financing.

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[39] *Sotsialisticheskya Industriya* (Moscow), Sept. 30, 1986.

[40] The start-up of the new Zaporizhya reactor was announced in *Robitnycha hazeta*, Dec. 13, 1986. On Dolgikh's visit, see *Izvestiya*, Oct. 12, 1986.

Chernobyl', which suffered from these problems roughly in proportion to its immense size, has been restarted, presumably because its reactors have been made safer. But the underlying dilemmas remain. They have been described most aptly by *Pravda*'s science correspondent, Vladimir Gubarev, who has recently written a play about the Chernobyl' disaster called *Sarcophagus*. Gubarev was a principal reporter of the disaster, and has a personal knowledge of the station's makeup and organization. Consequently, his dramatization is based on facts which can also be verified from other sources. What follows is a brief excerpt from the play as it appeared in the weekly *Sovetskaya kul'tura*.[41]

> Monitor: Our machines came from a warehouse somewhere. They were sent to us rather than being written off. We coped as long as there wasn't an accident. We mended and made do.
>
> Operator: The problem was we were always in a hurry; we pledged to have the reactor finished three months early, and in operation two days early. Yet, we asked four times for new dosimeters, but no one was in any hurry at the top. The builders rushed the whole thing through. Underneath the reactor you'll find hunks of concrete, a couple of mechanical diggers, and all for the sake of some sort of award. Who needs that sort of speed?
>
> Procurator (to the General): It was your signature on the document accepting reactor No. 4, wasn't it?
>
> General: Not only No. 4, all of them. I have worked here for fifteen years.
>
> Procurator: Why did you sign the acceptance documents when the roof was made of the same material and you knew that it was forbidden to use that material in industrial objects?
>
> General: I objected....I told the heads of the ministry.
>
> Procurator: But you still signed? That sort of roof was banned twelve years ago. Why was it used?
>
> Head: There was a lot of it in the warehouse. We had a deadline to meet.
>
> General: If I had not signed, someone else would have done. Or do you only sign things you can sign with a clear conscience?

The play also focuses on the lack of protective clothing and the failure of the head of the power station to take appropriate action at the time of the disaster. The above excerpt is revealing with hindsight, but it is no more frank than Soviet reports of the past five to ten years, which have again and again focused on alarming reports from various nuclear power plants: the Odessa station was said to be in a state of "chaos" in late 1984, and again in 1986; the main pressurized-water reactor factory at Volgodonsk collapsed into its reservoir in 1983; Rivne station workers reportedly had to be treated for alcoholism early in 1986; Rostov station was found to possess defective materials; the computer system at Zaporizhya had to be replaced because of serious defects; the top officials at the Khmel'nytskyi station were purged in 1983 for embezzlement, theft, and various other transgressions that led to criminal proceedings.[42] The picture is clear: the situation at Soviet nuclear plants before Chernobyl' gave cause for serious concern, if not alarm.

What of the future? How is life in Ukraine after Chernobyl'? For the residents of Kiev oblast, the disaster has brought intense suffering. Over 30 people are dead and over 200,000 have been exposed to high levels of radiation. The effects of the cesium isotope are still being monitored, and the city of Kiev now has a reserve water supply from the Desna River, in addition to the Dnieper. Thousands were still living in camps, tents, and boats as winter approached. The clean-up campaign, which has entailed the efforts of thousands of Ukrainian, Baltic, and other workers, is being carried out in wretched conditions.

Two reactors at the Chernobyl' nuclear plant have been restarted, and *Radio Moscow* has announced that the third reactor is to be back on line by June 1987.[43] (Meanwhile, it is still not possible to approach the damaged unit, and remote-controlled vehicles are involved in most of the work in that area.) At the World Energy Conference in Cannes in October, Valeriy Legasov, deputy director of the Kurachatov Atomic Energy Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, announced that the USSR is to increase its reliance on nuclear power for electricity production. The country had lost more farmland from the construction of hydroelectric dams, he declared, than from the Chernobyl' accident.[44]

On November 3, in Bucharest, Soviet Premier Nikolay Ryzhkov spoke at a session of the CEMA countries. He revealed that both the East European countries and the USSR planned to proceed with their massive programs for the expansion of nuclear energy. In Eastern Europe, the anticipated rise in capacity is from 8 to 50 million kilowatts, and in the USSR, an increase in capacity of 500–600 percent is forecast.[45] The latter is a slight reduction in the forecast annual rate of capacity growth from the current (1986–90) goal of 48 percent to around 40 percent, but it reveals that Soviet confidence in the industry has not been seriously affected by the Chernobyl' disaster. At least according to these early indications, Soviet confidence in the futfuture of the industry remains firm. Yet, although the Chernobyl' nuclear plant may be back in operation, the Chernobyl' disaster is not over.

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[41] *Sovetskaya kul'tura* (Moscow), Sept. 13, 1986.

[42] Marples, op. cit., pp. 79–92.

[43] Radio Moscow, Oct. 1, 1986.

[44] Associated Press (New York), Oct. 9, 1986.

[45] *Pravda*, Nov. 4, 1986.

Chernobyl' and *Glasnost'*

Ellen Jones and Benjamin L. Woodbury, II

On the night of August 31/September 1, 1983, Soviet interceptors shot down a South Korean commercial jet that had strayed into Soviet territory. When Western officials responded with accusations and condemnations, Soviet spokesman withdrew behind a curtain of silence and denial, followed by grudging acknowledgment and, finally, counterattack.[1] On September 9, then Chief of the General Staff Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov gave a televised press conference to present the Soviet side of the story.[2] The Soviets charged that the plane had been on an intelligence mission for the United States, and also accused the United States of trying to discredit the Soviet Union and undermine the chances of success at the arms limitation talks about to resume in Geneva.[3]

The Soviet handling of the KAL 007 incident, then, was reactive. Only under pressure of adverse international opinion did Soviet spokesmen admit that the Soviets had shot down an unarmed passenger airliner. But in making the admission, they also tried to shift responsibility for the incident from the Soviet Union to the United States.

Three years and two general secretaries later, unit No. 4 of the Chernobyl' nuclear power plant exploded. For party decision-makers in Moscow, the accident raised the immediate issue of how to deal with the news, both at home and abroad. Like the shooting down of KAL 007, the disaster was an international incident because the emitted radioactivity affected the USSR's neighbors. But unlike KAL 007, Chernobyl' was also a domestic issue, because it threatened Soviet lives and property, affected popular perceptions of the new Gorbachëv leadership, and modified elite assessments of Gorbachëv's power. The accident at Chernobyl' also offers a rare glimpse at the political and social impact of technological disasters in a socialist state. The reaction of the Soviet population to the accident and its aftermath tells us a lot about the role of both public opinion and the news media in the USSR. It also provides some insight into the changes introduced by General Secretary Gorbachëv and the limits of those changes.

This article explores the political and social aspects of the accident. It begins with an examination of Gorbachëv's public relations policy and its application to the Chernobyl' disaster. It then examines the implications of the accident for Soviet foreign policy and closes with an assessment of the domestic repercussions of the disaster.

The *Glasnost'* Policy

The accident at Chernobyl' came at a time when Gorbachëv was trying to change Soviet public relations policy. In the past, news of many events, particularly those thought to be embarrassing to the political

Ellen Jones and Benjamin L. Woodbury, II, are analysts of Soviet political-military affairs with the Defense Intelligence Agency (Arlington Hall, VA). Ms. Jones is author of Red Army and Society *(1985). The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position of the US government.*

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[1] On September 2, 1983, a TASS statement acknowledging the disappearance of the Korean airliner appeared in major Soviet newspapers. A subsequent TASS statement, more detailed but still not admitting the Soviet role in the airliner's disappearance, appeared the following day. (See *Pravda* [Moscow], Sept. 2, 1983, and *Krasnaya Zvezda* [Moscow], Sept. 2 and 3, 1983.) Finally, on September 7, *Krasnaya Zvezda* published an account acknowledging that "the interceptor-fighter plane of the Anti-Air Defenses fulfilled the order of the command post to stop the flight." For Western coverage of Soviet reactions, see *Time* (New York), Sept. 12, 1983, pp. 10–18.

[2] *Pravda*, Sept. 10, 1983.

[3] See, e.g., "So When Will Washington Give Answers," ibid., Sept. 25, 1983.

leadership, had been suppressed. This was true of natural disasters, like earthquakes or floods, and of man-made disasters, like industrial or transportation accidents. The Soviets had also been censoring coverage of negative social trends, such as an increase in infant mortality.[4] Soviet efforts to suppress news had also extended to international events, as the KAL 007 incident demonstrated. The usual pattern was silence, followed by evasion. Only when the diplomatic costs of this strategy mounted, did Soviet officials try to reduce them by a public relations counterattack. Soviet handling of the military involvement in Afghanistan followed this pattern, although in that case the shift from initial news suppression to fuller reporting appears to have been prompted more by domestic than by diplomatic considerations.

The policy of suppressing negative news has had some deleterious side effects, both at home and abroad. At home, it contributed to a widespread mistrust of the domestic media, inclining many Soviet citizens to turn to alternative sources of information available from the West, in particular to foreign radio broadcasts. The controlled nature of the official media also heightened the importance of private communication, especially by word of mouth.[5] There were also foreign policy costs. Suppression of information reinforced the image of the Soviet Union as a defensive totalitarian regime. This, in turn, undercut Soviet efforts to foster an image of openness and reasonableness—an image necessary for the recurrent Soviet strategy of exploiting divisions between Western Europe and the United States.

To counter such domestic and international quandaries, Gorbachëv proclaimed a policy of *glasnost'*—openness. This has translated into fuller reporting of "negative" news at home and more sophisticated public relations campaigns abroad. In writing for the domestic media, Soviet newsmen have at times begun to act like Western investigative reporters by running stories about mismanagement and corruption. *Glasnost'* has also affected the way in which Soviet officials and analysts can publicly advocate policy changes. There have always been opportunities to express differences over policy on selected issues in the post-Stalinist period. The new information policy, however, appears to have significantly widened the acceptable range of alternative policies that can be debated publicly. In cultural life, too, a much wider range of subjects, including some that are politically sensitive, is tolerated in film and literature. *Glasnost'* also means that social problems can be discussed more openly. The televised admission by Minister of Internal Affairs Aleksandr Vlasov that the Soviet Union has a drug problem is a case in point.[6] *Glasnost'* has also led to fuller and more timely reporting on natural disasters.[7] It has allowed for expanded (although still censored) coverage of Soviet military activities in Afghanistan, including the first showing on television of Soviet troops in combat.[8]

With regard to international audiences, *glasnost'* has meant expanded use of press conferences at which Soviet spokesmen have adopted a more informative and forthcoming manner in presenting Soviet foreign policy positions.[9] Gorbachëv himself has utilized press conferences extensively, both inside and outside the USSR, to publicize his arms control initiatives.[10] The Soviets also made special efforts to publicize the 27th CPSU Congress to foreign audiences.[11]

In short, *glasnost'* has changed the look and feel of Soviet public behavior in a variety of ways. The policy of *glasnost'* represents a judgment by a part of the political elite that heavy-handed censorship is not always the most effective way to mold public opinion in the USSR, that leadership goals can sometimes be better served by more open public discussion and sophisticated presentation rather than by suppression of the news. It also reflects an effort to reduce the influence of information from foreign sources in the USSR, such as that of foreign radio broadcasts.

This shift in public relations policy reflects the kinds of changes introduced since Gorbachëv became general secretary. Although Gorbachëv has described his domestic programs as a "revolutionary transformation,"[12] most of the changes carried out are fairly

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[4] The Soviets have again resumed giving infant mortality data in standard statistical sources after a 10-year lapse. This may be due partly to Gorbachëv's *glasnost'* policy and partly to the fact that reported data, which apparently peaked in 1975 at 30.8 deaths per 1,000 births, have declined to a less embarrassing level—26 per 1,000. See *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta* (Moscow), No. 43, 1986, pp. 6–7; and *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1985 g. Statisticheskiy yezhegodnik* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1985—Statistical Yearbook), Moscow, Finansy i Statistika, 1986, p. 547.

[5] Gayle Durham Hollander, *Soviet Political Indoctrination: Developments in Mass Media and Propaganda Since Stalin*, New York, Praeger, 1972, pp. 113–17, 181–83.

[6] Moscow Television Service in Russian, 1530 GMT, Nov. 10, 1986.

[7] See, e.g., "No Grounds for Rumor," *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (Moscow), Jan. 5, 1986.

[8] Moscow Television Service in Russian, 1430 GMT, July 11, 1985.

[9] See, e.g., the televised interview with Col. Gen. Nikolay Chervov on Berlin ARD Television Network in German 2200 GMT, Feb. 12, 1986, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-SOV*), Feb. 14, 1986, pp. AA/2–8.

[10] See the series of press conferences held to promote Gorbachëv's arms control statement of Jan. 15, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 13, 1986, pp. AA/2–5, Feb. 18, 1986, pp. AA/4–5, and Feb. 21, 1986, p. A/2.

[11] See *FBIS-SOV*, Mar. 3, 1986, pp. CC/3–4.

[12] *Pravda*, Feb. 26, 1986.

A. Krutov, a reporter for Moscow Television's "Vremya" program, interviews Soviet officials on May 10, 1986, in Kiev regarding the Chernobyl' accident. From left to right are: Vitaliy Masol, Vice-Chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers and Chairman of the republic's State Planning Commission; Krutov; Ivan Silayev, Vice-Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; Valeriy Legasov, member of the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences; Yuriy Izrael', Chairman of the USSR State Committee on Hydrometereology and Environmental Control; and Yevgeniy Velikhov, Vice-President of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

modest variations on old themes. This is especially true in foreign policy where most of the innovations are more stylistic than substantive. It is important to note, however, that for the Soviet political elite, these changes are still controversial. *Glasnost'* may seem like a cosmetic change—after all, Soviet authorities are not giving up control of the domestic media—but it has encountered resistance nonetheless.

Resistance to *glasnost'* could already be seen in leadership speeches at the 27th CPSU Congress. Gorbachëv, in his Central Committee political report (a document that reflects not only his personal policy preferences but also the collective position of the political elite), defended *glasnost'* vigorously, although he noted that there were those who "do indeed feel uncomfortable in the light of publicity."[13] The party's "second" secretary, Yegor Ligachëv, however, was less enthusiastic about *glasnost'*: in his Congress address, he criticized the party newspaper *Pravda* for "lapses" in its reporting on improprieties—an apparent reference to *Pravda*'s earlier publication of a letter critical of elite privileges.[14] In April 1986, Gorbachëv obliquely referred to the opposition to *glasnost'* during his address to the Socialist Unity Party Congress in East Germany, noting that there were some who felt criticism had "gone too far."[15]

The resistance to *glasnost'* is symptomatic of the general inertia that has impeded implementation of many of the new leadership's domestic policies. Efforts to streamline the planning and management process, for example, have been met with widespread bureaucratic resistance—something that Gorbachëv himself has complained of repeatedly.[16] In short, Gorbachëv may have made excellent progress in bringing about a massive turnover in personnel, but this has not necessarily translated into an ability to easily or quickly carry through domestic changes.

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[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid., Feb. 28, 1986.

[15] Ibid., Apr. 19, 1986.

[16] See, e.g., Gorbachëv's speech to the Khabarovsk Kray party organization on July 31, 1986, reported in *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Aug. 3, 1986.

Glasnost' and Chernobyl'

The initial Soviet response to the Chernobyl' disaster is a case in point. It was a reversion to the traditional Soviet way of handling embarrassing news—an information blackout was attempted. Soviet officials later claimed that this initial silence was due to the lack of information and uncertainty over the scope of the accident rather than to any reluctance to report on a disaster.[17] But the chronology of Chernobyl' suggests otherwise. To be sure, there may have been initial confusion about how serious the accident was. There may also have been some delay in providing a detailed report to political leaders in Moscow. However, there was still a substantial gap between the time the leaders knew that the accident had serious ramifications and the time they chose to make a public announcement about it. Moreover, even after the Soviet leadership had gotten its public relations campaign geared up, there were still major discrepancies between the story the Soviet media were telling and what was actually happening in Chernobyl'. Thus, Chernobyl' demonstrated that *glasnost'* means a more sophisticated public relations approach rather than more truthful reporting of the news.

The accident at unit No. 4 of the Chernobyl' atomic power station happened with little warning. According to the Soviet report on the accident to the International Atomic Energy Agency, plant operators were conducting a scheduled experiment that involved reducing reactor power.[18] Tests of this sort had been performed at Chernobyl' No. 4 previously, in 1982 and 1984. This time, however, the experiment went awry. In their zeal to complete the test, plant operators overrode safety protection systems and committed a series of six major safety violations that led to disaster. At 1:23 am on Saturday, April 26, explosions occurred in Chernobyl' No. 4, followed by fire and extensive damage to the reactor and reactor core. This resulted in high-level radioactive releases. According to Valentin Falin, head of the Soviet news agency Novosti, Gorbachëv was informed of the accident on that same day.[19] Gorbachëv himself stated later that an investigative commission was appointed immediately and sent to the scene of the accident to study the causes of the accident and carry out emergency measures. A working group was also formed in the Politburo under Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Nikolay Ryzhkov.[20] On Sunday, April 27, evacuation of the population within a 30-kilometer radius of the power plant was begun.[21]

The fact that the Soviet political leadership decided—apparently Saturday or early Sunday—on a major evacuation would indicate that it was fully aware of the scope of the Chernobyl' accident by that time. An official Soviet statement on the accident, however, did not come out until Monday, April 28, two days after the accident and many hours after Sweden had detected the radiation. Again according to Falin, it was not until Monday that party chief Gorbachëv got the first detailed report on the extent of the accident. Later on that day, the Politburo met to discuss the report of the investigating commission.[22] Even later on April 28, the Council of Ministers released the first Soviet public acknowledgment of the accident. The brief announcement stated only that an accident had happened and that measures were being taken to deal with it.[23]

This low-key coverage continued over the next several days. On Tuesday, April 29, the Council of Ministers released another announcement containing few new details of the accident.[24] This second release noted that two persons had been killed during the accident, but said that the situation had been stabilized (a claim that the Soviets themselves later contradicted) and noted that evacuation of nearby residents had already taken place.

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[17] See the comments by Georgiy Arbatov, Director of the USA-Canada Institute, on London BBC, World Service in English, 1110 GMT, May 4, 1986. See also the interview with Moscow party chief Boris Yel'tsin in *Stern* (Hamburg), May 7, 1986, p. 245.

[18] USSR State Committee for Utilization of Atomic Energy, *The Accident at the Chernobyl' Nuclear Power Plant and Its Consequences*. Information Compiled for the IAEA Experts' Meeting, August 25–29, 1986, Vienna. Part I. General Material. Draft, pp. 15–17. See also "Chernobyl: The Soviet Report," *Nuclear News* (LaGrange Park, IL), Sept. 11, 1986, pp. 1–8.

[19] Falin's comments appeared in an interview in *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), May 12, 1986, pp. 139–43. They were summarized by Paris AFP in English, 1252 GMT, May 11, 1986.

[20] These details were provided by Gorbachëv in his first public statement on the accident, at a May 14 press conference, reported in *Pravda*, May 15, 1986. See also *The Accident at the Chernobyl' Nuclear Power Plant*, op. cit., p. 2.

[21] The head of the government commission investigating the accident stated later that the evacuation was conducted via buses on Sunday, April 27, from 1400 to 1620 pm. Moscow TV Service in Russian, 1755 GMT, May 6, 1986. See also *Pravda*, May 6, 1986.

[22] *Der Spiegel*, May 12, 1986, pp. 139–43.

[23] Moscow TASS in English, 1717 GMT, Apr. 28, 1986, in *FBIS-SOV*, Apr. 29, 1986, p. R/1.

[24] Moscow TASS in English, 1706 GMT, Apr. 29, 1986. The statement was published in major Soviet newspapers on the following day. See, e.g., *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Apr. 30, 1986.

More reassuring remarks appeared in a Council of Ministers release on Wednesday, April 30. The release announced that radiation levels were decreasing and that decontamination work had begun.[25] It also refuted rumors published by Western news agencies that thousands of people had died in the accident. The Soviet media began what turned out to be a long series of articles condemning the West for exaggerating the seriousness of the accident and accusing the United States and the West of capitalizing on the accident to divert world public opinion from recent US military actions against Libya.[26] Soviet television also released a still photo of the damaged reactor.

This effort to suppress information about Chernobyl' provoked a storm of criticism in the West. It was also playing poorly at home. Many Soviet citizens were apparently very skeptical of the reassuring Soviet statements about the accident. Meanwhile, Western news coverage of Chernobyl' was reaching the Soviet public through contacts with friends and relatives abroad and foreign radio broadcasts—including the stories about a death toll in the thousands.[27] Thus, Soviet citizens with access to outside sources of news were hearing an account of the Chernobyl' situation that contrasted sharply with the official Soviet version. The minimal coverage was also contributing to rumors and public anxiety in areas near the accident— something that the Soviets subsequently acknowledged. One Soviet commentator noted that an important lesson of Chernobyl' was the need for honest, frank information.[28]

In response to these problems, the Soviet leadership decided to provide more extensive—although still heavily censored—coverage of the accident, but continued to play down its seriousness. A Council of Ministers statement on May 1 insisted that radioactivity was continuing to decrease.[29] Soviet television coverage of May Day festivities in Kiev and Moscow showed the usual line-ups of party leaders.

But on May 2, the Soviets moved a bit further away from traditional Soviet treatment of disasters by publicizing a visit to Chernobyl' by Ryzhkov and Ligachëv.[30] The two party leaders toured the Chernobyl' area, met with members of the government commission investigating the accident, and visited the evacuees. At the same time, the Soviet spokesmen and media stepped up their attacks on the treatment of the accident in the West.

On May 4, a spokesman for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) announced that the Soviets had invited its director, Hans Blix, to come to Moscow.[31] This move was obviously intended to counter Western complaints that the Soviets were holding back on Chernobyl'. A government communiqué issued on May 5 noted that the radiation danger in Ukraine and Belorussia was stabilizing and that dikes were being placed on the Prypyat' River to prevent contamination of water supplies.[32]

On May 6, the Soviet media counteroffensive regarding the accident went into high gear. There was a press conference at the Foreign Ministry press center featuring Boris Shcherbina, chairman of the government commission investigating the accident.[33] Again, the intention was to counteract Western charges that the Soviet leadership was being less than forthcoming on Chernobyl'. At the same time, Soviet domestic media began providing fuller coverage of the Chernobyl' events. The Soviet press published an account of the accident that highlighted the human-interest angle of the story.[34] Soviet accounts over the next several days continued to level sharp criticism at Western "scare stories" and implied that these stories were part of an anti-Soviet campaign.[35] They also pointed out that Soviet authorities were committed to providing the Soviet public and the entire world with extensive information on the accident, as the May 6 press conference had shown.[36]

During this period, Soviet authorities continually assured their own population as well as the West that

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[25] Moscow TASS in English, 1713 GMT, Apr. 30, 1986; also *Krasnaya Zvezda*, May 1, 1986.

[26] See, e.g., V. Bolshakov, "Senseless Zeal," *Pravda*, Apr. 30, 1986.

[27] On Soviet awareness of this spread of information, see the April 30 communiqué of the USSR Council of Ministers, loc. cit. Further evidence that Soviet authorities were aware that Western news coverage of Chernobyl' was seeping into the USSR comes from an interview with *Literaturnaya Gazeta* political observer Fëdor Burlatskiy in *Yomiuri Shimbun* (Tokyo), June 6, 1986. See also, Radio Liberty, Soviet Area Audience and Opinion Research, "The Chernobyl' Disaster and Western Radio Listening: Initial Findings," Munich, RM4-86, June 1986.

[28] Moscow Television Service in Russian, 0625 GMT, June 13, 1986. Additional evidence regarding the impact of conflicting information on the development of rumors is found in Radio Liberty, Soviet Area Audience and Opinion Research, "The Chernobyl Disaster: Sources of Information and Reactions," Munich, AR 4-86, October 1986.

[29] Moscow TASS International Service in Russian, 1123 GMT, May 1, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, May 1, 1986, p. R/1; also *Pravda*, May 2, 1986.

[30] Moscow World Service in English, 1500 GMT, May 3, 1986. The May 2 visit was reported on the evening news program "Vremya," on May 3.

[31] Paris AFP in English, 1504 GMT, May 4, 1986.

[32] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, 1527 GMT, May 5, 1986.

[33] Moscow Television Service in Russian, 1755 GMT, May 6, 1986.

[34] V. Gubarev and M. Odinets, "The Station and Around It," *Pravda*, May 6, 1986.

[35] Yuriy Zhukov, "Accidentally Dropping the Mask: Who Is Fueling the Ballyhoo and Why," ibid.; A. Mozgovoy, "Shamelessness," *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, May 6, 1986; and A. Shalnev, "Custom-Made Slander," *Sovetskaya Kul'tura* (Moscow), May 6, 1986, p. 22.

[36] "Concerning Events at the Chernobyl' AES. In the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, May 7, 1986.

М.РОЗЕН
Х.БЛИКС

Officials of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at a May 9, 1986, Moscow press conference regarding the Chernobyl' disaster and its consequences: at right, IAEA Director-General Hans Blix; at left, Maurice Rosen, director of the IAEA safety division.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

clean-up efforts were proceeding smoothly at Chernobyl'. An announcement by the Council of Ministers on May 7 said that radiation was continuing to fall and decontamination in the area around the station was nearly completed.[37] The media were writing that life in Kiev was normal. The upbeat coverage continued over the next several days. The Politburo reportedly commended the efficient work of those involved in clean-up operations and authorized a series of measures to provide financial assistance to evacuees.[38]

Soviet authorities also organized a tour of the Kiev area for foreign journalists, who were briefed on the Chernobyl' situation by Ukrainian officials.[39] The Soviet leadership obviously was calculating that the carefully controlled visit would result in less sensationalism in Western coverage of the event. These calculations were on the whole correct. For the most part, Western reports on the Kiev visit portrayed residents as uncertain and worried, but not panicked.[40] The Soviets were hoping of course that this news would filter back into the Soviet Union through foreign radio broadcasts and reinforce the official Soviet version of the events.

By May 9, Soviet reporters were conceding that some Kievans were concerned about the accident.[41] Ukrainian authorities announced plans to send Kiev's school children to holiday camp early as a precaution against possible radiation exposure. Local television warned Kiev residents against consuming fresh milk and vegetables and recommended other steps as additional preventive measures.[42]

Soviet spokesmen were still insisting that everything was under control. Soviet media highlighted the news conference held by IAEA Chairman Hans Blix,[43] and continued to run inspirational human-interest stories on Chernobyl', including a story based on an interview with an injured fireman.[44]

On May 11, there came the first indication in the Soviet press that a second crisis at Chernobyl' had been barely averted. The standard government announcement was predictably upbeat.[45] However, dur-

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[37] Moscow TASS in English, 1726 GMT, May 7, 1986; also *Krasnaya Zvezda*, May 8, 1986.

[38] *Izvestiya*, May 10, 1986.

[39] V. Gubarev and M. Odinets, "From Chernobyl' to Kiev: Our Special Correspondents Tell of a Meeting at the Ukrainian Council of Ministers," *Pravda*, May 10, 1986; Andrey Illesh, "Situation Normalizing—Meeting with Journalists in Kiev," *Izvestiya*, May 10, 1986; and Moscow TASS in English, 1533 GMT, May 9, 1986.

[40] See, e.g., Paris AFP in English, 0742 GMT, May 9, 1986.

[41] V. Gubarev and M. Odinets, "Spring of Alarm and Courage," *Pravda*, May 9, 1986.

[42] See, Paris AFP in English, 0742 and 0807 GMT, May 9, 1986.

[43] Moscow Television Service in Russian, 1430 GMT, May 9, 1986.

[44] G. Alimov, "Fulfilling His Duty," *Izvestiya*, May 10, 1986.

[45] Moscow TASS in English, 1714 GMT, May 11, 1986.

Foreign newsmen film a dosimetric check at a post in Markariv district, to which many people from the Chernobyl' area were evacuated.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

ing a televised interview, Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Ivan Silayev stated that "the situation currently does not pose a major threat, *which was feared*."[46] Despite this admission, much of the press coverage was dedicated to continuing complaints about Western criticism of the Soviet handling of the accident, as well as bitterness about a decision by the European Economic Community to ban food imports from Eastern Europe.[47]

On May 14, over two weeks after the reactor exploded, party chief Gorbachëv went on nationwide television to speak about the accident.[48] His talk was designed to repair the foreign policy damage caused by early Soviet silence on the accident, to shore up his own image at home by presenting himself as a strong and effective leader during the crisis, to convey the Soviet party leadership's concern for public safety, and to reassure both domestic and foreign audiences that the situation was under control and steps were being taken to preclude a repetition of the disaster. As with earlier Soviet media treatment of the accident, a key component of Gorbachëv's speech was the effort to shift public attention from Soviet behavior to the exaggeration by the Western press of the hazards resulting from the accident. Gorbachëv's address laid the groundwork for the Soviet public relations campaign in the following weeks and months.

As this review of the Chernobyl' chronology makes clear, the initial Soviet response to the reactor explosion closely followed the KAL 007 pattern. No information was provided until international pressure made the Soviets realize that silence was counterproductive. As with KAL, the early Soviet announcements were minimal and deliberately misleading: Soviet authorities were insisting that the situation was under control when, as they later admitted, a second disaster was threatening. Also, the reaction to Western criticism of

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[46] Emphasis added. Silayev's comments were broadcast on "Vremya," Moscow Television Service in Russian, 1430 GMT, May 11, 1986. See also Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, 1330 GMT, May 11, 1986; and *Izvestiya*, May 12, 1986. *Pravda* later acknowledged that "Ten days after the accident there was still the threat that it could escalate." See V. Gubarev and M. Odinets, "New Stage in the Work," *Pravda*, May 13, 1986.

[47] V. Bolshakov, "Warming Their Hands," *Pravda*, May 13, 1986.

[48] *Pravda*, May 15, 1986.

Soviet behavior was to attack the West: in the KAL case, for allegedly sending the plane on a spy mission in the first place; in the Chernobyl' case, for exaggerating the scope of the accident and engaging in anti-Soviet slander.

However, there were also some important differences between the handling of KAL and Chernobyl'. Once the public relations campaign on Chernobyl' got under way, it bore the imprint of Gorbachëv's *glasnost'* policy, with multiple press conferences; tours for foreign newsmen; interviews with officials, victims, and helpers; dramatic human-interest stories; and visible attention from top party leaders. To be sure, some of these differences can be attributed to the nature of the Chernobyl' accident itself—large numbers of Soviet citizens were affected by it and its aftermath. Nevertheless, these actions represented a concerted, if belated, attempt to apply the *glasnost'* policy to a technological disaster. Future handling of events of this nature will depend to a significant degree on how successful the Soviet leadership judges *glasnost'* to have been in containing the negative public relations consequences from the Chernobyl' disaster.

Foreign Policy Consequences

In the foreign policy realm, consequences are likely to be both limited and, for the most part, temporary. In the short term, the Chernobyl' accident almost certainly increased frictions between the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. The accident put East European leaders in a difficult position. On the one hand, they had to reassure their citizens and protect them against the consequences of radioactive contamination. On the other, they clearly did not want to criticize the Soviets or raise questions about their own civilian nuclear programs. In general, the public responses of the Warsaw Pact governments closely followed the Soviet strategy.[49] Most regimes played down the seriousness of the accident and condemned the West for exploiting the accident for political purposes. Media reporting was aimed at allaying public fears by assuring the population that the radiation was being continuously monitored and that it presented a minimal threat to public health. The one exception was Poland, where the government created an emergency panel to coordinate preventive measures and where children under 16 were given iodine preparations as protection against radiation effects.[50] In terms of popular reactions, Chernobyl' no doubt increased the already strong anti-Soviet sentiments among East Europeans.

In the long term, however, the accident and its aftermath seems unlikely to have a major political impact on the Soviet Union's relations with its East European allies. While some East European officials may resent the Soviets' failure to provide them with timely and accurate information about the accident, East European leaders have their own interests—chief among which is remaining in power—which would not be served by aggravating the Soviets unduly.

Outside of the Warsaw Pact, the Chernobyl' accident represents at least a temporary setback for Soviet public diplomacy. Since Gorbachëv became general secretary, he has worked hard to project an image of reasonableness, which is an integral part of his arms control strategy. Gorbachëv has tried especially to appeal to European audiences, so that Europe might pressure the United States to be more receptive to Soviet arms proposals. The initial Soviet silence on Chernobyl' undercut this strategy by underlining the USSR's continued commitment to secrecy. The initial news blackout also strengthened those in the West who argue that the USSR cannot be trusted.

A measure of how seriously Moscow has taken this public relations setback is the level of effort devoted to countering the negative international reaction. Top-level Soviet officials involved in the Chernobyl' cleanup continued to hold briefings on the accident throughout the summer.[51] The Soviets also made a determined—and quite successful—effort to appear forthright in their report to the IAEA meeting in August.

In addition, Gorbachëv has attempted to use the accident to give new impetus to his arms control proposals. During his May 14 address, for example, he pointed out that Chernobyl' demonstrated how dangerous nuclear weapons are, linking these remarks to an extension of the unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear tests. Gorbachëv's August announcement of another extension of the moratorium was repeatedly linked in the Soviet media with the Chernobyl' disaster, which was described as a pale reflection of the devastation that a nuclear war would bring. This effort, while not completely successful, has probably helped Gorbachëv to defuse the negative public relations fallout from Chernobyl'.

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[49] Most initial media reports in Eastern Europe were simply translations of the official Soviet announcements. See, e.g., Bucharest Domestic Service in Romanian, 1900 GMT, Apr. 29, 1986; Prague Domestic Service in Czech and Slovak, 1741 GMT, Apr. 29, 1986; *Népszabadság* (Budapest), Apr. 30, 1986; and Prague Domestic Service in Czech, 0700 GMT, May 4, 1986.

[50] Warsaw Television Service in Polish, 1730 GMT, Apr. 29, 1986.

[51] Press conferences designed to mold Western reports on the Chernobyl' issue were held in the Foreign Ministry's press center. See, e.g., *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda* (Alma Ata), May 29, 1986; Moscow Television Service in Russian, 1845 GMT, Aug. 21, 1986; *Krasnaya Zvezda*, June 7, 1986; and Moscow Television Service in Russian, 1748 GMT, Sept. 20, 1986.

Domestic Implications

The Chernobyl' accident has given Western observers a rare opportunity to see how a socialist regime copes with disaster. Soviet officials have made much of the courage and solidarity displayed by the people of the Soviet Union in reaction to Chernobyl'. In fact, the human response to Chernobyl' mirrored behavior during disasters in other national settings. For example, Soviet media claim that the evacuation of the surrounding communities went fairly smoothly; people were alarmed and anxious, but there was little panic.[52] Studies of evacuations in other countries suggest that this response is a typical one; despite popular images of mass hysteria, disaster victims rarely panic.[53] Some Chernobyl' victims, in particular the elderly and those separated from other family members, did resist the evacuation order.[54] This again follows patterns observed in Western studies of evacuation.[55]

Chernobyl' was also typical in that lack of information contributed to rumors. In the case of Chernobyl', wild rumors began circulating almost immediately after the accident was publicized. Many of the rumors incorporated two popular myths about disasters: that they invariably produce panic and result in widespread looting. For example, there were rumors that everyone who could run was fleeing Chernobyl' in panic, that there were bodies lying in the road, and that there was mass looting of stores and homes.[56] Lack of information, contradictory information, and little public trust in Soviet authorities, also contributed to anxiety. Again, this is hardly unique to the USSR.

In the Chernobyl' case, contradictory messages, together with the early official silence led to persistent public anxiety.[57] Residents throughout Ukraine and Belorussia were understandably worried about possible contamination of food supplies. A rumor touting the medicinal qualities of vodka as a cure for radiation was vigorously refuted by Soviet authorities. There were rumors that the waters of the Dnieper had been contaminated by radioactive dust. Kiev residents worried that the area was not safe for school children returning from summer camp. There were also stories circulating in the fall that the damaged reactor was still discharging radiation.[58] Soviet authorities now openly concede that most of these rumors, and the resulting popular resentment, were preventable through a more open information policy.[59] Indeed, the revised public information policy on Chernobyl'—qualified openness coupled with a public relations offensive—seems to have proven fairly effective both in calming public fears and defusing criticism of Soviet authorities.

Interestingly, the Soviet strategy of attacking the West for exaggerating the seriousness of the accident also appears to have worked fairly well. While some segments of the Soviet populace remain skeptical of Soviet coverage of the accident and its aftermath, many Soviets internalized the official media's outrage at Western "exploitation" of the tragedy, agreeing that Western governments, through the news media, were slandering the USSR.[60] This reaction is related, of course, to the fact that many Soviet citizens think that the media in the West are government-controlled.

The massive outpouring of sympathy and help for

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[52] A. Sokol, "To Work, to the Reactors," *Pravda Ukrainy* (Kiev), May 8, 1986; Vladimir Itkin and Lev Chernenko, "A Battle with No Front Line," *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, May 9, 1986; and A. Grakhovskiy, "Reserves of Resilience," *Trud* (Moscow), June 11, 1986.

[53] See Thomas E. Drabek, *Human System Responses to Disaster: An Inventory of Sociological Findings*, New York, Springer Verlag, 1986, pp. 120–21, 123–24, 136, 138.

[54] Vladimir Zhukovskiy, Vladimir Itkin, and Lev Chernenko, "The Alarms and Hopes of Chernobyl'," *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, May 8, 1986; and *Komsomolskaya Pravda* (Moscow), May 11, 1986.

[55] The Chernobyl' evacuation contrasted with most evacuations in the United States in both the mode of transportation and the destination of evacuees. While most evacuations in the West are by private vehicle, evacuation from the Chernobyl' area was by bus. Moreover, in most Western countries, disaster victims relocate with friends and relatives, with the remainder going to public shelters. The Chernobyl' evacuation, by contrast, placed the evacuees with individual families, generally complete strangers, in villages outside the danger zone. On the Soviet evacuations, see N. Matukovskiy, "Rallying Round," *Izvestiya*, May 20, 1986. On Western experiences, see Robert A. Stallings, "Evacuation Behavior at Three Mile Island," *Mass Emergencies and Disasters* (Uppsala, Sweden), Vol 2, No. 1, March 1984, pp. 11–39; and Drabek, op. cit., pp. 109, 125–26.

[56] Radio Liberty, AR 4-86, pp. 9–10; and V. Itkin, O. Moskovskiy, and L. Chernenko, "Patrolling the Danger Zone," *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, June 10, 1986. On Western experiences, see, Dennis E. Wenger, "A Few Empirical Observations Concerning the Relationship between the Mass Media and Disaster Knowledge: A Research Report," in *Disasters and Mass Media. Proceedings of the Committee on Disasters and the Mass Media Workshop, February 1979*. Washington, DC, National Academy of Sciences, 1980, pp. 241–62.

[57] *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, May 16, 1986; N. Baklanov, "Around the Market with a Radiation Meter," *Izvestiya*, June 24, 1986; and "Alcoholism and Radiation," *Pravda Ukrainy*, July 5, 1986.

[58] N. Baklanov and A. Prainikov, "Project in the Danger Zone," *Izvestiya*, Sept. 7, 1986; Moscow Domestic Service, 1315 GMT, May 14, 1986.

[59] See, e.g., *Pravda Ukrainy*, Sept. 26, 1986; O. Gusev and A. Pokrovskiy, "Four Months Later," *Pravda*, Sept. 2, 1986; and *Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya* (Moscow), June 10, 1986.

[60] See, e.g., interviews with Kiev residents broadcast on "Vremya," Moscow Television Service in Russian, 1700 GMT, May 5, 1986, in *FBIS-SOV*, May 6, 1986, pp. R/5–6. Additional evidence of the effectiveness of the Soviet attack on Western news media for exaggerating the scope of the accident is provided in Radio Liberty AR 4-86.

Significant portions of the public in the United States are also distrustful of media coverage of disasters, but (unlike Soviet audiences, which suspect the media of *downplaying* disasters), US audiences see the media as having a tendency to *exaggerate* them. See Drabek, op. cit., p. 166.

Yekaterina Derkonos, third from right, a worker in a household wares factory in Obukhiv, Kiev Oblast, with members of three families evacuated from the 30-kilometer zone around Chernobyl' whom she accommodated in her home.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

Chernobyl's victims is another typical human response to disaster. Soviet media in the weeks after the reactor explosion featured many stories of bus drivers who volunteered for evacuation duty, physicians who demanded to help, and families outside the danger zone who clamored for a chance to take in evacuees. Much was made of the many contributions to the special fund established for Chernobyl' victims.[61] Though some of this generosity was undoubtedly due to official pressure, much of it was genuine. Disasters in most national settings typically provoke a massive helping response from non-victims. Moreover, communities struck by disaster often experience heightened levels of internal solidarity and intolerance for outsiders.[62] Soviet authorities were capitalizing on this phenomenon when they highlighted inaccuracies in Western reporting and so diverted popular attention from the failure of Soviet officials to provide accurate information to their citizens.

Solidarity in response to disaster, however, is often followed by a negative reaction as victims, anxious to resume a normal life, lash out at those who are helping them. Chernobyl' victims apparently went through a similar stage. Some protested about the quality of medical care; others, that their pensions were not being transferred to their new residence. Relatives complained that they were unable to locate evacuees. Many of the evacuees were anxious to go home and responded negatively to the news that an early return to some places was impossible.[63]

The leadership responded in several ways. First, it announced a series of measures to compensate victims for material losses and provide replacement homes.[64] Second, responding to what is apparently a common need after disasters, the party leadership provided scapegoats by punishing selected officials. The government commission investigating the accident laid the blame squarely on human error.[65] Several low-level officials were summarily sacked for failing to be sufficiently solicitous of evacuee needs, others for fleeing with their families instead of staying on the job.[66] Several Moscow officials involved in nuclear power ministries were fired, as well as some lower level officials directly involved with the Chernobyl' plant and the experiment that led up to the explosion.[67] Taken together, these steps have apparently been fairly effective in containing negative popular responses to the Chernobyl' accident.

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[61] See *Krasnaya Zvezda*, May 13 and June 29, 1986; and *Izvestiya*, Aug. 10, 1986.

[62] Drabek, op. cit., pp. 142–44, 179–80, 182.

[63] A. Pokrovskiy, "Friends' Dependable Shoulders," *Pravda*, July 5, 1986; G. Krasnoperov, "How People Have Settled Down in Their New Location," *Sel'skaya Zhizn'* (Moscow), June 6, 1986; and Nikolay Balonev and Andrey Illesh, "The Ispolkom's Concerns," *Izvestiya*, June 13, 1986.

[64] V. Fomenko, "Civil Dignity—The Echo of Chernobyl'," *Pravda Ukrainy*, Oct. 31, 1986.

This is not to say that Gorbachëv has emerged politically unscathed by the accident. Western newsmen with extensive Moscow contacts indicate that Chernobyl' created an internal political crisis in Moscow, due to divisions within the elite over how to handle the accident.[68] Gorbachëv had identified himself personally with the policy of "openness" in news reporting. Consequently, the failure to apply this policy in the case of Chernobyl' could reflect negatively on his leadership abilities, because it may well have left the impression that he was overruled. Mid-level managers within the Moscow bureaucracy must surely have taken note of Gorbachëv's inability or unwillingness to carry out a policy with which he had strongly associated himself.

There have been increasing signs that some of Gorbachëv's policies are meeting with resistance. While some resistance would probably have developed in any case, Chernobyl' certainly contributed to it. Similarly, Gorbachëv may have to bear blame for the negative international repercussions of the accident. Both of these developments could undermine his ability to control Soviet policy and are, in this sense, detrimental to his consolidation of political power.

A Soviet military helicopter sprays decontamination chemicals on the countryside near the Chernobyl' nuclear plant on May 28.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

A political price for Chernobyl' may also be demanded from other members of the political elite. Gorbachëv could try to use the situation to purge or isolate those within the political elite who have opposed his "openness" policy, or to get rid of Ukrainian party chief Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi, a Brezhnev holdover long rumored to be slated for political demise. Central Committee Secretary Vladimir Dolgikh, another Brezhnev-era appointee, is also vulnerable because his responsibilities involve heavy industry and energy. Thus far, however, both Shcherbytskyi and Dolgikh remain in place.

The impact of Chernobyl' on the Soviet military and on civil-military relations has probably been mixed. Military personnel, both active-duty and reserve, have played a major role in the aftermath of the accident. Troops from the Kiev Military District were involved in the evacuation. Chemical defense units took part in the decontamination effort. Military medical sanitation battalions provided health checkups of area residents.[69] Military construction troops have been involved in clean-up efforts as well. Pipe-laying units and railroad troops were brought in to support the cleanup and the construction of the shell over the damaged reactor.[70] The air forces of the Kiev Military District were also involved in efforts to put out the fire and seal the reactor.[71] Additionally, civil defense units assisted in disaster relief support operations.[72]

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[65] The Politburo met in a special session to review the government commission report. See *Pravda*, July 21, 1986.

[66] V. Gubarev and M. Odinets, "Chernobyl' AES: Test of Courage," *Pravda*, May 12, 1986; Zh. Tkachenko, "Chernobyl' Will Remember the Courage and the Cowardice," *Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya*, Sept. 17, 1986; and O. Ignat'yev and M. Odinets, "Management Has Moved Back In," *Izvestiya*, July 17, 1986.

[67] *Pravda*, July 21, 1986; "On the Responsibility of Leading Officials at Certain Ministries and Departments Who Are Culpable with Regard to the Chernobyl' AES Accident," *Pravda*, Aug. 14, 1986; and *Radyanska Ukraina* (Kiev), July 27, 1986.

[68] Harrison Salisbury, "Gorbachev's Dilemma," *The New York Times Magazine*, July 27, 1986, pp. 18, 25, 30, 33.

[69] *Krasnaya Zvezda*, May 11, 21, and 25, June 10 and 28, 1986; A. Polyakov, "Duty and Responsibility," ibid., June 11, 1986; idem, "Mile Markers on the Route," ibid., May 18, 1986; and V. Svertsevich, "Chernobyl': Daily Routine," *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, June 12, 1986.

[70] V. Lyapkalo, "Pipe-Layers," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Aug. 27, 1986; and A. Polyakov, "In the Western Sector," ibid., June 14, 1986.

[71] "In the Hour of Trial," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, June 7, 1986.

Activities by military personnel at Chernobyl' received mixed publicity, suggesting that they also received mixed marks from the political leadership for effectiveness. The strongest kudos went to the helicopter pilots and the chemical troops.[73] By contrast, activities by the Defense Ministry's civil defense units have received very little press play; and Chief of National Civil Defense, Army General Aleksandr Altunin has been replaced,[74] apparently because of the poor showing at Chernobyl' of his civil defense units. The replacement of Altunin appears to be the only major military personnel change resulting from the accident. By contrast, officials at some civilian organizations were fired or reprimanded; and the organizational structure for nuclear safety was revamped.

Conclusion

The popular reaction to Chernobyl' is instructive for what it says about the role of public opinion in the USSR. Despite continuing evidence of popular fears about the accident and its consequences, there has been no suggestion of organized public resistance to the Soviet nuclear power program. In other words, there has been no hint of the sort of galvanizing of public opinion that could be expected had Chernobyl' taken place in a Western country. Public opinion does have a larger role under Gorbachëv, if only because this leadership is determined to make more sophisticated use of it. However, there is no evidence that popular pressures related to Chernobyl' have had any impact on a policy—the nuclear power program—to which the leadership is strongly committed.

The negative political reaction to the early leadership attempt to stonewall on Chernobyl' has probably done much to reinforce *glasnost'*. Certainly the accident does not seem to have reversed the Soviet effort to make more effective use of the media—both Soviet and Western. One example is the Soviet treatment of the accident on one of its nuclear-powered submarines in the western Atlantic. Another is the flying of foreign journalists to Afghanistan to observe the much-publicized withdrawal of some Soviet military units from that country.[75] Chernobyl' has apparently shown at least some Soviet leaders that they can get more mileage by manipulating the foreign press than by stonewalling it. Of course, the other side of the coin is that the Soviets are clamping down even harder on those foreign newsmen who try to get stories Moscow does not want told.

In the domestic arena, public discussion of negative events or trends appears to have expanded since Chernobyl'. The relatively forthright treatment of the August 1986 sinking of the cruise ship "Admiral Nakhimov" is one example.[76] The willingness to broach other taboo topics, like the recent ethnic riots in Kazakhstan, is another.[77] In short, the effectiveness of the aggressive, if belated, Soviet public relations campaign on Chernobyl' appears to have strengthened those in the Soviet leadership who argue that more effective control of internal public opinion means more open discussion of subjects traditionally dealt with by silence.

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[72] Ibid., May 27, 1986.

[73] Vladimir Zhukovskiy, Vladimir Itkin, and Lev Chernenko, "Helicopters Above the Crater," *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, May 11, 1986; and *Pravda*, Dec. 25, 1986.

[74] *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Sept. 24, 1986.

[75] *Pravda*, Oct. 7, 1986.

[76] As with Chernobyl', the accident received personal attention from top political leaders, and the results of an investigating commission report were endorsed in a Politburo meeting. See *Pravda*, Nov. 2, 1986.

[77] *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda*, Dec. 19, 1986.

Chernobyl' and Eastern Europe

John M. Kramer

It was not long ago that nuclear power was considered an inexpensive, safe, and environmentally sound answer to the world's energy needs. Today, it is more often associated with soaring costs and interminable delays in construction of new plants, apprehensions about the reliable and safe operation of existing plants, and fear that governments might utilize the nuclear energy industry to acquire, and even use, nuclear weapons. These and related concerns have prompted many governments to reassess, reduce, or even abandon their hitherto ambitious plans for the development of nuclear power.

However, to paraphrase Mark Twain, reports of the demise of nuclear power may be greatly exaggerated, given its projected status in Eastern Europe. All of the governments of that region have announced plans to establish or to augment substantially nuclear-power generating capabilities. Whether these ambitious plans are fully realized is another matter. The past record of nuclear power station (NPS) construction in the region—characterized by extended delays, frequently revised and sometimes abandoned plans, and a plethora of seemingly insoluble logistical, organizational, and administrative problems—suggests that the plans for expansion of nuclear energy capacity may well be underfulfilled, perhaps substantially.

The recent accident at the Chernobyl' nuclear power station in Soviet Ukraine only adds to the long list of problems East European governments face in implementing nuclear power plans. Nonetheless, publicly, governments of the region, while acknowledging the seriousness of the accident and the need to draw appropriate lessons from it, reaffirm their determination to press ahead with their own nuclear plans. This is in part because the damaged Soviet reactor differs in design from those existing or projected in Eastern Europe. But more important, these governments see no serious competitor to the atom in meeting their countries' energy needs. A Polish official, reflecting prevailing official sentiment, remarked that Chernobyl' represents "a lesson, not a verdict." A Czech source even asserted shortly after the accident that scientific progress involves not only successes but also setbacks, including "the loss of life . . . . Mankind has to pay for every advance and this also applies to the field of nuclear power."[1] These sentiments were reflected in the nuclear power plans announced at the 1986 meeting of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) in Bucharest. At this meeting, Nikolay I. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, announced that, by the year 2000, East European states would expand their installed nuclear capacity to 50 million kilowatts, versus approximately 8 million kilowatts of installed capacity in 1986. He also maintained that nuclear power would generate between 30 and 40 percent of the electricity then being produced.[2]

Despite such assertions, there is evidence that Chernobyl' has fostered, or reinforced, reservations about nuclear power among political elites throughout Eastern Europe. Poland, for example, has halted construction work "for several months" at its first NPS at Żarnowiec, reportedly because Polish nuclear experts have become "very meticulous" about safety since

John M. Kramer is Professor of Political Science, Mary Washington College (Fredericksburg, VA) and a Research Fellow at the National Defense University (Washington, DC). He has written widely on the politics of Eastern Europe. The present article is an abridged version of a chapter in a forthcoming book, The Politics of Energy in the Soviet Bloc.

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[1] For reactions of Polish and Czech officials, see respectively: *Informationen* (Copenhagen), June 11, 1986, in Joint Publications Research Service, *East Europe Report* (Washington, DC—hereafter *JPRS-EER*), No. 117, Aug. 4, 1986, p. 66; and *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (Frankfurt), June 23, 1986, in *JPRS-EER* No. 110, July 25, 1986, p. 2.

[2] *Pravda* (Moscow), Nov. 4, 1986.

Table 1: Share of Nuclear Power in East European Electricity Output from the Present to Year 2000

	1985/1986	1990[1]	2000[1]
Bulgaria	32	44	60
Czechoslovakia	20	30	50
GDR	11	15	30
Hungary	25	NA	40
Poland	—	9	40
Romania	—	18	NA

[1] These projections should be treated cautiously for, as the present study clearly demonstrates, all of these countries have a record of substantial underfulfillment of their nuclear plans.

SOURCES: Official publications of the respective countries.

Chernobyl' and fear it is being compromised at Żarnowiec.[3] Indeed, the delay may be even longer than announced, since "swift solutions" to the problems at Żarnowiec would require purchases of materials and equipment from the West with hard currency, of which Poland currently has very little.[4]

Even more outspoken was Nicolae Ceauşescu, general secretary of the Romanian Communist Party, who complained that the Soviet Union "tried to minimize the effects of Chernobyl' " and observed that the "serious damage" suffered by the nuclear facility "makes clear the great hazard posed by nuclear energy gone out of control." Ceauşescu concluded that "similar serious mishaps . . . cannot be ruled out in the future."[5]

Ceauşescu's views appear to reflect the sentiments of many private citizens in Eastern Europe as well. Although there is no antinuclear movement in the region of a magnitude comparable to those found in many Western countries, the accident at Chernobyl' did precipitate popular protests against nuclear power, especially in Poland and East Germany. Not surprisingly, the most widespread protests occurred in Poland—which suffered the highest levels of radioactive contamination from Chernobyl' among the East European states, and where anti-Soviet sentiments are particularly strong. More than 2,000 people in Kraków, organized by the dissident pacifist group "Freedom and Peace," marched to the old royal castle carrying placards and chanting such antinuclear slogans as: "No Iodine from the USSR," "Thou Shall Not Kill," and "Today Chernobyl', Tomorrow Żarnowiec."[6] Five Polish nuclear power experts published an open letter calling on the government to reassess the safety features at Żarnowiec, which, they claimed, had "raised doubts" among the population because many features of the plant, especially the containment structure, had been based upon as yet untested Soviet prototypes.[7] The Żarnowiec project also elicited a petition from some 3,000 residents of Białystok in northern Poland (one of the Polish areas seriously polluted by emissions from Chernobyl') demanding a halt in construction at Żarnowiec until the entire project could be placed under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency and assurances provided that the plant would use only the "most sophisticated" safety systems. The petition further asserted that official assurances about the safety of nuclear power were "not credible."[8]

In the German Democratic Republic (GDR), hundreds of people—doubtless well informed about the Chernobyl' events by West German television—submitted to the government on this year's Environment Day a petition entitled "Chernobyl' Is Everywhere," asserting that Chernobyl' had caused "insecurity and a feeling of being threatened." The petition condemned the government's alleged reluctance to discuss openly the magnitude and consequences of the accident as "irresponsible and socially dangerous," and urged the authorities through a referendum (constitutionally permitted, though never before employed) to initiate a "broad public discussion" about the future of nuclear power and, specifically, whether the GDR should completely abandon it by 1990.[9]

Members of the Evangelical Church in East Germany, long active on issues such as environmental pro-

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[3] *Życie Warszawy* (Warsaw), Sept. 5, 1986, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Eastern Europe* (hereafter *FBIS-EEU*), Sept. 15, 1986, p. G/14, citing *Głos Wybrzeża* (Gdańsk), Sept. 1, 1986, reports the halt in construction at Żarnowiec and indicates that it could last for "two or three years." This source adds: "The issue is delicate because, following the Chernobyl' tragedy, specialists are inclined to be overcautious, even though in such cases you can never be too careful."

[4] Ibid.

[5] Tanjug (Belgrade), May 15, 1986 in *FBIS-EEU*, May 16, 1986, p. H/1; *Scînteia* (Bucharest), May 9, 1986, quoted in Radio Free Europe (hereafter RFE), *Romanian Situation Report*, No. 7, July 2, 1986.

[6] On the demonstrations in Kraków see DPA (Hamburg), June 1, 1986, in *FBIS-EEU*, June 2, 1986, p. G/2.

[7] See DPA, May 16, 1986, in *FBIS-EEU*, May 19, 1986, p. G/3, for the text of the letter sent by the Polish nuclear experts.

[8] See cite in fn 6. The Polish Sejm responded to the petition from the residents of Białystok by acknowledging that, while the petitioners undoubtedly were "motivated by a true concern for the future of the country and its inhabitants," the fact remained that nuclear power was "indispensable" in Poland's energy future because of the "limited possibilities" to increase indigenous production of other fuels and the "lack of possibilities" to increase importation of liquid fuels. See PAP (Warsaw), June 10, 1986, in *FBIS-EEU*, June 13, 1986, p. G/5–7, for the text of the Sejm's response. Apparently, there will be some type of containment vessel around the reactors at Żarnowiec—a so-called "semimantle"—but its precise nature remains unclear.

[9] The text of the petition is published in *Across Frontiers* (Berkeley, CA), Fall 1986, p. 10.




ATOMY PROTI ŽIVOTU-ZDRAVÍ-PŘÍRODĚ
V ČSSR má být v příštích letech uvedeno do provozu 12 atomových reaktorů. Jen do roku 1990 to bude stát nejméně 90 miliard Kčs.
Reaktory v JASL. BOHUNICÍCH, MOCHOVCÍCH a DUKOVANECH nemají radioaktivní zónu chráněnou dvojitým pláštěm – pár kilometrů od osídlení!
Největší plánovaná atomka TEMELÍN s výkonem 4000 megawattu spotřebuje každou vteřinu potoky vltavské vody, které 4 chladírenské věže vysoké 150 metrů rozptýlí do okolí jako radioaktivní páru.
Atomová elektrárna s vykonem 1000 MGW dodává za rok 250 kg plutonia, které stačí na výrobu 25 jaderných hlavic.
Uskladnění atomového odpadu a likvidace prozářených elektráren po 20–30 letech provozu půjde na účet našich dětí a dalších generací.
Československo se má stát atomovou základnou Varšavské smlouvy.

Vydala skupina ANTIATOM

A postcard distributed by the Antiatom Group in Czechoslovakia. The photo of the Temelin Nuclear Power Station bears the words "Stop the atomic threat from Temelin--Antiatom:" On the reverse side is the following text: "ATOMS AGAINST LIFE—HEALTH—ENVIRONMENT. Czechoslovakia is to begin operating 12 atomic reactors in the near future. By 1990 alone, they will have cost at least 90,000 million korunas by 1990. Reactors in Jaslovske Bohunice, Mochovce, and Dukovany have no dual containment structures to shield the radioactive zone—this a few kilometers from human settlements! The largest planned atomic station, at Temelin, with a capacity of 4,000 megawatts, will guzzle up streams of water from the Vltava, which will then be dispersed into the atmosphere as radioactive vapor from four cooling towers 150 meters high. A 1,000-Mw atomic plant produces 250 kg of plutonium a year, enough to arm 25 nuclear warheads. Storing atomic waste and closing burnt-out plants after 20–30 years will be billed to the accounts of our children and later generations. Czechoslovakia is to be the Warsaw Pact's atomic base."

—This postcard was obtained by Radio Free Europe Research. We are grateful for permission to reproduce it here.

tection, also addressed these problems. In one instance, a peace group composed of church members sent a letter of protest to the GDR Council of Ministers that dismissed as "erroneous" official claims about the safety of Soviet-designed nuclear reactors and demanded that all reactors in the GDR be shut down immediately and research be begun on alternative sources of energy.[10] The subject figured "prominently" in the deliberations of the May 1986 synod of the church's leadership conference. One participant remarked that the "crust of taboos" surrounding public discussion of this hitherto unmentionable subject had been broken and a "nuclear debate" had ensued among the people.[11] The hierarchy of the church was more circumspect. Although it acknowledged that Chernobyl' had raised difficult questions as to whether nuclear power was "socially responsible," it predicted that the GDR "would probably have to live with nuclear energy for some time."[12]

A Western source from Czechoslovakia reported "panic" over Chernobyl' and "marked fear" among those residing near NPS's.[13] *Rudé Právo*, the official organ of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, implicitly confirmed this account when it reported that after Chernobyl' "many people" in Czechoslovakia asked whether the development of nuclear power "cannot be slowed down or even stopped."[14] Surprisingly, the dissident group Charter 77, which has been outspoken on many controversial issues over the years, has said relatively little about Chernobyl', although it did criticize official reticence about the accident.[15] However, a new dissident group "Antiatom" has emerged with the goal to "stop the atomic threat" in Czechoslovakia.[16] It has distributed postcards with a picture of the Temelin NPS and warnings about the cost and dangers (as well as the potential for diversion of efforts to the building of nuclear weapons) of the Czechoslovak nuclear power industry.

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[10] For the text of the letter of protest sent to the Council of Ministers, see *Die Tageszeitung* (West Berlin), May 17, 1986, discussed in RFE, *Background Report*, No. 102, July 21, 1986.

[11] Ibid. provides information on the antinuclear deliberations at the synod of the Evangelical Church.

[12] Ibid. East German officials had long contended that discussions of nuclear issues were unnecessary, because the people "were already told . . . that there was no danger." *Informationen*, Mar. 7, 1986, in *JPRS-EER*, No. 046, Apr. 23, 1984, p. 7.

It would be premature to assume that popular antinuclear sentiment will have no influence on public policy. Several regimes have already sought to assuage popular fears about the dangers of nuclear power by assuring their populations that they have enhanced safety measures to insure that nuclear accidents cannot happen in their country. Public opinion may also have influenced the decision to halt construction temporarily at the Żarnowiec NPS.[17]

Of course, antinuclear protesters face formidable—if not insurmountable—obstacles in achieving their goal of the complete abandonment of nuclear power. First, they operate in political systems that have the capacity to limit sharply their activities. Second, all regimes in the region by now have devoted so many resources to the development of nuclear power that they are unlikely to totally abandon these efforts. Third, just as in democratic societies, there are in Eastern Europe many ardent proponents of nuclear power who sincerely believe that the benefits to be derived from its exploitation far outweigh the risks.

The Case for Nuclear Power

East European proponents see nuclear power as essential if their countries are to close a rapidly widening gap between indigenous consumption and production of energy.[18] As one Czechoslovak official points out, his country "is not exactly awash in fuel and energy resources,"[19] while a Polish counterpart argues that nuclear power is the "only realistic source of additional energy."[20] But a citizen of the GDR captures the essence of this argument most succinctly: "Unless we want to turn off the lights, we just have to live with nuclear power."[21]

Proponents also see nuclear energy as more cost-effective than other nonnuclear sources of power. A Czechoslovak analyst, while admitting that the question of costs is a "complicated" one, nevertheless accepts this rationale "even after including the costs connected with solving problems of the external fuel cycle, such as storage of spent fuel, its transport and reprocessing, and neutralization of radioactive wastes."[22] It is unclear whether these calculations include the total costs of construction of NPS's—and not just operational costs—which are substantially greater for nuclear than for nonnuclear plants. It is likely that they do not.

Supporters also contend that increasing the reliance upon nuclear power while concomitantly reducing reliance upon brown coal and lignite in primary energy consumption would significantly enhance the quality of the environment in the region. The choice is a simple one, according to one Polish source: if Poland were to forgo nuclear power, then the future would witness "irreversible destruction of our environment and the turning of Poland into the dirtiest and most poisoned country in Europe."[23] This argument may explain why many East European environmentalists, notably Hungarian, voice little opposition to nuclear power.[24]

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[13] See *Luxemburger Wort* (Luxembourg), May 12, 1986, in *JPRS-EER*, No. 096, July 7, 1986, p. 44.

[14] *Rudé Právo* (Prague), July 28, 1986, in *FBIS-EEU*, Aug. 1, 1986, p. D/2. See also *Zemědelské Noviny* (Prague), Aug. 31, 1983, in *FBIS-EEU*, Sept. 2, 1983, p. D/4.

[15] *Dokumenty Charty* (Prague), May 6, 1986, in *JPRS-EER*, No. 091, June 20, 1986, pp. 102–03. A Western source suggests that many dissident groups in Eastern Europe, including Charter 77, have an "agenda full of concerns" (e.g., violations of human rights, inadequate delivery of government social services) that preoccupy them and take precedence over the "need for or desirability of antinuclear lobbying." RFE, *Background Report*, No. 74, May 27, 1986.

[16] See *Kurier* (Vienna), May 9, 1986, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-SOV*) May 12, 1986, p. M/1.

[17] As a Polish publication bluntly stated: "It is probable that nuclear energy could never survive another Chernobyl'-like failure" and added that "reassuring words will not calm frightened people if it is impossible to back up argument with evidence that proves the infallibility of designs, materials, and equipment used in nuclear power stations." *Życie Warszawy*, Aug. 23–24, 1986, in *FBIS-EEU*, Aug. 26, 1986, p. G/4. Reportedly, in Bulgaria, "security systems" at the Kozloduy NPS "have been tripled" since the accident at Chernobyl', while, in the opinion of a Western analyst, the accident accounts for the GDR's decision to place for the first time a containment shell around a reactor (at the Stendal NPS). BTA (Sofia), May 28, 1986, in *FBIS-EEU*, June 4, 1986, p. C/4; and RFE, *Background Report*, No. 102, June 25, 1986.

[18] See John M. Kramer, "Between Scylla and Charybdis: The Politics of Eastern Europe's Energy Problem," *Orbis* (Philadelphia), No. 4, 1979, pp. 929–33, for a fuller exposition of the sources of East Europe's energy gap.

[19] *Pravda* (Bratislava), July 10, 1984, in *FBIS-EEU*, July 12, 1984, p. D/1.

[20] *Rzeczpospolita* (Warsaw), May 1, 1985, in JPRS, *East Europe Report: Economic and Industrial Affairs* (hereafter—*JPRS-EEI*), No.060, July 22, 1985, pp. 5–6.

[21] *The New York Times*, Apr. 15, 1979, p. 27.

[22] See *Planovane Hospodarstvi* (Prague), No. 2, 1985, pp. 24–37, in *JPRS-EER*, No. 055, June 10, 1985, for a detailed analysis of the relative costs of nuclear and nonnuclear sources of power. See also *Rzeczpospolita*, May 1, 1985, in *JPRS-EER*, No. 060, July 22, 1985, pp. 5–6 on this issue. This source argues (incorrectly) that nuclear plants "require no more capital investment than do conventional plants."

Interestingly, proponents of nuclear power—particularly before Chernobyl'—rejected fears regarding the potential for accidents and other threats to public safety as exaggerated, if not fallacious. "Nuclear power is probably the best thing that humanity has ever had from the point of view of avoiding risks," proclaimed a ranking official of the Czechoslovak Atomic Energy Commission.[25] In the view of the director of the Research Institute of Nuclear Energy in Hungary, nuclear power was so "extremely safe" that current safety measures were "excessive" and entailed "excessive costs" and therefore needed to have "realistic limits" placed upon them.[26] If nuclear power represented any danger, such voices argued, it did so only under capitalism, where the insatiable pursuit of profit could lead the power industry to subordinate safety considerations to its own selfish economic interests.

The Soviet and East European approach to nuclear safety, they insisted, sought to prevent accidents from happening through excellence of design, reliability of equipment, and careful operational procedures, rather than using the Western approach of developing contingency plans for "worst-case" scenarios, including meltdowns. Thus, the USSR had long argued that its nuclear technology was so reliable that standard safety features used in the West (e.g., containment vessels to control meltdowns) were superfluous. Several Soviet scientists had even once contended that such features were merely "placebos to placate the people" under capitalism, made necessary by "negative dramatizations" in the press.[27]

Such insouciance is less common since Chernobyl'. Indeed, the Chairman of the USSR State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy has acknowledged that Chernobyl' represents a "severe blow" to the development of nuclear power, adding, however, that the Soviet Union had "no intention" of abandoning the technology "given, of course, the essential condition that a higher level of safety is ensured."[28] East European officials have responded to concerns about nuclear safety since Chernobyl' in two ways: (1) by emphasizing the technical differences between the reactors at Chernobyl' and those in operation in Eastern Europe, and (2) by assuring the population, as a Czechoslovak source put it, that "preventive safety measures . . . are being continually improved on the basis of acquired experience, so as to practically exclude any larger accidents."[29]

None of these rationales for nuclear power—even before Chernobyl'—went unchallenged either among political elites or among private citizens. We shall return to these criticisms when we assess the prospects for nuclear power in Eastern Europe. Before doing so, however, it would be useful to trace the development of nuclear power in the region from its inception in the mid-1950's to the present.

Nuclear Power 1955–70

The stress on nuclear power in Eastern Europe has both ideological and economic foundations. Communist planners historically identified electrification as a key factor in "the construction of the scientific-technological base" of communist society. Hence, nuclear power was seen as facilitating the establishment of mature communism. Furthermore, planners were aware that economic development in the region was rapidly outstripping the capacity of indigenous energy reserves. For example, as early as 1952, economic planners in Czechoslovakia had recommended the development of nuclear power in response to this situation.

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[23] *Rzeczpospolita*, Dec. 28, 1984 in Joint Publications Research Service, *East Europe Report: Political, Sociological and Military Affairs* (hereafter—*JPRS-EPS*), No. 026, Feb. 26, 1985, p. 191; *Tygodnik Powszechny* (Kraków), May 18, 1986, in *JPRS-EER*, No. 090, June 19, 1986, p. 86. John M. Kramer, "The Environmental Crisis in Eastern Europe," *Slavic Review* (Urbana, IL), No. 2, 1983, pp. 204–21, provides a comprehensive analysis of environmental pollution in the region.

[24] See RFE, *Background Report*, No. 74, May 27, 1986, for an analysis of the dilemma that environmentalists in Eastern Europe face in opposing nuclear power.

[25] *Pravda* (Bratislava), Nov. 6, 1985, in *JPRS-EPS*, No. 123, Dec. 17, 1985, p. 25.

[26] Budapest Domestic Service, Sept. 12, 1984, in *FBIS-EEU*, Sept. 14, 1984, p. F/7.

[27] The Soviet scientists are quoted in *The New York Times*, Jan. 2, 1980, p.23.

[28] The Soviet official is quoted in a dispatch from AFP (Paris), May 2, 1986, in *FBIS-SOV*, May 6, 1986, p. R/11, and in a dispatch from TASS, June 24, 1986 in *FBIS-SOV*, June 25, 1986, p. S/6.

[29] *Rudé Právo*, July 28, 1986, in *FBIS-EEU*, Aug. 1, 1986, p. D/2. However, Soviet officials continue to stress that the most effective way to ensure safety at NPS's is to prevent accidents from happening rather than providing plants with safety features, including containment structures, in case of accident. As one official remarked in a press conference shortly after Chernobyl', "we don't think containment vessels are much more effective, and we believe that the emphasis should be on preventing accidents." Quoted in *The Washington Post*, May 20, 1986, p. A/24. See also the comments of Valeriy Legasov, head of the delegation that presented the official report of the Soviet government on the Chernobyl' accident to the International Atomic Energy Agency. Legasov maintained that Chernobyl' had not changed the minds of Soviet experts about the efficacy of Western-style containment structures, because no such structure could have contained the explosion at Chernobyl'. *The Washington Post*, Aug. 28, 1986, p. A/32.

On January 17, 1955, the USSR announced that it would cooperate with its East European and Chinese allies in the "peaceful development of atomic science, technology, and national economy."[30] Shortly thereafter, the Soviet Union concluded agreements with all of these states to aid in the conduct of research on nuclear energy and, in the case of Czechoslovakia, the GDR, and Hungary, to provide technical assistance and equipment, including reactors, for the construction of NPS's.[31] For political, economic, and perhaps technological reasons the USSR honored its agreement only with the GDR, whose NPS at Rheinsberg became operational in 1966.

Politically, the upheavals in Hungary and Poland in 1956 and the growing rift between the USSR and the People's Republic of China reminded the Soviet leadership of the tenuous allegiance of its "allies" and of the potential for use of nuclear energy for other than peaceful purposes. These concerns applied especially to Czechoslovakia, which opted at its A–1 plant for a Soviet-designed reactor that used gas as a coolant, heavy water as the moderator, and natural uranium as the fuel. This reactor had the great advantage of permitting Czechoslovakia to rely upon its abundant indigenous reserves of natural uranium, thereby making it independent of any external source of supply (i.e., the USSR) for enriched uranium required by other types of reactors. The A–1's utilization of indigenous natural uranium threatened to eliminate an important mechanism of Soviet control over the nuclear programs of Eastern Europe—reliance upon the USSR as the sole source for enriched uranium—and, as a heavy-water reactor, the A–1 also was capable of producing fissionable material that could be used for military purposes. These two factors ultimately led the USSR to withhold its assistance. Reportedly, similar considerations led the USSR to "advise" Poland to abandon its plans for an independent nuclear program based on reactors fueled by natural uranium.[32] The one agreement that the USSR did honor was with the GDR, which opted for a light-water reactor not well suited for the production of fissionable materials and also fueled by enriched uranium supplied by the USSR.[33]

A 1966 view of East Germany's Rheinsberg Nuclear Power Station, the first operational NPS in Eastern Europe.

—Eastfoto.

From an economic standpoint, the Soviet Union may have feared that extensive use of nuclear power in Eastern Europe would lessen the need to import large quantities of liquid fuels from the USSR. By the mid-1960's, the bloc countries had completed construction of an extensive oil pipeline network (the so-called *Druzhba*, or "Friendship" pipeline) that was bringing annually upwards of 20 million tons of petroleum from the Soviet Union, and the prospects were for even more sales of oil—and hence, greater revenues—in the near-term future.

Finally, technological considerations also may have influenced the USSR. The type of reactor that Czechoslovakia had requested was not then operational in the USSR, and Soviet scientists knew relatively little about it. On the other hand, the GDR requested the very type of reactor that the USSR was using for the development of its own civilian nuclear power program. Indeed, the Soviet Union reportedly honored its agreement with the GDR in part because it wanted to undertake joint experiments with German nuclear scientists for the sake of the Soviet domestic nuclear program.[34]

Whatever the precise combination of factors that influenced the Soviet decision, its consequences were devastating for East European nuclear power development. Without the prospect of Soviet aid, Hungary abandoned its initial plans completely. Czechoslovakia continued the development of the A–1 plant, relying primarily on internal resources for expertise and technology. Predictably, these efforts were enormously costly, wasteful of scarce resources, and duplicative of research already conducted in other countries. When the A–1 plant was finally completed in 1972, it was 12 years behind schedule, and continuous problems plagued its operation. It was finally closed down in 1977.[35] The story of Czechoslovakia's A–1 project clearly refutes the recent contention of one Western analyst that the plant was "duly built with the active assistance of the Soviet Union."[36]

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[30] *Pravda* (Moscow), Jan. 18, 1955, carries the offer of nuclear cooperation between the Soviet Union and its allies.

[31] Unless otherwise noted, the following discussion is drawn primarily from Leslie Fox, "Soviet Policy in the Development of Nuclear Power in Eastern Europe," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Soviet Economy in the 1980's: Problems and Prospects*, Part I, US Government Printing Office, 1983, pp. 460–73; and J.G. Polach, "Nuclear Power in East Europe," *East Europe* (New York), No. 5, 1968, pp. 3–12.

[32] Polach, "Nuclear Energy in Czechoslovakia: A Study in Frustration," in *Orbis*, No. 3, 1986, p. 849.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Ibid., p. 851.

In 1965–66, in a seeming reversal of policy, the USSR concluded a new set of agreements with all East European states, except Romania and Poland, for the development of nuclear power. The agreements with Bulgaria, the GDR, and Hungary obligated the USSR to provide each of them with technical assistance and equipment, including two 440-megawatt (Mw) pressurized light-water reactors fueled with lightly enriched uranium for NPS's to be completed by 1975. The type of reactor to be provided—which was to become standard throughout Eastern Europe—was patterned after a model produced by Westinghouse (in fact it is often referred to as "Eastinghouse") and is considered reliable and economical by nuclear experts in the West. The agreement with Czechoslovakia envisioned construction of the A–2 and A–3 nuclear power plants with reactors of the same type—albeit of larger capacity—as that at the A–1 plant. Finally, in 1970 the Soviet Union concluded an agreement with Romania similar to those with Bulgaria, the GDR, and Hungary.

Several considerations motivated the USSR to conclude these agreements. The first was the desire to prevent East European states from seeking assistance in nuclear development from capitalist countries. In 1964–65, Czechoslovakia had approached Britain and France, and later Canada, about the purchase of a reactor and other equipment for the A–1 project. Ironically, this initiative grew directly out of the Soviets' refusal to help with the completion of this project. Romania, desirous of achieving some degree of independence from the Soviet Union, had also sought nuclear aid from several capitalist states, including Britain, Canada, and Sweden. None of these initiatives succeeded (largely because the United States, for security reasons, prevented the export of much of the necessary equipment). However, Romania did conclude an agreement with the United States in 1968 to exchange data on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the following decade with Canada for the supply of reactors at the Çernavodă NPS.[37]

Second, by binding the East European states more closely to the USSR in an important area of technology, the agreements enhanced the Soviets' overall political control of the region. The USSR sought to ensure this by supplying the Eastern Europeans with reactors fueled by lightly enriched uranium and by requiring them to export to the Soviet Union their indigenous reserves of uranium for enrichment and to return all spent fuel rods to the USSR for reprocessing. These policies again led to conflict with Czechoslovakia. The history of the A–1 plant repeated itself as the USSR refused to supply the heavy-water reactors fueled by natural uranium envisioned for the A–2 and A–3 projects. Finally, after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the latter opted—or was forced—to adopt the same type of reactor used by other East European states.[38]

Third, plain economic self-interest may have further motivated the USSR to conclude the 1965–66 agreements: by including Eastern Europe in its market for reactors, the nascent nuclear power industry in the Soviet Union was able to achieve otherwise unrealizable economies of scale in production. Presumably, by this time the USSR also did not feel that the East Europeans could achieve sufficient nuclear power capacities in the foreseeable future to threaten current and projected Soviet exports of liquid fuels to the region.

In any event, the Soviet Union did honor its agreements with Bulgaria and the GDR for the delivery of reactors, which permitted these countries to open

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[35] Chapter 77 alleges that the A–1 plant suffered two serious accidents (that included loss of life and radioactive steam escaping into the atmosphere) in 1967 and 1977, respectively, and that the latter mishap so damaged both the primary and secondary cooling circuits and the reactor itself that the plant had to be closed. Czechoslovakia never has acknowledged officially that the accidents occurred, but in 1980 a member of the Czechoslovak Nuclear Energy Commission did disclose that there had been a "defect" at the A–1 plant that damaged the reactor and led to the closure of the plant. Radio Prague, Aug. 8, 1980, in RFE, *Background Report*, No. 207, Aug. 14, 1980, provides an extensive analysis of all these issues.

[36] This contention appears in RFE, *Czechoslovak Situation Report*, No. 8, May 26, 1986. In contrast, in 1964, a Czech official called his country's experience in the development of nuclear power "depressing" and, in 1968, at the height of liberalization in Czechoslovakia, another ranking official asserted that "the results of the Czechoslovak atomic programs are tragic." These comments are found in, respectively: *Jaderna Energie* (Prague), No. 10, 1964, p. 356, and *Práce* (Prague), May 21, 1968, both quoted in Polach, "Nuclear Energy in Czechoslovakia," pp. 848 and 851.

[37] *The New York Times*, July 26, 1984, p. 25; ibid., Nov. 23, 1968, p. 93.

[38] Regarding this agreement, the former director of the Czechoslovak uranium industry (who escaped to the West after the invasion) declared that "I would never have signed this. Our children will condemn us for it some day." *The New York Times*, Mar. 5, 1972, p. 20.

NPS's in 1974–75. The agreements with Czechoslovakia and Hungary, however, were substantially modified and implemented only after protracted delays, and the one with Romania was never implemented. Hence, the overall record of achievement during this period fell far short of initial expectations: by 1970 only one NPS—at Rheinsberg in East Germany—was in commercial operation.

Nuclear Power Since 1970

Several factors contributed to a renewed emphasis on nuclear power in the 1970's. Politically, the USSR saw the development of nuclear power as part of a broader process of economic and—by implication—political integration in the region (a task made particularly compelling by the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968). This goal was to be pursued primarily under the auspices of CEMA, whose 1971 "Comprehensive Program for the Development of Socialist Integration" included measures to develop nuclear power.[39]

The East Europeans themselves viewed nuclear power more positively in the aftermath of the October 1973 war between Israel and the Arab states and the ensuing dislocations in international and Soviet energy prices and supplies. A communiqué issued by CEMA shortly after the October 1973 war asserted that "acceleration of the nuclear construction program in the CEMA countries was projected as a response to changing oil prices."[40]

Soviet energy also was becoming more expensive as reserves in European Russia became depleted and exploitation shifted primarily to remote and inhospitable regions of Western Siberia. Consequently, beginning in the late 1960's, the USSR had urged Eastern Europe to rely more on the world market and indigenous resources to close its energy gap.[41] Nuclear power was one means to this end.

The establishment of Interatominstrument in 1972 and Interatomenergo in 1973 represented visible institutional commitments to nuclear power. The former, a legally autonomous international association composed of the Soviet Union and all the East European members of CEMA except Romania, is headquartered in Warsaw. It coordinates industrial production, scientific research, and technical collaboration among the 15 facilities in the member states responsible for production of instruments of nuclear engineering. In 1975, the association established branches at Pleven in Bulgaria, Zielona Góra in Poland, and Dubna in the USSR. Although initially heavily subsidized, the association reportedly became economically self-sustaining by 1978.[42]

Interatomenegro, founded by the members of CEMA plus Yugoslavia, coordinates the planning, design, standardization, production, delivery, construction, and operation of equipment for NPS's. Under its auspices, each participating state assumes responsibility for producing specific components for reactors and other nuclear equipment. Czechoslovakia plays a key role here, thanks to a 1974 agreement with the USSR whereby it manufactures, under Soviet license, Soviet-designed equipment and components, including reactors, for NPS's. At present, it exports approximately one-half of its total output of such equipment and components to CEMA states, and it has already supplied reactors to the GDR and Hungary. Between 1986 and 1990, Czechoslovakia is scheduled to supply reactors and turbine systems for two power blocks in the GDR, two reactors to Poland, and special armatures to Bulgaria, the GDR, and the USSR. To date, all of the reactors exported are of the standard 440-Mw capacity, although Czechoslovakia is now beginning to manufacture 1,000-Mw capacity reactors (potential foreign customers reportedly include Bulgaria and Romania).[43]

The CEMA states also are cooperating in the development of a 750-kilovolt power grid that entails the construction of high-tension transmission lines from a complex of NPS's in the USSR. One of these lines—the so-called Vinnytsya-Albertirsa line—is now completed and links power stations in Soviet Ukraine with the power grids of Hungary and Czechoslovakia.[44] According to Judith Thornton, nuclear stations in Ukraine

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[39] *Izvestiya* (Moscow), July 31, 1971.

[40] BTA (Sofia), June 21, 1974, in RFE, *Background Report*, No. 5, June 28, 1974. On the increase in price for Soviet energy after 1975, see John M. Kramer, "Soviet-CEMA Energy Ties," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), July-August 1985, p. 41.

[41] For a particularly penetrating analysis of the increasingly restricted capacity of the USSR to close completely East Europe's energy gap, see István Dobozi, "Timely Questions of CEMA Cooperation in Supplying Raw Materials and Energy," *Kulgazdaság* (Budapest), No. 1, 1984, pp. 14–25 in *JPRS-EEI*, No. 030, Mar. 13, 1984, pp. 4–18.

[42] *Economic News of Bulgaria* (Sofia), No. 6, 1984 in *JPRS-EEI*, No. 131, Dec. 5, 1984, 36; Fox, loc. cit., p. 465. On p. 6 of "Atomic Energy in Eastern Europe: Trends and Prospects for the Year 2000," a paper presented at the Annual Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, 1981, Paul Josephson reports that Interatominstrument is economically self-sufficient.

[43] On the operation of Interatomenergo, see *Economic News of Bulgaria*, No. 6, 1984, in *JPRS-EEI*, No. 131, Dec. 5, 1984, p. 36. More detailed analyses of Czechoslovakia as an exporter of nuclear equipment are included in *Hospodarske Noviny* (Prague), No. 48, 1985, in *JPRS-EEI*, No. 034, Mar. 11, 1986; *Planovane Hospodarstvi* (Prague), No. 2, 1985, in *JPRS-EEI*, No. 055, June 10, 1985.

[44] RFE, *Background Report*, No. 77, Apr. 2, 1979, provides extensive background on the 750-kilovolt power grid project.



A portion of the 750-kilovolt transmission line from Vinnytsya in Soviet Ukraine to Albertirsa in Hungary upon the line's completion in October 1978.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

cording to Judith Thornton, nuclear stations in Ukraine contributed significantly to total Soviet exports of electricity to Eastern Europe (principally Hungary and Czechoslovakia) in 1985. How, if at all, the supply of Soviet-generated electricity to Eastern Europe has been affected by the loss of generating capacity at the Chernobyl' plant and the staggered, temporary shutdown of all Soviet Chernobyl'-type reactors to enhance their safety features is not yet apparent.[45]

In March 1979, as part of the power-grid project, the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland agreed to joint financing of the Khmel'nytskyi NPS in Ukraine. The East European participants are to finance one-half of the estimated $2.2 billion cost of the project, with Poland contributing more than $600 million and Czechoslovakia over $350 million. However, these figures represent only nominal costs: the total cost to the East Europeans for this project may be more than double the published figures. The participants were to be repaid with electricity from the station between 1984 and 2003, and thereafter could purchase electricity at regular commercial rates.[46] As of the end o 1986, the Khmel'nytskyi plant was still under construction, and hence was not delivering any power.

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[45] See Judith Thornton, "Soviet Electric Power after Chernobyl': Economic Consequences and Options," *Soviet Economy* (Washington, DC), Spring 1986. *Literaturna Ukraina* (Kiev), Mar. 27, 1986, in *FBIS-SOV*, May 6, 1986, p. S/1, reports that Chernobyl' supplied power to the CEMA power grid. A recent Soviet commentary noted that the situation regarding the supply of electricity to the economy and the population is tense: "To put it more simply, there is a power shortage. There are many causes of that. Including, of course, Chernobyl'." *Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya* (Moscow), Sept. 30, 1986. Overall, Chernobyl'-type reactors accounted for approximately 5–6 percent of the electricity generated in the USSR in 1985. Reportedly, the temporary closure of these reactors for "retrofitting" will reduce their total output by about 10 percent in 1986. See RFE, *Background Report*, No. 124, Sept. 9, 1986, for details. Hungary—which derives almost 30 percent of its electricity from the CEMA grid—would be the country most vulnerable in Eastern Europe to any reduction in exports o electricity from the USSR. MTI (Budapest), Nov. 4, 1986, in *FBIS-EEU*, Nov. 4, 1986, p. AA/12. To date, Czechoslovakia is the only country in the region reporting a drop in Soviet electricity deliveries because of Chernobyl'. To compensate for the shortfall, the USSR has offered to increas exports of natural gas. Radio Hvezda (Bratislava), July 23, 1986, as discussed in RFE, *Background Report*, No. 124, Sept. 9, 1986.

[46] *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), Feb. 20–21, 1982, in (footnote cont. on p. 48)

Fewer details are available concerning a similar agreement for participation by Bulgaria and Romania in the construction of another NPS (sometimes referred to as the "South Ukraine II") on the west bank of the River Bug in Soviet Ukraine and a transmission line from the plant across Romania to Bulgaria. The power block of this plant, with a 1,000-Mw reactor, was installed in 1982, and a similar reactor became operational in 1985. During the 1986–90 period, four additional 1,000-Mw reactors are to be installed, all manufactured at the "Atommash" complex in Ukraine, which is being developed for the serial-line production of this type of reactor. The precise contribution of the East European participants to this project and the terms of repayment have not been made public.[47]

This multilateral cooperation serves as a veneer for Soviet control of the nuclear activities of the CEMA states. As noted above, the East European states are required to obtain enriched uranium for their reactors from the USSR, as well as to return spent fuel for reprocessing. The Soviets also control the division of labor among the member states within the multilateral nuclear programs of CEMA, the design and standardization of nuclear equipment, the advanced training of scientists and other specialists, the export of nuclear technologies, the dissemination of technical information, and a myriad of other activities that ensure that the East European states are unable to develop independent nuclear programs.

The USSR is also a major supplier of components, including reactors, for East European NPS's. In the 1970–80 period, the CEMA states ordered 19 reactors from the USSR, 11 of which were delivered on schedule. In the future, the USSR is to specialize in the delivery of 1,000-Mw reactors, while Czechoslovakia will be the primary supplier of 440-Mw reactors. Bulgaria is the first East European state to begin installing a 1,000-Mw reactor. In 1979, it ordered two such devices for the fifth and sixth power blocks at the Kozloduy NPS and plans to install four similar reactors at a plant currently under construction in the Belene region. Overall, from 1986 to 1990, the USSR is to supply approximately 50 percent of the requisite equipment for construction of NPS's in CEMA states.[48]

Nuclear cooperation in CEMA has elicited from the participants open and frequent criticisms that evoke a sense of déjà vu in anyone familiar with the problems of CEMA in other areas of cooperation. A common complaint focuses upon delays in fulfillment of contractual obligations by the participating states. Premier Lubomir Štrougal of Czechoslovakia, after noting that his country has important cooperative agreements with the Soviet Union and other CEMA states for the delivery of reactor components, charged that its "partners" are "lagging behind from the standpoint of timetable" in the fulfillment of these agreements.[49] This situation may become even more acute, since the "Atommash" complex in the USSR has encountered massive problems in construction and is far behind schedule.[50] Premier Štrougal also has criticized "foot-dragging and disputes" in the construction of the Khmel'nytskyi NPS and its transmission line. "I do not think we can reconcile ourselves to further delays in the construction" of these facilities, he declared.[51] Reportedly, other CEMA states accuse Czechoslovakia of these very same sins, and Czechoslovak sources virtually admit to the charges.[52]

There also are numerous complaints about the quality and price of components in cooperative projects. Referring to a recent meeting of the CEMA states, Premier Štrougal asserted that they had addressed the subject "very frankly and sometimes very critically, and I believe with justification."[53] A Western source adds that East Europeans privately complain that the division of labor within CEMA creates "inflexible links to outdated Soviet technology," which is a "sure recipe" for maintaining the "inefficiency and declining technological competitiveness Eastern Europe is struggling to overcome."[54]

An unusually frank article in a Slovak publication provides revealing insights into the difficulty that Czechoslovakia (and, perhaps, other CEMA states) has experienced in ensuring that Soviet nuclear equip-

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RFE, *Polish Situation Report*, No. 13, July 27, 1982, provides background on the Khmel'nytskyi project. See also RFE, *Background Report*, No. 77, Apr. 2, 1979. The reason that nominal and actual costs in CEMA projects diverge is twofold: (1) the creditor in these projects, i.e., the East Europeans in the case of Khmel'nytskyi, typically extends to the borrower an implicit subsidy through an artificially low interest rate (usually 2 percent) on the credit; (2) the CEMA practice is to value credits and payments at their respective times of delivery, thereby devaluing the former in times of inflation.

[47] RFE, *Background Report*, No. 129, Nov. 18, 1985, provides extensive details on the "South Ukraine II" project.

[48] On the role of the USSR in CEMA nuclear projects, see *Hospodarske Noviny*, No. 40, 1985, in *JPRS-EEI*, No. 092, Dec. 9, 1985, p. 7.

[49] For Premier Štrougal's criticism, see Prague Domestic Television, July 4, 1981, in *FBIS-EEU*, July 8, 1981, p. AA/13.

[50] On the multiple problems encountered at the "Atommash" Complex, including that its foundation cracked as a function of unexpected land erosion, see *The Washington Post*, Nov. 9, 1983, p. A/1; and *The New York Times*, Apr. 1, 1984, p. 30, which also provides additional information on the "Atommash" Complex as well as on the overall state of nuclear equipment production and the problems being encountered therein.

[51] *Rudé Právo*, Oct. 19, 1983.

[52] See *Zivot Strany* (Prague), No. 14, 1982, in RFE, *Czechoslovak Situation Report*, No. 15, Aug. 25, 1982.

[53] Premier Štrougal's comments are reported in Prague Domestic Service, June 10, 1982, in *FBIS-EEU*, June 11, 1982, p. AA/4.

[54] On alleged Eastern European dissatisfaction with Soviet technology, see *The Washington Post*, Dec. 17, 1985, p. A/22.

ment meet local safety standards. This difficulty, the publication declared, represents a "fundamental shortcoming" in the completion of new power projects. The publication adds that the "technological process of increased nuclear safety demands new elements, new design solutions," and that the "frequent and favorite" Soviet response that "power blocks are identical" no longer applies.[55]

According to Stanislav Havel, Chairman of the Czechoslovak Commission for Nuclear Energy, in an interview shortly before the disaster at Chernobyl', one of the primary goals of CEMA nuclear cooperation is to achieve "considerably greater reliability for nuclear facilities and the safe operation of NPS's."[56] His statement comes nearly two years after Czechoslovakia had reportedly "significantly altered" Soviet-designed reactors to enhance their "reliability, safety, and technical production characteristics"—alterations accepted by the GDR, Hungary, and Poland.[57] Interestingly, ranking officials of the nuclear power industry in both Czechoslovakia and the USSR held talks in August 1986 to discuss their respective country's role "in the development of nuclear power and its safety."[58]

Finally, comments by Polish officials suggest general unhappiness with the self-styled "informal" procedures CEMA has developed to exchange information regarding nuclear accidents and environmental hazards that could ensue, and in particular with how the USSR transmitted information about the Chernobyl' disaster. Thus, Jerzy Urban, the official press spokesman for the Polish government, informed listeners that following "difficulties in the way of responding to certain facts" about Chernobyl', the USSR and Poland have agreed "to more precisely define" procedures for reporting emergencies, procedures that previously had "not been precise enough."[59]

National Programs Since 1970

Bulgaria. Bulgaria is among the six leading nations in the world—and the leading nation in Eastern Europe—in terms of the percentage of its electricity generated by nuclear power. Its installed nuclear capacity of 1,760 Mw, in four reactors at the Kozloduy NPS, ranks it behind only Czechoslovakia and East Germany in installed capacity in the region.



Construction at the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Station in Bulgaria in 1971.

—Eastfoto

Currently, construction is under way on two more power blocks at Kozloduy, each to be equipped with a 1,000-Mw reactor supplied by the USSR. Work also has begun on another NPS at Belene, to be equipped with four similar reactors, which is planned to be fully operational by the mid 1990's. Reportedly, the USSR was to supply these reactors, but it now appears that the first one (scheduled for delivery in late 1987) may come from—and be the first reactor of this capacity manufactured in—Czechoslovakia.[60]

Overall, Bulgaria, where nuclear power will generate over 30 percent of total domestically produced electricity in 1986, hopes to increase this percentage to 60 by the year 2000. Additionally, the plants at Kozloduy and Belene are to provide for the centralized supply of heat to nearby population and industrial centers, and in the "near future," construction is to begin on the country's first NPS devoted solely to the production of heat. The latter, with an initial heating capacity of 500 Mw in each of two blocks, will be expanded "at a later stage" to an overall capacity of 2,000 Mw. By 1995, Bulgaria hopes that such plants will supply approximately 17 percent of the country's "general heating consumption."[61]

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[55] *Pravda* (Bratislava), July 10, 1984, in *FBIS-EEU*, July 12, 1984, p. D/1.

[56] Chairman Havel's comments are carried by Czechoslovak Television, Apr. 18, 1986, as quoted in RFE, *Czechoslovak Situation Report*, No. 8, May 26, 1986.

[57] *Hospodarske Noviny*, No. 48, 1985, in *JPRS-EEI*, No. 034, Mar. 11, 1986, p. 2, notes the alterations—reportedly "on the recommendation of Soviet specialists"—in Soviet-designed reactors.

[58] CTK (Prague), Aug. 26, 1986, in *FBIS-EEU*, Aug. 27, 1986, p. D/5 reports on the meeting of Czechoslovak and Soviet nuclear officials.

[59] *The Washington Post*, May 7, 1986, p. A/36. On the "informal" procedures that CEMA purportedly has developed to exchange information on mishaps at NPS's, see *Jaderna Energie*, No. 3, 1984, as discussed in RFE, *Czechoslovak Situation Report*, No. 8, May 26, 1986.

[60] *Energetika* (Sofia) No. 8, 1984, in *JPRS-EEI*, No. 131, Dec. 5, 1984, pp. 37–38; *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), Sept. 12, 1984, in *FBIS-EEU*, Sept. 18, 1984, p. C/1. For extensive background on the development of nuclear power in Bulgaria, see RFE, *Bulgarian Situation Report*, No. 7, May 12, 1984.

These ambitious targets are unlikely to be fulfilled on schedule. Already a joint decree of the highest bodies of the Bulgarian Communist Party and the government has harshly criticized the pace of construction at the fifth block at Kozloduy, originally scheduled to be fully operational in late 1985.[62] A special committee, headed by a Politburo member, now oversees construction of the project, but work continues "to move at an extremely slow pace" and is currently a year behind schedule. Official publications, although typically reticent in providing detailed information, have identified shortages of labor (especially of highly skilled technicians), and related personnel problems, as well as delays in the supply of essential equipment as the primary culprits for the slowdowns. To reduce the labor shortage at Kozloduy, Bulgaria has imported "guest workers" from Cuba, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, Poland, and Vietnam.[63] The plant at Belene has experienced similar delays, apparently for the same reasons. Consequently, work there in the 1986–90 period must proceed under "tense conditions of organization and planning" if the project is to be completed on schedule.[64]

Czechoslovakia. Currently, Czechoslovakia has two NPS's in commercial operation: one at Jaslovske Bohunice and the other at Dukovany in southern Moravia. Both plants are equipped with 440-Mw reactors, the former with four reactors (the first two built in the USSR, the others in Czechoslovakia), the latter with two reactors already operational and a third to become so by the end of 1986 (all manufactured in Czechoslovakia).

By the year 2000, Czechoslovakia plans to have installed an additional 440-Mw reactor at Dukovany, as well as four more reactors at each of the two NPS's currently under construction, at Mochovce in western Slovakia and Temelin in southern Bohemia. The reactors at the Temelin plant will be the first ones in Czechoslovakia with a 1,000-Mw capacity and, more significantly, the first ones to be protected by a containment vessel.

If the plans for the Dukovany, Mochovce, and Temelin plants materialize, then Czechoslovakia would have approximately 9,000 Mw of installed nuclear capacity by the turn of the century. Nuclear power is projected to generate approximately 30 percent of all electricity in 1990, and as much as 50 percent by the year 2000. The current proportion is 20 percent. Additionally, all of these plants will supply heat and hot water to industrial and municipal customers; the first conduit for this purpose is currently under construction between Jaslovske Bohunice and the nearby municipality of Trnava.[65]

It is highly doubtful, however, that these targets will be met. Though considerable difficulties have plagued the construction of NPS's throughout the world, the assessment of one Western source that "the implementation of the nuclear energy program in Czechoslovakia is a particularly sorry case,"[66] appears merited in light of the evidence available. For example, in 1978, Czech officials projected that Czechoslovakia would possess 10,280 Mw of installed nuclear capacity by 1990,[67] yet it is highly unlikely that installed capacity will exceed 4,400 Mw by that date. Even this assessment assumes that all reactor blocks at Dukovany and the first two at Mochovce are operational by then. If the experience at Jaslovske Bohunice and Dukovany is at all indicative, even this scaled-down projection may be overly optimistic.[68] Even an official publication has called the plant at Mochovce "the worst-prepared building project of its kind" and added that "mistakes in and modifications of the early stage

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[61] *Energetika*, No. 2, 1985, in *JPRS-EEI*, No. 061, July 23, 1985, pp. 2, 5, provides a detailed discussion of these issues.

[62] On the difficulties encountered in construction at Kozloduy, see, *Energetika*, No. 10, 1983, in *JPRS-EEI*, No. 015, Feb. 3, 1984.

[63] *Zemedelsko Zname* (Prague), Feb. 13, 1986, cited in RFE *Background Report*, No. 72, May 23, 1986, reports on the use of foreign workers at Bulgarian nuclear projects.

[64] Sofia Domestic Service (Sofia), Nov. 26, 1985, in *FBIS-EEU*, Nov. 29, 1985, p. C/3–4.

[65] The following constitutes a selective list of sources detailing plans for nuclear power in Czechoslovakia: *Planovane Hospodarstvi*, No. 4, 1985, in *JPRS-EEI*, No. 071, Sept. 9, 1985; *Rudé Právo*, Sept. 21, 1985, in *FBIS-EEU*, Oct. 1, 1985, p. D/3; *Rudé Právo*, June 11, 1986, in *FBIS-EEU*, June 24, 1986, p. D/4; *Pravda* (Bratislava), May 22, 1985, summarized in RFE, *Czechoslovak Situation Report*, No. 14, Sept. 4, 1985. Data on the generation of heat at NPS's from *Práce*, Oct. 7, 1986, in *FBIS-EEU*, Oct. 24, 1986, p. D/9.

[66] RFE, *Czechoslovak Situation Report*, No. 14, Sept. 4, 1985.

[67] Ibid.

[68] On the problems encountered in making operational the power blocks at the Jaslovske Bohunice and Dukovany NPS's see, respectively, *Pravda* (Bratislava), May 2, 1984, in *FBIS-EEU*, May 7, 1984, p. D/15; and *Lidová Demokracie* (Prague), May 6, 1983, in *FBIS-EEU*, May 13, 1983, p. D/10. The latter source provides a particularly informative account of this issue.

Table 2: Installed Nuclear Capacity in Eastern Europe, (On Line as of September 1986 and Projected)

	Installed capacity on line		Plants under construction		Planned plants		Installed and projected capacity	
Country/plant	Reactors	Megawatts	Reactors	Megawatts	Reactors	Megawatts	Reactors	Megawatts
BULGARIA							10	7,760
Kozloduy	4	1,760	2	2,000	—	—		
Belene	—	—	4	4,000	—	—		
CZECHOSLOVAKIA							16	9,280
Jaslovske Bohunice	4	1,760	—	—	—	—		
Dukovany	2	880	2	880	—	—		
Mochowce	—	—	4	1,760	—	—		
Temelin	—	—	4	4,000	—	—		
GDR							11	5,600
Rheinsberg	1	80	—	—	—	—		
NORD	4	1,760	4	1,760	—	—		
Stendal	—	—	2	2,000	—	—		
HUNGARY							6	3,760
Paks	2	880	2	880	2	2,000		
POLAND							12	9,860
Żarnowiec	—	—	4	1,860	—	—		
WARTA	—	—	—	—	4	4,000		
(Name not designated)	—	—	—	—	4	4,000		
ROMANIA							13	9 ,600
Çernavodă	—	—	5	3,300	—	—		
Moldava	—	—	—	—	3	3,000		
Transylvania	—	—	—		5	3,300		
TOTAL	17	7,120	33	22,440	18	16,300	68	45,860

SOURCES: Official publications of the respective countries.

of the project will probably take 10 years to rectify."[69] That the site has proven to be geologically unstable, thereby creating an "unavoidable need to reinforce the seismic protection," is only one of a complex of problems confronting the builders.[70]

Nuclear power construction in Czechoslovakia suffers from a variety of shortcomings. Primary among them is a shortage of qualified specialists. There also is a lack of skilled blue-collar workers. According to one source, the failure to provide adequate housing, cultural and educational facilities, and other amenities has made it difficult to attract sufficient qualified personnel for work at NPS construction sites.[71]

Bureaucratic infighting and conflicts among key participants in nuclear projects are another major source of delays. There have been "repeated failures" to prevent "fundamental conflicts" among designers, suppliers, and builders, who often "subordinate deadlines, the quality of supplies, and other planned parameters to narrow economic viewpoints."[72] Apparently, such conflicts also have occurred with participating Soviet organizations, thereby necessitating "exacting" discussions between the two sides.[73] The deleterious consequences of these developments include numerous alterations in design at both the planning and project stage, failure to provide requisite equipment and materials to the builders on schedule, and low morale and productivity among the workforce. If an account in *Rudé Právo* is accurate, then construction of NPS's borders on the farcical:

> *Once upon a time, when they began construction there [i.e., Dukovany], they first laid a foundation stone*

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[69] *Smena* (Prague), Jan. 11, 1984, quoted in RFE, *Czechoslovakian Situation Report*, No. 2, Feb. 6, 1984.

[70] Another good source on the problems besetting this NPS is *Pravda* (Bratislava), Feb. 22, 1985, in *JPRS-EEI*, No. 036, Mar. 28, 1985, p. 10.

[71] Analyses of these problems include *Hospodarske Noviny*, No. 48, 1985, in *JPRS-EER*, No. 034, Mar. 11, 1986, p. 4; *Planovane Hospodarstvi*, No. 4, 1985, in *JPRS-EEI*, No. 071, Sept. 9, 1985; *Tribuna* (Prague), No. 35, 1980, summarized in RFE, *Czechoslovak Situation Report*, No. 22, Sept. 11, 1980.

[72] See Premier Štrougal's comments in *Rudé Právo*, Sept. 21, 1985, in *FBIS-EEU*, Oct. 1, 1985, p. D/3.

[73] *Rudé Právo*, May 28, 1983, in *FBIS-EEU*, June 7, 1983, p. D/2.

> *and functionaries descended on the place in nearly 70 cars. Only much later, almost without blueprints, a few dozen people started the building process in earnest. Many of them had been recruited from a local brick kiln factory, which happened to have closed down recently. The first machinery at their disposal they borrowed from the neighboring agricultural cooperative.*[74]

Commenting upon these conditions, one Western observer asserts: "More convincingly than any other undertaking, the Czechoslovak nuclear energy program exposes the creeping crisis in the country's neglected economic system."[75]

Responsible officials in Czechoslovakia have voiced similar sentiments. Deputy Premier Ladislav Gerle, the official in charge of the nuclear program, pointed out during "frank and critical deliberations" with representatives of the nuclear power industry the "specific shortcomings" in their work. Sounding very much like Soviet Communist Party leader Mikhail Gorbachëv, he stressed that the only "way out of the situation [is] an increase in the productivity of all participants in the construction and . . . the improvement of organization and management work."[76]

German Democratic Republic. The GDR traditionally has been a leader in the development of nuclear power in Eastern Europe. Its power plant at Rheinsberg was the first commercially operating nuclear facility in the region. Between 1974 and 1979, it placed another four reactors into service at its second NPS at Lubmin on the Baltic Coast (variously referred to as "NORD" or "Bruno Leuschner"). Thus, by 1980, the GDR with 1,840 Mw possessed the largest installed nuclear capacity in Eastern Europe, generating 12 percent of all the electricity produced in that country.[77]

Nonetheless, one should treat with caution the recent assertion of a Western analyst that the GDR is "firmly committed" to the development of nuclear power.[78] After all, Erich Honecker, the general secretary of the SED (communist party), has expressed his personal belief that "atomic energy is not the last word" and that he was pleased that the GDR still relied primarily upon coal for its power.[79] Initial forecasts had projected that the GDR would install an additional 3,520 Mw of nuclear power by 1985[80] (thereby bringing total installed capacity to 5,360 Mw) by commissioning another four reactors at the "NORD" facility and opening a third nuclear power station (called " Stendal" or "Magdeberg"). Furthermore, between 1986 and 1990 the new plant was to be expanded, bringing national nuclear capacity to either 7,120 Mw or 9,360 Mw. Nuclear facilities would then generate as much as 20 to 25 percent of indigenously produced electricity by 1990.[81]

In fact, however, no new nuclear capacities were commissioned between 1981 and 1985, and the percentage of electricity generated by nuclear power actually declined. The 1986–90 state plan now envisions that the "NORD" facility will be "made ready" by 1990 and that the new "Stendal" plant, equipped with two 1,000-Mw reactors, will be "put into operation" in 1991. The plan projects that, by 1990, nuclear power will account for 15 percent of all the electricity produced by East Germany. Thus, at best, the GDR will have 5,600 Mw of installed nuclear capacity by the early 1990's, substantially less than originally projected for that period and only slightly more than its plan target for 1985. Additionally, the share of electricity to be provided by nuclear power in 1990 is significantly lower than the respective figures envisioned by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.[82]

Hungary. Hungary has been ambivalent in its commitment to nuclear power. As noted above, its first (and only) NPS—located at Paks, on the Danube River south of Budapest—has its origins in the 1966 agreement with the Soviet Union whereby the latter was to supply two reactors to be made operational in 1975 and 1976, respectively. This agreement was never implemented, however. Then, in 1974, the project was officially resurrected, and the 1966 agreement "modified": Czechoslovakia, not the USSR, would supply the reactors; the capacity of the plant was to be doubled with the installation of four reactors; and the plant was to be eventually expanded to a total capacity of 4,000 Mw. Other projections contemplated bringing a series of 1,000-Mw reactors on line during the 1990's so as to

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[74] *Rudé Právo*, Apr. 27, 1984, quoted in RFE, *Czechoslovak Situation Report*, No. 9, May 11, 1984.

[75] RFE, *Czechoslovak Situation Report*, No. 14, Aug. 9, 1983.

[76] *Rudé Právo*, July 19, 1983, in *FBIS-EEU*, July 22, 1983, p. D/2. Premier Štrougal expresses similar sentiments in *Rudé Právo*, Sept. 21, 1985, in *FBIS-EEU*, Oct. 1, 1985, p. D/3.

[77] For background on the development of nuclear power in the GDR, see *Energietechnik* (Leipzig), No. 12, 1983, in *JPRS-EEI*, No. 024, Feb. 23, 1984, p. 32. *Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), Apr. 12, 1981 in *FBIS-EEU*, Apr. 30, 1981, p. E/17 also provides information on this subject.

[78] RFE, *Background Report*, No. 102, June 25, 1985.

[79] General Secretary Honecker's remarks, made to *Dagens Nyheter* (Stockholm), were reprinted in *Neues Deutschland*, June 25, 1986.

[80] On nuclear plans through 1985, see *DIW Wochenbericht* (West Berlin), Jan. 30, 1986, in *JPRS-EEI*, No. 056, Apr. 11, 1986, pp. 3–7.

[81] On the plans to expand the Stendal plant and on nuclear power through 1990, see *Die Zeit* (Hamburg), Mar. 13, 1981, discussed in RFE, *Background Report*, No. 48, Mar. 11, 1983.

[82] See the plan directives published in *Neues Deutschland*, Apr. 23, 1986, in *FBIS-EEU*, June 10, 1986, p. E/26.



The reactor hall at the Paks Nuclear Power Station in southern Hungary in May 1984.

—Eastfoto.

attain a total installed nuclear capacity of between 15,000 and 20,000 Mw by the year 2000. By that year, nuclear power would generate approximately one-half of all indigenously produced electricity.[83]

Such optimistic projections are rare these days. Indeed, Czechoslovakia's Deputy Premier Gerle has reported that Hungarian officials are making a "certain adjustment of the original program" and are "modifying the concept of the construction of nuclear power plants."[84] Undoubtedly, their experience with making operational the first four reactor units at Paks helped prompt this reassessment. The cost of the project, projected in 1976 at approximately 40 billion forints, now exceeds 75 billion forints, and to date only two of the reactor units have been made operational.[85] In 1985, these two units generated 25 percent of the electricity produced in the country.[86] Hungary now plans to allocate between 25 and 30 billion forints in 1986-90 to bring the other two reactors on line—a sum that exceeds total investment outlays planned for coal mining and approaches those planned for hydrocarbon extraction during this period.[87]

Government agencies had "negotiated a long time" over the future expansion of Paks. Debate revolved around whether there should be any expansion at all, and if so, whether it should involve reactors of 440-Mw capacity or, as originally planned, 1,000-Mw capacity. The debate seemingly was resolved with the announcement in February 1986 that Hungary and the Soviet Union had concluded an agreement for the installation of four more 440-Mw reactors during the 1990's. The reputed advantages of this reactor over its larger counterpart included its lower cost, shorter construction time, and the more limited impact on the national power grid if, for whatever reason, a reactor ceased to operate.[88]

However, future plans for nuclear power again changed with the announcement in August 1986 that the Soviet Union would render Hungary "technical assistance in the design and installation of two power units with 1,000-Mw reactors." The latest projections for nuclear power envision an additional 5,000–8,000 Mw of nuclear capacity (presumably including the two 1,000-Mw reactors at Paks) to be installed by the year 2015 and additional construction of NPS's.[89]

Poland. The saga of nuclear power in Poland has been one of continually frustrated plans, dating back to 1971 when the government first indicated its intention to build an NPS. For many years, Poland was "merely going through the motions" of constructing its first nuclear facility. Then, in 1982, the government suddenly announced—primarily for political reasons, according to one Western source[90]—the intention to build its first nuclear plant at Żarnowiec. Plans call for four reactor blocks with a total capacity of 1,860 Mw, the first to be made operational in 1991, the second nd third by 1993 and 1994, and the fourth in "the late 990's."[91] Czechoslovakia is to supply the reactors, nd other socialist states, including the USSR, are to xtend aid. But Poland is producing—in part with ssistance from Western firms—much of the requisite quipment. Domestic manufacture is to entail "dozens f projects" never before attempted by Polish industry, ncluding the construction of a 500-Mw turbo-generaor designed under license from the Swiss firm BBC, vhich will be the largest electrical machine ever built n Poland.[92]

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[83] MTI, Jan. 12, 1974, in *FBIS-EEDR*, Jan. 15, 1974, p. F/2; RFE, *Hungarian Situation Report*, No. 10, Sept. 9, 1974. For analysis of Paks development plans, see RFE, *Hungarian Situation Report*, No. 1, Jan. 11, 1983. *Magyar Hirlap* (Budapest), in RFE, *Hungarian Situation Report*, Sept. 9, 1974, provides estimates for nuclear capacities in the year 2000.

[84] *Pravda* (Bratislava), Nov. 15, 1984, in *FBIS-EEU*, Nov. 23, 1984, p. D/3.

[85] RFE, *Hungarian Situation Report*, No. 1, Jan. 11, 1983, provides a detailed analysis of the many problems encountered in making the power blocks at Paks operational. Data on costs overruns at Paks from *Heti Vilaggazdasag* (Budapest), Jan. 11, 1986, in RFE, *Hungarian Situation Report*, No. 5, Mar. 25, 1986.

[86] *Népszabadság*, Feb. 1, 1986, in *FBIS-EEU*, Feb. 13, 1986, p. F/6.

[87] See, *Népszabadság*, Jan. 18, 1986, in *FBIS-EEU*, Jan. 29, 1986, p. F/5

[88] MTI, Jan. 30, 1986, announced that Paks would be expanded with four 440-Mw reactors. The agreement to this end was signed by Soviet and Hungarian representatives on February 4, 1986 as reported in RFE, *Hungarian Situation Report*, Mar. 25, 1986. See *Népszabadság*, Oct. 18, 1985, in *JPRS-EEI*, No. 094, Dec. 12, 1985, p. 76, for information regarding debates on the future expansion of Paks.

[89] *Izvestiya*, Aug. 16, 1986, reports the agreement for 1,000-Mw reactors. Data on projections for nuclear power by 2015 from *Magyar Hirlap*, Oct. 31, 1986, in *FBIS-EEU*, Nov. 14, 1986, p. F/5.

[90] RFE, *Polish Situation Report*, No. 13, July 27, 1982, argues that "it is not possible to escape the feeling . . . that this projection is . . . merely intended to show the general public that the authorities are launching useful projects in the best public interest, even if their feasibility seems rather doubtful."

Poland also has announced plans to begin construction, in 1987, of a second NPS (named "WARTA") o be equipped with four Soviet-built 1,000-Mw reacors. The first reactor there is to come on line in 1994, and the entire project is to be completed by 2000. This plan is already embroiled in controversy. The proposed site of the plant, a heavily industrialized, urbanized, and polluted region between Płock and Włocławek, has engendered "fierce disputes," attributed by one ranking official to a "Hiroshima complex" that deeply rooted in Polish society.[93]

Finally, officials have spoken about making a third NPS operational by the year 2000. Reportedly, this plant, to be located on the Vistula River, would have four 1,000-Mw reactors and not only generate electricity but also supply heat to nearby communities, including Warsaw. Critics have assailed the project as "rash and frivolous," charging that the planners "did not deem it necessary to support their idea with verified and reliable economic calculations," and questioning the ecological impact that it will have on the Vistula River.[94]

If all of these plans were to materialize, then Poland would have 9,860 Mw of installed nuclear capacity by the turn of the century. Yet, Polish sources themselves concede that these plans probably cannot be realized; installed capacity is now projected at 7,760 Mw, but is unlikely to exceed 4,000–5,000 Mw by the year 2,000.[95] To realize even these more modest targets will require that Poland overcome formidable technological, fiscal, and political obstacles.

Romania. As one Western observer put it, "Romania's nuclear energy program displays more than a few features verging on the absurd."[96] These include the supervision of the program by members of the Ceauşescu family who possess no appropriate scientific or technical training for this task, the promulgation of completely unrealistic targets that are never fulfilled and are repeatedly revised without explanation, and groundless claims about Romania's ability to produce nuclear equipment, including nuclear weapons, for domestic use and for export. An unusual feature of the Romanian program—which some also might label as absurd given Romania's fiscal crisis—is the fact that technology from capitalist countries plays a key role in its realization.

As noted, targets for nuclear capacity in Romania have varied widely (one researcher has identified 14 different projections in the official press). The latest available estimate envisions an installed nuclear capacity of 4,500 Mw by 1990 and 9,600 Mw by 2000.[97] To date, of course, Romania has not commissioned any nuclear energy stations, and the realization of any of these targets remains uncertain.

In 1970 and 1982, Romania concluded agreements with the Soviet Union for the construction of NPS's. Little information is available on the 1970 agreement for the construction of an NPS equipped with (probably two) Soviet-supplied 440-Mw reactors, which was to be made operational by 1978. However, there is rumor that the Romanian-built foundation for the first reactor cracked during the 1977 earthquake, and, most likely, the project has now been abandoned.[98]

According to Romania's 1982 agreement with the USSR, the Soviet Union was to supply three 1,000-Mw reactors for the "Moldova" plant to be located in Romania's northeastern province of Moldavia. Although little has been heard about the project, a Hungarian source reported in 1986 that the plant would be built near Piatra Neamt and that the builders "would like" to have the first block operational by 1990. Another source now indicates that Czechoslovakia will supply two reactors for the project; it is unclear if this means that the project has been scaled back from three to two reactors or whether the USSR will simply supply the third reactor.[99]

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[91] For background on the Żarnowiec project, see *Komsomolskaya Pravda* (Moscow), Aug. 28, 1985; Warsaw Domestic Service, Apr. 14, 1983, in *FBIS-EEU*, Apr. 15, 1983, p. G/3; RFE, *Polish Situation Report*, No. 13, July 27, 1982.

[92] On the role of domestic manufacture—and the problems encountered therein—see, *Trybuna Ludu*, Nov. 14, 1985, in *JPRS-EER*, No. 036, Mar. 13, 1986, p. 74.

[93] *Życie Warszawy*, Oct. 18, 1985 in *JPRS-EER*, No. 025, Feb. 25, 1986, p. 38; *Życie Gospodarcze* (Warsaw), Aug. 26, 1984, in *JPRS-EEI*, No. 112, Oct. 5, 1984; *Rzeczpospolita*, May 3, 1984, in *JPRS-EEI*, No. 060, May 24, 1984, p. 45.

[94] *Tygodnik Powszechny*, July 27, 1986, in *FBIS-EEU*, Aug. 12, 1986, p. G/5.

[95] *Zycie Warszawy*, Oct. 10, 1983, in *JPRS-EEI*, No. 84875, Dec. 5, 1983, p. 31. The projection of 7,760 Mw of installed nuclear capacity by the year 2000 was announced at the conclusion of the 1986 session of CEMA in Bucharest. PAP, Nov. 5, 1986, in *FBIS-EEU*, Nov. 5, 1986, p. AA/11.

[96] See RFE, *Background Report*, No. 129, Nov. 8, 1985.

[97] Ibid. collates a variety of official estimates for nuclear power capacities. See *Agerpres* (Bucharest), July 9, 1985, in *FBIS-EEU*, July 11, 1985, p. H/5, for the latest official estimate of these capacities through the year 2000.

Romania also concluded an agreement with Canada, in 1977, for the supply of reactors and other requisite equipment, becoming the first and, thus far, the only Warsaw Pact state to reach such an agreement with a Western country. In 1978, Canada extended a US$1-billion credit to Romania for the purchase of the four 660-Mw Canadian-made reactors to be placed near the town of Çernavodă on the Danube River. The purchase was to be part of a larger deal whereby Romania would acquire an additional 12 reactors by the year 2000, some manufactured entirely by Canada and others by Romania under Canadian license. Romania also awarded to an Italian-American consortium a $320-million contract (backed by a $120-million credit from the United States government) to provide turbine generator sets and other equipment for the Çernavodă project. The first reactor at Çernavodă was to become operational in 1985, and the entire project was to be completed by 1990. Eventually, Romania hoped to become self-sufficient in the production of reactors and even to export reactors to Third World countries, paying Canada for the license to do so.[100]

Prospects are minimal that the Romanian-Canadian nuclear deal will be extolled as a model in East-West trade. To date, none of the reactor blocks at Çernavodă are operational and despite assurances by Canadian officials that they have an "interest" in "stepping up efforts" to commission these facilities ahead of schedule, it remains unclear when (or if) they will start up.[101] Fiscal considerations are a primary factor here. Romania has been unable to utilize fully its $1 billion line of credit from Canada because it possesses insufficient hard currency which Canada demands as a primary form of repayment for its loan. Inflation has eroded much of the value of the original credit so that it now would barely cover the purchase of two, rather than the originally projected four, reactors.[102]

Despite these setbacks, Romanian officials now say they are contemplating expanding the Çernavodă plant to five power blocks. There is even talk about cooperating with Canada in the building of another nuclear power facility.

Prospects

Nuclear power in Eastern Europe is currently entering a third stage of development, one that will prove crucial in determining its status well into the next century. The first stage—dating from the 1955 announcement of the USSR that it would assist its East European allies in establishing national nuclear programs until roughly 1970—began with grandiose dreams in several states, notably in Czechoslovakia, but ended in disappointment, frustration, and recriminations. The second stage of development, spanning the decade of the 1970's and extending into the early 1980's—and hence coinciding with the tremendous increase in world energy prices—saw most countries of the region place NPS's into commercial operation and all of them make plans for a substantial augmentation of their nuclear capacities. The difficulties encountered in implementing these plans—difficulties, it should be stressed, not unique to Eastern Europe—clearly have sobered decision-makers as they enter the current stage of nuclear development, where they must make hard choices regarding the almost 40,000 Mw of nuclear capacity either contemplated or under construction.

Economic considerations will be of primary importance in their deliberations. As we have seen, expenditures on nuclear facilities (almost invariably far higher than initially estimated) have consumed huge amounts of investment resources. According to a Czechoslovak economic newspaper:

> *A very detrimental effect on the entire economy is recorded by the constantly growing volume of investment costs per unit of output in nuclear power plants which currently limits the possibilities to make investment in other areas, even in the fuels and energy industry itself.*[103]

If anything, expenditures on nuclear power are likely to increase in the future as funds are allocated to dispose of ever greater amounts of nuclear waste, to

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[98] For background on this project, see Radio Bucharest, Mar. 24, 1974, discussed in RFE, *Romanian Situation Report*, No. 28, Dec. 7, 1978; RFE, *Background Report*, No. 165, Aug. 18, 1982, and No. 129, Nov. 18, 1985.

[99] Radio Moscow, Sept. 9, 1982, reported the signing of this agreement. The Hungarian press report on the project is in *Magyar Hirlap*, Jan. 14, 1986, in *FBIS-EEU*, Feb. 4, 1986, p. H/1. Radio Prague, May 16, 1985, reported on participation by Czechoslovakia in the project. RFE, *Romanian Situation Report*, No. 5, March 13, 1985, provides background material on the subject.

[100] Radio Bucharest, Oct. 25, 1977, carries the announcement of the agreement. The agreement is analyzed in detail in RFE, *Romanian Situation Report*, No. 33, Nov. 9, 1977. See also, *Agerpres*, Sept. 9, 1981, in *FBIS-EEU*, Sept. 10, 1981, p. H/1; RFE, *Background Report*, No. 165, Aug. 18, 1982. On the role of Italy and the United States in the Çernavodă project, see *The Financial Times* (London), Mar. 3, 1981, and *The Wall Street Journal* (New York), Aug. 27, 1982, p. 20.

[101] *Agerpres*, July 9, 1985, in *FBIS-EEU*, July 11, 1985, p. H/1, informs about Canadian interest in speeding up work in the project.

[102] For details of these fiscal arrangements, see RFE, *Romanian Situation Report*, No. 15, 1985.

[103] *Planovane Hospodarstvi*, No. 4, 1985, in *JPRS-EEI*, No. 071, Sept. 9, 1985, p. 21.



Parts of a nuclear power assembly seen at one of the production areas of the "Atommash" plant at Volgodonsk in the USSR.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

purchase nuclear fuels as indigenous reserves of uranium become depleted, and to acquire the equipment and materials necessary to enhance the safe operation of nuclear facilities. Already, fiscal constraints have so hampered the nuclear programs in Poland and Romania that one wonders if these countries will ever commission commercially operational NPS's. Fiscal concerns have made the future of nuclear power in Czechoslovakia "an open question for some time yet" and have led to adjustments of nuclear programs in the GDR and Hungary.[104] If world oil (and other energy) prices continue to decline, or even stabilize at or near existing levels, then arguments challenging the cost-effectiveness of nuclear power will become more compelling.

Enhanced concern for safety also will affect the deliberations of decision-makers. Muted manifestations of such concern were evident among officials even before the accident at the Chernobyl' nuclear power plant. In one of the most famous examples of such concern, two scientists were permitted to publish an article in the authoritative Soviet journal *Kommunist* in 1979, questioning (prophetically as it turned out) the wisdom of locating nuclear facilities close to or—as in the case of nuclear heating plants—even within the limits of densely populated urban centers.[105] Obviously, Chernobyl' has heightened these concerns among both the elites and the masses: concern for safety reputedly prompted Poland to halt temporarily construction at Żarnowiec, the GDR to construct a containment vessel for a nuclear reactor for the first time, and other regimes to undertake well-publicized steps to prevent future nuclear mishaps.

All these efforts notwithstanding, doubts about the safety of nuclear facilities in the region persist. In part, the problem is one of economics. Regimes which already are severely strained by the fiscal demands of nuclear programs may be unwilling—or unable—to muster the huge additional sums necessary for requisite safety measures. Then, too, as Chernobyl' graphically illustrated, the human element can compromise even sophisticated safety systems. Here the absence of autonomous public institutions to monitor the behavior of nuclear personnel may exacerbate the seemingly universal tendency to cover up mishaps and may impede efforts to prevent their re-occurrence. As a member of the Polish Academy of Sciences has forcefully argued, the "great weakness" of nuclear safety measures in "our country is rooted in the extensive and long-standing practice of concealing and falsifying breakdowns and accidents as well as their circumstances and results." He continues:

> *No public analyses, investigations, and trials take place, and no real causes and truly guilty people are disclosed. This situation is made worse by the ineffective and deceptive system of information and*

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[104] As a Czech source explains, "even though all the strength of the national economy will have to be mobilized . . . the scope of electricity production in nuclear plants will for a long time remain an open problem." *Planovane Hospodarstvi*, No. 5, 1981, quoted in RFE, *Czechoslovak Situation Report*, No. 12, June 29, 1981. Enhanced safety measures in the building of NPS's taken in the wake of the Chernobyl' disaster also will be costly; e.g. a Soviet official reports that they will increase the cost of building Soviet nuclear plants by approximately 40 percent. Reuter (Bonn), Oct. 17, 1986. Furthermore, the greater demand for enriched nuclear fuel from the USSR, attendant upon expanded nuclear facilities, will result in a "fast growth of demands on counter-deliveries" in payment. *Tribuna*, July 2, 1986, in *JPRS-EEI*, No. 148, Oct. 1, 1986, p. 1.

[105] *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 14, 1979.

> *public warnings, a thing that has often created great trouble.*[106]

Finally, the system of economic planning in communist Eastern Europe, with its emphasis on production, to the detriment—if not exclusion—of other objectives, may also compromise nuclear safety. Thus, the chief inspector for nuclear safety of the Czechoslovak Commission for Atomic Energy, responding to a question about whether nuclear plant personnel circumvent safety procedures in their efforts "to ensure production tasks," replied: "Certain tendencies actually do exist. In operations this mainly applies to shortening the shut-downs of blocks. Attempts are made to accumulate or leave out some controls as a result."[107]

Ironically, even after Chernobyl'—and the extensive contamination of the environment that ensued—concern for environmental quality may remain one of the strongest rationales *for* nuclear power in Eastern Europe. Admittedly, statements such as that of a ranking nuclear official in Czechoslovakia that nuclear power "unavoidably" necessitates that "some parts of the country will have to be more or less devastated"[108] are hardly reassuring to environmentalists. Yet it is equally true that most forms of energy production entail some pollution of the environment, and that those based on solid fuels—particularly soft coal and lignite, so widely used in Eastern Europe—are especially harmful. On balance, then, while nuclear power may not be a miraculous cure for environmental degradation in Eastern Europe, it may, nevertheless, prove more "friendly" (as a proponent of nuclear power once phrased it) to the environment than any other readily available source of energy production in the region.

However these issues are finally (if ever) resolved, nuclear power appears likely to remain an important, though probably not the decisive, component of the energy balance in the region for the foreseeable future. This applies especially to Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia and, to a lesser extent, the GDR and Hungary. On the other hand, the future of nuclear power seems much more problematic in Poland and Romania. In any case, events exogenous to the region—in particular, another world oil crisis that would drive up the price of petroleum and other fuels—could well alter this somewhat pessimistic prognosis and make the atom, as many of its proponents once assumed it would be, the key to the region's energy future.

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[106] *Tygodnik Powszechny*, July 27, 1986, in *FBIS-EEU*, Aug. 12, 1986, p. G/5.

[107] *Tribuna*, Oct. 29, 1986, in *FBIS-EEU*, Nov. 13, 1986, p.4. This official notes that the Presidium of the Federal Government has prohibited the "unjustified and unsubstantiated shortening of approved operational procedures." Apparently, the prohibition has not proven effective, because he adds that "it would help if the realization of this decision were supported by some incentive measures directly in power plants."

[108] *Rudé Právo*, Feb. 16, 1983, as quoted in RFE, *Czechoslovak Situation Report*, No. 1', June 24, 1983, carries the comment of the Czechoslovak nuclear official

China's Opening to the World

Huan Guocang

As the centerpiece of a plan designed to open China to the international community, China's "open door" policy was intended to expand China's foreign trade, introduce foreign technology and culture into Chinese society, attract overseas investment, and send a large number of students to developed countries for study and training. This would in turn, it was hoped, strengthen China's position in international labor and financial markets and enable it to become more actively involved in various international economic organizations and, gradually, to integrate the Chinese economy into the world economy as a whole.

During the last quarter of 1984 and the first quarter of 1985, however, China's "open door" policy suffered a number of serious setbacks. The rapid increase in imports of both production and consumer goods produced large deficits in China's foreign trade, and the nation's foreign exchange reserves dropped drastically, falling one-third within six months.[1] This weakened the central government's control over the expenditure of foreign exchange in particular and the conduct of foreign trade in general.[2] While those enterprises that specialized in imports continued to make huge profits (with some notable exceptions, such as the energy and chemical industries), about 80 percent of the enterprises that produced mainly for export continued to lose money.[3] Indeed, according to one Chinese economist, for the first quarter of 1985, China's degree of Trade Bias averaged only about 0.5, some 50 percent lower than that of most developed market economies.[4]

China's "opening to the outside world" also encountered problems of a somewhat different nature. For one thing, as Chinese enterprises competed with one another for both domestic and international markets, many imported projects became "redundant" and thus wasteful. For another, in general, imports of technology were neither well planned nor based on careful cost-benefit analyses. As a result, many projects became excessively dependent on imported parts and other supplies from overseas.[5] Moreover, China's limited domestic market and Chinese exporters' restricted access to the international market exacerbated these difficulties.

Not surprisingly, in the wake of such difficulties, some Chinese leaders and economists directed strong criticisms at what were then the primary vehi-

Huan Guocang, a scholar from the People's Republic of China, is currently a Senior Fellow (non-resident) at the Atlantic Council of the United States (Washington, DC) and is completing his Ph.D. in International Political Economy at Princeton University (Princeton, NJ). In 1987, he will be John Olin Fellow at the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University (Cambridge). The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily represent those of any Chinese or American institution. This study was supported by The Center for International Studies, Princeton University, and World Policy Institute (New York).

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[1] John Stuermer, "The Foreign Exchange Situation," *China Business Review* (Washington, DC), January-February 1986, pp. 14–17.

[2] Zhang Weiying and Li Jiange, "The Proposal of Depreciation of the Renminbi and Opening of the Market of Foreign Exchange," *Jingji Tizhi Gaige Yanjiu Baogao* (Research Reports of Economic System Reforms), No. 6, Beijing, The China National Institute of Economic System Reform of the State Council, 1985, pp. 1–18 (hereafter *Yanjiu Baogao*).

[3] Research Team on Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade, "On China's Policy of Development of Foreign Economic Relations and Foreign Trade During the Seventh Five-Year Plan," (The Main Report), *Yanjiu Baogao*, No. 11, 1985, p. 2; and *Yatai Jingji* (Fuzhou), No. 4, 1985, pp. 40–42.

[4] See Huang Fangyi, "On Constraining Elements to Our Country's Import of Technology and Foreign Trade and Suggestions on Improvement," *Jingji Yanjiu* (Beijing), No. 12, 1985, p. 22. Trade Bias (B) is calculated according to the following formula:

$$B = \frac{Pdm/Pfm}{Pdx/Pfs}$$

where Pdm = Domestic prices of imported goods; Pfm = International prices of imported goods; Pdx = Domestic prices of exported goods; and Pfx = International prices of exported goods.

[5] See e.g., Cao Jiarui, "The Current Situation and Problems of China's Importation of Technology (I)," *Liaowang* (Beijing), May 5, 1986, pp. 14–15.

cles of the "open door" policy—the four experimental Special Economic Zones (SEZ's) and Hainan District, which had been expressly created by the government to attract foreign investment as well as advanced technology, equipment, and management expertise (see map on p. 62).[6] Virtually none of the SEZ's had been able to balance its international payments,[7] and all had depended heavily on the central government's supply of foreign exchange, which was fixed at the official rate.[8] With the exception of the Shantou SEZ and the Shekou Industrial Zone (a part of the Shenzhen SEZ), the zones had exported less than one-third of their industrial production.[9] According to these critics, the share of the nonindustrial sector in the SEZ's total Gross National Product (GNP) was "too high."[10] And, contrary to expectations, the SEZ's did not attract much "advanced" technology to China, nor did they strengthen China's position in the international market. Rather, noted the critics, they provided the "back door" through which foreign corporations entered and occupied China's domestic market free of charge and through which Western values and culture spread rapidly among Chinese youth.[11] The SEZ's and Hainan District, they said, were thus the primary source of "economic crimes" and corruption. The central government, in response, quickly tightened its control over the four SEZ's and Hainan District. [See the Note by Joseph Fewsmith in this issue—Eds.]

Meanwhile, foreign investors began to complain of increasing difficulty in doing business in China. Office rents were raised to excess, they said, and the process of business negotiations was too protracted and too expensive. Moreover, the Chinese government's frequent policy shifts made it increasingly difficult for foreign investors to make long-term investment plans and commitments to the Chinese market. For example, under new regulations adopted by the central government in March 1985, which mandated that all foreign-involved enterprises balance their international payments,[12] many Chinese enterprises had to break their contracts with their foreign counterparts. Other serious problems arose around the obstacles to entering the Chinese market and to converting profits from Chinese Renminbi (RMB) into hard currencies through the Bank of China. This occurred in spite of the government's promise to facilitate such currency conversions through the "Law of the People's Republic of China Concerning Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Capital," which had been adopted in July 1979.[13]

China's newly established tourist industry came under attack as well. Foreign tourists often complained about the poor quality of service and facilities and the high price of traveling and staying in China, although the number of international tourists who visit China continues to increase. Moreover, the policy of limiting contact between Chinese citizens and foreign tourists and of charging foreigners different rates—higher for some goods and services; lower for others—made many foreign tourists uneasy.[14] These policies have also rekindled stong nationalist sentiment in China and thus have created tension between the government and Chinese society.

The continuing worldwide recession has further jeopardized the international environment within which China has adopted its "open door" policy. The protectionist policies in many developed countries directed against both newly industrialized countries (NIC's) and developing countries have hurt China's exports. Consequently, Chinese officials have begun to complain about the difficulties Chinese goods have had entering the market in developed countries, notably Japan, with whom China's trade deficit was US$6.1 billion in 1985. Calculations by the Chinese government project a 1986 deficit of approximately US$3 billion.[15]

Serious constraints have also emerged impeding China's efforts to expand its export of labor, as the major market for these services, the oil-rich states of the Middle East, experienced economic setbacks resulting from the recent decline in oil prices throughout the world. In addition, the recent recession in Hong Kong, China's largest trading partner and the source of a large trade surplus for China, has reduced significantly that city's imports from the People's Republic of China. Furthermore, the competition between China and other Asian countries for the international market in manufactured goods has become increasingly intense; and other developing countries have complained about China's aggressiveness in such international financial organizations as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as well as in international financial markets.[16]

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[6] At the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (December 1978), Deng Xiaoping proposed the "open" policy. In September 1979, the Central Committee and the State Council issued a joint document calling for the establishment of "special zones" in Shenzhen, Shantou, Zhuhai, and Xiamen. In May of the following year, another joint CC/State Council document formally designated these four zones as "Special Economic Zones."

[7] Chen Zhaobing, "On Some Criticism of Special Economic Zones," *Xueshu Yanjiu* (Guangzhou), No. 4, 1985, pp. 44–48; *Jingji Yu Guanli Yanjiu* (Beijing), No. 6, 1985, pp. 44–48; and *Fujian Luntan* (Fuzhou), No. 9, 1985, pp. 21–23.

[8] Zhang and Li, loc. cit., pp. 9–10.

[9] Huang Lijun, "China's Special Economic Zones at a New Stage of Development," *Yatai Jingji*, No. 5, 1985, pp. 43–46.

[10] *Renmin Ribao* (Beijing), Aug. 9, 1985, p. 5.

[11] Zhang Ge, "On Several Issues of the Special Economic Zones and Coastal Open Cities," *Fazhan Yanjiu* (Beijing), No. 2, 1985, pp. 22–24.

[12] *Liaowang*, July 21, 1986, pp. 10–11.

[13] Ibid., June 2, 1986, pp. 8–9.

[14] *Shijie Jingji Daobao* (Beijing), Apr. 4, 1986, p. 11.

[15] Ibid., Mar. 10, 1986, p.1; and *China Daily* (Beijing), May 28, 1986, p. 1.

In trying to reverse these setbacks, the Chinese government has made a serious effort to adjust its "open door" policy. It has approached other international players, both public and private, for mutual understanding and cooperation in an attempt to improve China's standing within the international community. From a preliminary examination, it appears that the government's recent efforts at readjustment have in the main been effective, although many serious problems remain. This essay examines these efforts and tries to place them in domestic and international perspective. Of particular concern is the process by which the government has adjusted its "open door" policy and the successes and failures of that policy to date. Finally, this essay will evaluate the source and nature of the problems that persist and suggest what remains to be done in order to make the "open door" policy more effective in the years ahead.

China's Foreign Trade Policy

During the past two years, the Chinese government has adjusted its foreign trade strategy substantially, steadily decentralizing decision-making for exports, while tightening control over imports. As part of this policy, the government has encouraged local authorities and enterprises, as well as private individuals, to conduct export business directly with foreign corporations.[17] Accordingly, the key task of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade and its local branches is no longer to control the export business, but rather to serve as intermediaries between the international market and Chinese enterprises by providing information and advice. Almost all provincial governments have been encouraged to set up their own trade representative offices abroad, and their business operations have, as a consequence, become more independent of the central government.

Chinese officials have also readjusted the mix of China's exports, and these changes seem likely to continue. Largely because of the recent decline in oil prices in the international market, the Chinese government has reduced its export of oil proportionately; once 23 percent of China's total exports (during the Sixth Five-Year Plan, 1981–85), oil exports now equal less than one-fifth of that total.[18] In addition, the rapid increase in agricultural production during the past few years has allowed the government to expand exports of farm commodities, especially of grain and cotton.[19] Moreover, the Chinese government has begun to place great emphasis on increasing its export of manufactured products, especially machinery and consumer goods.[20]

Ingots produced through an electrolysis process at the Guizhou Aluminum Plant using equipment imported from Japan.

—Eastfoto.

The government has therefore striven to increase the number of enterprises that produce for the international market.[21] These "exporting bases" have, accordingly, received considerable technology and financial investment, as well as financial assistance in the form of subsidies and low tax rates, from the central government in order to develop their specialties and strengthen their competitive posture in the international market. And, as part of its effort to expand exports at the local level, the central government has continued to allow provincial authorities to retain 17.5 percent and enterprises 12.5 percent of the total foreign exchange earned.[22]

Another significant step taken has been the government's move to depreciate the RMB. The most recent devaluation took place in July 1986, when the RMB was directly depreciated by 15.8 percent.[23] Moreover,

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[16] These sentiments were expressed to me during interviews with some officials of the World Bank in August 1985.

[17] *Liaowang*, Mar. 10, 1986, pp. 12–13.

[18] Ibid., May 26, 1986, p. 7.

[19] Song Guoqing, "An Analysis of the Present Situation of Grain Supply and Demand and China's Foreign Trade," *Yanjiu Baogao*, No. 3, 1985, pp. 1–12.

[20] Jun Kuo, "Chinese Economists Discussing the Strategy of Foreign Trade," *Liaowang*, Mar. 31, 1986, pp. 7–8; and *Shijie Jingji Daobao*, Mar. 31, 1986, p. 5.

[21] *Renmin Ribao*, May 6, 1986, p. 1.

[22] Research Team of Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade, loc. cit., p. 13.

[23] Ibid., pp. 15–20; and *Renmin Ribao*, June 12, 1986, p. 3.

The Special Economic Zones and Open Cities of China



—Adapted from a map in Michael Oborne, *China's Special Economic Zones*, Paris, Development Centre of the OECD, 1986, p. 185.

the government's efforts to reform China's domestic price structure,[24] as well as other aspects of Chinese economic and financial institutions, including the country's system of management, have further reduced both the existing price gap between the Chinese domestic market and the international market and the institutional gap between the Chinese economy and market economies.

A more important step, however, has been the government's efforts to link the readjustment of its foreign trade strategy with the simultaneous reform of domestic economic institutions and introduction of foreign technology and investment. In spring 1985, for example, Premier Zhao Ziyang clearly indicated that the basic development strategy of China's coastal areas (which account for about 60 percent of China's total industrial capacity) should stress *"Mao-Gong-Nong,"* that is, foreign trade-industry-agriculture.[25] This is intended not only to give the highest priority to an expanding foreign trade, but also to develop close coordination between these three sectors. Moreover, to take advantage of China's rich human and natural resources and to develop export-oriented manufacturing, industry has been heavily emphasized in all SEZ's and in "open" coastal cities and surrounding areas.

International financial markets. No trade strategy would be complete, however, without the securing of international financing. For this reason, during the past two years, China has strengthened its working relationship with the World Bank, IMF, and other international financial, economic, and scientific and technological organizations. It became a member of the Asian Development Bank in May 1986 and of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in October that same year. Because of its steady progress in reform, its continued opening up to the international community, its relatively steady economic growth during the past few years, and improvement in its political ties with Western countries, China is in a better position than most other developing countries to receive ai from the World Bank. Indeed, the World Bank has bee a continuing source of financial and technological ai to China. Together with the IMF, the Bank, which opened an office in Beijing in the fall of 1985, has als played a significant role as consultant to the Chines government concerning long-term development strategy and individual policy issues. Both the IMF and th World Bank, moreover, have expanded their trainin programs for Chinese senior officials.

Apart from receiving financial aid and concessiona loans from international organizations and foreign governments, China has also obtained commercial loan and issued bonds in the international financial marke This new policy has allowed a number of quasi-governmental business institutions to borrow money fro abroad.[26] In 1985, for example, China issued abroa some US$600 million in bonds.[27] In addition, the Ban of China has arranged for local authorities and enterprises to obtain commercial loans from foreign bank

The competition has intensified between China an other developing countries for the limited financi resources available from international financial an economic organizations and in the international financial market place. This is largely due to three factors: (1) the recent worldwide recession, which has hurt most developing countries' economic growth; (2) high interest rates in the United States, which continue to attract capital flow from the international market; and (3) the decline in oil prices, which has led the OPEC states to borrow money abroad. But even if China cannot balance its international payments, the IMF will likely provide it with financial support—a likelihood that has evinced increasingly strong complaints from other developing countries. Such complaints may ultimately affect decision-making in both the World Bank and the IMF, as China has only limited influence within the policymaking bodies of both organizations.[28]

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[24] In April 1986, the National People's Congress, constitutionally China's highest organ of state power, passed the Seventh Five-Year Plan, which among other things proposed to further China's price reform. The objective of this reform is to establish a new price system by which the market is the primary determinant of prices. Under the new system, the central government would control the prices of only a handful of "key" goods. For a discussion of the price reform, see *Liaowang*, Mar. 24, 1986, pp. 1–2; and June 16, 1986, pp. 13–14.

[25] *Shijie Jingji Daobao*, Jan. 13, 1986, p. 2, and Mar. 10, 1986, pp. 1–2.

[26] *Liaowang*, Apr. 14, 1986, pp. 8–9.

[27] Ibid., Jan. 20, 1986, p. 6; *Renmin Ribao*, June 15, 1986, p. 3; and Elizabeth Morrison, "Borrowing on World Bond Markets," *China Business Review*, January-February 1986, p. 18.

Exploring new markets. Facing a rapidly increasing pattern of protectionism throughout the international community, especially in industrial market economies, the Chinese government, working through diplomatic channels, together with other developing countries and NIC's, has openly urged the Japanese and US governments to reduce trade barriers against Chinese goods and to open further their own markets.[29] These efforts have been made in conjunction with the Chinese government's policy of building close political ties with these two countries. China has, in addition, actively sought new markets for its exports, initiating and investing in joint-venture projects overseas[30] and sending a large number of delegations to open-trade exhibitions around the world.

China has redoubled its efforts to enter the market of the Soviet bloc, signing long-term trade and technology transfer agreements with the Soviet Union and a number of East European countries. One important reason for this is that much of the trade between China and the Soviet bloc can be conducted in kind, without the exchange of hard currency. Such trade, moreover, does not require an institutional mechanism capable of ensuring a quick response to the dynamics of international trade. Thus, the Chinese can get low-level technology and equipment from Soviet-bloc countries in exchange for agricultural products and low-quality consumer goods, which are difficult to sell in the West. Even though China continues its efforts to import high technology from the industrial world, it is still a huge market for Soviet-bloc technology and industrial equipment, which are comparatively inexpensive and easier to operate than those from Japan, Western Europe, and the United States. More important, perhaps, China needs replacement parts to refurbish and upgrade the 156 large-scale industrial projects it imported from the Soviet bloc during the 1950's.[31]



A coal terminal at the open port city of Qinhuangdao in northern China, capable of servicing 50,000-ton ships.

—Gamma-Liaison.

The Chinese government has also given considerable attention to strengthening its position in the Asian market (notably in Hong Kong) and to exploiting new markets in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. In particular, the government has endeavored to export low-technology machinery, tools, and agricultural equipment, from which China can take certain comparative advantages in the international market.[32]

In order to reduce trade deficits, the Chinese government has tightened its control over foreign exchange expenditures. It has reduced imports, especially of consumer goods and automobiles, and, as a part of its general economic strategy, has strengthened its control over the flow of money and capital investment. As a result, both the scale of national investment and the demand to import technology and equipment have been reduced. Although local authorities and enterprises still retain part of the foreign exchange they earn, the central government, through the Bank of China (China's foreign-exchange reserve bank) and the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, now plays a key role in reviewing and sanctioning import requests. The central government also recently decided to open a foreign exchange market in China in order to collect foreign exchange held by enterprises and by individuals, who since

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[28] At the International Monetary Fund, for example, there are no professional staffs from the People's Republic of China in any research divisions. At the World Bank, the number of Chinese professionals is small.

[29] *Beijing Review*, June 16, 1986, p. 31, and *Renmin Ribao*, May 15, 1986, p. 1, May 29, 1986, p. 1, and June 6, 1986, p. 1.

[30] *Liaowang*, May 21, 1986, pp. 6–7.

[31] *China Business Review*, March-April 1986, pp. 53–54.

[32] Zhou Hualang, "China's Trade Ties with ASEAN," *Liaowang*, Mar. 24, 1986, p. 28; and *Renmin Ribao*, June 14, 1986, p. 1.

1984 have been allowed to maintain foreign exchange accounts in the Bank of China.[33]

Mixed results. These readjustments in policy have led to certain positive results. China's foreign trade continues to increase, and its 1985 total trade turnover of US$69.6 billion is expected to expand by some 8 percent in 1986.[34] Moreover, the structure of China's trade has changed. While the proportion of oil in total exports has declined, the proportion of exports of manufactured goods and agricultural products has increased. Although the export of Chinese goods and materials to Hong Kong fell in 1985, the pace of this decline slowed in the first half of this year then leveled off. China's trade deficit during the first four months of 1986 was US$939 million, far less than in the first four months of 1985,[35] and the latest official figures place the trade deficit at US$1.24 billion for the first half of 1986.[36] China's major trade partners remain Hong Kong, Japan, the United States, and Western Europe, although its trade ties with the Soviet bloc have expanded steadily.[37]

Nevertheless, a few problems remain. First, only the decision-making process governing exports has been decentralized; indeed, lines of authority and control regulating imports, foreign investment, and the expenditure of foreign exchange, as noted above, have been recentralized. This has been due largely to the government's efforts to reduce its foreign trade deficit, balance its international payments, minimize competition among Chinese entrepreneurs in the international market place, and eliminate the increase in "economic crimes." The central authorities—especially the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, the Bank of China, the People's Bank of China (the central bank charged with formulating and carrying out monetary policy),[38] the General Administration of Taxation, and the General Administration of Exchange Control —have strengthened their power vis-à-vis local authorities and enterprises.

Many complicated procedures and regulations have been reintroduced to supervise, control, and, if need be, intervene in the relations between local businesses and foreign corporations. As a result of the government's new policy stressing the balancing of foreign exchange,[39] all agreements signed between Chinese and foreign corporations now have to be approved by these central governmental agencies. This obviously makes negotiations between foreign corporations and their Chinese counterparts regarding imports to China more difficult than before.

This new emphasis has also led many Chinese entrepreneurs to propose additional trade projects to their foreign counterparts, regardless of whether the latter have the capacity to undertake them. This has dampened foreign corporations' enthusiasm for new projects, which, in turn, has curtailed the initiatives of their Chinese counterparts. The resulting damage has been particularly harmful to the government's new desire to increase the proportion of manufactured goods in China's total exports, as this goal requires an institutional mechanism for quick response to the dynamics of the international market. To be effective, such a mechanism must be responsive to the specific needs of enterprises and individuals and allow for decisive initiative and autonomous decision-making.

In the second place, the over-valued exchange rate of the RMB and the existing price gap between the Chinese domestic market and the international market have, increasingly, become key factors inhibiting the expansion of both Chinese exports and foreign investment in China. The current exchange rate between the RMB and US dollar is approximately 3.7 to 1. According to a survey conducted by a group of outstanding economists at the China National Institute of Economic System Reform of the State Council, the shadow exchange rate is about 6 to 1.[40] Unless the government is prepared to depreciate the RMB further, many Chinese enterprises will not have much incentive to increase their exports.

In general, prices for commodities in the Chinese domestic market are much lower than they are in the international market, especially for energy and raw materials. For example, despite the recent decline in oil prices in the international market, the price of oil in the Chinese domestic market is still only about one-third of international market cost.[41] More important, due to the sudden and dramatic rise in the inflation rate that accompanied the price reform in the last quarter of 1984 and the first quarter of 1985, the central government has reintroduced administrative measures to control price movement. Consequently, the price structure in China has been unable to respond effectively either to the dynamics of market supply and demand or to the productivity of individual enterprises; nor has it been linked closely to the price structure in the international market.

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[33] Research Team of Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade, loc. cit., p. 13, and *Fujian Luntan*, No. 10, 1985, pp. 29–30.

[34] *Liaowang*, Apr. 21, 1986, p. 1.

[35] *Renmin Ribao*, Mar. 2, 1986, p. 3, and *Liaowang*, May 21, 1986, p. 6.

[36] *Liaowang*, Aug. 11, 1986, pp. 12–13.

[37] Sino-Soviet trade, for example, reached US$1.6 billion in 1985. It is expected to increase to US$1.9 billion in 1986. See *Beijing Review*, Apr. 22, 1985, p. 6, and June 10, 1985, p. 7; and *Shijie Jingji Daobao*, Aug. 18, 1986, p. 2, and Aug. 25, 1986, pp. 1–3.

[38] For a discussion of recent developments in Chinese fiscal and monetary policy, see Dean Carver, "China's Experiment with Fiscal and Monetary Policy," in US Congress Joint Economic Committee, *China's Economy Looks Toward the Year 2000, Vol. 1: The Four Modernizations*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1986, pp. 354–75.

[39] Lin No, "To Strengthen and Promote Openness," *Nanfang Ribao* (Guangzhou), June 9, 1985, p. 1; and *Shijie Jingji Daobao*, Mar. 24, 1986, p. 3.

[40] Research Team of Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade, loc. cit., p. 13.

[41] *Liaowang*, May 21, 1986, p. 1.

Third, the government's foreign trade strategy faces a number of difficulties. Its policy of allowing local authorities and enterprises to retain a part of earned foreign exchange has weakened the government's control over the outflow and expenditure of foreign exchange—a large amount of which has been thus either spent on importing consumer goods or simply traded illicitly on the black market. This also occurs because the demand for imported goods has been great, the RMB has been over-valued, and the price gap between the Chinese domestic market and the international market remains wide.

The plan to upgrade China's export structure by changing the emphasis from primary goods (for example, raw materials, oil) to manufactured goods has not yet made much headway. This is because the government has not adopted proper financial and fiscal policies in support of this program, nor has it made effective institutional changes in order to provide enterprises with sufficient incentive to increase their exports of manufactured products. Lack of knowledge of the international market, especially as concerns changing trends in fashion and minimal standards of quality, remains a basic reason why China has been unable to increase significantly its exports of manufactured goods.[42]

The government has failed to devise an effective mechanism capable of balancing the need to intervene in foreign trade (especially imports) with the need to decentralize decision-making power. In particular, there is no legal institution to monitor government intervention and defend enterprises against inappropriate or arbitrary instances of it. Add to this list of shortcomings the lack of a realistic long-term foreign trade strategy, and the result is a substantially weakened capacity to perform in the international market.

Foreign Investment in China

Since the appearance of the first signs of trouble in the "open door" policy in late 1984, the Chinese government has continued its efforts to attract direct foreign investment. Amplifying its April 1984 policy of "opening" 14 coastal cities to foreign investment (see map on p. 62), the government has further announced the opening of three deltas: the Zhujiang (Pearl River) Delta, the Changjiang (Yangtze River) Delta, and the Minnan Delta in Southern Fujian Province.[43]

Unlike the SEZ's and Hainan District, these three deltas enjoy a comprehensive industrial system with a well-developed infrastructure, a highly qualified and skilled labor force, a long tradition of entrepreneurial spirit, a great market potential, and a prosperous rural economy. They thus can provide a better investment environment for foreign investors than the SEZ's can. More important, these regions have traditional ties with the international market and are better able to expand exports than the SEZ's are. There are, as well, strong ties between these deltas and overseas Chinese, many of whom are successful businessmen who have been encouraged by Chinese leaders to contribute and participate in the development of their hometowns. Mr. Yue-kong Pao (Sir Y.K. Pao), the chairman of the board of Hong Kong Worldwide Shipping Group, for instance, was named senior adviser to the Leadership Team for Development of Ningbo City. Mr. Pao and other overseas businessmen have contributed millions of dollars to the development of China's economy and education.[44]

Moreover, in these deltas and other open coastal cities, the government has established "Economic and Technological Exploitation Zones," whose development priorities are to obtain more "advanced" technology through foreign investment and to expand exports. To help attract overseas investment, the central government approved a plan in May 1984 granting foreign investors special tax rates and tax holidays similar to those adopted in SEZ's, as well as duty-free imports of production goods.[45] The zones are also intended to stimulate local participation, and local authorities have invested considerable sums in them.

This is not to say, however, that the government has abandoned the further development of the SEZ's and Hainan District. Deng Xiaoping has indicated that the SEZ's should continue to serve as "open doors" for the introduction of modern technology, knowledge of contemporary management, foreign investment, and civilization.[46] And Premier Zhao has said that the SEZ's

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[42] Ibid., pp. 14–15.

[43] *Jingji Ribao* (Beijing), Feb. 1, 1986, p. 1; He Chunlin, "China Is Facing a More Open Situation," *Liaowang*, Jan. 6, 1986, pp. 12–13; and *Liaowang*, Apr. 21, 1986, pp. 12–13.

[44] Yu Youhai, "An Important Decision To Accelerate Ningbo's Economic Development," *Liaowang*, June 6, 1986, pp. 7–8; and "Interview with Yue-kong Pao," ibid., May 5, 1986, pp. 12–13.

[45] See document issued jointly by the CCP Central Committee and the State Council, "Notification of Approval of the 'Summary of the Conference of Some Coastal Cities,'" Beijing, May 4, 1984.

[46] He Yunghua, "Report of the National Working Conference on the Special Economic Zones," *Liaowang*, Feb. 10, 1986, pp. 3–4.

Production line of the Yantai Silk Printing and Dying Mill, a joint Chinese-Italian venture in the open city of Yantai in the Pearl River Delta.

—Gamma-Liaison.

should treat the earning of foreign exchange as the priority in their development strategy.[47]

But the debate about which model the SEZ's should follow continues. Should their orientation be to attract advanced technology, or should the SEZ's lean toward labor-intensive and export-oriented economies?[48] The government has recently appeared to encourage all the SEZ's to follow the direction of Shekou Industrial Zone and Shantou Special Economic Zone. Their model involves the development of a labor-intensive, low-technology economy with less investment and with an orientation toward exports as the basic development priority. This approach does not require huge capital investment on the part of China, and it can be effective within a relatively short period of time. More important, it will enable the SEZ's to earn foreign exchange.[49]

But past experience has taught the government the need for strict supervision of the SEZ's and Hainan District. Thus, besides reducing the amount of foreign exchange at the official exchange rate made available to the SEZ's and Hainan District, the central government has adopted more restrictive policies in order to control their imports and their expenditure of foreign exchange. With a few exceptions, notably those corporations that bring "advanced" technology to the SEZ's and Hainan District, all enterprises involved with foreign investors have been instructed to balance their foreign exchange; that is, foreign investment return and profits must derive solely from these enterprises' exports.

In addition, a number of central government agencies, such as the Bank of China, the People's Bank of China, the General Administration of Taxation, and the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, have strengthened their capacity to supervise and intervene, if necessary, in the activities of the SEZ's and Hainan District. In order to undertake new projects involving foreign companies, enterprises within the SEZ's and Hainan District must now first obtain approval from each of these agencies. Moreover, enterprises in the SEZ's can neither lend nor borrow foreign exchange to or from each another without approval from the Bank of China and the General Administration of Exchange Control.[50] The central government has also encouraged various ministries and provincial governments to cooperate with one another in bringing investment, technology, and skilled labor into these zones, thereby strengthening the zones' capacity to expand their exports.[51]

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[47] *Shijie Jingji Daobao*, May 5, 1986, p. 14.

[48] *Yinjing* (Guangzhou), No. 3, 1985, pp. 6–7; *Guangzhou Yanjiu*, No. 5, 1985, pp. 20–21; and *Shenzhen Tequbao*, Nov. 11, 1985, p. 4.

[49] Weng Chengji, "The New Economic Situation of Shantou Special Economic Zone's Importation," *Zhongguo Duiwai Maoyi* (Beijing), No. 7, 1985, pp. 22–23; Huang Jingbo, "The Special Economic Zones' External and Internal Orientation," *Gangao Jingji* (Guangzhou), No. 5, 1985, pp. 27–28; and *Shijie Jingji Daobao*, May 5, 1986, p. 14, and May 15, 1986, pp. 14–15.

In order to improve the investment environment and to increase long-term confidence on the part of foreign investors in the Chinese market, Chinese leaders have repeatedly announced that they will never alter the "open door" policy, although they do acknowledge that it may be necessary to make certain policy readjustments in response to the changing economic reality.[52] Thus, Chinese leaders, either when visiting industrialized countries or when conversing with foreign guests at home, have consistently tried to convince those from the foreign business community to invest in China. In addition, the government has sped up the process of narrowing the legal gap that remains between China and countries with market economies by passing new laws and regulations. Correspondingly, the government has signed relevant agreements and treaties with foreign governments concerning the protection of foreign investment in China and transfer of technology to China.

Recently, the government decided to open Chinese capital and labor markets. In April 1986, the government passed the "Law of the People's Republic of China on Enterprises Operated Exclusively with Foreign Capital."[53] Although the law is vague on several important issues—most notably as concerns the circumstances under which foreign-owned enterprises can be expropriated—it does represent a significant step toward securing the legal rights of foreign investors in China. Among other things, for example, in those enterprises that are 100-percent foreign-owned, foreign investors are to enjoy total control of management, the right to hire and fire employees, and the right to protect their technology.

As a result, the investment environment in China appears to have improved considerably. During the past two years, according to Chinese sources, the number of foreign-involved enterprises has increased from 4,500 to over 7,300.[54] More investment has come from the United States, Japan, and Western Europe, and the proportion of industrial projects has increased significantly. Moreover, the proportion of Hong Kong capital has declined to 63 percent of total investment. While the SEZ's and Hainan District have steadily recovered from their crisis of a year and a half ago, more foreign investment has been placed in the three deltas and in other open coastal cities. More foreign banks and corporations have opened offices in China, and by April 1986, over US$17 billion in foreign investment had already been invested. According to the most recent government data publicly available, there are over 2,300 joint ventures, 3,700 joint management companies, and 120 one-hundred-percent foreign-owned enterprises in China.[55] The SEZ's, notably Shenzhen and Shantou, have increased the percentage of industrial output in total GNP, and the percentage of exports in total industrial products.[56]

Addressing foreign investors' concerns. From the perspective of foreign investors, five basic issues are critical: the possibility of sharing the Chinese domestic market, the availability of low tax rates, the prospect of low production costs, the capacity to convert profits into hard currencies, and, finally, the presence of guarantees that their investment will have secure legal protection from possible future policy shifts by the Chinese government.

To help balance its international payments, the Chinese government requires foreign investors to sell abroad those products that their enterprises produce in China. Nevertheless, many foreign-involved enterprises in China are not competitive in the international market and thus must depend heavily on China's domestic market. There are two basic categories of foreign investors who are interested in the Chinese market. The first is composed of those who believe that their production costs will be lower in China than elsewhere because of the comparatively lower cost of labor, raw materials, rents, and tax rates there. The lines of production of this group's enterprises are likely to be labor-intensive. More important, these investors usually share or control a portion of the international market and thus do not depend on the Chinese do-

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[50] *Shenzhen Tequbao*, Nov. 4, 1986, p. 2; *Shijie Jingji Daobao*, Mar. 24, 1986; and *Renmin Ribao*, Feb. 1, 1986.

[51] *Renmin Ribao*, Oct. 7, 1985, p. 5.

[52] E.g., see ibid., Apr. 10, 1986, p. 1; and June 12, 1986, p. 1.

[53] Ibid., Apr. 21, 1986, p. 1; and *Liaowang*, Sept. 1, 1986, p. 5. See the column by Xu Yuanchao in *China Daily* (Beijing), Apr. 23, 1986, in which some questions concerning the new law are answered (p. 2).

[54] *Renmin Ribao*, Dec. 16, 1986, p. 1; and *Liaowang*, Apr. 21, 1986, p. 1.

[55] *Beijing Review*, May 5, 1986, pp. 16–17.

[56] Liang Wensen, "Shenzhen Special Economic Zone's Economic Development and its Future," *Gangao Jingji*, No. 9, 1985, pp. 23–28; *Liaowang*, June 2, 1986, pp. 12–13; and *Shijie Jingji Daobao*, Mar. 17, 1986, pp. 1–2.

The Sanyo complex in the Shekou Industrial Zone of Shenzen Special Economic Zone.

—Photoreporters.

mestic market. They are able to export a high percentage of their products from China.

The second category consists primarily of those who either have high expectations of the Chinese domestic market or whose own position in the international market is not very strong. The Chinese government's new policy of controlling the domestic market has therefore discouraged the second group of foreign investors from investing in China.

During the past 18 months or so, it has been particularly difficult for foreign investors, working through the Bank of China, to convert profits made in China into hard currencies, although the agreements they had signed with their Chinese counterparts promised to allow them to do so. Instead, they have been encouraged by the Chinese to re-invest their profits and expand their production in China. Such suggestions, of course, only make the situation worse, as foreign investors feel forced to keep their investment in China although the potential for gain and profits remains uncertain.

The current exchange rate of the RMB has also reduced the actual value of capital investment that foreign investors bring to China. Moreover, largely because of the lack of a well-developed market structure, the government, especially at the local level, has readily (and at times arbitrarily) raised rents and wage levels. The increased inflation rate, together with the general shortage of supply, has led to a price increase on many producer goods and energy.[57] As a result, foreign investors complain often about the high cost of maintaining branch offices in China and about high production costs in general.

Similarly, the government has become less generous than before in offering low tax rates and long taxholidays to foreign-involved enterprises, especially those outside the SEZ's and Hainan District. Neither the "Law of the People's Republic of China Concerning Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Capital" nor the "Law of the People's Republic of China on Enterprises Operated Exclusively with Foreign Capital" is sufficiently specific on this issue. Some local authorities have taken advantage of this lack of specificity and have on their own raised taxes on foreign-involved enterprises. This has led some foreign investors to complain that Chinese laws are, among other things, "too general" and "too vague."[58]

Such complaints, in general, do not seem unfounded. There does appear to be an absence of institutional guarantees and of consistency in policy. This is largely due to the lack of an effective mechanism to coordinate existing law and legal institutions with governmental policies, policies that are frequently modified in response to changing domestic and international developments. Present Chinese legal institutions provide neither Chinese nor foreign enterprises the guarantees and rights that accompany a comprehensive or complete legal process. Nor are Chinese laws detailed enough to cover all issues and contingencies encountered in doing business. The absence of proper courts and of predictable and guaranteed judicial procedures, as well as of qualified lawyers, has enlarged the gap in legal conception between Chinese and foreign investors. As a result, each side often interprets legal agreements in quite different ways.

Technology Transfer to China

The Chinese government continues to urge industrialized countries, especially the United States and Japan, to reduce barriers against transfer of advanced technology to China, particularly computers, telecommunications equipment, and other dual-use technology. Many Chinese ministries, including the Ministry of Defense and the Office of Defense Industry, now station representatives overseas to collect information about the most recent developments in high technology and the possibility of purchasing such technology for China. And more and more foreign corporations have been invited to open exhibitions in China to introduce their new products.

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[57] Yang Zhihe, "A Discussion of the Structure of Industries in the Special Economic Zones," *Nanfang Jingji*, No. 5, 1985, pp. 14–15.

[58] *The Asian Wall Street Journal* (Hong Kong), Mar. 17, 1986, p. 4, and *Shijie Jingji Daobao*, Apr. 21, 1986, p. 10.

By gradually shifting its priority in importing technology from the purchasing of production lines to the granting of licenses for manufacture in China, the Chinese government has exploited various new forms of technology transfer.[59] In addition to offering lower tax rates and longer tax holidays on a selective basis to Chinese-foreign joint-venture and joint-operation enterprises, the government has formulated a strategy of "technology-market trade-off." This strategy is designed to open China's domestic market to those foreign corporations that can introduce "advanced" technology to China, that is, technology that China is unable to produce on its own.[60] In order to enhance its knowledge of the international technology market, the Chinese government has begun to hire foreign consulting companies. It has also formed a number of domestic corporations that specialize in such tasks as supplying parts for the repair of imported equipment, importing second-hand machinery, and leasing equipment from abroad.[61]

The central government has paid greater attention to coordinating imports of technology undertaken by different ministries and local governments. Several central government agencies, such as the General Administration of Exchange Control, the Bank of China, the State Commission of Basic Construction, the State Commission of Science and Technology, and the China Technology Import and Export Corporation, have appeared to play an increasingly significant role in planning, controlling, coordinating, and undertaking projects in this field.

Since 1984, the China National Technical Import Corporation, which has primary responsibility for importing technology and industrial equipment for the central government, has set up 12 local branches in major Chinese coastal cities and a number of representative offices abroad. It has been particularly active, and apparently quite successful, in providing information about the international technology market to local governments and business institutions and in helping them choose and purchase appropriate technology and equipment. During the past two years, the Corporation's local branches have undertaken about 1,800 projects, valued at over US$1 billion.[62]

Overall, the government's reform program has provided local authorities and enterprises with greater flexibility and decision-making power in dealing directly with foreign corporations. As a result, by deploying various forms of Chinese-foreign joint operations, such as joint ventures, product processing,[63] and joint management arrangements, local authorities and enterprises have been more active than before in developing their own capacity to import technology. But such ventures can be successful only if local authorities and enterprises are kept abreast of the latest developments in science, technology, and management. Accordingly, China is developing a nationwide network for translating and circulating the most current foreign publications on these subjects.[64] The government also sponsors lectures by foreign scholars and experts in China, and encourages their Chinese counterparts to participate in international exchange programs.[65]

China thus continues to import a great amount of technology from industrial market economies. This has been facilitated in recent years by the removal of certain barriers against transfer of technology to China. Both the Consultative Group–Coordinating Committee (CoCom) and the United States have continued to expand the number of items of technology that can be transferred to China, notably in computers and telecommunications, as well as other dual-use technology. Moreover, early this year, the United States government reduced from 90 days to 30 days the time needed for American corporations to apply for permission to sell technology to China. Chinese authorities, for their part, seem better prepared to receive such technology. Indeed, the importation of technology to China now appears better planned and coordinated; and efficiency in using imported technology has improved. More important, China has been placed in a better position to deal with foreign corporations in the international technology market, as it can import technology from a number of international suppliers.

Foreign and domestic obstacles. Yet, serious problems remain in acquiring and assimilating foreign technology. At CoCom, for example, China's status has been clouded by debates over whether, as some West European countries advocate, China's special status should be extended to the Soviet Union and East European countries. Others, notably the United States, have strongly opposed this. Moreover, there has been some resistance in the United States, particularly among certain interest groups with considerable political influence both in the administration and on Capitol Hill which have continued their efforts to block the transfer of high technology to China.

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[59] Li Shiyi, "To Accelerate Technology Reform Is the New Tendency of China's Economic Development," *Liaowang*, Mar. 17, 1986, pp. 5–6.

[60] *Zhongguo Jingji Wenti* (Xiamen), No. 3, 1985, p. 17.

[61] Tom Engle, "CITIC: Pacesetting Corporation," *China Business Review*, July-August 1985, pp. 6–7; and *Liaowang*, Jan. 20, 1986, p. 16.

[62] Cao Jiarui, "The Present Situation and Problems of China's Importation of Technology (III)" *Liaowang*, May 19, 1986, pp. 8–9; and Song Jian, "The Strategy of China's Technological Development," ibid., Apr. 21, 1986, pp. 6–7.

[63] Under this arrangement, foreign corporations supply raw materials, parts, and at times equipment and contract with Chinese enterprises to process these materials into finished products. The Chinese side is paid a fee for processing; the foreign corporation takes the finished product.

[64] Zhuang Kaixiong, "China Will Import More Advanced Technology," *Liaowang*, Mar. 17, 1986, pp. 14–15; and *Beijing Review*, May 12, 1986, p. 31.

[65] *Renmin Ribao*, June 3, 1986, p. 4, and *Beijing Review*, June 16, 1986, pp. 21–27.

Many foreign corporations, too, hesitate to sell their most recent technology to developing countries, including China, for fear of enhancing the competitiveness of potential rivals who enjoy the advantages of government subsidies and cheaper labor costs. This is particularly true of Japanese corporations. Chinese officials have often complained of the difficulty in obtaining technology from the Japanese and have become more interested in dealing with Europeans, notably German and French corporations, who are viewed as more reliable and more willing to transfer technology to China. In the United States, many small and medium-size companies see no advantage in transferring technology to China, as it may be a very costly, complicated, and time-consuming process.[66] Meanwhile, the relevant US government agencies, such as the Department of Commerce, the Agency for International Development, and the Department of State, continue to treat requests for technology transfer to China as routine business.

For China's part, the absence of cooperation between Chinese and American corporations has been another reason why it has been unable to exploit fully the available technology currently allowed to be transferred to China. Moreover, the Chinese government has not learned how to lobby effectively on Capitol Hill or with the administration, nor has it provided American corporations with sufficient incentives to lobby on China's behalf.

In addition, as a Chinese economist observes, many projects involving the import of technology are undertaken without the requisite infrastructure or qualified technical personnel and without careful analysis of costs and benefits for each project.[67] As a result, many imported production lines have had to depend on the external supply of components, parts, and even of administrators and technicians. Production costs have thus risen, and the Chinese have found it difficult to realize technological independence and to balance their international payments. Also, in its stress on importing "hard" technology, the government has paid insufficient attention to the importance of gaining essential "soft" technology.

Moreover, even if Chinese enterprises buy the latest technology and use it effectively, they must still face two difficult obstacles. They cannot sell their products easily in the international market as they do not know the market sufficiently; and in the domestic market, the demand for this latest technology is not on a scale necessary for its efficient use and operation.

Educational and Cultural Exchange

During the past two years, the Chinese government has continued to expand its cultural and educational exchange programs with other countries, especially those in the West, as well as Japan. Its policy of sending students abroad, however, has undergone important changes. Not only has the number of students studying overseas increased, but more important, the proportion of visiting scholars spending shorter periods of time doing independent research (rather than entering regular academic programs) in foreign countries has risen as well. Moreover, increasing numbers of younger students, many of whom are now majoring in the humanities, management, and other social science subjects, have been encouraged to work for their doctoral degrees. Their proportion of the total number of Chinese students studying abroad has reached 17 percent.[68]

The Chinese government is taking greater care than before to maintain close contact with Chinese students studying overseas. In order to prevent the possibility of a "brain drain," the government recently passed a regulation requiring college graduates to work in China for five years before being allowed to go abroad for their postgraduate education. In addition, those who complete their doctoral programs are being discouraged from undertaking postdoctoral programs abroad. Meanwhile, the Chinese press frequently carries stories about returned Chinese students who have been treated well and have been promoted to key positions in China. Chinese diplomats abroad, for their part, maintain regular contact with Chinese students at various campuses, and Chinese students associations overseas are becoming more active than before. In China, the ongoing reform process is seen as creating a better working environment and more opportunities for those who return. The Chinese government also actively seeks reassurances from foreign governments and some nongovernment sponsors that they will encourage Chinese students to return to China upon the completion of their studies.

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[66] Many American businessmen whom I interviewed said that it was still quite complicated and time-consuming to deal with China despite the US government's recent attempts to speed up the process.

[67] Cao, "The Current Situation and Problems of China's Importation of Technology (I)," loc. cit.

[68] *Liaowang*, June 23, 1986, p. 5.

Technicians of the Japanese Mitsubishi Nuclear Energy Industry Company explain a model nuclear power station to Chinese spectators at a Beijing exposition in December 1985.

—Eastfoto.

Another important component of the government's policy is to try to create a stimulating intellectual and cultural environment at home. More and more foreign scholars are being invited to give lectures and seminars on various subjects in China, and a great deal of literature, both academic and nonacademic, is being translated into Chinese and published in China. More and more Chinese cultural delegations are visiting abroad, and China's intellectual elite, as well as Chinese youth, are enjoying greater exposure to Western music, movies, and arts.

As a result of these policies, the number of Chinese students studying abroad continues to increase, but so does the number who return. According to official Chinese sources, approximately 16,500 Chinese students, mainly those sponsored by the Chinese government, have already returned to China and have begun to play a critical role in various government and nongovernment (academic and business) institutions.[69] The cultural exchange programs between China and other parts of the world have expanded rapidly, and Western culture, values, and scholarship, while the source of considerable debate among Chinese leaders, have come to increasingly influence Chinese youth, intellectuals, and society as a whole.

There have been other positive results as well. A new generation of Chinese policymakers and scholars who are open-minded and who have a broad international perspective is maturing. Chinese leaders travel frequently, especially to industrialized countries, consult with foreign experts, and read broadly. More and more high- and middle-level cadres are being sent to industrialized countries for training and study, and foreign scholars' comments and literature on China's domestic development and foreign policies are being widely disseminated throughout the Chinese bureaucratic establishment. As a result, Chinese leaders not only are more confident and better informed about various domestic and international issues, they also have considerably more opportunity to hear opinions and perspectives other than their own. In comparison with the earlier periods, they are thus seen as being more liberal, open-minded, and better integrated into the international community.

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[69] *Renmin Ribao*, May 14, 1986, p. 1, June 6, 1986, p. 4, and June 19, 1986, p. 1.

Nevertheless, the Chinese government's policy of cultural and educational exchange has not been fully consistent. The government has discouraged students who are not in official exchange programs from going abroad to study, and beginning this year, it has been pressuring all students, regardless of status, not to take their families overseas with them. It has also made it more difficult for those who have completed their planned academic program to transfer to another program in order to extend their studying and research abroad,[70] and it has announced that Chinese students must study for their Master's degree at home rather than abroad.

These restrictive measures have affected mainly those who are sponsored by the Chinese government and those who are still in China and trying to leave. They have not been as effective with those who are already abroad or who do not belong to the official exchange program. Not surprisingly, these restrictions have alienated many Chinese students and discouraged them from returning to China, arousing more suspicion and apprehension about further possible policy shifts by the government.[71]

In general, the government's cultural policy has been quite liberal. It has not been able, however, to maintain a stable and consistent cultural policy at home. Party conservatives have launched attacks on almost every new development in literature, the arts, the humanities, and the social sciences.[72] This has seriously alarmed those studying abroad, who worry about the potential conflict between official ideology and their academic disciplines and performance, again increasing their anxiety about returning to China.

There has been a lack of balance between Chinese leaders' use of foreign experts on the one hand and their use of China's own experts on the other. To be sure, the consultations and discussions that Chinese policymakers have had with foreign experts have expanded these officials' knowledge and perspective on various international and domestic issues. Nevertheless, many of the foreign experts to whom they have given a hearing know little about China and its problems of development, even though they may be distinguished in their own fields. Their comments on China's development are thus often very general and not necessarily relevant to Chinese reality. Moreover, the avenues wherein Chinese scholars may present their opinions and offer policy recommendations are random and have not been institutionalized.

Political Risks

The political risks of the "open door" remain. The degree of risk is largely influenced by five interrelated factors. The first derives from China's institutional shortcomings and weaknesses. The way to eliminate or alleviate these problems is to make further institutional economic reform, thereby narrowing the existing institutional gap between the Chinese economy and market economies.

The second factor concerns the dynamics of China's domestic political and economic development. Internal politics within the party and government have frequently affected the "open door" policy, partly due to the disparity between reform practice and rigid official ideology. In addition, different interest groups have benefited in varying ways by the "open door" policy. They have, accordingly, taken conflicting attitudes toward China's "opening to the outside world." The most effective way to reduce (it seems impossible to eliminate) the damage caused by these problems and eliminate the negative effects of ongoing political infighting over the "open door" policy, of course, would be to reform China's political system as well as its ideology. But this would be a monumental and difficult undertaking, and one fraught with uncertainty. So far, the Chinese government has been very cautious about China's planned political reform.

The third category is rather functional. The Chinese do not really know how to "open the door" and to perform effectively in the international market. This is particularly true of the Chinese government's policies regarding the SEZ's and the areas of foreign trade, foreign exchange, and foreign investment. The problem of coping with shifts in domestic economic policies has increasingly challenged the government, although during the past few years the government has made remarkable progress in enhancing its knowledge and improving its practice. These areas can be further aided by the normal learning process. The key issue here is to open more channels of policy consultation both within and outside the government and to raise a new generation of policymakers who have expertise in international business and finance. To be effective, however, such policymakers must be provided strong inducements, allowed initiative, and given the freedom to perform.

The fourth category concerns the dynamics of the

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[70] Interviews with Chinese students who came from China recently.

[71] One Chinese scholar estimated that about one-fifth of the Chinese students studying abroad are from Shanghai. About one-third of them, he said, are not sponsored by the Chinese government. Of that one-third, only very few intend to go back to China upon the completion of their studies overseas. See *Shijie Jingji Daobao*, Apr. 7, 1986, p. 8.

[72] Ibid., Apr. 21, 1986, pp. 1, 2, and 13, and May 12, 1986, p. 6.

A Singapore-registered ship at the fifth loading-unloading zone, one of the foreign trade docks of Shanghai Harbor.

—Eastfoto.

international environment in which China conducts business, especially in the Asia-Pacific region, where China conducts roughly 75 percent of its total foreign trade. Due to increased Chinese participation in international business transactions, the degree of interdependence between the Chinese and the world economy as a whole has increased. Certainly, many issues, such as the movement of oil prices, the process of worldwide recessions, and the increase in trade protectionism, are largely outside China's control. The establishment of mechanisms capable of accommodating policy adjustments, however, can reduce external damage to the Chinese economy. Moreover, intragovernmental consultation and cooperation and increased participation in international organizations can also help cope with these difficulties.

Finally, certain problems are inevitable. These are basic costs that every country must pay in the process of transforming itself from a relatively closed society to an open one—politically, economically, and culturally. Nevertheless, together with other economic and political difficulties, these problems can undermine the legitimacy of the "open door" policy, intensify conflicts within the party, generate social tensions, and damage the business community's confidence in the Chinese market. To a large extent, these problems will continue to exist and even intensify. The key issue for the Chinese government here is how to reduce their negative effect on the "open door" policy.

Although the post-Mao economic reform has restructured China's agricultural system, created a private sector, and partially changed the urban industrial system, the national economy is still largely based upon a central planning system. There are no well-developed markets of capital, labor, land, and producer goods in China. The central authority continues to play a key role in allocating financial, natural, and human resources. The price structure, especially in the urban industrial sector, is largely controlled by the government, although the recent price reform has introduced the market mechanism into the economy. These institutional shortcomings have made it difficult for foreign investors to achieve their long-term planning, manage their operations in China, and integrate the Chinese and international markets.

The high exchange rate of the RMB and the price gap between the international market and China's domestic market provide the institutional bases for the development of black-market activity, smuggling, and other "economic crimes." The current legal institutions in China do not define clearly the legal rights of enterprises and individuals engaged in the business activities, nor do they offer full legal protection to those developing the private sector in China.

During the past several years, China's domestic development has been generally stable and positive. After a brief interval during the first half of 1985,[73] the reform group has been able once again to pursue its program on both political and economic fronts. It has made strong efforts to facilitate the departure from the scene of the old generation of cadres and functionaries and has replaced them systematically with large numbers of younger, better educated, and more open-minded people—many of whom have had experience traveling or studying in the West.[74] These personnel changes have been carried out effectively at the ministerial and provincial levels.

In the course of carrying out these difficult transitions, the reform group has recovered the confidence to deepen its reforms in the realm of ideological affairs. It has emphasized the importance of creating a favorable atmosphere for academic and policy debates, and it has encouraged further introduction of Western economics into China.[75] These developments indicate that the reform group of the leadership has gained the upper hand over its conservative opponents in the debate over the role of ideology in China's Four Modernizations.

In the economic field, the reform group has extended price reform and development of the SEZ's, and begun to build up Chinese labor and capital markets. In addition, it has continued the development of the private sector and of "horizontal" joint ventures, joint operations, and technology transfer between enterprises in different industries and regions.[76] These efforts have buttressed the "open door" policy, improving the domestic climate for its implementation.

Nonetheless, the "open door" policy faces a number of serious domestic challenges. In the first place, the reform group has not fully subdued the opposition in the debate over party ideology, nor has it been able to create a new ideology sufficient to justify and legitimize its reform program and the "open door" policy. Individual political leaders, notably Deng Xiaoping, who is 82, have played key roles in the balance of power within the top leadership establishment as well as in the policymaking process. But, as recent debates on the development of the SEZ's have indicated, the conservatives have been able to challenge the reforms and the "open door" policy from both theoretical and technical perspectives. They have argued that the "opening to the outside world" has led China down the "capitalist road" and sold out China's sovereignty. Such attacks have shaken the confidence of foreign investors, who worry that shifts in policy may take place after Deng's departure. As a result, they are somewhat hesitant to make long-term commitments to the Chinese market.

Second, the systematic replacement of personnel has not been carried out successfully at low and middle levels. This is due partly to the fact that most mid- and low-level bureaucrats are relatively young, but also because the government has not accomplished proper institutional reforms needed to support and stabilize such changes in personnel. As a result, with the exception of foreign-involved enterprises in the SEZ's, party organizations still play the central role in determining decision-making in enterprises. This development has restricted these enterprises' capacity to deal effectively with foreign corporations, as most party political cadres know little about technology and business. It has also made it difficult to promote those who have studied abroad to key positions in various government and nongovernment institutions.

Third, during the last few years, the process of China's economic development has at times appeared to be unstable.[77] This has been largely due to the government's weakened capacity to manage the national economy and its consequent frequent policy changes. This instability in economic development has created additional serious difficulties for the secure adoption of the "open door" policy. The central government's policy shifts between high and low speed in pursuit of national economic growth have damaged China's credibility in the international market and deepened the hesitation of foreign corporations to build long-term ties with China.

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[73] As a result of the economic crises that occurred in the last quarter of 1984 and the first quarter of 1985, the reformers found themselves in a difficult position within the government. They had to parry the conservatives' strong criticisms of China's economic policies in general and the price reform and "open door" policy in particular.

[74] *Renmin Ribao*, June 29, 1986, p. 1.

[75] "Academic Youth Discussing the Political Reform," *Shijie Jingji Daobao*, May 26, 1986, pp. 1–2, and June 9, 1986, p. 2; and *Renmin Ribao*, May 18, 1986, p. 1, and June 6, 1986, p. 2.

[76] *Liaowang*, Apr. 14, 1986, pp. 22–23; *Renmin Ribao*, Feb. 5, 1986, p. 3; and *Shijie Jingji Daobao*, Mar. 24, 1986, p. 1.

[77] *Shijie Jingji Daobao*, June 6, 1986, p. 2, and *Liaowang*, Apr. 21, 1986, pp. 4–5.

Moreover, apart from policy itself, the unstable process of economic development has weakened the position of Chinese enterprises in the international market and their capacity to deal with foreign corporations. This is because at each peak point of the development cycle, the central government has implemented, usually without warning, restrictive financial, monetary, fiscal, and foreign exchange policies. As a result, Chinese enterprises have had difficulty fulfilling commitments made previously to their foreign counterparts. Such vacillation has certainly made it difficult for foreign corporations to meet their production and marketing schedules. They have also had difficulty in purchasing essential production goods in the Chinese domestic market, as Chinese government policy changes have had a significant effect on supply, demand, and prices in general.

The task of managing the "open door" policy has increasingly presented a serious challenge to the Chinese government. In particular, both China's domestic development and the international environment have undergone significant changes in the past few years. These changes require the Chinese government to adjust its policies if it is to cope adequately with a dynamic and ever-changing reality. But the government lacks a clear-sighted policymaking body imbued with unimpeded authority and the proven capacity to manage China's "opening to the outside world." In the absence of this, its policymaking procedure has been inefficient. Many policies do not last very long; and there has been no effective institutional mechanism to coordinate directives in different fields. In addition, policy debates are frequently mired in acrid ideological arguments and not implemented with the necessary precision. These shortcomings compromise the efficiency of the "open door" policy and engender inconsistency and vacillation.

Finally, the "open door" policy has brought certain negative Western cultural influences into China and created new tensions between different interest groups. Pornography has spread widely. Smuggling, corruption, the black market, and other illegal activities generally associated with increased foreign involvement in China have expanded rapidly. The gap in income and opportunity between those who work for foreign-involved enterprises and the rest of the population has widened, and this has posed a serious challenge to official ideology. Moreover, the intense competition to travel and study abroad has heightened tension between individuals and among various social groupings. Deeply rooted Chinese nationalism, in addition, has grown during the past year and a half. In the last few months of 1985, anti-Japanese student demonstrations took place in a number of large cities. Although ongoing party politics and dissatisfaction with inflation and the bureaucracy were also important, the major reason for the demonstrations was disaffection, indeed outright opposition, to the government's "open door" policy.[78] These political instabilities, if they continue and deepen, will undermine the legitimacy of the "open door" policy and jeopardize the political environment from which it has emerged.

The International Environment

The international economic and political environment has changed significantly in recent years. The world economy remains in a recession, and demand by developed countries for primary and manufactured goods from developing countries like China has been cut. The recession has also intensified competition for limited financial resources both internationally and within the markets of the developing countries themselves. As a result, China is finding it more difficult than ever to expand its exports, including those of grain and other agricultural products.

This is partially because the elasticity of demand for agricultural goods in the international market is not very great. More important, the competition for the international agricultural market among the leading exporters (China, the United States, Canada, Mexico, and the Common Market) has become increasingly tough. Unless China can further its institutional reforms and build a mechanism able to respond effectively to the dynamics of the international market, it will continue to have difficulties in upgrading its export structure successfully.

International protectionism in industrial market economies against both newly industrializing countries and other developing countries has been growing stronger. The United States, Japan, and Western Europe have adopted new restrictive policies against the import of manufactured goods from NIC's and other developing countries, including China. This protectionism has injured severely China's exports, both directly and indirectly. Under US government pressure, the GATT has recently passed a new resolution restricting even further the international textile trade.[79] This has hurt Chinese and Indian exports in particular. Direct exports, especially of textiles and other consumer goods, to industrial market economies have become far more difficult than before. Meanwhile, China continues to have huge trade deficits with Japan. Trade negotiations between China and Japan have not resulted in significant progress in allowing Chinese goods to enter the Japanese market, although Japanese officials have often made promises to ease restrictions.[80]

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[78] See Shi Ronghan, "To March Under Storms," *Guangdong Shehui Kexue*, No. 4, 1985, pp. 1–11. In this article, the author indicated that there have been at least two "big storms" attacking the SEZ's. The first was in 1982 when the SEZ's were accused of being "new colonial sections." The second was in the first half of 1985 when the SEZ's were criticized as having been a "failure."

Together with the worldwide recession, this protectionism has scuttled Hong Kong's economic growth and hurt its exports. Whereas Taiwan's growth rate in GNP in 1985 was 4.7 percent, Hong Kong's was a mere 0.8 percent.[81] As a result, businessmen in Hong Kong have felt it increasingly difficult to function as agents in facilitating trade projects between China and other parts of the world.

Hong Kong's recent poor economic performance has had a significant impact on China's "open door" policy. During the past two decades, Hong Kong has been China's number one trade partner. More important, the amount of trade surplus that China had with Hong Kong from the late 1970's to 1984 was roughly equal to the amount of China's trade deficit with Japan and the United States.[82] In 1985, however, for the first time, China had trade deficits with Hong Kong.[83] During the past few years, moreover, Hong Kong has played a critical role in China's "open door" policy. Over 60 percent of total foreign investment in China is from Hong Kong. The same percentage of foreign-involved enterprises in China are indeed Chinese–Hong Kong joint undertakings. Hong Kong's economic decline has thus reduced financial resources available to China. Most foreign-involved enterprises in China, notably those using processing, joint-venture, and joint-management formats, have been heavily dependent on Hong Kong businessmen's knowledge of the international market and their business connections. The damage to Hong Kong's exports caused by international protectionism has thus indirectly hurt China's own exports.

Since October 1985, oil prices in the international market have dropped rapidly. China's oil exports, as noted earlier, now account for about one-fifth of its total exports. According to a Chinese survey, the price of Chinese crude oil in 1985 in the international market was between US$23 and $24 per barrel. For every drop of one US dollar per barrel, China will lose export income of US$200 to 300 million annually. It is projected, therefore, that China will lose between US$2 billion and $3 billion in 1986.[84]

The Xiamen International Bank, a joint venture of three Chinese national financial institutions and a Hong Kong finance company, opened in March 1986 in the Xiamen Special Economic Zone.

—Eastfoto.

Prospects for the Future

Will China's "open door" policy continue? The answer seems to be "Yes." This is because the reformers in China, who had appeared to have been fairly adept at arranging for the next leadership succession, have committed themselves to such a policy, and are likely to remain committed in the years ahead. More important, the current Chinese leadership has managed to sustain its "open door" policy despite challenges both domestically and internationally.

To a large extent, China's "opening to the outside world" has facilitated its ongoing political and economic reforms and provided the absolute preconditions for the current leadership's efforts to integrate China into the international community. It has also helped create a new generation of policy-makers who are more open-minded and have a broad perspective and international experience. It has, furthermore, made Western culture available to Chinese society, thereby narrowing the considerable gap between China and the West.

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[79] See, e.g., *Shijie Jingji Daobao*, Nov. 3, 1986, p. 5.

[80] See ibid., Mar. 10, 1986, p. 1, and May 26, 1986, pp. 1, 5.

[81] *The Asian Wall Street Journal*, Mar. 3, 1986, p. 11.

[82] *China Business Review*, March-April 1986, pp. 53–54.

[83] Ibid., March-April 1985, p. 55.

[84] *Liaowang*, Apr. 21, 1986, p. 5, and May 26, 1986, pp. 6–7.

The "open door" policy has continued to increase the degree of interdependence between the Chinese and world economies. It has brought a large measure of foreign capital, technology, equipment, and management skills to China, thereby speeding up China's transformation into a modern industrial society and narrowing the institutional disparity between the Chinese economy and the industrial market economies. It has, at the same time, strengthened China's position in the international market. In the long run, it will likely have a strong impact on the process of China's development and upon China's overall relationship with the outside world.

But if China's "open door" policy is to be effective it must be adjusted and readjusted in light of its past shortcomings. It must be anchored by a long-term strategy based on concrete, detailed, and careful analysis of China's domestic needs and the dynamics of its international environment. It must be the product of consistent and predictable government policy. And it must be adjusted through carefully prepared and skillfully orchestrated policy modifications.

In practical terms, for the most part, this means proceding along lines already in place, albeit at a somewhat accelerated pace. For example, the RMB should be further depreciated, and prices in the Chinese domestic market should be gradually linked directly to prices in the international market place. Capital, labor, and producer goods markets need to be built up, and government financial and fiscal subsidies to export enterprises reduced. Favorable conditions and inducements designed to attract foreign investment should be continued, and foreign investors' share in China's domestic market ought to be defined clearly and protected by law. Profits made in China by foreign investors should be totally at their disposal and easily converted into hard currency.

Such measures will fall well short of the mark, however, if enterprises are not granted greater autonomy. Economic decision-making at the enterprise level must be further decentralized and depoliticized in order to allow for greater initiative, creativity, and the capacity to respond to changes quickly and decisively. Thus, party and government intervention in the *business* activities of enterprises should be reduced and ultimately eliminated, and experienced technicians and professional managers, not party bureaucrats, should be the enterprise's primary decision-makers. Enterprises also ought to be allowed to deal with foreign corporations directly, and Chinese legal institutions must be adapted in such a way as to protect enterprises' rights and interests.

Internationally, China should continue to work through diplomatic channels, jointly with other developing countries and NIC's, to urge developed countries, notably Japan and the United States, to remove protectionist barriers against Chinese goods as well as restrictions against the transfer of advanced technology to China. It should also take special care to develop and refine regional and subregional trade ties and cooperation, especially in the Asia-Pacific area, notably with Taiwan and South Korea. More important in terms of the immediate future, China should help Hong Kong stabilize its economic growth so as to alleviate China's trade deficit.

The unfolding of China's "open door" policy has contributed to the overall economic prosperity of the international community as well as to international stability, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. Continued economic cooperation and the concomitant integration of economies will no doubt have a long-term effect on the development of China's relations with other parts of the world, especially with the West, including Japan. But if China is to succeed in its "opening to the outside world," it must have the support of industrial market economies, in the form of both investment in China and the removal of trade restrictions against Chinese goods and the transfer of technology. Indeed, unless China can increase its exports, industrialized countries cannot expect to expand their sales to China significantly. In the long run, however, it is the continued expansion of cultural and educational exchange programs that will most likely reap the greatest reward—the building of mutual understanding and trust between the young generation in China and that in the West and in Japan.

Note

Special Economic Zones in the PRC

Joseph Fewsmith

NO ASPECT of China's policy of "opening to the outside world"[1] has proven more controversial than the decision, attributed directly to Deng Xiaoping,[2] to create Special Economic Zones (SEZ's) for purposes of drawing in foreign capital, stimulating exports, and gaining exposure to modern technology and management. The parallel between the zones—with their special privileges for foreigners and special administrative status—and China's 19th-century treaty port concessions governed by foreigners under the doctrine of extraterritoriality is apparent enough to require frequent refutation. "Can these zones turn into new concessions and colonies?" asks a typical commentary. They cannot, it is maintained, because "the economic leadership power in the special zones is in our hands."[3] Despite considerable success in developing the SEZ's and the extension of some of their special arrangements to additional coastal cities, the institution continues to have its foes.

The experiment with the SEZ's dates from April 1979, when a central work conference presided over by Deng Xiaoping called for their establishment. After investigations led by CCP Secretariat member Gu Mu, the party Central Committee and the State Council formally set aside areas of four cities—Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shantou in Guangdong province and Xiamen in Fujian province—for starting such zones on a trial basis. These actions were sanctioned when the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress in August 1980 promulgated "Regulations for the Guangdong Special Economic Zones" and officially approved the setting-up of the SEZ's.[4]

The zones, which are to act as laboratories for economic and management reform, are under the dual leadership of the central and provincial governments. At the central level, there is a Special Economic Zones Planning Office under the State Council, and Gu Mu oversees the development of the zones and implementation of the policy of opening to the outside world on behalf of the party. At the local level, there is a Special Economic Zones Administrative Office under the Guangdong Provincial Government. The mayor of Shenzhen has traditionally served as a vice-governor of Guangdong.

Of the four zones, Shenzhen has experienced far and away the most rapid development, drawing the bulk of government investment and attention. In only four years, from 1979 to the end of 1983, Shenzhen developed from a small border town of 20,000–30,000 people into a city of some 300,000. In the same period,

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Joseph Fewsmith is Analyst of Chinese Politics for the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (Washington, DC). He is author of Party, State, and Local Elites in Republican China: Merchant Organizations and Politics in Shanghai, 1890-1930 *(1985). The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do no necessarily represent the official position of the US government.*

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[1] Chinese media strongly prefer the term "opening to the outside world" *(duiwai kaifang)* and self-consciously avoid the term "open door policy" *(menhu kaifang zhengce)* because of its connotations of the old imperialist order. See Wu Cheng, " 'Opening to the Outside World' and the 'Open Door'," *Gongren Ribao* (Beijing), Feb. 14, 1986, p. 3, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-CHI*), Feb. 21, 1986, pp. K/4–5. This article will follow the Chinese-preferred usage, despite its cumbersomeness.

[2] Zeng Jianhui, "The Birth of an Important Political Decision—A New Step in Opening the Country to the Outside World," *Liaowang* (Beijing), No. 24, June 11, 1984, pp. 9–13, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, June 18, 1984, pp. K/1–7. This was affirmed by Liang Xiang, then mayor of Shenzhen, who said that during his inspection of Shenzhen, Deng had stated, "It is I who proposed running the special economic zone . . . ." See "Liang Xiang on Background to Deng Xiaoping's Remarks," *Wen Wei Po* (Hong Kong), July 13, 1985, p. 3, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, July 15, 1985, W/3–4.

[3] Guangdong provincial radio, Sept. 4, 1981, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 9, pp. P/1–2.

[4] Zeng Jianhui, loc. cit.

some 1.9 billion yuan were invested in capital construction, and some 2,500 contracts were signed with foreign investors. Development of the other three SEZ's has proceeded much more cautiously.[5]

By the beginning of 1984, the SEZ's seemed to be doing so well that Deng Xiaoping claimed during a visit to Shenzen that its "development and experience prove that our policy for setting up the zones is correct."[6] During the spring of 1984 there developed a veritable "learn from Shenzhen" campaign. In April, it was announced that an additional 14 coastal cities would be opened to foreign investment on a preferential basis—a decision that was largely justified by reference to Shenzhen's experience. At the October 1, 1984, Beijing observance of the 35th Anniversary of the Founding of the PRC, there was even a Shenzhen float in the parade proudly displaying the slogan of that city's Shekou industrial zone: "Time is money and efficiency is life." Moreover, at the Fourth Conference of the Chinese Writers' Association, in December 1983, State Councillor and then party Secretariat member Gu Mu indicated that three new areas—the Liaodong and Jiaodong peninsulas, and a triangular area in southern Fujian province—would also be "opened" economically.[7]

These developments were all part of a long-term policy. Gu Mu told the 9th meeting of the 6th National People's Congress (NPC) Standing Committee in January 1985 that

> *the general trend of our opening to the outside world is a gradual development from south to north, from east to west, and from coastal areas to the interior. . . . The faster a country's economic development, the bigger strides it will take in using foreign capital, importing technology, and developing trade. It has become a trend of economic development in the present world for a country to open itself to the outside world and develop economic exchange with foreign countries to promote and accelerate its own economic construction.*[8]

Comments by Premier Zhao Ziyang made during a November 1984 tour of the Pearl and Yangtse river deltas (sites of the Zhuhai and Shenzhen SEZ's and of some "open cities"—see map on p. 62) more closely linked economic construction in coastal areas with the broader development of the Chinese interior:

> *The special economic zones, open cities, and economically open zones are the bridgeheads in our opening to the outside world, and they should play the role of a springboard. On the one hand, they should import advanced foreign technology, equipment, and management and operations methods; absorb and digest them; apply them in innovations; and transfer them to the interior. On the other hand, they should sell commodities produced in the coastal areas with foreign technology to the interior, and export the latter's raw materials and produce, with added value after processing here, to the international market, in order to achieve better economic results. In a figurative sense, the special economic zones and open cities are like the intersection of two lines, forming two fan-shaped sectors, embracing the introduction of foreign technology and cooperation with the interior.*[9]

The account of Zhao's tour in a pro-PRC Hong Kong newspaper did note the premier's reservations about "rampant" black market activities in Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Zhuhai, as well as the tendency of the zones to make money off the interior rather than producing goods for export. But these matters were apparently secondary. Zhao reportedly went so far as to announce (with misplaced confidence) that China had "managed to solve the problem of imbalance in foreign exchange once and for all."[10]

Growing Economic Concerns

Even as Zhao spoke, however, adverse economic developments were creating a political climate in which long-standing doubts in some circles regarding the legitimacy of the SEZ's and the pace and scope of opening up could be expressed. Indeed, by early summer 1985, Deng himself beat a retreat, labelling the Shenzhen SEZ an "experiment," the success of which "remains to be proven,"[11] and Gu Mu announced that China would "give priority" to only four of the fourteen open cities—Shanghai, Tianjin, Dalian, and Guangzhou—and temporarily "slow down" the development of foreign cooperation in the other ten.[12] What had happened?

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[5] Liang Xiang, "The Policy of Developing Special Economic Zones Is Entirely Correct," *Renmin Ribao* (Beijing), Mar. 29, 1984, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 6, 1984, P/1–5.

[6] Xinhua, Feb. 1, 1984, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 2, 1984, pp. K/8–9.

[7] *South China Morning Post*, (Hong Kong), Jan. 4, 1985, reprinted in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan 4, 1985, p. W/3.

[8] Xinhua, Jan. 17, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 23, 1985, pp. K/5–16.

[9] Xinhua, Dec. 25, 1984, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 26, 1984, K/1–3. Elsewhere, Zhao had spoken of the open areas as "pivots for foreign imports and domestic coordination." See Lan Ching-chung, "Premier Zhao's Report on His Inspection of Guangdong and Jiangsu," Parts I and II, *Wen Wei Po*, June 15 and 16, 1985, p. 2, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *China Report: Economic Affairs* (Washington, DC—hereafter *JPRS-CEA*), No. 85-024, Mar. 12, 1985, pp. 89–95.

[10] Lan Ching-chung, loc. cit.

[11] Xinhua, June 29, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, July 2, 1985, p. I/1.

In the last quarter of 1984, rapid expansion of individual and collective consumption funds helped stimulate a rapid increase in imports of foreign goods to soak up the excess currency. In addition, loosening of controls over foreign trade and acceleration of the policy of opening provided opportunities for profit-making (sometimes corrupt) from imports. The result was a rapid and disproportionate increase in imports and a correspondingly rapid decrease in foreign exchange reserves. In the last quarter of 1984 and the first quarter of 1985, China's foreign exchange reserves fell by about one-third.[13]

The Beijing government moved quickly in an attempt to regain control over the foreign exchange situation. On March 21, an expanded role for the People's Bank of China in the nation's foreign commerce was signaled with the appointment of then State Councillor and alternate Politburo member Chen Muhua as its director.[14] On April 5, the State Council's General Administration of Exchange Control promulgated "Rules for the Implementation of Punishment for Violation of Foreign Exchange Controls."[15] And on April 20, *Guoji Shangbao* reported that the Foreign Trade Administration of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade had formulated several measures calling on provincial economic and trade organizations to "strengthen foreign trade management, supervision, and examination."[16] Also in April, the State Council convened a meeting of provincial governors, which addressed the issue of foreign exchange.[17]

These developments strongly suggested that the former free-wheeling operations of the SEZ's were coming under closer, critical scrutiny. A newspaper editorial urged the SEZ's to establish "externally oriented economies" and warned that the zones "cannot depend over a long time on state foreign exchange support."[18] A number of sources put their finger on the major issue—it was more profitable for enterprises in the SEZ's to sell imports on the domestic market than to develop products for export. A seminar on the theory and policy of opening to the outside world held in Guangzhou on April 4–9, 1985, concluded that the current foreign exchange rate "often makes export trade gain limited profits or even cause huge losses," while making it possible for "import trade to gain huge profits on the domestic market." This resulted in "speculating in foreign exchange," which was not the objective of "opening the country to the outside world." The meeting maintained that it was necessary to reform the foreign exchange control system in order to prevent state funds from being used for private purposes, to eliminate the "obvious dual foreign exchange rate," and to guarantee the foreign exchange earnings needed by the state.[19]

In mid-May, State Councillor Zhang Jingfu told a national meeting on the work of soliciting foreign capital that "the projects selected should meet the needs of our national economic development."[20] An authoritative article in the party daily the same day complained that economic units in the coastal areas had imported "large quantities of equipment and raw materials" and had used "large amounts of foreign exchange," but had sold their products primarily on the domestic market. "Unless we pay attention to this problem and adopt prompt measures to deal with it," the article warned, "the foreign exchange problem may adversely affect the benign economic cycle in these areas in two or three years' time."[21]

More stringent measures to control foreign exchange and concentrate economic resources of the SEZ's and open cities were soon to come. In late June, as noted above, Gu Mu announced that China would henceforth "give priority" to only four of the 14 open cities. A July conference of the governors and mayors of the 14 open coastal cities, four SEZ's, and Hainan Island reportedly "reaffirmed that China's open-door policy should develop steadily and healthily," but that in light of "new problems" occurring in the open cities over the previous year—including foreign exchange imbalances and excessive lending and building—the scale of capital construction in the open cities should "not be too large" and the capital construction budgets of the Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Xiamen SEZ's should be scaled back.[22] In an interview with the *South China Morning Post*, Zou Erkang, secretary general of the Shenzhen SEZ, confirmed that funds for economic construction in the zone had been cut by one-third, from an originally budgeted 2.5 billion yuan to 1.6 billion yuan (the same as in 1984).[23] These figures were repeated in a *Wen Wei Po* account, which added that Xiamen's 1-billion yuan budget would be reduced to 800 million and Zhuhai's expenditures would remain within the 1984 budget figure of 340 million yuan.[24]

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[12] Xinhua, June 29, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, July 16, 1985, p. D/1.

[13] According to Chen Muhua, Chinese foreign exchange reserves stood at US$16,674 million in September 1984 and $14,420 million in December. By the end of March 1985, reserves had fallen to $11,262 million. See Yeh Chi-jung, "Chen Muhua Received Hong Kong and Macao Reporters This Morning," *Hsin Wan Pao* (Hong Kong), Mar. 31, 1985, p. 1, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 1, 1985, pp. W/8–9; and *Zhongguo Xinwen She* (Beijing), July 6, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, July 8, 1985, p. K/20.

[14] On the appointment, see Xinhua, Mar. 21, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 21, 1985, p. K/10. For the commentary, see Chang Chien-hua, "Growing Importance of Financial Work; China Strengthens the Role of the People's Bank," *Wen Wei Po*, Mar. 23, 1985, p. 1, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 25, 1985, p. W/2.

Acording to one account, the "overwhelming majority" of domestically run enterprises in Shenzhen took advantage of the zone's preferential policies to import parts duty-free, assemble them, and sell the resulting products on the home market. In 1984 alone, such enterprises imported some $320 million in parts and exported only $42.2 million. See *Jingji Ribao* (Beijing), Feb. 22, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 5, 1984, pp. P/1–8.

[15] Xinhua, Apr. 8, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 19, 1985, pp. K/17–20. The rules reportedly had been approved by the State Council on March 25.

[16] Trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, May 10, 1985, pp. K/18–19.

[17] Tian Jiyun referred to this meeting at a subsequent conference of cadres of central organs. See Tian Jiyun, "Issues Concerning the Current Economic Situation and Reforms of Economic Structure," Xinhua, Jan. 11, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 13, 1986, p. K/12.

[18] *Guoji Shangbao*, Apr. 4, 1985, p. 1 editorial, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 16, 1985, pp. K/8–9.

[19] Lin He, "Roundup of the Seminar on the Theory and Policy of Opening to the Outside World," *Renmin Ribao*, May 17, 1985, p. 5, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, May 24, 1985, pp. K/5–7.

[20] Xinhua, May 16, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, May 21, 1985, pp. K/8–9.

[21] *Renmin Ribao*, May 16, 1985, p. 2, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, May 20, 1985, pp. K/10–11.

Policy Debate

It was in this setting that Deng Xiaoping took his more reserved position vis-à-vis the SEZ's. Clearly a high-level debate was raging over the development (perhaps even the very legitimacy) of the zones. Even before the depth of the economic problems was publicly exposed, a December 1984 symposium of "young and middle-aged research workers" on matters of world economics demonstrated widely divergent views over the pace and scope of China's policy of opening to the outside world.

Most striking, in light of the view often cited by Chinese media that the theoretical basis of China's open policy lay in Lenin's arguments for NEP, some participants argued that the NEP was the "product of specific Soviet historical circumstances" and that in theoretical terms Lenin regarded it as "one step backward from socialism." Moreover, critics of current policy argued that "our strategy of 'exchanging markets for technology' may end up by giving away our market but getting no technology." In addition, objections were raised to the development of commerce between the interior and the coastal areas on the grounds that a "one-way flow of funds" is bound to develop, which will "further enlarge the gap in the level of economic development between coastal and inland areas."[25]

In the spring of 1985, about the time that China's foreign exchange difficulties were being aired in public, central dailies *Renmin Ribao* and *Guangming Ribao* reprinted an article from the Guangzhou paper *Yangcheng Wanbao* sharply critical of the management of Shenzen's Shekou industrial zone.[26]

Shortly thereafter, Vice-Premier Yao Yilin inspected Shenzhen and reportedly told Yuan Geng that the zones could not continue to depend on "blood transfusions"—i.e., subsidies—from the state. Yuan reportedly countered that the transfusions could not be stopped abruptly, for that would put the very life of the SEZ's "in danger."[27]

Further evidence that the SEZ's had become a matter of contention at the highest levels came when Politburo member Hu Qiaomu wrote an article in the internal publication *Zuzhi Renshi Xinxi Bao* (Bulletin of Organization and Personnel), that was picked up first by the Hong Kong newspaper *Ming Pao* and then excerpted in the PRC legal-affairs newspaper *Zhongguo Fazhi Bao*. In the first such high-level attack on the SEZ's known to have been reported in publications available outside China, Hu sharply criticized the zones, evoking their similarities to the foreign enclaves in the 19th-century treaty ports. Hu recalled that "the Qing dynasty adopted an indifferent attitude" toward the concesssions, at the expense of "China's legal rights." He suggested that the present Chinese government had already gone too far in yielding to the "inordinate demands" of foreigners, and he demanded to know why the Chinese Communist Party "is prohibited from public activities" in foreign investment enterprises in the zones. Moreover, Hu charged, foreign businessmen "show no respect" for Chinese unions and "forget even the laws of their own countries when they come to the SEZ's."[28]

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[22] Kuang Yu, "State Council Holds Conference on Special Zones and Open Cities," *Wen Wei Po*, July 7, 1985, p. 1, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, July 9, 1985, pp. W/7–8.

[23] *South China Morning Post*, July 2, 1985, in *FBIS-CHI*, July 11, 1985, pp. W/8–9. (At that time, the official exchange rate was approximately 3.7 *yuan* to the dollar).

[24] Kuang Yu, loc. cit.

[25] "On the International Environment of China's Open Door—Summary of Views at the Symposium on World Economics of Young and Middle-Aged Research Workers," *Shijie Jingji* (Beijing), No. 2, Feb. 10, 1985, pp. 25–29, trans. in *JPRS-CEA*, No. 85-084, Sept. 19, 1985, pp. 1–8.

[26] "Shekou Leader's Democratic Style Is Good; Yuan Geng Supports Newspaper Criticizing Him by Name," *Yangcheng Wanbao*, Mar. 21, 1985, p. 1. The article was reprinted with slight variations on the back page of *Renmin Ribao* and the front page of *Guangming Ribao* on March 23.

[27] See *Ming Pao* (Hong Kong), June 4, 1985, p. 6, trans. in *JPRS-CEA*, No. 85-063, July 16, 1985, pp. 122–23. *Ming Pao*'s account was based on coverage in the local newspaper, *Shekou Tongxun*.

[28] "Hu Qiaomu Warns in Xiamen that Foreign Investment Enterprises Are Not Concessions; Their Inordinate Demands Cannot Be Given Tacit Consent," *Ming Pao*, June 22, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, June 24, 1985, p. W/8; and "Special Economic Zones Are Not Special Political Zones; China's Laws Must Be Upheld, Says Hu Qiaomu," *Zhongguo Fazhi Bao* (Beijing), June 28, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, July 8, 1985, pp. K/18–19.

The debate was continued by two historical allegories appearing in the central press. The first, written by Chen Xulu, a senior historian in Shanghai, appeared to take issue with Hu Qiaomu's views. According to Chen, conservatives in modern Chinese history "held that only by rejecting all things foreign was it possible to demonstrate the greatness of the Chinese nation." This stance, however, did not reflect true patriotism. On the contrary, argued Chen, "every sober-minded and far-sighted patriot was surely a person who integrated resisting aggression with learning from the West." In a barb that seemed directed at Hu Qiaomu, Chen declared that patriots in modern Chinese history include "those who became the targets of attack for advocating the need to make temporary concessions to foreign countries."[29]

An apparent response to Chen's article appeared on the history page of *Guangming Ribao* in November. Written by one Liao Zonglin, it rebutted Chen by name without explicitly citing the *Renmin Ribao* article. Calling Chen's thesis "metaphysical," Lin stated that the peaceful attitude of the Qing Court in the years after the 1894–95 Sino-Japanese War had, in fact, encouraged further foreign aggression, "making China a laughing stock in history" and "failing to play the slightest role in protecting state sovereignty and territorial integrity."[30]

In the course of this debate, local officials began to weigh in on behalf of Shenzhen. For example, on July 8 the *Hong Kong Standard* reported that Zou Erkang, secretary general and chief government spokesman of the Shenzhen SEZ, almost directly contradicting Deng Xiaoping's equivocal statement of only a week earlier, claimed that "after five years of experimenting with the open policy in the SEZ's, we are certain that it works."[31] And Shenzhen Mayor Liang Xiang told a meeting of Hong Kong businessmen that Shenzhen's industrial output in the first half of the year—almost double that of same period in the previous year—"testified to the success of the experiment." Moreover, Liang denied that Shenzhen relied on "blood transfusions" from the state; he claimed that less than 6 percent of investments in Shenzhen came from the state treasury.[32]

The most extensive defense of the SEZ's performance was made by Zou Erkang in a *Ta Kung Pao* interview. Zou seemed to place the blame for excessive foreign exchange expenditures squarely on other governmental units, including central government ministries and commissions. According to Zou, there was no problem with the balance of foreign exchange in the case of either wholly foreign-owned enterprises or Sino-foreign joint ventures. In recent years, however, various state-run enterprises had been established in Shenzhen by central authorities as well as by provincial and city governments. These enterprises, Zou claimed, "use their own foreign exchange" to import electronic parts for assembly. But the finished products "cannot compete . . . on the international market," and therefore "can only be sold at home for *renminbi* [China's currency]." "Their entire business," Zou said, "is subsidized by the state with foreign exchange." In addition, Zou defended Shenzhen against charges that it was profiteering off the interior. He noted that it was economic units of the central government, provinces, and cities that were establishing enterprises in Shenzhen because "they know they can make money."[33]

The Hainan Scandal

The wave of criticism of the SEZ's seems to have crested with the scandal surrounding Hainan Island's excessive use of foreign exchange to import some 89,000 foreign autos and 2 million television sets with the intention of reselling them for large profits in China's interior. The case surfaced on May 8, when Hainan radio reported that Hainan's party secretary Yao Wenxu had two days earlier engaged in a self-criticism admitting that the island had "violated state regulations on foreign exchange control, fraudulently purchased foreign exchange, and disrupted the foreign exchange control market."[34] This account, coming as it did on the heels of a two-month investigation by the Central Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIC) seemed to indicate that the matter had been resolved. However, the publication of the CDIC's findings was delayed until July 31, suggesting high-level conflict over how to handle the case. Further suggestive of disagreement was the report's finding that responsibility lay "to a certain extent" with an official of the Market Department under the State Industrial and Commercial Administration, a sign that some may have argued for less harsh treatment of Hainan leaders on the grounds that their actions did have some basis in state policy.[35]

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[29] Chen Xulu, "Patriotism in China's Modern History," *Renmin Ribao*, Aug. 2, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 13, 1985, pp. K/13–17. In his "Preface to '80 Years of Modern China'," printed in *Renmin Ribao* on August 5, 1983, Chen wrote that "most of the far-sighted Chinese who advocated learning from the West were stirred by foreign aggression and the disgrace of being inferior to others. . . . However, at the very beginning, almost all of them were misunderstood and censured by people. . . . The question of whether or not to study Western learning was always expressed as the conflict between the new and old or as the acute struggle between feudalism and antifeudalism." This articles is translated in Joint Publications Research Service, *China: Political, Sociological and Military* (Washington, DC), No. 452, JPRS 84245, Sept. 2, 1983.

[30] Liao Zonglin, "On the Question of Patriotism and National Betrayal During the Boxer Rebellion," *Guangming Ribao*, Nov. 27, 1985, p. 3, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 11, 1985, pp. K/9–12.

[31] See *FBIS-CHI*, July 10, 1985, p. W/2.

[32] Xinhua English, July 7, 1985.

[33] "Special Interview—Zou Erkang Speaks on a Number of Problems in Shenzhen's Development," *Ta Kung Pao* (Hong Kong), July 26, 1985, pp. 4–5, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 1, 1985, pp. W/1–7.

[34] Hainan Island Service, May 8, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, May 15, 1985, pp. P/1–3.

Guangdong party leader Lin Ruo and CCP elder Chen Yun appeared to take a particularly harsh view of the Hainan case. Lin, whose first task after taking over responsibility of the Guangdong party committee in the spring of 1985 was to deal with the Hainan situation, stated that "some comrades" viewed the actions of Hainan party leaders as an "error" and hence seemed to argue that they should be treated leniently. Rejecting this view, Lin said that the incident "is certainly not an error, but a serious mistake," and hence that the CDIC's judgment is "absolutely correct."[36] Speaking to the CDIC plenum in September, Chen Yun specifically cited the Hainan automobile case, saying that in such cases the party committee must be held responsible.[37]

By contrast, State Councillor Gu Mu took a more relaxed view. Writing in the Shanghai economic paper *Shijie Jingji Daobao* on July 8, only one week after the publication of the CDIC investigation report, Gu Mu vigorously defended the SEZ's and the open policy. Avoiding all mention of the Hainan case, Gu noted that the existence of abuses had "brought ill repute to the policy of opening to the outside world," but argued that this work was something "entirely new" and that "some mistakes" will inevitably be committed. According to Gu, such mistakes "conform to the law governing the development of things, and there is no need to make a fuss about it or regard this as too serious a problem."[38]

The singling out of Hainan for criticism was itself suggestive of compromise. Although the case clearly also involved the Shenzhen SEZ,[39] publicity surrounding the publication of the CDIC's investigation report did not accuse that zone of wrongdoing. While critics of the zones could point to the Hainan scandal as casting doubt on the SEZ's and, in general, on the implementation of the policy of opening, defenders of the zones could dismiss the Hainan episode as an example of "localism" and seeking "loopholes" rather than view it as evidence that the policy of opening to the outside world was itself fundamentally flawed.[40]

Reorienting the SEZ's

While the special economic zones and related undertakings appear to have survived the flurry of criticism in the first half of 1985, it is clear that their role in China's future has been rethought. As noted above, planned construction funding from the state was cut back in mid-1985. In August, Li Hao, previously a deputy secretary of China's State Council, replaced Liang Xiang as mayor of Shenzhen, bringing with him a clear mandate to reorient the zone's investment strategy toward development of "outwardly-oriented industries."[41]

During the summer of 1985, members of the Economics Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and the Shenzhen party committee apparently joined in an effort to redefine and justify the future developmental path of the zones.[42] This investigation generated several articles authored by members of the Economics Institute. Two articles by Liu Guoguang, head of the institute and vice-president of CASS, appeared in *Renmin Ribao* in August.[43] In the first, Liu considered three possible developmental strategies for Shenzhen: an inward orientation, a "double-track" orientation stressing sales on both the domestic and the foreign markets, and an outward orientation. Liu concluded that "the Shenzhen SEZ should be built strictly in line with the requirements of an outwardly oriented economy." Explicit rejection of the "double-track" orientation—which had been ostensibly endorsed by Zhao Ziyang at the beginning of the year—marked an apparent concession to critics of the SEZ's.[44]

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[35] See "Investigation report of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission," Xinhua, July 31, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 6, 1985, pp. P/1–8.

[36] Lin Ruo, "Draw a Lesson, Implement Policies, and You Will Have a Bright Future," *Nanfang Ribao* (Guangzhou), Aug. 4, 1985, pp. 1–2, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 8, 1985, pp. P/1–9.

[37] Chen Yun speech at the Sixth Plenary Session of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission, Xinhua, Sept. 26, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 26, 1985, pp. K/33–35.

[38] Trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 2, 1985, pp. K/3–14.

[39] E.g., in an interview, Zou Erkang stated that during the period in which Hainan Island was importing cars for resale to the interior, various regions and units "carried *renminbi* in gunnysacks to Shenzhen to rush to purchase Hong Kong dollars at very high prices." From an interview with Zou and Li Hao by Li Kuo-chiang, "Shenzhen Mayor Li Hao Exclusively Interviewed by This Magazine's Reporter," *Kuang Chiao Ching* (Hong Kong), No. 160, Jan. 16, 1986, pp. 6–9, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 30, 1986, pp. W/4–11.

[40] E.g., a Commentator article in the party daily stated that the "major reason" the regional party committee members committed mistakes was that they "proceeded from the interests of their region and forgot the interests of the whole country." See "Learn the Lesson; Continue to Forge Ahead," *Renmin Ribao*, Aug. 1, 1985, p. 1, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 2, 1985, pp. P/1–3.

[41] Xinhua, Aug. 31, 1985, "It Is Necessary to Build Shenzhen Into an Outward-Oriented Special Economic Zone—Interview with Li Hao, Newly Elected Vice-Governor of Guangdong," trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 4, 1985, pp. P/1–2. Although the ostensible reason for this change was the outgoing mayor's age (65), the 58-year-old Li's experience with the State Council suggests Beijing's interest in tightening central control over the zone. However, it was also apparent that authority over the zones was not being shifted out of the hands of the official primarily responsible for China's open policy, State Councillor Gu Mu, to whom Li had been a secretary. Liang Xiang was permitted to remain on the Shenzhen party committee for a while, but retired when the committee was reorganized in July 1986.

[42] He Fenghua, "The Question of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Developing an Outward-Oriented Economy," *Jingji Ribao*, Sept. 16, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 3, 1985, pp. P/1–4.

[43] "The Strategic Objective of Developing the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone," *Renmin Ribao*, Aug. 9, 1985, p. 5, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 15, 1985, pp. P/2–6; and "Development of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Faces a New Strategic Stage," *Renmin Ribao*, Aug. 12, 1985, p. 5, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 22, 1985, pp. P/1–5.

In the second article, Liu laid out a three-stage schema for the long-term development of Shenzhen. The first stage—from the founding of the SEZ to the present—appropriately concentrated on "laying a foundation," while the second and third stages should transform the zone into an export-oriented area that relies primarily on industry. Liu argued that although certain problems emerged in Shenzhen during the first stage of construction—including an excessive reliance on trade and real estate, a primarily domestic-market orientation, and an overemphasis on processing work—it would be wrong to "negate the achievements Shenzhen has scored in economic construction. . . ." Starting with the second period, it was necessary to "change the direction of the zone's economy," a task requiring an "appropriate reduction of speed" and a "tightening of macroeconomic control and strengthening of macroeconomic guidance."

Other articles seemed to reaffirm Liu's stress on an "outward orientation" of future SEZ economic activity, CASS member He Fenghua claimed in September that Shenzhen had already made significant steps toward achieving the strategic goal of an "outward-oriented economy dominated by the use of foreign capital, by industry, and by the production of export products."[45] Similarly, two other Economics Institute scholars, Dai Yuanchen and Shen Liren, argued for Shenzhen's development of an outward-oriented economy. They observed that if the zone retained its "present domestic-type economy, good interest and swift development might be gained from the gap [between domestic and foreign prices], but Shenzhen would be bound to be censored for getting rich on the back of the rest of the country, and contradictions between Shenzhen and the rest of the country would be deepened."[46]

Nevertheless, local actors still do not welcome the idea of an exclusively outwardly oriented future. For example, Wang Zhuo of the Guangdong provincial government's Commission for Reform of the Economic Structure maintained that it was necessary for Shenzhen to develop in both an inward and an outward direction, citing Zhao Ziyang's prescription that the SEZ's should act as "two sides of a fan and a pivot." Wang contended that to develop an exclusively "outward type" of economy—as advocated by Liu Guoguang—would force the zones to act as "export-processing zones" with a wall erected between the zones and the interior, preventing the zones from playing their proper role as a "window" for introducing technology, management, and knowledge.[47]

Yet Beijing seems firmly committed to the outward orientation, a view conveyed at a meeting of cadres of organs directly subordinate to the central government, apparently held in late autumn 1985. There Liang Xiang defended the performance of Shenzhen but promised that "industry will be taken as the leading factor, and steps will be quickened in developing an outwardly-oriented economy." According to published "excerpts" from his report, Liang also had to contend with charges of poor management, of economic crime, and of allowing there to be "weak links" in the construction of spiritual civilization. He said that an "Outline for Construction of Socialist Spiritual Civilization in the Shenzhen Special Zone" had been compiled, and—perhaps in response to Hu Qiaomu—he stated that more attention should be paid to the role of trade unions, the Communist Youth League, and women's federations in foreign-related enterprises.[48]

At the turn of 1985/1986, the State Council convened a conference in Shenzhen on the special economic zones, presided over by Gu Mu and attended by leaders of 29 departments of central authorities and the State Council. An interview with Li Hao and Zou Erkang revealed that Gu had mentioned a target of exporting 60 percent of Shenzhen's manufactured goods by the year 1990.[49] On January 6, 1986, the day after this conference closed, Gu presided over the inauguration of the Shenzhen Electronics Corporation, a conglomerate under the management of the Ministry of Electronics.[50] The establishment of the conglomerate appeared to symbolize central commitment to the development of a technology-based, export-oriented zone.[51] Two weeks later *Ta Kung Pao* similarly reported that the Ministry of Aeronautics, "in order to help the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone set up an outwardly-oriented industrial system," had decided to establish the Shenzhen Shenbao International Technology Development Company.[52]

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[44] The views that Liu attributed to advocates of the "double-track" orientation bear a striking resemblance to Zhao's description of the role of the open cities cited above. According to Liu, "these comrades maintain that since the Shenzhen SEZ is a pivot point of industrial and commercial contact between China and foreign countries, it should process materials from the hinterland for export and sell some of the parts and components they assembled from abroad to other areas of the country . . . . This view actually means that Shenzhen should bring into play its pivotal role between China and foreign countries."

[45] He Fenghua, loc. cit.

[46] "An Inquiry Into the Developmental Strategy of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone," *Renmin Ribao*, Dec. 13, 1985, p. 5, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 19, 1985, pp. P/1–4.

[47] Wang Zhuo, "A Probe Into Some Questions on Special Economic Zones," *Renmin Ribao*, Oct. 7, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 18, 1985, pp. K/5–9. Wang was even more emphatic in a January 1986 article. See "Have a Clearer Understanding of the Special Economic Zones from Shenzhen's Experience," *Jingji Ribao*, Jan. 25, 1986, p. 1, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 31, 1985, pp. K/7–10.

[48] Liang Xiang, "Construction and Developing in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone," *Jingji Ribao*, Dec. 11, 1985, p. 3, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 24, 1986, pp. P/1–12.

[49] Xinhua, Jan. 6, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 9, 1986, pp. K/8–9; and Li Kuo-chiang, loc. cit.

In early 1986, it was apparent that a compromise regarding the orientation of the SEZ's had been worked out. A February 1 Commentator article in *Renmin Ribao* (the first such authoritative treatment of the zones in the party daily in over a year) entitled "Take Business Overseas—Special Economic Zones Should Develop an Outward-Oriented Economy" stated that "the outward-oriented economy and the hinterland economy are complementary to each other."[53] Li Hao had gone even further in an article for the party theoretical journal in January, where he stated that Shenzhen was "a component part of our country's unified socialist market," and argued that "only by closely cooperating with the hinterland, developing each other's strong points and overcoming each other's weak points, and relying on the hinterland, will Shenzhen be able to develop more quickly."[54]

Conclusion

The open criticisms of the SEZ's by Hu Qiaomu, the conflicting historical allegories in the press, the crackdown on Hainan Island, the change of leadership in Shenzhen, the academic discussions on the proper orientation for Shenzhen, the convening of high-level meetings, and (most significant) Deng Xiaoping's own decision to distance himself from his previous wholehearted endorsement of the zones, all suggest that throughout 1985 there was prolonged and strenuous disagreement at the highest levels over the role of the zones and the course of opening to the outside world. Although criticism of the SEZ's failed to shake Beijing's commitment to them—if that was even the goal—it did force significant modifications of policy.

In terms of guiding policy, there was an apparent shift from the "two-fan" approach endorsed by Zhao Ziyang to the "outward orientation" approach adopted by the December 1985–January 1986 State Council meeting on the SEZ's. Collateral efforts to tighten control over foreign trade, expand exports, and step up ideological and political work in the zones appear to reflect this shift. In addition, capital construction expenditures in the zones, particularly Shenzhen, were curtailed.

By the end of 1985, however, it appeared that defenders of the zones had scored notable successes. In particular, recent affirmations of Shenzhen's experience by Gu Mu, Liang Xiang, Li Hao, and others, suggest that tensions over the SEZ's have been resolved largely in favor of the zones. Although the enunciation of an "outward orientation" with an emphasis on industry may have marked a setback for those, like Wang Zhuo, who favor a more open, free-trading approach, it nonetheless defined a more coherent rationale for the zones, one perhaps less subject to attack. In addition, the articulation of schema for the development of the zones in stages seems to imply that the mistakes of the first stage—the presumed cause of recent tensions—can now be relegated to the past. And while the zones' budgets for capital construction are to be reduced, it appears that Beijing will support the development through the establishment of some high-technology firms there.

The surfacing of such serious controversy, however, indicates that the ability to challenge important aspects of the Dengist reform program remains significant, even in a period in which the Dengist leadership was moving rapidly and apparently successfully to consolidate its authority. That it was possible to mount such an attack at such a time was undoubtedly due to the rapid fall in foreign exchange reserves, the related tendency of the zones to make money off the interior, and the degree of corruption associated with them. Deng's policies have been vulnerable to attack in periods of economic setback in the past,[55] and the recent criticisms of SEZ policy similarly suggest that the long-term viability of the Dengist program continues to rest heavily on scoring continuous and impressive economic achievements and on the ability to control corruption within acceptable limits.

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[50] Xinhua, Jan. 6, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 9, 1986, pp. K/9–10.

[51] See *Zhongguo Xinwen She*, Jan 6, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 8, 1986, pp. K/9–10.

[52] *Ta Kung Pao*, Jan. 20, 1986.

[53] Trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 4, 1986, pp. K/5–6.

[54] Li Hao, "Striving For a New Situation in Building Special Zones," *Hongqi* (Beijing), No. 1, Jan. 1, 1986, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *China Report: Red Flag* (Washington, DC), No. 86-004, Feb. 13, 1986, pp. 29–38.

[55] See H. Lyman Miller, "The Politics of Reform in China," *Current History* (Philadelphia), September 1981, pp. 258–73.

Books

Indochina's Continuing Tragedy

Robert S. Ross

ELIZABETH BECKER. *When the War Was Over: The Voices of Cambodia's Revolution and Its People*. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1986.

NAYAN CHANDA. *Brother Enemy: The War after the War*. New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986.

CHANG PAO-MIN. *Kampuchea Between China and Vietnam*. Singapore University Press, 1985.

WILLIAM DUIKER. *Vietnam Since the Fall of Saigon*, rev. ed., Athens, OH, Center for International Studies, Ohio University, 1985.

HEMEN RAY. *China's Vietnam War*. New Delhi, Radiant Publishers, 1983, distributed by Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, NJ.

IN RETROSPECT, Vietnam's 1978 occupation of Kampuchea (Cambodia) and China's February 1979 attack on Vietnam seem to be part of the natural progress of Southeast Asia's postwar geopolitical history. Although these events involved new actors and new alignments, the hostilities between Vietnamese and Cambodian Communists and the ensuing Sino-Vietnamese border war now appear to have been the inevitable next stage of the Indochina conflict after the withdrawal of the United States from Vietnam.

Nonetheless, this latest round of hostilities took many observers by surprise. Whatever their positions on United States policy toward Indochina during the 1960's and 1970's, most analysts had presumed that the war would be followed by a period of relative stability, during which Vietnam would focus its energies on unification and development while consolidating friendly relations with the new Communist governments in Laos and Cambodia. The escalating conflict between Hanoi and Phnom Penh and the Vietnamese military occupation of Cambodia were far from the expected scenario. The Pol Pot regime's self-defeating and destructive foreign policies, Beijing's de facto anti-Vietnamese alliance with the Khmer Rouge, and the brutality of the communist organization in Cambodia, were also something of a surprise. Although there had been a history of friction between Hanoi and Beijing, Hanoi had hitherto navigated the perilous waters of the Sino-Soviet conflict so successfully that few foresaw Vietnam's concluding a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union and fighting a war with China within less than four years of the fall of Saigon.

That these important developments and the consequent polarization of Indochina into warring blocs took US observers by surprise merely highlights the need for Americans to continue to work at understanding the politics of the region, despite sentiment for pushing Indochina back into the deep recesses of the national consciousness. The books under review here go a long way toward providing such an understanding by explaining the issues of the ongoing war in Indochina and their importance.

Robert S. Ross is Professor of Chinese Politics and Foreign Policy and of International Politics of Asia at the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies and the Political Science Department at the University of Washington (Seattle, WA). He is the author of a forthcoming book on "Chinese Policy toward Vietnam 1975-1979" to be published by Columbia University Press in 1987.

IN THE 1960's and 1970's, the United States contributed to a lessening of overt friction among the potential enemies in the region by assuming the role of the common enemy. At the same time, while many observers recognized that Indochina was not a monolithic bloc, analysts were more often than not either unaware of the significant divisions within the Khmer Rouge and between the Cambodian and Vietnamese Communists or else chose to underplay them. This changed only when the Vietnamese-Cambodian conflict gradually became apparent, starting in May 1975, when Vietnamese and Cambodian forces, fresh from having attained victory in their respective struggles, clashed for control of various islands in the Gulf of Thailand, and continuing until December 1977, when Phnom Penh broke diplomatic relations with Hanoi and gave public coverage to their bloody border war.

Nonetheless, as the authors of all the books under review here indicate, tensions between the Pol Pot wing of the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese leadership can be traced back as far as the 1960's. Thus, by 1970, when Lon Nol overthrew the government of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, two wars were being waged in Cambodia: a Cambodian civil war between the Khmer Rouge and Lon Nol's government forces and a conflict between Pol Pot's army and Vietnamese troops in the eastern sector of Cambodia near the Ho Chi Minh Trail.[1] The communist victory in Cambodia ended only one of these wars, and allowed the Pol Pot leadership to focus its attention and forces on Cambodia's war with the powerful and menacing Vietnamese.

THE Cambodian-Vietnamese conflict that followed the Vietnam War can be traced back to earlier, deep divisions within the Khmer Rouge itself. The first Cambodian Communists were members of the Indochinese Communist Party and received training from their more senior Vietnamese colleagues. Later generations of Cambodian Communists, on the other hand, studied Marxism-Leninism in Paris and, unlike their predecessors, felt neither loyalty nor obligation to the Vietminh. Thus, after the 1954 Geneva Conference, when Hanoi ordered Cambodian Communists to withdraw to Vietnam and wait to fight another day, the Paris wing of the Cambodian Communists, which included Pol Pot, opted to remain behind and organize resistance to the Sihanouk government. The Paris wing henceforth considered their Cambodian colleagues in Vietnam as more loyal to Hanoi than to Cambodia. As Elizabeth Becker points out in *When the War Was Over*, Cambodian Communists in Vietnam were maligned as "Vietnamese in Khmer bodies" (p. 151).

The tension and competition between these two groups of Cambodian Communists reflected differences in their bases of power, their revolutionary strategies, and their international alignments. Thus, the basis for conflict already existed when the Cambodian Communists who had been living in Vietnam since 1954 returned home in the early 1970's. What resulted was intense factional conflict that ultimately led to armed clashes.[2]

Clearly, the endless purges in postwar Cambodia and the escalating Cambodian-Vietnamese conflict have grown out of trends apparent long before the fall of Saigon. Nevertheless, the history of the postwar era indicates that the war between Hanoi and Phnom Penh and Vietnam's ultimate and continued occupation of Cambodia were not the inevitable outcome of such historical conflicts. There was no inexorable trend toward war. In this respect, observers who expected stable relations among the Indochinese states and between Vietnam and the Southeast Asian states simply failed to predict the self-destructive policies of the Khmer Rouge.[3]

Hanoi obviously sought close and cooperative relations with Laos and Cambodia in the immediate postwar era, but it presumably also sought the realization of its historic objective of an Indochina federation, now rechristened as a "special relationship." However, it does appear that at least initially Hanoi was not willing to pay an exorbitant price to attain the latter objective. In the aftermath of the fall of Saigon, Vietnam preferred a peaceful international environment.

As Nayan Chanda rightly points out in *Brother Enemy: The War after the War*, much of Vietnam's policy toward Laos and Cambodia and its quest for a "special relationship" was predicated on its fear of the expansion of Chinese influence into Indochina. Chanda notes that the billion Chinese to the north appeared even more threatening when Hanoi considered that China could encircle Vietnam by means of alliances with Cambodia and/or Laos (pp. 94–96, 215). Thus, when such encirclement seemed to develop as Cambodia established a strategic "tilt" toward China, Hanoi began to view its Cambodian neighbor with increasing alarm and moved to consolidate its relations with Moscow. Nevertheless, in explaining Vietnamese motivations, Chanda appears to underemphasize the threat Vietnamese policy posed for Phnom Penh. What was good for Vietnam was not necessarily good for Cambodia. As Becker argues, Pol Pot's hatred and belligerence toward Vietnam clearly reflected an obsessive and paranoid fear of Vietnamese expansionism, yet, even for saner and more moderate nationalist Cambodians, Vietnamese objectives in Indochina remained a thorny problem. The real source of the Vietnamese-Cambodian conflict was not Pol Pot's creation of an illusory Vietnamese enemy, but the inability of Cambodian and Vietnamese statesmen to resolve a real, yet possibly containable, conflict of interest.

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[1] For a discussion of Khmer Rouge policies after the 1970 Cambodian coup, see Kenneth M. Quinn, "Political Change in Wartime: The Khmer Krahom Revolution in Southern Cambodia, 1970–1974," *Naval War College Review* (Newport, RI), Spring 1976, p. 8.

[2] For discussion of the early years of Cambodian communism and the emergence of the Pol Pot wing, see Ben Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, London, Verso, 1985; and Timothy Carney, *Communist Party Power in Kampuchea (Cambodia): Documents and Discussion*, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1977.

[3] See, e.g., Michael Leifer, "The Security of Southeast Asia," *Pacific Community* (Tokyo), October 1975, pp. 626–36.

From the day Phnom Penh fell to the Cambodian Communists, Khmer Rouge leaders made it clear that they would not allow Cambodia to be subject to Vietnamese leadership. Whereas Hanoi stressed the role of coordinated struggle in the Khmer Rouge victory and the need for the further consolidation of relations among the Indochinese states in the postwar period, Phnom Penh's polemics clearly identified Vietnam, not the United States, as the primary threat to Cambodian independence. Its border policies, military deployments, and negotiations with Vietnamese statesmen all revealed Phnom Penh's unshakeable desire for complete freedom from Vietnamese influence. As Saigon was falling to the Vietnamese Communists, Phnom Penh demanded that all Vietnamese forces withdraw immediately from Cambodian territory and declared that it would "resolutely" oppose "all foreign intervention in the internal affairs of Cambodia and vigorously oppose all foreign subversion and aggression against Cambodia."[4]

Such tensions and verbal jousting became the norm in Indochinese politics after 1975. Hanoi would try to cajole or pressure Phnom Penh into accommodating itself to Vietnamese objectives, while Cambodia resolutely refused to significantly soften its hostile posture toward Vietnam. Meanwhile, the Khmer Rouge wasted no time after the fall of Phnom Penh in signaling its willingness to align with Beijing to offset Vietnamese power in the region. Nevertheless, despite such belligerence and contentious diplomacy, the Vietnamese-Cambodian conflict was contained, and relations did not deteriorate uncontrollably into full-scale war. Border liaison committees were established in mid-1975, and for the next two years the two sides kept their frequent border skirmishes under control; at times, Cambodian polemics even eased up a bit.[5] The Khmer Rouge media even declared on occasion: "Long live the militant solidarity between Cambodia and Vietnam!"[6]

EXPLAINING this relatively peaceful interlude in Vietnamese-Cambodian relations is difficult. Becker argues that until 1977, Khmer Rouge leaders, including Pol Pot and his political allies, still identified the United States as the immediate threat to the Khmer Rouge revolution. They thus sought to moderate conflict with the relatively more "benign" Vietnam in order to concentrate on the US enemy (pp. 210, 280). This, however, requires the reader to believe in a more rational Khmer Rouge view of Vietnam than Becker's own description permits—a Khmer Rouge capable of prioritizing its adversaries. Although Becker minimizes the importance of Phnom Penh factionalism (p. 280), a more plausible explanation stresses shifts in Politburo alignments.[7] Beginning in the spring of 1976, coinciding with the period of stability in Cambodian-Vietnamese relations, factional politics resulted in increased representation for the "Hanoi wing" of the Khmer Rouge. Only when Pol Pot had succeeded in eliminating his factional adversaries did he and his colleagues have sufficient authority to conduct an independent policy toward Vietnam.

Thus in early 1977, as Pol Pot consolidated his political position in Phnom Penh, the situation in Indochina rapidly deteriorated: Cambodia began launching a series of increasingly violent forays into Vietnamese territory, while Vietnam responded with ever greater force, trying to impress upon Phnom Penh the potential cost of an escalating conflict. Once again, the Fishhook and Parrot's Beak regions became violent war zones, just as they had been during the era of US involvement. The turning point came after a major Vietnamese incursion into Cambodia in December 1977. Phnom Penh responded with a stream of vitriolic polemics and the acquisition of additional Chinese support.[8] The ambodians had not been deterred y Hanoi's show of strength and so etnam began preparations for an l-out struggle during the next dry eason. A Vietnamese Politburo eeting in mid-February 1978 deided to set up a Cambodian exile rmy to overthrow the Pol Pot regime Chanda, pp. 214–16). Border hoslities had thus escalated into the ietnamese invasion of Cambodia.

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[4] "Press Communiqué of Cambodia Special National Congress," *Peking Review*, May 2, 1975, pp. 19–20.

[5] Gareth Porter, "Vietnamese Policy and the Indochina Conflict," in David W. P. Elliott, Ed., *The Third Indochina Conflict*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1981, p. 94; Hanoi Domestic Service, Jan. 4, 1978, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Asia and Pacific* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-APA*), Jan. 4, 1978, p. K/19.

[6] Editorial, Phnom Penh Domestic Service, Aug. 21, 1975, in *FBIS-APA*, Aug. 22, 1975, p. H/2.

[7] Michael Vickery, *Cambodia: 1975–1982*, Boston, South End Press, 1984, pp. 146–48.

[8] In early 1978, Beijing provided Cambodia with significant amounts of ammunition, 150mm artillery, and anti-tank weapons. See, e.g., Evelyn Colbert, *Power Balance and Security in Indochina*, Marina del Rey, CA, Security Conference on Asia and the Pacific, 1983, p. 14; Marian Kirsch Leighton, "Perspectives on the Vietnamese-Cambodian Conflict," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley), May 1978, p. 451.

HREE authors—Chanda, Becker, nd Chang Pao-min in his *Kampuhea between China and Vietnam*—gree that the growing belligerence f the Khmer Rouge was primarily esponsible for the deterioration of ietnamese-Cambodian relations. Not only did Pol Pot's domestic policies inflict immeasurable long-term harm on the Cambodian people, but he impact of his foreign policy is still ery much alive today in the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia and the political polarization of Southeast Asia. However, neither Chang nor Chanda quite succeed in providing a satisfactory explanation for what may in fact be the inexplicable tragedy of Pol Pot. Chang suggests that pre-existing Cambodian xenophobia was fueled by fear of a Sino-Vietnamese compromise—an unlikely prospect (pp. 52–53). Chanda points to a number of factors, including growing Cambodian suspicion of the incessantly consolidating Vietnamese-Lao relationship, culminating in the July 1977 Vietnamese-Lao Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation;[9] Pol Pot's greater self-confidence after the elimination of all domestic opposition to his leadership; the Khmer Rouge's conclusion that a negotiated solution to the Vietnamese-Cambodian border conflict was unattainable; the need to make a "show of force" against Vietnam in order to remain independent; and the "hubris of victory" (pp. 84–86, 96–98).

The roots of the Khmer Rouge insanity are directly addressed by Becker. She minimizes William Shawcross's argument that relentless and massive US bombing had destroyed the Khmer Rouge's capacity for rational thinking.[10] Instead, she stresses that the early abandonment of the Cambodian Communists in Cambodia by Vietnam, China, and the rest of the communist world—who favored the friendship of the accommodating Prince Sihanouk—compelled Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, and their Khmer Rouge colleagues to rely on their own resources and to distrust all outsiders. In the complete isolation of rural Cambodia, under conditions of guerrilla warfare, such mistrust intensified to the point where the party leadership felt secure only in isolation. Such paranoia, Becker argues, combined with a natural propensity for violence in Khmer culture, produced the incalculable loss of life in Cambodia (pp. 82–85). Finally, she adds, as life in Cambodia steadily deteriorated, Phnom Penh needed an external enemy to blame for the results of its own failed policies. Vietnam, Cambodia's traditional enemy, was the natural choice. Thus, the Khmer Rouge instigated a border war which it ultimately could not control (pp. 300–302).

As difficult as it is to accept the Shawcross argument that the United States is to blame for all the horrors of the Pol Pot regime, Becker's analysis is not much more satisfactory. Although all of the characteristics of the Khmer Rouge she describes—the isolation, the sense of abandonment, the cultural potential for violence, and the need for an external enemy—undoubtedly contributed to the nightmare, these traits have characterized other elites as well. Indeed, the Chinese Communist Party had a very similar revolutionary history, but without the same extreme consequences. For the time being at least, the incredible destruction wrought by the Khmer Rouge remains a troubling mystery.

WHATEVER explanation one offers for Pol Pot's domestic and foreign policies, even if one assumes that Cambodia had a stake in resisting Vietnamese power in Indochina, it is clear that the aggressive behavior exhibited by the Khmer Rouge in border clashes served to undermine Cambodia's basic interests. Vietnam, in the end, responded by invading and occupying Cambodia. An alternative option for Cambodia would have been to resist Vietnamese pressure and enhance its relations with China while seeking to avoid armed conflict with the Vietnamese. Although Vietnam would undoubtedly still have been disturbed by its inability to establish a "special relationship" with Cambodia, the prospect of a peaceful, if resolutely independent, neighbor might have deterred Hanoi from seeking to attain its goal by force. Indeed, Vietnam had experienced such a relationship for the two years following unification. The cost-benefit ratio for Hanoi changed dramatically, however, when Cambodia adopted a significantly more unfriendly border policy.

At the same time, it would be a mistake to impute any benevolent motives to the Vietnamese leadership. Indeed, William Duiker, in *Vietnam Since the Fall of Saigon*, argues that, in addition to the importance of Khmer Rouge provocations and

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[9] Vietnamese influence in the Lao communist movement long preceded the official communist takeover in Laos in December 1975. The most comprehensive analysis of Vietnamese relations with the Lao communist movement is MacAlistair Brown and Joseph J. Zasloff, *Apprentice Revolutionaries: The Communist Movement in Laos, 1930–1985*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1986.

[10] William Shawcross, *Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon, and the Destruction of Cambodia*, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1979.

Vietnamese defensive strategic and rational national interest calculations, Vietnamese historical ambitions for control over Indochina played a vital role in Hanoi's policy toward Cambodia (pp. 113, 122–23). Hanoi's invasion of Cambodia not only was an act clearly disproportionate to the scale of earlier Khmer Rouge provocations, it also was unnecessary for the defense of Vietnamese territory.

Whether in the context of an Indochina federation or of a "special relationship," Vietnam's leaders plainly sought a compliant Cambodia that would be willing to coordinate its policies with Hanoi's. For the Vietnamese, Duiker observes, the "issue was not subject to negotiation." Thus, Hanoi's growing "exasperation" with the obstreperous Pol Pot government became an increasingly significant factor in Vietnam's calculations (p. 113). Becker suggests that the Khmer Rouge's border provocations provided Vietnam with a "historic opportunity" to achieve its traditional objective of domination over all of Indochina (pp. 336–37). When "exasperation," national interest, and an opportunity to control its neighbor coincided, Vietnam prepared for war.

China's Dilemma

FOR Chinese leaders, the unification of Vietnam and the conflict between Cambodian and Vietnamese Communists posed a difficult dilemma that they ultimately failed to resolve: how could China deter Vietnam from dominating all of Indochina and, simultaneously, minimize Hanoi's incentive to side with Moscow in the Sino-Soviet dispute, thereby enhancing the potential for a more complete Soviet encirclement of China. A Vietnamese-Cambodian war was hardly in China's interest. Yet, a war did take place and Hanoi, with the support of Moscow, achieved military domination over both Laos and Cambodia.

What did China do to avert the war in Indochina? Could it have served its own interests and still promoted peace? To answer these questions we have to reexamine Sino-Vietnamese relations.

It is tempting to view Beijing's Vietnam policy as a simple continuation of the Middle Kingdom's view of its neighbor as a tributary state. Clearly, some of the strains in the relationship between the two countries can be traced back to China's traditional resistance to Vietnamese yearnings for independence.[11] Yet, it is important to recognize that dynastic China was as concerned with security as is the People's Republic of China (PRC), and that Chinese emperors sought a docile Vietnam in part to secure peace along a traditionally turbulent frontier. China has a long history of realpolitik, and the tributary system was no exception to this pattern.[12]

In the last four decades, first the United States and then the Soviet Union have established positions in Vietnam that appeared to threaten China's southern flank. Since the 1960's, China had been competing with Moscow for Vietnamese friendship and had opposed Vietnamese policies that could result in greater Soviet influence in Hanoi, fearing that after unifying Vietnam, Hanoi might abandon its relatively neutral position in the conflict between the Soviet Union and China.[13] After 1975, that fear became reality.

Unlike Hemen Ray, whose largely anti-Chinese polemic, *China's Vietnam War*, argues that Chinese policy was motivated solely by its ambition to exercise hegemony in the region (p. x.), Chanda and Chang recognize that the PRC's ultimate objective was to forestall a Soviet encirclement of China. This was the period when China was greatly apprehensive about the consequences of US "appeasement" and the resultant Soviet expansion into Asia, and Beijing's Vietnam policy was a clear reflection of these fears.[14] Ultimately the Chinese leaders' preoccupation with the Soviet threat in Indochina led to their invasion of Vietnam in 1979. As Deng Xiaoping told National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski during his visit to Washington just prior to the attack, China had to disrupt Soviet strategic calculations, and if Hanoi were not punished, Moscow might use Vietnam much as it had Cuba.[15]

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[11] For discussion of an earlier and no more successful Chinese military "lesson" to Vietnam, see "Intervention versus Tribute in Sino-Vietnamese Relations, 1778–1790," in John K. Fairbank, Ed., *The Chinese World Order*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1968. For the view of Vietnamese history defined as resistance to Chinese expansionism, see Joseph Buttinger, *The Smaller Dragon: A Political History of Vietnam*, New York, Praeger, 1958, p. 100.

[12] For a discussion of dynastic China's relations with Southeast Asia stressing national security considerations, see Jane Kate Leonard, *Wei Yuan and China's Rediscovery of the Maritime World*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1984. For a discussion of the realist tradition in Chinese political culture, see Michael Hunt, "Chinese Foreign Relations in Historical Perspective," in Harry Harding, Ed., *China's Foreign Relations in the 1980s*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1984; and Peter Moody, "The Romance of the Three Kingdoms and Popular Chinese Political Thought," *The Review of Politics* (Notre Dame, IN), April 1975, pp. 175–99.

[13] See, e.g., Donald S. Zagoria, *The Vietnam Triangle: Moscow, Peking, Hanoi*, New York, Pegasus, 1967; David Mozingo and Thomas Robinson, *Lin Piao on "People's War": China Takes Another Look at Vietnam*, Santa Monica, CA, Rand Corporation, No. RM 4814-PR, 1965. For a comprehensive discussion of the issues dividing the states through the fall of Saigon, see Eugene Lawson, *The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict*, New York, Praeger, 1984.

[14] Ross, "International Bargaining and Domestic Politics: US-China Relations since 1971," *World Politics* (Princeton), January 1986; and idem, *The Indochina Tangle: China's Vietnam Policy, 1975–1979*, New York, Columbia University Press, forthcoming.

[15] Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor, 1977–1981*, New York, Farrar Strauss Giroux, 1983, pp. 409–10

A HOST of other issues plagued relations between Hanoi and Beijing, including disputes over territory, economic frictions, the treatment of the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam, and the role of Cambodia in Indochina. Whereas Chanda argues that the Vietnamese "were ready to bend over backward to please Pol Pot," (p. 85) he fails to see that from 1975 to early 1978 PRC strategic concerns prompted Chinese leaders to acknowledge Vietnam's interests in Indochina. While attempting to consolidate its strategic position in Phnom Penh, until early 1978 China also sought to reduce Hanoi's incentive to seek a security relationship with the Soviet Union, and thus minimize the Soviet presence in Indochina, by negotiating, shelving, or ignoring the various Sino-Vietnamese conflicts of interests. As a result, Chinese leaders adopted a two-pronged approach when first faced with the problem of Vietnamese-Cambodian conflict. On the one hand, they adhered to their non-negotiable stand on an independent Cambodia, made clear by the PRC's February 1976 commitment to provide Cambodia free of charge military equipment valued at 226,000 yuan.[16] Beijing clearly feared that once Hanoi established predominant influence in Phnom Penh, it might later improve relations with Moscow at China's expense. Only an independent Cambodia could forestall such a development.

On the other hand, Beijing initially tried to avoid taking sides in the Vietnamese-Cambodian conflict and to moderate Phnom Penh's belligerent Vietnam policy. In the early period, China appeared to encourage Indochinese "unity," observing that Vietnam's victory was the "common victory of the Indochinese peoples in their united struggle,"[17] a phrase remarkably similar to Vietnam's own justification for a "special relationship." Deng Xiaoping pointed out that the Lao, Cambodian, and Vietnamese victories were "victories for the united struggle of the three Indochinese peoples."[18] In late 1977, as the Vietnamese-Cambodian border conflict escalated, he said, "what we want is for them to carry out good negotiations . . . . We do not judge what is just or erroneous."[19] In February, making China's last such moderating gesture, he suggested that the conflict be resolved through consultations based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence.[20]

As Chanda notes, it was a case of the "tail wagging the dog" (pp. 210–12) as Cambodian obstinacy increasingly forced Chinese leaders to choose between reducing aid to Cambodia, thereby possibly undermining China's strategic position in Indochina, or conceding an inability to moderate the Vietnamese-Cambodian conflict while maintaining opposition to a Vietnamese military solution to Cambodian belligerency. Beijing chose the latter, while still hoping somehow to avert a breach in its relations with Vietnam.

Nonetheless, although China had been prepared to accept an influential Vietnamese role in Indochina provided that Cambodia remained independent, its clear precondition was that Vietnam maintain strategic distance from the Soviets. The unspoken corollary was that Beijing would have the most influential voice in the region, for if the Soviet role were minimized, Chinese influence would naturally fill the vacuum.

Beijing unceasingly bombarded Hanoi with anti-hegemonist warnings, while stressing the importance of close relations between China and Indochina. In the aftermath of the fall of Saigon, Zhou Enlai and Zhu De had recognized that "Indochina belongs to the Indochinese peoples," but added that China and the three Indochinese countries were "linked by mountains and rivers and as closely related as lips and teeth." Likewise, while Ye Jianying declared that the Vietnamese and Cambodian victories were the "heaviest blows dealt at . . . hegemonism," he was careful to add that "no force can sabotage" Sino-Vietnamese friendship.[21] Beijing's tacit deal was remarkably similar to the one Hanoi alleges Deng offered in 1963—to grant Vietnam one million yuan in economic assistance if Hanoi rejected all Soviet aid.[22] However, as Hanoi moved closer to Moscow after the fall of Saigon, Beijing was less willing to concede any Vietnamese influence in Phnom Penh.

The turning point in Sino-Vietnamese relations came when the Vietnamese leadership, despite secret Chinese warnings, unified the currencies of northern and southern Vietnam, placed limits on cash holdings (thus destroying personal savings), and then nationalized the southern economy overnight in an obvious effort to crush the economic autonomy of its Chinese population.

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[16] Fong Weizhong, Ed., *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jingji Dashiji* (Economic Chronicle of the People's Republic of China), Beijing, Chinese Social Science Press, 1984, p. 559. Given our lack of knowledge of the internal pricing of military equipment, the figures are best left in yuan.

[17] Editorial, "A Great Victory of World Significance," *Renmin Ribao* (Beijing), May 1, 1985, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-CHI*), May 1, 1975, p. A/4.

[18] Xinhua, Sept. 22, 1975, in *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 23, 1975, p. A/15.

[19] Agence France Presse, Oct. 21, 1977, reported in *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 25, 1977, p. A/1.

[20] Beijing Radio, in Burmese, to Burma, Jan. 21, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 30, 1978, pp. A/7–8.

[21] See, respectively, Xinhua, Apr. 24, 1975, in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 24, 1975, p. A/17; "A Great Victory of World Significance," loc. cit., p. A/4; Beijing Domestic Service, May 2, 1975, in *FBIS-CHI*, May 2, 1975, p. A/3.

[22] *The Truth About Sino-Vietnamese Relations over the Past Thirty Years*, Hanoi, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 1979, p. 33. Duiker reports this as fact (p. 93), citing p. 20 of a different version of this Hanoi publication.

The result was severe hardship for the ethnic Chinese in southern Vietnam. At the same time, over 170,000 Chinese fled northern Vietnam for China with no discouragement from the Vietnamese authorities. The latter had evidently decided that the ethnic Chinese population was a potential "fifth column" working for the PRC and posed too great a threat to internal security.

Chanda, citing interviews with Vietnamese leaders, argues that Hanoi had not expected such a strong Chinese reaction (p. 241). It is more likely, however, given China's earlier secret warnings about "discrimination" against "Chinese citizens" and its harsh response to Indonesia's treatment of its ethnic Chinese population in 1965,[23] that Vietnam had simply decided, in light of the recent consolidation of Sino-Cambodian relations and Pol Pot's unwavering belligerence, that a military solution to the Vietnamese-Cambodian conflict was necessary. Since a Vietnamese attack on Cambodia would clearly entail hostile relations with China, Hanoi stood to lose very little in eliminating the autonomy of its feared ethnic Chinese "fifth column."

China responded by cutting off aid to Vietnam and bringing the dispute to the brink of armed conflict.[24] But whereas Duiker argues that China's harsh reaction to the overseas Chinese issue was simply a pretext for expressing opposition to Hanoi's Cambodia policy (pp. 132–33), Chang stresses the coincidence of Vietnam's disregard for Chinese warnings regarding the overseas Chinese and Hanoi's pronounced recent tilt toward Moscow as suggestive of a willingness to alienate Beijing. According to Chang, Hanoi's ethnic Chinese policy convinced Chinese leaders that Vietnam had decided to align itself with the Soviet Union (pp. 60–61). Chanda supplements Chang's explanation, stressing Beijing's anger at Vietnam's challenge to the PRC's overseas Chinese policy and pretensions to regional power (p. 242).

To this must be added China's growing frustration over the perceived audacity of its erstwhile tributary. Since 1975, PRC interests had encouraged Beijing to avoid alienating Vietnamese leaders, while it repeatedly voiced concern for the welfare of the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam and opposition to improved Soviet-Vietnamese relations. Chinese leaders interpreted Hanoi's policy as abuse of their good will and blatant defiance by an arrogant and weak neighbor. Hanoi had thus not only undermined Chinese interests, but had done so in a way that was simply too abrasive for Chinese leaders to accept gracefully. Much as frustration over Cambodian obstinence had shaped Hanoi's policy, exasperation with Vietnam's cavalier disregard of numerous warnings contributed to the severity of Chinese policy.

ULTIMATELY, China's effort to negotiate the hazards of Indochinese politics floundered on the escalating Vietnamese-Cambodian conflict and the intractability of Pol Pot. Without redefining its interests and abandoning its objective of an independent Cambodia and minimal Soviet influence in Indochina, could China have done more to avoid its conflict with Vietnam and avert a new round of warfare in Indochina?

There was in fact probably little Chinese leaders could have done to alter Cambodian foreign policy. They had tried without success to promote former Prince Norodom Sihanouk as a moderating influence in Phnom Penh, and they could not have altered Khmer Rouge border policy without weakening Cambodia's ability militarily to maintain its independence in the face of Vietnamese pressure. The only other factor open to Chinese manipulation was Soviet-Vietnamese relations, and here, too, the PRC found itself unable to alter the sequence of events in the interests of its own security or regional peace.

From the first days after the fall of Saigon, China had called on Vietnam to minimize its collaboration with the Soviet Union. As the *Renmin Ribao* editorial celebrating the fall of Saigon had reminded its readers, the "superpower that carries the signboard of socialism . . . burns with ambition and engages in frantic expansion."[25] When Le Duan visited Beijing in September 1975, Vice Premier Deng reminded him that "to combat superpower hegemonism is a vital task facing the peoples of all countries."[26] Not even Cambodia's provocative Vietnam policy—which probably contributed to Vietnam's interest in Soviet support—could persuade China to compromise on this demand.

Thus, China's decision to invade Vietnam reflected the failure of its policy of the previous four years and its apprehension about the extension of Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation into Cambodia. The foreign policy role of the attack is clear—it signaled Moscow about the dangers of its China policy, deterred Vietnam from taking the war into Thailand, bolstered China's credibility as an obstacle to Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation in Asia, and undermined Hanoi's ability to concentrate its military resources on annihilating the armed forces of the Khmer Rouge. At the same time, the attack reflected a Chinese thirst for revenge. Beijing's reaction to the overseas Chinese crisis already reflected Chinese exasperation with Vietnamese "insolence." Yet, Hanoi refused to heed the warning, going on to occupy Cambodia. The PRC's response thus reflected not only foreign policy considerations, but also the desire to "punish" the Vietnamese for their impudence. Li Xiannian insisted that Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia had been "backed by the Soviet hegemonists" and that "the Chinese people are very indignant at this." He added: "We have time and again warned the Vietnamese not to turn a deaf ear to what we have said." *Renmin Ribao* charged that Hanoi had responded to Chinese "patience and restraint" with duplicity and treachery. "They are arrogant in the extreme."[27]

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[23] The secret warnings are reported in Vietnam News Agency, June 17, 1978, in *FBIS-APA*, June 19, 1978, p. K/14. For a discussion of relations between China and Indonesia, see David Mozingo, *Chinese Policy toward Indonesia, 1949–1969*, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1976.

[24] Chanda, citing interviews with Chinese officials, argues that in May 1978 the Chinese Politburo had already decided to "teach Vietnam a lesson" for Vietnam's maltreatment of its ethnic Chinese population, implying that China's invasion of Vietnam would have occurred regardless of developments in Cambodia. My own research and interviews indicate that although Beijing may have aimed to pressure Hanoi with the threat of war, the Chinese leadership considered going to war because of the maltreatment of overseas Chinese inappropriate and actually resigned itself to Vietnam's ethnic Chinese policy, shifting its attention to Vietnam's Cambodia policy, which ultimately elicited the Chinese invasion. See Ross, *The Indochina Tangle*.

[25] "A Great Victory of World Significance," loc. cit., p. A/3.

[26] Xinhua, Sept. 22, 1975, in *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 23, 1975, pp. A/14–16.

Superpower Involvement

MUCH of the existing Western analysis of Soviet involvement in Indochinese politics focuses on Moscow's response to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and to Beijing's subsequent attack on Vietnam. The Soviet Union is seen as behaving responsibly, abstaining from direct military involvement in Vietnam's wars with Cambodia and China.[28] Relatively little attention, however, has been paid to Soviet-Vietnamese relations prior to the deterioration of the situation in Indochina, particularly to Soviet policy leading up to Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia. It is in fact clear that Moscow did everything possible to pressure Vietnam into committing itself to Soviet foreign policy, and that the USSR encouraged Hanoi to do whatever needed to consolidate Vietnam's "special relationships" in Indochina, including using force against Cambodia.

The Soviet Union pursued two complementary objectives—encircling China and improving its own strategic position vis-à-vis the United States in Southeast Asia. An alliance with Vietnam would provide just such a strategic position in the region, yielding an ally on China's border and access to the naval base at Cam Ranh Bay in the South China Sea.[29] Not only did the Soviet Union liberally supply Hanoi with military equipment, but, as Chanda's very revealing interviews with Vietnamese and Soviet statesmen make clear, Moscow relished the idea of a Soviet-Vietnamese treaty, despite its obvious potential for contributing to the outbreak of war in Indochina. Indeed, the treaty would have come much sooner than November 1978, one month before the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, except for the fact that Hanoi was waiting for the most opportune moment, having for some time been reluctant either to surrender its independence or alienate both China and the advanced capitalist countries, including the United States.

Why, then, was Vietnam unable to maintain the independence it had struggled so tenaciously for nearly 30 years to achieve, becoming instead a committed member of the Soviet bloc? Clearly, security reasons promoted close Soviet-Vietnamese relations. Only through friendship with the Soviet Union could Hanoi offset Chinese power and the potential for an anti-Vietnamese Sino-Cambodian alliance. But were there not other options for Hanoi than simply strategic alignment with the Soviet Union? Chanda seems to think so, arguing that the policies of other actors, particularly the United States and China, failed to respond adequately to Hanoi's efforts to develop a more varied set of diplomatic relations. When all other avenues were closed, Hanoi had little choice but to opt for closer, more dependent relations with Moscow.

Chanda argues that the Americans were primarily to blame for the inability of the United States and Vietnam to normalize relations. The Carter administration sent confusing signals, encouraging Vietnamese leaders to think that the United States would provide Vietnam with economic assistance, and then, once Hanoi had prepared itself to compromise, backing down because of the continued hostility of the American public and the weakness of the President. As a result, in mid-1977, when Hanoi was faced with limited Soviet aid, a poor economy, and a growing menace from Cambodia, US policy and the reluctance of Japan and Western Europe to grant significant economic assistance persuaded Vietnamese leaders to give in to Moscow's pressure to align themselves more closely with the Soviet Union in exchange for economic assistance. So began Hanoi's slide into the Soviet camp. In 1978, concludes Chanda, Hanoi finally dropped all preconditions to normalization, but the Carter administration, under the sway of the "Manichean anti-Sovietism" of Zbigniew Brzezinski, once again spurned a good-faith Vietnamese offer, choosing to placate Chinese interests so as to ensure a successful conclusion to US-China normalization negotiations (pp. 148–50, 158–60, 285–90, 408).

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[27] See, respectively, Xinhua, Feb. 11, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 12, 1979, p. A/7; editorial, "Our Forbearance Is Limited," *Renmin Ribao*, Dec. 25, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 26, 1978, pp. A/13–15.

[28] See, e.g., Stephen S. Kaplan, *Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument*, Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, 1981, pp. 106–08; Raymond L. Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*, Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1985, p. 716.

[29] For a discussion of Soviet objectives in Southeast Asia, see Richard H. Solomon, "Coalition Building or Condominium: The Soviet Presence in Asia and American Policy Alternatives," in Donald S. Zagoria, Ed., *Soviet Policy in East Asia*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1982.

Washington certainly might have had a role to play in Vietnamese foreign policy, yet Chanda exaggerates US potential for postwar involvement in Southeast Asian politics and underestimates Vietnam's own role in preventing normalization of relations. It is hard to imagine the United States exerting critical influence in Indochina so soon after its defeat there and just shortly after Bangkok had forced the closing of American military bases in Thailand.

Moreover, Hanoi's own "hubris" led Vietnamese leaders to believe they could expect the United States to accept their terms for normalization. Indeed, Becker stresses, it is one of the tragedies of post-1975 Vietnam that had Hanoi normalized relations with the Carter administration in 1976 or 1977 without preconditions, trade and aid might well have followed and Vietnamese policy options thus been expanded dramatically (pp. 389–93).[30] As Chanda rightly notes, rather than turn to Moscow, Hanoi in 1977 could have simply "swallowed its desire to establish ties with the defeated enemy on its own terms," dropping its demand that US economic assistance be a precondition for the normalization of relations (p. 149). That it did not adopt such a course at that time was a major policy error.

Moreover, while it is clear that Washington would not have risked normalizing its relations with China by first establishing relations with Vietnam—a sensible policy given their respective Soviet policies, it is also true that various aspects of Vietnamese policy, particularly the exodus of the "boat people" and the development of closer Soviet-Vietnamese relations that culminated in the November 3 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, also obstructed improved US-Vietnamese relations. Yet, if the United States and Vietnam had normalized relations in late 1978, such normalization would likely only have served to further encourage Vietnam to occupy Cambodia. It would have reduced Vietnamese isolation and undermined the even limited value of developing US-China cooperation as a deterrent to Vietnamese use of force—especially insofar as US-China cooperation would have undoubtedly been delayed.

ULTIMATELY, even without the economic assistance of the advanced capitalist countries, Hanoi could have rejected Soviet aid. Its enthusiasm for Soviet assistance reflected not only its sense of insecurity in Indochina, but also its eagerness to modernize its war-torn society. By contrast, for most of the period since 1954, North Korea has foregone generous Soviet economic and military assistance as the price of maintaining neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute.[31] In 1977, Vietnamese leaders had similar options, but they chose to place preconditions on normalization of relations with the United States and to pay the steep price Moscow was asking for Soviet economic assistance—a greater Vietnamese commitment to the Soviet Union in international politics.

The Vietnamese leaders' desire for rapid reconstruction really left only the Soviet Union or the United States as parties capable of providing the necessary technology and money. Even if China had been more forthcoming in its aid program, in 1976 and early 1977, it could not have provided Vietnam with an alternative to Soviet economic assistance. Indeed, Vietnamese efforts to play its two erstwhile communist allies off against one another angered Beijing, because it knew it could only lose such a competition.

In 1978, when Vietnam greatly increased its alignment with the USSR, security considerations clearly outweighed economic factors. Pol Pot's increasingly aggressive stance on border questions had become ever more costly to Hanoi in terms of casualties, economic dislocations, and the burden of Cambodian refugees on southern Vietnam. Moreover, having decided that Pol Pot was unappeasable and that Beijing's military alignment with Cambodia (following its failure to moderate Pol Pot's Vietnam policy in early 1978) posed an intolerable challenge to Vietnamese security, Hanoi could conclude that the cost of the military imposition of a "special relationship" on Cambodia had become less than that of maintaining the status quo. In these circumstances, Vietnamese leaders moved with deliberateness to deal with their suspect ethnic Chinese population, join CEMA, and enhance visibly military cooperation with the USSR, ultimately leading to their signing of the critical Treaty of Friendship in November 1978.

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[30] Interviews I had with various US officials indicated that the Carter administration was willing to seek ways to assist the Vietnamese economy once normalization had taken place.

[31] For a discussion of North Korea's maneuvering between China and the Soviet Union, see Thomas P. Bernstein and Andrew J. Nathan, "The Soviet Union, China, and Korea," in Gerald L. Curtis and Sung-joo Han, Eds., *The US-South Korean Alliance: Evolving Patterns in Security Relations*, Lexington, MA, Lexington Press, 1983. For brief discussion of Soviet and Chinese aid to North Korea, see John Copper, *China's Foreign Aid*, Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, 1976, pp. 24–27.

ONCE AGAIN, Pol Pot had played the crucial role in upsetting the delicate balance between war and peace in Indochina. Yet, as the reviewed works also make clear, Moscow itself had played a vital role in the course of events. Not only did it make Vietnam pay the price of closer alignment in return for economic assistance in 1977, but its readiness to outfit the Vietnamese army with sufficient equipment and its eagerness to sign the friendship treaty just as the dry season began in Indochina were significant factors in Hanoi's resort to war. The advantages of continued peace and forbearance would otherwise have seemed even greater.

While the Soviet Union played a major role in Vietnamese policy, the United States influenced Chinese strategy. Chanda clearly indicates that as Beijing's relationship with Vietnam deteriorated in 1978, Chinese leaders used the developing US-China relationship to bolster their position vis-à-vis the emerging Soviet-Vietnamese alliance (pp. 330–31). This culminated in the normalization of US-Chinese relations and Deng Xiaoping's masterly display of public relations during his January visit to the United States.

The normalization of US-Chinese relations and Washington's concomitant reluctance to normalize relations with Vietnam in late 1978 reduced the PRC's isolation and offset the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance, thus allowing China to feel more secure in "teaching Vietnam a lesson." By all indications, Chinese leaders had already laid plans to attack Vietnam prior to Deng's arrival in the United States. The Carter administration's warm welcome for the Chinese leader and its very mild admonishments concerning Beijing's expected punitive invasion further reinforced Beijing's inclination to retaliate against Vietnam for its occupation of Cambodia.

Conclusion

ALL of Southeast Asia and particularly the Cambodian people continue to suffer from the conflict in Indochina as Pol Pot and other erstwhile Cambodian leaders struggle against the Vietnamese occupation forces. The entire region remains polarized around the issue of Vietnam's continued occupation of Cambodia.

Chanda, Chang, and Duiker analyze the situation in Indochina focusing on events from China's February 1979 punitive invasion of Vietnam to the present, discussing both internal Cambodian issues and the diplomacy between China and the ASEAN states on the one hand, and Vietnam on the other. Duiker and Chang suggest that the main obstacle to a solution is Vietnam's insistence on domination in Indochina, while Chanda stresses Beijing's unwillingness to abandon Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge. There is undoubtedly truth in both explanations. On one point the authors do agree: that Vietnam, having established near complete de facto dominance over Cambodia and the various resistance armies, is in no hurry to withdraw its forces.

None of the books under review here offers sustained and consistent arguments to explain either the motivations and diplomatic behavior of the protagonists or the way in which their interactions led to a new Indochina war, even though during this period the signaling among China, the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and Cambodia was particularly rich and informative of their respective intentions and postures. Nevertheless, as narrative histories offering eclectic explanations of the major events leading up to the war, they take us a long way toward understanding the continuing tragedy of Indochina.

The War after the War, while focusing primarily on the Vietnamese situation, uses extensive and fascinating interviews with officials from all the sides to offer the most readable and comprehensive look at foreign relations in Indochina. Nevertheless, unlike Duiker and Becker, Chanda never adequately considers Vietnam's strong commitment to achieving a historically significant "Indochina Federation" when discussing Hanoi's decision to occupy Cambodia. His argument that Vietnam would have "bent over backward to please Pol Pot" (p. 85) contrasts with the view in Duiker's *Vietnam Since the Fall of Saigon* that there were clear limits to Vietnamese good will (p. 113).

When the War Was Over, by Becker, offers a full description of the horrors of Pol Pot's Cambodia and provides the best available discussion to date of Khmer Rouge policy in general. Despite a paucity of citations and various factual errors that limit the value of this work to both students and scholars, the book goes far toward helping us understand the horrors of Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge.

By focusing primarily on Chinese and Vietnamese diplomacy over Cambodia, Chang Pao-min cannot begin to adequately explain the ultimate fate of the Khmer Rouge, since it was intimately bound up in the bilateral Sino-Vietnamese conflict over the territorial issues, the overseas Chinese, and the Sino-Soviet competition in Vietnam. His *Kampuchea between China and Vietnam* is therefore more suited as a text for an undergraduate course on international relations in Asia. The reader searching for a more detailed discussion of these issues would be wise to turn to Chang's many articles on the topic. Duiker's book, while an excellent analysis of both Vietnamese domestic and foreign policy since 1975 and a work well suited for student use as an introductory text to postwar Vietnam, has a section on foreign policy that is regrettably too brief to fully explain the nuances of the complex Indochina setting.

As these books reveal, the policies leading to the third Indochina war were rarely simple. In the latest round of Indochinese wars, the tragedy is that the two major protagonists, Vietnam and China, initially preferred to avoid war. However, as occurs often in international politics, events outside the control of the major protagonists can override rationality and precipitate hostilities.

It may appear simplistic and too convenient to explain war as primarily the outcome of the behavior of a few pernicious leaders, but in Indochina Pol Pot and his fellow Khmer Rouge leaders clearly served as a catalyst precipitating the warfare. Cambodia's quest for independence was admirable, but its means were clearly abhorrent. Although Vietnam initially sought foreign policy independence from the Soviet Union and was initially prepared to accept less than a "special relationship" with Phnom Penh, and although China was at first prepared to tolerate some Soviet presence in Vietnam and promoted friendly Vietnamese-Cambodian relations, both states were unable to persuade Phnom Penh of the virtues of peaceful competition. Clearly, the United States and the Soviet Union neither created the conflict nor precipitated the war. Nonetheless, the superpowers, particularly the Soviet Union, encouraged the Sino-Vietnamese trend toward combat by favoring those options that promoted hostilities. After Saigon fell, China and Vietnam had various policy options. Ultimately, however, their choices steadily narrowed as the Pol Pot leadership became increasingly locked into behavior destructive not only to Cambodian interests, but to Chinese and Vietnamese interests as well.

Vietnam War Reviewed

Allan E. Goodman

WILLIAM S. TURLEY. *The Second Indochina War*. Boulder, CO, Westview, 1986.

R. B. SMITH. *An International History of the Vietnam War: Revolution Versus Containment 1956–61*. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1983.

R. B. SMITH. *An International History of the Vietnam War: The Kennedy Strategy*. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1985.

GEORGE McT. KAHIN. *Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam*. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1986.

GABRIEL KOLKO. *Anatomy of a War*. Toronto, Pantheon Books, 1985.

TRUONG NHU TANG. *A Vietcong Memoir*. New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985.

THE MOST striking thing about the six books under review here is that not one of them is written by a newcomer to the study of Vietnam. Indeed, the effort to put the United States's involvement in its longest, most controversial, and least successful war into perspective is today largely being carried out by the same handful of professors who were concentrating on the subject a decade ago. Sadly, there appears to be no new generation of Vietnam scholars either engaged in examining the issues differently or intent upon raising new questions about conventional wisdom. Between 1975 and 1984, for example, there were well over 10,000 Ph.D. dissertations written in the United States in the fields of history and of law and political science; yet, only 14 and 51, respectively, dealt with Vietnam. Of this number, just two have been published.[1]

Why is research and publication by new scholars important? A close look at the six books under review suggests part of the answer. While most are comprehensive, scholarly studies, they cover what is, for me at least, very familiar ground. Little new territory is explored, and few new explanations advanced. More important, they are all flawed by hindsight: each depicts the United States's entry into the war and the effects of the military and diplomatic strategies pursued by the US and the South Vietnamese governments in tones that make the outcome appear inevitable.

What is needed is fresh perspective and scholarly detachment. I accept as a fact of life that researchers rarely are able to remain entirely objective about their topics. But even if new scholars are trained by mentors who have well-developed theories about the subject being investigated, they may challenge old assumptions and question current interpretations, in the process offering new explanations and positing new theories.

Allan E. Goodman is Associate Dean of the School of Foreign Service and Director of the Master of Science in Foreign Service Program at Georgetown University (Washington, DC). His most recent book is The Search for a Negotiated Settlement of the Vietnam War *(1986). He is currently working on a book on "Strategic Intelligence and US National Security." The author is grateful to Joanna Lee and Gail Griffith for their research and editorial assistance.*

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[1] Data compiled for the years 1975 to 1985 from the annual editions of *Dissertation Abstracts International*, Ann Arbor, MI, University Microfilms, Inc., and *Cumulative Book Index*, New York, H. W. Wilson Company. Such scholarly inattentiveness to the study of Vietnam probably reflects both a desire to forget a national nightmare and the lack of fellowship and research resources that would allow today's dissertation writer to delve thoroughly into numerous and extensive archives, interview literally hundreds of decision-makers, and travel to Indochina for field research.

Interestingly, some of the earlier reportorial works such as *Quicksand War, The New Face of War, The Best and the Brightest*, and *Fire in the Lake* do a better job than this new crop of books at conveying the analytical fog, media hype, and misconceptions that affected both the conduct of the war and expectations in Washington, Saigon, and Hanoi about its outcome. During 1962–65, for example, while the US involvement in the war was being debated, neither the commitment made by politicians nor the difficulties encountered in fulfilling the commitment were fully appreciated by the American people. Nor was it clear between 1965 and 1975, despite the confident rhetoric of US and North Vietnamese leaders, who would win the war (or why).

Nevertheless, there is much in each of these books that deserves attention today. All of the authors are well qualified to write on Vietnam, and each brings a different perspective to the topic. Next to retired foreign service officer Douglas Pike of the University of California, Berkeley, William S. Turley, of Southern Illinois University, is probably the foremost American academic scholar on Vietnamese communism. George Kahin is the doyen of Indochina studies at Cornell University and has published numerous books on the encounter between American foreign policy and societal and political change in Southeast Asia. Gabriel Kolko is based at York College in Canada and has published numerous insightful and important studies from a leftist—but not an uncritical—perspective. R. B. Smith is a master historian at the University of London, and his *International History of the Vietnam War* in two volumes is the best work to date on the Vietnam war and the international relationships that affected it. And Truong Nhu Tang, a Vietnamese communist leader for most of the war, writes as a direct participant in Viet Cong activities in South Vietnam.

TURLEY'S *The Second Indochina War* is a well-structured recapping of the major political and military developments that shaped the conflict between the United States and North Vietnam in the period from 1954 to 1975. The narrative is straightforward and well-suited to the general reader looking for a concise history of the war.

Drawing on archival research conducted in Vietnam as well as on interviews with North Vietnamese officials in 1983 and 1984, Turley succeeds in correcting some current misimpressions that have crept into the post-mortem literature about the war. Among the most important of these are the issue of whether the Viet Cong was a political and military force born of Hanoi or one acting independently (it was not independent, according to Turley, pp. 18–31) and the issue of the extent of US influence on the conflict between communist and noncommunist Vietnamese over who would control Indochina. Turley argues convincingly that despite the massiveness of the US involvement, it was the political and social forces arising from societal change and anticolonialism in Indochina that determined who lost and who won the war in Vietnam. Thus, implicit in Turley's view, the much-debated question of whether the United States could have won the war *militarily* is irrelevant, not because the answer is too difficult to arrive at but because it is the wrong question.

Turley's account of how the US strategy of counterinsurgency unwittingly protracted and widened the war rather than contained it is also enlightening. For example, according to the author, the US strategy required the communists to escalate the conflict to "limited war" as early as 1963 which, in turn, led to significant numbers of US ground combat troops being introduced by 1965 (pp. 54–59).

My only criticism of Turley's book (and the others reviewed here) is that it does not go far enough in drawing the lessons of Vietnam for today. What Turley does say in his last chapter—"Of Lessons and Their Price"—is modulated and reasonable. With respect to the American involvement in the war itself, Turley maintains that

> . . . *in Indochina the United States made commitments out of proportion to its interests. This was done in the belief that maintaining the credibility of commitments required defending them everywhere. But placing credibility at stake in a region that was not vital to U.S. interests undermined the conviction of the American people that the commitment had to be kept. Neither U.S. enemies, U.S. allies, nor its own people believed that the United States, for the sake of Indochina, would long sacrifice its effectiveness in other parts of the world. Thus, [the] appearance of unconditional commitment to the Saigon regime . . . actually undermined U.S. credibility.* (pp. 194–95)

Unfortunately, neither Turley nor the other authors discuss how the United States could have done things differently, especially since the commitment seemed reasonable at the time given widely-held and persistent fears that the domino theory was valid. Nor does Turley discuss how the United States could have limited or reversed its commitments once the premises on which they were based were proved flawed, particularly after so many US soldiers had died defending the interests these commitments once reflected.

With respect to the impact of US actions on political developments within South Vietnam, Turley concludes that "the United States . . . trapped itself by supporting political groups that lacked the confidence of their own people." This in turn raised doubts about the sincerity of the United States's claim of defending the Vietnamese people's right of self-determination and thus "invited cynicism about U.S. intentions." As time went on, the United States found it increasingly necessary "to involve itself deeply in stabilizing fragile governments and in nation-building, which cast [it] in a quasi-colonial role." This left the United States in a particularly vulnerable position, one which Turley describes quite tellingly:

> *Having adopted chronically weak clients to fight a long-established, well-organized, deeply entrenched adversary, the United States had to substitute its own resources and purpose for those of the regimes it purported to defend. These in turn were robbed of initiative and stigmatized by dependency. Under the circumstances, the United States could not intervene without perpetuating conditions that U.S. leaders believed required them to intervene in the first place.* (p. 195)

Again, I would have liked Turley to elaborate on his analysis, in particular on how the United States could have legitimately succeeded in "nation-building." But to be fair, Turley makes no claim that his book will address or resolve these issues.

A HISTORY of much greater detail and scope is available in R. B. Smith's *An International History of the Vietnam War*. Two volumes are now in print, and they take the reader up to the US decision in February 1965 to escalate the war. (Volumes three and four will cover the next 10 years of the conflict.) Smith does a masterly job of relating world events to the beginnings of the conflict and the roots of the confrontation between the United States and North Vietnam. This has the important effect of keeping the United States's early involvement in Vietnam in proportion and perspective, by showing precisely how it was that the United States became embroiled in a war it did not seek, and why it was reasonable for decision-makers at the time to think that US actions would not lead to war.

For Smith, the very early 1960's was perhaps the most critical period of the war, especially the years 1960–61 when—by Smith's reckoning—the guerrilla movement should have been defeated in the countryside and political effectiveness established in Saigon. The opposition was in disarray, notes the author, and the 170,000-odd South Vietnamese troops, under the tutelage of their American military advisers, seemed firmly in control. But few US officials estimated correctly either the magnitude of the war inside South Vietnam or the tenacity of the Viet Cong and their adroitness at choosing when and where to fight.

Smith's analysis thus offers a fundamental insight that still has great relevance today. Guerrilla and limited wars always last longer than the strategists forecast. If such wars are not prosecuted and won decisively in their early stages, they may go on for years. What then matters most in protracted war situations is not military tactics or weapons but the political will to defeat the enemy. And as Smith makes very clear in volume two, such determination on the part of the United States was eroding as early as 1962.

Intervention, by George Kahin, is also a political and military history. It too is not short. It is about twice as long as Turley's book and covers events from 1945 to 1966. However, virtually all of Kahin's arguments and theses are familiar and, to many of us, quite predictable.

As a leading academic critic of the war, Dr. Kahin has consistently maintained that the United States's involvement in Indochina was an ill-conceived case of knee-jerk anti-communism. Like Turley, he makes it clear that even the massive application of US power did not translate into political leverage over successive governments in Saigon, nor was it a substitute for the political legitimacy and effectiveness necessary if there were to be a political alternative to communism in Vietnam. But unlike Turley, Kahin pleads his case by innuendo. Arguing that most decision-makers were cynical about the Vietnamese people and their struggle, he implies that US policies were morally and fatally flawed.

The problem with Kahin's book and approach is that it does a grave disservice to newcomers who are interested in gaining an understanding of why and how the United States became involved in the war. Instead of letting readers judge the validity and sincerity of US motives, Kahin makes it clear that, in his mind, the American government was part of "an unprecedented effort to shape and control a country's political character" (p. ix). This assertion predisposes the reader to think that US involvement was more sinister and premeditated than it was in reality. What the reader misses here is some sense of the idealism and ignorance from which US policy was formed and of the genuineness of the doubts many decision-makers had about whether they were doing the right things, for the right reasons, and in the right circumstances.

Moreover, I think the decision to have *Intervention* cover events only up to 1966 was a serious mistake that weakened the book for two reasons. First, the developments that Kahin describes from 1945 to 1966 are inadequate to explain to today's readers either why the US government remained as involved as it did in a conflict that appeared unwinnable and deleterious to its other national and foreign policy interests or why the United States so steadfastly remained on the side of an ally who appeared so feckless and unsavory. Second, Kahin's critical assertion that US involvement assured that power in South Vietnam "remained in the hands of Vietnamese prepared to act in conformity with U.S. interests" (p. 432) can only be proved by looking at how the government of Nguyen Van Thieu behaved and managed its relationship with Washington in the post-1966 period. In fact, during the period from 1967 to 1975, the Thieu government acted as anything but a compliant client state.

OF ALL THE BOOKS reviewed here, Gabriel Kolko's *Anatomy of a War* is the most comprehensive and the most satisfying. It tells a complete and detailed story of the Vietnam war period. Kolko covers the political, diplomatic, and social origins of the conflict between communist and noncommunist forces in Vietnam, the foreign policy and security considerations that led to the US involvement, the strategy and tactics used by both sides, the key turning points that affected military and diplomatic efforts to end the war, and why those efforts failed.

Unlike the authors of the other books reviewed here, Kolko has a pro-communist bias, which he reveals clearly in the preface:

> *As someone on what one can amorphously call the Left, I have favored autonomous socialist, economic development in the Third World, including Vietnam, and I fully welcomed the Vietnamese Communist Party's success over the French and American alternatives.* (p. xiv)

While holding no brief myself for this point of view, I like the way Kolko has handled it. He tells the story of what happened without letting his ideological preferences drive or obscure the analysis. And of all the books, Kolko's is the only one that tries to put the Vietnam experience into the context of the need to appreciate the enormous force and impact of societal change—whether externally driven or not—on political development. Thus, *Anatomy of a War* will be useful to today's students and new scholars seeking precedents for understanding limited wars and revolutionary struggles taking place now, as well as those that may occur in the future.

Kolko's book also effectively puts the Nixon/Kissinger foreign policy—as well as the relationship between the thinking of the two men—into perspective. Both are portrayed as calculating statesmen—not as amoral monsters—whose ideas about the proper purposes and objectives of American foreign policy were ultimately, but not predictably, undermined by the involvement in Vietnam.

HOW ALL THIS looked on the other side, and from the jungles and cities of Indochina, is the subject of Truong Nhu Tang's *Vietcong Memoir*. But Tang makes it clear that his book is not about events—especially military ones—likely to be recalled by readers today. His is the story, instead, of a "Vietcong urban organizer" who became the minister of justice in a cabinet set up by the South Vietnamese Communists' Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) in 1969, and who later became disillusioned.

It is not obvious at the outset of this autobiography why Tang, a privileged young man from an upper-class family background, would be drawn to the Communist movement in Vietnam. How this happened makes for extraordinarily interesting reading, and this is possibly the best nonfiction work available in English for students interested in understanding how communism, anticolonialism, and nationalism became so closely—and perhaps uniquely—intertwined in the lives of some Vietnamese. Especially fascinating are Tang's accounts of his meetings with Ho Chi Minh and the appeals the communist leader used to create patriots and partisans; of his days as a student in Paris where he gradually awakened to the realization that racial bigotry, poverty, and oppression of one people by another "were not . . . the natural order of the universe" (p. 18); and of the role that youthful rebellion and parents' reactions to it played in forming Tang's character and turning him toward what proved to be a life-long commitment to political agitation against existing authority.

From the outset, the reader also knows where the author stands—he dedicates the book to "betrayed comrades"—and why he feels betrayed. In sharp contrast to most of the leaders of the Viet Cong who, like Mao Zedong, believed that a revolution is "not a dinner party" but an act of violence by which one class overthrows another, Tang believed in "humane" liberation. In retrospect, it appears that the Hue massacres[2] in 1968 were a turning point for Tang. Tang was, he recounts, "upset" by what happened and "not entirely satisfied" by the explanation of it he received "in private" from Huynh Tan Phat, the PRG president. These massacres led Tang to want to assure that revolutionary justice would be fair—and to wonder if the PRG and the authorities in Hanoi were committed to providing it. Tang was also deeply affected by the pervasive anti-Southern bias of "comrades" from the North which, he notes, was often a factor in the incarceration of many of his PRG colleagues. There is thus some insight into the origins of today's Vietnamese gulag where Tang's own brothers have disappeared.

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[2] According to some accounts, thousands of Vietnamese civilians were killed as a result of communist terror after Hue had been captured by the Communists during the Tet offensive in late January 1968. The city was retaken on February 25, after heavy fighting and with high loss of life, by American and South Vietnamese forces. For a thorough discussion of this incident, see Don Oberdorfer, *TET!*, Garden City, NY, Doubleday, 1971.

IN A CERTAIN sense, then, the Vietnamese war has been a nightmarish tragedy for both the victors and the vanquished. But as these books help point out, knowledge of such wars does not automatically prepare foreign policy decision-makers to confront similar challenges in a better way. The sad truth is, given the various interventions in Central America, Southwest Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, that it is not at all clear that policy-makers or scholars in either the United States or the Soviet Union have gleaned any practical lessons about avoiding more Vietnams.

Correspondence

NOTE: Readers are welcome
to comment on matters
discussed in this journal.
Letters should be addressed to
The Editors,
Problems of Communism
US Information Agency,
301 4th Street, SW,
Washington, DC 20547, USA

INTERPRETING HUNGARIAN EVENTS

TO THE EDITORS: I much appreciated Charles Gati's article "Imre Nagy and Moscow, 1953–56" published in the May-June 1986 issue of *Problems of Communism*. I completely agree with almost all the observations and conclusions of the author and consider the article factually very accurate. However, based on my own four years of research into the 1953–58 period in Hungary, I would like to offer alternative interpretations on two matters discussed by Gati.

Nagy's removal in 1955. I think that Imre Nagy's fall from power in early 1955 was, contrary to Gati's assertion, only loosely linked with the fall of Georgiy Malenkov from the Soviet premiership. The central problem that worried the Soviet leaders and that was ultimately at the root of Nagy's ouster was the Conference of the People's Patriotic Front which took place some months earlier in Budapest on October 24–25, 1954. This meeting is accurately described in Tibor Méray's book "Thirteen Days that Shook the Kremlin." As Miklós Vásárhelyi pointed out in a meeting I had with him in Budapest in 1985, the Soviets feared the atmosphere of "nationalistic enthusiasm" that permeated both the Conference and Nagy's introductory speech. They decided that it was too dangerous to have such an autonomous Magyar organization and leadership in a country situated between Austria and Yugoslavia just on the eve of a global settlement with the West in the case of the former (the Austrian Peace Treaty), and of Khrushchev's Canossa journey to Belgrade in the case of the latter. Both events did indeed occur shortly after Nagy's ouster.

Reservations about Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. Gati is not the only one to speak of such opposition. While in Budapest, I heard a rumor according to which Sándor Haraszti had expressed his reservations during the party meeting at which the withdrawal of Hungary from the Warsaw Pact was decided. I also note that, in his autobiographical interview with István Eörsi (the English title is *Record of a Life*), György Lukács wrote that he and Zoltán Szántó not only *spoke* against such a withdrawal, but actually *voted* against it.

However, in the course of my own research, I have found no corroboration of either the rumor or Lukács's claim. Since Lukács, Haraszti, and Szántó had all died, more or less recently, I wrote on this matter to Dr. George Heltai, the former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Imre Nagy cabinet.

In a letter dated Charleston, SC, April 25, 1986, Dr. Heltai replied as follows (excerpts): "I respect Lukács, but I am afraid he always remembered what he wanted to do or say and not what he did say. In the case of the statement abrogating the Warsaw Pact Treaty, neither he nor Szántó raised objections as to its content; their objections were just some remarks about the form of our announcement ('Why do you make it so formal? Can't you talk to Andropov again?' etc.) [So they] did not vote against because votes were not taken. . . . [As for] Haraszti, I never heard any kind of reservation from him; on the contrary, I kept a picture in my mind: Haraszti gesticulating and enthusiastically supporting both proposals [i.e., the declaration of neutrality and the appeal to the United Nations to guarantee that status]."

FEDERIGO ARGENTIERI
Centro studi paesi
socialisti,
Istituto Gramsci
Rome

MR. GATI RESPONDS: I welcome Mr. Argentieri's comments. If the two of us—a prominent Italian scholar associated with the Italian Communist Party and an American scholar priding himself on his "bourgeois-objective" approach to politics—disagree only about such minor issues, then we have indeed come a long way.

1. Concerning Imre Nagy's removal in 1955, we agree on the important point: that the decision was made in and by Moscow. Describing that crucial meeting in the Kremlin on January 7, 1955, I pointed out that the charges against Nagy were made on the basis of his "recent speeches and articles." It may well be that the speech that had particularly angered

the Soviet leadership was Nagy's opening speech to the October 24–25, 1954, Congress of the People's Patriotic Front. On that occasion, Nagy had appealed to *all* Hungarians to help him implement his June 1953 program. Hence, presumably, the charge of "underestimating the party's governing role" and even of "chauvinism."

Was Nagy's subsequent ouster the consequence of this speech and "only loosely linked with the fall" of Malenkov? My view is that it was "hardly accidental," as *Pravda* might have put it, that Malenkov's demotion took place in February and Nagy's at the very beginning of March 1955. More important, a secret Soviet memorandum on the whole affair, sent to several East European parties and cited in my article, implicitly confirmed the link between Malenkov and Nagy. Permit me to quote its key sentence again: "The policy of Malenkov, aside from the harm which it threatened in Soviet domestic matters, concealed serious dangers for the countries of the people's democracies and for the relations of the Soviet Union with these countries, an example of which is the situation in Hungary."

2. Concerning the November 1, 1956, decision of the party's executive committee to withdraw Hungary from the Warsaw Pact, I specifically referred to "reservations" about and not "opposition" to that decision by three of the participants. I added that "the motion easily carried."

As Mr. Argentieri also believes that György Lukács and Zoltán Szántó expressed such reservations, the only issue between us is whether Sándor Haraszti, an ex officio member of the committee as editor of the party daily, did or did not join them. In saying that he did, I relied on the testimony of one of Nagy's closest associates—and one of Mr. Argentieri's two sources—Mr. Miklós Vásárhelyi. In saying that he did not, Mr. Argentieri relies on Professor George Heltai's testimony. Given my complete trust in and tremendous respect for both Messrs. Vásárhelyi and Heltai, which I know Mr. Argentieri shares, we cannot know for sure what Haraszti said at that meeting.

From today's perspective at least, far more telling is the fact that János Kádár did not express any reservations about Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact.

CHARLES GATI
Union College
Schenectady, NY

POLISH LIBERALISM

TO THE EDITORS: On page 48 of Roman Laba's article "Worker Roots of Solidarity" (*Problems of Communism*, July-August 1986), footnote 4 regarding the Polish journal *Respublica* deserves some comment. The author states that *Respublica* "was the most conscious representative of that political trend in Polish intellectual life in the early 1980's which advocated returning to liberal (i.e., Manchester Liberal) 19th-century tenets combined with a belief in elites and the need for their existence and a pessimism concerning the democratic potential of mass societies."

I wish to correct the impression that there have been no other significant representatives of liberal views in Poland in the early 1980's. Specifically, since 1978 "Officyna Liberałow" has been publishing books and brochures advocating the position of the Conservative-Libertarian Movement in favor of a free market. Some of these books were displayed at the 1986 Mt. Pellerin Society's Annual Conference in Italy. We not only advocate, we practice free market solutions. Where many Polish underground publishers print in 200 copies and give them away to foreign correspondents, we sell everything. As editor-in-chief, I am the only person entitled to give something away, and I do so only on very rare occasions. We print in sizable runs—e.g., 17,500 copies of George Orwell's *1984* in Polish. More normally, we print in runs of 3,500–5,000 copies. We normally sell our publications through our own network, and only a small part is sold through Solidarity channels. In addition to "Officyna Liberałow," there are some 15 other neo-liberal underground publishers in Poland.

Respublica has negotiated with the government to obtain legal status. There is nothing wrong in this initiative—the Conservative-Libertarian Movement hopes to do the same. Why the author choses not to identify *Respublica*'s editor, who is widely known in Poland, escapes me, since the name was mentioned by the government spokesman, Jerzy Urban, in a widely circulated account of the negotiations.

I highly appreciate *Respublica*, although only the articles in it by Stepan Kisielewski have been unmistakably in favor of a free market for Poland. But *Respublica* helped break the monopoly of the Left in underground publishing. Moreover, the journal is an extremely valuable ally, enjoying as it does some support from the Catholic Church, which our movement lacks. But when it comes to grass-roots influence, our movement outnumbers the *Respublica* group by as much as 50 or 100 to 1.

Respublica has now entered a new stage. Its position is very delicate, as it is going to be edited under Church auspices. It must also defend itself against Left accusations of being "collaborationist." We shall defend *Respublica* with our means and influence. Please, do not disturb!

The political situation in Poland is very complicated now, running beyond the bounds of the Polish United Workers' Party/Solidarity divide. Indeed, both of these "parties" are amorphous bodies. Both contain diverse factions: socialists, trotskyists, anarchists, communists (yes, in Solidarity, too), social democrats, nationalists, conservatives, liberals, christian-democrats (yes, in the PUWP too). Given this diversity, neither the communists nor Solidarity can have a very specific political program. Both mouth big words like "democracy" and "socialist democracy," or "people's power," which have no concrete meaning. In this context, Solidarity is in a better position: its program has not disappointed the population.

We fear that Solidarity leaders may feel obliged to "do something." They clearly cannot enter the political arena, for lack of a political program. Indeed, to enunciate a political program would disrupt the unity of Solidarity's diverse adherents—and "unity" is a sacred word among the Left, which predominates among Solidarity's leaders. Their only alternative is to organize meetings and demonstrations, with another dose of rhetoric, readily listened to by their supporters. As these words are more convincing than the rhetoric of the government, the latter will once again have them arrested. This is a vicious circle.

We prefer a slow evolution, in which we are sure winners. Time works for us as we propagate our views and win supporters. Revolutions in the streets are not important; it is the revolution in people's minds that counts. Thus we publish—both in the official and in the underground press—with good results.

JANUSZ KORWIN-MIKKE
Conservative-Libertarian Movement
Editor-in-Chief
Officyna Liberałow
Warsaw

JAPANESE CP

TO THE EDITORS: Following publication of my article on the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) in the July-August 1986 issue of *Problems of Communism*, some new information came to light regarding the JCP's recent relations with the Soviet and Chinese parties.

Relations with the Soviet party. It seems that JCP Presidium Chairman Tetsuzo Fuwa's visit to the Soviet Union in August 1986 was somewhat of a disaster for the Japanese party. Upon arrival in Moscow on August 4, the Japanese delegation was told that the meeting had to be postponed for a few days and that in the meantime the Soviet hosts had arranged a Leningrad sightseeing trip. Upon their return to Moscow, the Japanese were told that General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachëv was indisposed and that they would have to meet instead with Yegor Ligachëv.

Prior to his departure for Moscow, Fuwa had mentioned to assembled journalists his intention to bring up at the JCP-CPSU summit the vexing territorial problem (which the Soviets claim does not exist). Obviously, the Soviets decided to punish the JCP for not sticking to the rather restrictive agenda of antinuclear matters agreed upon at the Chernenko-Miyamoto meeting of late 1984.

When the meeting finally took place, a week later (on August 11), inexplicably Gorbachëv appeared, showing no signs of any recent illness. But he looked disinterested in the proceedings and left almost all the talking to Ligachëv and others. No joint statement was issued at the end of the talks. Party boss Kenji Miyamoto was reported furious at Fuwa's amateur diplomatic efforts (see Mizushima Tsuyoshi, "Chairman Fuwa Was Deceived: Gorbachëv's Cold Was a Feigned Illness," *Zembo* [Tokyo], No. 10, October 1986, pp. 18–19).

Relations with the Chinese party. On November 14, 1986, at a press conference in the National Diet building, Fuwa made public a document entitled "The Process of Bilateral Talks Between Japanese and Chinese Communist Parties" (See a summary in *Japan Press Weekly* [Tokyo], No. 1522, Nov. 15, 1986, pp. S/1–6). It is clear from this document that the JCP-CCP talks have reached an impasse.

The Japanese party gave the following details of recent negotiations betwen the two parties and its reasons for the breakdown of the talks. It appears that the Chinese party initiated the exchange in March 1985, and since that time several communications have been exchanged as well as a week of talks in late September 1985. The stumbling block (as discussed in my article) proved to be the unwillingness of the CCP to give up its contacts with pro-Chinese Japanese leftists (mostly former JCP members who were purged from the party), or as the JCP calls them, "anti-party groups and elements used by the CCP leadership at that time as the tools for hegemonist interference, which aimed even at overthrowing the JCP leadership."

The second problem was that although the CCP (1)"expressed pain and regret over the defects and errors committed [during the Cultural Revolution] and the extremely abnormal methods used in dealing with a number of communist parties, including the Japanese Communist Party," (2) used the term "self-criticism," and (3)offered an apology for violence used against two JCP representatives at the Beijing Airport in 1967, the Chinese stopped short of admitting intervention in the affairs of the Japanese party.

The final exchange took place in the form of a brief CCP Central Committee letter dated September 10, 1986, that expressed a "sincere hope to restore relations" but added "that it would be very difficult at present to achieve positive results from meetings between our two parties," and a JCP CC letter of October 24, 1986, which directly led to Fuwa's announcement in mid-November.

Thus, for the moment, it seems that the Chinese party is focusing more on cultivating easier relations with social-democratic and Third World parties, while the Japanese party is sticking to its principles.

There is also a publication that should be added to the table of JCP publications appearing on page 10 of my article: *Sokoku to Gakumon no tame ni* (For the Fatherland and Scholarship)—weekly organ of the All-Japan Federation of Student Self-Governing Bodies (JCP-faction), 18,000 copies. This is referenced on p. 233 of Nihon Seiji Keizai Kenkyujo (Japan Institute for Political and Economic Affairs), *Sayoku Benran—Kenkyu, Chosa, Taisaku no Tebiki* (The Left-Wing Handbook: Research, Surveys, and Policy), Tokyo, August 1986.

PETER BERTON
University of Southern California
Los Angeles

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CORRECTIONS

The photo of the Interfactory Strike Committee meeting at the Lenin Shipyard of Gdansk in August 1980 that appeared on p. 64 of the July-August 1986 issue of *Problems of Communism* should have been credited to Jean Gaumy/MAGNUM.

• • •

In Charles Gati's article "Imre Nagy and Moscow, 1953–56" (*Problems of Communism*, May-June 1986) there was an error at the top of column 2 on page 39. The sentence beginning after footnote reference 25 should read: "They knew that the party would soon call on Nagy, and perhaps on his associates too, to rejoin the regime and thereby help reestablish a measure of stability in the country."

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